James Berlin__Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class_WEEK 2

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Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing ClassAuthor(s): James BerlinSource: College English, Vol. 50, No. 5 (Sep., 1988), pp. 477-494Published by: National Council of Teachers of EnglishStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/377477 .

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James Berlin

R h e t o r i c a n d I d e o l o g y in t h e W r it in gC l a s s

The questionof ideology has never been far from discussionsof writing nstruc-

tion in the modernAmericancollege. It is true that some rhetoricshave deniedtheirimbricationn ideology, doingso in the nameof a disinterestedscientism-

as seen, for example, in various manifestationsof current-traditionalhetoric.Most, however, have acknowledged he role of rhetoric n addressingcompetingdiscursiveclaimsof value in the social, political,and cultural.This was particu-

larly evident duringthe sixties and seventies, for example, as the writingclass-

room became one of the public arenas for consideringsuch stronglycontested

issues as Vietnam,civil rights,andeconomicequality.Morerecentlythe discus-

sion of the relation between ideology and rhetoric has taken a new turn. Ide-

ology is here foregroundedand problematizedin a way that situates rhetoricwithinideology, ratherthanideology within rhetoric.In otherwords, instead of

rhetoricactingas the transcendental ecorderor arbiterof competing deologicalclaims, rhetoric is regardedas always alreadyideological.This position meansthat any examinationof a rhetoricmust first considerthe ways its very discur-sive structurecan be read so as to favor one version of economic, social, and

politicalarrangements ver otherversions. A rhetoricthen considerscompetingclaims in these three realms from an ideologicalperspectivemadepossible both

by its constitutionandby its application-the dialectical nteractionbetween therhetoric as text and the interpretivepractices brought o it. A rhetoriccan neverbe innocent, can never be a disinterested arbiter of the ideological claims ofothers because it is always alreadyservingcertainideologicalclaims. This per-

spective on ideology andrhetoricwill be discussedin greaterdetail later. Here Imerelywish to note that it has been forwardedmost recently by such figuresasPatricia Bizzell, David Bartholomae, Greg Myers, Victor Vitanza, and JohnSchilb andJohnClifford.I have also calleduponit in my monographon writinginstruction n twentieth-centuryAmericancolleges. I would like to bringthe dis-cussion I beganthere up to date, focusingon ideologyin the three rhetoricsthathave emergedas most conspicuousin classroompractices today:the rhetoricsof

James Berlin is professor of English at Purdue University. He is the author of WritingInstruction in

Nineteenth-Century American Colleges and Rhetoric and Reality: WritingInstruction in American

Colleges, 1900-1985, both published by Southern Illinois University Press. He would like to thank John

Mcevoy of the University of Cincinnati and Janet Atwill of Purdue for commenting on earlier versions ofthis essay.

CollegeEnglish,Volume50, Number5, September1988

477



478 College English

cognitive psychology, of expressionism, and of a category I will call social-

epistemic.Each of these rhetoricsoccupies a distinctpositionin its relation to ideology.

From the perspectiveoffered here, the rhetoric of cognitivepsychology refusesthe ideologicalquestionaltogether,claiming or itself the transcendentneutralityof science. This rhetoric s nonethelesseasily preemptedby a particulardeologi-cal position now in ascendancybecause it encouragesdiscursivepractices thatare compatible with dominanteconomic, social, and political formations. Ex-

pressionistic rhetoric,on the otherhand,has alwaysopenlyadmitted ts ideolog-ical predilections, opposing itself in no uncertain terms to the scientism ofcurrent-traditionalhetoricandthe ideologyit encourages.This rhetoric s, how-

ever, open to appropriation y the very forces it opposes in contradiction o itsbest intentions.

Social-epistemicrhetoric s an alternative hatis

self-consciouslyaware of its ideologicalstand,making he very questionof ideologythe center ofclassroom activities, and in so doingproviding tself a defense againstpreemp-tion anda strategyfor self-criticismand self-correction.Thisthirdrhetoric s theone I am forwardinghere, and it providesthe groundof my critiqueof its altern-atives. In other words, I am arguingfrom ideology, contending that no otherkindof argument s possible-a positionthatmust firstbe explained.

Ideology is a term of great instability.This is true whether it is taken up bythe Left or Right-as demonstrated, or example,by RaymondWilliams n Key-words andMarxismand Literatureand by JorgeLarrain n TheConcept of Ide-

ology. It is thus necessary to indicate at the outset the formulation hat will befollowed in a given discussion. Here I will rely on Goran Therborn'susage inThe Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology. Therborn, a Marxist so-

ciologist at the Universityof Lund, Sweden, calls on the discussionof ideologyfound in Louis Althusser and on the discussion of power in Michel Foucault. Ihave chosen Therborn'sadaptationof Althusserratherthan Althusserhimselfbecause Therbornso effectively countersthe ideology-sciencedistinctionof his

source, a stance in whichideology is always false consciousness while a particu-larversion of Marxism s defined as its scientificalternative n possession of ob-

jective truth.For Therborn,no positioncan lay claim to absolute, timelesstruth,

because finallyall formulationsare historically specific, arisingout of the mate-rial conditions of a particular ime and place. Choices in the economic, social,

political, and culturalare thus always based on discursivepracticesthat are in-

terpretations,not meretranscriptionsof some external,verifiablecertainty.Thechoice for Therborn hen is never between scientifictruthand ideology, but be-tween competing deologies, competingdiscursiveinterpretations.Finally,Ther-borncalls uponFoucault's"micropoliticsof power" (7)withoutplacingsubjectswithina seamless web of inescapable,whollydeterminativepowerrelations.For

Therborn,powercan be identifiedandresistedin a meaningfulway.Therbornoffers an especially valuablediscussionfor rhetoriciansbecause of

his emphasison the discursive and dialogicnatureof ideology. In other words,Therborn nsists that ideology is transmitted hrough anguagepracticesthat are

alwaysthe center of conflictandcontest:



Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class 479

Theoperationf ideologyn humanifebasicallynvolves he constitutionndpat-terningof howhumanbeings ive their ives as conscious,reflectingnitiators factsina structured,meaningfulorld. deology perates s discourse, ddressing

or,as Althusser uts t, interpellatinguman eingsassubjects.15)Conceived from the perspective of rhetoric, ideology provides the languagetodefine the subject(the self), other subjects, the materialworld, and the relationof all of these to each other. Ideologyis thus inscribed n languagepractices,en-

teringall features of our experience.Ideology for Therborn addresses three questions: "What exists? What is

good? What is possible?" The first deals with epistemology, as Therbornex-

plains: "what exists, and its corollary,whatdoes not exist: thatis, who we are,whatthe worldis, whatnature,society, men and women are like. In this way we

acquirea sense ofidentity,becoming

conscious of what is realandtrue;the vis-

ibilityof the world is therebystructuredby the distributionof spotlights,shad-

ows, anddarkness." Ideologythus interpellates he subjectin a manner hatde-termines what is real and what is illusory, and, most important, what is

experiencedandwhatremainsoutside the field of phenomenological xperience,regardless of its actual materialexistence. Ideology also provides the subjectwith standards or makingethical and aesthetic decisions: "what is good, right,just, beautiful,attractive,enjoyable, and its opposites. In this way our desiresbecome structuredand normalized."Ideology provides the structureof desire,indicatingwhat we will long for and pursue. Finally, ideology defines the limits

of expectation:"what is possible and impossible;our sense of the mutabilityofour being-in-the-worldand the consequences of change are hereby patterned,and our hopes, ambitions, and fears given shape" (18). This last is especiallyimportantsince recognitionof the existence of a condition(poverty, for exam-

ple) and the desire for its changewill go for nothing f ideology indicatesthat a

changeis simplynot possible (thepoorwe have alwayswith us). In otherwords,this last mode of interpellations especially implicated n power relationships na groupor society, in decidingwho has power and in determiningwhat powercan be expected to achieve.

Ideology always carries with it strong social endorsement, so that what we

take to exist, to have value, and to be possible seems necessary, normalandin-evitable-in the nature of things. Ideology also, as we have seen, always in-cludes conceptionsof how power should-again, in the natureof things-be dis-tributed n a society. Power here means politicalforce but covers as well socialforces in everyday contacts. Power is an intrinsicpartof ideology, defined andreinforcedby it, determining,once again,who can act and what can be accom-

plished. These power relationships, urthermore,are inscribed in the discursivepracticesof daily experience-in the ways we use languageand are used (inter-pellated)by it in ordinaryparlance. Finally, it shouldbe noted that ideology is

always pluralistic,a given historicalmomentdisplayinga variety of competing

ideologies and a given individual reflecting one or another permutation of theseconflicts, although the overall effect of these permutations tends to support the

hegemony of the dominant class.



480 College English

CognitiveRhetoric

Cognitive rhetoric might be considered the heir apparent of current-traditional

rhetoric, the rhetoric that appeared in conjunction with the new American uni-versity system during the final quarter of the last century. As Richard Ohmann

has recently reminded us, this university was a response to the vagaries of com-

petitive capitalism, the recurrent cycles of boom and bust that characterized the

nineteenth-century economy. The university was an important part of the strat-

egy to control this economic instability. Its role was to provide a center for ex-

perts engaging in "scientific" research designed to establish a body of knowl-

edge that would rationalize all features of production, making it more efficient,more manageable, and, of course, more profitable. These experts were also

charged with preparing the managers who were to take this new body of prac-tical knowledge into the marketplace. The old nineteenth-century college had

prepared an elite to assume its rightful place of leadership in church and state.

The economic ideal outside the college was entirely separate, finding its fulfill-

ment in the self-made, upwardly mobile entrepreneur who strikes it rich. The ac-

ademic and the economic remained divided and discrete. In the new university,the two were joined as the path to success became a university degree in one of

the new scientific specialities proven to be profitable in the world of industryand commerce. The new middle class of certified meritocrats had arrived. As I

have indicated in my monograph on the nineteenth century, current-traditional

rhetoric with its positivistic epistemology, its pretensions to scientific precision,and its managerial orientation was thoroughly compatible with the mission of

this university.

Cognitive rhetoric has made similar claims to being scientific, although the

method called upon is usually grounded in cognitive psychology. Janet Emig'sThe Composing Process of Twelfth Graders (1971), for example, attempted an

empirical examination of the way students compose, calling on the developmen-tal psychology of Jean Piaget in guiding her observations. In studying the cog-nitive skills observed in the composing behavior of twelve high school students,

Emig was convinced that she could arrive at an understanding of the entire rhe-

torical context-the role of reality, audience, purpose, and even language in thecomposing act. Richard Larson was equally ambitious as throughout the seven-

ties he called upon the developmental scheme of Jerome Bruner (as well as other

psychologists) in proposing a problem-solving approach to writing, once again

focusing on cognitive structures in arriving at an understanding of how collegestudents compose. James Moffett and James Britton used a similar approach in

dealing with the writing of students in grade school. For cognitive rhetoric, the

structures of the mind correspond in perfect harmony with the structures of the

material world, the minds of the audience, and the units of language (see my

Rhetoric and Reality for a fuller discussion of this history). This school has been

the strongest proponent of addressing the "process" rather than the "product"of writing in the classroom-although other theories have also supported this

position even as they put forward a different process. Today the cognitivistscontinue to be a strong force in composition studies. The leading experimental




research in this area is found in the work of Linda Flower and John Hayes, and Iwould like to focus the discussion of the relation of ideology and cognitive rhet-oric on their contribution.

There is no question that Flower considers her work to fall within the domainof science, admitting her debt to cognitive psychology (Hayes' area of spe-cialization), which she describes as "a young field-a reaction, in part, against

assumptions of behaviorism" (Problem-Solving vii). Her statements about the

composing process of writing, furthermore, are based on empirical findings, on"data-based" study, specifically the analysis of protocols recording the writingchoices of both experienced and inexperienced writers. This empirical study hasrevealed to Flower and Hayes-as reported in "A Cognitive Process Theory of

Writing"-that there are three elements involved in composing: the task en-

vironment, including such external constraints as the rhetorical problem and thetext so far produced; the writer's long-term memory, that is, the knowledge ofthe subject considered and the knowledge of how to write; and the writing pro-cesses that go on in the writer's mind. This last is, of course, of central impor-tance to them, based as it is on the invariable structures of the mind that operatein a rational, although not totally predictable, way.

The mental processes of writing fall into three stages: the planning stage, fur-ther divided into generating, organizing, and goal setting; the translating stage,the point at which thoughts are put into words; and the reviewing stage, made upof evaluating and revising. This process is hierarchical, meaning that "compo-

nents of the process [are] imbedded within other components" ("A CognitiveProcess" 375), and it is recursive, the stages repeating themselves, although inno predetermined order. In other words, the elements of the process can beidentified and their functions described, but the order of their operation will varyfrom task to task and from individual to individual, even though the practices of

good writers will be very similar to each other (for a rich critique, see Bizzell).The "keystone" of the cognitive process theory, Flower and Hayes explain, isthe discovery that writing is a goal-directed process: "In the act of composing,writers create a hierarchical network of goals and these in turn guide the writingprocess." Because of this goal directedness, the protocols of good writers exam-

ined consistently "reveal a coherent underlying structure" ("A Cognitive Pro-cess" 377).

It is clear from this brief description that Flower and Hayes focus on the indi-vidual mind, finding in the protocol reports evidence of cognitive structures in

operation. Writing becomes, as Flower's textbook indicates, just another in-stance of "problem-solving processes people use every day," most importantlythe processes of experts, such as "master chess players, inventors, successful

scientists, business managers, and artists" (Problem-Solving 2-3). Flower's text-book says little about artists, however, focusing instead on "real-world" writ-

ing. She has accordingly called upon the help of a colleague from the School of

Industrial Management (vi), and she includes a concern for consulting reportsand proposals as well as ordinary academic research reports-"the real world of

college and work" (4). This focus on the professional activity of experts is al-ways conceived in personal and managerial terms: "In brief, the goal of this



482 College English

book is to help you gain more control of your own composing process: to be-come more efficientas a writerand more effective with your readers"(2). Andthe emphasisis on self-madegoals, "on yourown goals as a writer,on whatyouwant to do andsay" (3).

As I said at the outset, the rhetoricof cognitivepsychologyrefuses the ideo-

logical question, restingsecure instead in its scientific examinationof the com-

posing process. It is possible, however, to see this rhetoricas being eminentlysuited to appropriationby the proponents of a particular deological stance, astance consistent with the moderncollege's commitment o preparing tudentsfor the world of corporate capitalism.And as we have seen above, the profes-sional orientation of Problem-Solving Strategies for Writing-its preoccupationwith "analyticalwriting"(4) in the "real world"of experts-renders it especial-

ly opento this

appropriation.For cognitive rhetoric, the real is the rational. As we observed above, forFlower and Hayes the most importantfeatures of composing are those whichcan be analyzed into discrete units and expressed in linear, hierarchical erms,however unpredictably ecursive these termsmay be. The mind s regardedas aset of structures that performs in a rational manner, adjustingand reorderingfunctions in the service of the goals of the individual.The goals themselves areconsidered unexceptionally apparent n the very nature of things, immediatelyidentifiableas worthyof pursuit.Nowhere, for example, do Flower and Hayesquestionthe worthof the goals pursuedby the manager,scientist,or writer. The

business of cognitive psychology is to enable us to learn to thinkin a way thatwill realize goals, not deliberate about their value: "I have assumedthat, what-ever your goals, you are interestedin discoveringbetterways to achieve them"

(Problem-Solving 1). The world is correspondingly structuredto foregroundgoals inherentlyworth pursuing-whether these are privateor professional, in

writingor in work. And the mind is happilystructured o perceive these goalsand, thanks to the propercognitive developmentof the observer-usually anex-

pert-to attain them. Obstacles to achieving these goals are labelled "prob-lems," disruptions n the naturalorder,impediments hat must be removed.The

strategies to resolve these problemsare called "heuristics," discovery proce-

dures that "are the heart of problemsolving" (36).Significantly, hese heuristicsare not themselves rational,are not linear and predictable-"they do not comewith a guarantee"(37). They appearnormallyas unconscious,intuitiveprocess-es that problemsolvers use without realizingit, but even when formulated orconscious applicationthey are never foolproof. Heuristicsare only as good orbad as the person using them, so thatproblemsolvingis finallythe act of an in-dividualperformingn isolation, solitaryand alone(see Brodkey).As Flowerex-

plains: "Good writers not only have a largerepertoryof powerfulstrategies,but

they have sufficient self-awarenessof theirown process to drawon these alter-

native techniquesas they need them. In other words, they guide theirown cre-

ative process" (37). The community addressed enters the process only after

problems are analyzed and solved, at which time the concern is "adapting your

writing to the needs of the reader" (1). Furthermore, although the heuristics

used in problem solving are not themselves rational, the discoveries made




throughthem always conform to the mensurablenature of reality, displaying"an underlyinghierarchicalorganization" 10)thatreflects the rationalityof theworld. Finally, language s regardedas a system of rationalsigns that is compati-ble with the mind and the externalworld, enablingthe "translating"or "trans-forming"of the non-verbal ntellectualoperations nto the verbal. Thereis thusa beneficent correspondencebetween the structuresof the mind, the structuresof the world, the structuresof the mindsof the audience, and the structuresof

language.This entire scheme can be seen as analogousto the instrumentalmethodof

the modern corporation, the place where members of the meritocraticmiddle

class, the twenty percentor so of the work force of certifiedcollege graduates,make a handsome ivingmanaginga capitalisteconomy (see Braverman,ch. 18).Their work life is

designedto turn

goal-seekingand

problem-solvingbehavior

into profits. As we have seen in Flower, the rationalizationof the writingpro-cess is specificallydesignatedan extensionof the rationalization f economicac-

tivity. The pursuitof self-evident andunquestionedgoals in the composing pro-cess parallelsthe pursuitof self-evident andunquestionedprofit-makingoals inthe corporate marketplace: "whatever your goals are, you are interested in

achievingbetter ways to achieve them" (Problem-Solving12). The purposeof

writing s to create a commodified ext (see Clines)thatbelongsto the individualand has exchangevalue-"problem solvingturnscomposing nto a goal-directedjourney-writing my way to where I want to be" (4)-just as the end of corpor-

ate activityis to create a privately-ownedprofit.Furthermore,while all problemsolvers use heuristic procedures-whether in solving hierarchicallyconceived

writing problemsor hierarchicallyconceived managementproblems-some arebetter at using them than are others. These individuals inevitably distinguishthemselves, rise up the corporate adder,and leave the less competentand less

competitivebehind. The class system is thus validatedsince it is clear that the

rationalityof the universe is morereadilydetectedby a certaingroupof individ-uals. Cognitive psychologists specializingin childhooddevelopmentcan evenisolate the environmental features of the children who will become excellent

problemsolvers, those destined to earn the highest gradesin school, the highest

college entrance scores, and, finally, the highest salaries. Middle class parentsare thus led to beginthe cultivationof theirchildren'scognitiveskillsas soon as

possible-even in utero-and of course there are no shortageof expert-designedcommodities that can be purchased to aid in the activity. That the cognitiveskills leadingto success maybe the productof the experiencesof a particular o-cial class ratherthanthe perfectingof inherentmentalstructures,skills encour-

aged because they serve the interests of a rulingeconomicelite, is never consid-ered in the "scientific" investigationof the mind.

Cognitiverhetoriccan be seen from this perspective as compatiblewith the

ideology of the meritocratic university described in Bowles and Gintis' School-

ing in Capitalist America. Power in this system is relegated to university-certified experts, those individuals who have the cognitive skills and the trainingfor problem solving. Since social, political, and cultural problems are, like the

ecomomic, the result of failures in rational goal-seeking behavior, these same ex-



484 College English

perts are the best preparedto address these matters as well. Furthermore, he

agreementof experts in addressingcommonly-sharedproblems n the economicandpoliticalarenasis additionalconfirmationof theirclaimto power:all trained

observers, after all, come to the same conclusions. Once again, the possibilitythat this consensus about whatis good andpossible is a productof class interestand class experience is never seriously entertained.Cognitiverhetoric,then, inits refusal of the ideologicalquestion leaves itself open to association with thereificationof technocratic science characteristicof late capitalism,as discussed,for example, by Georg Lukaics,Herbert Marcuse, and JiirgenHabermas(seeLarrain,ch. 6). Certainstructuresof the materialworld,the mind,andlanguage,and theircorrespondencewith certaingoals, problem-solvingheuristics,and so-lutions in the economic, social, andpoliticalare regardedas inherent eaturesof

the universe, existing apartfrom human social intervention.The existent, the

good, and the possible are inscribedin the very natureof thingsas indisputablescientific facts, rather than being seen as humanlydevised social constructions

always remainingopen to discussion.

ExpressionisticRhetoric

Expressionisticrhetoricdeveloped duringthe first two decades of the twentieth

centuryandwas especiallyprominentafter WorldWarI. Its earliestpredecessorwas the elitist rhetoricof liberalculture,a scheme arguing or writingas a gift of

genius, an art accessible only to a few, and then requiring ears of literarystudy.In expressionisticrhetoric,this gift is democratized,writingbecomingan art of

which all arecapable.This rhetorichasusuallybeen closely alliedwiththeoriesof

psychology that arguedfor the inherentgoodness of the individual,a goodnessdistortedby excessive contact with others in groupsand institutions.In this it is

the descendantof Rousseau on the one hand and of the romanticrecoil fromthe

urbanhorrorscreatedby nineteenth-century apitalismon the other. Left to our

own devices, thispositionmaintains,eachof us wouldgrowand mature n harmo-

ny. Unfortunately,hardlyanyoneis allowedthis uninhibiteddevelopment,andso

the fallen state of society is both the cause and the effect of its own distortion,as

well as the corrupterof its individualmembers.In the twenties, a bowdlerizedversion of Freudwas called uponin supportof this conceptionof humannature.

Morerecently-during the sixties and after-the theoriesof such figuresas Carl

Rogers,AbrahamMaslow,EricFromm,and even CarlJunghave been invoked n

its support.(Fora fullerdiscussionof the historyandcharacterof expressionisticrhetoric offered here, see my "ContemporaryComposition,"and Rhetoricand

Reality 43-46, 73-81, 159-65).For this rhetoric,the existentis locatedwithinthe individual ubject.Whilethe

realityof the material, he social, and the linguisticareneverdenied,they arecon-

sideredsignificantonly insofaras they serve the needsof the individual.All fulfill

their true function only when being exploited in the interests of locating the indi-vidual's authentic nature. Writing can be seen as a paradigmatic instance of this

activity. It is an art, a creative act in which the process-the discovery of the true

self-is as important as the product-the self discovered and expressed. The indi-




vidual's use of the not-self in discoveringthe self takes place in a specific way.The materialworldprovidessensory imagesthat can be used in orderto explorethe self, the sensations eadingto theapprehending-sourcef allexperience.More

important, hese sense impressionscanbe coupledwithlanguage o providemeta-

phorsto express the experienceof the self, anexperiencewhichtranscendsordi-

narynon-metaphoric anguagebut can be suggestedthroughoriginal iguresand

tropes. This original anguage n turn can be studiedby othersto understand he

self andcaneven awaken n readers he experienceof theirselves. Authenticself-

expression can thus lead to authenticself-experience or both the writer andthe

reader.Themostimportantmeasureof authenticity,of genuineself-discoveryand

self-revelation,furthermore,s the presenceof originality n expression;andthis

is the case whetherthe writer s creatingpoetryor writinga businessreport.Dis-

coveringthe true self in

writingwill

simultaneouslyenablethe individual o dis-

cover the truthof the situationwhich evokedthewriting,a situation hat,needless

to say, mustalwaysbe compatiblewith the developmentof theself, and this leadsto the ideologicaldimensionof the scheme.

Most proponentsof expressionisticrhetoricduringthe sixties and seventies

were unsparinglycriticalof the dominantsocial, political,and culturalpracticesof the time. The most extremeof these critics demanded hat the writingclass-

room work explicitly towardliberatingstudentsfrom the shackles of a corrupt

society. This is seen most vividly in the effort known as "compositionas hap-

pening." Fromthis perspective,the alienatingandfragmenting xperienceof the

authoritariannstitutional ettingcan be resistedby providingstudentswith con-crete experiences that alter political consciousness throughchallengingofficial

versions of reality. Writing n responseto such activitiesas makingcollagesand

sculptures, listeningto the same piece of music in differentsettings, and engag-

ing in randomand irrationalacts in the classroomwas to enable studentsto ex-

perience "structure n unstructure;a randomseries of orderedevents; orderin

chaos; the logical illogicalityof dreams" (Lutz 35). The aim was to encouragestudents to resist the "interpretations f experienceembodied n the languageofothers [so as] to order their own experience" (Paulland Kligerman150).Thismore extreme form of politicalactivismin the classroomwas harshlycriticized

by the moderatewing of the expressionistcamp, and it is this groupthat even-tually became dominant.The names of Ken Macrorie,WalkerGibson, William

Coles, Jr., DonaldMurray,and Peter Elbow were the most visible in this coun-ter effort. Significantly,these figures continuedthe ideologicalcritiqueof thedominantculture while avoidingthe overt politicizingof the classroom. In dis-

cussing the ideological position they encouraged, a position that continues tocharacterize hemtoday, I will focus on the work of MurrayandElbow, both ofwhomexplicitlyaddress the politicalin theirwork.

Fromthis perspective, power withinsociety ought always to be vested in the

individual. In Elbow, for example, power is an abiding concern-apparent in the

title to his recent textbook (Writing With Power), as well as in the opening

pledge of his first to help students become "less helpless, both personally and

politically" by enabling them to get "control over words" (Writing Without

Teachers vii). This power is consistently defined in personal terms: "power



486 College English

comes fromthe words somehowfittingthe writer not necessarlythe reader) ..power comes from the words somehow fitting what they are about" (WritingWithPower 280). Power is a productof a configurationnvolvingthe individual

andher encounterwiththe world,andfor bothMurrayandElbowthis is a func-tion of realizingone's uniquevoice. Murray'sdiscussion of the place of politicsin the classroom is appropriatelytitled "Finding Your Own Voice: TeachingCompositionin an Age of Dissent," and Elbow emphasizes, "If I want power,I've got to use myvoice" (EmbracingContraries202).Thisfocus on the individ-ual does not mean thatno community s to be encouraged,as expressionistsre-

peatedly acknowledge that communal arrangementsmust be made, that, inElbow's words, "the less acceptable hungerfor participationand mergingismet" (98). The community's right to exist, however, stands only insofar as itserves all of its membersas individuals.It is, afterall, only the individual,

actingalone and apartfromothers, who can determinethe existent, the good, and the

possible. For Murray,the student "must hear the contradictorycounsel of his

readers, so that he learnswhen to ignorehis teachers and his peers, listeningtohimself after evaluating what has been said about his writingand consideringwhat he can do to make it work" ("Finding Your Own Voice" 144-45). For

Elbow, the audience can be used to help improve our writing, but "the goalshould be to move toward the condition where we don't necessarilyneed it inorderto speak or write well." Since audiences can also inhibitus, Elbow con-

tinues, "we need to learnto writewhat is true and what needs sayingeven if the

whole world is scandalized.We need to learneventuallyto find in ourselves thesupport which-perhaps for a long time-we must seek openly from others"

(Writing WithPower 190).

Thus, political changecan only be consideredby individualsand in individualterms. Elbow, for example, praisesFreire's focus on the individual n seekingthecontradictionsof experiencein the classroombut refusesto take into accountthesocialdimensionof thispedagogy,finally usingFreire'sthoughtas an occasionfor

arrivingat a personalrealizationof a "psychologicalcontradiction,not an eco-nomic one or politicalone," at the core of ourculture(EmbracingContraries98).The underlyingconviction of expressionistsis that when individualsare spared

the distortingeffects of a repressivesocialorder,theirprivatelydetermined ruthswill correspond o the privatelydetermined ruthsof all others:my best anddeep-est vision supportsthe same universaland external aws as everyone else's bestand deepest vision. Thus, in WritingWithoutTeachers Elbow admits that his

knowledgeabout writingwas gatheredprimarily rom personalexperience, andthathe has no reservationsabout "makinguniversalgeneralizationsupona sam-

ple of one" (16). Murrayis even more explicit in his first edition of A WriterTeaches Writing:"the writer s on a search for himself.If he findshimself he willfind anaudience,because allof us havethe same commoncore. Andwhen he digsdeeply into himselfand is able to definehimself,he will find otherswho will read

with a shock of recognition what he has written" (4).This rhetoric thus includes a denunciation of economic, political, and social

pressures to conform-to engage in various forms of corporate-sponsoredthought, feeling, and behavior. In indirectly but unmistakably decrying the de-




humanizingeffects of industrial apitalism,expressionisticrhetoric nsistson de-

familiarizing xperience, on getting beyond the corruptionsof the individualau-thorized by the languageof commodifiedculturein order to re-experiencethe

self and throughit the externalworld, finding.n this activity possibilitiesfor anew order. For expressionisticrhetoric, the correct response to the impositionof currenteconomic, political,and social arrangementss thus resistance, but aresistance that is always construed in individual terms. Collective retaliation

poses as muchof a threat to individual ntegrityas do the collective forces beingresisted, and so is itself suspect. The only hope in a society workingto destroythe uniqueness of the individual is for each of us to assert our individualityagainst the tyrannyof the authoritarian orporation,state, and society. Strat-

egies for doingso mustof course be left to the individual,each lightingone smallcandle in orderto create a brighterworld.

Expressionisticrhetoriccontinues to thrivein highschools and at a numberof

colleges anduniversities.At firstglance, this is surprising,unexpectedof a rhet-oricthat is openlyopposedto establishmentpractices.Thissubversiveness,how-ever, is moreapparent han real. In the first place, expressionisticrhetoric s in-

herentlyand debilitatinglydivisive of political protest, suggestingthat effectiveresistance can only be offeredby individuals,each actingalone. Given the isola-tion andincoherenceof suchprotest, gestures genuinelythreateningo the estab-lishmentaredifficult o accomplish.Beyondthis, expressionisticrhetoric s easilyco-opted by the very capitalistforces it opposes. After all, this rhetoriccan be

used to reinforce the entrepreneurialvirtues capitalismmost values: individu-alism,privateinitiative,the confidence forrisktaking,the rightto be contentiouswithauthority especiallythe state).It is indeednot too muchto saythat therulingelites in business, industry,andgovernmentarethose mostlikelyto nodinassentto the ideologyinscribed nexpressionisticrhetoric.Themembersof thisclass seetheirlives as embodyingthe creative realizationof the self, exploitingthe mate-rial, social, andpoliticalconditionsof the world inorderto asserta privatevision,a visionwhich,despiteits uniqueness,finallyrepresentshumankind's est nature.

(Thatthis vision in fact representsthe interestsof a particular lass, not all class-es, is of course not acknowledged.)Those who have not attained the positions

whichenablethemto exert this freedom have been prevented romdoingso, thisideologyargues, not by economicandclass constraints,butby theirown unwill-

ingness to pursuea privatevision, and this interpretations often embracedbythose excluded fromthe rulingelite as well as by the rulingelite itself. In otherwords, even those most constrainedby theirpositionsin the class structuremaysupportthe ideologyfound in expressionisticrhetoric n some form.This is most

commonlydoneby divorcing he self fromthealienationof work,separatingwork

experiencefromotherexperienceso thatself discoveryand fulfillment akeplaceaway from thejob. For some this may lead to the pursuitof self expression inintellectual or aesthetic pursuits. For most this quest results in a variety of forms

of consumer behavior, identifying individual self expression with the consumptionof some commodity. This separation of work from authentic human activity islikewise reinforced in expressionistic rhetoric, as a glance at any of the textbooksit has inspired will reveal.



488 College English

Social-EpistemicRhetoric

The last rhetoricto be consideredI will call social-epistemicrhetoric, n so doing

distinguishingt from the psychological-epistemic hetoricthat I am convincedisa form of expressionism. (The latter is found in Kenneth Dowst and in CyrilKnoblauchand Lil Brannon,althoughKnoblauch'srecent CollegeEnglishessay

displays him moving into the social camp. I have discussed the notion of epis-temic rhetoric and these two varieties of it in Rhetoric and Reality 145-55,

165-77, and 184-85.) There have been a number of spokespersons for social-

epistemicrhetoricover the last twenty years:KennethBurke,RichardOhmann,the team of RichardYoung, Alton Becker and KennethPike, KennethBruffee,W. Ross Winterowd, Ann Berthoff, Janice Lauer, and, more recently, Karen

Burke Lefever, Lester Faigley, David Bartholomae, Greg Myers, Patricia

Bizzell, and others. In groupingthese figures togetherI do not intend to denytheirobvious disagreementswith each other. For example,Myers,a Leftist, hasoffered a lengthy critiqueof Bruffee, who-along with Winterowdand Young,Becker and Pike-is certainly of the Center politically. There are indeed as

many conflicts amongthe members of this groupas there are harmonies.Theyare brought ogetherhere, however, because they sharea notionof rhetoricas a

political act involvinga dialectical interactionengagingthe material,the social,and the individualwriter,with languageas the agency of mediation.Theirposi-tions, furthermore, nclude an historicistorientation,the realization hat a rhet-

oric is an historicallyspecific social formationthat must perforcechange overtime;and this feature in turn makespossiblereflexivenessand revisionas the in-

herently ideological nature of rhetoric is continuallyacknowledged.The most

complete realization of this rhetoric for the classroom is to be found in Ira

Shor's Critical Teaching and Everyday Life. Before considering it, I would like

to discuss the distinguishing eatures of a fully articulatedsocial-epistemicrhet-

oric.For social-epistemicrhetoric,the real is located in a relationship hat involves

the dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse community (social

group)in which the observer is functioning,andthe materialconditionsof exist-

ence. Knowledgeis never foundin any one of these but can only be positedas aproductof the dialectic in which all three come together.(Moreof this in a mo-

ment.) Most important, his dialectic is grounded n language: he observer, the

discourse community, and the material conditions of existence are all verbal

constructs. This does not mean that the three do not exist apartfromlanguage:they do. This does mean that we cannot talkand write aboutthem-indeed, we

cannot know them-apart from language.Furthermore,since languageis a so-cial phenomenonthat is a productof a particularhistoricalmoment,our notions

of the observingself, the communities n which the self functions,and the verystructuresof the materialworldare social constructions--allspecificto a partic-

ular time and culture. These social constructions are thus inscribed in the verylanguage we are given to inhabit in responding to our experience. Language, as

Raymond Williams explains in an application of Bakhtin (Marxism and Liter-

ature 21-44), is one of the material and social conditions involved in producing a




culture. This means that in studyingrhetoric-the ways discourseis generated-we are studyingthe ways in whichknowledgecomes into existence. Knowledge,afterall, is an historicallyboundsocial fabricationrather hanan eternal and in-

variablephenomenon ocated in some uncomplicated epository-in the materialobject or in the subjector in the social realm.This bringsus back to the matterof the dialectic.

Understanding his dialectical notion of knowledgeis the most difficultfea-ture of social-epistemic rhetoric. Psychological-epistemic rhetoricgrantsthatrhetoric arrives at knowledge,but this meaning-generatingctivityis always lo-cated in a transcendent self, a subject who directs the discovery and arrives

through t finallyonly at a betterunderstanding f the self and its operation-thisself comprehensionbeing the end of all knowledge. For social-epistemicrhet-

oric, thesubject

is itself a social construct thatemerges through

the lin-

guistically-circumscribednteractionof the individual,the community,and thematerialworld. There is no universal, eternal,and authenticself that beneathall

appearances s at one with all otherselves. The self is alwaysa creation of a par-ticularhistorical and culturalmoment.This is not to say that individualsdo notever act as individuals. It is to assert, however, that they never act with com-

plete freedom. As Marx indicated, we make our own histories,but we do notmake themjust as we wish. Ourconsciousness is in largeparta productof ourmaterialconditions. But our materialconditionsare also in partthe productsofour consciousness. Both consciousness and the materialconditions influence

each other, and they are both imbricated n social relationsdefinedandworkedout through anguage.In otherwords, the ways in which the subjectunderstandsand is affectedby materialconditions is circumscribedby socially-deviseddefi-

nitions, by the community n which the subjectlives. The community n turnisinfluencedby the subjectand the materialconditionsof the moment.Thus, the

perceivingsubject,the discoursecommunitiesof which the subjectis a part,andthe materialworld itself are all the constructionsof an historicaldiscourse, ofthe ideologicalformulations nscribed n the language-mediatedracticalactivityof a particulartime and place. We are lodged within a hermeneuticcircle, al-

thoughnot one that is impervious o change.

This scheme does not leadto an anarchisticrelativism.It does, however, indi-cate that argumentsbased on the permanentrationalstructuresof the universeor on the evidence of the deepest and most profoundpersonalintuition shouldnot be accepted without question. The material,the social, and the subjectiveare at once the producersand the productsof ideology, and ideologymust con-

tinuallybe challengedso as to reveal its economicandpoliticalconsequencesforindividuals. In other words, what are the effects of our knowledge?Who bene-fits from a given version of truth?How are the materialbenefits of society dis-tributed?Whatis the relationof this distribution o social relations?Do these re-lations encourage conflict? To whom does our knowledge designate power? In

short, social-epistemic rhetoric views knowledge as an arena of ideological con-flict: there are no arguments from transcendent truth since all arguments arise in

ideology. It thus inevitably supports economic, social, political, and cultural de-

mocracy. Because there are no "natural laws" or "universal truths" that indi-



490 College English

cate what exists, what is good, what is possible, and how power is to be dis-

tributed, no class or group or individual has privilegedaccess to decisions onthese matters.They must be continuallydecidedby all and for all in a way ap-

propriate o our own historicalmoment.Finally,becauseof this historicistorien-tation, social-epistemicrhetoric contains within it the means for self-criticismand self-revision. Humanresponses to the materialconditionsof existence, thesocial relationsthey encourage, and the interpellationsof subjectswithin themare always alreadyideological, are always alreadyinterpretationshat must be

constantlyrevised in the interestsof the greaterparticipation f all, for the great-er good of all. And this of course implies an awareness of the ways in whichrhetoricscan privilegesome at the expense of others, according he chosen fewan unequalshare of power, perquisites,andmaterialbenefits.

Social-epistemicrhetoric thus offers an explicit critiqueof economic, politi-cal, and social arrangements,he counterpartof the implicitcritique oundin ex-

pressionistic rhetoric. However, here the source and the solution of these ar-

rangementsare describedquite differently.As Ira Shor explains, studentsmustbe taughtto identifythe ways in which control over theirown lives has been de-nied them, anddenied in such a way thatthey have blamed themselvesfor their

powerlessness. Shorthus situatesthe individualwithin social processes, examin-

ing in detail the interferencesto criticalthoughtthatwould enable "studentstobe their own agentsfor social change, theirown creatorsof democraticculture"

(48). Among the most important orces preventingwork towarda social order

supporting he student's "full humanity"are forms of false consciousness-re-ification, pre-scientific thought, acceleration,mystification-and the absence ofdemocraticpractices in all areas of experience. AlthoughShor discusses these

forms of false consciousness in their relationto workingclass students,theirap-

plication to all students is not hard to see, and I have selected for emphasisthose featureswhichclearlyso apply.

In fallingvictim to reification,studentsbegin to see the economic and social

system thatrendersthempowerlessas an innateandunchangeableeatureof the

naturalorder. They become convinced that changeis impossible,and they sup-

port the very practices that victimize them-complying in their alienationfrom

theirwork, theirpeers, and theirvery selves. The most commonformof reifica-tion has to do with the preoccupation with consumerism, playing the game of

materialacquisitionand using it as a substitutefor more self-fulfillingbehavior.

In pre-scientificthinking,the studentis led to believe in a fixed humannature,

always andeverywherethe same. Behavior thatis sociallyand self destructive sthen seen as inevitable,in the natureof things, or can be resistedonly at the in-dividual level, apart from communal activity. Another form of pre-scientificthinking is the belief in luck, in pure chance, as the source of social arrange-ments, such as the inequitable distribution of wealth. The loyalty to brand

names, the faith in a "common sense" that supportsthe existingorder,and the

worship of heroes, such as actors and athletes, are other forms of this kind ofthought, all of which prevent "the search for rational explanations to authentic

problems" (66). Acceleration refers to the pace of everyday experience-the

sensory bombardment of urban life and of popular forms of entertainment-




which prevents criticalreflection. Mystificationsare responses to the problemsof a capitalistsociety which obscure their real sources and solutions,responsesbased on racism, sexism, nationalism,and other forms of bigotry. Finally, stu-

dents are constantlytold they live in the most free, most democraticsociety inthe world, yet they are at the same time systematicallydeniedopportunities or

"self-discipline, self-organization, ollective work styles, or groupdeliberation"(70), instead being subjectedat every turn to arbitraryauthority n conducting

everyday affairs.Shor's recommendations or the classroomgrowout of an awarenessof these

forces and are intendedto counterthem. The objectof this pedagogy s to enablestudents to "extraordinarily reexperience the ordinary" (93), as they criticallyexamine their quotidianexperience in order to externalizefalse consciousness.

(Shor'suse of the term"critical"is meant to recallFreireas well as the practiceof the HegelianMarxistsof the FrankfurtSchool.) The pointis to "addressself-

in-society and social-relations-in-self" (95). The self then is regardedas the

productof a dialecticalrelationshipbetween the individualand the social, each

given significanceby the other. Self-autonomyand self-fulfillment re thus pos-sible not throughbecomingdetached fromthe social, but throughresistingthosesocial influences that alienate and disempower, doing so, moreover, in and

throughsocial activity. The liberatoryclassroombegins this resistanceprocesswith a dialogue that inspires "a democratic model of social relations, used to

problematize the undemocratic quality of social life" (95). This dialogue-a

model inspiredby PauloFreire-makes teacherand learnerequals engagedin ajoint practice that is "[l]oving, humble,hopeful, trusting,critical"(95). This iscontrasted with the unequalpower relations in the authoritarianclassroom, a

place where the teacherholds all powerandknowledgeandthe student s the re-

ceptacle into which information s poured, a classroom that is "[l]oveless, ar-

rogant,hopeless, mistrustful,acritical"(95). Teacher and student worktogetherto shape the content of the liberatoryclassroom, and this includescreatingthematerialsof study in the class-such as textbooks and media. Most important,the studentsare to undergoa conversion from "manipulated bjects into active,critical subjects" (97), thereby empoweringthem to become agents of social

change ratherthan victims. Shor sums up these elements: "social practice isstudied in the name of freedom for critical consciousness; democracy andawarenessdevelop through he form of dialogue;dialogueexternalizes alse con-

sciousness, changing students from re-active objects into society-makingsub-

jects; the object-subjectswitch is a social psychologyfor empowerment;powerthroughstudycreatesthe conditionsfor reconstructing ocialpractice"(98).

This approach n the classroom requires nterdisciplinarymethods, and Shor

gives an example from the study of the fast-food hamburger:"Concretely myclass' study of hamburgersnot only involved Englishandphilosophy n ouruseof writing, reading, and conceptual analysis, but it also included economics in

the study of the commodity relations which bring hamburgers to market, historyand sociology in an assessment of what the everyday diet was like prior to therise of the hamburger, and health science in terms of the nutritional value of the

ruling burger" (114). This interdisciplinary approach to the study of the re-



492 College English

productionof social life can also lead to "the unveilingof hidden social history"(115),the discoveryof past attemptsto resist self-destructiveexperience.This inturn can lead to an examinationof the roots of sexism andracismin our culture.

Finally, Shor calls upon comedy to reunitepleasureandwork, thoughtand feel-ing, and upon a resourceful use of the space of the classroom to encouragedi-

aloguethat provides students with informationwithheld elsewhere on campus-"informational,conceptual, personal, academic, financial"(120)-ranging fromthe location of free or inexpensiveservices to the locationof politicalrallies.

This survey of the theory and practiceof Ira Shor's classroomis necessarilybrief andreductive.Still, it suggeststhe complexityof the behaviorrecommendedin the classroom, behavior that is always open-ended, receptive to the unex-

pected, andsubversive of the planned.Mostimportant, uccess in this classroomcan never by guaranteed.This is a place based on dialectical collaboration-theinteractionof student, teacher, and sharedexperiencewithina social, interdisci-

plinary ramework-and theoutcomeis alwaysunpredictable.Yet, as Shormakes

clear, the pointof this classroomis that the liberatedconsciousnessof students sthe only educational objective worth considering, the only objective worth therisk of failure.To succeedat anythingelse is no success at all.

It should now be apparentthat a way of teaching is never innocent. Everypedagogy is imbricated n ideology, in a set of tacit assumptionsabout what is

real, what is good, what is possible, and how power oughtto be distributed.Themethod of cognitive psychology is the most likely to ignore this contention,

claimingthat the rhetoricit recommends s based on an objectiveunderstandingof the unchanging structures of mind, matter, and language. Still, despite its

commitment to the empiricaland scientific, as we have seen, this rhetoriccan

easily be made to serve specific kinds of economic, social, andpoliticalbehavior

that works to the advantage of the members of one social class while disem-

powering others-doing so, moreover, in the name of objective truth. Ex-

pressionisticrhetoric s intendedto serve as a critiqueof the ideologyof corpor-ate capitalism, proposing in its place an ideology based on a radical

individualism.In the name of empoweringthe individual,however, its naivetyabout economic, social, and political arrangements an lead to the marginalizing

of the individualswho would resist a dehumanizing ociety, rendering heminef-fective throughtheir isolation. This rhetoric also is easily co-optedby the agen-cies of corporate capitalism, appropriatedand distorted in the service of the

mystificationsof bourgeois individualism.Social-epistemicrhetoricattemptsto

place the questionof ideology at the center of the teachingof writing.It offersboth a detailedanalysisof dehumanizing ocial experienceanda self-criticaland

overtly historicized alternativebased on democraticpracticesin the economic,

social, political,and culturalspheres. It is obvious thatI find this alternative he

most worthy of emulation n the classroom, all the while admitting hat it is the

least formulaicand the most difficult to carry out. I would also add that even

those who are skeptical of the Marxian influence found in my description of thisrhetoric have much to learn from it. As Kenneth Burke has shown, one does not

have to accept the Marxian promise in order to realize the value of the Marxian

diagnosis (Rhetoric of Motives 109). It is likewise not necessary to accept the




conclusions of Ira Shor aboutwriting pedagogyin orderto learnfromhis analy-sis of the ideological practicesat work in the lives of our studentsandourselves.A rhetoriccannotescape the ideologicalquestion,andto ignorethis is to fail our

responsibilitiesas teachersand as citizens.

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