ISSU E PAPER...ISSU E PAPER N~ I. This paper was written by Hiram A. Ruiz, Africa policy analyst...

ISSU E PAPER

N~ I

This paper was written by Hiram A. Ruiz, Africa policy analyst with the U.S. Committee forRefugees (USCR). It is based in part on USCR site visits to Liberia and Sierra Leone in October/November1990, and Cate d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in August/September 1991. It was edited by

Virginia Hamilton and produced by Koula Papanicolas.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees receives no government funding. USCR is grateful for the importantsupport it receives from the Ford Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, the John D. and Catherine T.MacArthur Foundation, the Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, and the John Merck Fund. USCR is alsograteful to many individual contributors.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees is also grateful to a number of agencies and individuals, includingthe following, for facilitating our site visits to Liberia and neighboring countries: AICF, Monrovia; AyeleAjavon-Cox; Margaret McKelvey; Janet Fleischman; Joe Gettier; Alhaj S.A. Kabba; Jane Martin; Joyce Mends-Cole; UNHCR Sub-offices Danane, Gueckedou, and Nzerekore.

Cover photo: USCR/H. Ruiz

@ 1992 American Council for Nationalities Service

ISSN 0882-9281

UPROOTED LIBERIANS:CASUALTIES OF A BRUTAL WAR

The civil war in Liberia has been a wretched trag-edy. It has fanned ethnic hatred, uprooted half thecountry's population, left tens of thousands dead,injured, or orphaned, derailed an already ailingeconomy, and destroyed schools, hospitals, andother infrastructure. The country's collectivepsyche has been permanently scarred by the feroc-ity of the violence and the atrocities committed dur-ing and after the war.

Although a cease-fire declared in November1990 ended the fighting, there is still much insecu-rity, and no real resolution to the conflict. Liberiaremains a divided country. Monrovia, the capital,is controlled by an interim government installed bythe Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), and protected by an ECOWAS peace-keeping force known as ECOMOG. The rest of thecountry is at least nominally controlled by theNational Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the rebelgroup whose campaign to oust the much criticizedgovernment of the late President Samuel Doetriggered the war. The remnants of Doe's ArmedForces of Liberia (AFL), accused of perpetratingsome of the worst atrocities of the war, maintains abase near Monrovia, as does a splinter rebel group,the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia(INPFL). In mid- 1991, a new armed Liberian factionbased in Sierra Leone entered the fray, leading torenewed fighting in border areas.

ECOWAS has made limited progress (atleast on paper) towards resolving the politicalimpasse. It has reached an agreement with thehead of the NPFL, Charles Taylor, and with thepresident of the interim government in Monrovia,Dr. Amos Sawyer, to disarm and encamp the armedfactions under ECOMOG supervision, and thenhold internationally monitored elections. But the

agreement has resulted in little concrete action.Some Liberians express guarded optimism

about the prospects for peace and reconciliation.Others worry that the peace process will collapse,resulting in renewed fighting. Most of the morethan 663,000 Liberian refugees in neighboringcountries want to return home, but are reluctant todo so until they see definite action to resolve theconflict. Inside Liberia, more than 500,000 peopleare displaced, many separated from their families.They and many other Liberians endure severehardship, and many still live in.fear. In NPFL-controlled areas, undisciplined boy-soldiers harassthe civilian population. While the NPFL leadershiphas sought to curb their abuses, it apparently lackscontrol over its fighters in some remote areas of thecountry.

Though Monrovia is generally safe, there arestill reports of sporadic looting and other abuses,particularly by AFL soldiers. Since the cease-fire, ithas experienced a tremendous population explo-sion.

Although there is an apparent return tonormalcy in Monrovia, one does not have to scratchvery deep below the surface to find that it is false.Some shops and businesses have reopened, butrelatively few people have jobs. Most depend oncontinuing free food distributions and on financialhelp from relatives in the United States. Amongboth young and old there is still fear, shock, anger,and a desire for revenge.

In neighboring C6te d'Ivoire, Guinea, andSierra Leone, the much-heralded hospitality of thelocal people, who welcomed the refugees into theirhomes and shared their food with them untilinternational aid arrived, is wearing thin. For manyrefugees, this "cohabitation" (the expression used in

Casultie ofa Brtal arICasualties of a Brutal War 1

the region for locals and refugees living together)continues to work well, but for others, the honey-moon is over.

Besides its effect on political dynamicswithin West Africa, the Liberian civil war has alsosharply affected relations between the United Statesand Liberia, whose ties stretch back more than ahundred years, to the "founding" of Liberia, by freedblack American slaves.

Though the United States has been thesingle largest contributor of emergency aid toLiberia and Liberian refugees since the fightingbroke out, the U.S. government has largely re-mained on the sidelines. At the height of the war,the political and/or military intervention that manyLiberians expected from the United States to stopthe bloodshed never came.

Political and economic realities are suchthat Liberia will have to turn to the United Statesfor help in rebuilding the country when that be-comes possible. With the Administration's atten-tion fixed on other countries also seeking to rebuildafter historic upheavals (particularly the formerSoviet republics), advocates for aid to Liberia facean uphill struggle.

USCR staff made site visits to Liberia andneighboring countries in November 1990 andAugust 1991 to assess the situation of the civilianvictims of the Liberian conflict. This paper, basedin part on these visits, will address the causes ofLiberian refugees' flight, the conditions of internallydisplaced and other war-affected Liberians in Monroviaand NPFL-held areas, the current situation of refugeesin the countries of asylum, and the impact of the spill-over of the Liberian war into Sierra Leone. It will alsoanalyze the prospects for peace and reconstruction,and make recommendations to the United States andthe international community to assist Liberian refugeesand Liberia as a whole.

THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT*

The Settlers and the American Colonization So-ciety The history of Liberia is often reduced to afew brief lines that recount Liberia's settlement in1822 by emancipated slaves from the UnitedStates, its becoming the first independent republicin Africa in 1847, its subsequent domination by thesettlers' descendants, often referred to as the

Americo-Liberians, the bloody coup that broughtSamuel Doe to power, and the 1985 election that herigged to stay in office.

But there is much in Liberia's history towhich we can trace the roots of the present con-flict. It is a history filled with ironies and inequities,lofty ideals and base realities.

The first permanent black American settle-ment in what is now Liberia was established in1822, sponsored by the American ColonizationSociety (ACS), whose members included a numberof prominent Americans. The settlers' first yearswere difficult. Many died of disease. Local chiefs,angered by the ACS's attempts to block the slavetrade in the region, attacked the settlers.

By 1828, the settlement, named Monrovia,was home to some 1,200 American blacks and asmall number of "Congoes", Africans who had beenfreed from slave ships bound for the United Statesand set free in Monrovia. During the next decade,new settlements sprouted along the Liberian coast,and the settler population doubled. In 1847, afterthe ACS dramatically reduced aid to the settlement,Liberia declared its independence, becoming thefirst republic on the African continent. GreatBritain and other European countries recognizedLiberia's independence. But the United States,despite its critical role in Liberia's formation, with-held recognition until 1862, reportedly to avoid thepresence of a black ambassador in Washington.

Ironies and Inequities Despite the lofty sentimentsexpressed in Liberia's motto, "The Love of LibertyBrought Us Here," the emancipated slaves who settledin Liberia quickly adopted the ways of their formeroppressors. From the outset, Americo-Liberians heldthemselves apart from the indigenous Africans, whomthey regarded as inferior and uncivilized.

Although they represented only 5 percent ofthe residents of Liberia, the Americo-Liberiansabsolutely controlled the country's economic,political, and social life. Their superior statuseventually extended to the growing number ofCongoes, who integrated with them. By 1860, thenumbers of Americo-Liberians and Congoes were

* Primary sources for this historical section include:Liberia: A Country Study, American University Foreign AreaStudies, 1984; and Liberiaw A Promise Betrayed, LawyersCommittee for Human Rights, 1986.

2 Uprooted Liberians


LIBERIA AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIESRefugee and Displaced Populations

Freetown SIERRA LEONE

Kenema.*

PujehunZimmi

ATLATIC CEANiaiATLANTIC OCEAN B Grand GedehCounty

SinoeCounty Maryland

County

Grand KruCounty

EI1 Areas where Liberian refugees are concentrated

Area where Sierra Leonean refugees are concentrated

Areas where internally displaced Sierra Leoneans are

Note: Internally displaced Liberians are located throughout Liberia, especially in Monrovia and in thesoutheastern counties.

roughly equal (approximately 5,000 each).For the better part of the next 100 years,

indigenous Africans remained second class citi-zens. Most lived in the interior, in regions largelyunexplored until the early 1900s. Little attention

was paid to their needs, and the gulf--both eco-nomic and social--between Americo-Liberians andlocals widened. Some became integrated into theAmerico-Liberian community through intermarriageor through the ward system, in which indigenous

Casualties of a Brutal War 3


children were taken into Americo-Liberian house-holds, sometimes remaining servants but oftenbecoming integrated with the family. Over time, asmore Congoes and locals integrated with Americo-Liberians, a new urban elite, predominantly but notexclusively Americo-Liberian, emerged.

During the 1920s, the economicallystrapped Liberian government raised funds byproviding "contract laborers," usually forciblyrecruited from among the indigenous population, toplantation owners in Spanish-held islands off thecoast of Africa. In 1930, the League of Nationsfound the Liberian government guilty of, in effect,complicity in promoting a form of slavery. A Leaguereport described Liberia as a republic of 12,000citizens with 1,000,000 subjects, and condemnedthe Liberian government for making no effort toimprove the lot of the indigenous population.

Tubman and the "Unification Policy" WilliamV.S. Tubman, often called the "Maker of ModemLiberia", was Liberia's president for 27 years, begin-ning in 1944. Tubman implemented a "UnificationPolicy," aimed at bringing Liberia's indigenouspeople into the social and political mainstream(without necessarily weakening the Americo-Liberians' dominant role). Although the Americo-Liberian oligarchy remained firmly in control, thesituation of indigenous Liberians improved.

Tubman died in 1971 and was succeeded byWilliam R. Tolbert, whose years in power werecharacterized by corruption and poverty, but alsoby a maturing political opposition. Growing socialunrest exploded on April 14, 1979, in the so-called"rice riots." Tolbert's government proposed anincrease in the price of rice that would ostensiblyaid farmers, but which many viewed as benefittingTolbert and his agriculture minister, both of whomhad large rice farms. A demonstration by some2,000 opponents of the proposed price increasebecame violent when a crowd of some 10,000 otherpeople--mostly from Monrovia's mushroomingunderclass of young, unemployed migrants fromthe interior--began looting stores and rice ware-houses. During the ensuing melee, more than 40people were reportedly killed and 500 injured.

A year after the rice riots, on April 12, 1980,Tolbert was overthrown in a coup led by MasterSergeant Samuel Doe and 16 other noncommis-sioned officers. Tolbert and 27 members of his

security guard were killed and their bodies dumpedin a mass grave. More than 200 other people werekilled during the 3 days following the coup. A weeklater, 13 other top government officials were ex-ecuted in Monrovia. Their execution was shown onLiberian television. The U.S. Assistant Secretary ofState for African Affairs termed the public execution"one of the most shocking spectacles in recentmemory." Nevertheless, U.S. aid to Liberia in-creased dramatically after Doe came to power.

Doe's Decade in Power Whatever hopes Liberiansmay have had for a fairer distribution of wealth andpower were soon dashed. Doe suspended the constitu-tion and declared martial law. He concentrated powerin the military, which was dominated by his own eth-nic group, the Krahn, who represented no more than 4percent of Liberia's population. According to a 1986Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report,

Almost from the moment they seizedpower, soldiers of the Liberian Armed Forceshave been a law unto themselves. Looting,arsonfJogging, arbitrary arrests, persistentreports of rape--all of these abuses have beenattributed on a wide scale to soldiers loyal toPresident Doe. Reports of summary execu-tions, meanwhile, have been colored bycredible eyewitness descriptions of horrficbrutality, including castration and dismem-berment.

In 1984, Doe announced that he planned toreturn Liberia to civilian rule. He lifted the ban onpolitical activities and scheduled elections for thefollowing year.

The elections, another infamous landmarkin Liberia's history, took place on October 15,1985. When early results indicated that Doe wouldlose heavily, Doe's supporters cast aside the estab-lished vote counting process and substituted theirown procedure. They declared Doe the winner with50.9 percent of the vote. International observersmonitoring the election, including representatives ofthe U.S. Congress, complained that the electionshad been rigged. The Los Angeles Times labeledthem "one of the most blatant frauds in recentAfrican history."

On November 12, 1985, a month after theelections, there was a coup attempt against Doe.



The coup leaders' radio announcement that theyhad overthrown Doe led to widespread celebrationsin the streets of Monrovia. But it was premature;Doe prevailed.

In the wake of the attempted coup, inter-ethnic tensions among Liberia's indigenous popula-tion, which had been escalating since Doe came topower, exploded. The leader of the attempted coup,Thomas Quinonkpa, was a member of the Gio, agroup living primarily in Nimba County. Krahnsoldiers rounded up hundreds of Gios and Manos(who are closely related to Gios) in Monrovia andsubjected them to what eye-witnesses described as"blood-curdling brutality" before killing them.Truckloads of corpses were dumped into massgraves near the beach. Killings also reportedlyoccurred in Nimba County. Opposition leaderswere detained for months without charge. TheLawyers Committee report, written the year afterthe attempted coup, said, "Liberia is rife with talk ofrevenge. The possibility of massive reprisalsagainst the Krahn if President Doe is violentlyremoved from power is conceded by all sides."

The United States and the Doe Regime Duringthe first five years Doe was in power, the UnitedStates provided his regime with $400 million ineconomic aid and a further $52 million in militaryaid. Prior to Doe, U.S. economic aid to Liberia hadnever exceeded $20 million per year. The U.S. gov-ernment justified the dramatic increase by sayingthat it hoped to influence Doe to move toward democ-ratization (and away from Soviet or Libyan influence).

U.S. pressure helped bring about the 1985elections, but to many Liberians the U.S. governmentundermined the democratization process by validatingelection results that were repudiated by virtually allothers in the international community. AlthoughU.S. aid to Doe's regime diminished considerablybetween 1986 and 1989, many Liberians continued toperceive the United States as Doe's patron. TheLawyers Committee report concluded, "Many Liberiansbelieve that the United States, far from promotingstability, is sowing the seeds of further conflict."

A BRUTAL WAR

Rebel Incursion Marks Start of War The Liberiancivil war began in December 1989, when a rebel

group calling itself the National Patriotic Front ofLiberia (NPFL) attacked AFL positions in NimbaCounty. The NPFL initially consisted of only a fewhundred men under the leadership of Charles Tay-lor (who while serving in the Doe government sev-eral years earlier had been accused of embezzlingnearly a million dollars). Taylor and his men weresaid to be backed by Libya.

The AFL retaliated against the mostly Gioand Mano civilian population of Nimba County.AFL soldiers razed whole villages. They stole, shot,and killed at will. The viciousness of their re-sponse, and the fact that it was directed primarilyagainst civilians, set the tone for the war. TheNPFL's ranks grew quickly as other Gios andManos in Nimba joined the group. The NPFL alsoattacked civilians, primarily members of the Krahnand Mandingo ethnic groups (Doe and many AFLleaders and soldiers were Krahn; Mandingos,mostly traders who had migrated to Liberia fromGuinea during the past few decades, were viewed assupporting the Doe regime).

What began as a campaign to oust Doe frompower became very quickly an all out, ethnicallybased civil war.

The war spread rapidly. NPFL forces,though comprised mostly of poorly trained youngrecruits (including a high percentage of boys intheir early to mid-teens), gained control first of mostof Nimba, and then large areas of surroundingcounties. As the fighting spread, tens of thousandsof Liberians poured across the borders into Guineaand Cote d'Ivoire. By early February 1990, 120,000Liberian refugees had fled.

A Reign of Terror From its onset, the war wascharacterized by victimization of civilians by all ofthe armed factions. Survivors describe not justphysical abuse, rape, and wanton killing, but alsomutilations, people forced to eat their own bodyparts, the sick and elderly burned alive in theirhuts, and pregnant women's stomachs torn openwith bayonets and their unborn babies ripped fromtheir wombs. Men, women, and children wereforced to watch the torture and execution of theirloved ones. Anyone who protested or even cried outrisked being killed.

As the fighting approached Monrovia, hun-dreds of thousands 6f the capital's residents fled.Most headed for the Sierra Leonean border, though


Casualties of a Brutal War5

The Liberian civil war resulted in countless civilian casualties. Many thousands were killed or injured in the fighting, otherswere tortured, mutilated, or forced to watch the killing of their loved ones. Hunger felled others still. This severely malnour-ished woman was being taken to Monrovia in a wheelbarrow by her husband, who hoped to find food and medical care for herthere. USCR/H. Ruiz

some sought refuge in Liberia's interior. As AFLforces became increasingly cornered in Monrovia,they went on a rampage of looting and killing.Many of the victims were Gios and Manos, but noone was safe. Seeking safety in numbers, civiliansgathered in churches and other buildings. On May30, AFL soldiers attacked the United Nationscompound, one such refuge. They entered thecompound, beat the men, women, and childrengathered there, and abducted more than 40 people,many of whom they reportedly shot in a nearby field.

USCR interviewed a survivor of the attackon the UN compound:

When the soldiers jumped over thefence, they killed three people on the spot.They grabbed people and held them atgunpoint. They raped two women in front ofeveryone. They beat the people who were inthe yard. People were trying to run away,shouting and crying. The soldiers were justshooting.



By June, NPFL forces were on the outskirtsof Monrovia. So too were the forces of a secondrebel group, the Independent National PatrioticFront of Liberia (INPFL), which had split off fromthe NPFL in February. Although observers believedthat the rebels would capture the city fairly quickly,that did not happen. There were major skirmishes--including indiscriminate shelling of the city--amongthe various groups, but a decisive battle nevercame. Instead, throughout July and August, inwhat has been described as a reign of terror, AFL,NPFL, and INPFL "troops" brutalized the remainingcivilian population.

Rebels, often bizarrely dressed in wigs anddresses and wearing masks, executed anyonesuspected of being a Krahn or a Doe supporter.Prince Johnson, the INPFL's leader, was photo-graphed personally executing civilians, including aLiberian Red Cross worker who was handcuffed toa French relief worker. AFL soldiers similarly shotGios and Manos--and anyone else who crossedtheir path.

The Massacre at St. Peter's Church On July 30,AFL soldiers perpetrated the worst atrocity of thewar. At about 2:00 a.m., some 30 AFL soldiers en-tered St. Peter's Lutheran Church, a designatedRed Cross shelter where an estimated 2,000 people,mostly Gios and Manos, had taken refuge. Thesoldiers opened fire on the defenseless civilians,killing 200 to 300 people and injuring hundreds ofothers. After the attack, many of the survivors,including many wounded, fled to the nearbyU.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.AID) compound, which by then was vacant save forthe caretaker. AFL soldiers later burst into thecompound, captured more than 350 people, andreportedly shot them on a nearby beach. Alto-gether, some 600 men, women, and children weremassacred that day.

The total number of Liberians killed duringthe war is not known. Estimates range from10,000 (U.S. State Department), to 50,000 (reliefworker), to more than 100,000 (member of interimgovernment in Monrovia).

The United States Steers Clear: West Africa In-tervenes As the fighting escalated, there were callsfor the United States to intervene, either to end thefighting, or at least to provide a safe haven for civil-

ians. The Washington Post said that one of the lastforeigners to leave Monrovia, a relief worker with aFrench medical group, "criticized the U.S.government... [for] shirking a humanitarian respon-sibility to protect civilian lives by refusing to inter-vene in the Liberian conflict." But the UnitedStates opted not to intervene militarily. A U.S.official told the Post, "The bottom line is, it's not inthe United States' interest to get in the middle ofthis fight.... It is not something we would putU.S. boys on the line for."

In June, the Administration deployed 2, 100Marines on four ships off the coast of Liberia, butthey remained offshore. On August 6, after John-son threatened foreigners in Monrovia,U.S. helicopters based on the ships evacuated theAmericans who remained internally (a skeletonstaff, guarded by Marines, remained at the em-bassy).

In the absence of any U.S. or UN action, the16-member Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) decided to send a peace-keepingforce to Liberia. There had been dissent among itsmembers--particularly between French and En-glish-speaking member countries--as to what roleECOWAS should play in the crisis, particularlymilitarily. Some French-speaking countries sup-ported Taylor and were against military interven-tion. Nigeria, an English-speaking country that hassought to expand its influence in the region, op-posed Taylor.

In mid-August, ECOWAS began deploying afive-nation (Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, andSierra Leone) peace-keeping force known asECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) toMonrovia. Initially, ECOMOG had little impact onthe security situation. By early September, how-ever, it established control over a small area of thecity near the port on Bushrod Island.

A year later, in an August 1991 interviewwith the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), theU.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Peter De Vos, said,"Early on in the crisis, President Bush made adecision--I think a wise one--not to send Americansin.to either kill Liberians or to be killed by them."De Vos added, "From day one [of the war], we weretelling Doe to stop what he was doing in Nimba.We tried to get the groups together. We had[Deputy Secretary of State for African AffairsHerman] Cohen in the area. But we do feel that it



is a Liberian problem, and they need to resolve it."For many Liberians, the U.S. decision not to

intervene came as a shock. A member of theInterim Government of Liberia put it this way:"Where was our oldest friend when we were goingthrough this nightmare? Many people flocked toMonrovia thinking that the Marines would land andstop the massacre." Despite "appeal upon appealupon appeal," he said, that did not happen.

Ambassador de Vos rejected Liberians'criticisms that the United States should have donemore and emphasized the Administration's at-tempts through diplomatic channels to stop thefighting. He said, "I disagree that the United Statesdiscarded Liberia. Did we prevent war? No. Butdid we try? Yes, we tried damned hard.. .but theLiberians wouldn't cooperate."

Doe Killed: ECOMOG Goes on the Offensive OnSeptember 10, 1990, Prince Johnson and his mencaptured Doe outside ECOMOG's headquarters.They tortured and killed him, and put his mutilatedbody on public display. INPFL cameras filmed theentire event.

Doe's death marked a turning point in thedynamics of the conflict. ECOMOG, which accord-ing to a New York Times report was originally sentto "curb anarchy.. .and restore a measure of order,"launched a military offensive against the NPFL. Attimes fighting alongside INPFL and AFL troops, bymid-October ECOMOG had pushed the NPFL out ofMonrovia. When ECOMOG captured the Fendellcampus of the University of Liberia, a few milesoutside Monrovia, they freed tens of thousands ofcivilians who had been forced to leave Monrovia bythe NPFL forces. (The NPFL had also kidnappedthousands of West Africans, including diplomats andjournalists, whom they detained until late 1991.)

For the first time in months, there was nofighting in Monrovia. But looting and harassmentof civilians continued, especially at the hands ofremaining AFL soldiers, who remained holed up onthe grounds of the late President's Executive Man-sion along with more than 2,000 of their relativesand other Krahn civilians. INPFL and, reportedly,even some ECOMOG soldiers also participated inthe looting. As Monrovians and other displacedLiberians poured into the city, thousands of nation-als of other African countries who had been trappedin Monrovia during the war converged on the port,

hoping to leave on one of the ECOMOG ships thatferried supplies and troops to the city.

Shortly after ECOMOG secured most ofMonrovia, and only one day after the first shipmentof food in months reached Monrovia, USCR anivedin the beleaguered Liberian capital, accompanyingstaff of the U.S. AID Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance (OFDA).

A team from the medical relief groupModecins sans frontieres (MSF-Belgium) was al-ready in Monrovia, as was a representative of theU.S.-based Catholic Relief Services (CRS), whichalso had a team helping to distribute rice in NPFL-held areas. With most hospitals and clinics de-stroyed, no water or electricity in the city, malnutri-tion rampant, and no food in sight, MSF concen-trated on restoring some water supply, organizingtransportation for the little food aid available, andfeeding the most severely malnourished children.

USCR found a city, and a people, devastatedby war. In testimony before the Senate Subcom-mittee on African Affairs on November 27, 1990,shortly after returning from Monrovia, USCR staffsaid:

Mr. Chairman, while in Monrovia, Isaw the battered buildings, burned-out cars,and camps for displaced people that nowcharacterize that city. I witnessed the wide-spread human suffering: people scooping upgrains of rice; emaciated children (thoughfortunately not as many as I'd feared);thousands of men, women, and childrenlining upfor.. .rations; orphans and childrenseparated from their families and now leftalone to survive as best they can. I drovethrough the deserted streets of the Sinkorneighborhood of central Monrovia. No onegoes to Sinkor because it is still the preyingground of the Armed Forces of Liberia...andmost Monrovians are afraid to go anywherenear the AFL.

I had the numbing experience of goingto St Peter's Lutheran Church, site of theAFL's worst atrocity.... Dozens of decompos-ing bodies--men, women, and children--remained heaped one upon the other. Thesmell of death pervaded the area. In thedarkness, I nearly stepped on what was leftof a girl's body....

8 Uprooted LiberiansUprooted Liberians8

Monrovia, November 2, 1990. Thousands of people wait for 8 cups of rice each. For months, as fighting raged in and aroundthe capital, no food reached the city's residents. Water and electricity were cut off and the city's hospitals and clinics wereabandoned and ransacked. After ECOMOG, a West African peace-keeping force, restored calm to Monrovia in October 1990,tens of thousands of displaced people poured into the city, and the first international food aid arrived. Local people organized arelief group, SELF, which distributed the food. In early 1992, conditions in Monrovia are much improved, but most of the city'sresidents are still dependent on food aid. USCR/H. Ruiz

The city's population has swelled asdisplaced people who had been living inareas controlled by Taylor moved intoMonrovia.... Thousands are still living incenters for displaced people.

The one bright spot was the resilience dis-played by Liberians who had lived through the war.Among them were Dorothea Diggs and Blamoh Nelson,two energetic and committed people who founded alocal relief group called Special Emergency Life Food(SELF), which recruited more than 1,000 volunteers tohelp distribute food in the city. One U.S. relief officialdescribed SELF as "the best indigenous start-uporganization" that he had seen in 23 years of relief work.

LIBERIA--A YEAR AFTER THE WAR

A Divided Country On November 27, 1990, all ofthe parties involved in the conflict sat down to talkfor the first time. The initial outcome was positive:they declared a cease-fire. That cease-fire has held,but the parties have failed to find a political solu-tion to the conflict. In the interim, a new group hasjoined the fray: the Sierra Leone-based United Lib-eration Movement of Liberia for Democracy(ULIMO), made up mostly of Krahns (many ofwhom are former AFL soldiers) and Mandingos whofled to Sierra Leone and Guinea during the war.

In early 1992, Liberia remains a dividedcountry. Monrovia is under the administration of



the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU),headed by Interim President Amos Sawyer, a formerprofessor at the University of Liberia and well-known opposition figure during Doe's years inpower. Sawyer was first selected as interim presi-dent at an ECOWAS-convened meeting in Banjul,the Gambia, in August 1990. According to theterms of the agreement reached between ECOWASand meeting participants, Sawyer is barred fromrunning for president when national elections areeventually held.

In March 1991, at a peace conference inMonrovia at which all Liberian political parties,including the NPFL, were to select a new interimgovernment, Sawyer was re-elected interim presi-dent. By the time that vote was taken, however, theNPFL representatives to the conference had walkedout. Taylor himself, citing security concerns, didnot attend.

Although the interim government adminis-ters the capital, ECOMOG remains by far the mostpowerful entity there. ECOMOG provides security,and the presence of its 8,000 troops is a boon tothe fledgling economy.

The AFL continues to exist. Its troops areconfined to barracks on the outskirts of Monroviaand are not supposed to enter the city armed. Butthey reportedly do, looting and harassing civiliansunder cover of night.

The INPFL, which has participated in theinterim government on and off, has been assignedan area east of the capital where its armed men aresupposed to remain. According to an October 1991Africa Watch report, Johnson, who served in theLiberian military in the early 1980s and partici-pated in the failed coup attempt against Doe in1985, is now often described as "erratic, mentallyunstable, and psychotic." Between July and Octo-ber 1991, he personally executed more than half adozen people, mostly his own officers. In January1992, Johnson reportedly executed three more ofhis officers. Africa Watch says, "Prince Johnson isnot accountable to any authority; there are noprocedures in place for bringing him to justice."

The rest of Liberia--more than 95 percent ofthe country's territory--is controlled by the NPFL,which does not recognize the legitimacy of theinterim government in Monrovia. It has set up analternate Liberian government, the National Patri-otic Reconstruction Assembly (NPRA), based in

Gbarnga and headed by Taylor. Some critics claimthat Taylor is using his position as president of theNPRA government to enrich himself.

According to a December 1991 report fromthe SMA Fathers, a missionary group doing reliefwork in Liberia and among Liberian refugees,"Liberia is definitely two different worlds now.... Inthe feeling of some church persons, the division isstill quite serious and reflects a sense that the warshould not yet be regarded as totally completed."

Monrovia: A False Normalcy USCR returned toMonrovia in August 1991 and found a considerablychanged city. The population had mushroomed tomore than 600,000. Some of the damaged build-ings had been repaired, and although checkpointsremained at key intersections, there was no longerthe sense of being in a war zone.

The most dramatic change was the numberof people and the level of activity in the streets.Bars and nightclubs had reopened (they wereamong the first businesses to do so). According toMike Yuknis, a relief worker with Catholic ReliefServices, "They tapped a need that people had: toget their minds off all that had happened." Streetmarkets, shops, cinemas, even some restaurantsand hotels had also reopened. Taxis and busesoperated. Some flights had resumed into Spriggs-Payne Airport, which had been deserted on USCR's1990 visit.

But the sense of normalcy that USCR foundin August 1991 (and which still prevails) was false.A relief worker who has lived in Liberia for manyyears says, "When you visit Monrovia and see allthe activity, you get the feeling that everything isback to normal--but it's only on the surface."Francis Junod, former head of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation inLiberia, adds, "It's a sort of auto-hypnosis. Peoplehave a sense of euphoria that's totally artificial."

There is little real economic activity. Fewpeople have paying jobs. The only industrial plantto reopen is the brewery. The luckiest are thosewho work for the UN system, which despite a slowstart has established a large presence, or for one ofthe many private relief groups now operating in thecity and environs. Government workers, includ-ing doctors, nurses, teachers, police, etc., arepaid "incentives" as and when the governmentcan afford them. However, the government has few


sources of income. Many people in Monrovia (aswell as Liberians in the interior and refugees inneighboring countries) rely on financial remittancesfrom relatives in the United States.

Many of the more than 500,000 displacedpeople in Liberia are in Monrovia, having fled theirhome areas for the greater security that the capitalaffords. The centers for displaced people thatsprang up in Monrovia during the war are gone, butthe displaced continue to live in overcrowdedconditions with relatives or friends who can illafford to assist them. Every day, dozens if nothundreds of people manage to cross into Monrovia,either with NPFL permission, or by avoiding itsdetection. Those caught trying to leave NPFL areasclandestinely are subject to physical abuse anddetention.

Thousands of returnees (former Liberianrefugees, most of whom came back from SierraLeone when the Liberian civil war spilled over intothat country) also live in Monrovia in similar condi-tions to the displaced--and more continue to arrivefrom around the region. On December 1, 1991, aship carrying 787 returnees arrived from Conakry(Guinea) and Freetown (Sierra Leone).

According to a UN report on emergencyneeds in Liberia, "Nearly all displaced persons.. .andreturnees live in destitution, lacking the basicnecessities of life."

Virtually all of Monrovia's residents con-tinue to receive free food, mostly provided by theUnited States. SELF, which remains responsiblefor food distribution, has developed a more sophis-ticated system. According to SELF's DorotheaDiggs, when food first arrived in November 1990,every adult and child went to a distribution site andwas given eight cups of rice. Now, food is distiib-uted to heads of households by locally selectedneighborhood relief teams in 175 neighborhooddistribution centers. Each house in the city isnumbered, and SELF keeps computerizedrecords of the number of residents in eachhouse.

There have been problems and complaintsabout SELF, but considering that it is now distrib-uting food to more than 600,000 people and that itstill relies primarily on volunteers, SELF is doing aremarkable job. The UN report on emergencyneeds in Liberia said, "The success achieved by theinternational community in its response to the

crisis to date owes much to nongovernmentalorganizations, including the locally formed SELF."

According to Ross Mountain, coordinator ofUN emergency relief operations in Liberia, until thesituation in Liberia stabilizes and the economy getsback on its feet, free food distribution is likely tocontinue. However, priority will be given to vulner-able groups and institutions, e.g. schools, hospi-tals, and maternal and child health clinics.'There's nobody starving in Monrovia, but we're notthrowing away food," Mountain said. In 1992, thegeneral ration is likely to be lower, with some foodaid channeled into the private commercial sector toboost the economy and reduce dependency. Food-for-work programs will also be encouraged. (TheWorld Food Program estimates that more than 1.2million Liberians, including all of Monrovia's resi-dents, and displaced or otherwise war-affectedcivilians in NPFL areas, will need food aid in 1992.)

Although there is still a shortage of hospitalbeds and medicines in Monrovia, health care hasimproved since November 1990. Malnutritionamong children, which was 35 percent in November1990 (some reports estimated that at the height ofthe war malnutrition was more double that figure),was only 4.5 percent by March 1991, and 2.5percent by October 1991. Many of the supplemen-tal feeding centers that provided extra nourishmentto those most at risk (usually children and preg-nant or lactating women) have closed. In August1991, 25 percent of the more than 5,000 peopleattending the feeding centers operated at that timeby Action International Contre la Faim (AICF) werenot children but undernourished elderly people.

The psychological impact of the war alsoremains strong. One relief worker interviewed said,'There is still a lot of animosity about what hap-pened in the war, both in Monrovia and on theother side [the NPFL areas]. I get the feeling thatpeople are waiting for the roads [between Monroviaand NPFL areas] to open to take revenge." Manyfamilies remain separated. There is still muchshock, as well as fear and anxiety about the future.

"Greater Liberia"--Still Insecure BeyondMonrovia, past the checkpoints that mark the arti-ficial border between the two Liberias, the NPFL isin control. "Greater Liberia," as NPFL officialssometimes refer to the area, or "the other side" asmany in Monrovia call it, has received much less


Casualties of a Brutal War 11I

attention than Monrovia. In part, that is becausevisitors to Liberia find it difficult to travel about inNPFL-held areas. Special permits have to be ar-ranged, and dozens of checkpoints must be navi-gated. Security is tenuous. In December 1991, theUN suspended its relief operations in Grand GedehCounty after NPFL soldiers attacked one of its staffthere.

Africa Watch's October 1991 report onLiberia summarized conditions in the NPFL areas:

Civilians in NPFL territory... no longerface the atrocities of all-out war, neverthe-less, they suffer the capricious actions associ-ated with a military occupation--arbitraryarrest, physical abuse, confiscation anddestruction of property, and restrictions onfreedom of movement and freedom of expres-sion. Underlying these problems is theperception that the NPFL fighters' are a lawunto themselves, and many of these fightersare young, undisciplined, and unpaid.

Although the NPFL nominally controls all ofLiberia outside of Monrovia, its leadership's abilityto exert control over its commanders in the field--less yet their young, undisciplined fighters--isquestionable. The level of security (or insecurity)therefore varies from region to region.

When fighting broke out in Grand GedehCounty in July 1991 between the NPFL and aremaining Krahn resistance force, refugees who fledto C6te d'Ivoire reported human rights abuses onthe scale of those at the height of the war. Morethan 10,000 refugees, almost all of them Krahns,fled from Grand Gedeh to the Tai region of COted'Ivoire in July and August 1991. A joint UNICEF/AICF team that visited Grand Gedeh in Novemberfound 11 percent malnutrition among childrenthere.

A relief official in Cate d'Ivoire who hasinterviewed many refugees from Maryland, GrandKru, and Grand Gedeh counties said, "Since July1990 there has been a total breakdown of order ineastern Liberia. Bands of bandits rob whomeverand whatever they want. Taylor has made an effortto protect people, but his troops haven't." ALiberian man who works with the Red Cross inother NPFL-held areas said that the situation iscalmer now, but, "When people get used to shoot-

ing, it's hard to stop them. Refugees don't comeback because they're scared, but those of us whostayed through the war are used to shooting."

Discontent within the NPFL's top ranksbecame evident in November 1991 when Taylorreportedly ordered the execution of 18 NPFL fight-ers whom he accused of plotting a coup againsthim.

Relief Groups Aid Civilians in NPFL-Held AreasThe availability of relief and social services also var-ies from county to county. Various relief groups,including the ICRC, CRS, MSF Belgium, MSF Hol-land, AICF, GOAL Ireland, and Lutheran World Ser-vice, provide a variety of services, including fooddistribution, supplementary feeding, health care,and agricultural projects. But their work is concen-trated in rural areas near Monrovia, along theMonrovia-Gbarnga corridor, and in areas of Nimba,Bong, Lofa, Bomi, and Grand Cape Mount coun-ties. Even in some of those areas, particularly inGrand Cape Mount County, their ability to operatefluctuates according to the security situation. Littleaid reaches most areas in southeastern Liberia,particularly Grand Gedeh, Grand Bassa, Sinoe,Grand Kru, and Maryland counties, where an esti-mated 213,000 people are displaced.

Health care is the major concern in manyparts of the interior. That is true even inMontserrado County near Monrovia, which, be-cause fighting lasted longer there than in otherregions, was both more devastated and receivedhelp later than other counties. According to AICFdirector Dr. Magali Lachot, "In Kakata [only some25 miles from Monrovia], there is almost no healthstructure. Throughout Montserrado County,conditions in the villages are still very difficult."Because of the proximity of areas of MontserradoCounty to Liberia's "internal border," and thepresence of so many armed forces near that border,food distribution in the region is carried out by theICRC, whose mandate includes assistance tocivilians in conflict zones.

In some areas, those who stayed behindwere able to plant crops in 1991. Some food aidhas reached the areas in need, and an effort hasbeen made to secure and distribute seed rice forfuture planting. A group similar to Monrovia'sSELF has formed to coordinate food distribution tovulnerable populations in the NPFL areas.



Liberians United to Serve Humanity (LUSH), as thegroup is called, met in Gbarnga with the leaders ofSELF, who offered them technical advice.

Liberia's Children: Casualties of War One of themost tragic consequences of the Liberian civil warhas been its effect on the country's children. Chil-dren have been both victims and innocent perpetra-tors of the violence that engulfed the country.Thousands are orphaned, many others are sepa-rated from their families. A prominent Liberiannow living in Abidjan, the capital of COte d'Ivoire,said, "Children are now growing up with the ethnichatred in their hearts."

JERRYOne young victim of the war, a 12-year-old

named Jerry, encapsulates the pain that still pervadesMonrovia. I met Jerry at the Good Samaritan orphanagein Monrovia, one of the few safe havens for childrenduring the war. Sister Dorothy T. Schellart, who runsthe orphanage, introduced me to some of the childrenliving there.

When I met Jerry, he appeared cheerful. Heaccompanied me around the orphanage, showed mewhere he and the other boys his age sleep, where theyeat, and where they attend classes.

Later, Isat alone withJerry and Sister Schellartand asked Jerry how he came to be there. Jerrynarrated his story without outward emotion, as ifdescribing a film he had seen. Yet, throughout ourconversation, he was wringing the end of his shirt intoa knot that got tighter and tighter.

Jerry told me how the rebels had killed hisfatherinfrontofhim and hisfamily, and how they madehim and his sisters drag theirfather's body to the river,where they had to dump it. He told me about fleeingwith his mother and sisters to a center for thedisplaced near Monrovia, and about becoming sepa-rated from them when ECOMOG troops engaged therebels in battle near the center. He described makinghis way alone to Monrovia, where he slept in aban-doned cars and stole or begged forfood to survive untilanother boy told him about the orphanage.

When he finished talking, I asked Jerry if hethought very often about his father, mother, and sister.That was all it tookfor the pent-up emotions to come out.Jerry looked at me, and burst into tears.

There are many Jerrys in Monrovia.

Many children who became orphaned orseparated from their families made their way toMonrovia, where they lived in the streets, slept inabandoned cars or buildings, and begged or stolefood to survive. "I sleep in the market, under thetable," said one six-year-old. Another child added,"I sit down and beg for food."

The United Nations Children's Fund(UNICEF) carried out a survey of 518 street childrenin April 1991 and found that 17 percent had wit-nessed the deaths of their parents. According to areport by UNICEF consultant Dr. EstherL. Guluma, 'The children's testimony revealed theirexposure to, and consequent familiarity with,



hostility, direct violence, destruction, and gruesomeatrocities, including rapes and torture." Most of thechildren reported going hungry much of the time.

The stories that these children recounted toUNICEF speak for themselves:

' The freedom fighters, they cut people'sthroats in front of me." (9 year old)o "My mother and my father were killed by thegovernment soldiers. I was there when mymother and my father were killed. (13 year old)o "I was stabbed in the stomach in Nimba byNTPFL forces after they killed my sister." (15year old)

After the fighting ended in Monrovia, severalorphanages and shelters were set up to assist thestreet children, many of whom are clearly troubled.The director of one of the temporary orphanages,Jessye Duncan, said, "When the children firstarrived, they were reluctant to say anything abouttheir past. We have some who have been combat-ants, who have killed. One boy describes visionsthat people whom he killed chase him."

Many of the separated children have nowreunited with family members, and some of thetemporary orphanages and shelters have closed.One "orphanage" that still operates and that con-cerns many relief workers in Monrovia is run byPrince Johnson and the INPFL. Some observersbelieve that Johnson uses the presence of thechildren in a building right next to his house as a"human shield," protecting him against attack. It iswidely believed that the INPFL trains youngsters atthe orphanage and recruits them into its ranks.(Johnson has reportedly promised to close the orphan-age, but as of January 1992 had not done so.)

In the NPFL-held areas, extended families orfriends care for most orphaned and separatedchildren. But a major problem there is the NPFL'scontinued use of child soldiers. Taylor himselfreportedly recognizes that this practice is not onlydetrimental to the children involved and the com-munity at large, but is also damaging to his publicimage. Nevertheless, children still make up asignificant number of the NPFL's "forces". Theirnumber is declining, but slowly. One relief workerwho regularly travels in NPFL-held areas said, "InApril [19911, half of the "guards" at NPFL check-points were young boys. Now [August 19911 the

number is less, but there are still many."A workshop sponsored by UNICEF and the

Save the Children Fund (UK) in Gbamga to trainschool counselors and teachers on trauma counsel-ing was limited and basic, while the needs ofLiberia's traumatized children are vast and com-plex. Also, according to UNICEF's Gulama, "Thetraining workshop revealed that those counselingthe children are in dire need of counseling them-selves, especially in attempting to reconcile theirwar experiences and their social values."

LIBERIAN REFUGEES

Local People Welcome Refugees: InternationalResponse Inadequate When Liberian refugeesfirst fled to Guinea, Cate d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leonein late December 1989, local people in villages andtowns opened their homes to them. Even in a con-tinent where, despite the poverty of host countries,refugees have generally been welcomed by theirneighbors, the hospitality shown to Liberian refu-gees was unprecedented.

All along the borders, individual familiestook in refugees, shared their food supplies withthem, and often gave them land to farm. Schoolsand other public buildings became makeshift grouphomes. Local health services, already over-stretched, were extended to the refugees. As aresult, Liberian refugees, unlike most refugeesworldwide, did not wind up living in refugee camps,but "cohabitating" with the local people in theasylum countries. As a relief worker in C6ted'Ivoire put it, "Tliis was the glorious time. TheLiberians were received as brothers, not as refugees."

This generosity provided the refugees withfood and shelter in a more humane environmentthan a refugee camp. It also helped make up forthe woefully inadequate initial response of theinternational community--including the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).Without the action of the Guinean, Ivorian, andSierra Leonean people, there could have been amajor refugee tragedy in West Africa.

Several factors contributed to the poorinternational response. The region did not have ahistory of refugee flows. Therefore, the UNHCRpresence there was minimal, and many of the otherinternational and nongovernmental agencies that


often respond in emergencies were also notpresent. In the case of C6te d'Ivoire, the mostprosperous (and best able to respond) of the threehost countries, the government at first chose tohandle the situation by itself, and for some time didnot request UNHCR assistance.

In Guinea, which asked for UNHCR assis-tance almost as soon as the refugee influx began,the problem was particularly acute. Guinea hadthe largest refugee influx; most of the refugees werelocated in a remote and inaccessible region. As lateas June 1990, six months into the refugee emer-gency, USCR warned, "Some food has reached therefugees in Guinea, but it is not enough. Shelter,medical care, and sanitation are also still inad-equate."

When food aid did arrive, it inadvertentlythreatened relations between refugees and locals,since officially it could go only to refugees, eventhough locals were also in need, having used theirreserves to help the refugees.

The Honeymoon is Over Two years after refugeesfirst fled the Liberian civil war, a comprehensiveinternational and local relief effort is in place,though it has many glitches. Financing of the pro-gram is well below need, which means that refugeesreceive only basic assistance.

There are more than 663,000 Liberianrefugees in exile throughout West Africa. Thelargest number are living in Guinea (397,000) andCate d'Ivoire (240,000). Most of the Liberian refu-gees who were living in Sierra Leone fled thatcountry too after Liberian rebels invaded in March1991. However, 7,200 Liberians continue to beassisted in a refugee camp near Freetown, theSierra Leonean capital, and as many as 10,000other Liberians live unassisted in Freetown andother urban areas. There are also 8,000 Liberianrefugees in Ghana, 1,000 in Nigeria, and smallernumbers in other West African countries. (As ofDecember 20, 1991, more than 4,200 Liberians hadapplied for Temporary Protected Status--a categoryof temporary asylum--in the United States. Manyhad been in the United States on tourist, student,or other temporary visas when the war began.Others arrived later.)

A number of refugees have begun to returnto Liberia (some estimates say some 56,000 in1991), while others live in asylum countries but

return to work on their farms in Liberia. Bothtrends are likely to carry on if the situation inLiberia continues to stabilize. The prospects forlarge-scale repatriation are discussed later in thispaper.

Meanwhile, most Liberian refugees live inexile, cohabitating with their local hosts. Whilemany involved in the relief effort believe that thearrangement is working well, a closer inspectionreveals mounting tension and friction, and a grow-ing acknowledgement that the cohabitation "honey-moon" is over.

C6TE D'IVOIRE

"Even in Families There Are Problems" Tensionbetween refugees and locals is surprisingly pro-nounced in C~te d'Ivoire, even though better infra-structure and fewer logistical problems there aidthe relief effort. Andrew Mayne, head of theUNHCR sub-office in Danane, the Ivorian town withthe highest concentration of Liberian refugees,says, "The cohabitation is going well, but it is tend-ing to become more strained." The top local officialthere, Mr. Kone-Dibonian, concurs. While empha-sizing the positive, he says, "Even in families thereare problems."

Flore Kouame, an official in the refugeesection of the Ivorian Interior Ministry in Abidjan,says that she believes the effects of the refugees'presence are not all negative. For example, waterpumps have been installed, houses built, and roadsimproved--all of benefit to Ivorians when the refu-gees leave. But her colleagues in the governmentare increasingly negative about the refugees' pres-ence. She says, "Everywhere I hear, 'When will therefugees go?', or, They are a burden."'

The problems are least noticeable in thevillages nearest the Liberian border. There, manyrefugees and locals, whose villages are in closeproximity, are not only of the same ethnic groups,but are often related or have known each othermost of their lives. In the village of Belegleu, about45 minutes from Danane and just a few miles fromthe Liberian border, Kardor, a refugee in his 40swho was chief of his village in Liberia, says, "Herein this village I have never had any problem withanybody. Neither have the other refugees." An-other refugee adds, "Even though we are not at



home, we feel a little bit okay here."Even in the border villages, however, rela-

tions aren't always warm. One contentious issue isfood distribution. Since refugees are scattered inhundreds of villages, food can't be distributeddirectly to each family. It is generally handed overto the village chief and a refugee leader, who in turndistribute it to the refugees (usually after both havetaken a "commission" for themselves, according tosome refugees and relief workers). The greater thetension between locals and refugees in a village, themore problems associated with the distribution.

Farther from the border, the level of kinshipbetween locals and refugees decreases, and ten-sions increase. The issue of rent and farnlandbecomes thorny. A refugee in the town of Tai said,"There is no relationship [between refugees and

locals]. When we get food, relations are okay. Butwhen the food is finished, the relationship is fin-ished." Other refugees complain that when localshire them to cut wood or work in their fields, theydon't pay as promised. Locals, on the other hand,complain that refugees take their hospitality forgranted and don't share willingly even though theydepleted their own food reserves to help the refu-gees when they first arrived.

Tension Highest in Danane It is in Danane thatthe problems and ensuing tensions reach a peak.Many of the refugees in Danane are of urban back-ground. They generally do not have direct linkswith the local people, and are not cohabitating withthem. Their large number (refugees nearly out-number locals), the fact that English rather than

When Liberian refugees fled to neighboring countries beginning in December 1989, the relief effort was hampered not onlybecause UNHCR's response was slow and inadequate, but also because many of the refugees, particularly those in Guinea,were located in remote, difficult to reach areas. When the rainy season began, trucks carrying relief aid would often get stuck inmuddy roads, slowing the delivery of the limited food aid that was reaching the area. The situation was saved by thegenerosity of the local people, who opened their homes to the refugees and shared their food with them. USCR/H. Ruiz



French is becoming the most commonly heard lan-guage, and cultural differences between locals andrefugees are all part of the problem.

One example is Ivorians' reactions to theway Liberian women dress. Ivorian women gener-ally dress in "traditional" African style, while thestyle of dress of Liberian women is more akin tothat in the United States--shorter skirts, jeans, andeven shorts. Ivorians find the latter particularlyoffensive.

Increases in crime, violence, and prostitu-tion, however, are the greatest source of friction inDanane, and draw the attention and concern ofgovernment officials as far away as Abidjan, theIvorian capital. Ivorian officials acknowledge thatnone of these problems is new to Danane, but saythey have increased significantly since the refugees'arrival.

A local teacher described the changes hehas witnessed: "Before the refugees arrived,Danane was small, calm. Now it's not safe. Vio-lence has increased. There is more fighting, steal-ing, guns, and insecurity. You can't walk the streetlate at night."

Food, Education, and Health Care Also ProblemsWhen asked what problems they face in C6ted'Ivoire, most refugees say, "food". At the time ofthe U.S. Committee for Refugees' visit in August1991, refugees were receiving only half rations ofrice. In May 1991, the Ivorian government decidedthat the refugee population figure, 327,000, wasinflated. The government scaled down the rationand also carried out a census that produced a refu-gee population of 210,581. (In December 1991,another census determined the number of refugeesto be 240,000.) A relief worker involved in food dis-tribution said that another reason for the cut inration was that "the government saw too much ricefor sale by refugees." An Ivorian government officialtold USCR that since the price of rice is controlledin C6te d'Ivoire, it is a problem when many refugeessell rice at a lower price. Refugees say that theyhave to sell some of the rice they are given to payrent and buy other food items or medicines.

A refugee woman said, "They cut the foodration and I don't know what to do. No one in myfamily has work. We don't even have money to paythe rent." The distribution of full rations wasresumed in September, but, based on the recom-

mendation of a World Food Program (WFP) assess-ment team, may yet be reduced again.

Education has been a sore point. For morethan a year and a half after refugees began arrivingin COte d'Ivoire, the government did not allow anyeducation programs for refugee children. Earlyefforts by the refugees and some relief groups to startrefugee schools on their own were thwarted when thegovernment ordered all the schools closed. In late1991, the government agreed to allow educationprograms, which are due to begin in 1992.

Access to health care and medicines, whichis supposed to be available without cost to bothlocals and refugees, also creates friction. Whilesome refugees say that they are able to get medicalattention and drugs, many others complain thatthis is not the case. A refugee in Tai voiced acomplaint raised frequently: "If I need medical care,I can go free to the clinic, but then for medicinethey give you a prescription to take to the pharmacy,where you have to pay. If you sell rice to get money topay for medicine, later you have nothing to eat."

There is also concern about the NPFL'spresence in Danane. Refugees and relief workersalike said that besides the official NPFL representa-tives based in Danane, there are NPFL spies in thetown. USCR heard contradictory reports aboutlinks between the local police and the NPFL. Onereport was that the local police occasionally arrestLiberian refugees and hand them over to the NPFL.However, USCR was also told that many of the localIvorian policemen are from the same ethnic groupas Liberian Krahns, and therefore unlikely tocooperate with the mostly Gio and Mano NPFLleadership. In mid-1991, refugees became con-cerned when local officials confiscated a list of morethan a thousand Liberians who had asked torepatriate to Monrovia and reportedly handed itover to Taylor.

According to the Regional Bureau for Africaat UNHCR's headquarters in Geneva, "Tensionsbetween refugees and their hosts ought to beviewed in the context of a massive influx.... Thesituation in Cate d'Ivoire is, in our view, character-ized by a surprising absence of conflicts betweenrefugees and locals."

Inadequate Response to New 1991 Influx Al-though the NPFL has controlled most of theLiberian countryside since mid-1990, parts of



Grand Gedeh County, the home area of Doe'sKrahn tribe, remained in the hands of a smallKrahn resistance group. In July 1991, the NPFLlaunched an offensive that gave it control of the areaand resulted in the flight of more than 10,000 refugees,mostly Krahns, to the Tai region of Cate d'Ivoire.

In Ponan village, near Tai town, USCR inter-viewed a man who had arrived in C6te d'Ivoire only aweek before. He said, "On the way, two women died inmy presence. Some babies died. Some died of hunger,others had been shot. Those you see here, Godblessed them."

The response of UNHCR, the local authorities,and relief groups to the new influx in Tai was alsoinadequate, apparently due largely to their lack ofcooperation and coordination. At the time ofUSCR's site visit in mid-August, the influx hadbeen underway for more than a month, but no foodhad been distributed to the new arrivals (the first fooddistribution was scheduled to take place within a fewdays of USCRs visit). Although the badly woundedhad been taken to hospitals, new arrivals received littlemedical care and almost no medicines.

Because the Ivorian government does notallow foreigners to practice medicine, a medicalteam from a relief group based near the Tai regioncould not provide direct medical care to the newlyarrived refugees, even though the Ivorian authori-ties did not assign any extra Ivorian medical per-sonnel to the area to help. On several occasions,the local ambulance crew refused to go to Tai totransport ill refugees to the nearest hospital.

In a statement sent to the concerned authori-ties and the media on August 22, 1991, USCR said:

The medical situation is particularlyalarming. A number of refugees told USCRthat they were ill or had sick relatives, buthad not received adequate medical care. Onewoman...said three of her children had diedbecause of diarrhea since their arrival inPonan. She had taken her children to thevillage health post, but was only givenmedicine for two days. When she took herchildren back for further treatment, she saidshe was told the medicines were finished.Her children later died.

An Ivorian Backlash Beginning in May 1991, theIvorian government stopped granting automatic

refugee status to newly arrived Liberians (an excep-tion was made in the case of the 10,000 recent ar-rivals from Grand Gedeh). In August, UNHCR'sMayne said, "The government of C6te d'Ivoire doesnot seem to recognize prima facie refugee status fornew arrivals, except for those clearly fleeingconflict.... Those arriving in Danane from NPFLareas are being considered 'tourists' or 'visitors'.That's a fairly radical change [in policy]."

Subsequently, the Ivorian governmentinstituted a procedure for determining the individualrefugee status of Liberians who had arrived after May1991. By January 1992, the backlog of asylumapplications had largely been cleared, but only 50.4percent of the applicants were granted refugee status.UNHCR says that it has not received reports of thosedenied refugee status being forced to leave C6ted'Ivoire, but they receive no assistance.

By taking this position, the Ivorian governmentapparently intended to discourage refugee arrivals.There is a growing attitude, not only in Ivoriangovernment circles, but also at UNHCR and theU.S. embassy, that Liberians leaving the countrynow are no longer fleeing because of persecution orinsecurity in Liberia, but because more food andbetter economic opportunities exist in C6te d'Ivoire.UNHCR's Mayne said that many of those arrivingnow "do seem to be influenced by the assistancepolicy. Though people still cite the lack ofsecurity.. .our perception of the situation in Liberiais that there are only isolated areas subject toproblems."

USCR asked several new arrivals staying inthe refugee transit center in Danane about theirreasons for leaving Liberia. Most cited either fear ofpersecution or concern about the general securitysituation. One of two brothers who fled togethersaid, "The war is not over. If it were, we wouldn't behere. Soldiers come and take whatever they want."Asked if they would have come anyway if foodweren't available, he responded, 'Yes, because wecould not stand the tension." Another refugee admit-ted, however, that he had come primarily to telephonerelatives in the United States to ask them for money.

GUINEA

A Poor State of Affairs During the early months ofthe refugee crisis in Guinea, the problems createdby the large influx and the remote areas into which



refugees fled were compounded by the slow andinadequate international response. As in Cated'Ivoire, assistance from local people saved theday--and the lives of many refugees. IbrahimToure', the top local official in the Guinea forestregion where most refugees are located, said, "Thiswas the first time in the history of Guinea thatthere was a refugee situation.... The refugees werereceived with open arms."

On June 26, 1990, USCR wrote to then-UNHigh Commissioner for Refugees, ThorvaldStoltenberg, expressing concern about UNHCR'sresponse to the crisis. USCR said, "According to aU.S. State Department report, the refugees' situa-tion 'has become truly life-threatening.... Manyfactors have contributed to this poor state of af-fairs. However, lack of coordination and a shortageof experienced emergency UNHCR relief staff havebeen the most significant problems.'"

UNHCR cited lack of funds as part of thereason for their weak response. UNHCR's REFUGEESmagazine said, "UNHCR is in the grip of an unprec-edented financial crisis. It is a sad fact that theorganization's response to the [Guinea] emergency hasbeen severely constrained by a shortage of funds."

Beginning in September 1990, when UNHCRfirst established a permanent presence inNzerekore, the main town in the area, the situationimproved. According to Dr. Sonia Van Osch, whohas been working with MSF-Belgium in the Guineaforest region since April 1990, when the newUNHCR officer arrived, he "came and asked whatMSF was already doing, explained what UNHCRcould do, and made a program for us to worktogether."

Cohabitation in Guinea Similar to That in C6ted'Ivoire As in COte d'Ivoire, cohabitation worksbest in small villages in the border areas. It worksless well in the larger towns, particularly Nzerekore.

"In the villages, especially, cohabitationcontinues to work," Van Osch says. "In manyvillages, refugees are completely integrated. It'ssomewhat different in Nzerekore. Some have foundjobs and are integrated, but others are only therebecause they have nowhere else to go," she adds.

In the village of Tawmando, where bothLiberian and Sierra Leonean refugees are living, avillage official says, 'The refugees are living in thehouses of the people of the village. They eat to-

gether with us, they do everything with us."Mohamed Sharif, editor of a newspaper publishedby Liberian refugees in Nzerekore, says that even inthe towns, "There's been a great deal of generosityfrom our hosts." Sharif adds that locals have goneout of their way to provide refugees jobs.

Guinean officials have allowed refugees toset up their own education programs and to useGuinean school buildings. According to JaneSwann, who heads an International Rescue Com-mittee (IRC) education project in the region, "Rightnow, roughly 20 percent of refugee children of allages have access to educational facilities." UNHCRreports that some 26,000 refugee students areattending classes in 85 schools. Swann expectsthe number of refugees attending school to "in-crease dramatically as parents see that there is aquality.. .program." UNHCR and IRC plan to offerassistance to 40,000 refugee students in 1992.However, the absence of schools and teachers inmany villages will still be a problem.

Some aspects of health care are also lessproblematic in Guinea. Unlike Cate d'Ivoire,Guinea has incorporated Liberian medical andhealth care personnel into the local health caresystem, easing language and trust problems.Refugees can use local health facilities and receiveavailable medicines free of charge (UNHCR providesfunds for drugs for the local clinics). But somerefugees say that they have trouble actually gettingmedical attention or obtaining medicines.

Through a UNHCR agricultural projectpopular with refugees and the local government,more than 10,600 families have received agricul-tural tools and rice seed. According to the project'sdirector, families with even a fourth of a hectare ofland (many families have more than that) canharvest up to 200 kilograms of rice, roughly theamount of free rice a family of four would receiveduring a five month period. Local people have alsobeen given rice seed, a move that has benefittedrelations between locals and refugees.

Involvement of the refugees in the relief processhas also proved helpful. UNHCR has encouraged theestablishment of 40 refugee committees, correspondingroughly to the distribution points.

Food Distribution Process Remains Major Prob-lem Getting food to the refugees has been a majorproblem. According to Shelly Pitterman, the head



Uprooted Liberians20

r-

of the UNHCR office in Nzerekore, the refugees arescattered in some 747 villages in Guinea's forestregion--a fertile area, but one with very poor roads,many of which become impassable during the longrainy season. For many months after the refugeesbegan to arrive, food was transported to the area byland from Conakry, a journey that took severaldays (longer if bridges along the way were washedout or if the ferries that transport trucks across thebigger rivers were inoperative).

Beginning in late 1990, arrangements weremade to transport food to the refugees in Guineathrough Cate d'Ivoire, which has significantly betterroads. That helped considerably, but food still hasto be delivered to more than 40 food distributionsites in Guinea. Staff of the International Federa-tion of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies,which is responsible for the actual distribution,gave an example of the problems they face:

Recently, 55 food trucks were on theirway to a distribution site. After 15 of themhad crossed the bridge near the town, thebridge broke. We were told it would take aweek to repair the bridge, so the rest of thetrucks and the Red Cross staff had to turnaround. Not only was distribution at thatcenter delayed, but since the 15 trucks thathad reached the village got stuck there for 10days, other scheduled distributions were alsodelayed. That sort of thing happens everyday.

These delays mean that refugees receivefood rations not monthly, but every six weeks ortwo months. As of August 1991, most refugeeswere only getting one month's rations at everydistribution. The Red Cross was planning to startdistributing at least a six weeks' ration in some ofthe more remote sites.

Red Cross staff said, "We are very consciousof the problem, and worry about it, but it's a prob-lem of logistics--and money. Only 55 percent of ourbudget has been covered." They argue that moretrucks, funds to improve roads and bridges, andadditional personnel to supervise the distributionsare needed. According to a U.S. official familiarwith the region, a high level of corruption makesclose supervision necessary. (Since USCR's sitevisit to Guinea in August 1991, the U.S. State

Department Bureau for Refugee Programs hasmade additional funds available to the Red Cross.)

Food could become a greater problem inGuinea in 1992. WFP plans to distribute rationsfor 450,000 refugees (a figure arrived at in a censustaken April 1991), but UNHCR recorded a total of566,000 refugees in Guinea as of November 1991.

Rioting in Nzerekore--Some Refugees InvolvedTensions have existed between locals and refugeesin Nzerekore since the early days of the influx. Ac-cording to a refugee living in Nzerekore, in Novem-ber 1990, following rumors that the NPFL andGuinean dissidents might launch an attack againstGuinea, "People were rounded up (both refugeesand locals) and taken to the military barracks,where they were interrogated." A similar incidentoccurred in March 1991. But the biggest probleminvolving refugees in Nzerekore took place followinglocal elections on June 9, 1991.

Voting in such elections is often along ethniclines. When the election yielded unexpected re-sults, given Nzerekore's ethnic composition, it wassaid that many refugees voted, influencing theoutcome. It seems possible that refugees mighthave been able to register and vote, since an esti-mated 24 percent of the refugees who fled toGuinea from Liberia were actually born in Guinea(there has been considerable migration into north-ern Liberia from Guinea in recent decades, particu-larly by members of the Mandingo ethnic group).

Anger over the election results led to severaldays of rioting in Nzerekore. According to somereports, hundreds of people may have been killed.The Guinean authorities arrested a number ofpeople, including six refugees.

On July 8, UNHCR issued a notice to refu-gees in Nzerekore that warned, "The Government ofthe Republic of Guinea calls on all refugees fromLiberia and Sierra Leone who have been givenasylum in Guinea to respect the laws of Guinea.Under no circumstances should a refugee becomeinvolved in the internal political affairs of Guinea."

Refugees Flee Fighting in Sierra Leone, EnterGuinea In early March 1991, a rebel force enteredSierra Leone from Liberia. The rebels quickly occu-pied many sections of eastern Sierra Leone, forcingmore than 96,000 Sierra Leonean refugees--plussome 10,000 Liberian refugees who had been living



in Sierra Leone--to flee to Guinea. (In November1991, UNHCR reported that the number of SierraLeonean refugees in Guinea had grown to 169,000,but other sources consider that estimate high.)

Strained resources made assisting this newinflux difficult. The refugees entered areas ofGuinea even more remote and less able to accom-modate them than was the case with the earlierinflux. Problems with food and health care arosealmost immediately, and many refugees reportedlydied from an outbreak of severe diarrhea. However,according to MSF's Van Osch, while there was aproblem, early intervention helped to contain it."The number of people who died was not extraordi-nary for the size of the population," she says.

Although the refugees were entirely depen-dent on food aid during the first months after theirarrival, food had only been distributed three times,and then to only some of the refugees. DuringUSCR's visit to the Gueckedou area--where most ofthe new refugees were living--in mid-August 1991,no food had been distributed to the refugees in twomonths (a distribution was scheduled for thefollowing week).

The number of refugees entering theGueckedou area exceeded the number of localpeople. As a result, while many of the SierraLeonean refugees did move into the homes ofGuineans, others built their own temporary shel-ters on the outskirts of existing villages. AlthoughUNHCR did not encourage this, they did providethem some shelter material, including blue tarpau-lin for the roofs of their shelters. Now, near manyGuinean villages in the Gueckedou area, rows ofblue-roofed huts mark the sites of newly sprung-up"mini refugee camps."

Two refugees interviewed at a mini-campnear Nongoa town reported moving there because itwas cheaper than paying rent in the town. Awoman said, "Now I sleep safe, don't pay rent, andnobody can bug me because I'm under the UN."

Because it was easier to identify refugeesliving in the mini-camps than refugees cohabitatingin villages, assistance reached them earlier. Thatled to a further exodus of refugees from villages intomini-camps. Some said they believed that UNHCRwanted them to move into camps so that they couldbetter assist them. A refugee at a mini-camp nearthe village of Tekoulo said, "We have been told thatthe refugees in this area should come and build

here in the camp. If they don't, they may get leftout [of the distribution]."

The mini-camps, because they areunplanned, pose logistical challenges. Refugeesthere are likely to have greater needs and less of asecurity net than those cohabitating with localfamilies. The mini-camps do not have the infra-structure, services, or administration that usuallyexists in official refugee camps.

SIERRA LEONE

Liberian Refugee Influx Began May 1990 TheLiberian refugee influx into Sierra Leone began sev-eral months later than those into Cate d'Ivoire andGuinea. It was not until late May 1990, as NPFLforces approached the outskirts of Monrovia, thatrefugees fled towards Sierra Leone. Many earlyarrivals entered Sierra Leone in cars or buses, car-ried money, and headed to Freetown, where theyrented houses and apartments.

That pattern changed very quickly as fight-ing broke out in Monrovia and tens of thousands ofthe city's residents left suddenly for Sierra Leone.Rural people from western Liberia also beganfleeing across the border. Press reports in mid-June indicated that there were already more than20,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, withanother 1,000 arriving each day. By September,UNHCR estimated that more than 125,000Liberians had entered Sierra Leone. Most werecohabitating with locals in villages along the borderor staying in public buildings in some of the largertowns in eastern Sierra Leone (UNHCR did notextend assistance to refugees in Freetown, sayingthat if they needed help they should return toeastern Sierra Leone).

USCR first visited Sierra Leone in November1990 and was told by government ministers thatthe refugees' presence was impeding even basicservices to their own people in the refugee-impactedrural areas, and was causing rents and prices ofgoods to rise in the capital. Other sources reportedthat the economic and social problems exacerbatedby the refugee influx were creating grave politicalproblems for the government.

Between August and November, a numberof Liberian refugees and nationals of other WestAfrican countries arrived in Freetown aboard


overcrowded ships that had transported supplies toECOMOG troops in Monrovia. In October, theSierra Leonean government forbade a Nigerianvessel loaded with refugees from docking inFreetown, forcing it to remain anchored offshore.Several people died on the ship, causing an interna-tional outcry. The ship eventually proceeded toConakry (Guinea), where the passengers wereallowed to disembark.

War Hits Sierra Leone In early March 1991, theLiberian war spilled over into Sierra Leone. Evennow, it is not clear who the rebels are or why theyattacked Sierra Leone. The most commonly heardtheory--one favored by the Sierra Leonean govern-ment--is that the incursion was the doing of theNPFL, motivated by a desire for revenge for SierraLeone's participation in the ECOMOG peace-keep-ing force, and for the spoils to be had in what isSierra Leone's richest and most fertile region (one ofthe rebels' first targets was reportedly a diamondmine at Zimmi).

Although many of the rebels were Liberians,and probably associated with the NPFL (thoughTaylor has repeatedly denied that he was behindthe incursion), there is speculation that at leastsome of the rebels were Sierra Leoneans opposed tothe government in Freetown. One relief workersaid, "For sure there is forced involvement of SierraLeonean youngsters by the rebels, but now thereare also some Sierra Leoneans willingly fightingagainst the government." According to a U.S.official familiar with the area, many of the "rebels"captured by the Sierra Leonean military once theybegan to gain an upper hand were in fact SierraLeoneans.

The rebel incursion brought the horrors ofthe Liberian war--killings, atrocities, fear, displace-ment--to Sierra Leone. In September 1991, USCRvisited the town of Pujehun, which Sierra Leoneangovernment troops had just retaken from therebels. There, Natoma, a Sierra Leonean womanwho had remained in the town throughout theoccupation, described her experiences:

The rebels arrived on Saturday, April20. I'd heard rumors about the rebels, buthadn't thought they'd attack this town.When they did, I was engulfed in fear. Arebel entered my house.... He told my hus-

band to go outside, then shot and killed him.I saw him being shot. I saw his blood run-ning. They didn't allow me to bury him untilthe following Thursday. His body remainedon the spot....

Most people jled the town. Very fewremained. I heard everywhere else had alsobeen attacked, so I decided to stay. Everyday they killed people. Before they killedthem they tied their hands behind their backsand paraded them around the town naked--men and women. They'd slice their ears offput them in their mouths, and make themchew them.

More Than 325,000 Sierra Leoneans UprootedThe rebel occupation of large areas of eastern SierraLeone has uprooted several hundred thousandpeople. Many fled to Guinea (in August 1991,UNHCR said 97,000; in November, they said169,000--a figure that other sources question). Ac-cording to OFDA, 145,000 Sierra Leoneans havebecome internally displaced, and another 12,000Sierra Leoneans who were caught behind the rebellines were either forced to move into Liberia or fledthere voluntarily.

The plight of the displaced Sierra Leoneansdrew little public attention. Relief groups already inthe area to assist Liberian refugees set up fooddistribution and health care programs, but gettingfunding for their work proved difficult. That waspartly due to the lack of international awareness,but also to bureaucratic delays within the SierraLeonean government and poor coordination amongthe government, the UN, and relief groups, whichdelayed Sierra Leone's appeal for international aid.

In Segbwema, a small town that has re-ceived more than 16,000 displaced people, para-mount chief M. B. Jimmy-Jajua IV said, "The RedCross established a clinic with three nurses [to aidthe displaced], but they only have first aid kits, andno drugs. The hospital here is not free, and thedisplaced in need of treatment don't have money topay." At a center for the displaced in Segbwema,Lucia, a woman who arrived at the center onemonth earlier with 13 family members, said, "SinceI got here, I go and cut wood to sell so I can buyfood. One person in my family is in the hospital,and I also need money for that. Yesterday, we hadno food." A man at the center for two months said



In March 19,91, the Liberian civil war spillet over into Sierra Leone. Rebels, mostly Liberians but possibly also some SierraLeoneans, entered and captured parts of eastern Sierra Leone. The brutality and atrocities associated with the Liberian wardescended on the Sierra Leonean people, many of whom fled the area. Liberian refugees who were living in Sierra Leone werealso forced tojlee again.

USCR visited Pujehun, a Sierra Leonean town near the Liberian border, shortly after it had been retaken from the rebelsby the Sierra Leonean army. This group of Sierra Leoneans, who had hidden in nearby forests during the rebel occupation,were on their way home. Rebels still occupy some areas in Sierra Leone, and fighting continues along the border between theNPFL and ULIMO, a new, mostly Krahn Liberian group that opposes the NPFL. USCR/H. Ruiz

that he was receiving food for his family from theRed Cross every two weeks, "But it's not enoughbecause we share it with many others. Six otherpeople eat from the rations my family of five re-ceives."

Liberian Refugees Repatriate from Sierra LeoneIt is not known how many Liberian refugees livingin Sierra Leone were caught behind rebel lines fol-lowing the incursion (some relief groups estimate asmany as 30,000 to 40,000), or what happened tothem. However, tens of thousands of Liberian refu-

gees escaped before the rebels reached the areaswhere they were staying and made their way toFreetown. Liberian refugees became scapegoats forSierra Leoneans' anger over the rebel incursion. InJuly 1991, New African reported, "All Liberianrefugees.. .are seen as 'spies' in the employ of therebels. As the harassment and persecution contin-ues, there have been tales of random and oftenunprovoked beatings of the refugees."

Many refugees approached UNHCR askingto repatriate, but the agency declined to organize amass repatriation. Hubert Edongo Menye, UNHCR



Head of Desk for West Africa, told USCR, "UNHCRis not in a position to promote mass voluntaryrepatriation because conditions of security anddignity are not fully met in Liberia." Even thoughMonrovia could be considered safe, Edongo saidthat it would be irresponsible for UNHCR to repatri-ate refugees there knowing how overcrowded thecity was.

The interim government in Monrovia ar-ranged for the repatriation by ship of Liberianrefugees from Freetown (UNHCR facilitated trans-portation from the interior to Freetown and pro-vided food and water for the sea voyage). Accordingto Dr. Alfred Kulah, executive director of the interimgovernment's National Repatriation and Resettle-ment Commission, "We felt it was our responsibilityto provide Liberians the opportunity to returnhere." Kulah rejected UNHCR's argument thatovercrowding in Monrovia was an obstacle torepatriation. "If there is one inch of land inMonrovia and people want to voluntarily comehere," Kulah said, "UNHCR should help them to dothat."

Estimates of the number of refugees whorepatriated from Freetown vary widely, but 12,000to 15,000 is the figure most commonly heard.Only some 17,200 Liberian refugees remain inSierra Leone, of whom 7,200 receive internationalaid at the Waterloo refugee camp, near Freetown.Considering the number of Liberian refugees whoeither fled to Guinea, returned to Monrovia, orremain in Sierra Leone, the 125,000 estimate of theLiberian refugee population in Sierra Leone prior tothe rebel incursion appears high.

ULIMO The incursion resulted in the formation ofa Sierra Leone-based armed force of Liberians whohad been living as refugees in Sierra Leone.ULIMO, as the force is known, is made up mostly offormer AFL soldiers and other ethnic Krahns (in-cluding many young boys). ULIMO fought along-side the Sierra Leonean troops to push the NPFLout of southeastern Sierra Leone. Then ULIMOtroops crossed the river that marks the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border and fought the NPFL onLiberian soil. The two groups still battle--indeci-sively--along the border, with each side gaining,then losing, ground. Although Sierra LeoneanPresident Joseph Momoh denies that he continuesto support ULIMO, it is widely believed that the Si-

erra Leonean military does so.In January 1992, rebels still held some

areas of eastern Sierra Leone, but fighting along theSierra Leone-Liberia border had subsided, at leasttemporarily.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The Yamassoukro Accords Following the Novem-ber 1990 cease-fire, ECOWAS has led the search fora political resolution to the Liberian conflict. It hasbrought Sawyer and Taylor together for severalmeetings, most recently in September and October1991 in Yamassoukro, Cate d'Ivoire. At the Sep-tember meeting, Yamassoukro III, participantshammered out an agreement that would pave theway for internationally monitored elections for asingle Liberian government. It called for:

o Continued observance of the cease-fire;o The encampment and disarmament of troopsunder ECOMOG supervision;o The depositing of arms and ammunition inarmories, also under ECOMOG supervision;o The establishment of a five-member ElectionsCommission to organize and supervise elections;ando A four-nation ECOWAS committee to visitSierra Leone and Guinea to enlist their coopera-tion in restoring normalcy along their border withLiberia.

Yamassoukro IV set a timetable for imple-mentation of the agreements reached atYamassoukro III. Encampment and disarmamentof troops was to occur within 60 days of November15. Elections were to be held by April 1992. It wasalso agreed that all "hostile foreign forces" (meaningULIMO) withdraw from Sierra Leone, and that a"buffer zone" be established on the Liberian side ofthe Liberia-Sierra Leone border. To accomplishthese goals, ECOMOG was to "enjoy freedom ofmovement throughout the territory of Liberia"; allwarring factions would "willingly abandon theirfighting positions and move into designatedcamps"; and, "all entry points into Liberia would bemonitored by ECOMOG troops."

It was also announced at Yamassoukro IVthat Senegalese troops had joined the ECOMOG

Casu~tie of Brual Wr 2Casualties of a Brutal War 25

forces (a U.S.-supported move) and that Guinea-Bissau would also send troops. Including troopsfrom more French-speaking nations in ECOMOGwas meant to ease Taylor's concerns about Nigeriandominance of ECOMOG.

The results of the Yamassoukro IV meetingwere greeted with great enthusiasm (at least amongthe less skeptical). However, November 15 cameand went, with no progress towards encampmentor disarmament in sight. On December 31, thou-sands of demonstrators in Monrovia called forimmediate enforcement of the peace accord.

Prospects for Peace: Mixed Verdict Some observ-ers say that the failure to invite the INPFL andULIMO to the Yamassoukro meetings weakened theprospects for peace. Shortly after Yamassoukro IV,Johnson said he would not cooperate with the planbecause he had not been invited to participate.According to press reports, ULIMO issued a state-ment on November 14 saying that they rejected"major aspects of the agreement."

Taylor, though agreeing to the proposals atYamassoukro, subsequently told Africa News, 'Thisgovernment [the NPRA] is not going to be dissolved,and this army [the NPFL] is not going to be dis-solved."

Elections cannot take place unless Taylor'stroops are encamped and disarmed, ULIMO's threatneutralized, and the AFL and INPFL securely con-fined to barracks. But the elections cannot simplyfollow. The rainy season in Liberia begins in earlysummer, making many roads impassable. Once itbegins, it is unlikely elections can be held untilafter it ends in October/November. The status quocould therefore continue until at least the end of1992, with the potential always present for renewedfighting or for a complete breakdown of the peaceprocess.

In January 1992, there were both positiveand negative trends in relations between the vari-ous Liberian factions. The interim governmentintroduced several measures that irked the NPFL,including imposing an embargo on luxury goods(fuel, cigarettes, beer, etc.) leaving Monrovia forNPFL-controlled areas, and devaluing the Liberiandollar and issuing new bank notes to replace theold currency. Taylor condemned the introductionof the new currency and banned its use or evenpossession by anyone in NPFL areas (however,

according to a Monrovia radio report, members ofthe NPFL were among the thousands of Liberianslining up at Monrovia banks to exchange their oldLiberian dollars for new). Johnson said that heexecuted two of his top INPFL officials in January(other reports said he executed three) because theyhad the new currency. On a more positive note,there were reports that the NPFL eased restrictionson travel to and from Monrovia on some roads.

REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

A Challenge for Liberia and the InternationalConnunity Although many Liberian refugeeshave already returned home, the vast majority ofthose who fled remain in exile. If, when, and howthey will return, and what will be done to help themreintegrate are major questions facing Liberia andthe international community.

Virtually all the Liberian refugees USCR metwant to return home. It is likely that most will,with the possible exception of ethnic Krahns andpossibly Mandingos. Although the Krahns USCRinterviewed also want to return home eventually,they are the most wary about their security uponreturn.

Some refugees say that concern about howthey would feed their families in Liberia stops themfrom moving back. Most, however, cite continuinginsecurity in Liberia or uncertainty about how thepeace process will evolve as reasons for not return-ing to Liberia now. According to Fabienne Bonjour,an ICRC staff member in C~te d'Ivoire, "They arewaiting for the situation to settle, to see who willrule the country. So, they are reluctant to rushback. Also, they don't know what they will find.They'll need food, seeds, medical and educationalassistance." Yet the belief that refugees can andshould return now is said to be gaining groundamong relief officials. Gerry Hamilton, the DeputyChief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Abidjan,said, "There is a growing feeling among relief offi-cials in Tabou and Danane that people should startgoing back."

Official Repatriation: UNHCR Makes Plans,Yamassoukro Doesn't Unlike the UN plan man-dating that Namibian refugees be repatriated intime for them to participate in Namibia's first elec-


i


tions, the Yamassoukro agreements do not providefor the repatriation of Liberian refugees before elec-tions, even though they represent a significant per-centage of the Liberian electorate. The issue of for-mal, assisted repatriation is therefore left entirely toUNHCR.

UNHCR has drafted a repatriation plan, buthas not set a date for its implementation. Thedraft, presented at a UN interagency meeting inAbidjan December 13-14, 1991, says, "UNHCR willnot at this stage actively promote a mass voluntaryrepatriation to Liberia because conditions are notyet conducive for such an action." It adds, "Thetime frame for refugees' registry for repatriation willbe determined by family, seasonal, and logisticalfactors, as well as the individual refugee's percep-tion of the situation in Liberia at any given time."UNHCR has now opened an office in Monrovia tocoordinate repatriation.

The UNHCR repatriation plan reflects theagency's economic hard times; it seeks to carry outa mammoth task with a very modest budget. Theplan is to be implemented over a six-month period,and anticipates that some 176,000 Liberian refu-gees, particularly those from villages and townsnear the border areas, will return home on theirown, either before the formal repatriation programbegins or simultaneously with it. Another 356,000refugees would be provided transportation toLiberia. They would return through one of tenentry points, and be taken to reception centers tobe established at Gbarnga, Yekepa, Zorzor,Voinjama, Harper, and Monrovia.

All the returnees would receive a repatria-tion package that would include a set of agricul-tural tools and several kilograms of seeds. WFPwould reallocate food currently earmarked forrefugees in countries of asylum to returnees inLiberia.

UNHCR plans only limited involvement inthe returnees' reintegration, however. Mostly, suchassistance is expected to be provided through theUN's comprehensive Emergency HumanitarianAssistance Program for Liberia, which includes arequest for funding for a program of assistance toreturnees and internally displaced Liberians.

Relief and Reconstruction: Limited Help Theoverall program of relief and reconstruction assis-tance to Liberia has many components, but the UN

program is the core of that effort.The UN issued its first appeal for emergency

aid to Liberia, for $6.3 million, in December 1990.In July 1991, the Secretary General issued a sec-ond appeal for $135.5 million for the period July 1991through July 1992, to provide both emergency andreconstruction aid to Liberia in several key sectors.

UN APPEAL FOR LIBERIA

Food: $80.4 million to provide food aid to 1.4million people.Health: $15.5 million to reopen medicalfacilities, revitalize programs for disease con-trol, and deploy eight health relief teamsthroughout the country.Water and Sanitation: $6.7 million to providenew water sources, refurbish hand pump wellsthat have become polluted, and continue tocarry out the rehabilitation of the White Plainswater plant, which serves Monrovia.Education and Children in Difficult Circum-stances: $5.4 million to rehabilitate schools,provide educational materials, and supportprojects to assist children who have beenorphaned, separated from their families, andtraumatized by the war.Agriculture: $10.8 million to provide seedsand agricultural tools, restock poultry, andassist fisheries.Assistance to Displaced Persons, Refugees,and Returnees: $13.8 million to assist thereintegration of refugees returning from neigh-boring countries, internally displacedLiberians, and some 12,000 Sierra Leoneanrefugees in Liberia.Program Support: $3 million for implementa-tion of the UN program.

The UN program aims to help Liberiansbuild a new Liberia, not just reconstruct whatexisted in the past. According to UN coordinatorMountain, 'There is a body of opinion that.. .reformof a number of the institutions and policies of thepre-war days is long overdue. The reconstructionprocess should be geared to a Liberia that can bemore self-sufficient than was the case in the past.If there's some benefit to be seen from this tragedy



it's to use it as an opportunity to go in new direc-tions."

The international response to the December1990 and July 1991 UN appeals for Liberia hasbeen less than adequate. Acoording to UN sources,as of November 1991, donor contributions to thetwo appeals totaled only $78.3 million (approxi-mately $56 million in food aid and $22.3 million innon-food aid). Of that, $48.7 million was given bythe United States ($45 million in food aid, but only$3.7 million in non-food aid). A UN official inMonrovia expressed concern that while donors,particularly the United States, were providing muchof the required food aid (for which, he said, UNofficials were grateful), they were not coming forthwith the funds needed to implement the equallyimportant non-food sectors.

According to an October 1991 OFDA report,since the Liberian crisis began, the United States'total contribution to the relief effort (not only to theUN appeal, but also to other relief projects inLiberia, and to Liberian refugees in neighboringcountries) has been $127.9 million.

The poor international response is no doubtdue to a variety of factors, including donors' domes-tic economic problems. But insecurity in Liberia isanother stumbling block. A U.S. official familiarwith the situation said, "Disarmament of soldiers isholding up international response to the UN ap-peal. If it clearly begins, donors will be more forth-coming." Another reason for the poor response isthe continuing perception that the United Statesshould take the lead in providing assistance toLiberia.

No Longer "Special": The Future U.S.-LiberiaRelationship The relationship between the UnitedStates and Liberia has already irrevocably changedas a result of the United States' having stayed onthe sidelines during the crisis. Ambassador De Vosdescribes his perception of the relationship:

"Does the United States have a specialrelationship with Liberia as it does with theUnited Kingdom or Israel? No. Do nine-tenths of Liberians know where the UnitedStates is? Yes. Do nine-tenths ofAmericansknow where Liberia is? No. The relationshipis more special to Liberians than to the United

States. It's a one-sided image of the relation-ship."

Whether the relationship is special or not,the widely held perception in the internationalcommunity that the United States should takeprimary responsibility for assistance to Liberiameans that Liberians will have to rely largely onU.S. help to rebuild.

What will the U.S. response be? De Vossays that the United States "might wind up beingthe largest donor" to the UN appeal for Liberia. Headds, "In terms of reconstruction aid.... If Liberianstruly want to run their country in a proper way,with.. .honesty and integrity and more than asemblance of democracy, the United States willprobably want to help. But if that doesn't happen,it will be hard to mobilize support in the UnitedStates for Liberia."


28 Uprooted Liberlans

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All Liberians have been casualties of thebrutal conflict that began in December 1989.Many thousands were killed or injured, countlessothers witnessed the death or torture of lovedones. More than 650,000 Liberians--more than aquarter of the country's population--remain inexile; half a million more are displaced withinLiberia.

Despite the November 1990 cease-fire, theabsence of a full political resolution to the conflictmeans that the country cannot yet begin torebuild, and that Liberian refugees cannot yetreturn home. In the interim, assistance to thoseaffected by the conflict must continue.

It appears that progress is being made onthe political front. NPFL head Taylor, interimpresident Sawyer, and ECOWAS leaders haveagreed to the disarmament of combatants, to befollowed by democratic elections. But for everystep forward there seems to be another stepbackwards. Until all the parties involved actuallyimplement the provisions of the ECOWAS-medi-ated Yamassoukro agreements, Liberia will re-main in a state of prolonged limbo, neither at warnor at peace.

If and when peace comes, other challengeswill await the Liberian people. Many of those theymust tackle on their own. But, realistically, theywill also need substantial material assistancefrom the international community, and their needwill come at a time when other large-scale repa-triation programs such as those to Cambodia andEthiopia are underway and competing for shrink-ing international resources, and when the formerSoviet republics are seeking aid to rebuild theireconomies. In the United States, economicrecession has contributed to an "America first"attitude that is resulting in reduced spending onforeign aid. Aid to Liberia is not high on theAdministration's agenda.

Nevertheless, the international communitymust insure adequate protection and assistancefor Liberian refugees, promote their successfulrepatriation and reintegration, and facilitateLiberia's reconstruction and reentry into theworld community. Otherwise, Liberia's nightmare

will not end. In this context, the U.S. Committee forRefugees makes the following recommendations:

1) The OAU, the UN, and individual coun-tries with influence in the region (includingdonor countries) should actively backECOWAS's peace-making efforts, both politi-cally and financially. The NPFL and the in-terim government of Liberia (as well as theINPFL, AFL, and ULIMO) should immediatelyimplement the provisions of the Yamassoukroagreements. Words are not enough.

The ECOWAS-sponsored Yamassoukrotalks yielded a peace plan offering the onlyconcrete hope for ending the protracted politicalimpasse that has followed the Liberian civil war.The international community, and particularlythe OAU and the UN, should support ECOWAS.New UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, elected with substantial support fromAfrican countries, should capitalize on that goodwill by encouraging African leaders--some ofwhom have influence over leaders of the variousLiberian factions--to press hard for immediatecompliance with the peace plan. Donor govern-ments should also use their political leverage topush the Liberian factions towards peace, andshould provide ECOWAS concrete financialsupport.

Until the Liberian factions implement theprovisions of the Yamassoukro agreements andLiberia is under one democratically electedgovernment, it will be difficult to mobilize andchannel developmental aid to Liberia, and thethreat of renewed fighting will remain.

2) All the armed Liberian factions shouldcease recruiting children into their ranks, anddemobilize children currently serving in theirforces. Liberians, and the international com-munity, should give top priority to imple-menting programs to assist children trauma-tized by war.

Countless Liberian children have been



victims of, witnesses to, or forced perpetrators of,brutal violence. The psychological effects of theseexperiences will plague them--and Liberia as awhole--for decades to come. The 1989 UN Con-vention on the Rights of the Child calls on statesto "refrain from recruiting any person who hasnot attained the age of 15 years into their armedforces." Many of the boy-soldiers in Liberia arewell under 15 years of age. While there is growingrecognition in Liberia of the severity of this prob-lem, armed factions continue to use child sol-diers. They must stop doing so immediately.They are wrecking countless young lives andcontributing to the future instability of the coun-

try.Programs to assist emotionally troubled

children must be made available. Training pro-grams for demobilized child soldiers are alsonecessary. The international community shouldhelp provide the human and material resourcesneeded to make this possible.

3) UNHCR must ensure that Liberian refu-gees receive adequate protection and assis-tance until they can return home.

UNHCR's program of assistance toLiberian refugees has improved substantiallysince the early months of the refugee emergency.However, the program is underfinanced, sorefugees receive only the most basic assistance;the food distribution system in Guinea is stillinadequate; and in both C6te d'Ivoire and Guinea,health care and medicines are not readily avail-able. UNHCR must continue to work with do-nors, local authorities, and its implementingpartners to ensure that these problems are ironedout. UNHCR also needs to monitor closely thenew asylum determination process in C6ted'Ivoire, to ensure that newly arrived asylumseekers are given a fair hearing.

UNHCR should specifically document andanalyze the lessons of the cohabitation experimentinvolving Liberian refugees and locals so that it doesnot repeat mistakes that it has made and can betterrespond in similar future situations.

4) Donors should respond generously

when UNHCR appeals for funds to implementits repatriation program for Liberian refugees.

The possibility exists that Liberian refu-gees can repatriate in 1992. It depends on thesincerity of those who participated in theYamassoukro meetings and the willingness of theother Liberian factions to end the war. If thathappens, the international community will becalled upon to finance the repatriation program.

But the international community, thoughwelcoming the possibility of large-scale repatria-tions, has not matched its rhetoric with actions.That is surprising and disturbing. Many of therefugees worldwide who are now--or may soon be--able to repatriate have been victims of the Cold War.It is ironic that, in the aftermath of the Cold War,they should again be victimized because theirhome regions are no longer geopolitically impor-tant.

At a time when donor resources areshrinking, repatriation is a worthwhile invest-ment. Repatriation is a permanent solution, infact the optimum solution long espoused byboth UNHCR and donor countries. Helpingrefugees to go home when they are able to is farpreferable to maintaining them--at great cost--as refugees. A well-handled repatriation isalso an investment in the future, because ifaccompanied by adequate reintegration anddevelopment assistance, it can contribute topolitical stability and economic self-sufficiencyin the refugees' home countries.

5) The United Nations should press donorsfor full funding of its program of assistance toLiberia. The UN program is sound, and is alifeline for hundreds of thousands ofLiberians. Sierra Leoneans displaced as a re-sult of the rebel incursion into their countrymust also be assisted.

The UN's 1990 and 1991 appeals for aid toLiberia have met only a limited response ($141.8million requested and only $78.3 million pledgedas of November 1991). In early 1992, the UN willlaunch its appeal for the coming year. The UNprogram seeks to provide food, water, agricul-tural assistance, medical care, and education

30 Uprooted Libel-jaiLs

_14b


throughout Liberia. But it is not only thosealready in Liberia that are dependent on the UNprogram of assistance. UNHCR's repatriationprogram does not provide for the reintegration ofrefugees once they return home. That is sup-posed to be covered by the overall UN plan forLiberia. Donors--and not just the United States--should provide the financial support needed toimplement the UN program. But the UN can notsit back and wait for funding to come. It must beproactive. The UN should press donors to sup-port its vital Liberia program.

In Sierra Leone, more than 145,000 peoplehave been internally displaced, and as many as169,000 have fled to Guinea, as a result of therebel incursion into their country. While thosewho are in Guinea are being assisted throughUNHCR, the internally displaced continue tosuffer. Sierra Leone is getting some internationalhelp, much of it from the United States, but itsneeds are overshadowed by the larger Liberiansituation. The situation in Sierra Leone needscontinuing monitoring to ensure that needed helpreaches the affected populations.

6) The United States should take the leadin mobilizing reconstruction assistance toLiberia.

Once Liberia is stable, its reconstructionmust begin. Some steps on that road are alreadybeing taken as part of the relief effort. But forLiberia to stand on its own two feet in the future,the economy will have to be revived, industry andforeign investment encouraged. Basic servicessuch as electricity and communications will needto be fully operative. More schools and institu-tions of higher learning must reopen.

That will require development assistance,not just emergency relief. At present, the UnitedStates is barred from providing development aidto Liberia by the Brooke amendment, whichprohibits such aid to countries that fail to repay

foreign loans (the Brooke amendment was im-posed on the Doe regime). Congress now appearsinclined to waive the Brooke amendment, and maydo so in early 1992. It is imperative that it do so.

But it is not only the Brooke amendment,or economic hard times in the United States, thatblocks U.S. reconstruction aid to Liberia. The U.S.government has largely lost interest in Liberia.Yet many in the international community continueto say that the United States should take the leadin providing reconstruction aid.

They are right. The United States does havean inescapable moral responsibility to help theLiberian people. For too long, we supported aregime that oppressed the Liberian people. Weshould now do the right thing by Liberia. Realisti-cally, we can not do it alone. But by taking the lead,the United States can seize the moral high groundand be in position to persuade other nations tosupport Liberia's reconstruction efforts.

Liberia's democracy and human rightstrack records have not been good. Its governmenthas been fraught with corruption and self-inter-est. Power has been concentrated in the hands ofa few. The suppression of opposition was com-mon even before Doe, and became more brutalduring his regime. More recently, the civil war--with its attendant atrocities, suffering, displace-ment, and destruction--has traumatized theLiberian people and devastated the country.

Now, Liberians have the opportunity tostart anew. The international community can andshould assist materially, but it is up to Liberiansto put aside thoughts of revenge, learn to livetogether once again, and work towards the institu-tion of democratic principles and respect forhuman rights. Only by so doing can they hope toattract the international support and aid they willneed, and proceed to build a better, stronger,more humane Liberia.



ISSU E PAPER...ISSU E PAPER N~ I. This paper was written by Hiram A. Ruiz, Africa policy analyst...

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