It is probable that all heavy matter possesses –
description
Transcript of It is probable that all heavy matter possesses –
It is probable that all heavy matter possesses – latent and bound up with the structure of the atom –
a similar quantity of energy to that possessed by radium. If it could be tapped and controlled what an agent it
would be in shaping the world’s destiny! The man who put his hand on the lever by which a parsimonious nature regulates so jealously the output of this store of energy would possess a weapon by which he could destroy the
earth if he chose.
F. Soddy,1904
World Nuclear Plant Distribution
Regional Analysis
Sources: International Nuclear Safety Center and Energy Information Administration
443 Total Nuclear Generating Facilities (364.9 GW)
20542004
14
7
Billion of Tons of Carbon Emitted per Year
1954
0
Currently
projected path
Flat path
Historical emissions
1.9
2104
14 GtC/y
7 GtC/y
Seven “wedges”
Wedges
O
Nuclear Power and Global Warming
Compared to a modern coal plant, nuclear would save about 186 g C/kWh or 680 g CO2/y
Total emissions today is about 7 gigatons C/y
Business as usual to 2050 projects about 14 gigatons C/y
700 GW nuclear could save about 1 gigaton C/y
Some Countries in 1500 GW World
Algeria Pakistan
Armenia Philippines
Azerbajian Poland
Belarus Romania
Georgia Thailand
Indonesia Turkey
Iran Turkmenistan
North Korea Uzbekistan
Malaysia Venezuela
Mexico Vietnam
Gachin
Lashkar A’bad
Ardekan
Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002
Arak Heavy Water Reactor Arak Heavy Water Reactor ComplexComplex
Gachin
Lashkar A’bad
Ardekan
Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002
Natanz Gas Centrifuge Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Uranium Enrichment ComplexComplex
•Covert facility in remote location, could enrich uranium for weapons•Dummy structures to prevent detection and identification•Concealed underground, hardened, well defended
AFTER: 20 JUN 04DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite imageDigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image
Dummy bldg Dummy bldg to conceal to conceal entrance rampentrance ramp
Covered electric Covered electric transformer stationtransformer station
Dummy bldgs Dummy bldgs to conceal to conceal Ventilation shaftsVentilation shafts
Concealment EffectivenessConcealment Effectiveness
→
→
→ →
→
→ →
→ →
Pu MOX
TWO SCHEMES FOR BACK-END
POOL
DRY CASKS
REPOSITORY
OR
REPROCESSING
MOX FABRICATION
LONG-TERM STORAGE
REACTORS U-FUEL
POOL
REPROCESSING
HLW (and SF?) REPOSITORY
REACTORS MOX-FUEL
REACTOR
POOL 1)
2)
Proposed U.S. GNEP Technology Demonstration Facilities
“Virtually any combination of plutonium isotopes … can be used to make a nuclear weapon… Reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states. Theft of separated plutonium, whether weapon-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.”
US Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposal Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, Washington, D.C., January 1997.
Materials Pathways for Advanced Separations/RecyclingMaterials Pathways for Advanced Separations/Recycling
LWR Spent FuelChopping and
Nitric Acid Dissolution
UREX ProcessProduct
Conversion
CCD-PEG Process
TRUEX Process
TALSPEAK Process
Product Conversion and Interim Storage
Decay Storage of Cs & Sr
Fuel FabricationAdvanced
Burner Reactor
ABR Spent Fuel Processing
High-Level Waste Form Production
Clarified Dissolver Solution
Uranyl Nitrate Solution
Uranium Storage or Disposal as
U3O8
U3O8
Cs/Sr Aluminosilicate
Transuranics plus Remaining Fission Products
All Remaining
Fission Products except
Lanthanides
Cladding Hulls, Iodine
Technetium
Transuranics plus Lanthanide Fission Products
Lanthanide Fission Products
Transuranics in Nitrate Solution
TRUs (oxide or metal)
Fresh Fuel
Spent Fuel
Recycled Actinide
Elements
Cs/Sr Aluminosilicate
Residual Fission
Products
UREX Raffinate(>99% Tc)
(>99.9999% U)
(>99.9% Cs/Sr)
(>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm)(>99.9% Np)
(>99.99% Pu/Am/Cm)(>99.9% Np)(<0.1% lanthanides)
Note: no high-level liquid waste requiring underground tank storage
Transportation
Se
para
tion
Pla
ntR
ea
cto
r C
omp
lex
High Radiation
Moderate Radiation
Low Radiationand Storage
Receipt
SOME NEW “IRANS”?
Countries with negligible nuclear power today, but lots in 2050:
Italy, South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Thailand, North Korea, and several former Soviet republics.
GNEP would reverse 30+ years of no reprocessing in U.S. In that time no new commercial reprocessing anywhere.
SUSTAINABILITY OF A TWO-TIER WORLD?
, “I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the U.S.-India nuclear deal where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments. Such an approach opens up divisions among the world’s nuclear powers, with each making a list of ‘friends’ who can be trusted with nuclear technology, and ‘foes’ who are dangerous risks,”
“Iran’s nuclear ambitions – a modest proposal,” Brent Scowcroft, The National Interest, Spring 2006.
A REPORT ON THEINTERNATIONAL CONTROLOF ATOMIC ENERGYPrepared forTHE SECRETARY OF STATE'S COMMITTEE ONATOMIC ENERGYby a Board of Consultants
<TR
Chester I. Barnard
Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer
Dr. Charles A. Thomas
Harry A. Winne
David E. Lilienthal, Chairman
Washington, D. C. March 16, 1946
… there is no prospect of security against atomic warfare in a system of international agreements to outlaw such weapons
controlled only by a system which relies on inspection and similar police-like methods. The reasons supporting
this conclusion are not merely technical but primarily the inseparable political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreements between nations, each free
to develop atomic energy but only pledged not to use bombs. So long as intrinsically dangerous activities may be carried
out by nations, rivalries are inevitable and fears are engendered that place so great a pressure on a system of enforcement by
police methods that no degree of ingenuity or technical competence could possibly cope with them.