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Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd Author(s): Fauzi M. Najjar Source: British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Nov., 2000), pp. 177-200Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826091Accessed: 10-12-2015 15:24 UTC

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British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (2000), 27(2), 177-200 "

Islamic Fundamentalism and the

Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr

Hamid Abu Zayd FAUZI M. NAJJAR*

ABSTRACT On June 14, 1995, Cairo's Appeals Court ruled that Nasr .HImid Abu Zayd, a Professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Cairo University, was an apostate from Islam, and ordered his separation from his wife. The court based its decision, later upheld by the Supreme Court, on its interpretation that the principle of lhisba is applicable in matters of personal status. Hisba is based on the Qur'anic verses entrusting Muslims with the collective obligation to encourage good and discourage evil. In his books and articles, Abu Zayd, a liberal-secularist writer, extended his linguistic research to the study of Islamiic texts, in particular the Qur'an and the Sunna, thereby infurating the Islamnists, who charged him with blaspheming Islam, and demeaning Islamic 'Ulama', past and present. Like many liberal writers in Egypt, Abu Zayd is an advocate of freedom of thought and scientific research, anld a critic of the contemporary Islamic discourse. The rejection of Abu Zayd's promotion at the University, the court decision, and his self-exile in Europe, fearing for his life, are evidence that the influence of the Islamists has extended beyond preaching into the Academy and the Judiciary, to the detriment of scientific research, freedom of thought and expression, and social and economic progress.

Introduction

Tension between Islamic fundamentalists and liberal Muslim intellectuals is as old as the beginning of modernization in the Muslim world. Western institutions, ideas and values have swept over the Arab-Muslim world, breeding suspicion and resentment among Muslim conservatives. Most feared and resented are Western secular laws and education, which have gradually supplanted Islamic laws and religiously controlled educational systems. This onslaught of Western culture presents Muslims with a serious dilemma: how to become modern and remain Muslim. While liberal intellectuals seek a modernized Islam, fundamentalists seek to Islamize the modern age, calling for a return to pristine Islam. Earlier efforts by modernists, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and their disciples, to reconcile their religion with the modern world are well documented. However, instead of the tension between the two camps being reduced, we nowadays witness an increase in the level of contentiousness and vociferousness, culminating in violence.

The earlier debate between conservatives and modernists was to a large extent

* Professor Emeritus, College of Social Science, Michigan State University. Special gratitude goes to Dr George N. Sfeir who read this paper and made most valuable suggestions.

ISSN 1353-0194 print/ISSN 1469-3542 online/00/020177-24 ? 2000 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies DOI: 10.1080/13530190020000529



FAUZI M. NAJJAR

scholarly, peaceful and civilized. It involved written tracts, books and articles, verbal exchanges, public encounters and dialogues, and pressure on political authorities to adopt or abandon certain policies. Rarely did the exchanges result in physical violence, legal prosecutions or assassinations, as has been the case in the last few decades. The new phenomenon of political Islam and Islamic extremism is rooted as much in political, economic and social realities as in theological or ideological controversies.

The call for a return to early Islam strikes the liberals and secularists as dangerous, and a step backward, away from the civil society they regard as the only way to progress. Intellectuals like Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Naguib Mahfouz (Najib Mah. fz) and Farag Foda, to mention only the prominent three who have paid a heavy price for their outspokenness, have waged a war against the 'obscurantist' ideas and schemes of the Islamists, stressing Islam's compatibility with modern civilization. Their arguments are based on the conception that Sharfa rules are human interpretations and applications of fixed religious principles in accordance with changing circumstances, and therefore can now be changed, contrary to the Islamists' claim that they are divinely-ordained and immutable, valid for all times and places. SharPia rules and the immutable principles of Islam are not synonymous. Islam is flexible and open to change; it calls for the use of reason to promote public well-being. Such arguments have enraged the extremists among Islamists, who have resorted to charging their opponents with kufr and ilhad, to justify their exclusion from society. In June 1992, they assassinated Farag Foda, an avowed secularist writer, made an attempt on the life of Naguib Mahfouz, the Nobel Laureate in Literature, in 1994, and initiated legal proceedings against Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a noted scholar and liberal thinker, on grounds of apostasy from Islam, forcing him and his wife to flee Egypt.

The Abu Zayd case is unique in the current conflict between Muslim fundamentalists and liberal-secular intellectuals. Never before has an Egyptian court ruled that a husband must be separated from his wife on grounds of apostasy. Yet that is what Egypt's appellate court has done, by upholding such a ruling by a lower court. Since the lawsuit was closely linked to Abu Zayd's promotion case at Cairo University, where he was an Assistant Professor of Arabic and Islamic studies, it is essential that the case be presented in some detail.

Abi Zayd's Promotion Case

Nasr Abu Zayd was born on 10 July 1943. He received his Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic studies, graduating with the highest honours. His dissertation was entitled Falsafat al-Ta'wil: Dirasa fi Ta'wTl al-Qur'an 'ind Muhyl al-DnI Ibn al-'ArabT, a third edition of which was published by Dar al-Tanwir of Beirut in 1994. He was appointed Instructor in the Department of Arabic Studies at Cairo University, and was later promoted to Assistant Professor. He is married to Dr Ibtihal Yunis, an Assistant Professor of French at the same University. Abu Zayd is a noted scholar with a number of publications in linguistics and Islamic studies, a good teacher, well liked by his students, and respected by his colleagues and by writers in general.

On 9 May 1992, Abu Zayd applied for promotion to the rank of Professor,

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submitting some of his publications to the University Tenure and Promotion Committee in support of his application. The University Committee handed over the material to a subcommittee of three Professors for evaluation: Dr 'Abd al-Sabur Shahin, Professor in the College of Ddr al-'Ulum and a fundamentalist preacher, Dr Mahmud 'All MakkT, and Dr. 'Awni 'Abd al-Ra'uf. Seven months later, based on Shahin's negative report, the University Committee denied Abu Zayd's promotion, ignoring the more favourable reports of the other subcommittee members, and the highly favourable report by the Department of Arabic Studies, prepared by such eminent scholars as Jabir 'Asfur, Chairman of the

department, Hasan Hanafi, chairman of the Philosophy Department, Mustafa Suwayf, and 'Abd al-'Azlz Hammuda. The departmental report stressed Abu Zayd's broad knowledge, his scientific contributions, originality of his reasoning, and his use of modern scientific research methods. Aware of Shahin's ideological orientation, the departmental committee stressed freedom of research and expression, and independent reasoning (ijtihad), a time-honoured academic tradition.'

Shahin's Report

'Abd al-Sabur Shahln, a Professor in Ddr al- 'Ulum, is also a regular Friday preacher in the 'Amr Ibn al-'As Mosque in old Cairo. His report is coloured by his fundamentalist religious outlook. While some of his criticisms may be valid, most are polemical and emotional charges, such as calling Abu Zayd's works 'cultural AIDs', and a 'Marxian-secularist attempt to destroy Egypt's Muslim society'. Abu Zayd's 'reprehensible' works do not deserve to be called 'academic research', and his Marxian writings testify to the 'atrophy of his religious conscience'. The candidate, ShahTn added, belongs to a gang of writers who believe in 'intellectual terrorism'.'

Instead of evaluating the quality of his research and scholarship, ShahTn sought to belittle Abu Zayd's publications, and malign his character. For example, he said that the journals in which Abu Zayd's articles appeared were 'of limited circulation', and his book al-Imam al-Shdfi'T 'consists of 110 pages of small size, and is lightweight'. The book, he continued, is a critique of the great jurist's attempt to combine the doctrines of more than one school of jurisprudence (talfiq), in order to set a middle position between reason ('aql) and tradition (naql). He rebuked Abu Zayd for criticizing Shafi'Ts preference for tradition over reason, for rationalizing Quravsh's domination over Islam, and for saying that Islamic history was a conspiracy hatched by the caliphs of Quravsh. How dare he [viz. Abu Zayd] depict the great Muslim jurist as mulaffiq (falsifier) and mughdlit (deceiver), and accuse him of seeking to put an end to intellectual and juristic diversity, ShahTn asked menacingly. More serious from Shahin's point of view is Abu Zayd's statement that 'it is high time we [Arabs and Muslims] re-examined our conditions, and liberated ourselves, not only from the authority of the religious texts, but also from every power that impedes human progress. We must do that now, and immediately, before we are swept away by

Al-Ahali, No. 600, April 7, 1993, 2 'Abd al-Sabur Shahin (ed.) Qissat AbT Zavd wa Inhisdir al-Alhilnivya (Cairo: Ddr al-I'ti.sdn, 1995).

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FAUZI M. NAJJAR

the deluge'.3 'What does [Abu Zayd] have in mind for the [Islamic] Umma, after it throws away the Qur'an and the Sunna?' Shahin asked dramatically.

Going over the rest of Abu Zayd's publications, Shahin found fault in most of the author's interpretations and opinions. He accused him of ridiculing al-'aql al-ghaybl (belief in the supernatural), 'which is the basis of faith', as the realm of fables and myths, while claiming that secularism is the true interpretation and scientific understanding of religion. As Abu Zayd puts it, 'secularism in essence is nothing but the real interpretation and scientific understanding of religion, and not what the falsifiers [the fundamentalists] propagate, that it [secularism] separates religion from life. The [contemporary] religious discourse, intentionally and maliciously, confuses separation between church and state with separation of religion from society and life'.4 This, Shahin claimed, is an attack on Islam. To add insult to injury, Abu Zayd 'enthusiastically' championed Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses, 'widely known for its depravity and hallucination'. He accused Abu Zayd of overlooking the 'rottenness that issues from the bowels of an apostate kafir, and betraying lack of intellectual integrity by comparing the Satanic Verses with Naguib Mahfouz's Awlad Hdratind'.

Abu Zayd's contention that the religio-hegemonic rule of Quraysh was based upon racial and tribal foundations, and not upon cultural and civilizational ones, and that different interpretations of the religious texts existed during the time of the Prophet is in Shahin's judgment a 'distortion'. Attributing a human dimen- sion to revelation is an insult to the religious dogma. He sought to discredit the candidate by accusing him of adopting his ideas from Orientalist literature, in particular Regis Blachere's Introduction to the Qur'an. What Shahin found most galling is Abu Zayd's statement that 'mythical perceptions of an eternal Arabic Qur'an remain alive in our culture' (cf. Q. 85:22). He considered this a 'strange statement' in view of the fundamental Islamic belief that the Holy Book, God's Word, is eternal, whereas Abu Zayd holds that 'the moment it was revealed to Muhammad it acquired a human existence (wujud) separate from its divine nature'. The implication that the Holy Book is a myth is a 'reprehensible transgression'. In his evaluation of the candidate's intellectual production, Shahin has focused on those aspects of his writings which can be construed as evidence of his secularism, atheism, and rejection of Islam.5

Dr Mustafa al-Shak'a, former Dean of the College of Arts and Letters, 'Ayn Shams University, was commissioned by al-Azhar to evaluate Abu Zayd's book al-Imam al-Shdfi'T. Following in Shahin's footsteps, Shak'a described the author as 'insolent enough to regard himself the equal of al-Shafi'l, and to attack the Companions [of the Prophet] and the 'Ulamda' of Islam. By so doing, he slanders Islam and its Holy Book with disrespectful intimations about the Prophet of Islam'. He considered the book as being offensive to Muslim sensibilities, betraying hatred of Islam, its Book and its 'Ulama'. He accused the author of lacking knowledge of many Islamic sciences to be qualified to tackle such a subject. After pointing out certain 'errors' and 'shortcomings' in Abu Zayd's research, such as depicting Shafi'l as a client of the Umayyads, Shak'a condemned him for calling Islam an ideology. For the former Dean Islam is not an

3 Nasr Hamid Abiu Zayd. al-Ilmidm al-ShqIfi'Twa Ti 'sTs al-Ideolojivya al-Wasa.tiyya (Cairo: Sind' li '1-Nashr, 1992), . 110. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, al-Khitlb al-DTMf. Riu'vd Naqdiyya (Beirut: al-Muntakhab al-ArabT, 1992). 5 Shahin's report was published in al-Alhrqm, 14 and 21 April 1993. Reprinted in Qissat Ab ZaVd, pp. 19-33.

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ideology in the same vein as Marxism, socialism, and capitalism, but a divine message revealed by the Creator, ideology is a 'human creation'. In conclusion, he pronounced the book as an assault on Islamic holiness, 'betraying madness; it is one of the most anti-Islamic books'. He recommended that it be withdrawn from circulation, in order to protect the minds of students and general readers 'against its poison'.6

Makki's Dissenting Report Professor Mahmud 'All Makki's balanced report of Abu Zayd's academic works faithfully summarizes the author's arguments before making his own judgment.7 For example, in Naqd al-Khitdb al-DTT, Abu Zayd 'ascertains that religion, scientifically understood, is an essential element in any renaissance (nahda)'. The book, he elaborated, is a critique of the contemporary religious discourse and its two major guiding principles, hakimivya (sovereignty and rule of God's law) and the sanctity of the religious texts, the Qur'an and the Sunna. The champions of ha.kirnivya extend the concept of jahiliyya (pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance) to include all trends of rational thought in Islamic culture, reject differences of opinion and the role of reason, and disregard scientific and cultural thought. Thus fundamentalism, moderate and extremist, becomes an ideological rationalization of reactionary and authoritarian regimes.

According to Abu Zayd, the contemporary religious discourse commits 'ideological deception' when it encounters reason with the dictum hl ijtihdd fi mn fihi nass (there is no personal reasoning in any matter covered by the religious text). What the ancients meant by nass is what is definitive and clear, with one single meaning. Thus understood, the nass is rare in the Qur'an and even rarer in the Prophetic traditions, which means that most of the Quranic sutras and most of the traditions are open to interpretation and personal reasoning. Abu Zayd makes the distinction between religion and religious thought; the latter consists of human reasoning in understanding and interpreting the religious texts, and it is subject to the general linguistic and cultural rules to which it belongs. Hence, the Qur'an is a linguistic text, and its divine character does not preclude its being studied and analysed. Makki acknowledged that Abu Zayd is in agreement with the Mu'tazilites on the question of the createdness of the Qur'an, and their metaphorical interpretation of the suras suggesting corpo- reality. The mythical character of the religious texts is negated, and replaced by rational concepts, conducive to a better human condition, in contrast with the literal interpretations, which betray an ideological orientation opposed to progress and civilization. For example, Abu Zayd cites the fundamentalist interpretation of the Quranic slara (31:6) as prohibiting singing, an interpretation possible only by ignoring its historical context and the reasons for its revelation.

Makki did not regard Abu Zayd's critique of the opinions of ancient and modern religious writers as being antagonistic to religion. Rather 'it is a kind of ijtihad which earns its author a reward if he is wrong, and two rewards if he is

6 Shak'a's report is reprinted in ibid, pp. 39-60. 7 Makki's report was published in al-Ahrciim, 28 April and 12 May 1993, cf. Abi Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-D[ni (Cairo: Sniir'li 'l-NCshr, 1994), pp. 29-31 and 63.

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right'. He added: the Naqd al-Khitab al-DinT 'demonstrates an enlightened, progressive thought, based on a conscious and competent reading of the heritage, relating the past to the present, and deriving from the heritage what liberates the mind and turns it into an active force in the nation's progress'. Makki was highly complimentary of some of the author's writings, in particular his Ihdar al-Siyaq fi Ta'wTl al-Khitab al-DTni, 'a serious piece of research, the like of which we rarely find in contemporary linguistic studies'. We should not be appalled by the author's assertion that there is similitude between religious and non-religious texts, he advised. Fully conscious that the Qur'an is the revealed Word of God, earlier jurists and 'Ulama' nevertheless regarded it as a discourse to be studied in the same way as human discourses, Makki asserted. Hence, Abu Zayd's contention is not an innovation. His research 'demonstrates erudition, and analytical and deductive ability'. His praise of the candidate's research did not mean that he agreed with all his conclusions. Despite certain disagreements, Makki concluded that Abu Zayd's contributions qualified him to be promoted to full Professor.

Rejection of Abu Zayd's Promotion and its Ramifications

No sooner had the University announced its rejection of Abu Zayd's promotion than a war of words erupted between the Islamic Jama'a and the Azharites on one side, and the liberal-secularists on the other side. The latter among aca- demics and writers were appalled by the University's submissiveness to the power of 'extortion in the name of religion'. It was obvious to them that the decision had been based not on the quality of the candidate's scholarly contributions, but on what Islamists regarded as his unorthodox interpretations of Islamic texts. For many, the University had surrendered to Islamist pressure, sacrificing academic freedom and integrity. It was another case reminiscent of Taha Husayn's and 'Al1 'Abd al-Raziq's in the 1920s.8

The former defended Shahin's report and the University's decision, more out of concern about Abu Zayd's secularist ideas than his promotion as such. For them, those who championed freedom of academic research represented the 'left' which consisted of communists, atheist secularists, and the remaining followers of Nasserism. In their view, Abu Zayd's purpose was to destroy Islam. Using the Islamist media and the mosque pulpits, they accused him of teaching kufr to Muslim students. One Muhsin Muhammad wrote about 'those who, heedless of God and the homeland, and who revile Egypt [lit., disfigure her face] by defending freedom of academic research'.9

Media support of Abu Zayd was not less melodramatic, reflected in such headlines as 'The Committees on Promotions Turned into Inquisitions', 'Terror- ism Threatens the Principal Stronghold of Learning in Egypt', and 'The University has Proclaimed Itself a New Khumayni in the Middle East'. Al-Aha1lT weekly, organ of the leftist Tagammu' Party, mounted a campaign against the Shahin report, as an example of the 'terrorism' practised by Islamists 'in the name of religion'. One of its prominent members, the late Muhammad Kha-

8 See the opinions of Yunan L. Rizq, Professor of History at 'Ayn Shams University, and Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah, former Professor of History at al-Azhar University, in al-AhzlF, No. 601, 14 April, 1993. 9 Ibid.

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lafallah, published a detailed rebuttal of the report,10 underscoring its failure to abide by the 'basic principles of academic evaluation'. The report, he said, was more of a journalistic nature than a scientific and objective analysis of Abu Zayd's works. Contrary to Shahin's judgment, Khalafallah asserted that the author had meticulously researched his books and articles, using original and authoritative sources. Calling the report an 'academic scandal', he pointed to its 'superficial arguments', such as accusing Abu Zayd of having his articles published in journals of limited circulation, because he feared violent public reaction. Does the scholarly quality of a research article depend on public reaction, or on the scientific facts arrived at by experiment and experience, asked Khalafallah?

He went on to question why Shahin should be annoyed by Abu Zayd's critique of Shafi'Ts talfq, used in the sense of tawfiq (harmonization)? Is that sufficient ground to deprive the candidate of his promotion? Was Shafi'c an infallible prophet, or a king immune from criticism, he asked, pointing out that the jurist was a human being and a mujtahid, whose opinions were disputed by other imujtahids. Abu Zayd's work, he said, was not a study of Shafi'c as a person, but of his role in establishing the middle position between naql and 'aql. He concluded that Shahin's report was unscientific, and ideologically biased, while Abu Zayd's research 'is scholarly and objective; his use of original sources, as well as his conclusions, are sound'.

Many academicians expressed concern about the status and reputation of the University. Dr Sulayman al-'Attar, Professor at Cairo University, bemoaned the lack of courage in confronting the influence of 'this religious priesthood, recently contrived in Islam'. For him, as well as for others, Abu Zayd's case is 'proof of the downfall of the idea of a university, where academic decisions are now being made at the behest of a mafia-like group', and according to considerations inimical to the interests and conventions of the University. To the Islamists' declaration 'there is no place in Egypt for secularists', 'Attar retorted: 'there are no secularists in Egypt in the Western sense of the term, but there are free thinkers who believe in Islam'. Underscoring the threat of this 'priesthood' to culture and progress, he called for the renewal of religious thought 'on the eve of a new century. What Abu Zayd has done is a step, rather a drop, in this renewal'.

While liberal secularists and free thinkers rushed to the defence of Abu Zayd, Islamist writers sought to detract from his work, and to charge him with impiety for the manner in which he analysed and interpreted the religious texts. His theory of the Quranic text and its interpretation was portrayed as a 'reflection of Marx's theory of religions and philosophies, no more than ideologies portraying false ideas and rationalizations of the bourgeoisie's explanations of social conditions'.12

FahmT-Huwaydi, a well-known columnist, and an Islamist, was critical not only of Abu Zayd's writings, but also of his approach to the question of his promotion. In a column published in al-Ahradm3 he blamed the 'disappointed candidate' for arousing public opinion against the University, and accused those

I) AI-Ahfdli, No. 603 28 April 1993. Al-Ahridm, 7 July 1993.

12 Al-Alircim, 23 June 1993. 13 Al-AhlriIm, 20 April 1993.

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who rushed to his defence of mounting an ad hominem campaign against the professors who approved the Shahin report, calling their actions a 'charade' (taa-hura 'abathiyya). Finding it difficult to straddle both his commitment to free speech and his Islamist ideology, HuwaydT argued that the central issue in the Abu Zayd case was not freedom of expression and research, 'a privilege Abu Zayd could have had without the promotion'. As an Islamist, Huwaydi said he could not favour freedom without limits, and without deference to social values. 'Tinkering with the Shar'1 texts, especially those of the Qur'an and the Sunna, is unacceptable. They ought to remain beyond the reach of those who claim freedom of expression and research, and advance arguments aimed at undermin- ing and abrogating the texts, on the pretext of their historicity or the relativism of Shar'l rules'.

Abu Zayd States his Own Case

Abu Zayd's response to these and other charges is more than a defence of his faith and academic record. As a member of a small group of intellectuals, who have become aware of the danger of the fundamentalists' 'narrow and obscurantist' interpretations of Islam, he has dedicated books and articles to challenging the arguments of what he calls 'the contemporary religious discourse' (al-Khitab al-Din)O. His concern is not only to refute their 'misguided' understanding of Islam, but also to demonstrate how they have manipulated religion for political power and financial gain.

The issue, as Abu Zayd sees it, lies in the clash of two types (namat) of thinking and two types of methodologies. The first type stands for al-thabit wa 'I-tathbit (the immutable and its assertion); the other stands for discovering and ascertaining the truth. The attachment to the past which the first propagates tends to serve the special interests of those who feel threatened by change and development; they tend to interpret the Islamic heritage to their own advantage. As Abu Zayd notes, Islam 'is no longer the system of spiritual and moral values, which permeate the individual's being and society, rather it has been used as a political slogan to mobilize the masses, exploit the simple-minded, deceive the semi-educated, and arouse the emotions of many professionals'.

The second type of thinking, to which Abu Zayd belongs, does not regard the heritage as sacred, inasmuch as it is human thought regarding religion. It stands for development, and embraces the future. Abu Zayd denies that he is opposed to religion, or that he does not believe in the supernatural. For him religion is 'an essential and original component of the Arab-Muslim nation, and an indispensable element in its renaissance'. His quarrel is not with religion, but with the religious thought propagated by the Islamists. He finds a wide gap between the slogans used by the fundamentalists and their actual practices in politics, economics, and thought. The slogans, such as 'Islam is the solution', are 'glittering and attractive', but the reality is something else. Abu Zayd claims to have attempted a scientific understanding of religion, 'wide apart from the ideological exploitation of Islam by the religious discourse'. He accuses Shahin and others of using Islam to justify Islamic financial and economic investments, such as al-Ravyyn Islamic Investment Company, with which Shahin was associated, and which was accused of misappropriating the savings of the believers. 'This huge swindle could not have been accomplished without the

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ground being prepared by the Islamic discourse, which sanctions myths and fables, and stifles reason'.14

Distinguishing between religion and religious thought, Abu Zayd claims to reach 'an objective understanding of the religious texts', and not to rule them out, as the Islamists accuse him of doing. For him the proper place of religion is in the morals, habits and behaviour of individuals, and not what the contemporary religious discourse turns it into-a tool in the economic, social and political warfare. It is in this context that he makes the statement for which he is often condemned by his critics: 'Secularism is not opposed to religion, rather it is the true safeguard of the freedom of religion, belief and thought ... It is the true safeguard of civil society, without which it would not exist'. Elaborating on this statement, he says: 'Secularism is in essence the true interpretation and scientific understanding of religion, and not what the hypocrites claim, that it separates religion from life. Contemporary religious discourse, intentionally and maliciously, confuses separation of church and state with separation of religion from society and life'.'5 Separation of religion from society is an 'illusion propagated by the religious discourse in its war against secularism. Separation between the power of the state and that of the clergy is possible and desirable. It had been accomplished in Europe, which emerged from the darkness of the Middle Ages into the vastness of science, progress and freedom'.16 To do this, Abu Zayd contends, moderate and extremist Islamists alike use five analytical tools (alivyyt): (1) blending human thought and religion, eliminating the distance between subject and object; (2) explaining all phenomena, natural and social, by attributing them to a primary principle or cause; (3) reliance on the authority of the ancestors (al-salaf) or the heritage (al-turadth), investing secondary texts with the sacredness reserved for primary texts; (4) rejection of any intellectual disagreement with their own views, claiming to have a monopoly on truth; (5) ignoring the historical context. In their lamenting of the glorious past, the golden age of the Orthodox Caliphs and the age of the Ottoman Caliphate are equally revered.17

The fundamentalist claim that there is only one Islam, the preserve of the 'Ulamdi', unaffected by historical change or the circumstances of different societies is ridiculed by Abu Zayd. He argues that right from the beginning of Islamic history, and even during the life of the Prophet, new situations called for reinterpretations of Islamic principles. Moreover, two domains were recognized: one for religion and the other for human reason and experience. He cites an often-quoted saying of the Prophet Muhammad: 'You know better the affairs of your worldly existence'. Yet the contemporary religious discourse 'insists on extending the authority of the religious texts to all spheres of life. It claims to know the divine intention latent in these texts'.'8 For the religious discourse the past is the foundation to which the present must conform. If, however, the present fails to do so, it is considered ignorant (jahilT) and wayward. Hence, the

14 Nasr Hamid Abuf Zayd, 'al-lslCim Bayna al-Fahmi al-'lmf wa 'l-Istikhdicdi al-Ndfi'i, al-AhrIdm, 4 August 1993. Idemi, Naqd pp. 67-68 and 1 13-116; Idem al-Tqfkri fiZaindn al-Takfri,: Didcd al-Jahl wa 'al-Zaf\jwa 'l-Klm1fdi', (Cairo: Sina' li 'I-Nashr 1995). pp. 69-70. 15 Abfi Zayd, Naqd ..., p. 31; al-Tafklr ..., p. 72. is Ibid.. p. 73. 17 Abu Zayd, Naqd..., pp. 67-68. 18 Ibid., p. 78; al-TafkIr, p. 71. Henceforth page numbers noted in the text indicate al-T/fkir.

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salafi religious discourse seeks to refashion the present in the image of the past. Abu Zayd maintains that Abu al-Hasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari (d. 935-936), the conservative theologian, dominates the thinking of contemporary Islamists. And just as his system of theology dampened free thought and research, so do the methods and techniques of contemporary religious discourse, with the added qualification of violence. If God manages this world in every detail, the human being and the law of causality are negated in favour of a sweeping fatalism, resulting in 'social and political determinism'. Individuals will have nothing to do except wait for what God ordains. This kind of thinking, says Abu Zayd, 'is a pervasive characteristic of the Arab-Islamic mentality, and is inimical to any kind of reform, and contrary to the most elementary principles of scientific research'. (pp. 79-80).

Asserting Islam's respect for rational inquiry, and the fact that it is the 'secular religion par excellence (bi-imtiyaz), because it does not recognize an ecclesiasti- cal order, Abu Zayd distinguishes between al-'aql al-ghayb[ (preternatural mind) and al-'aql al-dtnl (religious mind). Whereas the former finds in faith the explanation of everything, the latter seeks to discover the direct causes of all phenomena, without giving up faith. The slogan 'Islam is religion and state' is a historical development and social event; 'it is not of the essence of Islam'. Even revelation is a historical event and not a metaphysical, timeless one, he declares, (pp. 79-82 and 90-92).

A cardinal Islamic belief is that the Word of God is coeval with Him and is revealed in the Holy Qur'an. Any Muslim who holds that the Holy Book is created (makhluq) and generated (muhdath) is a kdfir and an apostate. The Mu'tazilites held that the Qur'an is created and not an attribute of the divine essence; it is the speech of God, and speech is an act and not a divine attribute, they argued. Accordingly, it is an attribute of the divine acts, but not of the divine essence. The sphere of the attributes of divine acts is common to God and the world. For example, divine justice can be understood only in relation to where it is being realized, which is the world. Unlike the attributes of divine essence, which do not need the existence of the world, those of divine acts do. Abu Zayd seems to follow the Mu'tazilite school of theology. For him the Qur'an is not part of the dogma, and what is mentioned in it regarding the 'Tablet Preserved, the Throne and the Chair' must be understood metaphorically and not literally. 'When we say this is mythical, we do not mean the Book, but the mental conceptions of the Tablet Preserved; is this kufr?' he wonders (p. 203).

In line with the Mu'tazilite doctrine, Abu Zayd makes the distinction between divine power (qudra-potentiality), an absolute attribute of God, and action (fi'l). He argues that not every potentiality need become an actuality. And if God's Word is an action, how can the Qur'an be eternal? God can do anything, but it does not follow that He does. Moreover, if God's Word is an action, it is then an historical phenomenon, because all divine actions take place in the created, historical world. The Islamists' charge that the 'historicalness' of the Qur'an places it in the category of folklore 'betrays their ignorance'. To say that the Qur'an is an historical creation does not detract from its sacredness, or that it is God's creation (pp. 203-206 and 210-211). Needless to say, Islamists find such arguments unconvincing.

Against those who accuse him of denying the divine nature of the Qur'an,

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Abu Zayd reiterates that the Holy Book is divine in origin, human in language. It has two natures: divine in so far as it is the Word of God, and human in so far as it is revealed in a human, Arabic language. It is this double nature that led to the differences of views among early Muslim scholars as to whether the Book is an eternal attribute, or is created. Those who held that it is eternal, viewed it from the divine angle, while those who held that it is created, viewed it from the language angle. He adds that his study of the Qur'an is from the language angle, i.e. from the angle of a human-social phenomenon, 'which we, with our human minds and methods can understand' (pp. 244-245).

In support of his call for emancipation from the 'sway of the religious texts', Abu Zayd cites 'Umar b. al-Khattab's decision on the right of the mu'allafa qulubuhum in the Zakat (alms tax),19 and the suspension of the hadd punishment for theft in the year of al-Ramada (year of the famine). He then wonders: did the second caliph violate the religious texts, or did he understand them in their context, grasp their significance, and refuse to submit to the sway of the literal meaning. What Abu Zayd is saying is that the divine law must be interpreted in the light of changing circumstances. 'Necessities make allowable what is otherwise prohibited by the law', goes a famous Islamic saying.

As to Abtu Zayd's study of al-Shafi'c, the great Muslim jurist, his detractors considered the work not only an impertinence, but failed scholarship. Islamic jurisprudence and its theoretical bases (usuil) is not his specialty, wrote Muhammad Baltaj1, Dean of Dair al-'Ulum, in al-Sha'b newspaper of 16 April 1993; it is the specialty of the Sharla Committee. And in a private meeting with the President of the University, Baltaj1 added: 'What is the connection between the Arabic Language Department [to which Abtu Zayd belonged] and the great jurist?' Addressing Abii Zayd, he continued, 'Your occupation is the study of language and literature only, why write a book on Imam al-ShafiT?' To this Abtu Zayd says his book is not on jurisprudence, but on al-Shafi'Ts ideology of the middle position (al-idylujivyya al-wasativva), a study of the theory of knowledge as he developed it in his science of jurisprudence (p. 124).

As to monopolizing specialization, it is in reality a defence of taqlid (unques- tioning acceptance of authority), by those who fear that critical scientific research would undermine it. As Abui Zayd puts it, 'Taqlfd is a veil on reason, the human being's unique characteristic'. Scientific research exposes the 'putrid- ity of useless recapitulation and repetition, which fill many so-called scientific books and studies'. He then asks: which is more 'respectful' of the heritage, renewal by analysis and reinterpretation in the light of modern methods, or repeating it mechanically without critical understanding? By defending al- Shafi'1, Islamists seek to defend the heritage, and to exploit the feelings of good-natured Muslims in support of vested interests (p. 127).

In an effort to refute the charges made by the Islamists, and to discredit their interpretations of the Islamic heritage, Abtu Zayd distinguishes between primary texts (the Qur'an in particular), and secondary texts like the Sunna and subsequent interpretations of both. Throughout the history of Arab-Islamic culture, he points out, secondary texts acquired the authority of primary ones.

19 Cf. Qour'an 9:60. There is no general agreement as to who al-mil 'cllaf. qlftlliibthumi were. Some define them as influential leaders who were given a share of the fctv' (booty) in order to ward off their mischief and attract them to Islam. See KhalTl 'Abd al-Karim, ShIlcldi al-Rabciba bi AhwCl MiijtaIm al-.Saiiba, Vol. 1 (Cairo: Sna' li 'l-Nashr, 1997), pp. 89-92.

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Thus, the personal reasonings of jurists became primary texts around which commentaries and exegeses were fashioned. Accordingly, the sphere of ijtihad was limited to understanding these secondary sources, and to choosing between the opinions expressed in them, without going back to the original text (the Qur'an). That is why taqlfd has become the hallmark of the Arab-Muslim mind (p. 135).

Focusing on 'Asr al-Tadw-n [second and third centuries AH], Abu Zayd points out that the central issue was the conflict between reason and tradition. Those who championed reason used ta'wEr (interpretation) to reconcile the two, while those who doubted rational conclusions and championed tradition adhered to the literal meaning of the texts, sought to expand their domain, and stress their comprehensiveness (p. 137). The call for emancipation from the authority of the texts is in reality a call for emancipation from the absolute power and compre- hensive authority of those who exercise repression, hegemony, and supremacy in the name of the texts, without any consideration of time, place, circumstances and conditions. There should be no conflict between reason and the religious texts, says Abu Zayd, because reason is the only means for understanding, explaining and interpreting the texts. If there is any conflict, it is between reason and the (unquestioned) authority of the texts. Reason is weakened as the texts assume supreme authority. This weakening of reason is the cause for the backwardness of the Arab-Muslim world, and Abu Zayd blames those Islamists who use the texts in order to tighten their grip on the minds of the masses (pp. 138-139).

It must have become clear that Abu Zayd's 'defence' is a defence of freedom of thought, research and belief, fundamental human rights that are under attack by the contemporary religious discourse. Beyond accusing the University Ad- ministration of succumbing to fundamentalist pressure, and betraying academic freedom, he pays little attention to the question of his promotion. His main concern is to underscore the threat of the fundamentalist movement to the development of Muslim societies and culture. It is for this very reason that he refused to defend himself before the court, defiantly declaring: 'I refuse to defend myself against such charges [of apostasy], because I do not allow anyone, whoever he is, or any authority, whichever it is, to judge my faith'.20

Legal Proceedings Against Abu Zayd

Neither his arguments nor the overwhelming support he received from the intellectual community in Egypt and the Arab world saved Abu Zayd from being brought to court on grounds of apostasy from Islam. Public discussion and media handling of his promotion case played into the hands of Muslim extremists, who had already expressed disapproval of his views. They did not even have to write their own brief: Shahin's report and similar critiques of his research were, in their opinion, sufficient arguments to prosecute him on grounds of blasphemy and apostasy. The newspaper 'Aqtdatt, published by Dar al-Tahrlr, a government institution, was the first to publish an unverified report that a number of Azharite 'Ulama', and two Cairo University Professors, had decided to initiate legal proceedings against Abu Zayd, seeking to suspend him from

20 Al-Qawl al-MiifJdfi Qadivvat Abi Zavd (Cairo: Maktabat MadbtflT 1996). pp. 407-408.

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teaching, and to separate him from his wife.21 The Jihad, a radical Islamist organization, called for his death, so did Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of the leaders of al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, who recently has emerged as the alleged leader of the New Jihad.22

The case against Abu Zayd was brought before the Personal Status and Domestic Relations Department of the Giza Court of First Instance on 10 June 1993, by Muhammad Samida 'Abd al-Samad, a former vice-president of the Council of State, now a practising lawyer, and six of his colleagues, seeking his separation from his wife on grounds of apostasy. The petition charged him with publishing a number of books and articles which, according to 'reputable scholars,' amounted to kufr, placing him outside the Islamic pale. As an apostate, he was subject to the hadd punishment. The petition included most of the charges and accusations made by Dr Muhammad Baltaji, Dean of Dar al-'Ulfim, and by Shahin in his evaluation report of Abu Zayd's publications. It was also based on a monograph by Dr Isma'il Salim, an Assistant Professor of comparative jurisprudence (fiqh) in the same college. In his monograph, Salim accused the defendant of maligning the Qur'an, Sunna, the Prophet's Companions, and Islam's leading jurists. He also accused him of 'deifying reason, which is a danger to the creed'. He described the Tanwfriyyfin (members of the Enlighten- ment Movement) as 'ignorant, who understand freedom of thought to mean freedom to lead the people to infidelity'. He called on the General Egyptian Book Organization (GEBO) to cease publication of its series on 'Confronting Terrorism with Enlightened Thought'. The GEBO had reprinted books like cAll cAbd al-Raziq's al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm, Qasim Amin's Tahr[r al-Mar'a, Taha Husayn's Mustaqbal al-Thaqafa fT Misr, and Salama Musa's .Hurriyyat al -Fikr, all of which, in Salim's view, malign Islam and its Holy Book.23

A wave of alarm and consternation swept over the intellectual community, not only in Egypt, but also all over the Arab-Muslim world. This was an unusual case with serious ramifications for all those who valued freedom of thought and belief. Recalling the assassination of Farag Foda a year earlier, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights called for solidarity with Abu Zayd and his wife, and on the government to provide police protection for them against possible assassination attempts by Muslim extremists. It renewed its warning that, in view of the prevailing climate of religious fanaticism, a person's faith should not be a matter of public discussion. Moreover, the case would place the Egyptian Judiciary in an unenviable position of having to restrict freedom of thought and belief, a fundamental right guaranted by the Egyptian Constitution, and by international conventions.

Support for Abu Zayd came from all directions, even from those who disagreed with some of his interpretations. The Egyptian Enlightenment Society described the lawsuit as contrary to religion and law, and the investigation as a 'new inquisition'. The writer Ahmad Isma'll called Abu Zayd's prosecutors 'slanderers, philosophers of [Islamic] investment companies and Islamic economics, and advisors to princes and oil Shaykhs'. Blinded by their interests, they

21 Al-AhCli, No. 604. 5 May 1993. 22 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, in Muhammad Hashim (ed.) Bacna al-Takfir wci '-TanwTr (Cairo: Marka. al-Mahroisa, 1996), p. 17. 23 Text of petition is reproduced in al-TcafkT ..., pp. 265-277.

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accused Abu Zayd of apostasy, 'because he calls for freedom of the mind, emancipation from inherited reaction, and the opening of the door of ijtihdd'.24

Legal arguments in defence of Abu Zayd were aired in the media by prominent lawyers, stressing that the lawsuit had no basis in Islamic or Egyptian law. Khalil 'Abd al-Karim, a leading defence lawyer, argued that the court had no jurisdiction over whether a citizen is or is not a Muslim. Ahmad 'Abd al-Hafiz al-Sayyid described the lawsuit as a 'blatant assault on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution ... and a violation of the most private of a citizen's privacies-his marital life. If we allow every Tom, Dick, and Harry to encroach upon the private life of citizens, it will constitute a violation of Articles Nine and Fifty seven of the Constitution'. Moreover, he added, Egypt is bound by international conventions, which supersede national laws. Since there had been serious disagreement among jurists on the question of apostasy, the lawsuit 'serves no legal purpose or real interest; all it intends to do is to defame and harm the defendant,' he concluded.25

In a memorandum submitted to the Giza Court, Shaykh Sayyid Dawud Khalid, an Azharite with the rank of 'alim, stated that in no way could Abu Zayd be charged with apostasy, because (1) either he is a believing Muslim, in which case there is no problem, or (2) he is a believer, who entertains doubt, and makes different interpretations in his discourse on religion, in which case he still cannot be charged with apostasy, because of lack of certainty. He quoted Imam al-Shafi'i: 'If proof is still open to probability, it ceases being a conclusive evidence' (idha tatarraqa al-dalil al-ihtinaml batala minhu al-istidldl). Khalid warned that the Egyptian courts are not religious tribunals, and that such a case would play into the hands of the enemies of Islam in the West, who already think of Islam as a terrorist religion. He then wondered why Taha Husayn, 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, and others (who had been subjected to similar accusations) were not separated from their wives? Providing his own answer, he said: 'Because we live in an age seized with terrorism, and extremism, when the poverty, good- heartedness, and simplicity of the Egyptian people are exploited'.26

New circumstances have, in Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish's opinion, muted the issue of apostasy. He argued in al-Islam DTn al-Fitra that the apostate must be asked to repent indefinitely, and he should never be killed. The Qur'an, he asserted, does not stipulate such a punishment for an apostate in any of its verses. Regarding the traditions reported by (Muhammad) al-Bukhari (810-870), and interpreted as mandating the immediate (fawran) killing of an apostate, Jawish dismissed as inconclusive their definition of apostasy. He went on to explain that early apostates from Islam used to rejoin their own religious communities in their wars against Muslims. Therefore, they were regarded as traitors warring against God, His Messenger, and the Muslims. He compared them to modern deserters, who sometimes are executed. The apostates from early Islam were 'hypocrites and seditious'. The verse (Q. 2:17) warns those who turn away from their religion of punishment in Hell; 'therein they shall dwell forever'. Jawish concluded by saying that the Prophet 'has taught us how to act according to circumstances, but we have been afflicted with apathy

24 Al-AIhil/, Nos 631 and 632, 10 and 17 November 1993. 25 Al-Ahidil, Nos 635, 636 and 640, 8 and 15 December 1993, and 12 January 1994. 26 Al-Ahdlh, No. 642, 26 January 1994.

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(jumd), and we have failed to grasp the implications (lit., secrets) of his conduct and his natural religion. We have not been able to go beyond the letter [of the religious texts]'.27

In January 1994, the Giza Court rejected the apostasy lawsuit against Abu Zayd on procedural grounds, basing its ruling on Article 3 of the Civil and Commercial Code of Procedure (No. 13, 1968), which stipulates that no petition or litigation shall be heard unless the plaintiffs have a legal interest in it, recognized by the law. Moreover, neither the Sharla Courts Organization Regulations, nor any other law, have set the conditions under which such a case can be heard. The Court also ruled that no third party has the right to bring about separation between husband and wife.28 The Court did not address the issue of apostasy.

The ruling was appealed, and on 14 June 1995, Cairo's Appeals Court, reversing the earlier decision, ruled Abu Zayd an apostate, and ordered his separation from his wife. Unlike the Giza Court, it accepted the petitioners' legal standing, and agreed to enforce the Islamic law, which prohibits a believer from being married to an apostate. The Appeals Court based its decision on its interpretation that the principle of hisba is applicable in matters of personal status.29

The Hisba Principle

The office of Muhtasib (Inspector of the Markets) had continued into Islam from Byzantine times. It was Islamized by the 'Abbasids by entrusting its holder with discharging the collective obligation, enjoined in the Qur'an, to encourage good and discourage evil (Q. 3:104,110,114/7:157/9:71,112/22:41/31:17). The Muhtasib was made responsible for enforcing Islamic morals and behaviour in the community of Muslims. The office was called hisba. He assumed great powers, such as flogging the drunk or amputating the hands of thieves, but the procedure of the Muhtasib did not, in the words of Joseph Schacht, 'always satisfy the strict demand of Islamic law ... The institution itself has survived, in some Islamic countries at least, into the present, and so has the right of every Muslim, notwithstanding the presence or absence of an officially appointed Muhtasib, to come forth as a private prosecutor or common informer. The Muhtasib became the arbiter of both morals and markets'.3? It was on this basis that the Appeals Court made its decision.

The ruling against Abu Zayd emboldened Islamists to file hisba lawsuits against a number of intellectuals, including Naguib Mahfouz, seeking to separate them from their wives on grounds of apostasy. In response to a chaotic situation that threatened the stability of Egyptian society, and under strong pressure from public opinion, the People's Assembly on 29 January 1996, unanimously passed 27

Excerpted in ibid. 28 AI-Ahdil, No. 643, 2 February 1994.

Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalisml. Political Islam and the New World Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), pp. x, 170 and 172. See also an excellent analysis of the legal aspects of this case in George N. Sfeir, 'Basic Freedoms in a Fractured Legal Culture: Egypt and the Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd'. Middle East Journal. 52(3): (Summer 1998), pp. 402-414. 30

Joseph Schacht, An Iltrodulction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 52.

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a law regulating the procedures for filing hisba lawsuits, without infringing upon the right of every Muslim to do so.

The New Hisba Law

According to the new law, only the Public Prosecutor has the authority to bring hisba lawsuits before the court, after receiving information (balagh), with supporting documents, from petitioners. In all situations, the Public Prosecutor alone shall be the prosecutor. Although the law limited hisba lawsuits to matters of personal status, divorce in particular, it did not apply to Abu Zayd's case, which already had been decided.3'

The new law was received with some relief, but not without certain misgiv- ings. In view of the fact that Law 462 (1955) (Organization of Sharf'a Courts Regulations) had abolished religious courts, the new law was considered su- perfluous. According to Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawi, a former superior judge, and an outspoken liberal, the new law 'satisfies the claims of the extremists and terrorists, as it confirms Hisba as part of the religion of Islam and of the Shar a, which is not the case'.32 'Ashmawi argued that neither the Qur'an nor the .Hadlths mention anything about it. He then wondered if the legislative assembly sought to straddle two positions: facing the world's outcry against terrorism with the new hisba law, and appeasing the 'terrorists' (he means the fundamentalists) by codifying hisba, and giving them the right to challenge the Prosecutor General's decisions? He pointed out that neither in Egypt nor in the Arab world are such lawsuits heard, concluding that the court has no jurisdiction to investigate a writer's conscience.

In addition to placating Muslim extremists, the new law also pleased moderate Islamists by codifying hisba 40 years after the abrogation of the Sharla Courts Regulations. Yet the law generated heated debates among writers and scholars on its nature and implications for modern times. Its explanatory memorandum states that the right of hisba is established by the Shari'a, based on the Qur'anic injunction to encourage the good and discourage the evil. Moreover, earlier jurists had agreed that hisba lawsuits are communal obligations, and that it is incumbent on every Muslim, who knows what is good and what is evil, to inform the judge about a violation of God's rights. However, the memorandum adds, although the basis of hisba is established by the Sharla, procedural regulations are not based on a universal principle immune from interpretations. Consequently, there is no reason why they cannot be changed or modified by the ruler to promote legitimate public interests. At the same time, 'the law strives to regulate matters so that such lawsuits are not initiated for revenge, defamation, terrorism, or creating a climate of insecurity and fear'.33

The then Muftt of the Republic, Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, now Rector of al Azhar, took a middle position. In his opinion, Islamic law does not prohibit hearing hisba lawsuits according to certain procedures set by the ruler in the interest of the community. And there is no Sharfa reason why hisba should be the special province of the Public Prosecutor; it is the right of every

31 The text of the law as published in al-Ahri7nm, 30 January 1996. 32 Muhammad Sa'Td al-'Ashmawi, 'al-Hisba Qadiyvat al-Maw\\sim', al-AhdlT No. 750, 31 January 1996. 3 See Sfeir on the explanation of God's Rights, 'Basic Freedoms ..' pp. 406-407.

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individual Muslim, who fulfills the legal conditions of maturity, rationality, and rectitude, and is a person of honour and integrity, he averred. At the same time, the Mufti saw no Shar'l reason that would preclude bringing a hisba case to the Public Prosecutor or to his deputies, before it is referred to judicial authorities. In short, the lawmaker has the right to regulate procedures in the public interest, after consulting the experts, he concluded.34

Other scholars emphasized the administrative character of hisba, in order to substantiate the claim that it is the responsibility of the ruler to regulate it. The Muhtasib was expected to safeguard public order, settle disputes, and perform tasks that were not within the jurisdiction of the judge or the police, such as preserving decorum in public places, inspecting weights, measures, and prices, etc. In short, in past centuries, hisba was an Islamic administrative system, and not a divinely ordained institution, which could be reorganized and regulated by the ruler. It was called wilayat al-suq by the Umayyads. The 'Abbasids called the office holder al-Muhtasib. In al-Andalus and north Africa he was called sahib al-suq. On the whole, hisba was limited to the supervision of the markets.35

Although hisba may not be an Islamic system, strictly speaking, Dr Ahmad Kamal Abu al-Majd, a prominent law professor, described it as 'one of the most advanced and best systems that the legal mind has devised'. Similarly, Fahmi Huwaydi, columnist for al-Ahram newspaper, asserted that it is 'one of the most important constitutive elements of civil society known to the Islamic experience'. He compared the Muhtasib to a present-day Ombudsman, and praised the new law for preserving the institution, and for restoring its 'lofty meaning' to it.36 It has become evident that hisba is ambiguous, controversial, and, for some, inapplicable in this day and age. However, the triumph that the fundamentalists had achieved in the court ruling, was perceptibly qualified.

Expressions of support for Abu Zayd and his wife, Ibtihal Yunis, came from intellectuals and others all over the world. The Egyptian Writers' Union expressed alarm at the implications of such a ruling for free speech and belief. It condemned any attempt to prosecute writers and thinkers for their personal opinions, simply to serve the dubious ends of extremists. In a statement entitled 'We Refuse the Inquisition of Conscience', more than 200 intellectuals, including such prominent writers as Jabir 'Asfur, Mahmud Amin al-'Alim, Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'.tT Hijazl, and Jamal al-Ghitani, 'having been dismayed by Cairo's Appeals Court's decision ... declare their complete solidarity with, and support for, Abui Zayd and his wife, in defence of freedom of belief, expression, scientific research, and sanctity of personal life'. Asserting that the ruling was a 'gross and patent' violation of international agreements and conventions of human rights, they declared that 'it is inadmissible for anyone to violate the human conscience by probing into it, seeking to incriminate and accuse [thinkers] of kufr, and terrorize society as a whole'.37

On 3 July 1995, the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Middle East

34 The MuftF's statement as reproduced in al-Ahrdmn, 30 March 1996. 35 Philip K. Hitti, Histoir of the Arabs (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 322 and 527. Sulayman Fayyad, 'Li'l-Hisba Avdan Wajhan', al-Ahalh, No. 758, 27 March 1996. 36 Ahmad Subhi Mansiur, Hadcl al-Riddl: Dircisa Usi./liyya Tdrkhivvyya (Cairo: DCdr Tib' hli 'l-Dircidsdt wa 'I-Nashr, 1993), passim, where he argues that nobody, not even the Prophet, had any right to charge anyone with kufr. 37 Al-Aliilf, Nos. 715 and 716, 21 and 28 June 1995.

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Studies Association of North America sent a letter to President Husni Mubarak expressing 'deep concern' about the Appeals Court's ruling. In addition to placing 'drastic limits on the freedom of research and publication of our colleagues in Egypt', the ruling is 'incompatible with international norms of academic freedom and human rights, and we urge the Egyptian government to intervene to ensure that these freedoms are adequately protected'. The letter also urged the government not to implement the ruling, 'which would gravely infringe on the rights of Professors Abu Zayd and Yunis and have a chilling effect on the academic work of their colleagues and students'. Referring to the assassination of Farag Foda in June 1992, the letter added: 'Hence, we are apprehensive about the personal safety of Professor Abu Zayd and urge the Egyptian authorities to take all necessary measures to ensure his safety'.38

At the same time, the General Assembly of the American University of Beirut Faculty Association issued a statement repudiating the court decision against Abu Zayd. The statement called the decision 'an attack on the freedom of thought and expression as well as restrictive of academic research, excellence, and progress'.39 Scores of articles and statements were penned in support of the 'maligned professor', and many lawyers volunteered to appeal the case to a higher court.

Needless to say, the radical Islamists were exhilarated by the court's judgment. In a Friday sermon in the 'Amr b. al-'As Mosque, on 16 June 1995, 'Abd al-Sabuir Shahin, who had mounted a campaign against the members of the Enlightenment Movement, calling them 'Marxists' and 'secular believers', whose faith is sullied with kufr, called Abu Zayd 'a corrupt individual', and his supporters 'misfits'. Commenting on the Appeals Court's decision, he said: 'The Court has issued its ruling after having examined the case over a period of two years, and has become convinced that the man is an apostate who should be separated from his wife'. Concluding his sermon, Shahin threatened the Tanwiriyyun that their life in Egypt 'has come to an end'.4?

Despite great odds, Abu Zayd's defence lawyers petitioned for a stay of execution. At the same time, the Public Prosecutor appealed the case to the Family Law Department of the Supreme Court of Appeal. Based on the memorandum of its own prosecutor, the Supreme Court upheld the Appeals Court's decision on 5 August 1996, following the same reasoning: Abu Zayd (1) denied things mentioned in the Qur'an, such as the Throne of God, angels, devils, jinn, paradise and hell, describing them as myths of the past, (2) described the Holy Book as a cultural product (muntaj thaqaff), denying its pre-existence in the preserved Tablet (3) called it a 'linguistic text', implying that the Prophet lied about receiving revelations from God, (4) described the Qur'anic sciences ('ulum al-Qur'an) as 'reactionary heritage', and the Sharla as the cause of the Muslims' backwardness and decline, (5) described the mind that believes in the supernatural as a mind submerged in myth, (6) characterized Islam as an 'Arabic religion', thus denying its universality, (7) claimed that the final version of the Qur'an was established in the Qurayshl idiom in order to assert the supremacy of the Quraysh tribe, (8) denied the authenticity of the

38 Middle East Studies Association Newsletter, 17:(3): (August 1995), pp. 17-18. 39 American University of Beirut Bulletin (September 1995), p. 17. 40 Al-Ahalf, No. 633, 24 November 1993; No. 715, 21 June 1995.

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Prophetic Sunna, (9) called for emancipation from the authority of the religious texts, and (10) contended that observance of the religious texts is a form of slavery. Consequently, Abu Zayd was accused of patent kufr.4'

The definitive and final ruling of the Supreme Court dashed all hope for the defendant. Only a presidential pardon or waiver of punishment would save him and his wife from separation. But it was obvious that President Mubarak was not inclined to provoke the Islamists by defying the Court's ruling. Furthermore, he had been consciously supportive of the independence of the courts, and quite reluctant to interfere in any of their decisions. Soon after he assumed office following President Anwar Sadat's assassination, he signed a law (No. 35, 1984) restoring the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, which had been dissolved in 1969. The new law also guaranteed the Public Prosecutor and his deputies immunity, a privilege hitherto unknown. This was interpreted as proof of Mubarak's great respect and esteem for the judiciary.42

The 'surprise' verdict cast gloom over Egyptian intellectuals, who already believed themselves to be under siege by militant Islamists. 'A setback for civilization', mourned the president of Cairo's Bar Association, one of the team of lawyers who defended Abu Zayd. The secretary-general of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights said the decision was 'a big shock to us ... a damaging blow to Egypt ... and a slap in the face of civil society, a restriction on freedom of opinion and belief, and a license to murder'. Fahmi Huwaydi described it as 'symptomatic of a breakdown in society. Nobody debates anymore, only two channels are left, guns and judges'.43

The ruling's far-reaching legal and political implications to freedom of thought, expression, and independent thinking are matched by its legitimizing the killing of the defendant. Any religious zealot may kill Abu Zayd for being an apostate from Islam. The killer in this case will be regarded as having gone too far (mutajawiz), and usurper (mufta'it) of the State's right, but he will have the right to live (haqq al-havydt). What added to the gloom was that the Supreme Court's decision is irrevocable, and Law 3 (1996), which regulates procedures of hisba lawsuits is not retroactive.44 Steps to reverse the ruling or alleviate its legal consequences were to no avail.

While liberals defended Abu Zayd's right to free expression, conservative Muslim writers faulted him for challenging the sanctity of certain Islamic principles about which no disagreement is permissible (al-mna'llm min al-drn bi 'l-.darura). Leading among these is Dr Muhammad 'Imara, a prolific writer on Islamic subjects. In a monograph entitled al-Tafslr al-Marx li'l-Isla/m, 'Imara identifies Abiu Zayd as a Marxist, primarily for having 'most of his research' published in Marxian and leftist journals, like Qa.dyva Fikriyyva, Adab wa Naqd, al-Yasar, al-AhUali, and al-Tarfq. He goes on to charge Arab Marxists with making a practice of opposing the contemporary Islamic tide, focusing in particular on Abiu Zayd's book Mafhfim al-Nass: Dirasa fi 'Ullm al-Qur'an, which he describes as a 'Marxian analysis of Islam's Holy Book'.45

41 Al-Alhrsm and The New York Times, 6 August 1996; The Economist 10 August 1996, pp. 32 and 34. 42 Al-AIhrim, 27 March and 9 April 1984; cal-Akhbdr, 7 July 1986. 43 Al-Alhrdm and The Newt York Times 6 August 1996; The Economist, 10 August 1996 pp. 32 and 34. 44 Fauzi M. Najjar, The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt', Arab Studies Quarterly, 18:(2) (Spring 1996),

4-5. Muahammad 'Imara, al-TafsAr al-MarcT li 'l-Isl/im (Cairo: Dcir al-Shurtiq, 1996), p. 7. Subsequent page

references will be enclosed in brackets within the text of the article.

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To prove his point, 'Imara quotes from Mafhum al-Nass the following statement: 'The cognitive horizons of a historical group are determined by the nature of its social and economic structures, and that both the base and the superstructure interact in an intricate dialectic'. He says that Abu Zayd applies this theory not only to historical events, but also to the origin of religion. Moreover, he describes the state as a 'class apparatus', and the 'social project' as based on, and changing according to, class relations, a basic Marxian concept [pp. 36-37]. Abu Zayd not only adopts the Marxian methodology, but he also defends it against the 'religious discourse', which rejects and condemns Marx- ism. He claims that Marxism is not against religion as such, but against 'religious thought and the reactionary intrepretation of religion' (p. 50).46

Affirming his commitment to freedom of thought and pluralism, because they are 'fundamental Islamic values', 'Imara acknowledges that Abu Zayd's case is an intellectual and not a legal one. Therefore, it should be challenged and debated by argument, and not by court rulings. He blames the court for not asking the defendant to repent, and for failing to engage him in a dialogue: 'probably the court would have been convinced by his defence'. Acknowledging that the Qur'an does not prescribe a punishment for apostasy, he concurs that it is based on the hadfth: 'He who changes his religion, and deserts the Muslim community, must be killed'. Deserting the community is comparable to modern treason; that is why the subject of apostasy comes right after that of warfare (hiraba) in fiqhl books, 'Imara assumes (pp. 9-11). Citing the Islamic maxim 'There is no compulsion in religion', he affirms that faith is a matter of assent and certainty in the heart.

'Imara goes on to accuse Abu Zayd of denying that the Qur'an was revealed by God through the archangel Gabriel, and that it had preexisted before it was revealed, an article of faith accepted by all Muslims. Departing from this consensus, Abui Zayd argues from a dialectical-materialist point of view, that the Holy Book was the product of existing conditions, and that it had no prior existence. According to dialectical materialism, 'Imara states, 'thought does not precede reality; it is a reflection of it' (p. 51). In short, Abu Zayd holds that the Qur'an is a 'cultural product', and a 'linguistic text'. In other words, it was formed within the cultural reality of a period of 20 years (p. 52).47

'Imara does not find any contradiction between the Qur'an being a 'linguistic text' and being of divine origin at the same time. What he seriously questions is Abu Zayd's contention that the Qur'an was transformed into a human text the moment it was revealed. In Abu Zayd's words, 'The religious texts became human texts once they were embodied in history and language ... And they are governed by the dialectic of mutability and change. The texts are immutable in the uttered (mantuaq) form, mutable in the comprehensible (maJhum) form'. He distinguishes between meaning (ma'na) and significance (maghza). 'The meaning represents the historical signification of the texts, within the context of their coming into being and their formulation, whereas the significance has a contemporary character, in that it is the outcome of an interpretation in an age quite different from the age [when] the text [was revealed] ... What we call for is not

46 Naqd ..., p. 35.

47 Ibid., p. 99. Cf. Nasr Hamid Abui Zayd, Mlaflfim al-Nayss: Dirdisa fi 'Ulhma al-Qur'Cin, 2nd edn. (Beirut: al-Markaz al-ThaqEfif al-'Arabl, 1994), pp. 27-28.

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to pause at the meaning, but to discover the significance, which will enable us to establish an historical and scientific consciousness' (p. 57).48

According to 'Imara, the Qur'anic Arabic is a divine language, and not a human creation; this is an article of faith for all Muslims. God revealed the Qur'an in Arabic, which is part of its structure, essence, and reality (cf. Q. 12:2/20:113/42:7/43:3). Yet Abu Zayd refuses to accept it as true. He suggests that the essence of the Holy Book is its meaning, and not its Arabic idiom. He argues that regarding Arabic as an essential part of the Qur'anic text is 'an ideological tenet', based on al-Shafi'i's Arab 'asabiyya, and not one of divine truths and fundamental Islamic beliefs (p. 51). For 'Imara, 'the Arabicity of the Qur'an is divine, and not al-Shafi'T's invention, motivated by his Arab ideological 'asabiyya'. In his judgment, Abu Zayd's ijtihadat are not in keeping with his declaration that 'I am a Muslim, proud of being a Muslim, a believer in God, His Books, Prophets, and the Day of Judgment' (pp. 51-56).49

'Imara then takes up belief in prophecy, revelation, dogma, and Sharlfa which, he says, are of supreme value in Islam. But for Abu Zayd prophecy is not an inimitable deed, above and beyond the laws of matter, nature, and actual reality, but merely a faculty of the human imagination, whereby the prophet is in touch with the angel, the same way the poet is in touch with his muse (lit., shay.tan), or the soothsayer with his jinn. The difference between prophet, poet, sufTf, and soothsayer is one of degree, and not one of quality and kind of imagination, as 'Imara interprets Abu Zayd's position (p. 55).

According to his materialist philosophy and positivist methodology, Abu Zayd maintains that the religious doctrine is by necessity based on mythical conceptions in the culture of the jamada. Hence, it is linked to the level of consciousness of (a particular) group, changing with its development. In other words, the religious doctrine is not something fixed, as we understand the fixed norms of religion. Accordingly, he attacks the religious discourse, which rejects his contention that religious doctrines are conceptions conditioned by the level of consciousness and knowledge of the age. Since the religious doctrine is, in Abu Zayd's view, based on mythologies, it follows that the Sharla is 'self-created'. The Sharfa, as Abu Zayd puts it, 'has created (saghat) itself in keeping with the movement of Islamic society and its development' (p. 58-59).50

Finally, 'Imara affirms the eternality of the Qur'an, which he says is beyond questioning, and trans-historical. He upbraids Abu Zayd for believing in the historicity of the religious texts, and for discounting any immutability, conti- nuity, and eternality of their meanings and significations. With 'unprecedented boldness', Abu Zayd writes: 'The Qur'an is an historical discourse, comprising no fixed, intrinsic, and separate meaning. There are no intrinsic fixed elements in the texts, but each reading of the text reveals, in a socio-historical sense, its own essence'. In other words, each Muslim makes his own interpretation of the religious texts, deriving a different signification for each historical situation, 'Imara elaborates with irony (p. 61).

Having 'demonstrated' Abu Zayd's 'heresy', 'Imara goes on to question his academic qualifications. He argues that the scholar lacks sufficient knowledge of

48 Naqd ..., p. 126. 49 For Abui Zayd's statement, see al-Ahrdm, 19 June 1995. 50 Abfi Zayd. MaftlTin al-Nacss .... p. 107.

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things that should not escape a Professor of Islamic studies. He accuses him of 'narcissism, deceit, and impudence' in employing his 'limited knowledge' to pervert truths and mislead readers (p. 76). For example, he challenges Abu Zayd's claim that empirical evidence shows that most of the Qur'anic verses were revealed in response to a particular need, or for a special reason, by citing two empirical studies, which demonstrate that 90% of the verses were revealed for no special reason, underscoring the universality of the text (p. 78)." 'Imara picks out a few historical inadvertences in Abu Zayd's works, in order to discredit his scholarship. What he finds more galling is the scholar's impudence in criticizing Islamic authorities, like the great jurist al-Shafi'i, and hujjat al-Islam (Abu Hamid) al-GhaZalT (1058-1111). In most of the instances cited by 'Imara the difference is one of interpretation, and would have little bearing on the charge of apostasy. For example, Abu Zayd's judgment that al-GhazalT had dealt 'a fatal blow to reason' is strongly disputed by 'Imara, but is shared by a large number of scholars, (pp. 85-100).52 Although some of 'Imara's arguments may not stand scrutiny, he at least has used argument, rather than other means to confront Abu Zayd.

Conclusion

The controversy generated by Abu Zayd's case is the outcome of a long process of change that has been going on in the Muslim world since the latter part of the eighteenth century. Historical forces, Western domination of Muslim countries being the most pervasive, have generated new political and intellectual move- ments. Political turmoil following independence of Muslim States, the creation of the State of Israel, the rise of military regimes, the proliferation of oil wealth, and the absence of democratic institutions have increased economic and political disparities between classes. These developments have played into the hands of the extremists, who have capitalized on public disaffection to promote the cause of Islam as the solution of society's problems. The success of the Khumayni revolution in Iran has reinforced the Islamists' belief that an Islamic State can be established by force, since normal political and democratic procedures are non-existent. Consequently, the liberal-secularist advocates of the civil society are at loggerheads with the champions of the Islamic State, who have become a force to be reckoned with. This liberal-traditionalist duel was played out in the Abu Zayd case to become an important landmark in Egyptian judicial history. For the first time in modern Egypt, the courts have ruled the separation of a man and his wife on grounds of unsubstantiated apostasy, since Abu Zayd and his wife have, on numerous occasions, declared that they are Muslims, and that they want to remain together.53

This is not the first time 'thought' has been put on trial in Egypt, or elsewhere for that matter. From Socrates to Copernicus, the West had known such cases. The cases of Farag Foda (assassinated in 1992) and Naguib Mahfouz (stabbed in 1994) have already been referred to. Both are advocates of freedom of thought and expression, and both have been critical of the contemporary Islamic

51 Ibid., p. 336. 52 AI-Al-ll, No. 800, 15 January 1997. 53 Muhammad Fawzi (ed.), Nasr Hdmciid Abi Zavd Bavna cal-Kifr \wa 'l-lindn (Cairo: Dar al-Rcd'id li'l-Nashr-, 1995), pp. 132-137.

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discourse. Many others have been threatened and vilified by the fundamentalists, but spared the humiliation of being killed or dragged to court.

The court ruling declaring Abu Zayd an apostate, and ordering his separation from his wife, has many serious ramifications for Egypt in particular, and for Muslim society in general. Apart from the fact that 'no official or unofficial party has the right to accuse a person of infidelity on the basis of his opinions and

personal beliefs', the case of Abu Zayd has also serious implications for social and intellectual development in Egypt. By seeking to silence free speech, the Islamists, in the opinion of a leading Egyptian intellectual, 'sont un obstacle a la democratisation et a la modernization, elles representent un veritable danger existentiel pour un pays bi-religieux comme l'Egypte'.54 No society can hope to

progress without freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of scientific research and experimentation. By so doing, Muslim fundamentalists condemn their societies to stagnation and backwardness. If learned scholars and writers are intimidated or strangled on grounds that their ideas are in conflict with the fundamentalist interpretation of the religious texts, Muslim society can only look to a gloomy future. In the words of the memorandum of the Legal Aid Centre, the 'seriousness of the present crisis goes beyond the ruling charging a person with apostasy (ridda), and ordering his separation from his wife, to the retreat (ridda) of society as a whole from the caravan of civilization, progress, and the use of reason freely and creatively, in favour of fanaticism and stagnation. Dr Nasr Hamid Abui Zayd's crime is that he has used reason and free thinking, and exercized ijtihaid in an age that rejects ijtihd' .55

In a commencement address to the graduates of the American University in Cairo, on 17 June 1999, Edward W. Said, University Professor of English and Comparative Literature, Columbia University, could have had Abui Zayd's case in mind, when he wondered if the university 'can survive as a real university if its governance and teaching mission become the objects of scrutiny and direct interference not of its teachers but of powers outside the university'. He went on to say: 'We must always view the academy as a place to voyage in, owning none of it but at home everywhere in it. There can be no forbidden knowledge if the modern university is to maintain its place, its mission, its power to educate'. On the question of academic freedom, which is the heart of Abtu Zayd's case, Said said that 'the whole notion of academic freedom underwent a significant downgrading during the past three decades. It became possible for one to be free in the university only if one completely avoided anything that might attract unwelcome attention or suspicion'.56

Abu Zayd's 'crime' is that he extended his linguistic research to the study of Islamic texts. The fact that the fundamentalists have succeeded in having him convicted on these grounds underscores their influence on the Egyptian academy. Egypt and the Muslim world are at a crossroads, faced with the challenges of modern times. They will not be able to join the 'caravan of civilization' while the dominant forces in their societies are working to return them to the pristine

54 Rifa'a al-Sa'Td, Contre l'Integrismne Islamiiste. Une Expedrience Egyptienne (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1994), p. 13. See also the Memorandum by the Egyptian Legal Aid Centre for Human Rights, reproduced in al-Tafkfr, p. 86. 55 Ibid., p. 89. 56 A printed copy of Said's address was distributed within AUC Today, the American University in Cairo Magazine, Fall 1999.

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days of early Islam. 'If we want to live in the 21st century, or the 20th century, we have to know how to pursue scientific knowledge', is one of Abu Zayd's strong assertions. As things stand now, there is little room for optimism.

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