Concepts and 'Isms' in PsychologyAuthor(s): Joseph JastrowSource: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 39, No. 1/4 (Dec., 1927), pp. 1-6Published by: University of Illinois PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1415396 .Accessed: 19/06/2011 22:40

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THE AMERICAN

JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY Founded in I887 by G. STANLEY HALL

VOL. XXXIX DECEMBER, 1927 Nos. 1-4

CONCEPTS AND 'ISMS' IN PSYCHOLOGY

By JOSEPH JASTROW, University of Wisconsin

The attention now given to the history of science is in every way commendable. The broadening value for every professional scientist of an acquaintance with the intellectual steps by which his science has come to its present status and recognition, is part of the liberal education of the specialist. It is perhaps particularly important in such a discipline as medicine in which the relation between theory and practice is so variable. Such a history is concrete and full of incidents by reason of that relation. The more abstract disciplines lack this realistic touch, and their history consequently follows the line of doctrine. Still further, doctrine arises from the creative con- tribution of distinctive minds and is likely unduly to carry the im- press of personal attitude rather than the objective stamp of inquiry.

In the case of psychology, its late emancipation from the tutelage of philosophy gives its history an irregular perspective. The earlier attempts to project a history of psychology consisted in little more than selecting the psychological portions of the doctrines of repre- sentative philosophies; it is on the whole definitely creditable to the importance of psychology that so many of the important philoso- phical problems followed what we now recognize as psychological clues. As is usual in such affiliations the dominant party claims the credit. Much of what passes as the history of philosophic doctrine is far more directly a chapter in the antecedents of modern psychology. Once psychology was established in the modern sense, the perspective of its problems appeared clearly; we find that the later histories of psychology take their clue from modern interest, and record the step- by-step contributions, often anticipations, of thinkers primarily in-

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terested in philosophy. The interest and profit in such an undertak- ing appears admirably in the masterly study of Stratton on "Physio- logical Psychology among the Greeks."

As an instance of presenting the distinctive forces that are re- sponsible for the development of psychology, one may cite the division of Dessoir who recognizes the practical interest as "psy- cosophy" (later applied psychology) parallel with the technical in- terest in doctrine, which is 'psychology' in its usual accepted meaning. With doctrine once made prominent, the historical path was inevit- ably that set by the doctrinal survey. We have then such sectional contributions as Warren's of the "History of the Association Psy- chology;" and we have as equally important the historical presenta- tion of selected problems. Roback's recent book on "Character" contains so large a historical material that it may stand as the model of this procedure. We have there presented the successive stages in our knowledge of this important problem. Similarly Wilm has given us a history of the "Theories of Instinct." I mention this in order to make clear that the history of psychology is not a barren subject-that indeed under the impetus of the modern perspective it has grown in significance.

By way of contrast it is rather noteworthy that the study of philosophy, especially as introduced into the college curriculum, has proceeded so generally in terms of an historical outlook. It was true of many courses in philosophy that they were far more courses in the history of philosophy than in philosophy itself. It would almost appear that philosophers were hard put to define the matter of their considerations, and went eagerly to the history to supply their deficiencies. To center the study of philosophy around its history is hardly a warranted pedagogical device. It is certainly in marked con- trast to the procedure in physics and chemistry or biology. Thus with neglect on one side and over-emphasis on the other, the proper placing of the historical aspect is itself an interesting problem.

I find it necessary to present this background for the special con- sideration that I here have in mind, for I wish to raise the question as to the significant and profitable steps in the evolution of psy- chology. Owing to the patterns which were followed, that which was made the center of discussion was a certain system of thought, and this frequently took the name of an 'ism.' So marked is the influence of personality that most of the original 'isms' seem to have been personal ones. We have almost forgotten that Platonism was origin-

CONCEPTS AND "ISMS" IN PSYCHOLOGY 3

ally the body of doctrine set forth by Plato. It has come to mean a certain attitude and interest in large human problems. We forget that Epicurianism meant originally a view on a particular problem held by Epicurus. When a movement took another name such as Stoicism (somewhat accidentally from the place from which the doctrine was originated) we soon forgot its origin, and made it repre- sent a distinctive moral quality, quite as much as a philosophical position. The evolution is complete when we turn to such a word as skepticism which is a true name for a doctrine, or electicism, which equally clearly indicates a desire to take the best out of many systems without over-adherence to any one.

The thesis which I venture to maintain is that so far as the in- terests of modern science, including psychology, go, the whole method of 'isms' is wrongly focused. We suffer from it in the way of confusion and irrelevance and futility of discussion. As a mere label for a particular body of doctrine, it is useful enough. No one would object to associationism as a convenient method of referring to that doctrine; but it clearly represents only a position in regard to the solution of a special problem. It does not mean that an associationist regards every problem in psychology as solved by that method or attitude; if we do we are open to the confusion of the 'ism' fallacy. We have so flagrant a modern example of it that it is at once called to mind. Behaviorism, both as a term and as an 'ism' is an undesirable citizen in the province of psychology. It carries with it just that undesirable implication that if one is a behaviorist, he solves his en- tire set of psychological problems by this attitude. It is again likely to be 'unionized' and applied to the doctrines of one school or one man, thus concealing the far more important factor that there are all sorts of behaviorism, that in some sense every modern psycholo- gist is a behaviorist, though most of them protest emphatically against the appropriation of that term by one group of thinkers who have no proprietary right to it, and who have spoiled the term for most of its useful service.

If by way of contrast we go back to the most momentous shift of scientific interest of modern times, that inaugurated by the doctrine of evolution, one may see the relations more clearly. Perhaps it is a subject for congratulation that no one called it 'evolutionism,' so deadly is the 'ism' implication. We called it Darwinism so far as it indicated the position of Darwin; but 'evolution' is a concept; it is not an 'ism.' My thesis is that science advances profitably and

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significantly in terms of concepts and not in terms of 'isms.' A change in concept, or the introduction of a new concept advances knowledge. Such concepts as evolution, conservation of energy, and such shifts of concept as would be indicated if we should trace the changes in meaning of the term 'instinct,' are the realities that mark the de- velopment of science.

When we refer to the theoretical element in a concept we may call it a theory; but concept is still the better name. Thus we have done well to use the term Freudianism, or Freudism, as little as possible. We present his doctrine in terms of the leading concepts such as the subconscious, suppression, conflict, transfer, regression, and so on. Here, unfortunately, the major application of this group of approaches to psychological problems has introduced a false emphasis. Quite too commonly 'psychoanalysis' has usurped the place which belongs to the total group of concepts which have done so much to quicken psy- chological interest. That they have done so from the study of the abnormal is itself an example of the importance of that concept, which may be stated as the position that normal mental behavior is to be illuminated by many of the concepts that arise out of the study of the abnormal. It would be as unfortunate as misleading if this notion were called 'abnormalism.' So, similarly, the illumination of the entire mental domain from the genetic approach is one of the fertile concepts of modern psychology. Though without sharp boundaries the introduction of the genetic view functions as a con- cept. It indicates the profitable lines of advance.

Equally characteristic are the shifts in the meaning of concept with the change of name. Such is the concept of 'intelligence,' its rich addition of connotation when it was brought in line with the concept of arrest, thus combining the genetic concept of stages of growth with the increasing complexity of logical processes; all this establishes the value of the concept.

I may pass with a brief mention the most unfortunate tendency of the 'isms' in psychology or elsewhere, namely that when that direction of adherence is followed, it results not in a science, but in a cult. Here the error is flagrant and commonly understood. Cults are devoted to 'isms.' Too many represent a peculiarity of an individual, as when Fletcherism was the exaggerated adherence of Mr. Fletcher to excessive mastication in the maintenance of health. It was equally clear that homeopathy, which began with the peculiar notions of Hahnemann, soon became a cult, deriving its name from its

CONCEPTS AND "ISMS IN PSYCHOLOGY 5

doctrine homeopathy, or like cures like. Science has remained scien- tific because it has avoided the extreme danger of cults. The 'ism' is the clear invitation and temptation of the cultist.

In the present contribution I have set myself the simple task of calling attention to what seems to me a very important distinction. It is peculiarly important in psychology that we should avoid the emphasis on 'isms' and develop the importance of concepts. The reason why the history of philosophy is so full of futile controversies is that it is divided into schools, which are institutions for the propa- ganda of a cult, in many cases a legitimate body of adherents to a doctrine. But the irrelevance of 'schools' appears when we consider that they do occupy the same field or share the same interests. There is no alternative or choice between them, for frequently they have no prominent common element. This brings me to my concluding point; namely, that the history of science must take account of the shift of interest, as well as of theory and fact and method. Many doctrines formerly held have not been disproved, but just outgrown-dis- carded with the wane of interest. We have simply moved cultural miles away from any interest in them. We all know the stock illus- tration of 'scholasticism'-the discussion of the problem of how many angels can dance on the end of a needle. But there is no greater incongruity of terms in this than in any other problem which has passed the way of all knowledge, and ceased to interest when once the newer concepts have prepared the way for a different perspective as well as a new enlightenment. There have been revolutions and reformations in doctrines; and these have always followed the recon- struction of values, reshaping of interests, so that the old problems lost not what validity they may have had, but lost any hold on the actual intellectual interests of the day. 'Modernism,' if we must call it such, represents a perspective of interest, a mode of approach, as well as access to a substantial body of doctrine.

My plea is accordingly that in the pursuit of psychology we drop the outgrown and barren interest in 'isms,' and substitute the living and profitable interest in concepts. We need this in psychology more than in the other sciences for many reasons. First, because its pro- cedure is less well established, and secondly because the laboratory or investigative method is new, and still presents not merely an advance in method, but a choice of problems to which that method may be profitably applied. Furthermore, we are under the temptation of pushing a profitable idea to an unprofitable extent. There is no

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question that the concept of a 'glandular psychology' is legitimate for the body of facts which show that glands exert a vital influence on behavior. We can secure its value by incorporating it into the con- cept of behavior. But if we attempt to explain the entire differences of personality from that approach, we may end in a glandular cult. Once more, we still are under the influence of 'schools.' We like to classify and place people in terms of their doctrines and to the neglect of their interests. The history of psychology that is to be written, would, as I see it, follow the suggestive line of concepts, and indicate how from age to age as interest changed, as knowledge advanced, newer concepts were needed, would express and give point to the shift of doctrines, to the growth of insight. The historical approach offers an interesting opportunity to set in order the right relation of con- cepts and 'isms.' But the distinction is equally important in the guidance of the profitable developments of the future. There are many signs at hand in science in general and in psychology in particu- lar, that we are ready for this correction of the fundamentals of our science.