Jacob Kijne Presentation

Jacob W. Kijne

Water Management Consultant

20 September 2012

Sharing Water: Water Allocation, Water Quality and Conflict Management

In early August 2012, BBC World News and other news agencies reported that half of the counties in the USA (in 35 states) had been declared disaster areas because of drought. USDA had said that yields, especially corn (maize) and soya were badly affected. Since then there have been headlines in the news papers about the higher food prices to come. Droughts here and in many other countries, as well as floods in Burma and Niger, are the background for this discussion about water sharing and water conflicts. A motto for this discussion might be: “There is a sufficiency in the world for man’s need but not for man’s greed” (as said by Mahatma Gandhi).

Quoted on 2012 page 259 of Gustaf Olsson’s new book ‘Water and Energy: threats and opportunities’. IWA Publishing.

Introduction

Some twenty years ago, Ismail Serageldin, then Vice-President of the World Bank, and Chairman of the CGIAR, said that ‘the wars of the next generation will be about water’. At about the same time, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a similar statement. Perhaps it is no coincidence that both gentlemen are from Egypt, a country that depends entirely on Nile river water, a source that could easily be cut off by upstream countries such as Ethiopia, with its population of more than 80 million people and still growing, or Sudan.

Introduction

This essay starts with a discussion of the water war argument, followed by some data on different types of water conflicts, and their number reported in the past. Then there follows a brief review of incentives to cooperate rather than to enter into a dispute. The process of water conflict management and its key issues are discussed before concluding with an analysis of whether the history of conflicts can be seen as a predictor of what the future will bring.

Introduction

But first a word about terminology: the terms transboundary and international waters need clarification. Generally, the term ‘international waters’ refers to those waters that cross boundaries of two or more countries, while ‘transboundary water’ is a more inclusive term that refers to waters crossing any jurisdictional or sectoral boundaries, including those within countries. The terms conflict and dispute also have distinct meanings in the literature. A ‘conflict’ involves two or more parties with one of them disagreeing on a change in water use by one of the other parties, with the disagreement leading to violence of some kind. A ‘dispute’ is a conflict that results in non-violent tensions among parties, including political, legal, or economic actions.

Introduction

The competition for water is becoming stronger every year because of increased food and biofuel needs for a growing world population, aggravated by changing eating patterns, greater demands for water from urban centers for drinking water and sanitation and also from industrial and economic development, and finally as a result of changing rainfall and runoff patterns due to climate change. The causes of conflicts include both hydrological factors and the social and economic needs of riparian states, but also the need for changes in water use, e.g. arising from economic development. The critical issues in conflict management to be discussed later are of course linked to the causes of conflict.

The water war arguement

Some scientific papers point to water not only as a cause of historic armed conflict but also as the resource that will bring soldiers to the battlefield in this 21st century. Invariably, water wars are mentioned in the context of the arid and hostile Middle East where the situation is rapidly getting worse with a diminished flow in the River Jordan and a much lower water level in the Dead Sea. The basic arguments for ‘water wars’ therefore are:

(1) water scarcity in arid and semi-arid regions that leads to immense political pressures;

(2) water ignoring political boundaries; and

(3) the fact that international water law is poorly developed and hard to enforce, complicating water conflict management.


On the legal aspects, the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Commission, which took 27 years to develop, reflects the difficulty of matching legal and hydrological realities. The Convention, based on the Helsinki Rules (1966), provides important principles for cooperation, such as ‘equitable use’ and the ‘obligation not to cause appreciable harm’. The Convention, however, provides little practical guidelines for water allocation, the most common cause of conflict. International laws are concerned with the rights and responsibilities of nations; as a result that some non-national political entities, such as the Palestinians along the Jordan River and the Kurds along the Euphrates, cannot claim water rights in international courts.


Globally, nearly half of the total land area is found in international basins; for Africa, the percentage is as high as 62%. There are about 270 international river basins and more than half of the world’s population lives in transboundary basins (Gleick, 2012).

Water conflicts have been reported since people first started to leave written records. The Atlas of Water (Black and King, 2012) counts a total of 816 conflicts between 1948 and 2008, half of which were about the allocation of water. Other sources present slightly different data (Gleick, 2012; Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009). Additional causes of conflict cited by these authors include water resources being used as weapons or targets during military action. In terrorism the action is caused by non-state actors; such actors may use water resources as targets or tools of violence and coercion. In development disputes the harm can be done by state or non-state actors.

Data on transboundary river basins, conflicts and agreements

Data show an increase in water disputes over time. This increase may partly be explained by better reporting and the globalization of news. Since the end of WWII, all regional wars and conflicts, such as those in the Balkans and Central Africa, have resulted in water-related harm. The effects in these two areas reflects one of the most important changes in the nature of conflicts over the last several decades – the growing severity and intensity of local and sub-national conflicts, and the relative decrease of conflicts at the international level (Gleick, ibid). A growing number of these disputes over water allocations across local boundaries, ethnic boundaries, or between economic groups have escalated into conflicts.


An early example of a terrorist-cum-development-related conflict happened from 1907 till 1913 in the Owen’s Valley of California. The Los Angeles aqueduct/pipeline suffered repeated bombings in efforts by the affected people in the Valley to prevent diversions of water from the Owen Valley to Los Angeles.

Another well-known development conflict resulted from the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan over the waters of the Indus River. This was not resolved until 1960 with the Indus Water Agreement, reached through World Bank intervention, involving the construction of a number of large link canals to bring water from the Indian side of the new border to Pakistan.


An example of a conflict in which water was used as a political tool occurred in 1998 in Angola. Fierce fighting broke out at the Gove dam on the Kunune River as UNITA and Angola government forces battled for control of the installation.

A recent example of a development conflict occurred in 2006 in Ethiopia. At least 12 people died and more than one hundred were wounded in clashes over competition for water and pasture in the Somali border area.

The ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is an example of a political conflict. In the West Bank, it is mainly caused by competition for water supplies, with Israel getting more than three quarters of the supply, including water for the controversial settlements in the West Bank.


At the same time as this increasing number of disputes and conflicts, there are many examples of peaceful resolutions. The Atlas of Water (2012) reports a total of 1743 cooperative events between 1948 and 2008. Delli Priscoli and Wolf (2009) report the number of international water treaties from 1888 till 2000 as 62. Most of the treaties specify boundaries and indicate some limits on the use of surface water. Only nine of the 62 treaties deal specifically with groundwater regulations, including allocation, quality and protection of the land. About 25 include some conditions on groundwater management, but not on water allocation, while an equal number mention water quality only indirectly.


Although the exact number of disputes and treaties may not be known, it is evident from the data that there are more cooperative events than conflicts. It should also be realized that treaties seldom clearly define water allocations and limits on water quality. Moreover enforcement mechanisms on water quality are often absent, especially in international basin agreements. Thus, although helpful, the mere presence of a treaty does not automatically translate into behavior altering cooperation (Warner and Zawahri, 2012)


Cooperation among riparian countries is becoming imperative as pressure on the water resource increases. In March 2012 in Marseilles, at the initiative of the International Network of Basin Organizations, some 69 basin organizations in Africa, America, Asia, and Europe signed ‘The World Pact for Better Basin Management’. They expressed their intention – among other things – to improve water governance in their basins, organize dialogues with stakeholders, facilitate agreements on a ‘shared vision of the future of the basin’, develop action and investment plans that meet the economic, social and environmental priorities of the basins, and organize in each basin a harmonized data base as part of an integrated information system.

Incentives to cooperate

Although important, these agreements do not include a methodology for dealing with disputes or conflicts. A case in point is the Mekong River basin. There is a long history of international cooperation under the Mekong River Committee and the Mekong River Commission, established in 1957. This Commission is made up of representatives of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. In December 2011, the Commission urged for a second time that approval be withheld for the construction of a potentially devastating dam at Xayaburi in northern Laos until more is known about its effect on the Lower Mekong (Economist, May 5th 2012). Apart from high up in the gorges of south-western China, the Mekong remains undammed.


But now a Thai construction company has been contracted to build the dam, and apparently 5000 workers have been hired. Two countries, Laos and Thailand, are expected to share the power to be generated at the dam. The news that the dam will be built has triggered an angry response from the other riparian neighbors. The December agreement, calling for further environmental studies, included Laos. Opponents of the dam argue that the Xayabury dam will adversely affect the livelihood of 65 million people in South-East Asia who depend on fishery for their sustenance. In fact, the Mekong Agreement of 1995 requires the four nations to consult and respect their neighbors’ concerns but leaves the final decision to each sovereign state.


Interesting in this context is a 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice in a decision on a dispute about water pollution from paper mills between Argentina and Uruguay which states that Environmental Impact Assessment is an essential requirement of customary international law and diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm and its notification are required not just between states that have concluded international agreements (McIntyre, 2011). The international Court of Justice has also stipulated that the principle of equitable utilization should be seen as a process rather than a normative determinative rule.


Under ideal circumstances striving for equity and preventing harm would be strong incentives for collaboration between neighboring countries. However, rarely are the potential partners in collaboration equal partners in power. A review of the treaties from the past half century reveals an overall lack of robustness (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.). Nevertheless, on the positive side, in some of the more recent treaties, there has been a broadening in the definition and measurement of basin benefits, with the intention to equitably allocate the benefits derived from the use of water, not the amount of water itself. One example is the 1961 Columbia River Treaty, in which the US paid Canada for the benefits of flood control and Canada was granted rights to divert water between the Colombia and Kootenai Rivers for hydropower generation.

Equity versus efficiency

Some scientists support the introduction of ‘efficiency’ rather than ‘equity’ into water conflict management, where ‘efficiency’ is defined as the allocation of water to its highest use. ‘Highest use’ may be illustrated by the following example. There is much variation in current water demands for producing 1 kg of corn: in the USA it is 0.57 m3, in India 3.05 m3, and in Nigeria 5.34 m3. This is an example of inefficient water use in India and Nigeria. Water sharing should take into consideration the possibility of increasing the overall efficiency of water utilization by reallocating the water according to these values. But different water users, for example domestic water users versus users of golf courses, along a watercourse may value water differently.


The logical extension of this efficiency concept is the so-called ‘virtual’ water, i.e. the water required to produce specific goods and services. Some argue that the virtual water trade will become increasingly important as nations or regions experience water scarcity and then desire to mitigate the economic and political impacts of the internal water shortage by importing food. This can only work if nations in water-scarce regions have the hard currency to buy the food they need on the world market and are willing to forgo food self-sufficiency in their staple food crops. To complicate this issue: water-poor countries often export fruits and other high value crops to water-rich countries as these crops cannot be grown in the importing country for climatic reasons or can be produced much more cheaply in the exporting country. Trade should be beneficial to both the exporter and importer. The assumption that nations are willing to depend for their staple crops on import from elsewhere is doubtful, especially when world market prices of agricultural products are volatile as a result of drought in the main production areas.


Procedures for collaboration and dispute management range from initiatives taken by the conflicting parties themselves towards increased participation and interventions by third parties. The most far-reaching type of outside intervention is third-party decision making. Unassisted conflict management procedures include conciliation, information exchange, collaborative problem solving and negotiations. Assistance by others could consist of help in relationship building, such as counseling, team building, and procedural assistance (i.e. coaching, facilitation and mediation), as well as more substantive assistance through technical advisory boards, dispute panels, fact finding, and advisory mediation. Third- party intervention could be nonbinding or binding arbitration and mediation, and judging. A critical tipping point is reached when the power to resolve the dispute moves from the parties in dispute into the hands of an outside party. With third party decision-making, the primary communication pattern is between parties and the arbiter or the panel charged with the decision making (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).

Possible procedures for successful water conflict management

The extensive literature on dispute management shows a trend toward procedures of assisted dispute resolution but without the third-party making the decision. In the USA, the growing experience of litigation or threat of litigation when a third party made the decision, acts as an incentive to move away from third-party involvement. Reviews of international mediations describe similar experiences. Procedures with minimal assistance allow the parties in dispute more control over the outcome. Some reviewers suggest that disputes with a third-party decision have limited capacity to deal with the multiple parties and issues that characterize water disputes. Yet expert panels or commissions have been common in the water resources field. For example, there are technical committees on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Indus and other rivers. Technical committees have also been central to the work of a variety of river basin commissions in the USA and Canada.

Possible procedures for successful water conflict management

Many disputes, such as upstream-downstream conflicts, start as zero-sum confrontations where one party’s loss is another’s gain. As the adversarial stage plays out, negotiations can shift from rights (what a party feels it is entitled to) to needs (what is actually needed to fulfill its goals). At the same time, the attention shifts from past to future. The next stage – if all goes well – is usually a move towards more cooperative solutions which entail the desire to increase the benefits of the resource throughout the basin. This is often called ‘expanding the pie’, meaning no longer conceiving the situation as a zero-sum argument. The most successful cases of building regional approaches to water have gone beyond seeing water as the end to recognizing it as a means to achieve other goals such as socio-economic development or reducing the risks of floods or drought. The last stage is agreeing on the sustainable implementation of an action plan in which the benefits are distributed fairly equitably among the parties. Needless to say, this is a very brief summary of what is usually a complicated and time-consuming process which is often characterized by one step forward and two steps back (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, ibid.).

Stages in water conflict management

The interesting studies by Professor Lynn of the Department of Agricultural Economics at University of Nebraska, Lincoln, (UNL) should be mentioned in this context. He and his co-workers (Sheeder and Lynn, 2011) studied farmers’ motivation to engage in conservation tillage in the upstream area of the Blue River/Turtle Creek watershed on the border between Nebraska and Kansas. Runoff from irrigated fields of upstream farmers contributes to the pollution of the lake which is the source of drinking water for the downstream people. Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been concerned about downstream water users’ lack of access to clean water. To reduce water pollution from agricultural runoff, conservation measures are stimulated by payments. Three groups of people were identified in the study area: upstream farmers, downstream water users and people who were both upstream farmers and downstream water users.


The researchers analyzed the sense of empathy (thinking yourself in the shoes of others) of those in each group. The key finding from their research is that increasing conservation payments is not likely to be cost-effective on their own for addressing pollution problems. Individuals may ultimately make choices based on empathy/sympathy. A strong feeling of empathy leads to a sense of a shared interest in enhanced water quality and diminishes the more primal tendency to maximize profits. They conclude that water policy and educational programs need to pay attention on how to induce, and otherwise ’nudge’, empathy. A key question in conflict management is indeed how to stimulate this feeling of empathy for the other party in the conflict.


Power often plays an important role in water disputes. Unequal power relationships, without a robust third-party involvement, can create strong disincentives for cooperation. A strong regional economic entity can provide support when issues arise between basin states, as was the case with the Central Asian Economic Community in disputes around the Aral Sea. This was also the role of the World Bank (especially of its president Eugene Black) with the World Bank’s positive, active and continuous involvement in the India-Pakistan water treaty after partition in 1947. Note that the World Bank was also the donor facilitating the solution in this conflict. It has been recognized that in particularly hot conflicts, when political concerns override the water issues, a sub-optimal solution may be the best that can be achieved.

Critical issues in conflict management

Sometimes separating resource issues from political interest may not be productive. Involvement of a non-riparian, regional power may then be important. A case in point was the role of Egypt in conflicts about the water of the Jordan River. Elsewhere, solving political and resource use disputes was accomplished in two mutually reinforcing tracks (also in the Middle East). A special type of unequal power occurs in disputes between Mexico and USA in the use of water from a shared aquifer when federal and state governments hold different opinions and thus impede cooperation (Delli Priscoli and Wolf, 2009).


Upstream-downstream power. Equitable agreements are hard to reach when one riparian country holds most geographic and military power. Examples include disputes between Turkey and Iraq and Syria over the water allocation from Tigris and Euphrates, and also with respect to the Salween River, with China as the upstream power, and Burma and Thailand downstream.


The water disputes between Turkey and Iraq and Syria have been studied in detail (Warner, 2012, and Warner and Zawahri, 2012). Turkey is clearly the dominant power (hegemony) in this situation, while Syria and Iraq complained but had little choice but to accept the fact that Turkey was building dams and the remaining flow in the two rivers would be much reduced. Turkey needed the water for the development of the South East, the Greater Anatolia Project (GAP), including hydropower and irrigation of 2 million ha. Gradually, Turkey started to frame the right to water as a security issue. Presenting policy issues as a security issue (‘securitization’) has been done by many countries and is often a potent way of rallying a political constituency behind a policy. Securitization involves presenting a threat as a life and death concern legitimizing extraordinary measures, such as top-down decision-making and classifying information.


[On May 9, 2012, Mario Otero, Under-secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, in the State Department (USA) commented that “if left unaddressed, water challenges worldwide will pose a threat to US security interests”.]

The political situation in the area changed with the US occupation of Iraq, Syria’s support for Kurdish fighters, privatization of Turkey’s water sector and the outcome of the World Commission on Dams (FAO and World Bank, 2000). Turkey at the time wanted to construct the Ilisu dam close to the border with Syria. The downstream water users objected as they feared for their own water supplies; the river shows large variability in its flow. American Society of Agronomy CSA News September 2012, page 20.


The need to find international funding for the construction of the Ilisu dam alerted national and international NGO’s to the destruction of heritage sites below the reservoir, the environmental impact of the dam and the inevitable resettlement issues. As a result of international pressure, the donor countries and banks withdrew their support which led to long delays. Yet, in 2005 Turkey revised the project. More protests followed but the construction has now started with completion expected in 2015.

This brief discussion of power and power distribution shows the complexity of the various roles played by domestic and international political players, and the limited validity of the secularization attempted by Turkey.


Data. Data collection and sharing is essential before an agreement can be reached or construction takes place. But parties in developing countries often disagree about the validity of the collected data, especially on the ecological impacts and development projections. Requesting increasingly detailed data clarifications is often used as a delaying tactic. Agreement on the minimum data necessary for a solution can be a first step in establishing trust, and if that is not possible delegating data gathering to a third party may speed up negotiations.


Benefits. All the water resources in the relevant domain of the parties in conflict need to be included in the water management programs and strategy. Ignoring the link between quantity and quality, and between surface water and groundwater ignores the hydrologic reality. What is needed is Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM; see Lenton and Muller, 2009), which is difficult to realize. In all disputes, but especially between nations with unequal power all economic benefits from a possible agreement between parties should be considered.


Several important trends of the recent past could raise the likelihood of water disputes in the future. These are population growth and the associated increased demand for food, biofuel and meat, urbanization, economic development, the associated energy and industrial water demands, and climate change. These challenges are closely interlinked. For example, Vaux (2004) argued with great clarity that water scarcity will constrain the extent to which we are able to provide adequate water and sanitation services to most of the world’s population. The notion that water for domestic purposes is of such high value and clear priority that it takes precedence over other uses, cannot be maintained. There are no well-functioning markets which respond to relative values to ensure that water is allocated to uses with the highest values.

Forecasting the future from past trends

Communities in both dry and humid areas struggle to obtain the water supplies needed to support existing and anticipated population and economic growth. The need to maintain sustainable ground water resources, the maintenance and improvement of water quality and the need to feed a more populous world will compete in part with the need for water that should be allocated to sanitation and drinking water supplies for poor people. Alleviating ground water overdraft by importing additional surface water supplies is becoming less viable as surface water becomes fully appropriated (Vaux, ibid.). Increasing energy supplies in countries with frequent power cuts require large amounts of water; energy from biomass and oil need most. A case in point is South Africa, one of several countries that are both water- and energy-scarce, and where much needed water is diverted to coal-fired power plants with SO2 scrubbers. See also Olsson (2012).


To make matters worse, there are concerns about the implications for transboundary waters arising from the rapid increase in acquisition and leasing of large areas of agricultural land by others countries and investors. Since 2000, more than 1000 of such deals have been made, involving a land area of about half the size of Europe, 40 percent of which is in Africa (230 Mha, according to a recent report from Kings College, London). In Mali 100,000 ha of land previously cultivated by small family farmers was last year allocated to investors for large-scale farming. The process has largely bypassed the official procedures established by the Office du Niger at regional scale. Negotiations are done behind closed doors and water is often presumed to be included without it explicitly being mentioned in the land lease agreements.


Large scale farming for the production of sugarcane or palm oil (perennial crops), and double cropping require more water than was used by the family farmers in the past. Local farmers often have no legal ownership of their land or the water they use. In dry seasons of deficit years the water supply in the Niger River is not adequate to meet this increased demand. The Niger Basin Authority has put restrictions on the flow of water that Niger is allowed to divert upstream of the Markala dam, in order to maintain a significant downstream flow for fishing and ecological reasons. A recent special issue of Water Alternatives (Mehta et al., 2012) reports several similar cases.


Unfortunately, as the SIWI report (Jägerkog et al, 2012) points out, the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments agreed by FAO, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the UN conference on Trade and Development, and the World Bank do not explicitly mention water. Is the acquisition of land in a developing country land grabbing or a normal business transaction? It should be recognized that large-scale investment is often desperately needed in rural areas to deliver social and environmental benefits, and help reduce rural poverty. The SIWI report concludes that there is a clear trend for deals to occur in places with weak governance and legislation.


As mentioned climate change complicates the already existing competition for scarce water. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) notes that climate change will lead to “changes in all components of the freshwater system” and includes impacts on water availability, timing, quality and demand. Most transboundary water agreements, however, are based on the assumption that future water supply and quality will not change (Gleick, 2012). As the Egyptian hydrologist Fekri Hassan has observed “In the long run, the only constant is change.” Quoted in Delli Priscoli (2012).


Currently, global circulation models are not of much help to water managers as they are not reliable predictors of rainfall and runoff at the scale required for catchment water management. There are 23 of such models which generate hundreds of scenarios (Delli Priscoli, 2012). Policy changes will also be needed. As Delli Priscoli (ibid) writes, “anticipatory policies and actions can improve the capacity of a watershed to adapt to transboundary impacts of changes in water use, land use and climate on water resources and services. But these policies are still in their infancy”.


Full-scale water wars are unlikely but the frequency of water conflicts is likely to increase because of strong competition for the scarce resource. Conflicts can be anticipated as the most common causes are known. Such anticipation should include data collection and measures to encourage cooperation between the opposing parties. Parties should not be allowed to get stuck in rigid positions or in securitization. Broad sets of benefits should be identified.

Closing Comments

There is no one-size-fits-all solution for water disputes. Much depends on the local situation but international institutions might play a role as third party mediators. Coping with water scarcity requires both mitigation and adaptation. There are various ways to augment the supply of water by constructing more storage in reservoirs, reuse of drainage water and treated waste water, and desalinating sea water; all of which are controversial, expensive and require energy. Equally important, there are various ways to reduce the demand for water, including reducing water consumption in high-income countries, reducing the amount of animal products we consume, and reducing the amount of non-revenue water (losses). There is a role for governments and water companies in achieving these demand reductions.

Closing Comments

Demographics are important: the growing population of the Sahel can expect their water supplies to diminish, while the decreasing population of Southern Europe will have relatively more water. Similar dichotomies exist elsewhere. In future, they might cause a flow of ecological refugees.

Overall, then, with respect to water conflicts there is room for optimism as well as pessimism, since water sharing has the potential for win-win solutions.

Closing Comments

• Black, M. and King, J. (2012) The Atlas of Water: Mapping the World’s most critical resource. 2nd edition. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles

• Delli Priscoli, J. (2012) Reflections on the nexus of politics, ethics, religion and contemporary water resource decisions. Water Policy 14:21-40

• Delli Priscoli, J and Wolf, A.T. (2009) Managing and Transforming Water Conflicts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York

• Gleick, P.H (2012) The World’s Water, vol. 7. Island Press, Washington DC

• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) The Fourth IPCC Assessment Report. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York

• Jägerskog, A, Cascao, A, Harsmac, M, and Kim, K (2012) Land acquisitions: how will they impact transboundary water? Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI) www.siwi.org/publcations

References

• Mehta, L, Veldwisch S.J. and Franco, J. (2012) Introduction to the Special Issue: Water Grabbing? Focus on the (Re)appropriation of Finite Water Resources. Water Alternatives 5(2):193-207

• McIntyre, O. (2011) The World Court’s ongoing contribution to International Water Law: the Pulp Mills case between Argentina and Uruguay. Water Alternatives 4(2):124-144

• Olsson, G. (2012) Water and Energy: threats and opportunities. IWA Publishing, London, New York

• Sheeder, R.J. and Lynne, G.D. (2011) Empathy-conditioned conservation: “Walking in the shoes of others”. Land Economics 87(3): 433-452

References

• Vaux jr, H. (2004) Perspective Paper 9.2 pp 535-540 In: Global Crises, Global Solutions (B. Lomborg, ed.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York

• Warner, J. (2012) The struggle over Turkey’s Ilisu dam: domestic and international security linkages. Int. Environ. Agreements 12:231-250

• Warner, J. and N. Zawahri (2012) Hegemony and asymmetry: multiple-chessboard games on transboundary rivers. Int. Environ. Agreements 12: 215-229

• World Commission on Dams Report (2000). UNDP, New York and World Bank, Washington DC

References

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