Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 48, Number 4, 2002, pp. 528-538.

© 2002 Department of History, School of Political Science and International Studies, The Universityof Queensland and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Issues in Australian Foreign PolicyJanuary to June 2002

CHRISTINE MASONSchool of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland

The first six months of Australian foreign policy in 2002 reverberated from the graveevents of 2001, namely, the continuation and broadening of the Australian role in the“War Against Terror” and increasing dilemmas with regard to the Australian policy onrefugees. A notable addition to these developments was the consternation caused byZimbabwean politics, and Australia’s part in that country’s one-year suspension fromthe Commonwealth. After years of virtual neglect of African politics, Australia, via itschairing of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM), led thecritique against the regime of Robert Mugabe and paved the way for high-levelnegotiations with other African state leaders to address the growing humanitarian crisesin Zimbabwe. Closer to home, Australia continued its involvement in the re-building ofEast Timor. However, ongoing negotiations with East Timor concerning the ownershipof vast gas and oil reserves have proved more contentious than anyone anticipated.Australia, perhaps assuming that a small, poor and currently donor-dependent statecould not put up a struggle, has found itself battling international law in order to gainsignificant access to the multi-billion dollar reserves. Finally, another internationallegal issue, which produced controversial debate, was Australia’s ratification of theInternational Criminal Court (ICC).

With these issues in mind, it seems apparent that two divergent trends havedeveloped over the last six months of Australian foreign policy. The first is a strongstance on the violation of human rights. This is evidenced by Australia’s position onZimbabwe and its continuing support for the independence and development of EastTimor. However, the tendency towards the protection of human rights in somecircumstances is in sharp contrast to the second noticeable trend in Australian foreignpolicy, the maltreatment of refugees. Instead of championing human rights in thisinstance, Australian policy breaches various covenants such as the Convention on theRights of the Child (CROC) and other organs of international law. These contrastingapproaches are discussed at length below.

The “War Against Terror”At the time of writing,1 Australia continues to support the foreign policy initiatives ofthe United States in the “War Against Terror”. Defence Minister Robert Hill outlinedthe changes this implied for Australian foreign policy, including the move towardsacting “swiftly and firmly” against perceived threats in order to prevent such casesevolving into attacks. Defence Minister Hill explained that the:

1 It is possible that foreign policy may change in this regard with the recent debates concerningAustralia’s trade relations with Iraq, especially with regard to wheat, altering its previous support forUS air strikes. John Kerin, “Howard Eases off the War Talk”, The Australian, 20 August, 2002, p. 2.

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defence of Australia and its interests does not stop at the edge of the air-sea gap. It probably nevermade sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing concentric circlesaround our coastline, but it certainly does not do so now. We are seeing a fundamental change tothe notion that our security responsibilities are confined to our region. The ADF is both morelikely to be deployed and increasingly likely to be deployed well beyond Australia.2

This is evident in Australia’s commitments in Afghanistan and surrounding regions.There are between 850 and 1300 Australian Defence Force personnel currentlydeployed to support the international coalition against terror. This includes AustralianSpecial Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan; limited aircraft support inKyrgyzstan; Operations Group Commander in Manas, Kyrgystan; and the presence oftwo frigates in the Persian Gulf supporting the Multinational Interception Force.

However, there is concern from some commentators about Australia’s commitmentto United States’ policy. Former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, RichardButler, warns such “support ignores the sharply growing skepticism within the UnitedStates about the policy direction and abilities of George W. Bush”.3 Despite theseconcerns, Australia and other states are currently refocusing attention towards Iraq andfear its potential to manufacture and distribute weapons of mass destruction. Thesefears have been exacerbated by Iraq’s refusal to allow United Nations’ weaponsinspectors into its central military complexes. Australian Foreign Minister, AlexanderDowner, has openly warned that appeasement strategies would be both dangerous andineffective. Short of openly committing Australian forces at this point, it is clear thatthe Australian government supports the United States’ policy of overthrowing SaddamHussein’s leadership.4 Foreign Minister Downer recently argued that “a policy ofturning our back on Saddam Hussein and saying ‘it doesn’t matter, let’s just hopeweapons of mass destruction go away’ — is a policy for which the internationalcommunity would pay a very high price”.5

It is unlikely that this approach will manage to overcome the hypocrisy that manystates, especially in the Middle East, feel is evident in relation to the debate onweapons of mass destruction. The lack of comment or critique by the United States andother world powers on Israel’s undeclared nuclear program is one point of contention.Anger towards Israel has peaked in the last six months with that state’s frequent andbloody incursions into the autonomous regions of Palestine. In addition to this, manyMiddle Eastern states ask: What right does the largest stockpiler of weapons of massdestruction, the United States, have to strike another state, Iraq, for also attempting todevelop the same technology? There seems to be a perception that “in the right hands”such weapons can be managed and controlled. So, which hands are “wrong”?According to some commentators, many Muslim and Arab states are considered to bethe “wrong hands”, since certain elements argue that the Islamic faith is recalcitrantand inherently prone to violence.6 A Muslim state that is also nuclear, goes theargument, presents a greater risk to the international community and is far less

2 Address to Defence and Strategic Studies Course. “Beyond the White Paper: Strategic Directions forDefence”, Australian Defence College, Canberra 18 June 2002.http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/HillSpeechtpl.cfm.3 Richard Butler, “So Who’s been Letting Off Esteem?” The Australian, 24 April 2002, p. 11. Seealso Owen Harries, “Turning on Axis Distorts Aim”, The Australian, 1 April 2002, p. 11.4 Paul Kelly, “Hussein in Bush’s Sights”, The Weekend Australian, 23-24 March, 2002, p. 28.5 Alexander Downer cited in John Kerin, “Downer in Full Alert on Nuclear Hussein”, The Australian,17 July 2002, p. 4.6 Janet Albrechtsen, “Ignorance is Muslims’ Worst Enemy”, The Australian, 10 April 2002, p. 11.

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predictable than a “secular” and liberal-democratic state. In light of these complexitiesand the current fragility that exists in the Middle East concerning the Israel/Palestinedispute, it would seem prudent for Australia to exercise restraint on the issue of anattack on Iraq.

Australia continues to have generally poor relations with Asia. Relations arehampered by its ongoing commitment to the interests and policies of the United Statesrather than those of its Asian and Pacific neighbours. As Greg Sheridan points out,John Howard “lacks a political dialogue or relationship of consequence with most ofthe regional leaders.”7 This lack of an extensive shared dialogue was initiallyreinforced and further highlighted by the events of September 11th and the “War onTerror”. Armed Islamic groups are active in Asia, especially in the Philippines,Thailand and Indonesia.8 Links between some members or segments of these AsianIslamic groups and the Al-Qaeda movement are almost guaranteed.9 However, there isconsiderable tension over how such issues should be addressed, particularly inIndonesia. Megawati Sukarnoputri is battling to keep separatist forces under control inIndonesia,10 and the populist type of Islam that is prevalent in Indonesian societymeans that governmental clamps on more militant and political Islamic groups couldlead to communal backlash.11 Popular protest in Indonesia against the US air strikes onAfghanistan and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s “soft” response to the strikes indicates thestate’s fragility.12 Additionally, Australia’s recent overwhelming support for EastTimor, discussed below, has had a serious impact on relations between Australia andIndonesia.13 Australia must be sensitive to these complexities and strive to work withIndonesia and Asia generally on issues of commonalities rather than emphasising andcriticising areas of difference and policy divergence. In some respects, the CHOGMdiscussions, examined below, provided a useful forum for dialogue with Asia aroundthe issue of terrorism. The notion of “terror” irrespective of ethnic, national andreligious differences was stressed and, as a result, concepts of common suffering due to“terror” have brought greater regional understanding into Australian foreign policy.

7 Greg Sheridan, “Howard Needs to Get Smart on Asian Links”, The Weekend Australian, 23-24March, 2002, p. 17.8 Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanaoand Aceh”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 24, 2001, pp. 241-269; Andrew Tan, “ArmedMuslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications”, Studies inConflict & Terrorism, vol. 23, 2000, pp. 267-288.9 Tony Wright and Michael Maher, “Al-Qaeda in Our Region: Evil Close to Home”, The Bulletin, 19February, 2002, pp. 22-27.10 Robert Cribb, “Not the Next Yugoslavia: Prospects for the Disintegration of Indonesia”, AustralianJournal of International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, (1999), pp. 169-178.11 For a good discussion of the dynamics of one prominent armed Muslim group, Laskar Jihad, seeMichael Davis “Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia”,Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 24, no. 1, (2002), pp. 12-32.12 Donald J. Porter, “Citizen Participation through Mobilisation and the Rise of Political Islam inIndonesia”, The Pacific Review, vol. 15, no. 2, 2002, pp. 201-224.13 Peter Chalk, “Australia and Indonesia: Rebuilding Relations After East Timor”, ContemporarySouth East Asia, vol. 23, no. 2, 2001, pp. 233-254; Anthony Milner, “Balancing ‘Asia’ AgainstAustralian Values” in James Cotton and John Ravenhill, (eds), The National Interest in a Global Era:Australia in World Affairs 1996-2000 (Oxford, 2001), pp. 31-50.

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Refugees, People Smuggling and Australia’s Role in the Asia-Pacific RegionRelations between Australia and Indonesia were frosty in February 2002 as many ofIndonesia’s political elite snubbed the Prime Minister’s visit.14 However, by lateFebruary relations thawed with the co-hosting of a regional ministerial conference onpeople smuggling in Bali by Foreign Minister Downer and his Indonesian counterpartHassan Wirajuda. Indonesia made concessions, to Australia’s praise, introducing newcriminal legislation to address people smuggling, followed by a wave of deportationsof asylum seekers. However, Australia could have contributed more vigorously to thecampaign to end people smuggling by addressing the source of problems andrecognising Indonesia’s limitations in terms of its capacity to deal with asylumseekers.15 Instead of assisting Indonesia or, more sensibly, accepting moreresponsibility on-shore, Australia continues to allocate exorbitant amounts of money todetention centres.16 Peter Costello’s Federal Budget for 2002-3 reflected a continuationof this trend. It was, as the Refugee Council of Australia put it, “the most anti-refugeebudget yet delivered by a government not known for its commitment to refugeeprotection”.17 Resources were allotted for a new detention centre on Christmas Islandand over A$100 million dollars per year assigned for funding the “Pacific Solution”.As former Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti astutely points out, the “PacificSolution”

involves the apprehension and forcible removal of people across national boundaries for profit.Desperate people are being dumped in desperately poor island states. These states are paid largebribes to accept people Australia does not want. The people dumped in this way have no guaranteeof protection.18

In the international arena, the policy of pushing refugees on to Pacific states has servedonly to tarnish Australia’s reputation. Additionally, in the Pacific, various governmentrepresentatives, NGOs, church groups and activists were openly and vociferouslycritical of the policy.19

International condemnation has also been bolstered by Australia’s on-shoretreatment of refugees in various detention centres around the country, especially at theWoomera Centre in South Australia. Incidents in Woomera realigned the refugeedebate around a new theme: the issue of child rights. In a country that has stringentchild welfare laws and a family law system orientated around the “best interests of thechild”,20 many believe that it is inconsistent and ill conceived to ignore international

14 Don Greenlees and Ian Henderson, “Indonesian MPs Snub Howard Visit”, The Australian, 6February, 2002, p. 1.15 Tim Lindsey, “Boat People: Why the ‘Indonesia Solution’ Won’t Work Either”, Dissent, no. 8,2002, pp. 42-3.16 For good commentary on this issue, see the editorial in The Australian, 15 May 2002, p. 24.17 Refugee Council of Australia, “RCOA Reflections on the 2002/3 Federal Budget”, May 2002, p.1.18 Chris Sidoti, “Refugee Policy: Is There a Way Out of This Mess?”, Racial Respect Seminar,Canberra, 21 February 2002, p. 3.19 Oxfam/Community Aid Abroad, Adrift in the Pacific: The Implications of Australia’s PacificRefugee Solution (Fitzroy, Victoria, February 2002), pp. 22-25.20 See the recent addition of clauses pertaining to the primacy of the rights of the child in the FamilyLaw Act 1975 (Cth). For commentary, see Juliet Behrens and Phillip Tahmindjis, “Family Law andHuman Rights” in David Kinley (ed.) Human Rights in Australian Law (Sydney, 1998).

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conventions in relation to refugee children in detention.21 Many ordinary Australiansfelt that the government was de-humanising refugees through its handling of the“Children Overboard” scandal.22 Similarly, the government claimed that refugees in theWoomera detention centre “taught” their children to drink shampoo, cut themselves,hunger strike, and stitch their lips together. However, the Human Rights and EqualOpportunity Commission (HREOC) found no evidence of parental encouragement inits fact-finding mission in early 2002.23 The same accusations of child manipulationwere also raised during another well-publicised event, the Bakhtiari affair.24 Twominors, Alamdar Bakhtiari, fourteen, and his brother Muntaza, twelve, escaped fromWoomera detention centre, assisted by protestors, only to be graphically recapturedthree weeks later and returned to what they described as “hell in Woomera”.25 Thegovernment dismissed images of the bedraggled and tearful boys being sent back toWoomera Detention Centre as shameless “pro-refugee” publicity.26 However, it did notdeny that instances of the ingestion of toxic substances, self-mutilation, hunger strikesand, in the case of the Bakhtiaris, escape attempts, occurred in detention.27 Nor did itdeny that these incidents involved children who are incarcerated in the variousdetention centres, especially in Woomera. The controversy was further heightened bythe report on immigration detention centres presented by Justice PrafullachandraBhagwati, regional advisor to the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights.28

The major claim now being leveled at the Australian government is its breach of theUnited Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,29 to which it is a signatory.Evidence of sub-standard living conditions, unacceptable processing times,psychological harm and child detention led the HREOC to conclude that Australiaunequivocally breached CROC in addition to other conventions ratified by Australiaunder international law. With all these issues in mind, it is interesting that Australiamade vocal protestations against human rights abuses in Zimbabwe.

CHOGM, Racial Politics and ZimbabweThe sixteenth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) from 2-5March 2002 again raised the issue of the role and usefulness of the Commonwealth. AnEditorial in The Australian labeled the Commonwealth a “lame-duck institution” anddeclared that the CHOGM process was a “largely irrelevant talk-fest out of touch with

21 John Kerin and Natalie O’Brien, “Boat Children: What Really Happened”, The Australian, 27March 2002, p. 1; Cameron Stewart, “Evidence Thrown Overboard”, The Weekend Australian, 2-3March, 2002, p. 21.22 Dave Corlett, “Asylum Seekers and the New Racism”, Dissent, no. 8, 2002, pp. 46-7 & 59.23 HREOC, Report of Visit by HREOC Officers, Woomera Immigration Detention Centre, 6 February2002.24 Craig Skehan, Mark Riley and Brigid Delaney, “Howard Lashes Asylum Backers”, The SydneyMorning Herald, 20-21 July, 2001, p. 1.25 Amanda Keenan, Andrew McGarry, Megan Saunders and Roger Martin, “‘We are Back inWoomera Hell’”, The Weekend Australian, 20-21 July 2002, p. 1.26 Craig Skehan, Mark Riley and Brigid Delaney, “Howard Lashes Asylum Backers”, The SydneyMorning Herald, 20-21 July, 2002, p. 1.27 Howard Dick, “Australia Dips Below Moral Sea Level”, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August, 2002,p. 11.28 For government critique of the report, see Swapna Majumdar, Cynthia Banham and Craig Skehan,“Advance Copy of ‘Flawed’ Report Went to Ruddock”, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 2002, p. 4.29 Phillip Alston and Glen Brennan, The UN Children’s Convention and Australia (Canberra, 1991).

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political realities”.30 This is a far cry from how the Commonwealth once featured inAustralian foreign policy. The Commonwealth was central to Australia and Australianidentity in the post-Second World War era when Australia still looked to the UnitedKingdom for leadership. It was pivotal in the campaign against apartheid in SouthAfrica, and led the international community in respect of debt relief and sustainabledevelopment platforms in the 1970s in particular. However, the Commonwealth andCHOGM are unquestionably less relevant in the contemporary political era. Asidefrom the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, there is little in the way of“substantial” world power within the Commonwealth, with most member states unableeven to afford to host a Meeting.31 The fifty-four-member association consistsprimarily of smaller, weaker and developing states.32 The actual funding and capacityof the Commonwealth to implement changes or reforms is also limited. It is more thanever, as Greg Sheridan points out, “a minimal Commonwealth”.33 For example, theannual Commonwealth budget is a mere £35 million and predominantly targets smalldevelopment projects and administrative assistance between member states. In additionto these woes, CHOGM events are often marred by the absence of certain state leaders.The 2002 Meeting proved no exception. Only thirty-five of the fifty-one states thatattended the Meeting sent a Head of State or Government. Notably, the 2002 Meetinglacked several key leaders, with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad andIndia’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee not attending. Additionally, GeneralMusharraf was again absent from CHOGM, Pakistan having been expelled from theCommonwealth following the 1999 military coup that brought General Musharraf topower. The Commonwealth had earlier decided that the coup, in conjunction with thefailure to hold democratic elections, breached Commonwealth ideals of democracy,human rights and good governance enshrined in the Harare principles. The absence ofPakistan in a period when it is so central to the “War on Terror” was noticeable.Pakistan has a vital importance to current foreign policy because of its proximity toAfghanistan, the huge number of Afghan refugees residing in its territory, and theactivities of Muslim political groups in various parts of the country. The continuingtension between the nuclear powers India and Pakistan further highlighted the absenceof both countries from CHOGM 2002. Instead of the Commonwealth addressing suchissues, it was forced to refocus on a region it has long neglected, Africa, and to addressthe phenomenon dominating contemporary global politics, terrorism.

Australia has actively avoided “African issues” since the end of apartheid in SouthAfrica. The dominant view is that Australia’s interests lie elsewhere, especially andobviously in the Asia-Pacific region. Former Prime Ministers Malcolm Fraser and BobHawke were very Africa-orientated in their foreign policy formulations. Their interestreflected the Commonwealth’s particular involvement with, and focus on, Africaduring the 1970s. However, the subsequent creation and strengthening of newinstitutions such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the deepening ofAustralia’s allegiance to the United States has meant a stronger focus on Asia and amove away from Africa.34 CHOGM 2002 therefore signaled an exception in Australian 30 “CHOGM Deal Too Little for Zimbabwe”, The Australian, 9 March, 2002, p. 12.31 See the Round Table Editorial, “Australia and the Commonwealth, Before the Brisbane CHOGM”,no. 361, September 2002, p. 469.32 Greg Sheridan, “Howard’s Big Opportunity to Hold the Floor”, The Weekend Australian, 2-3March 2002, p. 17.33 Greg Sheridan, “Uncivil War Over the Size of a Feather”, The Australian, 5 March, 2002, p. 7.34 John Ingleson (ed.), Regionalism, Subregionalism and APEC (Clayton, 1997).

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foreign policy. The Meeting brought the Zimbabwean regime of Robert Mugabe intothe world spotlight.35 Australia’s prominence in critiquing Zimbabwe, while laudablein bringing Africa back onto Australia’s foreign policy agenda, was also useful indeflecting the attention of participants away from Australia’s own abuses of humanrights. As mentioned above, Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers, its incarcerationof children and handling of riots in Woomera, and the establishment of detentioncentres in the Pacific all clearly violate aspects of international law and have led tointernational condemnation.36 However, it was Zimbabwe and not Australia that drewworld attention at CHOGM 2002 and threatened to divide member states. Ethniccontroversies entwined the debate that ensued over Zimbabwe. Commentatorssimplistically divided the Commonwealth into two camps: the “white, liberal-democratic” states [Australia, Canada, Britain, New Zealand] who wanted to expelZimbabwe versus the “black, ex-colonial not-really–liberal-democratic” states[Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya] that supported Mugabe’s rule.37 However, this simpledichotomy was inaccurate on several levels. First, there were divisions between the“white, liberal-democratic” states. New Zealand and the United Kingdom campaignedvigorously for the immediate suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth duringCHOGM. By contrast, Australia and Canada pushed for such decisions to be madeafter the Zimbabwean elections.38 In the end, there was strong support across the boardfor allowing the 9-10 March Zimbabwean elections to take place before any decisionwas made vis-à-vis its position in the Commonwealth.39 Second, it is myopic todichotomise the Commonwealth member states into “black” and “white”, “colonial”and “non-colonial”. The reality is that all the Commonwealth states are heterogeneousand colonial and postcolonial identities are extremely complex and malleable. Third,there were African states that criticised Zimbabwe, and segments of the “white, liberaldemocratic states” that supported aspects of Mugabe’s leadership.

With such complex relations at play, CHOGM created a troika consisting of Nigeria,South Africa and Australia to settle on the matter following the Zimbabwean elections.It was decided that if an international observer mission deemed that the elections werenot free and fair then Zimbabwe would face Commonwealth action ranging fromcollective disapproval to suspension.40 After Mugabe’s re-election, a brief meeting ofthe three CHOGM-designated leaders resulted in the decision, amid plenty of publicityand debate, to suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth for one year. Despite itssuspension from the Commonwealth, international condemnation and the applicationof sanctions, the situation in Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate with famine nowlooming. At the time of writing, Australia is also considering “targeted sanctions”, akinto those adopted by the European Union, the United States and Switzerland, tofinancially strangle Mugabe’s regime.41 However, the substantive impact of suchsanctions is questionable. If there is one clear lesson to be learnt from the massivesanctions imposed upon Iraq, it is that such measures usually harm civilians more thanthe regime targeted. This is likely to be the case in Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe 35 For an outline of some of the Commonwealth’s key concerns regarding Zimbabwe, see DerekIngram, “Commonwealth Update”, The Round Table, no. 361, September 2002, p. 471-474.36 Irene Khan, “Australia’s Poor Human Rights Record”, The Australian, 6 March, 2002, p. 13.37 See the editorial in the New Straits Times, 7 March 2002.38 Dennis Shanahan, “Zimbabwe Deal Leaves Bad Blood”, The Australian, 5 March 2002 p. 1.39 Saiful Azhar Abdullah, “Criticism over CHOGM Quashed”, New Straits Times, 6 March 2002.40 CHOGM Statement on Zimbabwe, 4 March, 2002.41 Megan Saunders, “Sanctions Plan for Mugabe”, The Australian, 17 July, 2002, p. 6.

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continues his coercive rule despite sanctions imposed by the European Union and theUnited States. The efficacy of Australian sanctions in addition to those already in placetherefore seems questionable. However, sanctions and expulsion are “good” foreignpolicy in so far as they openly condemn human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and, for thetime being, put Africa back on the Australian and Commonwealth agenda.

The second central issue raised at CHOGM 2002 was the impact of the terrorist actsof September 11, 2001. Although Zimbabwe was the focus of media attention duringCHOGM, the discussions surrounding terrorism were more significant regionally. In apositive sense, CHOGM provided an opportunity to develop much needed cross-cultural dialogue on the post-September 11 era.42 CHOGM fora entertained debatesconcerning what constitutes terrorism; how terror should be addressed; and who shouldcarry the grave responsibilities of combating terrorism.43 The outcomes were moreenlightened than many expected, with Malaysia taking a key stance on the importanceof examining why terrorism thrives in poor, weak communities. The issue of povertyand disparity between northern and southern states was raised by numerous Africanstates, and also by Malaysia and Bangladesh. The Coolum Communiqué reflected theseconcerns and agreed that poverty and disparity were central to examining the sourcesof terrorism. This was considered to be a break-through by many CHOGMparticipants, in particular by states such as Malaysia that had argued that thoroughexamination, and recognition, of the roots of terror were absent from the internationalagenda. Thus, Point 6 of the Coolum Communiqué stipulated that “[w]hile terroristactivities are unconscionable and should be eradicated forthwith, the challenge is tounderstand the root causes of those despicable acts and deal with them appropriately”.44

The subsequent Point in the Communiqué went on to recognise the difficulties faced by“small and less developed members of the Commonwealth” in meeting the obligationsspecified by the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1373. It was resolvedthat the more developed and prosperous states would undertake to support and assistthe less developed states in the Commonwealth in any way possible in order to combatterrorism. How this will take place in practice is yet to be resolved, however substantialworking groups were established to examine potentials and possibilities. On this level,CHOGM 2002 was hailed as a success, and Australia’s role in this success seen assignificant. Especially noted was the growing agreement between Australia andMalaysia with respect to terrorism and joint military co-operation. This new andengaging dialogue, fostered at CHOGM, and developed over the subsequent months,produced the most significant military link between the two states since the 1950s. Itnevertheless is a dialogue that overlooks human rights controversies in Malaysia and isaimed squarely, and therefore narrowly, at terrorism.45

East Timorese Independence and the Grab for Oil and Gas ResourcesThe brutal backlash against the East Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia inthe August 1999 referendum led to Australia’s most comprehensive commitment ofmilitary forces abroad since the Vietnam War. The Australian-led International Force

42 Sunder Katwala, “The Commonwealth Summit”, Guardian Limited, 1 March, 2002, [online]http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4365905,00.html [accessed 15/8/02]43 Mahmood Mamdani, “An African Perspective on Contemporary Terrorism”, Development, vol. 45,no. 2, June 2002, pp.25-27.44 CHOGM, Coolum Communiqué, 5 March 2002, Coolum, Queensland, Australia.45 Craig Skehan, “Human Rights Fail to Rate Mention as Pact is Signed” Sydney Morning Herald,August 2, 2002, p. 9.

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for East Timor (INTERFET) stabilised the country within weeks of both pre- and post-referendum violence. The successful INTERFET mission helped ease East Timor intoits first democratic elections and its declaration of independence on May 20, 2002. Thespectacular revelry that followed allowed Prime Minister Howard to bask in thereflected glory of “good foreign policy”. It was noted that during the May 2002celebrations the Prime Minister “had a triumphant air as he strode betweenappointments” proclaiming independent East Timor the “crowning-glory in[Australian] foreign policy”.46 Australia continues to support East Timor in numerousways, with a huge role in building up the latter’s fledgling military establishment, theEast Timor Defence Force (ETDF). During the armed struggle (1975-1999), EastTimorese leaders, notably José Ramos Horta, had decried the future need for militaryforces. Ramos Horta proposed that only a gendarmerie would be necessary in theindependent state. The about-turn in East Timorese policy can be attributed to the 1999Indonesian military-sponsored violence, the potential problems posed by ex-FALINTIL47 combatants, as well as to substantial Australian logistic and financialsupport for the new armed forces.48 Australia has committed A$3.9 billion dollars toEast Timor between September 1999 and June 2004. Less than 10% of this amount isear-marked for non-military activities. The ETDF will be allocated A$13.5 milliondollars a year, the equivalent of approximately 6.13% of the total East Timorese annualbudget.49 It can be argued that in a new state in desperate need of basic infrastructureand grappling with education, health and judicial funding crises,50 this type of militaryexpenditure is unnecessary and lacking in foresight. The poorer East Timorese peoplebecome, the more unsettled politics will be and (as if in a self-fulfilling prophesy) themore the military may be drawn into politics to quell popular dissatisfaction.

Irrespective of the debate concerning the necessity of the new ETDF, a far morepressing question remains: Why has Australia recently invested so much in East Timorafter it spent nearly a quarter of a century trying to destroy its claims to independence?One prominent commentator explains Australian support for East Timor’sindependence as a “damage-limitation exercise given Canberra’s unstinting support ofIndonesia throughout the latter’s twenty-four-year genocidal occupation.”51 Howeveranother view, raised by Australian Senator Bob Brown, is the precarious question of oiland gas reserves in the Timor Sea. The May 20 celebrations were marred somewhat byprotestors in Dili and elsewhere petitioning Australia’s stance on East Timor’s oil andgas reserves.52 The oil and gas reserves are divided between two main fields, Bayu-Undan and Greater Sunrise. The Timor Sea Treaty, signed between Prime MinisterHoward and East Timorese President Xanana Gusmão effectively split the Bayu-

46 Ian McPhedran, “World’s Newest Nation Greets a Free Dawn”, Courier Mail, 20 May 2002, p. 1.47 Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional Timor Leste.48 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, New Neighbour, New Challenges: Australia and the Securityof East Timor (Barton: ASPI, 2002), p. 23.49 Hamish McDonald, “East Timor Builds a New Kind of Army”, Sydney Morning Herald, April 20-21 2002, p. 16.50 For an outline of the complex restructuring that needs to take place, see Patrick Candio and RolandBleiker, “Peacebuilding in East Timor”, Pacific Review, vol. 14, no. 1, 2002, pp. 63-84.51 Jim Aubrey, “Canberra: Jakarta’s Trojan Horse in East Timor” in Paul Hainsworth and StephenMcCloskey, The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia (London,2000), p. 146.52 Robert Wesley-Smith, “Australia’s Treachery, Again”, Inside Indonesia, no. 71, July-September2002, p. 12.

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Undan field 90-10 in East Timor’s favour. The Bayu-Undan field is worth an estimatedA$15 billion dollars and, although East Timor will receive the most substantial portion,the Northern Territory is going to be the base for the gas line, providing extraemployment and investments to Australia. However, the controversy surrounds themore lucrative Greater Sunrise deposit, which is estimated to be worth A$30 billiondollars and 82 per cent of its royalties are currently allocated in Australia’s favour.Why is Australia claiming such a large amount? The answer lies in the disputedmaritime borders which Australia failed to agree upon when it was seeking the sameoil and gas reserves through treaties with Indonesia. Under current internationalmaritime law Australia has a weak case for claiming such a large share of the GreaterSunrise deposit.53 International law stipulates that the final power of arbitration oversuch a maritime issue rests with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.East Timor was initially unaware of this process and has only recently been briefed bykey US Legal Advisor, Peter Galbraith. In response, East Timor raised the possibilityof ICJ arbitration with Australia. As a counter measure, Australia promptly withdrewfrom the ICJ’s jurisdiction on maritime boundaries, claiming it had “several” disputedmaritime issues. Yet no other pressing disputes appear to warrant such a dramaticmove. The result is a deadlock that remains to be resolved.

Australian and the International Criminal CourtAt the 1998 Rome Conference Australia gave unwavering support for theestablishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC). Foreign Minister Downerstressed the need for an adequate balance between international and domestic legaljurisdiction whilst also stating that crimes such as ethnic cleansing, systematic sexualassault and mass torture fall within the Court’s ambit. However, on the domestic front,as ratification dates approached, in early 2002 tensions developed within the governingcoalition. Elements of the Australian government considered that the ICC wouldintrude upon Australian sovereignty. One National Party MP claimed that it wouldleave Australian citizens open to the decisions of so-called “African and Asianjudges”.54 There was also a strong tendency among some government members tofollow the US in the latter’s rejection of the ICC. Indeed, supporters of the ICC felt thatPrime Minister Howard, during his visit to Washington D.C. at the time, had beenoverly swayed by US denouncers of the Court. Other commentators felt thatunhindered support for the US approach was not pragmatic, since the US holds aposition of strength and power globally that Australia does not share. In this light, PaulKelly argued that

[t]he worst strategic blunder Australia could make today would be to duplicate […] Americanunilateralism as a model for our role in the world. Such a folly would doom Australia to fewerfriends and diminishing influence.55

The ICC came into being on July 1, 2002 and will collate allegations of genocide, warcrimes and crimes against humanity. In the end Australia did ratify the ICC, although itwas not one of the original sixty states to do so, as proponents such as Foreign MinisterDowner and Attorney-General Daryl Williams had hoped. Additionally, Australia

53 Don Greenlees, “Howard Insists Gas Treaty is a Good Deal”, Australian, 20 May, 2002, p. 6.54 Cited in Alex J. Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, “Justice Beyond Border? Australia and theInternational Criminal Court” (forthcoming), Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no.3, 2002.55 Paul Kelly, “Risks, Yes, but Join the World”, The Australian, 17 July, 2002, p. 11.

538 Christine Mason

tabled a declaration with its ratification reaffirming the primacy of Australian domesticlaw, preventing ICC prosecution of any Australian citizen without the consent of theAttorney-General, and granting Australia the discretion to define “genocide”, “warcrimes” and “crimes against humanity”. The effects of the ICC on Australia remain tobe seen, however it is significant to note that key commentators view Australia’s riderto ratification as both “unnecessary” and “unhelpful”.56

ConclusionAustralia has found itself in the world spotlight over the last six months of 2002 forcontrasting reasons. On one hand, it led the critique of the Mugabe regime inZimbabwe and was central to that country’s suspension from the Commonwealth. Theworld watched as Prime Minister Howard hosted CHOGM 2002 and unified leaders inthe campaign against human rights abuses and election fraud in Zimbabwe. Australiaalso featured prominently in East Timor’s celebrations, as a champion of the latter’sindependence. Despite tension between various members of government, Australia alsoratified the ICC and is poised to contribute to its growth and operation. Finally,relations in Asia improved overall with increasing agreement to cooperate in the “WarAgainst Terror”. However, issues that drew critical world attention overshadowedthese foreign policy achievements. Australia’s continued violation of numerousinternational conventions, its insistence on pushing the “refugee problem” onto weakerPacific states. and its internal treatment of asylum seekers in detention centres all standin stark contrast to its stance on human rights in Zimbabwe. It appears that it is easierto call another state’s treatment of its citizens into question than to address the problemof those wanting to be citizens of one’s own country. Notions of “citizenship” do notsimplify the problems Australia is grappling with. Refugee movements defyconventional notions of citizenship and state boundaries, and Australia needs torecognise that the international legal discourse recognises the rights of refugeesirrespective of citizenship. Australia, as a signatory to CROC, the Refugee Conventionand the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has a duty towards thepeople it is incarcerating, shipping off in the “Pacific Solution” and turning away at seawith naval vessels. It would be far sounder for Australia to be internationallyrecognised for a change of policy in this regard rather than to morph more noticeablyinto an international pariah state.

56 Alex J. Bellamy and Marianne Hanson, “Justice Beyond Border? Australia and the InternationalCriminal Court” (forthcoming) Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 3, 2002.