ISS Risk Special Report - Philippines - Emergent epicentre to ISIS SE Asian ambitions - FULL REPORT

ISS Risk Special Report:

Philippines – Emergent Epicentre to Islamic State’s Southeast

Asian Ambitions?

9 May, 2016

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Contents

1. Executive summary ............................................................................................................................. 2

2. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 4

3. Setting the scene - overview and contextualisation ............................................................................ 6

4. The changing terrorism landscape in the Southern Philippines & SE-Asia ...................................... 11

5. Chronology of ISIS-related events in the Philippines ........................................................................ 14

6. Contextualisation of the current threat .............................................................................................. 22

7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 29

List of acronyms: ................................................................................................................................... 32



1. Executive summary

With its dominant presence in Iraq and Syria, it is sometimes easy to discount the expansive

scope of the Islamic State‟s ambitions of a global caliphate. Our observations and research

indicate that, regardless of the success of ISIS in this stronghold, the group is undoubtedly

growing in other parts of the world. This report focuses on the future prospects of ISIS in

Southeast Asia (SE-Asia), contending that, ceteris paribus, the Philippines will soon be the

headquarters for ISIS in the region.

This report provides the rationale behind this assertion by elucidating the pre-existing

presence of terrorist organisations across the Philippines in light of the current domestic

political and social conditions. Additional analysis of how regional neighbours, most notably,

Malaysia and Indonesia are handling extremism are additional factors that support our

thesis. We assert that the Philippines will emerge as the epicentre of Islamic extremism in

SE-Asia, but there is no doubt that the entire region will be affected by the establishment of a

base in the region. This base will aid in facilitating the movement of followers, planning

attacks, fundraising, and cultivating strategic alliances between local terrorist groups.

The Filipino government is not doing nearly enough to curtail the radical threat of ISIS or,

more generally, terrorism in the country. Juxtaposed with the strong-armed efforts by the

Malaysian and Indonesian governments in their respective homelands, the use of the

Philippines as a jihadist functionary is being ever more exacerbated as alternative operating

options in the region dwindle. One of the major issues in the Philippines is the

underestimation of the influence of ISIS, illustrated by the labelling of local extremist

networks as „criminal gangs‟ or „bandits,‟ rather than Islamic extremists. Currently, the

majority of SE-Asian terrorist groups have training camps in Southern Philippines and the

state has become the major transit hub for those traveling to Syria. Unfortunately, without

proper recognition of the issue by the Filipino government, terrorist activities will only

continue to escalate.

There are, however, potential pitfalls that ISIS would have to overcome before successfully

establishing a headquarters in the Philippines. One is the lack of collectively recognised

leadership. Without this, there is little sense of unity between ISIS disciples as there is no

one to align varying agendas and objectives. With a plethora of breakaway groups in the

country, a leader that can unify the fractions is vital to establishing a strong SE-Asian base.

Finances are another matter that ISIS affiliates in the Philippines must address in order to

secure a headquarters in the state. Records from Mosul indicate that local cells must

contribute 20% of their generated income to other local and provincial cells, placing a



significant financial demand on pledged organisations. Consequently, there has been an

increase in kidnappings, ransoming, piracy, and extortion across the Philippines, but

especially in Mindanao, where jihadist groups have the greatest presence. In order to

sustain a successful base, ISIS will have to ensure a steady flow of income.

The state of the situation is dependent upon the outcome of two major occurrences: the

results of the election and the status of the BBL - both of which will occur in the next few

months. The outcome of the election may usher in a new government with greater concern

for and capacity to confront the growing terrorism problem across the country. Conversely, it

could usher in a new leader that maintains the status quo of inactively addressing the

situation for another 6 years. This ties directly to the second major outcome, which is the

passing, postponement, or rejection of the BBL. Should it pass, Islamic separatism and

Islamic fundamentalism will be pitched against each other, slowing down the aspirations of

ISIS in the country. If it does not pass, the unchanged dynamic will perpetuate

circumstances that allow ISIS to operate and thrive in the area. The next few months will

essentially determine the future of terrorism and the capacity of ISIS in the Philippines.

When considering the ambitions of ISIS, no corner of the world can be left examined.

Presently as well as well as historically, SE-Asia has been rife with terrorism and the future

outlook does not appear to be any different. If the status quo continues, we predict the

circumstances in the Philippines will align with ISIS ambitions, allowing the terrorist group to

foster a thriving epicentre for regional operations.



2. Introduction

Terrorism is nothing new to the Philippines; it has plagued the country for decades. Terror

groups have utilised the Southern Philippines region of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago

as an operational base and a safe haven to pursue a range of objectives from locally

orientated nationalist separatist campaigns, to communist orientated campaigns and

broader, regional Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic separatism. The range of different

groups helps to create a myriad militant problem riddled with competing interests and rife

with mistrust, egos and splits that can be easily misread. As such, the evolutionary nature of

the terrorist landscape in the Philippines is one of constant change, ever greater complexity,

a steady rise in sophistication and divisions and fractures and shifting agendas a common

denominator to these forces. The most foreboding consequence of all these competing

forces however, is that these groups are playing firmly into the hands of more entrenched

and radical elements with a far broader agenda.

The utilisation of the region by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the 1990‟s and 2000‟s is good

example of Southern Philippines regional importance as a terror hub in Southeast Asia (SE-

Asia). Furthermore, al-Qaeda‟s (AQ) support in the country for groups such as Abu Sayyaf

Group (ASG) and JI further solidifies this perception. Dynamics are changing again in this

second decade of the century with the interest expressed by both Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria (ISIS) towards the region and by indigenous terror groups towards ISIS.

The Philippines provides ISIS perhaps the only real immediate and viable launch pad for

their SE-Asia aspirations. Obtaining a foothold in the region would facilitate a satellite

extension of Mindanao by ISIS via a wilayat (province), adding to the ISIS „borderless sphere

of influence in Asia‟. This could potentially create an epicentre for SE-Asia extremism and a

convergence of common goals between rival groups, possible mergers of fighting formations

and a commonality of purpose, or it could lead to heightened inter rivalry between

predominate groups and further radical off shoots or ISIS wannabes. How this will play out in

the remainder of this year and beginning of 2017 will be determined by a range of factors,

the impending election, the passing or not of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) and

associated Bangsamoro Autonomous Region‟s creation, how ISIS manage their expansion

plans for the region and how ISIS develop in neighbouring countries are but a few of the key

influencers.

More immediate fundamental problems presently exist, namely the internal politics of the

primary terror groups in the Philippines. The infighting between Moro Islamic Liberation Front



(MILF) and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) for example benefits neither; it

does benefit Ansar al-Khilafah Sarangani (AKS – now renamed as Ansar al-Khilafah

Philippines or AKP) and Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) though.

Possible fracture lines within these groups (MILF & BIFF) are being exacerbated by this

Islamic infighting, which has already caused breakaway groups and could result in further

groups or elements also breaking off from the primary groups, or sub groups already broken

away, they need a home and a cause to turn to. This in turn assists the militant Indonesians

and Malays, read JI, long established in Mindanao, who influence and are the primary

strategic, logistical and training forces behind groups like AKP, which in turn helps the

aspiration of regionalisation of Islamic fundamentalism across SE-Asia, which ultimately

benefits ISIS.

Yes, it is a complex set of dynamics in the midst of an increasingly strong undercurrent of

extreme Islamic militancy. Several indigenous groups may have signalled a desire to, or

have actually pledged allegiance to ISIS, others have not and have even rejected ISIS

overtures.

How this ISIS attempt to expand their sphere of influence into SE-Asia from the Southern

Philippines will actually play out is incredibly difficult to predict with so many diffused

interests and orientations and obvious and less obvious agendas in motion. Is ASG

genuinely moving to a more hard line position regarding Islamic orientation and away from

the patent criminality of the past? Why are they coming under the gaze and influence of

ISIS? The MILF, will they resist ISIS aspirations as potentially derailing the prospects for the

realisation of Bangsamoro via the BBL or derail the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) and come into open conflict with them or their wannabe ISIS disciples?

The deadline of 30 June 2016 for ratification of the BBL is looming large. Where do such

regional desires leave MILF? The BIFF, will they bury the hatchet with MILF, or in MILF, for

the greater good of Islam? It is a complex geography of militancy to take apart and

understand in respect of attempting to understand what role the Southern Philippines will

emerge to take on a regional connectivity level in SE-Asia for ISIS.



3. Setting the scene - overview and contextualisation

After following the entrenched militant situation in the Philippines since the early 2000‟s, in

early 2015 ISS Risk was reporting on the growing presence of ISIS in Asia. However we

held a somewhat outlier view for that time or perhaps one more aptly described as „rare‟ in

regard to ISIS‟ designs for Asia.

We believed that ISIS‟ Asia ambitions were far from restricted to activities and strategic

designs in South Asia, its‟ so called Khorasan wilayat. As such our stance was that they

were equally focused in its assessments on developments in SE-Asia, and how the threat

posed by an ever more global Salafi jihadism group was spreading in this part of Asia too.

As mid-2016 approaches, SE-Asian neighbours Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are

potentially each facing a very worrying question. What is this worrying question? “Which of

them will be the first to suffer the consequences of ISIS declaring SE-Asia‟s wilayat inside

their borders?” But more importantly what does this mean for the region? It will affect them

all.

ISIS is if nothing else an ambitious and potent entity which to date has demonstrated a clear

strategy of expansionism through an ability to both create and seize opportunities offered by

„local‟ extremist dynamics. ISIS states that for a wilayat to be proposed and approved by

them, the needs for a proposal detailing the proposing group‟s military and governance

strategy, as well the identification of a collectively chosen leader first needs to be addressed.

Issue No. 7 of ISIS‟s Dabiq magazine describes the process in detail1, however a key point

in respect to the developing threat of ISIS in SE-Asia is the ability to identify and collectively

chose a leader. The problem in the Philippines is that there is something of a pool of

potential leaders, some ordering their men to shoot at each other – hardly fitting a key ISIS

leadership requirement, an ability to bring unity.

The ISIS’ strategy for SE-Asia is one of a regionalisation (and unification) of appealing

to and co-opting existing local extremist groups’ activities under its careful

stewardship.

ISIS intends to achieve this by providing financing, training and ultimately total leadership.

But like all global enterprises and entities, meaningful progress in a new region demands a

1 : “This [approval] process includes documenting their bay‟āt [pledge of allegiance], unifying the

jamā‟āt [assembly] who have given bay‟ah, holding consultations to nominate a wālī [governor] and

members for the regional shūrā assembly, planning a strategy to achieve consolidation in their region

for the Khilāfah [caliphate] so as to implement the Sharī‟ah [Islamic law], and presenting all this to the

Islamic State leadership for approval.”



well-coordinated and well-staffed „flagship-esque‟ regional headquarters that is governed by

a committed executive body with strong local connections. The Philippines presents a

strong, if not the strongest option at the moment for several reasons. The prevailing security

conditions, or arguably, the lack of them, in Mindanao are clearly favourable to many terrorist

groups, the region risks slipping back to its heyday terror hub status of 15-20 years ago. The

porous nature of the maritime routes into Malaysia and Indonesia allow for extensive supply

and logistical routes. The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia have been largely

successful in denial strategies to inhibit ISIS gaining a foot hold geographically; ideologically

they are well behind the curve. Therefore the Southern Philippines is attractive as a central

training and command and control hub for the entire SE-Asian region.

ISIS, despite declarations to the contrary from the government and security agencies in the

Philippines, has already constructed in-roads into some of the country‟s jihadist groups

within the Mindanao islands. These inroads commenced perhaps as early as 2012 the seeds

were being sown and are now patently propagating. ISIS‟ ideological influence and

operational connectivity with some of the leading and secondary domestic terror groups and

factions is becoming increasingly evident. ISIS, like its predecessor al-Qaeda in the 2000s,

has created alliances and is looking to build upon those. Exploiting local religiously gilded

domestic separatist tensions and politics, the Philippines offers ISIS a potentially valuable

prize – a location for its SE-Asian headquarters from which to grow its regional ambitions –

namely the Sulu Archipelago – Zamboanga Peninsula region in southern Mindanao, in the

Southern Philippines.

This geographical area, or future ISIS platform, historically referred to as the „Bangsamoro‟

i.e. „region of the Moros2‟ which lies opposite Malaysia and Indonesia is already set to

become at once both a politically autonomous region and a stronghold of conservative Sunni

Islam in the region. Its people are largely impoverished, long politicised, disenfranchised and

aggrieved. They are a Muslim minority in a country which is 87% Roman Catholic. In

keeping with ISIS‟ global ambitions the fact that the Sulu Archipelago and parts of Mindanao

were once part of the Islamic sultanate (Islamic Sultanate of Sulu, founded in 1405) is a

historical precedent not lost on ISIS or its recruiters.

The Black Standard synonymous with al-Qaeda and later ISIS have been seen with the

words „Islamic State of Mindanao and Sulu‟ on several videos and social media pages of

Filipino extremist groups‟ personalities in 2016. It has also been adopted by a leading faction

2 The Moro term stems from the Spanish colonial era, and is a derivative of the word „Moors‟. Muslim

groups now apply the term as part of a collective Muslim Philippine cultural identity, one separate

from the „Filipino‟ Christian identity.



of the ASG and then subsequently by the ASG itself.

Recruits have long been drawn from the region to supply local separatist-cum-criminal

groups and extremist terror groups. However, as has been documented over the last two

years, the region has also supplied ISIS‟ foreign fighter cadres in Syria and Iraq during the

ongoing Syrian War. Coupled with this, the historic harbouring of JI members from Indonesia

and its Malay cells by ASG at their training camp (Camp Abu Bakr) in Mindanao with Moro

communities in Malaysia and Indonesia during the 2000‟s reinforces the regionalism of the

problem. Known routes to Syria have been in place for some time now, the passing of

jihadist recruits to Syria and Iraq from the Bangsamoro was an inevitability.

Parts of the Bangsamoro are both fertile and open to ISIS to spread its Salafist ideology and

global jihadism brand, and it is from these locations that they can build further allegiances

across SE-Asia with local extremist groups and their supporters. Such allegiances already

exist with some groups in Indonesia. With the establishment of the Bangsamoro

Autonomous Region (intended to supersede the existing ARMM), SE-Asia will have an

epicentre of militant jihadist activities in each of their respective backdoors. With passage to

Syria becoming ever more difficult for ISIS recruits, and the return of veteran ISIS combat

troops and trainers to their countries of origin in SE-Asia, an autonomous region that could

act as a landing-pad and base of operations and quite literally a beach head for these

jihadists is a disconcerting one.

As seen with the diverting by ISIS command of foreign fighters recruits from Syria to Libya in

response to the international crackdown on ISIS recruits, ISIS clearly thinks globally when

looking to build up key nodes of its forces. A key aspect to this report‟s assessment of ISIS

and extremism in the Philippines is whether the Southern Philippines is being prepped for

such use. With Indonesia and Malaysia governments openly reporting the continued

recruitment of their nationals by ISIS and other groups and their known presence as foreign

fighters in Syria, the Philippines may well become an „alternate jihadist destination‟ for

training by ISIS. With the Philippine government now committed to launching a military

counter attack in the region, in response to ASG actions of late, this alternate jihadist

destination for training may well serve as a frontline through which to gain combat

experience just like Syria. The difference at the moment is the fact that the Ad-Hoc Joint

Action Group (AHJAG), a conduit or back channel between the government and MILF,

reduces the risk of missteps when the government forces launch strikes on foreign jihadists.

That conduit could evaporate if the 30 June vote fails to ratify the BBL. Then all bets are off

the table and Mindanao potentially becomes a total no go zone for the government again.



Without doubt that will only benefit the plethora of radical jihadist militants and their

aspirations for themselves and the region. Ironically, MILF present perhaps the best

opportunity to contain the growth of ISIS in the region, but conditions attached may be too

much for some in the Philippines administration to swallow.

This report is an objective assessment of the various developments in extremism / terrorist

group dynamics in the Philippines over the last 24 months. It delivers transparency to and

therein, an understanding of the current terror and political risk concerns faced by the

Philippines as the mid-year point approaches. As the attacks on Jakarta in January 2016,

the arrest of suicide bombers during planning phases in Kuala Lumpur the same month, the

ongoing internment of suspected jihadists across Malaysia since mid-2015, the Malay

governments closing of the Sabah border with ARMM, and the killing of a Moroccan national

identified as a bomb-making instructor during a large scale attack by a terrorist group against

Philippine security forces in Basilan in April; 2016 is a critical year for ISIS and its allegiants

and supporters in this part of Asia.

ISIS in the main is believed to derive its income from multiple sources, ranging from taxes on

local communities, kidnapping foreign and locals and holding them for ransom, controlling

rent, the sale of its black market oil (air strikes on facilities, tracking of smuggling routes,

increased border security, absence of maintenance and refinery personnel have had an

impact on this source of revenue). Yet it seeks to maintain a diversified set of fundraising

streams. Kidnapping and ransom in the Philippines, as regularly seen in the western media,

is a criminal activity synonymous with the ASG factions and other groups and arguably a key

factor in Philippine authorities continued labelling of them as „bandit groups‟.

From records taken in Mosul it would appear that ISIS required local cells to contribute 20%

of their locally generated income for redistribution to other local and provincial cells. If this is

the case for pledged Philippine groups (and SE-Asian groups), then the criminal actions of

these groups so as to support this revenue and „central treasury‟s creation are serious. Such

a „financial demand‟ will most likely lead to a (material) increase in not just kidnapping and

ransoming, but also piracy, zakat3, extortion as well as the propaganda push from groups

upon the local populaces to legitimize their actions.

For the Bangsamoro region these criminal revenue generating actions will be felt most

strongly, as will any possible official security or military responses to them. Observations are

already being made in the Philippine press which have alluded to the ramping up of

3 Islamic donation or ‘alms giving’ although legitimate under Sharia law forms part of ASG Treasury revenue

streams



kidnappings in Mindanao since January 2016 (see pledging of ASG factions and other

groups in the chronology section below). If there is indeed such a swift correlation then the

dangers of ISIS (through their followers) have expanded in the SE-Asia region, and the

Philippines is certainly no exception to this phenomenon. ISIS is ushering in a new chapter

in extremism and the criminal activities in support of their terror activities to the Philippines.



4. The changing terrorism landscape in the Southern

Philippines & SE-Asia

A proper assessment of the potential terrorist risks brought by an increasing ISIS penetration

in the Philippines is not possible without a comprehensive analysis of the growth of ISIS in

SE-Asia. The growing regional interconnectivity in terms of language, existing terrorist

organisations and alliances, key personnel, recruitment channels, resource mobilisation,

logistics and supply pipelines and the spreading of ideology means one thing: developments

in one part of SE-Asia have the potential to rapidly impact security risk levels in other parts

of the region.

4.1 A common destination, but heterogeneity in goals

Since 2013, several jihadists from different SE-Asian terrorist groups, particularly from

Indonesia and Malaysia, have been travelling to Syria to fight alongside ISIS. Similarly, albeit

in considerably lower numbers, jihadists from indigenous Philippine terrorist groups have

also travelled to the Middle East. Regardless of the exact origins within the region of these

jihadists the common and even unifying intent shared by them all (and their recruiters) has

been for them to undertake a „combat tour‟ in Iraq and Syria and then eventually return to

SE-Asia brandishing new skill sets and battle-tested terrorist tactics, techniques and

procedures (TTP) which can then be transferred to the next generation of jihadists in the

region.

Frequently a smaller but nonetheless important expectation of these Syria jihadi returnees

from their early (local) recruiters has also been that they have networked with the right

people in the Middle East to return home with established ties to foreign financiers. The

simple rationale for this is a difference in approach by organisers and facilitators within and

between differing groups and the subsequent connotations for regional plans.

In short, the Indonesian planners, coordinators and facilitators take a somewhat more

structured, long term and pragmatic position and stance than their Philippine hosts in the

country, who tend to be, well, emotionally driven and less given to strategically oriented

goals.

The fundamental difference between Indonesian and Malaysian based groups like JI and

Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), as opposed to Southern Philippines based groups like

ASG, is that the former placed emphasis on sending key personnel to the region for a „train

the trainer‟ experience. So that when they return, they can establish a self-sufficient training



apparatus like those established by returning Afghanistan veterans in the 1990s. Philippines

based groups by contrast were mostly interested in securing access to foreign funds for their

domestic operations. Indonesia-based groups like JI are not as reliant on foreign financial

support as their Philippines-based counterparts, since they can generate significant revenue

domestically in Indonesia and Malaysia. This difference in self-financing capabilities also

explains the comparatively far larger number of Indonesian and Malaysian jihadists being

transferred to Syria in comparison to those sent from the Philippines. Those being sent to

the Philippines offer a more strategic orientation or re-orientation of the domestic Philippine

jihadists thinking.

4.2 Routes to Syria

A small number of non-governmental organisations from the region have also played an

active role in facilitating the travel of SE-Asian jihadists to Syria and Iraq under the guise of

providing humanitarian aid to refugees. It is important to acknowledge JI‟s role in this

„grafting‟ exercise that is currently taking place, because JI transcend regional alliances. The

best example of such a group is the Hilal Ahmar Society of Indonesia (HASI), which has

served as JI‟s humanitarian wing since 2011.

Since 2012, HASI has sent multiple groups of JI personnel (jihadists) from Indonesia and

Malaysia to Syria to fight under the different jihadist groups. HASI members have also been

quite active in holding fundraisers with JI in Indonesia, and have reportedly raised

considerable funds in support of transfer of recruits to the Middle East, financing military

training and recruitment costs for JI. HASI itself also receives a great deal of foreign financial

support, specifically from Saudi Arabia-based financiers who are dedicated to facilitating the

transfer of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq.

The US Department of Treasury labelled HASI as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist

(SDGT) group for its activities and direct association with JI. HASI Director Angga Dimas

Pershada also received a SDGT designation at the same time and is recognised as a senior

member (and public face) of JI‟s Foreign Affairs Division. In his joint-position Pershada has

been intimately involved in the organisation‟s now routine transfer of recruits from the JI

network and group, to ISIS in Syria. In the early days of the transferring of SE-Asians to

serve in Iraq-Syria, the biggest challenge for these Indonesian and Malaysian jihadists was

to demonstrate their usefulness to ISIS‟ cause. A credibility issue was there as jihadists from

SE-Asia were traditionally looked down upon by militants from other countries for not being

sufficiently radical. To overcome this perception, groups such as JI and MIT began sending

their best trained and most militant radicals to ISIS. It is some of these individuals, who are



returning to assist in the development of the terror infrastructure in the region, which the

Southern Philippines will patently play a significant role in.

Additionally, JI began setting up training camps across SE-Asia, including Malaysia, where

would be jihadists from SE-Asia were vetted, trained and further radicalised before being

sent to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq. It is our assessment that the Malaysian suicide bombers

of ISIS graduated from these JI pre-deployment training camps. Until late 2014, Malaysia

was being used as a major transit hub for SE-Asian jihadists planning to travel to Syria. This

changed however when Indonesian and later Malaysian authorities began their respective

crack down on ISIS affiliated groups and supporters in their nations. The Malaysian

government‟s effectiveness of its anti-ISIS operations led to ISIS issuing an alert via its

recruitment channels in January 2015 advising would be jihadis to not use Malaysia as a

transit route for further travel to Syria. It was during this time that travel patterns of would-be

jihadists from the region moved away from the Malaysia route, and new routes being

explored. One early report was that JI was using Brunei as an alternative transit point for

sending fighters to Syria.

At present, it is our assessment that the Philippines has taken over as the major transit hub

for onward travel towards Syria. Several combat indicators point in that direction, not the

least of which is the fact that Southern Philippines provides the most permissive operating

environment for terror groups in the region. The commencement of direct commercial flights

between the Philippines and Turkey from November 2014 also ensured that jihadists from

the region could travel far more easily to Syria via Turkey. While the governments of

Indonesia and Malaysia have demonstrated strong determination in preventing the growth of

jihadist activities in general and towards ISIS in particular, in their respective countries, the

same cannot be said for the actions of the Philippine authorities. Consequently, the vast

majority of SE-Asia‟s terror groups now have bases and training camps in Southern

Philippines.



5. Chronology of ISIS-related events in the Philippines

It must be noted that when tracking terrorist groups in the Philippines, an emphasis on

personalities and the importance of their associations is a critical aspect to the assessment.

Thinking or determining trends or patterns on a group level is an approach that would leave

an analyst materially „behind the curve‟ as to what are the latest developments. As will be

seen in this chronology section and the following assessment sections, the importance of

connectivity and how these connections are bound is seminal to understanding the situation

in the Philippines and how ISIS is looking to push aside al-Qaeda‟s presence and supplant

JI‟s influence.

2012

2012 / November

Dinno Amor R. Pareja, a key member of Rajah Suleiman Movement (RSM), posted a

video online calling on Muslims in the Philippines to join jihad. In this video Pareja used

the black flag of ISIS as his backdrop. An organisation called Jamaal al-Tawhid Wal Jihad

Philippines was also referred to in the video. Interestingly, the Jamaal al-Tawhid Wal

Jihad was the movement founded by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, the founder of AQ in Iraq,

the forerunner of ISIS.

2013

2013 / October

An Iranian news site reports that a Filipino terrorist was killed in Syria.

2013 / December

Overseas Filipino workers from Syria reported that two Filipinos had died while fighting

against Syrian government troops in Damascus and the Syrian government troops had

identified them as members of the ASG.

2014

2014 / May

Muslims in the Philippines, who called themselves part of the Ansar Dawlah Fi Filibbin,

posted a video showing a few men in white dress performing a pledge of allegiance to

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This incident happened a month before Baghdadi declared the



formation of the Caliphate.

2014 / June

Malaysian police arrested three Malaysian nationals from Sabah, who were associated

with ASG and were planning to join ISIS in Syria and launch suicide bombings in Iraq. All

these men received training in the Southern Philippines.

2014 / July

A video appeared on some internet sites showing Muslim detainees in the Philippines

performing the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi. The detention area appeared to be

the Special Intensive Care Area (SICA) of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology

in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. SICA is known to be a high risk detention facility

detaining suspected high risk personalities associated with different militant groups. It

was believed that Ahmad Santos, the founder of the RSM jihadist group organised the

activity. Santos‟ links with ISIS were established by his brother-in-law Dinno Amor R

Pareja, a key RSM member, who is believed to have good contacts with ISIS leadership

in Syria.

ASG‟s Basilan wing Commander Isnilon Hapilon pledges allegiance to al-Baghdadi.



2014 / August

BIFF, a splinter group of MILF, declared that it has formed an alliance with ISIS.

Former President of Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, claimed that 100 young Filipinos are

training with ISIS in Syria.

Rodrigo Duterte, the Mayor of Davao City, said that more than 100 residents of Davao

City were recruited by ISIS and have since left the country.

A confidential government memo, which was leaked to the media, revealed that the

Philippine authorities were on alert following the increase in the number of Filipinos

travelling to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS.

2014 / September

Ansar Khalifah Sarangani (AKS), which later renamed itself as AKP, pledged allegiance

to ISIS.

ASG threatens to execute two German hostages unless Berlin pays US$ 6.4 million in

ransom and stops supporting the US-led international military campaign against ISIS.

Philippines began investigation on the involvement of Filipinos jihadists in Syria and Iraq.

The government also began monitoring Filipino jihadists who had travelled to Syria or Iraq

and were trying to radicalise others after returning home.

More than 100 supporters of ISIS gathered in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur province,

Mindanao and pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The open event took place

during the Friday prayer at the city‟s grand mosque.



2014 / October

Reports indicated that Southern Philippines based jihadist organisations like ASG and

BIFF – which have already pledged allegiance / support to ISIS – were showing

increasing signs of inter-group coordination. Another terrorist group, KIM was acting as

an umbrella organisation for existing and emerging jihadist groups with ties to ISIS. KIM is

an umbrella organisation which was formed out of tactical alliance between BIFF, JI, 105th

battalion of MILF and the Isnilon Hapilon faction of ASG. This tactical alliance means

these groups conduct joint training, joint operation and joint fund raising.

ASG released two German hostages after receiving a ransom of US$ 5.6 million. The

other demand for Germany to end its support to US-led international military campaign

against ISIS was not met.

President Aquino downplayed the threat posed by ISIS, saying that MILF was helping

prevent Filipino Muslims from joining radical groups. The President also discarded the

possibility of connection between Filipino terrorist groups and individuals with ISIS.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) deployed an additional 1500 troops in

Mindanao to improve the monitoring and gather intelligence on groups that were

recruiting for ISIS.

A new terrorist group Bangsamoro Justice Movement (BJM), a breakaway faction of

BIFF, was formed and it pledged allegiance to ISIS. Usman Basit was identified as the

leader of the group. (Tauntingly unmasked in central position in the photo below).



2014 / November

A Filipino jihadist was identified as one of the ISIS executioners involved in the

beheadings of Syrian Air Force pilots and an American hostage.

According to different estimates, between 20 and 200 Filipinos are believed to have

travelled to Syria to join ISIS.

2015

2015 / January

At least 44 members of the Philippines Special Action Force (SAF) were killed when they

were ambushed by Muslim insurgents in Mamasapano town, Maguindanao province

while pursuing high value terrorists. The SAF personnel were returning from their assault,

when they were engaged by BIFF members. While manoeuvring away from BIFF assault,

the SAF personnel strayed into MILF controlled territory and eventually came under MILF

fire too. The high value targets were JI member Zulkifli bin Hir aka Marwan and BIFF

bomb maker Abdul Basit Usman; Marwan was killed in the raid, but Usman managed to

escape. Marwan was considered a chief facilitator of coordination between different

militant groups in SE-Asia like JI, BIFF, AKP etc. and was considered the major driver of

uniting these groups under the banner of ISIS.

2015 / April

Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario told the Association of SE-Asian Nations

(ASEAN) that ISIS threatens the Philippines through the Black Flag Movement in

Mindanao.

A Christian pastor was kidnapped in Mindanao by a notorious Islamist terrorist named

Mohammad Jaafar Sabiwang Maguid alias Commander Tokboy, who claimed himself to

be the leader of ISIS in the Mindanao islands. Tokboy was reported as the leader of AKP

at this time, and allegedly also a former commander of the MILF‟s 105th Base Command.

AKP, which had earlier pledged allegiance to ISIS, released a video threatening to deploy

suicide bombers in the Philippines and make the country a graveyard for American

soldiers.

2015 / August

A leaked Philippine Foreign Ministry document estimated the number of Filipinos who

have joined ISIS at „close to 200‟. Furthermore the ministerial document estimated that



over 100 of the jihadist recruits went to Iraq, where they underwent military training,

before they were deployed in Syria.

2015 / November

Ten ISIS flags were recovered during a fire fight between government troops and AKP

militants in Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat. Eight AKP rebels were killed during the

encounter.

A video of men in masks with ISIS‟ black flag behind them is posted on Facebook,

claiming that „ISIS in Mindanao‟ will attack the APEC Summit in Manila.

2015 / December

ISIS released its first propaganda video for the Philippines, showing a terror training camp

in a Filipino jungle. Several jihadi commanders are shown urging Filipinos to travel to

Syria to join ISIS before revealing the group have already started their own terror camp in

the Philippines.

Mayor of Cotabato City, Japal Guiani Jr, stated that a group linked to ISIS was recruiting

young men from the region and had already recruited more than 1000 people from

different areas of central Mindanao.



2016

2016 / January

A new video released on the dark web showed members and leaders of four jihadist

organisation – ASG, AKP, Ansar Al-Sharia and Ma‟rakat Al-Ansar – pledging allegiance

to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Present in the pledge were Isnilon Hapilon from ASG, Abu

Sharifa of AKP and Abu Haris of Marakat al-Ansar. The video also described Insilon

Hapilon as the overall leader of the four groups. ASG and AKP had individually pledged

allegiance to ISIS in the past.

2016 / February

ISIS formally recognised pledges of allegiance from a number of jihadist groups from the

Philippines, including the Katibat Ansar al Sharia, Katibat Marakah al Ansar, AKP and the

ASG faction led by Isnilon Hapilon.

Former Mayor of a town on Basilan reported active recruitment in local mosques and

schools were being undertaken since 2015 in the name of ISIS.

2016 / March

A prominent Saudi cleric Sheikh Ayed al-Qarni, who is a critic of ISIS and is on the



group‟s hit list, survived an unsuccessful assassination attempt after delivering a lecture

at the Western Mindanao State University. The perpetrator was a Filipino national who

was shot dead at the site.

AKP released a video showing the beheading of an alleged spy in Sarangani, Southern

Philippines. This was the first ISIS-style beheading video released by the AKP.

Jund al-Tawhid battalion of the ASG pledged allegiance to ISIS. The battalion is

estimated to be 22 members strong and is based in Sulu.

2016 / April

ISIS claimed responsibility for a clash in Basilan between government troops and ASG

militants led by Isnilon Hapilon, which left 18 soldiers and 5 terrorists dead. Identified

amongst the dead militants was a Moroccan national Mohammed Khattab, who was a

bomb-making expert and instructor, as well as jihadist preacher and propagandist.

Importantly he was understood to have been working as a central figure in unifying

Mindanao based Islamic terrorist groups and factions.

MILF in Ranao, a splinter group of MILF, pledged allegiance to ISIS.



6. Contextualisation of the current threat

The evolving situation pertaining to ISIS‟s present strategy is constantly changing in

complexity across the many of spheres they are engaging so as to develop bridgeheads. For

the Philippines the outcome of the election, undecided at the time of writing, will have a

bearing on how that evolution may hasten, or be curtailed in SE-ASia. With so many

unknowns at the moment regarding what may or may not happen with the BBL at the end of

June being passed or not it is difficult to call with definitive authority what could or will

happen. Prior to 2012, ISIS was largely unheard of for most people, never mind in the

remote hinterland of Mindanao. However, that does not mean ISIS were not in play, it simply

means they were not then on the international media radar. What existed then was best

described as a latent undercurrent of an increasingly militant and extreme form of Islamic

fundamentalism.

The main groups in the Philippines have coexisted for decades, fracturing over time into sub

groups or new groups, emerging to challenge the hegemony of the primary factions. The

ongoing fragmentations, regardless of how inconsequential they may appear, present the

extremist jihadists with a fertile recruiting ground to fuel this eastern growth strategy. Two

scenarios are a given, the BBL will either pass or it won‟t pass on the date stated, but those

are the only givens. If the BBL passes then the ISIS aspirations and those of other regional

players facilitating these desires will have a different dynamic to deal with, a set of

circumstances that essentially could slow down ISIS aspirations but also pitch Islamic

separatism against Islamic fundamentalism in the region, if Manila plays their hand right. If

the law is not passed, then those dynamics and circumstances could provide the basis for

the acceleration of ISIS planning and spread their influence more rapidly than even they

have planned or hoped for. Is the spike in attacks in the past few years a coincidence, or is

there a discernible pattern emerging to support the thesis that ISIS are creating a holistic

jihadist network, not just in areas of the Southern Philippines, but across and in the region?

The first of the following maps demonstrates the activities over a five year period for all

indigenous militant groups, regardless of orientation and agenda, highlighting the breadth

and depth of terrorism across the country over the period 2010 – 2014. The subsequent

maps drill into the Islamic attacks specifically and then into only ISIS alleged or related

incidents, finally looking at spheres of influence of the differing groups and where this

influence overlaps. The increasing ISIS influence is clear to be seen as accelerating from

2014 onwards. Although at the moment it appears on the surface that the groups remain

disparate and divided. Combat indicators suggest that the ISIS aspirations are evolving, but



that evolution could quicken as stated depending on domestic factors and events in the

political arena in the Philippines.

The map below demonstrates the scale of the general terrorism problem country wide over

the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2014.

Terrorist attacks in the Philippines: 2010 - 2014



The next map gives a clearly proportional representation of the terrorism problem, clearly

identifying the south as the epicentre of terrorism, but surprisingly incidents spread across

the entire country.

Terrorist attacks in the

Philippines: 2010 - 2014



"That period of the last quarter of 2013 and first quarter of 2014 - we have estimated that this

was the period when several Philippine militant organisations like the Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF,

the JIS embedded in Sulu and Zamboanga peninsula in central Mindanao started to prepare

for the eventuality of taking their oath of allegiance,” said Rodolfo Mendoza, a terrorism

expert at the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research.

However, we would argue that the foundations for this development were laid in mid to late



2012 in terms of overtures being made and alliances being struck and ideals formulated. The

main issue holding the extremist groups back from becoming official members and launching

an IS caliphate in SE-Asia is actually their disunity. A case of too many chiefs and not

enough Indians, a singular and acceptable leader has yet to emerge who would be worthy of

ISIS approval and sanctioning. Looking only at the jihadist orientated attacks, the immediate

interpretation of the data is that there is a clear demarcation between the geographical

concentrations of the groups. This allows for determinations in spheres of influence, overlaps

and reorientation towards ISIS which is clearly demonstrated in the subsequent map.

This next map reinforces that geographical demarcation between the primary radical Islamic

groups aligning themselves with ISIS, or trying to. ASG for example are concentrated to the

west on or around Sulu. BIFF is focused on central Mindanao.



However, although the tactical area of operations (TAOR) of BIFF sits squarely within the

MILF TAOR and the existing ARMM and will be part of the BBL if and when ratified, BIFF

could play a central role in unifying interests in the coming months and year, as could AKP.

That is a critical factor in BIFF‟s position and more importantly potential alignments moving

forward. BIFF emerged as a force in response to the peace negotiations between MILF and

the government, whereby more radical elements of MILF disagreed with the progress of the

peace process and sought to create a new group that would continue with a militaristic

campaign agitating for their separatist Islamic agenda. KIM is acting as an umbrella

organisation for existing and emerging jihadist groups with ties to ISIS.

KIM is more exactly a joint venture which was formed out of tactical alliance between BIFF,

JI, 105th battalion of MILF and the Isnilon Hapilon faction of ASG. This tactical alliance

means these groups conduct joint training, joint operation and joint fund raising. The AKP

straddling ASG and BIFF areas of control places the group in a strong position as facilitator

and coordination between ASG, BIFF and KIM. Therefore given ASG‟s predominance in the

Sulu peninsula then this group offers ISIS a tangible opportunity for an early entry platform

and base of operations from which to expand with the inclusion of AKP, KIM and BIFF

incrementally. ISIS‟ influence and closeness to KIM is clearly a key footnote when assessing

how ISIS can reach several groups through existing organically grown conduits. The AKP

through its Malay founder and this „foreigner‟s‟ historical relations with many local groups is

able to straddle both ASG and BIFF areas. Somewhat unsurprisingly the AKP holds a strong

position in the terrorist landscape as a known facilitator and coordinator between ASG, BIFF

and KIM. On top of the aforementioned groups‟ coverage of Mindanao proper, one can also

clearly see from the map above ASG‟s predominance in the Sulu archipelago – a

predominance that reaches all the way southwest to the Malay seaboard.

The confusion regarding understanding and interpretation of the growing risk is a problem in

the formulation of an effective counter strategy to ISIS influence and growth in the region.

The following selected quotes come from a range of observers in the Philippines and

underscores this confusion, opinions like the politics of the country are quite divided:

Said Maria Ressa, CEO of Rappler: "ISIS is grafting onto the same extremist networks,

which JI had in the past. JI actually used the Philippines not just as a theatre of

operations but largely as a training ground and Indonesia, which has the world largest

Muslim population became the theatre of operations. We’re seeing the same thing … take

shape now."

"They’re not really ISIS," Philippines military spokesman Colonel Restituto Padilla told

reporters in December 2015. "We view them as mere criminal gangs." National security



adviser Cesar Garcia said: "ISIS has no training camps in the Philippines."

Rohan Gunaratna: "The ISIS-initiated merger of the fighting formations and unifications

of the leaders will present an unprecedented challenge to the Manila government," he

said. "ISIS is likely to create a safe haven in Basilan and mount operations from the Sulu

archipelago into both the Philippines and Malaysia."



7. Conclusion

The outcome of election results in the Philippines is an unknown as this report is being

completed. However, the internal juxtaposing and power plays that will likely emanate as a

consequence of change will undoubtedly have an impact on the Southern Philippines. Will

Deturte, who is expected to win with a healthy majority, favour pressing ahead with the BBL?

His father was after all a Muslim from the south. He has been mayor of a southern city

afflicted by terrorism related violence over the years. Or will the BBL be postponed and held

up in political wrangling as alliances and favours are sought by the power brokers in Manila

far removed from the south politically and geographically? What complexion will a new

Congress have? Who will control the puppet masters in this Congress? None of these

questions can truly be addressed or answered in this report, nor are they what the onus of

this report is focused upon. What can be addressed here is what will be the potential impact

on ISIS aspirations and actual growth in the Southern Philippines along with the indigenous

Islamic groups now merging for commonality of purpose.

So what is the real risk of ISIS growth? Mergers and acquisitions or co-opting in the

Southern Philippines? Perhaps the reality of the risk is being lost in the clutter of noise from

the election or the denials emanating from multiple parties and observers as to the extent or

not of any threat of ISIS being in the Southern Philippines. Perhaps it is being overplayed by

the ISIS propaganda machine. The actual situation is both, but to properly appreciate what is

unfolding one must understand that it is not merely about ISIS in the Southern Philippines

and consequently SE-Asia. It is about a deep flowing radical Islamist undercurrent that has

been morphing and gaining momentum for a considerable period of time, in a state of

transcendence as such. It is this undercurrent that ISIS and other extremist groups seek to

exploit, tap into, and build upon. ISIS just happens to be the current franchise. The plethora

of smaller groups, particularly in the Philippines, appears to be at a micro level rudderless

and redefining themselves. However, they are redefining themselves in a potential climate of

political uncertainty. It is here that the emergence of the genuine macro threat could be

defined – a threat far broader than to just Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.

The evidence suggests that ISIS have been making inroads over the past four years, quietly

to begin with and now more visible. A denial of the reality merely assists the radicals. The

risks could be exacerbated with any delays to the BBL slated for 30 June. A delay or

postponement could well be the catalyst for a resurgence in separatist terrorism. If that

happens then it provides the other militant groups with the distraction they seek to up the

ante. ISIS will then simply reap the rewards of increased activity in the Mindanao province.



Frankly, the Philippines government has a problem keeping a lid on the terrorism problem

now, despite the largest group behaving itself and curtailing its activities for the last decade,

then what if the terrorism risk escalates and extends beyond the Southern regions? It does

not auger well the rest of the country if the multiple groups operating across the region are

left largely unchecked and the Philippines security forces are suddenly faced with the

prospect of an escalation in MILF related violence. Although at the moment IS are not

materially supporting the aspiring groups, this does not mean ideologically that a transition is

not underway. The intent is there, but should one wait to determine the threat through

retrospective evidence or evaluate that transition now?

The genuine fundamentalist orientation of the differing groups will play a factor in which one

will ultimately take the lead in delivering on IS aspirations in the Philippines. The ASG is

perhaps the least ideologically driven, yet is trying to present itself as the bastion of Islam or

IS by being the first Philippines group pledging bai’at to Abu Bakr al-Bagdhadi in July 2014.

However, ASG in the past 2 years have been using the IS association or connection for

pursuance of criminal activities as opposed to ideologically driven affinity to IS. ASG‟s

criminal kidnapping activities are well documented. Although the incidence of ASG „incidents‟

clearly increased when they pledged allegiance to IS, the majority of that increase was

actually kidnappings for money. The IS paraphernalia is used, but not in the same manner

as IS use it, in that IS use it for all victims, ASG are selective. Moreover, the ransom values

placed on different countries nationals varies significantly also. For example western

hostages command significantly different monetary values than Asian hostages, and it is

with western hostages where ASG tend to employ the IS paraphernalia to reinforce their

patently selective valuations.

Geography combined with the prospects for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region under the

BBL perhaps also plays a role in ASG potentially wanting to be seen as the lead

organisation. If the BBL is passed then geography most certainly comes into play, in that the

MILF will likely take a dim view of activities and actions that could scupper the concept of, or

impact the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region within their area of influence. ASG operate

outside the MILF area of influence. It is here where the BIFF come into play along with AKP.

BIFF followed suit in August 2014 and declared allegiance to IS.

Although BIFF operate within the MILF area of influence they are essentially tolerated by

MILF. This tolerance could be tested if they decide to pursue an agenda deemed damaging

to MILF aspirations and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. Thus an overlap of influence

by AKP between ASG and BIFF areas of operation and influence becomes of importance to



IS as a potential bridging exercise. It is this potential for harmonisation of interests that IS will

seek to orchestrate first between AKP, ASG, KIM, and BIFF if that sought after bridgehead is

to be established. ASG, although largely criminal and clearly perceived as so, could act as

the catalyst for this bridgehead if seen alter their ethos, even for expediency, it may be

enough to galvanise the differing groups and ASG operate outside the existing ARMM and

the proposed new BAR.

Additionally, if MILF feel they have been sold a pup on this peace process after investing so

much in it then they could extend their campaign outside their historic area of interest. One

can be sure, KIM, AKP, ASG, BIFF and ultimately ISIS will capitalise upon the deteriorating

security environment for their own ends. Time will tell. But the impact on a geopolitical level

cannot be downplayed. The new Congress in the Philippines will be watched closely by their

aggressive regional neighbour China. The opportunity to exploit weaknesses will not be lost

on China. A surge in terrorism domestically will present particular challenges and stresses

for the Philippines security services, police, military, and navy at a time when new leadership

will be seeking to either engage with China or confront China. If the government faces

problems managing the domestic and growing regional terrorism problem then what

challenges will they have to overcome dealing with a nascent international terrorism problem

on top, a further deterioration in the local terrorism landscape and an increasingly

challenging Chinese encroachment on issues of sovereignty?

The next few months could essentially define the terrorism landscape in the Philippines and

the SE-Asian region for the next decade or longer.



List of acronyms:

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group

AHJAG – Ad-hoc Joint Action Group

AQ – al-Qaeda

AKP – Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines

AKS – Ansar al-Khilafah Sarangani

AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines

ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

BBL – Bangsamoro Basic Law

BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BJM – Bangsamoro Justice Movement

HASI – Hilal Ahmar Society of Indonesia

ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

JI – Jemaah Islamiyah

KIM – Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao

MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MIT – Mujahidin Indonesia Timur

RSM – Rajah Suleiman Movement

SDGT – Specially Designated Global Terrorist

TTP – Terrorist Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

ISS Risk Special Report - Philippines - Emergent epicentre to ISIS SE Asian ambitions - FULL REPORT

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