Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?

7/27/2019 Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?

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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2004, Article 3

AnIslamicRevolutioninEgypt?ByRudyJaafar

Middle Eastern countriesparticularly

in thesecondhalfof the twentiethcentury

have witnessed the rise of sociopolitical

movementsthat

pressure

governments

to

adopt the Sharia, or holy law of Islam, as

ultimate arbiter of social and public affairs.

The failures of socialism and panArabism

have,morethanever,strengthenedthebelief

inpolitical Islam aspanacea topolitical and

economic woes. These Islamic movements,

coupledwith other popular grievances, can

often threaten established regimes and state

structures,resulting inviolentarmedconflict

andchaos.ThehistoryofthemodernMiddle

East is repletewith such events: the Syrian

regimesassaulton thecityofHama in1982,

thenullificationof the1992electionsand the

subsequent civil war in Algeria, and the

recurrent flareups between militants and

security forces inEgypt, toname a few.The

mostsignificantofthemall,however,wasthe

Iranianrevolution, for itwas thesoleIslamic

strugglethatculminated intheestablishment

ofanIslamicstate.UsingtheIranianmodelas

a basis of comparison, I will examine the

possibility, or lack thereof, of the emergence

of a revolutionary Islamic government inEgypt, and by extension, evaluate the

apparentuniquenessoftheIranianrevolution

in thehistoryofpolitical Islam.As theArab

worldsmostpopulousnation,Egypt isalso,

quotingFouadAjami, the statewhereArab

historycomesintofocus.1Inotherwords,an

analysis of revolutionary political Islam in

Egypt would shed some light on the

developmentsof Islamicmovements inother

Arab countries. Iwill startmy analysiswith

theobvious:

Iran

is

aShia

country,

whereas

EgyptspopulationispredominantlySunni.Is

therean intrinsiccharacteristic inShia Islam

thatallowsitsadherentstomobilizeandfight

fora religious authority?Wewillattempt to

answerthisquestionbyconsidering,first,the

ideologicalanddoctrinalfoundations,aswell

as thehistoricalpositionsofShiaandSunni

spiritualleadersvisvistemporalauthority.

Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations inShia Islam

The Shia, to this day,believe that the

leadership of the community ofMuslims is

the divine right of the descendants of the

ProphetthroughthefirstImam Ali.Thisline

of descendants constitutes the line of Shia

Imams,whohave,historically,challengedthe

prevailing authority of their time. Their

rebelliousactivity resulted in themartyrdom

of the first three Imams and the subsequent

persecution of theirdescendants.The Imami

challenge to temporal authority continued

until theghaiba,oroccultation,of the twelfthand lastImam,MuhammadalMahdi,in874.

Here, it is believed the twelfth Imam

miraculouslydisappeared; however, he is to

return to the temporalplane in the future in

ordertoinstitutejusticeonearthandheralda

goldenageforMuslimsandhumanity.

Al Nakhlah The Fletcher School Tufts University160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700


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Al Nakhlah2

Shia EthosThe origins of Shia ethos are therefore

found in rebellion and martyrdom. The

rebelliousanddisappearingImamsofShiism

have enabled the development of a dual

ideologythatcouldbeeitherrevolutionaryor

quietist. Indeed, the paradigm of the

messianicMahdicancarry,ontheonehand,a

revolutionary significance, similar to the

rebellionsagainst the temporalauthoritiesof

the early founding Imams. In contrast, the

ideology can alsobe quietist in nature, and

here the concept of the ghaiba is of utmost

importance, for, in theabsenceof theMahdi,

theShiaare tomind theirownbusinessand

paylipservicetotheauthorities.

Another major aspect of Shia ethos

stems from the martyrdom of the earlyImams. Alis, and particularly Husseins,

deaths at the hands of their enemies have

createdanabhorrenceoftyrannyandinjustice

in themindsof the followersofShiism.The

early Imams have been remembered as

championsof theoppressed in theirstruggle

against the impious rulers. The dialectic

between theconceptsofjusticeandrebellion

in opposition to those of tyranny and

oppressionhasthereforebeencentraltoShia

thought.We

will

now

examine

the

influence

it

has had on the development of the Shia

clergy.

Iranian Shia ClericsThe particular historical and ideological

development of Shia identity has led to

unique results in the evolution of the Shia

clericalestablishment.Beginning in sixteenth

century Iran, the Safavids bestowed upon

these clerics, or ulama (singular: alim)

religious scholars considered guardians of

Islamictraditions economicbenefitssuchas

property and the right to collect religious

taxes from the populous.2The Iranian Shia

ulamaenjoyed, therefore, from the startand

as a result of their relative financial

independence, strong positions visvis the

state. Moreover, the decline of temporal

powerinPersia,fromtheseventeenthcentury

onwards,furtherstrengthenedthe ulamaand

enabledthemtoquestionthelegitimacyofthe

rulers. Another factor that proved to be a

sourceofindependenceandincreasingpower

for the ulamawas the locationof important

Shia centers of learning and leadership

outside Iran, in theOttoman cities ofNajaf

andKarbala.Temporal and spiritualpowers

were thereforegeographicallyseparated,and

the clergy couldbetter resist thepressure of

theIranianstate.3

The Usuli School

The independence of the ulama in

eighteenth century Persia led to the

emergenceof a school of thought specific to

Persian Shia Islam.TheUsuli,orMujtahidi,

doctrine,asitcametobeknown,centeredon

theconceptof themujtahid,aclericwhohas

undergoneextensivetrainingintheologyand

hasbecome a recognized interpreter of law

anddoctrine.Thisideologyboundsbelievers,

rulers included, to follow the teaching of an

accomplished mujtahid, sometimes referred

toasmarjaetaqlid, inthepoliticalsphereas

inotherareasofhumanactivity.HamidAlgar

argues that, under Usuli doctrine, the

monarch was theoretically bound, no lessthanhissubjects,tosubmittotheguidanceof

a mujtahid, in effect making the state the

executivebranchof ulamaauthority.4Usuli

doctrinethereforeprovidesthemujtahidwith

tremendous power, his rulings carrying far

morelegitimacythananyissuedbythestate.

The emergence of these particular

doctrines and powers of the Shia clergy in

Persia is, therefore, a direct result of the

historicalconditionsarisingsince thebirthof

Islamthroughtheearlytwentiethcentury.Wewill now turn to the role of the Egyptian

ulama, who have had a diametrically

opposedhistoricalpath ina landsubscribing

toSunniIslam.

Temporal and Spiritual inter-relations inSunni Islam

Al Nakhlah The Fletcher School Tufts University


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Spring 2004, Article 3 3

Early Sunni doctrinal developments, andcontrasts with Shi'ism

The history of orthodox Islam has

produced differing results for the Sunni,

compared to the Shia, ulama. The Sunni

clerical establishment has historically

supported the rulers and they therefore

enjoyed the protection of the state. Unlike

their Shia counterparts, the Sunni ulama

thereforehadtodeveloptheirdoctrinesunder

the aegis of a government claiming political

legitimacy. The Shia ulama possessed no

politicalprotectors,andwere,asaresult,not

forcedtoreconciletheirdoctrineswithofficial

temporal creed. Sunni clerics, on the other

hand, in return for state protection, had to

sacrificetheirdoctrinalindependence.5There

have been interesting parallel historical

processes, albeit with different endresults,

between Sunni and Shia doctrinal

developments.TheSunniAbbasiddynastyin

Baghdadaswellas theShiaSafavidsofIran

hadbothsupported,intheircomingtopower,

ulama with a Mutazili outlook. Mutazili

thoughtemphasizestheapplicationofreason

and educatedjudgment to questions of law

and doctrine. This rationalist approach was

challenged, however, in both cases, by

traditionalists refusing to waiver from theliteralmeaning of religious texts. In Safavid

Iran,aswehaveseen, the ulamamaintained

individual judgment and interpretation in

legal theory; ijtihadwas indeed encouraged

following rigorous training. In the Abbasid

case though, thevictory, for reasonsbeyond

the scopeof this study,wasachievedby the

literalists. Individual interpretation of law

and doctrine was prohibited. This event is

referred to as the closure of the doors of

ijtihadin

Sunni

Islam.

Evidently,

this

development further curtails the power of

Sunni ulama.6

The 'ulama of Egypt

TheEgyptian ulamasfinancialsituation

was radically different than that of their

Iranian Shia counterparts; they were

financially dependent on the state. The

Egyptian ulama receivedno cashmoney for

their teaching but were paid in rations of

bread,donations,giftsofclothing,orfinancial

endowments.7

On several occasions, the

Egyptian ulamawere cowed

through

finances by the rulers due to their

dependenceonthestate.8UnliketheSafavids

or the Qajars, the Ottoman and Mameluk

rulers ofEgyptwere thereforevery effective

in curtailing the power of the ulama.

Moreover, the Egyptian states successful

formationofamodernizedarmyandacentral

bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century

further reduced the power of the ulama.9

Thiscasecontrastssharply,aswehaveseen,

with developments in Iran. The financial

dependenceofthe ulamaonthestateandthe

centralization of Egypt do not explain,

however, the absence of political leadership

on the part of the Sunni clerics. Therewere

many occasions when the state effectively

collapsed and the ulama were left with

tremendous power on their hands, yet they

failed toshow leadershipand takecontrolof

the situation. Throughout Egyptian history,

the ulama have temporarily filled a power

vacuum, when one occurred, only torelinquish political authority when it was

firmly in their hands.10

The most notable

example, occurred following the French

invasion in 1798. Napoleon courted the

ulama and lavished them with gifts and

wealth forhesaw themasnatural leadersof

the native society. He tried to establish a

nativegovernmentbyofferingthe ulamathe

highestpoliticaloffices,butthe ulamawould

notaccept.Theyinformedhimthattheywere

accustomed tohavingTurkishofficialsat thehead of allbureaus of the government, and

Turkswerefinallyretainedattheheadofthe

governorship, the army and the police.11

DanielCreceliusarguesthatthisdevelopment

isa reflex from theSunni ulamascenturies

oldsubmissiontopoliticaltyranny,aswellas



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Al Nakhlah4

anadmissionoftheir inabilitytoperformthe

vitalfunctionsofgovernment.12

TheSunni ulamacouldnotconceiveofa

government inwhich they exercised power.

Their role, as it has always been, was to

advisethe

government

of

others;

to

govern

the governors. They did not aspire to lead

politically.Theywerepreserversof tradition,

politicalbrokersatmost,and they couldnot

shatter this image of themselves.13

They

correspond to the classical Sunni role of the

Muslim thinker, best expounded by Al

Ghazali,described asdirectorof conscience

for political authority in administering and

discipliningmen that order andjusticemay

reigninthisworld.14

The doctrinal differences we have

exploredbetween theShiaandSunni ulama

are numerous and consequential. Alone,

however, they do not explain the

phenomenonof the Islamic revolution.After

all, the Iranian ulama had coexisted for

hundreds of years with rulers more

authoritarian and despotic thanMohammad

RezaShah.Moreover, the clericsof Iranhad

not, preceding the revolution, advocated the

seizure of political power; on the contrary,

theyhadremainedonthemarginsofpolitics.Based on this analysis, it is safe to conclude

thattherehappenedaspecificdevelopmentin

twentieth century Iranwhich permitted the

establishment of an Islamic republic. A

development,asweshallsee,notmirroredin

Egypt.

The rise of the Islamist movement in Egypt

The government, al-Azhar, and the militants

Asdiscussedearlier,the ulamainEgypt

hadalwaysbeenaninstrumentofthestateto

legitimizetherulingelite.Followingthe1952

revolution, however, the abuse of this

instrument reached absurd proportions, as

the following example illustrates. Under

Nasser, the servicesof the ulamawereused

to legitimizeArabnationalismandsocialism.

Sadat then solicited alAzhar todelegitimize

the socialists and the nasserites. He then

pushed for support of his policies and used

alAzharasa counterweight to themilitants,

asdidhissuccessorMubarak.15TheEgyptian

governments takeover of religious

institutions,and

their

subsequent

crisis

of

legitimacy,were themost important factors

contributing to the emergence of radical

Islamic groups, such as Jihad, Gamaa

Islamiya, and Takfir wa alHijra, whose

purpose was the violent overthrow of the

regime.16Anotherelement strengthening the

recruitmentbaseof these radicalgroupswas

theexplosionoftheurbanpopulationduetoa

decrease in themortality rates coupledwith

massiveruralmigration.Indeed,theslumsof

Cairoconstituteperfectenvironments for theeffervescence of radical Islamic ideologies,

feeding on the alienation and destitution of

large collectives of people. The Egyptian

Islamic militants believed the clerics had

surrendered their right as interpretersof the

faithbecause they colludedwith the unjust

temporalauthorities.

Violentactionsagainsttherulers,carried

under the banner of Islam, were therefore

legitimate.Theseextremistgroupsengagedin

assassinations

and

brutal

attacks

in

order

to

destabilize the ruling authorities. The most

notable event was President Sadats

assassination in 1981 by Egyptian army

membersofalJihad.Anotherimportantevent

istheNovember1997LuxorattackbyGamaa

extremistswhichkilled58foreigntouristsand

4Egyptians,andwhichresultedinamassive

reduction inthenumberof tourists, followed

by a serious downturn in the countrys

economy. Following these operations,

however, there occurred a shift in support

away from the militants. The Egyptian

populationsbackingforthemilitantIslamists

witheredasimagesofthedisplaysofviolence

were broadcast on the news. These actions

appalledalargesectionofthepeople,andas

a result, themilitants lost thepublic support

theyhadenjoyed.Moreover, thegovernment

seized the opportunity and respondedwith



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an allout war on these extremists before

completely neutralizing their operational

capacity. Many militants died or fled the

country during these ruthless campaigns

waged by the state security forces. The

conclusion was an unconditional ceasefire

announcedbyGamaaIslamiyainMarch1999,

followed thereafterbyAlJihadsdeclaration

of the end of military operations in June

2000.17Nowadays,therefore,theviolentand

direct threat to the integrity of theEgyptian

state has significantly subsided. This

development has not spelled the end of the

Islamicmovement inEgypthowever.A1994

alAhram poll declared that 86 percent of

EgyptiansbelievedviolentIslamicgroupsdid

not

work

to

the

benefit

of

society.

The

same

poll alsomentioned that 73 percent thought

nonviolent Islamic groupsbenefited Egypt.

Therewasthereforebroadsupportamongthe

peopletogiveIslamagreaterroleinstateand

society;thedisagreementwasoverthemeans

employedtoachievethatresult.

The path of non-violent polit ical Islam in EgyptThe pillar ofMuslim activism in Egypt

and in most Arab countries is the Muslim

Brotherhood.18Establishedin1928byHassan

AlBanna, the Brotherhoods ideology is

basedontheestablishmentofanIslamicstate

and the application of Sharia as the only

solution toall societal ills. Itscommitment is

to socialjustice and it perceives its foreign

enemiesasCapitalismandZionism.19In the

eighties, following fruitless bloody conflicts

withthegovernment,theBrethrenrenounced

violence as a means of achieving their

politicalaims.Thosememberswhodisagreed

and believed in the continuation of violent

struggle splintered and formed the violent

groupsGamaa andJihadmentioned earlier.

With this new nonviolent strategy, the

Brethren were allowed by Sadat to run for

parliamentary elections.20

The Muslim

Brothers new focus shifted towards

penetratingtheorgansofcivilsocietyinorder

toenlarge theirpowerbaseand spread their

message.Their targetswere the professional

associations of doctors, engineers,

pharmacists and university teachers.21

Throughout the Arab world, these

associationsare

the

most

active

civil

organizations because of the high level of

education and political conscience of their

members, as well as their independent

financial resources. This new nonviolent

strategyprovedvery successful andpolitical

Islamic activism developed a substantial

socioeconomic base. For example, the

movement creatednew Islamicbankswhich

amassed deposits surpassing those of state

ownedorconventionalbanks.Themovement

was

also

capable

of

providing

better

health

andsocialservicesthanthoseofthestate.22

PublicsupportforIslamicgroupingsalso

increased, when in times of crisis, these

organizations outperformed the government

inassistingthevictims,aswasthecaseinthe

October 1992 earthquake. The Brotherhood

emergedfromthe2000electionswith17seats,

thelargestgroupintheopposition.

Aswehave seen, the statesdominance

of AlAzhars completely discredited the

institution.

This

in

turn

has

provided

support

to the Islamic militants from a population

disenchantedby the dearth of a viable and

constructivepolitical ideology, aswell asby

increasing economic and social woes. The

extremeviolenceperpetratedbythemilitants

alienated the people, however, and the

Egyptiangovernmentmanagedtosubduethe

militant Islamic threat to its integrity. The

growthof thenonviolent Islamicmovement

seekingtoturnEgyptintoanIslamicstatehas

notbeenaffectedthough.Indicationsactually

pointtowardsanincreaseinitspopularbase.

Iranian developments in po litical Islam

On the other side of the Middle East,

Iranianhistory followedadistinctlydifferent

path.SimilarlytotheEgyptiancase,therewas

massive ruralmigration, a destabilization of

the traditional social groups due to rapid



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Al Nakhlah6

modernization, and state repression.23

The

regime,however,wasunable toweather the

assaultson itsauthority.ThePahlavissimply

couldnotholdontopoweramidthemassive

nationwidecampaignofcivildisobedience.24

A question arises: how was popular

discontent transformed into largescale

rebellion,before ending in the establishment

of an Islamic regime? We will start our

analysis with the leader of the revolution,

AyatollahKhomeini.

Khomeini's leadershipWith thepublicationofVelayateFaqih,

hisseminalwork,andinaradicalbreakwith

traditional Shia positions of political

passivity,Khomeini

advocated

the

acquisition

oftemporalpowerbytheclergy.25Heargued

that it was the duty of the Faqih to seize

powerand implement thepreceptsofSharia

asbest as he could.A societybased on the

holy law of Islam, and guidedby aMuslim

religiousjurisconsult,wasthebest thatcould

beachievedbefore thecomingof theMahdi.

Though many in the Shia clerical

establishment opposed his views, Khomeini

was able,nonetheless, toprovide the ulama

withatheoretical

and

doctrinal

justification

forpolitical engagement. In order to expand

his message further and unite, under his

leadership,thevariousgroupsopposedtothe

Shah, Khomeini incorporated into his work

ideasfromanotherIraniantheoreticalthinker,

Dr. Ali Shariati. Khomeini substituted the

concept of the faqih for Shariatis

rawshanfekran, or enlightened intellectual,

as the leader of the Islamic revolution.

Moreover,inhisdiscoursepost1970,heused

Marxist terms of class struggle, plentiful in

Shariatis analysis, to proclaim himself

representative of the disinherited.26

S.E.

Ibrahim states that Islamic and leftist

ideologies provide a persuasive intellectual

responsetothe issuesofnationalcrises,class

malaise, and individual alienation.27

Khomeini succeeded in magnifying their

impacts.Hisgroundbreakingwork fused the

two ideologies together, the Islamic and the

leftist,andtheircombinedeffectprovedtobe

far superior than the sumof their individual

parts. Khomeinis ideas spread to large

segments of the Iranian population; poor

young militants interpreted this new Shia

doctrine in a revolutionary context, and the

educated urban middle class joined the

chorus.This intelligentsiadeluded itself into

believing that in the end, following the

removal of the Shah, it would unseat

Khomeini, this charismaticbut impotentold

man.28Their predictions, obviously, failed

miserably. In addition to the poor and the

secularmiddleclass,anotherimportantsocial

group,

the

bazaar,

joined

Khomeinis

revolutionary forces. These merchants

representedthetraditionalalliesoftheclerical

establishmentinIranandthetwoclasseshad,

inthepast,joinedforcesintheirhostilitytoa

strong state. The bazaar always resented a

centralized government that could have

burdened it with heavy taxation. It had

therefore supported the ulama in their

opposition to the state since the late 19th

century.Thealliancebetweenthemosqueand

thebazaarwasoldandwellestablished.With

the first violent incidents in 1978, the

revolutionary wheel was set in motion. In

addition to Khomeinis leadership, the

popular uprising benefited from the

confluenceofseveralotherfactors:the ulama

provided logistical and organizational

support using their network of 80,000

mosques,thebazaarissuppliedthefunds,and

the rural migration of the previous years

provided the human potential for mass

mobilization ineverymajorcity in Iran.29In

summary, we can state that though the

opposition to the Shahwaswidespread and

the popular movement benefited from

favorable causes, most importantly, it was

unitedundertheleadershipoftheAyatollah,

asheaccomplishedtwomajordevelopments.

He first transcended, theoretically, the

limitations of the marjae taqlid and



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established the concept of Velayate Faqih,

increasing further the power of the clergy.

Secondly, he created an umbrella for all the

different political and social movements

opposingtheShah.

Comparative Analysis

The Egyptian ulama lost their

legitimacy, and the popular religious

leadership of the opposition passed to

reactionary organizations created by men

whowerenotclericswithtraditionalreligious

educations. The ensuing rift between these

twopolesof the Islamicmovement inEgypt

severely constrained its powers and

effectiveness in challenging the state. The

Iranian religious movement was capable of

facing the Shah with one united front,

whereas the Egyptian Islamic opposition is

handicapped by its internal conflict, which

has prevented the emergence of a unifying

figure in the image of the Ayatollah

Khomeini,anindispensableleaderinthecase

oftheIranianrevolution.

Another important factor is thescopeof

the ideology underpinning the revolt. The

Iranian revolution contained elements of a

class struggle superimposed on the religious

natureof

the

event.

Khomeini

sradical

ideology was the cornerstone of this

revolution, for it united the multifarious

forces opposing the Shahunder onebanner,

that of political Islam. Though Egyptian

Islamists attracted people from diverse

backgrounds,theirideaswereopposedbythe

clerical establishment, and were therefore

deniedtheirsupportinbecomingasignificant

force for change. The organizational role

played by the mosque in the Iranian

revolution

is

a

case

in

point.

The

legitimacy

of

the governments the radical Islamists are

fighting is also of importance to this study.

The Shah, for example, was alien to his

people.His forcedmodernizationpolicies,as

wellashisKemalistattacksonthetraditional

moresofhissociety,decreasedhislegitimacy.

Hisstrongalliancewith theUSandIsrael,as

well as his capitulation to the American

demandoflegalimmunitytoUSpersonnelin

Iran, also damaged his credibility. On the

otherhand,theradicalEgyptiangroupsfacea

government possessing stronger credentials

from thepopulous.Nasser, forexample,was

the champion of nationalism and pan

Arabism, a largerthanlife figure who was

extremely popular in Egypt. Nasser was

therefore able to fight the Islamists more

effectively than the Shah. Even Sadats

position was better than the Shahs, for,

though he signed a peace treatywith Israel,

he had fought a successful war with the

IsraelisandmanagedtoregaintheSinaiwith

theCampDavidaccords.

Conclusion

Ihavetraced, throughoutthisstudy, the

historical, doctrinal, ideological and political

dimensionsoftheIslamicmovementsinboth

IranandEgypt.Bothactorssought to initiate

a popular Islamic revolution and topple the

government,thoughonlyonewassuccessful.

Today,itseemsunlikelythatthesecondevent

will occur; in other words, Egypt will not

experience an Islamic revolution. However,

this conclusion does not exclude the

possibilityofEgyptbecominganIslamicstate.

Indeed,as

it

is

mentioned

in

this

research,

the

Egyptian Islamists are gaining ground.They

are slowly, but surely, penetrating all

instrumentsofcivilsociety;theyhaveshifted

theirstrategyfromatopdowntoabottomup

approach. Nonetheless, their ultimate goal

hasremained theestablishmentofanIslamic

government.ValiNasrdistinguishes the two

movements as Red andGreen Islam.30Red

Islam corresponds to the Iranian case; a

revolutionaryideologyimbuedwithelements

ofMarxistclassstruggle.GreenIslam,on theotherhand, isnot revolutionarybut consists

ofaslowandgradualevolution towards the

establishment of an Islamic state. Geneive

Abdoswork31is insightful inthisrespect,as

itelucidatessomeof the tacticsandprogress

achieved by the new Islamists of Egypt in

furtheringtheiragenda.



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Al Nakhlah8

The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and donotnecessarilyrepresent those ofAl Nakhlah, itsAdvisory andEditorial Boards, or the Program on Southwest

Asia and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at TheFletcherSchool.

1

FouadAjami,TheArabpredicament:Arabpoliticalthoughtandpracticesince1967(NewYork:

CambridgeUniversityPress),13.2NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:

MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(Los

Angeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),221222.3Ibid,226.

4HamidAlgar,TheoppositionalroleoftheUlamainTwentiethcenturyIran,inScholars,

Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.

Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),235.5NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:

MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),216.

6Ibid,223224.

7AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,

inScholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,

ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),154155.8Ibid.

9NikkiKeddie,TherootsoftheUlamaspowerinmodernIran,inScholars,Saints,andSufis:

MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,ed.NikkiR.Keddie(Los

Angeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),213.

10

AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,


ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),159163.11DanielCrecelius,NonideologicalresponsesoftheEgyptianUlamatomodernization,in

Scholars,Saints,andSufis:MuslimreligiousinstitutionsintheMiddleEastsince1500,

ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),173174.12Ibid.

13AfafLutfialSayyidMarsot,TheUlamaofCairointheEighteenthandNineteenthcenturies,


ed.NikkiR.Keddie(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),164165.

14

GillesKepel,MuslimExtremisminEgypt(LosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress),229230.

15MuhammadQasimZaman,TheUlamaincontemporaryIslam:custodiansofchange(New

Jersey:PrincetonUniversityPress),146.16TamirMoustafa,ConflictandCooperationBetweentheStateandReligiousInstitutionsin

ContemporaryEgypt,InternationalJournalofMiddleEasternStudies32(2000):10.



9/9


17TheEconomistIntelligenceUnit,Countryprofile2002:Egypt,TheEconomistIntelligence

UnitLimited(2002):9.18SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo

Press),56.19Ibid,24.

20TamirMoustafa,ConflictandCooperationBetweentheStateandReligiousInstitutionsin

contemporaryEgypt,InternationalJournalofMiddleEasternStudies32(2000):1718.21SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo

Press),58.22Ibid,6061.

23GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard

UniversityPress),108;HosseinBashiriyeh,TheStateandRevolutioninIran,19621982

(NewYork:StMartinsPress),34.24SaidAmirArjomand,TheTurbanfortheCrownTheIslamicRevolutioninIran(NewYork:

Oxford

University

Press),

191.

25GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard

UniversityPress),40.26Ibid,41.

27SaadEddinIbrahim,Egypt,Islam,andDemocracy(Cairo:TheAmericanUniversityinCairo

Press),26.28GillesKepel,JihadTheTrailofPoliticalIslam(Massachusetts:TheBelknapPressofHarvard

UniversityPress),7.29HosseinBashiriyeh,TheStateandRevolutioninIran,19621982(NewYork:StMartinsPress),

121122.30

SeyyedRezaValiNasr,lectureonLatesttrendsinpoliticalIslam,TheFletcherSchoolofLawandDiplomacy,TuftsUniversity,Medford,MA.,5November2003.

31SeeGeneiveAbdo,NoGodbutGod:EgyptandthetriumphofIslam(NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress).


Jaafar - An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?

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