Iuichi Earthquake impact mitigation in poor urban areas

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Earthquake impact mitigation inpoor urban areas

The case of Metropolitan Manila

Kanako IuchiDepartment of Urban and Regional Planning,

University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, Champaign, Illinois, USA, and

Ann-Margaret EsnardDepartment of Urban and Regional Planning, Florida Atlantic University,

Fort Lauderdale, Florida, USA

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that the Philippines is often described as the meltingpot of natural disasters (typhoons, floods and torrential rains). As part of the Pacific ring of fire, thePhilippines is also prone to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In the current disaster managementscheme, the poor are likely to be put last. Conventional risk reduction mitigation methods (such as landuse and building codes) are failing. A paradigm shift is needed one that enables poor communities tomaximize their limited resources and contribute to risk reduction.

Design/methodology/approach Interviews and field investigations were conducted between2001 and 2006 in three case study neighborhoods in Metro Manila to understand the risk componentsthat exist and the resources (or lack of) for dealing with them.

Findings Field surveys highlighted three major risk components: liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),illegal electrical connections, and residential buildings. Mitigation efforts need to be implemented by:developing hybrid community organizations; minimizing direct physical damage; developingneighborhood cooperatives through microfinance schemes; and developing an in-kind community

insurance system.Originality/value While this research focused on earthquake impact mitigation, the inquiry andfindings with respect to the urban poor in high risk areas, have applicability to other localities in thedeveloping world. Furthermore, Manilas situation is not unique. Disaster threats, rapid substandardurban development, growth in the number of the poor, and degradation of social capital, arephenomena present in other parts of the developing world. In such settings, traditional mitigationapproaches are difficult to carry out effectively as well.

Keywords Case studies, Earthquakes, Philippines, Risk assessment, Poverty

Paper type Research paper

Background and introductionThe Philippines is located in a region within the Pacific Ring of fire, a zone of frequent

earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Metro Manila[1], the capital of the Philippines, is

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

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The field work component of this research (initiated between 2001 and 2004) was funded by the Japanese overseas development assistantships and the World Bank. Follow-up work andresearch were completed at Cornell University, where Professors David Lewis and ThomasVietorisz of Cornell Universitys Department of City and Regional Planning provided timely andimportant advice and feedback. The Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and theInternational Studies in Planning at Cornell University provided for travel to conduct fieldsurveys in Metro Manila in the summer of 2005.

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Disaster Prevention and ManagementVol. 17 No. 4, 2008pp. 454-469q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0965-3562DOI 10.1108/09653560810901700


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faced with rapid urbanization, which has led to unequal income distributions and landownership, and many households who are forced to migrate to marginal land withunsafe living and work conditions. The poorer segments of the population, those mostvulnerable to a pending catastrophic earthquake event, make up at least 40 percent of

the total population in Metro Manila. Overall, they are less resilient and have lesscapacity to prepare for and survive disasters. In the current disaster managementscheme, the poor are likely to be put last, because the wealthier population whoregularly pay taxes and have title to their land are given priority.

Manilas situation is not unique and needs to be considered in a broaderinternational context. Population concentration, rapid substandard urbandevelopment, growth in the number of the poor, and degradation of social capital,are phenomena present in other parts of the developing world. In such settings,traditional mitigation approaches are difficult to carry out effectively, due to factorssuch as violations of laws and regulations intended to regulate safe construction, andlimited government resources. Furthermore, traditional mitigation strategies are notsufficient in coping with major-scale earthquakes. The mitigation approach thus needsto be modified. The poor need to be the core actors in any redefined mitigation strategy,because while lacking power, they are the most affected by disasters. A redefinedmitigation approach requires a deeper understanding of peoples risk perception, levelof engagement in mitigation activities, risk components in the neighborhood, andeconomic limitations which will lead to an understanding of preparedness levels andthe possible impacts of immediate and long term post-disaster periods. Anunderstanding of organizations, institutional and personal networks, andneighborhood actors, are also important.

Research was conducted over several years to gain a new perspective on earthquakedisaster risk reduction potential community-driven pre-disaster damage reductionstrategies in Metro Manilas poor areas. This paper summarizes research findings and

begins with a background section on disasters and impacts on the urban poor, asummary of Metropolitan Manilas disaster threats, and the limitations of usingtraditional/conventional approaches to mitigation and disaster management. It thenproceeds with main findings and observations based on field work and surveysconducted between 2001 and 2006. The paper ends with recommendations andsuggestions for revised mitigation and disaster management strategies.

Natural disasters and impacts on the urban poorThe World Bank, more than a decade ago, estimated that urbanization was increasingat a rate three times faster in low and middle income countries than in high incomecountries (Clark, 2003). Rapid urbanization is often associated with a lack ofappropriate and effective land use planning and building standards, deterioration of

older, densely packed inner city areas (UNDP, 2004), as well as increasedvulnerabilities to natural hazards. Comparisons of the impacts of extreme naturalevents and disasters on countries with high, medium, and low Human DevelopmentIndicators (HDI)[2] have been made using information from the UNDP and the Centerfor Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (Wisner, 2003). Table I clearly revealsthat countries with low HDI suffer more in terms of death toll; 86 percent of deathsoccurred in countries with low HDI, while only two percent occurred in countries withhigh HDI[3].

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Research by the UK Department for International Development (DFID, 2005) alsoshows a strong correlation between disaster and poverty with the poor being themost affected. The reasons can be both physical and economic:

(1) the poor are physically vulnerable because they tend to live in hazardous areas,such as gullies or shorelines that are prone to disaster; and

(2) they are economically vulnerable because disasters destroy their householdsnatural, physical, and social assets. In addition, injury, disability, and loss of liferesulting from disasters affects their main asset their labor.

With decentralized local governments lacking basic resources (personnel, suppliesand funds), the wealthy have power to control the recovery process. Wisner et al.s(2004, p. 301) reference to the following statement by a field survey participant inGujarat further highlights this issue that is, with good political connections thepowerful castes have even managed to attract infrastructure and investment, whilethe poor and the marginalized are now left as abandoned hamlets devoid of even

basic facilities. Overall, this creates a situation where the poor are usually leftbehind, which sometimes bring their coping strategies to breaking point, havelong term effects on livelihoods and often tip the poorest into destitution (DFID,2005, p. 2).

Metropolitan Manila: a disaster waiting to happenThe Philippines is often described as the melting pot of natural disasters. Located inthe tropics, it experiences major typhoons (approximately 20 per year[4]), floods andtorrential rains. As part of the Pacific ring of fire, the Philippines is also prone toearthquakes and volcanic eruptions. Particularly, the Luzon earthquake in July 1990,and volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo in June 1991, vividly show the geographic

hazards of Luzon Island, where Metropolitan Manila is located (Figure 1). Thesedisasters caused estimated losses of US$ 577 million[5] and US$ 423 million[6]respectively, figures that do not include the economic effects due to loss of lives andindustries. Casualties from these disasters added up to 4,390 people (1,283 dead, 321missing, and 2,786 injured) and 1,057 people (850 dead, 23 missing, and 184 injured),respectively, according to the National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC)(2003)[7]. Although neither disaster directly damaged Metropolitan Manila, this area isfacing an increasing risk from natural disasters, one of which is a possible rupture ofthe West Valley Fault (WVF) system that runs north-south in eastern part of themetropolis.

HDI Deaths per disaster Proportion (%) Cost per disaster (US$m)

Low 1,052 86.23 79Medium 145 11.89 209High 23 1.89 636

Source: Modified from Wisner (2003, p. 46) based on IFRC (2001, pp. 162, 164)

Table I.Level of humandevelopment and impactof disasters

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Disaster threats to Metro ManilaThe possibility of a large scale earthquake generated from the WVF system is veryreal. Scientists have determined that at least three rupturing events have occurredwithin the last 1400 years along the WVF System, based on radiocarbon dates and soildevelopment and that the last rupture occurred during the eighteenth or nineteenthcentury (Nelson et al. 1995). Use of recurrence intervals of 200 to 400 to estimate futurelarge earthquakes along the WV Fault have been suggested by Nelson et al. (1996).

Potential damage and casualties from a magnitude 7.2 rupture of the WV Faultsystem can also be significant, based on a 2004 MMEIRS study[8] by JapanInternational Cooperation Agency (JICA). The study concluded that approximately 40

percent of total buildings would be heavily, moderately or partially damaged, withcasualties of 147,100, and a death toll of 33,500 (0.3 percent of the total population).That study also estimates significant fire damage that can result in building collapse,casualties and deaths. Other infrastructure damage would include water pipe, electricpower transmission and distribution line cutoffs, and public service buildings,including hospitals, schools, and office buildings of Local Government Units (LGUs[9]).The MMEIRS study clearly predicts that Metro Manila would be in a chaotic state if aWV Fault related earthquake occurs.

Figure 1.The Luzon Island and

metropolitan Manila

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Metro Manila faces urbanization growth rates that increase vulnerability of thearea, accompanied by population concentration, rapid substandard urbandevelopment, and increasing percentage of the population living in poverty. Thepopulation concentration of metro region has intensified since 1948, when the

region was home to eight percent of the total national population. By 2000, thishad increased to thirteen percent. During these years, the population rate increasedby 3-5 percent in the Metro Manila area, while nationally, the rate was less thanthree 3 percent[10]. Urban land expansion beyond the periphery of the metroregion is also evident. By 1994, the city covered approximately 430 km2[11]compared to the 110 km2 covered in 1948. The urbanized area had grown threetimes larger in a half century than throughout the first five centuries of Manilashistory[12]. According to the Presidential Commission on the Urban Poor(PCUP)[13], 3.45 million people were identified as poor in 1995, compared to 2.8million in 1990 (Nakanishi et al., 2001).

The conventional mitigation approach: conceptual functions and failuresPeople in Metro Manila have a relatively high consciousness of possible disasters thatcould affect them. The Luzon earthquake and the Pinatubo eruption in the early 1990shas made it clear that such disasters can happen at any time. Additionally, dailyexposure to floods and inundations has led to the development of some preparednessand coping strategies. Some city governments, such as Marikina City, are active indisaster management activities, owning storage buildings to stock basic needs andoffer support during emergencies to the affected families[14]. However, just as in othersocieties, Metro Manilas capacity to cope with the impacts of catastrophic events isunknown.

Mitigation approaches often rely on government-led regulation, advanced

technology, and public emergency response. Many of these traditional approaches,however, tend to fail. First, regulation represented by building codes and zoning laws,are usually promulgated by public agencies and enforced through the legal system,with varying degrees of effectiveness (The World Bank, 1999). The conventionalwisdom is that damage can be reduced by:

(1) enforcing building codes that make newly constructed buildings resistant toearthquakes and existing buildings more durable;

(2) implementing land use controls that direct people away from hazardous areas;and

(3) utilizing advanced technologies such as quake-absorbing constructionmaterials can minimize structural vulnerability.

However, an earthquake in Kobe, Japan, in January 1995[15], destroyed the safety mythof many Japanese, by proving that such technologies cannot withstand a disasterwhose force is significantly greater than expected. Lastly, public emergency responseis anticipated to function logistically, to initially assist people and save public assetsfrom further losses. The Kobe earthquake showed that the public sector could notrespond as planned, especially in the first 72 hours (The Great Hanshin-AwajiEarthquake Memorial Research Institute, 2006).

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Why conventional approaches are not effective in Metro ManilaIn the Philippines, building codes, under Presidential Decree (PD) 1096[16], specifiesthe minimum requirements and standards of building design to protect against fire andnatural disasters (JICA, 2004). This system, however, is largely ineffective because

people ignore regulations and construct buildings without building permits. Evenpermitted buildings under construction are not monitored beyond the formal approvalprocess. Municipal land use controls with regulations that prohibit construction onriver banks, public lands, and government lands, are not functioning either, asbuildings are densely constructed in these hazardous areas. Besides, it is not only thepeople who do not follow rules and regulations, but also the governments. A revisedcomprehensive land use plan (CLUP)[17], which included articles and sections relatedto disaster mitigation, was originally ordered to be prepared for ratification, by theseventeen local governments[18] comprising Metro Manila by the end of 2002.However, only seven local governments had completed compiling this plan by the endof 2003 (JICA, 2004).

Public emergency response operations in Metro Manila are expected to function as abottom-up procedure, primarily coordinated and supervised by LGUs andBarangays[19], called Disaster Coordinating Committees (DCCs). When local DCCsare overwhelmed by situations, the regional and provincial DCCs, and eventuallynational government are, in theory, to give their support (JICA, 2004)[20]. However,there is a lack of coordination between different levels of organizations. The content ofthe emergency response plans often completely ignores earthquakes, whether it ispreventative or in response to the earthquake or related fires. Furthermore, as lessonsdocumented in earthquakes in Kobe and other regions show, these paper-basedemergency response plans do not function as expected when a large earthquake hits. Itis most likely that the initial actions to be taken by the governments will be delayeddue to the many unexpected problems that arise.

The fragmented and decentralized government structure, differences in the interestsof government leaders, and in the differences in availability of funds[21], has led tofurther inequity in levels of mitigation preparedness and emergency response. Theavailability of calamity funds for each LGU in the metro region represents huge gaps.The LGU with the largest fund, the City of Manila, makes up 18.49 percent of the total,while the LGU with smallest fund, Pateros, only makes up 0.25 percent[22].

Field research, findings and observationsCase study neighborhoodsGiven the problems and limitations discussed above, a new approach is needed forreducing the potential impacts from earthquake disasters, for understanding theneighborhood variations, and for a more customized approach to mitigation planning

in poor neighborhoods. In response to this need, surveys were conducted in threeneighborhoods to more fully understand the risk components that exist in these andother poor communities, as well as the resources for dealing with them, including socialcapital and networks. The selection of the case study neighborhoods was based oncharacteristics such as densely packed buildings, deteriorating infrastructure, andlarge proportions of buildings that lack appropriate standards. The surveymethodology focused mainly on neighborhood interviews, but also included fieldinvestigations.

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Risk perception and level of engagementInterview responses suggested that people in general are aware that earthquakes causebuilding damage and fire, yet are not really engaged in mitigation and preparednessactivities. On the other hand, the survey made it clear that poor neighborhood residents

do not have complete information and knowledge about the earthquake risks that theyare facing. For example, many people know that an earthquake generates buildingdamage, yet have no idea how it could affect them, both short-term and long-term.

Survey respondents in two of the three case study neighborhoods, where woodenbuildings are built close together and thus occasionally suffer from fire incidents,responded that they have in place some response measures for fire, at the householdlevel. Responses of women from the three neighborhoods revealed that they are verysensitive about the need to keep their immediate environs safe and livable, and theirwillingness to devote their utmost effort at the household level to mitigate possiblerisks based on their knowledge of disaster impacts. However, willingness of women isnot yet systematically coordinated to comply with disaster mitigation efforts.

Risk componentsField surveys showed that the three major risk components found in theneighborhoods are liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), illegal electrical connections, andresidential buildings itself. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is commonly used in thehouseholds for cooking. The shape of the LPG tanks makes them prone to rolloverduring ground shaking, and because a tanks connection to the stove is loose, there is ahigh probability that the connection could break and cause gas to leak out (Figure 2).Commonly, in very poor neighborhoods, buildings with floor space of less than 10square meters are at least two or three stories high, constructed of wooden materials,and built adjacent to similar buildings. Because the living arrangement in thesebuildings is such that one household occupies one floor with a kitchen, there is a high

concentration of LPGs found in each neighborhood. Any gas leaks would result inmultiple explosions and fires in multiple locations.

The second element is illegal electrical connections that are prone toshort-circuiting, even under normal circumstances (Figure 3). In the event of anearthquake, this could initiate fire which would spread through flammable building

Figure 2.Major components thatcause fire outbreaks. LPGtank largely used inhouseholds

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materials. Such illegal connections are very common and can be found throughout thepoor communities.The other types of risk that people face are their residential buildings. The types of

vulnerable residential buildings in impoverished neighborhoods can be classified intotwo basic types: wooden and masonry. The structure of the wooden buildings in theseneighborhoods is very simple, with columns that are thin and roofs and walls that areun-reinforced (Figure 4). Even in masonry buildings where most of the pillars arereinforced, walls are not (Figure 5). From past earthquakes occurred in different places,researchers found that building collapse in both wooden and masonry buildings arecaused by failure of walls and separation of walls from roofs and foundations. Thus,unless special measures are taken to strengthen the structure of these buildings, MetroManila will also face large casualties from building collapse.

Daily economic constraintsSome of the poor in Metro Manila are fortunate to own houses. They often rent outrooms to supplement their income. The price of rent varies from P 1,000 to P 5,000 perroom depending on the location and size. Others who do not have such retained capital

Figure 3.Major components that

cause fire outbreaks.Illegal electricity

connections

Figure 4.Structure of wooden and

masonry buildings.Wooden buildings found

in illegal settlements

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often face difficulties in surviving from day to day. Whenever households are in this

situation, they borrow money from 5-6[23] or Bombay[24] rather than from neighbors,friends or relatives. Most respondents who usually borrow money from these informalmoney lenders are fully aware of the high interest rate of 20 percent or more, but theyprefer to avoid any possible conflicts about money matters that may arise betweenclose relationships. On the other hand, there are formal cooperatives[25], which includea service of providing loans to members.

Some residents, those who own their homes or run a business, responded that theyusually borrow from the cooperatives because the interest rate is lower by ten percent.Yet, for most respondents, keeping up with payments of monthly membership dues isoften difficult and thus they end up borrowing from the 5-6 or the Bombay anyway.Some residents indicated forming a cooperative as a community undertaking, based ontheir understanding that such an organization could provide opportunities to generateincomes, and also allow investment in neighborhood improvements.

Organization and networksIn case study neighborhoods, there are neighborhood associations and thehomeowners associations identified as active units for neighborhood activities.These two groups usually have strong mutual connection with the barangays. Often,these groups jointly extend livelihood programs or other social activities withbarangays, according to the barangay leader and leaders of the homeownersassociation. Barangay leaders[26], Purok[27] leaders, and neighborhood associationleaders are perceived as the leaders by the people in the neighborhoods, andneighborhood residents usually follow the decisions that these leaders make to keepthe neighborhood in order. Currently, there is no uniform rule about the informationdistribution networks at either barangay or LGU level.

Women as the main actors for neighborhood disaster mitigation activitiesField surveys suggest that the majority of men go out for work, while women stayhome to take care of the children and do household chores. Some women run smallhome-based businesses or get side jobs that they could do from home. Many women in

Figure 5.Structure of wooden andmasonry buildings.Masonry buildings foundin illegal settlements

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such impoverished areas are willing to work, yet the fact of low educationalattainments and work inexperience make it difficult for them to do so.

Daily activities of women in the neighborhood are strengths, because majority ofwomen are aware of changes that occur in their neighborhood. Additionally, in many

cases, they function as the hub of information in families and neighborhoods. Suchengagement of women in neighborhoods and families highlight the importantnetworking roles that they can play at the local level. As mentioned before, women didnot show significant interest in taking a leadership role in their neighborhood activitiesexcept in the case of working jointly with other mothers to protect their children.

Recommendations for a revised approach to mitigation and disastermanagementMake community organizations hybridPeople in the impoverished areas did not know the possible risks they may face, andadditionally have large budget constraints to engage in activities that relate to reduce

such risks. Thus, participating in risk minimizing activities, such as reducing buildingvulnerabilities, is often difficult. Active participation in risk minimizing activities bythe poor requires an organization that is operated independently at the neighborhoodlevel, but one that would fit into an information sharing and distribution framework asproposed in Figure 6.

During the pre-disaster period, hybrid organizations would function for the wellbeing of poor neighborhoods; and in case of a disaster, the organization can shift torespond to the situation immediately. The organization can oversee creation anddevelopment of active womens organizations and business ventures. This serves thedual role of increasing financial stability and exposure to information and knowledge.

Although the governments and the public institutions are not capable of respondingto all the needs of the poor, they are still in essential and critical positions to provide

leadership and information to a variety of organizations and groups at different levels.Further, they have the responsibility to provide equal opportunities and support

Figure 6.Flow of information and

knowledge toneighborhoods

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neighborhoods that are falling behind, or at least encourage actions to unifyneighborhoods as part of mitigation and disaster resiliency efforts.

Minimize direct physical damages

To minimize damages from building collapse, people in poor neighborhoods need tounderstand the specific risks by type, of their residences and neighborhoods. Byknowing the risks and applying seismic resistance techniques they can largelydecrease risk exposure. Since men in poor neighborhoods are quite adept at buildinghouses, they would benefit from improving their houses in inexpensive ways, usingdonations collected from construction suppliers.

The causes of fire, namely, the materials that develop fire and are flammable, needto be minimized. Four recommendations seem pertinent in this case: build commoncooking spaces; minimize illegal electricity connections; reduce the use of flammablematerials in buildings; and promote fire extinguishing and evacuation activities.Building communal cooking spaces is of the highest priority. Sharing a space will notonly reduce the numbers of LPG-filled tanks, but can serve to enhance social capital, bydaily gathering and sharing of information among women. This collective system willalso give opportunities to government to participate in this proactive activity.Government could take part in subsidizing fuel for the neighborhoods aninexpensive mitigation approach with huge benefits toward risk reduction.

Develop neighborhood cooperatives through microfinance schemesDevelopment of neighborhood cooperatives is one way that the poor neighborhoodsin Metro Manila can increase and improve their financial and social capacities. Thecooperative system would be based on three main funds: revolving fund, repayment,and disaster management related funds (See Figure 7). The revolving fund would beused for operational expenses such as worker salaries. Repayment funds will go

back to the fund lending institutions, and the rest will be aimed to spend inmitigation activities. For the funds pooled for mitigation purposes, two types are

Figure 7.Funds for neighborhoodcooperatives

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proposed a vulnerability reduction fund and a calamity fund. Vulnerabilityreduction funds can widely be used for a host of programs and activities thatsupport any mitigation or other information sharing activities. Calamity funds canbe saved for purchasing seismic resistant construction materials.

Government could provide information on the how-to; for example, tips onapproaching micro-finance institutions and running the community business. Overall,key issues for sustained operation of neighborhood cooperatives are transparency offinance, women being key actors, and open communication with administrative bodiesand other existing organizations. The bonding that can develop through dailynetworking and interaction will enable a more efficient flow of information andincreased neighborhood unity.

Develop an in-kind community insurance systemA community insurance system would focus on developing committed networks of thepoor in the neighborhoods to participate and contribute through providing the labor,

one of the most costly components during the recovery and reconstruction period. Suchcollective and voluntary provision of labor can provide an opportunity for quicker andless expensive recovery.

This system could be further extended to work between government andcommunities, by aiming to exchange and utilize resources held by both parties duringthe post-disaster period. Government could provide basic survival food and supplies(such as rice), while community members contribute their labor.

This system is constructive for both poor neighborhoods and government;especially since poor neighborhoods do not have access to private insurance options.The system can be operated by an advance agreement made between neighborhoodsand government. This in-kind community insurance system offers other benefits as

well:. economic inflation that often develops in post-disaster would not affect this

insurance system because it is developed in a non-monetary form; and. government could operate this system with minimum input, which will be a large

incentive toward implementation.

Final thoughtsWhile this research focused on earthquake impact mitigation, the inquiry and findingswith respect to the urban poor in high risk areas, has applicability to other localities inthe developing world. The trend of urbanization and the vulnerability of the poorneighborhoods in hazardous urban areas require that communities maximize their

limited resources and contribute to risk reduction.Governments at all levels should continuously improve and strengthen their

capacities for implementing appropriate conventional practices: enforcing buildingcodes and land use guidelines, and improving emergency response capacities.Application of advanced technologies to the mitigation practices may be furtherinvestigated as part of private-public partnership schemes.

However, a paradigm shift in mitigation approaches is needed. The essential issuesin redefining disaster mitigation strategies can be summarized as follows:

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. the poor are most at risk to earthquake disaster and should be main actors in themitigation process;

. qualitative field work assessments are important for understanding the varietyand variability of poverty and vulnerability characteristics in urban settings;

. mitigation plans need to be customized based on urban forms and structures,social systems and cultures;

. the role of organizations, networks and governments must be better coordinated;

. an independent organization of some form is required in each underprivilegedneighborhood to integrate disaster mitigation activities with efforts towardeconomic efficiency; and

. women have a good sense of their neighborhood conditions and residents, andneed to be active players in mitigation activities as well as resource persons inthe organizations.

Notes

1. Metro Manila, the capital region of the Philippines, is made up of 17 local government units(LGUs). This comprises 13 cities and 4 municipalities, and functions as the political,economic, social, and cultural center of the country. It is one of the most populous areas inEast Asia.

2. The Human Development Indicator quantifies available data to assess the state of humandevelopment across the globe and provide a critical analysis of a specific theme each year. Itcombines thematic policy analysis with detailed country data that focus on humanwell-being, not just economic trends (UNDP, 2004). The main indicators are: Lifeexpectancy at birth; Adult literacy rate; and Combined primary, secondary and tertiarygross school enrollment. All countries are classified into three clusters by achievement in

human development: high human development (with an HDI of 0.800 or above), mediumhuman development (0.500-0.799) and low human development (under 0.500) (UNDP, 2004).

3. It is important to note, however, that the cost per disaster is low in those developingcountries, but the number of deaths per disaster is high compared to those in medium andhigh HDI countries.

4. The number is calculated based on information provided by National Disaster CoordinatingCommittee of the Philippines in 2003.

5. The National Disaster Coordinating Committees (NDCC) official figures indicate 31.176Billion Pesos, based on the 2003 adjusted rate of 1 Philippine Peso PHP 0:01851 USDollar (USD)

6. The NDCC official figures indicate 22.8502 Billion Pesos, based on the 2003 adjusted rate.

7. The NDCC is the focal inter-institutional organization for disaster management at thenational level. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense, and itsmembers generally represent national government departments and the Philippine RedCross (JICA, 2004).

8. Earthquake Impact Reduction Study for Metropolitan Manila, JICA, 2002-2004.

9. Local Government Units (LGUs) are the generic name used for cities and municipalities inMetro Manila. The LGUs are responsible for basic services and regulatory functions throughLocal Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which was enacted in 1991. LGUs areanticipated to enhance self-reliant communities and effective government (JICA, 2004).

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10. The population growth rate of the metropolitan area between 1995 and 2000 was less thanthe national growth rate. Some social scientists perceive this phenomenon not as a setback ofpopulation agglomeration in the metropolis, but as a development of the greater metropolis,with people moving just outside the administratively defined metro Manila.

11. The area of urban expansion shown was calculated using GIS. The figure is based on anurban expansion map from MMEIRS (2004), which was originally taken from the book Cityof Man published by the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

12. The Historical records of Manila can be found going back to the early 16th century. When aSpanish troop, dispatched by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, landed at Maynila in 1570, the regionwas already developed as the center of regional trading under the influence of Islam. Maynilais thought to have been established around 1500. The Spanish colonized Manila by force,constructing Intramuros near Manila Bay, and established as the colonial capital city,Manila, (Insigne y siempre leal Ciudad de Manila) in June 26, 1571 (Nakanishi et al., 2001).

13. This committee was created in 1986 by President Aquino to deal with urban poverty issues.The first president of this committee was a representative from squatter residentsassociation and engaged to settle the problems on squatter clearance (Nakanishi et al., 2001).

14. Information obtained through site visit and an interview with Marikina DisasterManagement Officer, in October, 2002.

15. This earthquake is officially called Earthquake of Southern Hyogo Prefecture, 1995. Itoccurred on January 17, 1995 with magnitude 7.3 and its aftermath saw 6,433 dead, 3missing, 43,792 injured (as of December 26, 2002), and 219,000 buildings were heavilydamaged. (The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Research Institute, 2006).

16. Presidential Decree 1096 is the National Building Code of the Philippines.

17. Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance for the National Capital Region, March 1981. Thisordinance describes the type of zoning and procedures of implementation. Housing and Landuse Regulatory Board (HLURB) is responsible for ratifying and adjusting the land use planprepared by individual LGUs, while Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) isresponsible for advising LGUs in developing plans.

18. The 13 cities and 4 municipalities comprising Metro Manila local governments are Kalookan,Las Pinas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas,Paranaque, Pasay, Pasig, Pateros, Quezon, San Juan, Taguig, and Valenzuela.

19. The barangays are the smallest local government unit in the Philippines, which was codifiedunder the 1991 Local Government Code. The word barangay is a native Filipino term for avillage, district or ward. Municipalities and cities are composed of barangays. Historically, abarangay is a relatively small community of around 50 to 100 families. So in metro Manila,one finds small barangays if the area was established a very long time ago, and largerbarangays if the areas are newly established.

20. In Metro Manila, two laws, PD 1566 (1978) and Local Government Code (1991), Republic ActNo. 7160, the Philippines, function as important components to the legal framework ofdisaster management. The former instructs Metro Manila to create a Regional DisasterCoordinating Committee (RDCC) and Local Disaster Coordinating Committees (LDCC), whilethe latter gives local and regional governments the power to implement disastermanagement provisions.

21. Normally, LGUs marginal viability comes from two sources, the five percent calamity fundfrom local budgets, and the 800 million Pesos provided as national calamity funding in theGeneral Appropriation Act of 2003 (JICA, 2004).

22. Calculated based on the information provided by JICA, 2004, which originally refer toDepartment of Budget and Management Regional Office, National Capital Region

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23. Term describing the money lending system used by people in Metropolitan Manila. The termis derived for the concept that borrowing 5 pesos will be increased to 6 pesos when returning,which is a 20 percent interest rate. The term of loan is usually 1 month.

24. This is another money lending system that is usually operated by Indian investors who are

called Bombay (old name of Indias capital Mumbai). Bombays travel by motorcycle andare easily recognizable throughout the region. They collect payments in small amounts. Forexample, if they lend 100 pesos, they will collect 20 pesos each time, yet more than 5 times.Therefore at the end, money borrowers pay back much more than they have borrowed.People perceive the numbers of Bombay are decreasing recently.

25. Cooperatives are self help organizations with several mandates that include credits,agriculture sector, marketing, services, etc. This organization is usually run by someneighborhood residents; their activities are not limited to their region but extend to nearneighborhoods.

26. Barangay leaders include Barangay chairman, Kagawads and Tanods. Barangay Chairmanis the equivalent of the City Mayor as chief executive of his barangay. There are usuallyseven Kagawads and they are the members of the Barangay Council. Tanods are responsible

for the Barangay security.27. Puroks are the quasi-official administrative body that exists under Barangays. Puroks are

usually seen in the suburban areas, as this body significantly existed in rural areas of thePhilippines.

References

Clark, T. (2003), Urban World/Global City, 2nd ed., Routledge, London and New York, NY.

DFID (Department for International Development, UK) (2005), Disaster Risk Reduction: A Development Concern, Publication No. 912, DFID, London.

(The) Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Memorial Research Institute (2006), Lessons Learned from Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, available at: www.hanshin-awaji.or.jp/kyoukun/eng/

index.html (accessed April 4, 2006). JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) (2004), Metropolitan Manila Impact Reduction

Study, Final Report, JR-04-04, JICA, Tokyo.

Nakanishi, T., Kodama, T. and Aratsu, K. (2001), Mega-Cities of Asia [4]: Manila (Asia no daitoshi [4] Manila ), Nihon Hyo-ron Sha.

National Disaster Coordinating Committee (NDCC) (2003), Major and Minor Natural Disaster Incidents: 1980-2003, NDCC, Manila.

Nelson, A., Personius, S., Rimando, R., Punongbayan, R., Tungol, N., Mirabueno, H. and Rasdas, A.(1995), Four Large Earthquakes in the Past 1,400 Years on a Fault in Metropolitan Manila,The Philippines, Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology, Quezon.

Nelson, A., Personius, S., Rimando, R., Punongbayan, R., Tungol, N., Mirabueno, H. and Rasdas, A.(1996), Earthquake Recurrence on the Northern Part of the West Marikina Valley Fault

An Active Fault in the Metro Manila Area, US Geological Survey and Philippine Institute ofVolcanology and Seismology, Quezon.

United Nations Development Programme (2004), Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, UNDP, New York, NY.

Wisner, B. (2003), Capitalism and shifts in vulnerability, Natural Disasters and Development ina Globalizing World, Routledge, London and New York, NY, pp. 43-56.

Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004), At Risk: Natural Hazards, PeoplesVulnerability and Disasters, Routledge, London and New York, NY.

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(The) World Bank (1999), Managing Disaster Risk in Mexico: Market Incentives for MitigationInvestment, The World Bank, Washington, DC.

About the authors

Kanako Iuchi is a PhD student at University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. Prior to joiningUIUC, she was a masters student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at CornellUniversity. Before embarking on graduate studies, Ms. Iuchi worked in a consulting firm for adecade, gaining field experiences and insights of Japanese-funded projects overseas. Herinterests include disaster management and improving plight of the urban poor upon disaster indeveloping countries. He is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected]

Ann-Margaret Esnard is an Associate Professor and Director of the Visual PlanningTechnology Lab at Florida Atlantic University. Prior to joining FAU, she was a faculty memberin the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University. Dr. Esnards expertiseencompasses GIS/spatial analysis, vulnerability assessment, land use planning, and disasterplanning.

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