Evolution and Human Behavior 32 (2011) 444–446

Book Review

Isn't it ironic? A review of Why Everyone (Else) is aHypocrite: Evolution and the Modular MindRobert Kurzban. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UniversityPress; 274 pp. $27.95.

Robert Kurzban is a consortium of modules based at theUniversity of Pennsylvania. They (those modules, or somesubset of them) have recently written a very interesting bookabout self-deception and hypocrisy. You (whoever you are)are reading a review of that book.

In brief, the consortium's thesis is this. If the mind isconceived as a unitary psychological entity — a unitary,singular, indivisible self — then the notion of self-deceptionis deliciously paradoxical (how could one and the same entitybelieve two contradictory propositions simultaneously?how could one and the same entity be both the subjectand the object of a particular deception?). If, however, themind is conceived as a modular apparatus, an entitycomposed of numerous functionally specialized subentities,then such paradoxes dissolve. “Self-deception,” on theKurzban consortium's modular conception, involves neitherself nor deception, but is just a misnomer for scenarioswhere (1) certain parts of the mind — but not others —generate systematically distorted representations; and (2)different parts of the mind thereby represent mutuallyinconsistent information.

The related problems of self-control (why do people locktheir refrigerator doors at night?) and hypocrisy (how is itthat people often fail to practice what they preach?) yield tosimilar analyses (the parts of the mind that lock the door arenot the same parts that want to open it at midnight; the partsthat preach are not the same parts that practice). And the factthat the modules in the Kurzban consortium (henceforth,“Kurzban,” “he,” or “him,” though it should be stressed thatthis is just for rhetorical ease) view the mind as not merely amodular system, but as an evolved modular system, enables‘him' to tell a comprehensive story that encompasses bothproximate issues of psychological architecture and ultimateissues of biological function. In brief, humans are hypocrit-ical and “self-deceptive” because of the way human mindsare constructed, and human minds are constructed this waybecause this arrangement helped ancestral humans todifferentially negotiate social and nonsocial environments.

On the whole, “I” found Kurzban's arguments verycongenial. The broad outlines, of course, are familiar — thenotion that the mind has internal structure is explicit in many

1090-5138/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.04.005

psychological traditions, from Freud to Fodor, and the ideathat this structure evolved to solve recurrent problems inancestral environments is a foundational assumption ofevolutionary psychology. Kurzban has obviously aimed hisbook at a popular audience — he hopes that by the end,readers “will come to have a fundamentally different view ofhuman nature” (p. 22), but few readers of this journal will beunacquainted with the modular view that he espouses.Nevertheless, the book brims with vivid examples andeffective intuition pumps (I particularly liked his metaphor ofmodules as smartphone applications for the mind), and thereare more than enough novel arguments and insights tointerest and enlighten specialists. I will pick up on just a fewpoints here.

My first point concerns the scenario in which two parts ofthe mind represent mutually inconsistent information. Toillustrate this state of affairs, Kurzban reviews a range ofpsychological and neuropsychological phenomena, includingoptical illusions, split-brain patients, phantom limbs, andblindsight. These examples are intrinsically fascinating, andKurzban does a fine job of using them to demolish the“unitary” view of the mind. However, he neglects to mentionsome especially compelling recent demonstrations of infor-mation encapsulation. For example, Johansson and colleagues(Johansson, Hall, Sikström & Olsson, 2005; Johansson, Hall,Sikström, Tärning & Lind, 2006; Hall, Johansson, Tärning,Sikström&Deutgen, 2010) have demonstrated a phenomenonthey call choice blindness. Participants in their studies areasked to make a binary decision (e.g., to select which of twofaces they find most attractive, or to indicate which of twovarieties of jam they prefer the taste of) and to offer reasons forthis decision. After the participants make their choice, butbefore they offer their reasons, the experimenters use sleight-of-hand trickery to covertly exchange the option theparticipants did not select for the option they did select.Whereas Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and Wilson and Nisbett(1978) showed that people in certain situations will confab-ulate justifications for their decisions (thus demonstrating thatthe decision-making process is sometimes walled off from themodules that orchestrate verbal explanations of it), Johanssonand colleagues have found that many of their participants arequite prepared to offer justifications for decisions they did noteven make.

The above point pertains to psychological architecture,but demonstrating that the mind is structured so as to permitcross-modular informational inconsistencies is only part of

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Kurzban's project. As befits his evolutionary orientation, asecond major focus is on how ultimate evolutionary forcessustain intermodular inconsistencies and intramodular pro-cessing distortions. Here Kurzban has many interestingthings to say. Like a number of other theorists (e.g., Haselton& Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006), he thinks thatcertain modules are designed to generate systematicallydistorted representations. Unlike some others, however, hedoesn't think that humans are the “intended” consumers oftheir own distorted representations; or rather, he thinks thatconsumption of one's own distorted representations is onlyadaptive insofar as these representations are then regurgitatedfor consumption by others. In Kurzban's view, distortedrepresentations can have a strategic value in social settings,where they can play a role (akin to propaganda) inmanipulating the representations of others to one'sadvantage. In nonsocial settings, however, veridicalrepresentations are always preferable. Thus, if a tendencyto systematically overestimate one's ability to perform acertain task is adaptive, this is not because it increases thechances of success at that task but because it increases theconfidence that others have about one's ability to performthe task — perhaps making one appear a more valuablesocial partner.

If Kurzban is right that systematically distorted represen-tations can be adaptive in certain social contexts but thatveridical representations are always adaptive in nonsocialcontexts, then this explains at least some instances ofmutually inconsistent — and mutually encapsulated —representations. The distorted representations may come intoplay when public relations are paramount and one'sreputation is at stake, but otherwise, veridical representationsshould always orchestrate behavior. Both representations areuseful in different situations, but to prevent cross-contam-ination they may need to be sealed off from one another.

I have two points to make about these ideas. The firstconcerns the overlap (which Kurzban acknowledges)between his ideas and those of Robert Trivers, who hasfamously suggested that a capacity for self-deception hasevolved because it facilitates the deception of others (e.g.,Trivers, 2000; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). I think that bothKurzban and Trivers would agree with the following claims:(1) the ability to misinform others is adaptive, and (2) thepropagation of such misinformation is a risky and effortfulbusiness, most safely and effectively accomplished through agullible mouthpiece. As far as I can see, the key differencebetween them is that for Trivers, self-deception does involvesome element of inner deception — some inner deceivermisleads the mouthpiece, and the mouthpiece then guile-lessly misinforms other people. For Kurzban, however, thereis no deception in self-deception. The job of the mouthpiecein his scheme is certainly to propagate misinformation, buthis mouthpiece generates this misinformation itself byprocessing reality in a systematically distorted fashion —by being “strategically wrong.” For Kurzban, modules thatgenerate distorted representations have no access to

veridical representations and do not receive input fromthe modules containing the veridical representations: “[I]t'snot like one module is pulling something over on anothermodule” (p. 130).

My second point concerns the possibility that happiness,or self-esteem, has some biological benefit. Kurzban doubtsthis. He sees that certain systematically distorted represen-tations— inflated perceptions of one's prowess or prospects,for example — might enhance happiness. However, heargues that evolution can only “see” the effects of behavior,whereas happiness itself has no behavioral effects. I think itis possible to dispute both of these claims, but here I focus onthe former. Kurzban insists that ultimate explanations ofmodular functions “…must refer, ultimately, to effects out-side the body” (p. 141, his emphasis). But why must this bethe case? I agree with him that natural selection does not“care” about happiness for its own sake, but only insofar ashappiness promotes survival and reproduction. But survivalis not just a function of behavior. Whether or not happinessleads individuals to engage in more adaptive behaviors (witheffects “outside” the body), happiness will presumably beselected for to the extent that it sustains and enhancesphysical health, for example by constraining cardiovascularand neuroendocrine responses to stressful circumstances (seeTaylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower & Gruenewald, 2000). Herethe effects are “inside” the body and are not “behavioral” inthe ordinary sense. But evolution can surely “see” them.

So, Kurzban's insistence that systematically distortedrepresentations can only conceivably be adaptive in thecontext of social strategy may be unnecessarily strict.Nevertheless, his discussions of these and many relatedissues are instructive and valuable, although some of hisswipes at social psychologists seem a bit unfair. Kurzbancompares social psychology unfavorably to his own fieldof evolutionary psychology and writes that the former“tends to be a collection of intuitive ‘just-so’ stories” that is“frequently not recognizable as science” (p. 242, note 66).Given that evolutionary psychology is probably the branchof psychology that is most strongly associated with the just-so story charge, this could seem a case of the pot callingthe kettle black. Does Kurzban himself take care to avoidtelling just-so stories?

In a particularly interesting section toward the end of thebook, Kurzban outlines a provocative theory of sexualmores. He suggests that a pro-life stance on abortion is notbased on concern for the rights of the embryo but that itstems instead from an evolved proclivity to punishpromiscuity in women. He writes that in “a species inwhich individuals can constrain others' behavior with rules,you’d expect evolution to act to cause members of the speciesto favor rules that serve their reproductive interests even ifthey don't know this is why they’re endorsing these rules.” (p.210, his emphasis). Because my reproductive interests areharmed by the promiscuity of other people (so long as theyare not being promiscuous with me), it makes evolutionarysense for me to support rules — like proscriptions on

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abortion, prostitution, or recreational drug use — that curbpromiscuous behavior.

I find this argument ingenious and persuasive, evencompelling. But note that one could quite easily tell a verydifferent story here. Consider that it is not, strictly speaking,the promiscuity of other people that limits my relativereproductive success— it is the sexual reproduction of otherpeople. In a sense, then, the best thing I could do to advancemy own reproductive interests would be to encourage otherpeople to have abortions. Perhaps that's what reallyunderpins a pro-choice stance on abortion — not somelaudable concern for the rights of a woman to choose, but analtogether darker agenda. People who support the rights ofwomen to have abortions might just be trying to advancetheir own reproductive interests by encouraging thetermination of their sexual rivals' offspring.

So, is Kurzban's account then merely a just-so story? As Imentioned above, just-so accusations are not infrequentlyleveled at evolutionary psychologists, but often they revealmore about the ability of critics to imagine how evolutionaryconjectures might be falsified than about the scientific rigorof the psychologists in question. Fortunately, Kurzban suffersfrom no such failure of the imagination. It turns out that heand his colleagues have already begun to devise and conductempirical tests of his theory of sexual mores. Kurzban,Dukes, &Weeden (2010), for example, showed very recently(the study is not mentioned in Kurzban's book) that attitudestoward sexual promiscuity are better predictors of attitudestoward recreational drug use than are abstract politicalcommitments, and that controlling for promiscuity attitudesvirtually eliminates the relationship between abstract politicalcommitments and drug attitudes. Further refinement isnecessary (and it will be interesting to see whether similarresults are observed in the case of abortion attitudes), butthere is no doubting Kurzban's commitment to falsifiability.Although I do think he might have been more charitable withhis comments about social psychology, it seems clear that,with respect to theoretical and empirical rigor, he practiceswhat he preaches.

On the other hand (and this is admittedly a petty point), Icouldn't help noticing that in his book he is not quite ascareful in his use of pronouns as one might have expected,given his disdain for the unitary view of the mind and itslinguistic residue. Indeed, some of his lapses into thelanguage of “you” and “I” do not seem to reflect knowingrhetorical decisions, but arguably exemplify and perpetuatethe conceptual confusion he is elsewhere at pains to expose

and dispel. For example, early in the book, he writes ‘Thisbook is about all these different selves, some of which makeyou run, some of which make you lazy, some of which makeyou smart, and some of which keep you ignorant. You'reunaware of many of them.” (p. 6). Who, exactly, is headdressing here?

It may be that this whiff of hypocrisy is quite deliberateand that Kurzban is being archly ironic. But of course, hemight simply be betraying his humanity. He is, after all, justa bunch of modules.

Ryan McKayARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders

Department of PsychologyRoyal Holloway, University of London

Egham, Surrey TW20 0EXUnited Kingdom

E-mail address: ryantmckay@mac.com

References

Hall, L., Johansson, P., Tärning, B., Sikström, S., & Deutgen, T. (2010).Magic at the marketplace: Choice blindness for the taste of jam and thesmell of tea. Cognition, 17, 54–61.

Haselton, M. G., & Buss, D. M. (2000). Error management theory: A newperspective on biases in cross-sex mind reading. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 78, 81–91.

Haselton, M. G., & Nettle, D. (2006). The paranoid optimist: An integrativeevolutionary model of cognitive biases. Personality and SocialPsychology Review, 10, 47–66.

Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. (2005). Failure to detectmismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.Science, 310, 116–119.

Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., Tärning, B., & Lind, A. (2006). Howsomething can be said about Telling More Than We Can Know.Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 673–692.

Kurzban, R., Dukes, A., & Weeden, J. (2010). Sex, drugs and moral goals:Reproductive strategies and views about recreational drugs. Proceedingsof the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 277, 3501–3508.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we canknow: Verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review,84, 231–259.

Taylor, S. E., Kemeny,M. E., Reed, G.M., Bower, J. E., &Gruenewald, T. L.(2000). Psychological resources, positive illusions, and health. AmericanPsychologist, 55, 99–109.

Trivers, R. L. (2000). The elements of a scientific theory of self-deception.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 907, 114–131.

von Hippel, W., & Trivers, R. (2011). The evolution and psychology of self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 1–56.

Wilson, T. de C., & Nisbett, R. E. (1978). The accuracy of verbal reportsabout the effects of stimuli on evaluations and behavior. SocialPsychology, 41, 118–131.