Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 55

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Jonathan Rynhold is a lecturer in the department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University,Israel and a research associate at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies. His research focuseson Israeli policy towards the peace process. He recently published an article on the Barakgovernment and the peace process and is co-editor of a forthcoming book on the 2003Israeli elections.

Survival, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 55–76 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation

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Make Better Neighbours?Jonathan Rynhold

Bitter controversy surrounds Israel’s construction of a security barrierbetween itself and the Palestinians in the West Bank. Palestinians, andmost of the international community, condemn the project as a land grabthat will destroy any prospect of resurrecting the peace process. TheIsraeli public, meanwhile, overwhelmingly favours the barrier as asecurity measure to prevent the infiltration of terrorists. The concept wasproposed, originally, by the Israeli left as part of a strategy of ‘unilateraldisengagement’ following the collapse of the peace process in September2000. The Israeli right initially opposed the plan because it considered‘unilateral disengagement’ to be a form of retreat. But the right-winggovernment of Ariel Sharon is now constructing the barrier with somedispatch, while many on the left are increasingly critical of the way thescheme is being implemented; they claim it will bring added suffering tothe Palestinians, deepen hatreds and worsen the conflict.

The barrier is under construction and it is likely to be finished, soarguments about whether it should be built at all are pretty muchacademic. Far more important now is the nature and route of the barrier.Routes that go too deep into West Bank territory, that cut off and isolatePalestinian villages and encompass remote Israeli settlements are indeedlikely to heighten the Palestinians’ humiliation, harm them economicallyand provoke worsened violence and terrorism. But other routes, closerto the ‘Green Line’, could exert more positive influence, not least becausethey would logically entail the abandonment of unviable settlements. Asensibly routed barrier has the potential not only to help protect Israelisfrom terrorists, but also to make a broader strategic contribution as amechanism for managing the conflict and as a back-up plan as theprospects for a formal agreement fade. Such a back-up plan is needed

56 Jonathan Rynhold

because the ongoing diplomacy – now focused on the ‘Road Map’endorsed by Washington, the EU, Moscow and United Nations – doesnot look promising.

A road map to nowhereOne lesson drawn by participants in the failed Permanent Statusnegotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) was theimportance of having a back-up plan if agreement on core issues provesimpossible.1 Unfortunately, this lesson has not been widely absorbed. InJuly 2003, the US Under-Secretary of State, David Satterfield, declaredwith regard to the ‘Road Map’ sponsored by the Quartet (the US, Russia,the EU and the UN), ‘We don’t have a Plan B’.2

The Road Map aims to resolve the conflict in three stages by 2005. Inthe first stage, the PA is to implement comprehensive security reformswhile Israel is to dismantle illegal settler outposts set up since March2001. The second stage involves the creation of a Palestinian state withinprovisional borders, while the third stage envisages negotiations on thecore Permanent Status issues such as borders, Jerusalem and the right ofreturn for Palestinian refugees. Thus far, the Road Map has not been asuccess, nor is the outlook promising. Security reforms have not takenplace and Yasser Arafat’s continued presence at the heart of the PAcontinues to hamper any prospect of this occurring. Two major terroristattacks in Jerusalem in August 2003 signalled the end of the internalPalestinian cease-fire, but even before these attacks the Israel DefenceForces (IDF) thwarted 57 attempted terrorist attacks during the twomonths when the cease-fire was in place.3 Meanwhile, Israeli PrimeMinister Ariel Sharon has dismantled only a few illegal settler outposts.

The problem of ‘ripeness’The Road Map is unlikely to succeed anytime soon for the basic reasonthat it has inherited the fundamental limitations of Oslo. The Osloprocess led to many worthwhile achievements in the period 1993–2000.Moreover, the detailed negotiations conducted in 2000 will no doubtcontribute significantly to the shape of any future permanent statusagreement, once conditions are ripe. The problem is that conditions arenot ripe and are not likely to be any time soon.4 This is demonstratedmost notably by the heretofore unbridgeable disagreements over theemotive issues of identity: sovereignty over Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Polls consistentlydemonstrate widespread Palestinian opposition to giving up on whatthey term a ‘right of return’ for refugees and their families to Israel.5 Onthe other hand, 68% of Israelis are opposed to allowing any refugees

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 57

whatsoever into Israel, while a further 16% are only prepared to let in afew thousand. Israelis perceive the ‘right of return’ as a serious threat totheir most stable consensus political value – the existence of Israel as ademographically Jewish state.6

In an effort to resolve these issues, there have beenseveral unofficial permanent status frameworkagreements negotiated by left-wing Israeli leaders andmoderate Palestinians, most notably, the Beilin–AbuMazen plan of 1995 and the Beilin–Abed Rabbo Genevaplan of 2003.7 But the fact that some respected publicfigures have been able to reach agreement does notmean that the conflict is ripe for resolution. None ofthese people are currently in positions of significantpower. More fundamentally, it is unlikely that they willbe able to garner the necessary degree of public supportto implement the compromises that they propose.8 Precedents are notpromising: during the permanent status negotiations in 2000–01, Palestiniannegotiators were constrained by public opinion from adopting compromiseson the refugee question put forward in previous informal meetings.9

Previous attempts by elites to negotiate compromises on these coreissues of identity and symbolism ahead of public readiness allowedrejectionists to mobilise the public to violence. The most notable exampleis Sharon’s visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in September 2000,which provided the opportunity for the incitement to violence, known byPalestinians as the ‘the Al Aqsa intifada’.10

The same dilemma seems likely to thwart current initiatives.Specifically, the model for dealing with the refugee question embodied inthe Geneva plan does not appear workable. The idea is to allow refugeesto choose from a number of options, including that of immigration intoIsrael, with Israel having the final say on the number. In reality, however,no Israeli government will agree to absorb all the refugees who wish toimmigrate. According to a recent survey, 10% of all refugees – 400,000people – want to immigrate to Israel. Methodological problems with thesurvey almost certainly mean this figure is a substantial underestimation.11

But even this figure is several times larger than Israel could be expected toabsorb, as it would significantly change of the country’s demographicbalance. Consequently, if implemented, this aspect of the Geneva planwould have destabilising consequences, especially given that more than75% of refugees were unwilling to accept coexistence with Israeli Jewsunder any circumstances.12 On the other hand, if hundreds of thousands ofrefugees are refused permission to immigrate to Israel, it would be almostimpossible for even a genuinely moderate Palestinian leadership to stand

Israelisperceive the‘right of return’as a seriousthreat

58 Jonathan Rynhold

against the refugees. This would probably lead to both internecinePalestinian violence and an escalation of violence between Israelis andPalestinians.

Economic integration and trustThe Oslo framework sought to overcome such problems of ‘ripeness’ intwo ways: economic integration, embedded in the 1994 Paris Protocols;and the cultivation of mutual trust. Integration was supposed to generateeconomic benefits for both sides, creating a reservoir of support for thepeace process that would allow creative compromises on the mostdifficult issues when the time came. Confidence-building measures weresupposed to generate mutual trust between the elites necessary toformulate the creative compromises on tough issues like Jerusalem andrefugees. Many commentators, including Oslo architect Ron Pundakwriting in these pages, have argued these mechanisms failed primarilybecause their implementation was botched from 1993 to 2000 by bothIsraeli and Palestinian leaders.13 But while it may indeed have beenbotched in various ways, there are also structural factors that continue tomake success unlikely.

First, Oslo was based on the EU model, which entailed the integrationof the labour market, infrastructure and elements of tax collection. Thismodel is fundamentally unsuitable for the Middle East. EU countrieswere at similar levels of socio-economic development when they joined.By contrast, in 1999–2000, prior to the outbreak of violence, Israel’s grossdomestic product (GDP) was about 20 times higher than that of thePalestinian Authority (PA) and its gross national product (GNP) percapita was roughly equal to that of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and thePA combined.14 On this basis, a common Israeli–Palestinian economicspace cannot be based on equal, horizontal cooperation, but only on ahierarchical relationship of dependency.15 This relationship is likely toinspire resentment rather than reconciliation. It also provides a strongeconomic incentive for illegal Palestinian immigration into Israel, a realitythat both widens and intensifies the conflict. Indeed, the World Bank hasconcluded that a reduction in Palestinian employment in Israel under therubric of a non-discriminatory open trade regime (which allows freemovement of goods, but not labour) and not the Oslo model ofintegration, is the best economic model for Palestinian development. 16

Second, the structure of the Oslo process mandated an interimagreement before the sides knew the shape of the final status agreement.This generated mistrust as each side sought to manoeuvre itself into abetter position for either permanent status talks or the collapse of theprocess. In addition, the lack of a clear resolution to permanent status

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 59

issues provided continued legitimacy for rejectionists on both sides. Thismade it politically difficult for either side to take actions that would havebuilt trust and support for the process, such as a major settlement freezeby Israel and an effective crackdown against the terrorist infrastructureby the Palestinian Authority. Given that the Road Map is structured likethe Oslo agreement, with an interim and a permanent stage, it is likely toencounter the same problems.

A common argument is that these problems can be overcome throughgreater outside pressure and engagement. What is usually meant is morepressure on Israel from the United States and more pressure on thePalestinians from the European Union and Arab states. Yet whatever thestated willingness of these outside parties to apply such pressure, it islikely to be outweighed – when it comes to the toughest, most emotiveissues such as refugee return and Jerusalem – by the intransigence of theprotagonists. It is just not very likely, for example, that the USadministration will confront the American pro-Israel lobby if the Israelipublic remains strongly opposed to an agreement. (It is particularlyunlikely in this election year.)

Some other proposals for outside intervention seem even lessplausible – such as the suggestion that a US-led international force in theOccupied Territories could somehow dampen Palestinian terrorism andIsraeli retaliation.17 Would such a force be prepared to root out terroristinfrastructure, even if US and other soldiers became targets of attack? Ifterrorists killed a large number of international troops, would not publicopinion in Western countries demand a retreat? In any case, US resourcesand the Bush administration’s political capital are currently stretched tothe limit in dealing with post-Saddam Iraq.

Unilateral disengagementThe ‘disengagement’ approach to peace guided the policies of formerLabor Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. In political terms,disengagement means the creation of a Palestinian state. In security terms,it means the construction of a security barrier along the border, with noIsraeli settlements on the Palestinian side. In economic terms, it meanslessening reliance on Palestinian labour and separating infrastructure,including the possible construction of an elevated road and communicationslink between the West Bank and Gaza under full Palestinian control.18 ForBarak, disengagement is essential ‘with or without an agreement’.19

In the wake of the first intifada in December 1987, public support forsecurity disengagement became increasingly strong, a fact which Rabinand Barak successfully exploited in their respective election victories in1992 and 1999. Following the increase in terror attacks that accompanied

60 Jonathan Rynhold

the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government built a fence around the GazaStrip and plans were made for a similar fence around the West Bank.

With the collapse of the peace process in September 2000, the Barakgovernment began to develop a comprehensive plan for unilateraldisengagement. Since Barak’s defeat in the 2001 election, former membersof his team have proposed variants of this plan, one of which was includedin Labor’s 2003 election manifesto.20 The plans call for a staged unilateralwithdrawal from Gaza and 65-85% of the West Bank including withdrawalfrom around 40-70 settlements. Some plans included disengagement fromArab areas in East Jerusalem, excluding ‘the holy basin’.21

Politically, the plan aimed to protect Israel’s character as a democraticstate with a large Jewish majority. Proponents feared that in the absenceof partition, there would be a Palestinian majority in Israel and theTerritories by 2010. In strategic terms, the plan aimed at conflictmanagement. The hope was to reduce friction between Israelis andPalestinians through withdrawal from many settlements and the creationof a border that would facilitate the removal of Israeli checkpoints andthus greater freedom of movement within Palestinian areas. The planallowed for the creation of a contiguous area under Palestinian controlthat could form the basis for a state with temporary borders.

At first, the Sharon government categorically rejected unilateraldisengagement.22 But the government is now constructing the barrier. Themain impetus for its construction has been twofold: pressure from publicopinion; and defence against the massively increased level of terrorism.Since the collapse of the Oslo process, 80% of Israelis have consistentlysupported the construction of a security barrier in the West Bank; by theend of 2003 a majority of the public also supported a wide-rangingunilateral withdrawal from most of the occupied territories.23 As publicpressure grew and the death toll continued to rise, the government began,in spring 2002, construction of the barrier. Nonetheless, Sharon remainedequivocal, and told President Bush that if the PA destroyed terroristinfrastructure and carried out security reforms, he would ‘re-evaluate’ thewhole project.24 Meanwhile, there was a growing realisation that thegovernment’s preferred means of fighting terrorism was failing. OperationDefensive Shield, in which the IDF re-occupied large tracts of Palestinianterritory, led to a major reduction in Israeli casualties in the Territories, butit has been less effective in Israel proper. 25 Many who initially opposed thebarrier have come to accept the argument of Avi Dichter, the head of theGeneral Security Service (GSS), that the barrier ‘is the key to Israelextricating itself from the terrorist quagmire.’26 In October 2003 theCabinet finally endorsed a complete route for the barrier; since then, thepace of construction has increased significantly.

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 61

Sharon has also reversed his opposition to unilateral withdrawal. InDecember 2003 he declared his support for unilateral disengagement,including withdrawal from some settlements, in the event that the AbuAla government fails to meet its Road Map obligations by summer 2004.Sharon has also stated that a few settlements might be dismantled priorto then, within the framework of the Road Map.27 In February 2004,Sharon said,

As part of the disengagement plan I have ordered an evacuation – sorry, a relocation –

of 17 [out of 21] settlements with their 7,500 residents, from the Gaza Strip to Israeli

territory … not only settlements in Gaza, but also three problematic settlements in

Samaria [northern half of the West Bank]. In any case, there won’t be any Jews left in

Gaza after an agreement, while in Samaria there will be a few settlements.28

Controversy over the routeIn announcing its decision to construct the barrier, the Sharon governmentstated categorically that it ‘is a security measure, not an expression of apolitical or any other kind of border’.29 Nevertheless, all parties recognisethe barrier’s political implications. The possibility that it could become a defacto border has provoked much debate over its route. For this reason,Sharon rejected the route initially proposed by the defence establishment,which ran too close to the Green Line for his taste. In spring 2003, thegovernment favoured a route that included a large settlement bloc aroundAriel, other parts of the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem.30 Thegovernment also raised the possibility of placing another barrier on theeastern side of the West Bank, inside the Jordan Valley, that would haveput half of the West Bank and half a millionPalestinians on the Israeli side of the fence. This routesuggested that Sharon wanted to use the barrier toimplement his old plan for a Palestinian entity based oncantons.31 However, the idea of a Jordan Valley barrierhas been effectively dropped.

Once the settlers reversed their initial oppositionto the barrier, they succeeded in altering its route toinclude more settlements.32 The Palestinians,adamantly opposed to the whole idea, could not doanything to influence the route, but their campaignagainst it pushed Washington to weigh in. 33 The US recognises Israel’sright to build the fence, but the Bush administration was also receptive tothe Palestinian argument that the barrier constituted an Israeli ‘landgrab’, exacting a high economic, social and humanitarian price from thePalestinians. The US has strongly opposed the penetration of the barrier

All partiesrecognise thebarrier’spoliticalimplications

62 Jonathan Rynhold

deep into the West Bank, and has focused its opposition to the inclusionof the Ariel bloc inside the barrier’s perimeter. Washington has arguedthat this undermines Palestinian moderates’ ability to implement theirRoad Map obligations and contradicts the Road Map’s vision of a viableand territorially contiguous Palestinian state.34 As a result of US pressure,Israel decided not to connect the Ariel bloc to the main barrier for thetime being, constructing non-contiguous barriers instead; but the issue isup for review in spring 2004.

Dimensions of the barrierThe barrier consist of several layers. In most places, it is 50–70 metreswide and includes a ditch and obstacles; patrol roads exclusively formilitary use; and dirt roads that will be dusted for footprints to track anyinfiltrators. A ‘smart fence’ with electronic sensors, thermal observationposts and video cameras will run down the middle. On the outer edgesof the barrier, barbed wire hinders potential infiltrators. In places whereJewish and Palestinian population centres are in close proximity, thebarrier takes the form of a six-metre high concrete wall (8.5km of theexisting barrier and less than 5% of planned final project35).

The barrier will be about 700km in length, more than 300km longer thanthe Green Line. As a result, about 15% of the West Bank will be on theIsraeli side of the barrier. Approximately 70,000 West Bank Palestiniansand 200,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians will be separated from the rest ofthe West Bank.36 The whole project is scheduled for completion by thesummer of 2005.37

Security implicationsSince the outbreak of violence in September 2000, more Israeli civilianshave been killed and wounded than Israeli soldiers, which isunprecedented. Of the total 862 Israeli casualties from 29 September 2000to 24 September 2003, over 60% were killed within the Green Line, eventhough only 4% of the nearly 19,000 attacks occurred there.38

The creation of a contiguous physical barrier between the West Bankand Israel would limit the ability of terrorists, saboteurs and weapons toinfiltrate into Israel. It would also make it more difficult for terrorists torecruit Israeli Arabs, who since September 2000 have started to becomeinvolved in terrorism (albeit still in small numbers).39 According to theGSS, from September 2000 to August 2003 there were 116 suicidebombings. All but one suicide bombing was launched from the unfencedWest Bank.40 The erection of concrete walls close to Israeli populationcentres adjacent to the border makes it more difficult for Palestinians toshoot at Israelis from Palestinian areas, as they shot at the Jerusalem

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 63

IIS

Sm

aps

Bethlehem

Jenin

Nablus

Ariel

Qalkilya

Tulkarm

based on an original map © B'Tselemupdated by J. Rynhold, January 2004

Jerusalem

Hebron

Jericho

D e a dS e a

D e a dS e a

Ramallah

The Security Barrier

main barrier – completed

main barrier – under construction

main Palestinian towns and villages

main Jewish settlements

secondary fence

'Green line' – 1949 Armistice line

main barrier – planned

Bethlehem

WestBank

SYRIA

JORDAN

Gaza

JerusalemJericho

Nablus

Tel Aviv

25km

25 miles

Hebron

LEBANON

Nazareth

Me d

i te r

r an

e an

Se a

I S R A E L

64 Jonathan Rynhold

suburb of Gilo from Bethlehem in 2000. The length, topography andhuman geography of the West Bank border make it more difficult todefend than the Gaza Strip. However, the IDF has developed technicalsolutions to such problems including the use of hand-held computerswith a global positioning system.41

For the barrier to be effective, it must be uninterrupted. The gap nearAriel would have to be closed one way or the other. In addition, the IDFneeds to implement its plan for proper regulation of the passageways.Failure to do this was responsible for the death of 19 Israelis in anOctober 2003 terrorist attack in Haifa.42 The inclusion of the majorsettlement blocs within the barrier eases the task of defending them, butmajor deviations from the Green Line to achieve this increase the overalllength of the barrier, making it more difficult to defend. This isparticularly true of the Ariel bloc, where topography and geography addto the strategic burden of creating easily defensible borders for Israel.Deviation from the Green Line has also complicated the defence of thoseborders by necessitating the construction of 41 extra gates to allowPalestinians to reach farmland on the Israeli side of the barrier. The areasslated for inclusion inside the secondary fences have generally beenchosen for strategic reasons unrelated to suicide bombings, most notablyin the Beit Ayreh area, where the purpose is to keep Israel’s onlyinternational airport out of the range of shoulder-launched missiles.43

Mobile forces or a non-contiguous barrier could be used to secure theseareas instead. On balance, while major deviation of the barrier from theGreen Line will enhance the security of the settlements that are included,it will be at the cost of complicating the defence of Israel proper.

But even a highly successful barrier will be no panacea, although it mightcontribute to a de-escalation of the violence. The fewer successful terroristattacks in Israel, the fewer Israeli retaliatory and defensive operations. Asfor the argument that Palestinian radicals will respond to the barrier byfiring Qassim missiles over it, these have been far less lethal than suicidebombings. So far, over 1,400 mortar shells and over 160 Qassim rocketshave been fired into Israel, all from Gaza, resulting in one fatality.44

The barrier has potential security benefits that go beyond its directimpact on terrorism. In a long-term, low-intensity conflict, thepsychological endurance and social cohesiveness of the civilian populationare crucial to preventing demoralisation and defeat. A democratic societywith an army based on the ‘nation-in-arms’ model, can only sustainmorale if there is a consensus on the legitimacy of a policy that puts thelives of its citizens in danger.45 This consensus can only be sustainable ifthe construction of the barrier is quickly followed by withdrawal fromoutlying settlements. So far in the current round of violence, Israeli

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 65

morale has remained high because it is founded on the common beliefthat that the Barak government agreed to wide-ranging concessions,which the Palestinians rejected in word and deed. Were Israeli forces toremain in the Occupied Territories indefinitely, however, a significantIsraeli minority would question the legitimacy of thispolicy, while a larger group would lack the motivationto risk their lives in the military.46

Some Israeli opponents of unilateral disengagementworry that it will be interpreted by Palestinian militantsas further evidence – after Israel’s unilateralwithdrawal from southern Lebanon – that violenceworks. This may be true, but is probably unavoidable,and the converse proposition – that continued use ofmilitary force against Palestinian terrorism can be mademore effective – does not look plausible. The use offorce has only increased motivation for terroristattacks. In any event, an Israel that – after unilateralwithdrawal from many outlying settlements – can be more easilydefended will be in a better position over time to limit the strategicdividends of terrorism. Moreover, Israeli deterrence in the interstate arenais unlikely to be affected. Israel remains the strongest power in the region,and has the backing of the United States.

Economic harm to Palestine?The barrier rules out a return to the Oslo model of economic integration.As noted above, however, the World Bank has argued that a non-discriminatory trade policy is a better model for long-term Palestinianeconomic progress. The barrier should facilitate such trade through fiveplanned terminals for the transfer of goods. Still, such a policy, based onsignificantly reducing the number of Palestinians working in Israel,would be painful. The pain can be mitigated if necessary by allowingsome Palestinian workers to enter Israel through the nine plannedcrossing points. The existence of more organised crossing points shouldsimplify the identification of threats, thereby easing the path of workersinto Israel.

In principle then, the security barrier need not cause significanteconomic damage to the Palestinians. In practice, however, theconstruction of the barrier has already damaged the Palestinian economy,primarily as a result of its route deviating from the Green Line. Accordingto the World Bank and the Israeli Human Rights association B’tselem, thefirst section of the barrier could negatively affect the daily lives of 200,000Palestinians.47 Most of the land used for the barrier was requisitioned from

Use of forcehas onlyincreasedmotivation forterroristattacks

66 Jonathan Rynhold

Palestinians.48 Thousands of Palestinians have been separated from theiragricultural land in the most important agricultural region in the WestBank. The barrier has also impaired access to education and health services

for some Palestinians, particularly those living inenclaves created by the fence. Israeli promises toconstruct numerous passageways to ease theseproblems are as yet unfulfilled.

This problem is not insuperable. For example, 41agricultural gates have been constructed to allowaccess to Palestinian farmers separated from their landalong the first section of the barrier. These haveproved cumbersome to operate and thus problematic.In addition, in January 2004, a number of alternativesto the barrier route were decided, which will lower

the humanitarian cost of the barrier to the Palestinians. More changes ofthis sort are required, and are under consideration.49 Furthermore, tocompensate for the loss of work opportunities inside Israel, industrialzones are being set up next to the barrier, on the model of the Karniindustrial zone by the Gaza fence, which has continued operatingthroughout the violence.50

Another possibility is that Palestinians located on the Israeli side of thebarrier could be granted a special temporary residency status, whichwould give them access to health, education and social benefits in Israel,as enjoyed by Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Given the cost of such ameasure, outside pressure might need to be brought to bear for this tooccur. International aid raised to ease the effects of the barriers could beused to provide transport solutions, such as road improvements. Suchmeasures would lighten the burden of the barrier on the Palestinians, butonly routing it very much closer to the Green Line could remove theburden altogether.

Deadly frictionReducing friction in a systematic way requires maximum disengagementbetween Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, there must beprovision for everyday activities to continue on each side of the barrier.51

The route of the barrier, how it is managed and the fate of settlementswill determine whether the barrier reduces or worsens this friction.

So far, the barrier has increased friction by making Palestinians’ dailylives more difficult. These problems can be somewhat mitigated. Moreproblematic are the main secondary fences that border some Palestinianvillages on both sides and the smaller enclaves. Quite apart from theirhigh costs in human-rights terms, the supposed security benefits of

The barrierhas alreadydamaged thePalestinianeconomy

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 67

secondary fences are outweighed by the increased resentment that theywill cause, which can only increase motivation for violence. They shouldbe abandoned and replaced with mobile forces.

Similar problems are likely in the Jerusalem area, where the proposedroute of the barrier will place about 200,000 Palestinians on the Israeli sideof the barrier, while about 35,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem will beoutside the barrier.52 Until now, Palestinian Jerusalemites were rarelyinvolved in violence, but this could change if their freedom of movement isrestricted. Adjusting the barrier to run more or less along the ethnicdividing line inside Jerusalem, as originally suggested by Israel’s NationalSecurity Council, would significantly improve this situation.

Deciding on an optimum route for the barrier is a fraught process.The negative impact on the everyday lives of Palestinians could beminimised by routing the barrier along the Green Line, but the physicaland political reality of the settlements would create an alternative sourceof friction. So long as some settlements remain, securing access to themrequires the continued stationing of Israeli forces in Palestinian areas, acause of resentment and violence. In permanent status negotiations, theparties aimed to minimise this problem through a formula that includedthe maximum number of settlers in the minimum amount of territorycontaining as few Palestinians as possible. Maps produced during thosetalks presented a scenario in which 65–80% of the settlers were gatheredinto small blocs that took up 4–6% of the West Bank.

With the exception of Jerusalem, the barrier generally follows thesame formula, though it is less territorially generous to the Palestinians.While it does not officially mandate withdrawal from settlements outsideits perimeter, the barrier makes eventual withdrawal from many of theseplaces inevitable. The inclusion of blocs within the barrier’s perimeterwill make the physical distance of journeys for Palestinians within theWest Bank longer, but journey time should be reduced, as manyroadblocks and checkpoints will be dismantled.53 The costs of this policyto the Palestinians could be reduced further if the US applied pressure toadjust the route of the fence so as to avoid enclaves and make thesettlement blocs smaller. In the case of Ariel, the IDF put forward anoption that reduced the size of the bloc significantly while still retaining amajority of the settlers from the area.54

Israel’s political interestsThe construction of a barrier cannot logically serve Israel’s own political-demographic interests unless it involves an Israeli withdrawal from manysettlements. The route is also important in terms of maximising thenumber of Israelis and minimising the number of Palestinians on the

68 Jonathan Rynhold

Israeli side of the barrier. To date, the barrier has put about 3,500Palestinians on the Israeli side of the barrier. If one includes thesecondary fences, then around 70,000 Palestinians are on the wrong sideof the line. An additional 200,000 Palestinians will also be on the Israeliside, because the barrier will place East Jerusalem within its confines. Ifthe barrier became a de facto border, then the current path wouldundermine Israel’s political-demographic interests as understood by thevast majority of Israelis. The only way to resolve this situation would beto remove the secondary fences and alter the path of the barrier to divideJerusalem more closely along ethnic lines as proposed in the December2000 Clinton Parameters for a Permanent Status Agreement.

Construction of the barrier also carries political costs for thegovernment, in terms of international pressure against it. The UN hasdeclared that its route is a violation of international law. TheInternational Court of Justice in The Hague is also due to deliberate onthe matter. Some members of the Israeli Cabinet fear that the likelynegative judgment will strengthen trends towards Israel’s internationalisolation and might serve as a basis for future sanctions.55 Conversely,right-wing elements in the government and the settler lobby aredemanding that the barrier be routed deeper inside the West Bank. Inthe absence of a major change on the Palestinian side and givenoverwhelming domestic support for the barrier, international pressure islikely to remain ineffective, unless that pressure comes from the US.56

Palestinian interestsThe main threat posed by the barrier to Palestinian political interests isthat it will become the de facto border. The inclusion of parts of theWest Bank within the perimeter of the barrier threatens to limit the sizeof any future Palestinian state, calling into question its viability.

The barrier route approved by the Israeli government does notprevent the coming into being of a viable, territorially contiguousPalestinian state with temporary borders, as envisaged in the Road Map.Certainly its route makes that contiguity very awkward, but technicalsolutions can make it workable. The current route is actually closer to theterritorial settlement agreed to by the left-wing Israeli government in the2000–01 Permanent Status negotiations than to the territorial settlementspreviously proposed by Sharon and Netanyahu.57 Removing thesecondary fences and making the settlement blocs smaller wouldimprove the Palestinian position further, but even if Ariel ends up insidethe barrier, it need not block a contiguous Palestinian state from cominginto being. The Ariel bloc was included on the Israeli side of the line inthe 1995 Yossi Beilin–Abu Mazen peace plan and appeared again on the

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 69

maps accepted as a basis for negotiations by the Palestinians at the 2001Taba talks.58 Since then, in the unofficial Geneva Plan, part of the BeitAryeh area that is to be contained inside a secondary fence wouldactually be annexed to Israel. 59

The barrier works to the Palestinians’ advantage in one significantway: it dramatically enhances the probability of an Israeli withdrawalfrom tens of isolated settlements left outside the barrier. The mostobvious candidates for withdrawal are situated mainly in the centralareas of the West Bank, where the defence of settlements has severelyinhibited Palestinian freedom of movement. It is estimated that theannual operating costs of the barrier will be $225 million and that 40 IDFcompanies – 5,000 soldiers – will man it. As a result, without withdrawalfrom outlying settlements, manpower and financial resources will beextremely stretched.60 The barrier will further contribute to thepsychological disengagement of Israelis from the settlements, therebyeasing eventual withdrawal.

Overall, the security, economic and demographic implications of thebarrier all point to withdrawal from the outlying settlements. Sharonseems to understand this, which is why he has began to speak aboutunilateral withdrawal from settlements and redeploying troops to theIsraeli side of the fence. Indeed, the fact that a right-wing government isconstructing the barrier has dramatically lowered the political price ofeventual withdrawal. This is especially valuable as these settlements arepopulated by the most ideologically motivated settlers who are mostlikely to resist removal. All Israeli governments have had great difficultyin confronting the settler lobby. Indeed, it is worth recalling that duringthe Oslo process of 1993-2000, the number of settlers actually doubled.61

But will the barrier – as critics fear – constitute the future borderbetween Israel and Palestine? In terms of international law, the situationwill remain the same whatever Israel does on the ground. Thirty years ofsettlement could not alter the fact that permanent status negotiationswere based on the 1967 borders, as will be a future agreement,regardless of the security barrier. The cost of moving the barrier neednot be an obstacle to a peace agreement either. The 1979–81 removal ofIsraeli airfields and defences from Sinai, which cost much more than thebarrier, was not an obstacle to a full Israeli withdrawal in the peacetreaty with Egypt. Moreover, if the Palestinians began to implement thesecurity reform mandated by the Road Map, it is likely that the route ofthe barrier would be changed or its construction halted altogether. Onthe other hand, the longer it takes to return to negotiations, the moreintegrated settlements on the Israeli side of the barrier will become andthe more difficult it will become to abandon them later on.

70 Jonathan Rynhold

The barrier is criticised on the grounds that it will ruin any chance ofa return to fruitful negotiations. This argument would be far morepersuasive if fruitful negotiations were actually on the horizon. It isindeed possible, as former Israeli Labor leader Amram Mitzna argued inthe 2003 election, that construction of the barrier might spur thePalestinians to act decisively against terror and re-enter negotiationssooner rather than later. In addition, if the barrier succeeds insignificantly reducing terrorism within the Green Line, it will lower thesense of threat felt by Israelis. This in turn will increase their readiness tomake concessions in negotiations.62 On the Palestinian side, the inabilityto carry out successful attacks against Israeli civilians inside the GreenLine could strengthen the position of Palestinian moderates.

Whither disengagement?There is a fair amount of scepticism regarding Ariel Sharon’s intentions.Some argue that he will construct the eastern fence, dismantle just ahandful of settlements, annex some ‘consensus’ settlements and try toimplement his old plan for creating Palestinian cantons on just half of theWest Bank. Others believe that Sharon actually supports the moreextensive plan for unilateral withdrawal put forward by Deputy PrimeMinster Ehud Olmert: moving tens of thousands of settlers and drawingthe dividing line inside Jerusalem, while retaining the major settlementblocks and the Jordan valley. 63 If Sharon moved to dismantle settlements,the Labor party would not allow the Israeli right to bring down thegovernment.64 On balance, it seems more likely that Sharon will adopt thesecond course, although he is likely to dismantle only a few settlementsto begin with. Sharon has promised that any unilateral measures will beco-ordinated with the US, and Washington is adamantly opposed to theeastern fence.65 In any case, for the reasons argued above, it seems thatconstruction of the fence makes a more extensive withdrawal virtuallyinevitable whatever Sharon’s initial preferences.

These two versions of unilateral disengagement would entail radicallydifferent consequences. Implementation of the first version would cause aserious rupture in US–Israeli relations and an escalation of the conflict withthe Palestinians. The Palestinians, having seen the castrated state on offer,might abandon their pursuit of a ‘two state solution’ and revert to the ‘onestate solution’ that is Israel’s nightmare.66 Given that Israel’s borders underthis scheme would be extremely long and difficult to defend, and that theywould include within them over 250,000 Palestinians, both the strategic andthe demographic logic of the original disengagement plan would beseverely compromised. On the other hand, the closer the implementationto the original Barak plan, the better the chances that the plan will have

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 71

positive results and contribute to conflict management. Olmert’s ideassound similar to Barak’s. There are, to be sure, some notable differences:Olmert views his plan as a way of ensuring a better border than the 1967lines and he expects it to end the prospect of negotiations for twentyyears.67 Barak and his allies emphasise the importance of leaving the dooropen to negotiations. To this end, many of them have stated thatpermanent status agreement will be based on the 1967 borders withagreed changes.68 An Israeli declaration regarding the government’swillingness to make greater compromises in a permanent status agreementwould greatly assist the whole process, by easing Palestinian fearsregarding Israel’s ultimate intentions. However, this is a declaration thatSharon almost certainly will not make.

The fence in its current format is a mixed bag. It is not an absolutedisaster, but neither does it form a solid basis for conflict management.On balance, it is good for security, but it is not the security panacea theIsraeli public believes it to be. In economic and social terms it is good forIsrael but very bad for the Palestinians. In terms of reducing friction, thepicture is likely to be mixed; the same is true of its political ramifications.Its most important benefit is that it makes the evacuation of manysettlements inevitable. Its most negative element is the separation ofArab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. If the fence were tobe extended to the Jordan valley, the mixed bag would become adisastrous package, sure to aggravate the conflict. So far, however, theeastern fence is not under construction.

Most of the fence’s negative political ramifications could be avoided iffruitful negotiations were to commence soon. In concept, there is acontradiction between Road Map diplomacy and the barrier, but inpractical terms it is possible to give the Road Map a chance and at thesame time pursue the option of unilateral disengagement. Given thatSharon has stated that Israel will unilaterally withdraw from settlementsif the Road Map collapses, the government might as well make a virtueout of necessity by making a bold offer to dismantle many settlements inreturn for genuine fulfilment by the Palestinians of the first part of theRoad Map. Labor would certainly support such a proposal.

In the likely event of the Road Map’s failure, it makes sense to try todevelop the potential for effective conflict management inherent in thebarrier. As a unilateral initiative, the barrier inevitably will conform moreto Israeli interests than to Palestinian interests. But with a number ofsignificant changes it can be implemented in a way that will improve theoverall security situation and reduce friction, while keeping open thepossibility of negotiating a Permanent Status agreement in the future. Inthis regard, three forces have the potential to push unilateral

72 Jonathan Rynhold

disengagement in the right direction. First, Sharon will need the supportof the Labor Party to implement any unilateral withdrawal. Second,Israeli public opinion needs to be made aware of the fact that thebarrier’s current route threatens to undermine the demographic and

security logic they support. Finally, against thisbackdrop and with Sharon committing himself to co-ordinating measures with Washington, the US has agood chance of seriously influencing matters as well.

In any event, the barrier is being built.Consequently, the key is to maximise its benefits andminimise its costs. The best way to achieve this is byde-emphasising political considerations related tosettlements, focusing instead on the underlyingstrategic logic of the original concept of unilateraldisengagement proposed by Ehud Barak and hisassociates.

It has been reported that some significant steps aredue to be taken in this vein. For example, in January 2004 it was decidedto alter the route near Qalkilya and Tulkarm.69 In addition, the secondaryfence around Baka al- Sharkiya is to be removed, and the depth barriersplanned for the northern section of the barrier are now unlikely to bebuilt.70 Meanwhile, the other secondary fences are to be built only afterthe main fence closer to the Green Line is completed. Even then, thesesecondary fences are to remain open unless there is a major security alert.These changes, which will cost over a million dollars to implement, are aresult of both US pressure and pragmatic operational considerations.71

While such moves represent a step in the right direction, more needs tobe done. More enclaves should be removed and mobile forces shouldreplace secondary fences, as envisaged in Barak’s original disengagementplan.72 While an Israeli withdrawal from Arab East Jerusalem is not goingto happen soon, disengagement from infrastructure there couldcommence more quickly.

The security barrier is hardly an optimal strategy for resolving theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict. It will impose significant costs, particularly onthe Palestinians. If an eastern fence is constructed, it will serve to furtheraggravate the conflict. However, if implemented wisely, the barrier couldturn out to be the best means available for managing a deadly conflict.

Sharon willneed Laborsupport toimplementunilateralwithdrawal

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 73

AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank ProfessorGerald Steinberg, Dr Shlomo Shpiro andthe anonymous reviewers for their helpfulinsights and comments.

Notes1 Yossi Beilin, A Guide for a Wounded Dove

(Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2001),pp.126, 255; Rob Malley & HusseinAgha, ‘Camp David: Tragedy of Errors’New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001.Text of Road Map can be found athttp://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrm3.htm.

2 Amir Oren, ‘The cease-fire may haveended, but it’s not over’, Ha’aretz,2 August 2003.

3 ‘57 Terror Attacks Thwarted July-August 2003’, IDF Spokesperson,10 September 2003, www.idf.il

4 The CIA sees a stalemate continuinguntil 2020. www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2003_12_08_papers/dec8_middleeast.doc

5 Israel Palestine Center for Research &Information ‘Project Report April 2001’,www.ipcri.org; PSR (Palestinian Centerfor Policy & Survey Research) Poll, July2003, www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugees june03.html

6 Asher Arian, Security Threatened(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress 1995), p. 23; ‘The Peace Index’,August 2003, Tami Steinmetz Centrefor Peace, Tel Aviv Universitywww.tau.ac.il/peace/index.htm

7 Michael Hirsh, ‘The Lost Peace Plan’Newsweek, 25 September 2000 p. 46.Details of the Geneva Plan can befound at http://www.heskem.org.il/index_en.asp

8 Joint Israeli–Palestinian attempts togenerate widespread public support forcompromises on these issues do notappear to be succeeding . See the

Nusseibeh–Ayalon initiative:www.mifkad.org.il/eng; Khaled AbuToameh, ‘Dozens deny signingNusseibeh ad on right of return’,Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2003. Only 19–27% of Palestinians support the GenevaPlan. Support is lowest regarding theclauses relating to refugees, see Poll no.118, 22 December 2003, PalestinianCentre For Public Opinion (PCPO) andPoll no. 10 December 2003, Centre forPolicy and Survey Research (PSR),pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p10b.html.

9 Rosemary Sayigh, ‘Palestinianrefugees in Lebanon’, Middle EastPolicy, 2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 94–105.

1 0 As Donald Horowitz, a leading experton ethnic conflict has suggested, whileelites can do much to moderate ethnicconflict, the bottom line is alwayswhat the wider public are willing toaccept in their name. DonaldHorowitz, Community Conflict: Policyand Possibilities (Coleraine: Centre forthe Study of Conflict, University ofUlster, 1990).

1 1 PSR July 2003 poll; Max Abrahms,‘The ‘Right of Return’ DebateRevisited’, Middle East IntelligenceBulletin, August–September 2003, vol.5, no. 8-9.

1 2 Ibid.1 3 Ron Pundak, ‘From Oslo To Taba:

What Went Wrong’, Survival, vol. 43,no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 31–45.

1 4 Figures taken from World Bankwebsite, http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html; http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/0/F192A5DA7D266F048525694700278825?OpenDocument; http://www.worldbank.org/html/schools/regions/mena/israel.htm

1 5 Dan Schueftan Disengagement (TelAviv: Zamora-Bitan, 1999) [Hebrew]pp. 97, 103–106, 126–128.

74 Jonathan Rynhold

1 6 Long Term Policy Options for thePalestinian Economy (The World Bank:July 2002). Nigel Roberts, ‘From thedrawing board’, Ha’aretz, 21 July 2003.

1 7 Martin Indyk, ‘A Trusteeship forPalestine?’, Foreign Affairs, May/June2003, vol. 82 no. 3; Dana Allin andSteven Simon, ‘The Moral Psychologyof US Support for Israel’, Survival,vol. 45, no. 3, Autumn 2003; Nomi BarYaacov, ‘New Imperatives for Israeli–Palestinian Peace’, Survival, vol. 45,no. 2, Summer 2003.

1 8 Jonathan Rynhold, ‘Barak, the IsraeliLeft and the Oslo Process’, IsraelStudies Forum, vol. 19. no. 1, Fall 2003.

1 9 Author interview with Ehud Barak,9 February 2003.

2 0 Author interviews with Ehud Barak,Gilad Sher, and other members of theBarak team; Gilad Sher and Uri Sagi,‘Policy Paper’ (Jerusalem: Van LeerInstitute, 2002); Ben Kaspit ,‘Mitzna’sRoad Map’, in Maariv - ShabbatSupplement 20 December 2002, pp. 4–5 [Hebrew].

2 1 Sher & Sagi, ‘Policy Paper’.2 2 Amit Ben-Aroya, ‘Sharon: The

Separation Fence is a Populist Idea’,Ha’aretz, 12 April 2002.

2 3 Asher Arian, Public Opinion on NationalSecurity (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Centre forStrategic Studies 2001, 2002, 2003); ThePeace Index May 2001, February,March and May 2002, July 2003; pollsconducted by Israel Radio, ‘AnotherMatter’, 10 December 2003 http://bet.iba.org.il and Yediot Achronot,12 December 2003.

2 4 Mazal Mualem, ‘Smart fence, stupidpolitics’, Ha’aretz, 30 August 2003

2 5 Ze’ev Schiff, ‘Lose-lose situation’,Ha’aretz 7 August 2003.

2 6 Uzi Benziman, ‘When the bubblesburst’, Ha’aretz, 23 May 2003.

2 7 Herb Keinon, ‘PM detailsdisengagement plan’, Jerusalem Post,19 December 2003; Mazal Mualem, ‘Imake the decisions, PM tells Likud

convention’, Ha’aretz ,6 January 2004.2 8 Yoel Marcus, ‘PM’s pullout plan: 20

settlements to go within a year ortwo’, Ha’aretz, 3 February 2004.

2 9 Jerusalem Post, 24 June 2002, p. 1.3 0 Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘Sharon includes

Arab villages in Jerusalem plan’,Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2002; AlufBenn, ‘Defense Ministry wants fencedeeper in West Bank’, Ha’aretz,23 March 2003.

3 1 Meron Rappaport, ‘A Wall in theHeart’, Yediot Achronot, 23 May 2003.

3 2 Rappaport, ‘A Wall in the Heart’.3 3 On Palestinian opposition to the

barrier see, ‘The Apartheid Wall’www.pengon.org; Undermining Peace:Israel’s Unilateral Segregation Planswww.arij.org/paleye/Segregation-Wall/Section%207.pdf

3 4 Glenn Kessler, ‘Bush Criticizes IsraeliFence’, Washington Post, 26 July 2003,p. A16; James Bennett, ‘IsraelReportedly Willing to Delay Portionsof Barrier’, New York Times, 8 August2003.

3 5 ‘The Seam Zone’, Israel Ministry ofDefence, http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/default.htm

3 6 ‘The Separation Barrier’,www.btselem.org

3 7 Amir Rapaport, ‘The Fence’, Ma’ariv,24 October 2003.

3 8 Uzi Benziman, ‘Weight of theevidence’, Ha’aretz 26 August 2003.

3 9 Since September 2000, Israeli Arabswere, for the first time, active interrorist squads that caused the deathof 60 Israelis. Schiff, ‘Lose-losesituation’.

4 0 Ibid.4 1 ‘The Seam Zone’, Israel Ministry of

Defence. See note 35.4 2 Amos Harel, ‘The fence flaws’,

Ha’aretz, 7 October 20034 3 On these issues see, Saul Cohen, The

Geopolitics of Israel’s Border Question(Boulder: Westview & Jaffe Centre for

Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 75

Strategic Studies, 1986), especially themap on p. 112.

4 4 Schiff, ‘Lose-lose situation’. Technicalexperts do not see much scope forimproving the missile. Still, Qassims inthe West Bank would put most Israelipopulation centres within its 15kmrange. This threat can be counteredby operations against launching sitesand infrastructure, and by the closedmilitary zones near the barrier. InaFriedman, ‘Junk Rocket, PotentialThreat’, Jerusalem Report, 22September 2003, pp. 12–17.

4 5 Kober, ‘Western Democracies in Low-Intensity Conflict’.

4 6 There are signs already that Israelimorale is eroding and that thelegitimacy of the occupation is beingquestioned. A few members of elitearmy units have publicly refused toserve in the Territories. Lily Galili,‘Generals Back Unilateral Withdrawal’,Ha’aretz 18 February 2001.

4 7 www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/HEPG/Wallreport.pdf; Yehezkel Lein,Behind The Barrier (Jerusalem:B’Tselem, April 2003).

4 8 Palestinian sources claim that the firstsection of the barrier put 10,100hectares of Palestinian territory onthe Israeli side. Amira Hass, ‘IDFredefines Palestinians west of thefence’, 14 October 2003.Compensation was offered by Israel,but was rejected by Palestinians forfear of legitimising Israeli actions.

4 9 Ze’ev Schiff, ‘Fence route is moved,scrapping 2 enclaves’, Ha’aretz, 30December 2003; Amos Harel, ‘IDFmoving sections of separation fencewestward’, Ha’aretz 9 January 2004;Aluf Benn and Gideon Alon, ‘PMadmits fence harms Palestinians’Ha’aretz, 19 January 2004.

5 0 Amos Harel, ‘Easing rules interritories will focus on creating jobs’,Ha’aretz 2 November 2003.

5 1 See Chaim Kaufman, ‘Possible and

Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars’,International Security, vol. 20, no. 4,Spring 1996.

5 2 ‘The Jerusalem Separation Fence’,www.btselem.org

5 3 See the comments of senior Israelidefence officials cited in Benn, ‘U.S.expert to review Israeli security fencedemands’.

5 4 See the map presented in LeslieSusser, ‘Rethinking the Fence’,Jerusalem Report, 8 September 2003,pp. 16–18

5 5 Herb Keinon, ‘Lapid: Fence recallsapartheid’, Jerusalem Post, 5 January2004

5 6 However, 71% of the Israeli public areprepared to support the barrier evenin the face of US opposition. The PeaceIndex, July 2003.

5 7 See the maps of Sharon, Netanyahu,Beilin-Abu Mazen and Taba at theFoundation for Middle East Peacewebsite, www.fmep.org

5 8 Ibid.; ‘The Morontinos Non-Paper’,Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 31, no.3, 2002, p. 82; Hirsh, ‘Lost Peace Plan’.

5 9 www.heskem.org.il6 0 For a more detailed discussion see The

Movement for Unilateral Disengagementwebsite, www.hipardut.org.il/Index_e.asp

6 1 Figures from the Interior Ministry andthe Central Bureau of Statistics, ‘Specialsupplement on the settlements’,Ha’aretz, 26 September 2003.

6 2 Analysis of Israeli public opinionsuggests that threat perception is themost important determinant of thepublic’s orientation to the peaceprocess. Arian, Security Threatened,pp. 27–29, 193–94.

6 3 ‘Interview with Ehud Olmert’ YediotAchronot, 5 December 2003.

6 4 Gil Hoffman, ‘Sharon plan aims tominimize confrontation withPalestinians’, Jerusalem Post,12 December 2003

6 5 Ibid.

76 Jonathan Rynhold

6 6 ‘Qureia: Israel’s unilateral moves arepushing us toward a one-statesolution’, Reuters, 9 January 2004.

6 7 ‘Olmert: “tens of thousands” will bemoved’, Jerusalem Post, 22 December2003.

6 8 Gilad Sher and Uri Sagi, ‘Policy Paper’.6 9 Ze’ev Schiff, ‘Fence route is moved,

scrapping 2 enclaves’ ; ‘Amos Harel,‘IDF moving sections of separationfence westward’.

7 0 Author interview with NetzahMashiah, Defence Ministry officialresponsible for the construction of thebarrier, 28 October 2003.

7 1 Ze’ev Schiff, ‘Fence route is moved,scrapping 2 enclaves’; Amos Harel,‘IDF moving sections of separationfence westward’.

7 2 Aluf Benn, ‘No “irreversible steps” inBarak’s unilateral separation plan’,Ha’aretz, 15 January 2001.