Isaac's File

8/21/2019 Isaac's File

1/64

INDEX

Index........................................................................................................................................................................1Voter Turnout good..................................................................................................................................................2LOW TURNOUT GOOD........................................................................................................................................9Compulsory ot!ng !n"re#ses Turnout...................................................................................................................1$CO%&UL'OR( VOTING DO)' NOT INCR)*') TURNOUT.......................................................................1+CO%&UL'OR( VOTING I' D)%OCR*TIC....................................................................................................19CO%&UL'OR( VOTING I' NOT D)%OCR*TIC...........................................................................................,-CO%&UL'OR( VOTING I' D)ONT GOOD....................................................................................................-1CO%&UL'OR( VOTING I' UTIL GOOD.........................................................................................................-2CO%&UL'OR( VOTING !s UTIL *D............................................................................................................./,CO%&UL'OR( VOTING I' GOOD 0OR LI)R*L'....................................................................................../0R))RID)R &ROL)%...................................................................................................................................../+*TT*C3 *D' I%&*CT'....................................................................................................................................$%I'C......................................................................................................................................................................,


2/64

VOTER TURNOUT GOOD

Lo4 turnout d!re"tly 5#rms demo"r#"y.Engelenexpl#!ns6 7#rt )ngelen 8Rese#r"5 *ss!st#nt o t5e 0und or '"!ent!!"

Rese#r"5 : 0l#nders;6

T5!s proAlem !s #ggr##ted Ay t5e #"t t5#t$lo% voter turnout means une*ual an# socio+economically "iase# turnout(8L!p5#rt6

199+6 2;.*s 3e#ney #nd Rogers 82$$6 1$; #ptly summ#r!e6$international evi#ence sho%s that turnout an# ine*uality are closely

lin&e#, an# that as turnout fallssoit "ecomes more une*ual(!hile universal suffrage e*uali)es the

opportunities for participation in elections8eery "!t!en 5#s ex#"tly one ote;6ine*ualities"et%een privilege# an# less

privilege# citi)ens persist in the %ay citi)ens eercise such opportunities8L!p5#rt6 199E6 1:2F VerA#6 N!e #nd 3!m6 19+E6 1:;. T5!sorms # proAlem Ae"#use goernments norm#lly respond to t5e op!n!ons expressed Ay "!t!ens !n ele"t!ons H! you dont ote6 you dont "ount 8urn5#m6 19E+6 99;. T5!s #ssumpt!on 5#s Aeen

emp!r!"#lly "on!rmed.In their cross+country comparison, -ueller an# .tratmann82$$,6 21/1;foun# that pol!t!"#l p#rt!"!p#t!on 5#

# pos!t!e !mp#"t on !n"ome eBu#l!ty.The more citi)ens a"stain, the greater income ine*uality %ill "ecome!T5e log!" Ae5!nd t5!s !s

"le#r enoug5./s turnout #eclines, less privilege# citi)ens ten# to a"stain more than others! /s a result, they %ill

have less representatives loo&ing after their concerns an# %ill therefore eert less influence on policy

#ecisions! /s lo% turnout means une*ual influence, it violates the value of political e*uality, %hich lies at

the heart of any notion of #emocracy!I t5us 4#nt to #rgue t5#t # purely orm#l eBu#l!ty o opportun!ty 5#s to Ae extended to # more suAst#nt!#l eBu#l!ty op#rt!"!p#t!on #nd !nluen"e.

?!g5 turnout !s ne"ess#ry or # leg!t!m#te demo"r#"y. Engelenexpl#!ns6 7#rt )ngelen 8Rese#r"5 *ss!st#nt o t5e 0und

or '"!ent!!" Rese#r"5 : 0l#nders;6


3/64

0olitical participation is also crucial for guaranteeing the legitimacy of a #emocratic regime!The more

citi)ens a"stain, the more the electe# "o#ies lose their accounta"ility!To !llustr#te t5e proAlem one "#n reer to ele"t!ons 45ere only #

m!nor!ty o t5e ele"tor#te determ!nes t5e ele"tor#l result.In elections to the European 0arliament 6 or ex#mple6average turnout has

#ecline# system#t!"#llyfrom 123 of all registere# voters !n 19+9to a recor# lo% of 45!13 !n 2$$- 8)&6 2$$-;./s more

than half of the electorate #Ast#!ns !n 1E o t5e 2/ memAer st#tes6one can har#ly spea& of popular or ma6ority %ill8W#tson #nd

T#m!6 2$$1;.

/s #emocracy cannot imply that la%s are enacte# "y legislators representing a minority ofeligi"le voters, one has to conclu#e that high turnout levels are necessary for any #emocracy claiming

legitimacy!

Lo4 turnout underm!nes demo"r#"y. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o )"onom!"s #nd &ol!t!"#l

'"!en"e;.

0articipation in elections is #eclining in most a#vance# in#ustrial countries!7o%er turnout6 moreoer6is more

une*ual turnout#nd t5ese t4o #"ts6 t#@en toget5er6 underp!n t5e "#se or "ompuls!on. 7o%er turnoutseems tothreaten the legitimacy of a

country(s government#nd ele"tor#l system6"ecause itsignificantly increases the li&elihoo# that governments %ill

reflect a minority, rather than a ma6ority6 o reg!stered oters6 #nd o t5e ot!ngpopul#t!on6 !tsel.*s 0erd!n#nd %ount s#!d6 "omment!ng on t5e report o t5e

&o4er InBu!ry6 !n r!t#!n68%hen little more than 9:3 of the electorate has vote# for the %inning party, as in the

Unite# ;ing#om general election of -ay 9::5, legitimacy "egins to #rain a%ay

of usAot5er tovote#t #llin national elections#nd s"#r"ely # t5!rd !n lo"#l ele"t!ons6the "ureaucracy "egins to thin& of elections

as a tiresome an# increasingly insignificant interruption in its continuous eercise of po%er! hat

#evelops is!!!$eecutive #emocracy( an# ! ! ! more ru#ely #escri"e# ! ! ! $elective #ictatorship(= 8%ount 2$$;.

Lo4 turnout me#ns uneBu#l turnout. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o )"onom!"s #nd &ol!t!"#l

'"!en"e;.

It !s not ne4s t5#tturnout has "een #eclining in most #emocracies since the .econ# orl# ar . ?o4eer6 t5e #sso"!#t!on o lo4

turnout 4!t5 uneBu#l turnout m#y Ae less 4ell @no4n #nd !ts s!gn!!"#n"e less "le#rly #ppre"!#ted. 0or ex#mple6in the last t%o General Elections in =ritainthe participation gap "et%een manual an# non+manual %or&ers more than #ou"le#> from aroun# 53 in

?@@A to aroun# ??3 in 9::5!L!@e4!se6Aet4een t5e 19$s #nd 2$$/ t5e d!eren"e !n turnout Aet4een t5e top #nd Aottom Bu#rt!le o e#rners gre4 rom +M to #round

1,M.The results#re not d!ss!m!l#r !n ot5er "ountr!es6 #ndare particularly pronounce# in the Unite# .tates, %here turnout at

presi#ential elections for the college e#ucate# can "e over 953 higher than that of the population as a

%hole, %hile those %ho lac& a high+school #iploma are ?13 less li&ely to vote than the general population8Rose 2$$$6 ,1+;.


4/64

Lo4 turnout t#@es #4#y t5e o!"e o t5e lo4er "l#sses #nd #ors "ert#!n pol!t!"#l p#rt!es. 7everexpl#!ns6

7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o )"onom!"s #nd &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e;.

The fact that lo%er turnout means increasingly une*ual turnout is trou"ling, "ecause those least li&ely to

turn out are over%helmingly #ra%n from the least privilege# social groups in a polity! T5us6 t5e I&&R report notes t5#t

t5oug58socio+economic status + %hether measure# "y income, class or e#ucation B!s not #s s!gn!!"#nt # #"tor #s #ge !n

determ!n!ng 45et5er # person 4!ll ote or not6 !thasneert5eless"ecome an increasingly significant factor: #t le#st !n t5e U3 . . . #lt5oug5 t5ere 5#sAeen some de"l!ne !n turnout #mong #ll !n"ome "#tegor!es s!n"e 19-6 t5e de"l!ne !s most r#p!d or t5ose 4!t5 t5e lo4est !n"ome=. 83e#rney #nd Rogers 2$$6 12; 'o6 !t loo@s #s t5oug5

those people %ho #o least %ell in our societies are least li&ely to vote' an# in %hat seems to "e a vicious

circle, those least li&ely to vote are least li&ely to attract sympathetic attention from politicians eager to

get electe# or reelecte#!.o ine*ualities in turnout are trou"ling, "ecause they suggest a vicious circle in

%hich the most marginal mem"ers of society are further marginali)e#!Not only t5#t!n so #r #s t5ese nonoters #re more l!@ely to

ote or so"!#l demo"r#t!" pol!t!es t5#n ot5er people6 #nd p#rt!"ul#rly l!@ely to Aene!t rom t5em6 !neBu#l!t!es !n turnout seem to depr!e t5e let o # s!gn!!"#nt pol!t!"#l "onst!tuen"y #nd m#@e

!t e#s!er or t5e r!g5t to get reele"ted.?en"e6 #s L!p5#rt m#@es pl#!n6 so"!#l demo"r#ts s5ould Ae p#rt!"ul#rly "on"erned #Aout#eclining voter turnoutAe"#use !t

ma&es it more #ifficult to elect social #emocratic governments an#, therefore, to pass social #emocratic

legislation or pu"lic policies!

Lo4 turnout !s # proAlem !n mult!ple "ountr!es. 7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t

t5e Un!ers!ty o C#l!orn!#6 '#n D!ego;6 voter

turnout has fallendr#m#t!"#lly #ter : #ndas a result of B the a"olition of compulsory voting in ?@A:!W5en I gre4 upin

Collan#, voter participation in elections at all levels B national, provincial, an# local B %as almost al%ays

%ell a"ove @: percent' no% it is much lo%er at all levels, %ith a na#ir of only 21 percent in the ?@@4

European elections.


5/64

Lo4 turnout le#ds to so"!oe"onom!"#lly A!#sed turnout. 7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l

'"!en"e #t t5e Un!ers!ty o C#l!orn!#6 '#n D!ego;6


6/64

Voter turnout !s een 4orse t5#n 4e t5oug5t. 7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t t5e

Un!ers!ty o C#l!orn!#6 '#n D!ego;6 a"out 25 percent 8Goldsm!t5 #nd Ne4ton 19E;. In)urope#n rl!#ment ele"t!ons 845!"5 #re #lso se"ondorder ele"t!ons;6 t5e #er#ge turnout !n t5e 12 memAer "ountr!es !n 199- 4#s only /E per"ent : #nd !t 4#s only #Aout , per"ent !n

r!t#!n6 &ortug#l6 #nd t5e Net5erl#nds. ?ere #g#!n6 *ustr!#n oters #re st!ll 4ell #Aoe t5e #er#ge turnout !n t5e !rst )urope#n rl!#ment ele"t!on !n *ustr!# #lmost ex#"tly # ye#r #go 4#s

#lmost E per"ent.

Voter turnout !s not only lo46 Aut de"l!n!ng. 7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t t5e

Un!ers!ty o C#l!orn!#6 '#n D!ego;6


7/64

eample is Russell Dalton(s81996 --:-/;comparison of the ?@5:s %ith the ?@@:s in 9: #emocracies> he fin#s

an average #ecline of 5 percentage points B an# ?A of the 9: countries %ith lo%er turnout in the ?@@:s as

against only 2 countries %ith higher turnout! The same conclusion emerges from a recent stu#y for the

European .cience oun#ation8org 199/F Top 199/;.T5!s de"l!ne !s espe"!#lly d!sturA!ng Ae"#use leels o edu"#t!on #nd prosper!ty 8#"tors t5#t "#n Ae expe"ted to!n"re#se turnout; 5#e Aeen go!ng up dr#m#t!"#lly !n )urope6 #s t5ey 5#e !n t5e Un!ted 't#tes.

Lo4 turnout 5#rms demo"r#t!" leg!t!m#"y. Carvar# 7a% Revie%expl#!ns6 7?#r#rd L#4 Re!e46


8/64

'o"!#l 'e"ur!ty #nd %ed!"#re 5#e Aeen d!!"ult or pol!t!"!#ns to resole Ae"#use o t5e oer45elm!ng pol!t!"#l pressure rom t5e elderly. In t5e s#me study6the Institute for

0u"lic 0olicy Research states that since the ?@1:(s the turnout gap "et%een the top *uarter earners an#

the "ottom *uarter earners has almost #ou"le#! The #isparity "ase# on e#ucation level is 6ust as

su"stantial#nd "#n Ae seen Aelo4These ine*ualities in voter turnout coul# impair some of the most vulnera"le

mem"ers of society! The young, poor an# une#ucate# are those most li&ely to "e affecte#, #nd poss!Aly t5e most5elped6 Ay "ompulsory ot!ng l#4s.

T5ere #re t4o proAlems 4!t5 t5e "urrent turnout leels. =roo&ieexpl#!ns6 7J#mes ?#rr!son roo@!e 8Gr#du#te '"5ool

o Clemson Un!ers!ty;.

In t5!s next se"t!on I 4!ll d!s"uss # 5#ndul o ourn#l #rt!"les t5#t #re rele#nt to my rese#r"5. In t5!s !rst Ay/ren# 7i6phart6 5egives t4o m#!nJthreeK reasons

%hy lo% voter turnout is a serious pro"lem! Jirst,K There is a systematic class "ias to%ar#s those that #o

not vote!L!p5#rt #!rms 45#t I 5#e pre!ously d!s"ussedF t5#tthe more e#ucate# a citi)en is the more li&ely they are to vote8199+;

T5e #ut5or s#yst5!s !s true not ust or t5e Un!ted 't#tes6 Aut #round t5e 4orld.7i6phart asserts that the "ias of turnout lea#s to a "ias of

political influence! The higher classes of citi)ens vote more, an# in turn have more influence over election

see&ing politicians!T5esecon#proAlem t5#t7i6phart points out!sthat turnout is not only lo% in the U!.!, "ut

also the %orl#!?e 4#rns re#ders not to Ae de"e!ed Ay #"ts t5#t "!te oter turnout #s # per"ent#ge o reg!stered oters. T5ose numAers #re 5!g5ly m!sle#d!ng #nd do not ully

!llustr#te t5e proAlem.The turnout6 t5e #ut5or s#ys6is most frightening %hen loo&ing at local or mi#term elections! In the

Unite# .tates, off+year turnout is closer to 25 percent an# local elections as lo% as 95 percent 8L!p5#rt6 199+;.

*lt5oug5 less puAl!"!ed6 t5ese se"ondorder ele"t!ons #re "ert#!nly not !rrele#nt. JThir#,K It is not only the lo% num"ers that alarms the

author, "ut their #ecline!Once at an average of 1: to 15 percent in the ?@5:(s, U!.! voter atten#ance has

#ecrease# to 5: to 55 percent in the ?@@:(s 8L!p5#rt6 199+;.W5!le less suAst#nt!#l6 t5e de"l!ne #round t5e 4orld !s st!ll "ons!der#Ale.The average

turnout in 9: in#ustriali)e# nations has #ecline# from an average of H2 percent in the ?@5:(s to AH

percent in the ?@@:(s8L!p5#rt6 199+;.


9/64

7O TURNOUT GOOD

Lo4 turnout !s not # proAlem6 Aut !nste#d s!gn!!es "ontent 4!t5 t5e goernment. =roo&ieexpl#!ns6 7J#mes

?#rr!son roo@!e 8Gr#du#te '"5ool o Clemson Un!ers!ty;.

* d!erent Buest!on to #s@ !s 45#t ex#"tly # lo4 turnout !mpl!esK.upporters of compulsory la%s maintain that a lo% voter turnout is

harmfulto t5e leg!t!m#"y o # st#te #nd "#n !mply l#rges"#le d!strust #nd d!s"our#gement rom t5e pol!t!"#l pro"ess 8ID)* W5y6 2$$-;. Conersely6 opponents o m#nd#tory ot!ng

l#4s #rgue t5#tlo% voter turnout signifies %i#esprea# contentment %ith government! The International

Institute for Democracy an# Electoral /ssistance refers to the eample of /l"ania! In the ?@@:(s /l"ania

ha# three competitive elections, all %ith high voter turnout in the @:th percentile 9::4F! The Unite#

.tates ha# a 4A percent turnout in the ?@@1 presi#ential election! In the late ?@@:(s it %as /l"ania, not the

Unite# .tates, %hich %as #evastate# "y national riots resulting in the collapse of the fe#eral

governmental structure!Turnout #lone !s not m#nd#te enoug5.


10/64

O-0U7.ORL VOTING INRE/.E. TURNOUT

Compulsory ot!ng 4ould l!@ely !n"re#se oter turnout. Engelenexpl#!ns6 7#rt )ngelen 8Rese#r"5 *ss!st#nt o t5e

0und or '"!ent!!" Rese#r"5 : 0l#nders;6


11/64

/ secon# metho#t5ereore6loo&s at a country that has intro#uce# or a"olishe# compulsory voting at some

moment in time! -a&ing sure all circumstances remain the same, such %ithin+country comparisons are

"etter suite# to singling out its effect!*lt5oug5the##!l#Ale#ata!s l!m!ted6 !tleaves no room for #ou"t 45ereer !t !s !ntrodu"ed6

compulsory voting raises turnout.Completely #n#logously6the #ata sho% that turnout al%ays #rops %hen such la%s

are a"olishe#!%oreoer6 turnout leels "ont!nue to drop !n su"5 "ountr!es. T5!s suggests t5#tcompulsory voting helps soli#ify some &in# of

ha"it or social norm that ero#es only gra#ually in time!)en 45en su"5 l#4s #re not #"t!ely enor"ed6 t5ey engender "ompl!#n"e. ?ere6 #s 4ell

#s !n "ountr!es 45ere enor"ement !s not ery str!"t6sanctions are mainly a sym"olic remin#er that voting is compulsory>

$compulsory voting can "e very effective in raising turnout B in spite of lo% penalties t5#t #re !mposed or #!l!ng to ote

8usu#lly s!m!l#r to # p#r@!ng !ol#t!on;6 !n sp!te o t5ela enforcement8usu#lly mu"5 less str!ngent t5#n p#r@!ng rules #re enor"ed;6 an#!n sp!te o the secret

"allot6 45!"5 me#ns t5#t #n #"tu#l ote "#nnot Ae "ompelled !n t5e !rst pl#"e 8L!p5#rt6 199E6 2;. W5en "!t!ens #re no longer "ompelled to ote6 t5e so"!#l norm #nd "!!" sense o dutyto ote gr#du#lly #n!s5. T5!s results !n de"l!n!ng turnout leels6 m#n!est!ng t5emseles !rst #mong t5e youngest "!t!ens6 45o d!d not yet !ntern#l!e t5e norm to ote 80r#n@l!n et #l.6 2$$-6

121:122;.The fact that young people a"stain more than others an# that average turnout is #eclining in#icates

that the legal o"ligation, the social norm an# the civic sense of #uty to vote coeist an# reinforce each

other83e#ney #nd Rogers6 2$$6 1E:2$;.

&en#lt!es or non"ompl!#n"e 4!t5 "ompulsory ot!ng en"our#ge !nd!!du#ls to ote.ac&man expl#!ns6 7'!mon

J#"@m#n 8&roessor o pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

ompulsory voting has a #irect impact on voter turnout, evi#ent in "oth aggregate an# in#ivi#ual level

analyses!T5e underly!ng log!" !s extremely s!mple.ompulsory voting(s non+compliance penalties offset the costs of

electoral participation, effectively attaching a cost to not turning out an# there"y overcoming the fact

that turnout is a lo% "enefit activity for many citi)ens! * numAer o !nd!re"t "onseBuen"es o "ompulsory ot!ng #re #lso d!s"ussed.

Crossn#t!on#l stud!es s5o4 t5#t "ompulsory ot!ng !n"re#ses oter turnout. ac&man expl#!ns6 7'!mon J#"@m#n

8&roessor o pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

)ena casual inspection of compen#iums of aggregate turnout statistics reveals higher turnout among

countries %ith compulsory voting. 0or !nst#n"e6a recent collection of #ata on voter turnout in ?A? countries

fin#s turnout a"out si or seven percentage points higher in 94 countries %ith some form of compulsory

voting than in countries %ithout compulsory voting8ID)* 199+6 ,2;.-ultivariate statistical analyses typically

fin# compulsory voting to have larger impacts on turnout, controlling for other institutional an# political

varia"les that affect turnout!7i6pharts 8199+; re!e4fin#s compulsory voting associate# %ith a "oost in


12/64

turnout rates of seven to siteen percentage points F or ex#mples o t5e stud!es re!e4ed6 see &o4ell 819E1;6 J#"@m#n 819E+;6 J#"@m#n #nd %!ller8199/;6 #nd 0r#n@l!n 81999;6 t5e l#tter study Ae!ng d!st!n"t!e or !n"lud!ng #n !nd!!du#lleel #n#lys!s6 explo!t!ng surey d#t# rom )urope#n Un!on "ountr!es. *mong L#t!n *mer!"#n

"ountr!es6 t5e est!m#ted turnout Aoost #sso"!#ted 4!t5 "ompulsory ot!ng !s roug5ly eleen to seenteen per"ent#ge po!nts 80ornos 199;.T5ese results #re str!@!ng "ons!der!ng 8#; l#rge "rossn#t!on#l d!eren"es !n !nst!tut!on#l #nd pol!t!"#l "5#r#"ter!st!"s o t5ese "ountr!es t5#t !mp#"t turnout 8e.g.6 J#"@m#ns 19E+ study "ons!dered "ompet!t!eness o ele"t!ons6 ele"tor#l

d!sproport!on#l!ty6 numAer o pol!t!"#l p#rt!es6 un!"#mer#l!sm s A!"#mer#l!sm6 Aut ound "ompulsory ot!ng to 5#e t5e l#rgest !mp#"t on turnout o #ll t5ese !nst!tut!on#l e#tures; #nd 8A;

"ons!der#Ale #r!#A!l!ty !n t5e enor"ement o "ompulsory ot!ng #mong t5ose "ountr!es t5#t ostens!Aly 5#e "ompulsory ot!ng.

W!t5!n"ountry "omp#r!son stud!es 5#e s5o4n t5#t "ompulsory ot!ng !n"re#ses oter turnout. ac&man

expl#!ns6 7'!mon J#"@m#n 8&roessor o pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

'tud!es o t5!s type !nd "ompulsory ot!ng to 5#e l#rge ee"ts on #ggreg#te turnout.0rior to the implementation of compulsory voting in

?@94, turnout in the nine elections for /ustralia(s Couse of Representatives average# 14!93' in the nine

elections follo%ing the intro#uction of compulsory voting turnout average# @4!13,#n !n"re#se o ,$.- per"ent#ge po!nts 8t

E.+F #ut5ors "#l"ul#t!ons6 us!ng d#t# !n ?ug5es #nd Gr#5#m 819E;;.In the Netherlan#s, the a"olition of compulsory voting in ?@A:%as follo%e# "y a #rop of roughly ?: percentage points to roughly H438Ir4!n 19+-F ?!r"y 199-;. In #dd!t!on6the

removal of fines for non+voting in Vene)uela in ?@@2 sa% turnout fall "y roughly 2: percentage points 8L!p5#rt 199+6 9;.In *ustr!#6 "rosspro!n"!#l #nd long!tud!n#l #r!#t!on !n t5e use o "ompulsory ot!ng perm!ts # po4erul #ssessment o t5e !mp#"t o "ompulsory ot!ng. Turnout !n eleeneder#l p#rl!#ment#ry ele"t!ons Aet4een 19/, #nd 19E+ #er#ged 92.+M !n pro!n"es 4!t5out "ompulsory ot!ngF #mong pro!n"es 4!t5 "ompulsory ot!ng turnout #er#ged 9/.+M6 to y!eld #

tre#tment ee"t o ,.$ per"ent#ge po!nts 8t,.-;6 t5!s sm#ller Aut st#t!st!"#lly s!gn!!"#nt ee"t rele"t!ng # HH"e!l!ng ee"t 8turnout r#tes #re Aounded #t 1$$M;. * re#son#Ale "on"lus!on o

t5ese stud!es !s t5#tcompulsory voting effects are con#itional on "aseline levels of electoral participation' i!e!,

compulsory voting is li&ely to have "igger impacts on turnout %hen other factors pre#ispose a country to

lo% turnout, an# vice+versa8?!r"y 199-;. T5!s !ns!g5t "#n Ae #ppl!ed !n "rossn#t!on#l stud!es o oter turnout6 us!ng !nter#"t!on terms or mult!leel st#t!st!"#l models

to m#@e t5e ee"ts o Compulsory ot!ng "ond!t!on#l on ot5er #r!#Ales.

&uAl!" op!n!on sureys s5o4 t5#t olunt#ry ot!ng 4ould de"re#se oter turnout. ac&man expl#!ns6 7'!mon

J#"@m#n 8&roessor o pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

0u"lic opinion surveys have also "een use# as proies for the $$natural eperiment(( of removing V! 0or

!nst#n"e6researchers in a num"er of countries %ith V have as&e# respon#ents to report their li&ely

"ehavior in a counterfactual scenario of voluntary turnout! Results from stu#ies of this type suggest

mo#est falls in voter turnout in /ustralia +++ to a"out HH3 from the current @13 figure 8%#"@err#s #nd %"*ll!ster

199; "ut larger falls in =elgium8?oog5e #nd &eller!#ux 199E;6=ra)il8&o4er #nd RoAerts 199/;6an# Vene)uala, all on the or#er

of aroun# thirty percentage points!J#"@m#n81999; urges "#ut!on !n !nterpret!ng t5ese est!m#tes6 #rgu!ng t5#t 8#t le#st !n t5e *ustr#l!#n "#se;survey

response "ias pro#uces an overestimate of voluntary voter turnout, since hypothetical non+voters are less

li&ely to respon# to a survey on politics in the first place!


13/64

Compulsory ot!ng !s t5e only ee"t!e remedy to lo4turnout. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London

'"5ool o )"onom!"s #nd &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e;.

If the first steps !n t5e #rgument or "ompulsory ot!ngare6 typ!"#lly6an epression of concern a"out #eclining an# increasingly

une*ual turnout, the net step notes that there are a variety of plausi"le reme#ies or t5ese proAlems. ?o4eer6none

seems as imme#iate, or as effective as compulsion in rectifying "oth lo% an# une*ual turnouts! T5us6%hile

it is common to suggest that registration an# voting shoul# "e ma#e easier, that voting shoul# ta&e place

at %ee&en#s, an# that more active campaigning of all voters shoul# "e promote#, none of these is

guarantee# to have any significant effect on turnouts, or on ine*uality! 'u"5 ee"ts6 !n #ny "#se6 #re l!@ely to Ae med!um to long term

y "ontr#st6compulsory voting has imme#iate an# #ramatic effects on turnout, an# the results are most

#ramatic the lo%er the rate of turnout to "egin %ith!0or ex#mple6 !n t5e 2- ele"t!ons s!n"e 19-6 *ustr#l!# 5#s #er#ge turnout o 9-./MF #nd !n t5e

19 ele"t!ons s!n"e 19-+6 elg!um #er#ged 92.+M turnout..o, compulsion in an# of itself can turn aroun# lo% turnout #nd6 een t5oug5 !t"#nnot 45olly remoe !neBu#l!t!es o turnout6 !t "#n dr#m#t!"#lly lessen t5ese6 too.

Compulsory ot!ng !n"re#ses oter turnout or !rstorder ele"t!ons #""ord!ng to stud!es.7i6phartexpl#!ns6

7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t t5e Un!ers!ty o C#l!orn!#6 '#n D!ego;6


14/64

man#atory voting!The turnout in Dutch local an# provincial elections %as a"ove @: percent un#er

compulsory voting, "ut #roppe# un#er voluntary voting to 5: percent in the ?@@5 provincial elections! In t5eour )urope#n rl!#ment ele"t!ons 5eld so #r 8rom 19+9 to 199-;6 t5e our "ountr!es 4!t5 m#nd#tory ot!ng 5#d #n #er#ge turnout o E- per"entF t5e e!g5t "ountr!es 4!t5 olunt#ry ot!ng

5#d #n #er#ge o - per"ent : # A!g d!eren"e o ,E per"ent#ge po!nts.

Compulsory ot!ng "#n !n"re#se t5e oter turnout. =roo&ieexpl#!ns6 7J#mes ?#rr!son roo@!e 8Gr#du#te '"5ool o

Clemson Un!ers!ty;.

To com"at %hat 7i6phart #eems as unsatisfactory turnout, he proposes t4o pol!"y "5#nges. T5e !rst o t5ese !s to "re#te more


15/64

!neBu#l!ty !n *ustr#l!# Aeore "ompulsory ot!ng. *s !n m#ny demo"r#"!es tod#y6%ealthy, property+o%ning citi)ens %ere much more li&ely to

vote than poor, non+property+o%ning citi)ens!T5!s #n#lys!s does not suggest t5#t property o4ners5!p or property #lues ex5!A!t # "#us#l ee"t on turnout'!m!l#rly6 t5ese #"tors #re not ne"ess#r!ly t5e most !mport#nt pred!"tors o ot!ng. T5e #n#lys!s !s des"r!pt!e6 un"oer!ng #s Aest #s poss!Ale 45o oted #nd 45o #Ast#!ned rom ot!ng Aeore

t5e #dopt!on o "ompulsory ot!ng.

Introdu"!ng "ompulsory ot!ng "#n !n"re#se oter turnout. o%ler expl#!ns6 7*nt5ony 0o4ler 8Dep#rtment o Goernment6

?#r#rd Un!ers!ty;. )le"tor#l #nd &ol!"y ConseBuen"es o Voter Turnout )!den"e rom Compulsory Vot!ng !n *ustr#l!#.

Pu#rterly Journ#l o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e6 2$1,6 E 1/91E2.>

In orderto test the effect of compulsory voting on election results, I have collecte# the results of every state

legislative assem"ly election from ?@?: to ?@5:! The si /ustralian states provi#e an ecellent

opportunity to test for the effects of near+universal turnout "ecause they a#opte# compulsory voting at

#ifferent times!Employing a #ifferences+in+#ifferences #esign, I estimate the effect of compulsory voting

on three #ifferent #epen#ent varia"les> voter turnout, 7a"or 0arty vote share, an# 7a"or 0arty seat

share!*s "ompulsory ot!ng !s !mplemented !n one st#te6 4e "#n "omp#re t5#t st#tes "5#nges !n ot!ng Ae5#!or 4!t5 t5e "5#nges o ot5er st#tes #t t5e s#me t!me. T5!s des!gn Q !n !tss!mplest orm Q reBu!res # HHp#r#llel trends #ssumpt!on t5#t ot!ng Ae5#!or 4ould6 on #er#ge6 5#e p#r#llel trends #"ross st#tes !n t5e #Asen"e o #ny "5#nges !n "ompulsory ot!ng l#4s.

L#ter !n t5e present p#per6 t5!s #ssumpt!on !s d!s"ussed !n det#!l6 ust!!ed 4!t5 st#t!st!"#l tests6 #nd rel#xed Ay #llo4!ng or st#tespe"!!" trends. Voter turnout #nd t5e ele"tor#l su""ess o t5e

L#Aor rty6 me#sured !n t4o d!erent 4#ys6 #re t5e pr!m#ry out"omes o !nterest.Dur!ng t5!s t!me per!od6 *ustr#l!# 5#d mult!ple p#rt!es "ompet!ng or o!"e. ?o4eer6 seer#l "onser#t!ep#rt!es 4ould typ!"#lly orm # "o#l!t!on #g#!nst t5e L#Aor rty6 so t5e en!ronment #pprox!m#tes # t4op#rty system. T5e "le#r d!eren"es Aet4een t5e L#Aor rty #nd t5e "o#l!t!on p#rt!es

l#rgely reoled #round e"onom!" !ssuesF L#Aor rty preerred goernment !nterent!on to prote"t 4or@ers6 #nd "o#l!t!on le#ders preerred ree m#r@ets. y #n#ly!ng t5e L#Aor rtys

su""ess6 4e "#pture t5e Aul@ o pol!t!"#l "ompet!t!on o""urr!ng dur!ng t5!s t!me per!od. *lso6 g!en t5e e"onom!" d!!de Aet4een t5e L#Aor #nd "o#l!t!on p#rt!es6 4e 5#e # "le#r pred!"t!on

#Aout t5e ee"t o !n"re#sed turnout on t5e L#Aor rtys su""ess. eore turn!ng to t5e expl!"!t e"onometr!" tests6 I present t5e r#4 d#t# or t5e #n#lys!s !n 0!gure 2. T5e top p#nel o t5e !gure

presents t5e leel o oter turnout !n eery ele"t!on #nd t5e Aottom p#nel presents t5e L#Aor rtys ote s5#re. ?ollo4 tr!#ngles represent ele"t!ons Aeore "ompulsory ot!ng6 #nd sol!d

tr!#ngles represent ele"t!ons #ter t5e #dopt!on o "ompulsory ot!ng !n t5#t p#rt!"ul#r st#te. T5e n#@ed eye "#n re#d!ly dete"t t5e s!gn!!"#nt ee"t o "ompulsory ot!ng on oter turnout.Ineach state, turnout 6umpe# #ramatically %hen compulsory voting la%s %ere implemente#! Co%ever, the

effect of compulsory voting on 7a"or 0arty vote share is less apparent, "ecause there is so much natural

variation in this varia"le from year to year!8T5!s #r!#t!on m#y expl#!n 45y "onser#t!e p#rt!es !n *ustr#l!# "ont!nued to support "ompulsory ot!ng l#4s

een t5oug5 t5e tests !n t5!s study ree#l t5#t t5ey suered rom t5e pol!"y.;

0o4ler presents t5e spe"!!" results o t5e st#testud!es. o%ler expl#!ns6 7*nt5ony 0o4ler 8Dep#rtment o Goernment6



*""ord!ng to t5ese results6average turnout in the a"sence of compulsory voting #uring this perio# %oul# have "een

1A percent6 #nd t5e L#Aor rty 4ould 5#e re"e!ed -- per"ent o t5e otes.Co%ever, average turnout %ith compulsory voting %oul#

have "een @? percent6 #nd L#Aor 4ould 5#e re"e!ed /, per"ent o t5e otes.T5!s suggests t5#t +E per"ent o t5e ne4 8m#rg!n#l; oters Aroug5t to t5e polls Ay "ompulsoryot!ng supported t5e L#Aor rty "omp#red to ust -- per"ent o older 8regul#r; oters. T5!s est!m#te !s suAst#nt!ely l#rge Aut Bu!te pl#us!Ale6 g!en 45#t 4e no4 @no4 #Aout turnout

!neBu#l!ty pr!or to "ompulsory ot!ng. *mong t5e 91 per"ent o oters 45o oted under "ompulsory ot!ng6 only 1 per"ent o L#Aor oters turned out to t5e polls under olunt#ry ot!ng 45!le


16/64

EE per"ent o nonL#Aor supporters turned out.These calculations in#epen#ently confirm the etent of turnout ine*uality in

/ustralia "efore compulsory voting! =efore compulsory voting, non+7a"or supporters %ere ?!4 times

more li&ely to vote compare# to 7a"or supporters! hen compulsory voting cause# an eogenous

increase in turnout, election results change# #ramatically!

Compulsory ot!ng 5#s Aeen proen to sole or lo4 #nd A!#sed turnout. o%lerexpl#!ns6 7*nt5ony 0o4ler 8Dep#rtment

o Goernment6 ?#r#rd Un!ers!ty;. )le"tor#l #nd &ol!"y ConseBuen"es o Voter Turnout )!den"e rom Compulsory Vot!ng !n

*ustr#l!#. Pu#rterly Journ#l o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e6 2$1,6 E 1/91E2.>

=efore the implementation of compulsory voting, /ustralia %as similar to many a#vance# #emocracies

to#ay! 7ess than A: percent of citi)ens vote# in fe#eral or state elections, an# %ealthy citi)ens %ere much

more li&ely to vote than %or&ing+class citi)ens!G!en t5ese p#tterns6 t5e lessons le#rned rom *ustr#l!# m#y Ae #ppl!"#Ale to m#ny demo"r#"!es tod#y.

ith the etent of turnout ine*uality in the Unite# .tates, .%it)erlan#, 0olan#, an# many other

countries, the effects of compulsory voting coul# "e 6ust as great in these contets! $$Democracy(s

unresolve# #ilemma(( is that elections #o not accurately reflect the preferences of the citi)enry 8L!p5#rt6 199+;.

.ystematic turnout ine*uality means that some citi)ens %ill "e "etter represente# than others!In t5!s study6 I

explo!t # r#re opportun!ty to test t5e extent o t5!s d!lemm#.=efore the intro#uction of compulsory voting in /ustralia, election

results an# pu"lic policy %ere #rastically #ifferent from the preferences of the citi)ens! hen near+

universal turnout %as achieve#, elections an# policy shifte# in favor of the %or&ing+class citi)ens %ho

ha# previously faile# to participate!W5!le/ustralia has largely resolve# the pro"lem6 !neBu#l!t!es !n oter turnout rem#!n !n

most #d#n"ed demo"r#"!es.Increase# turnout has tangi"le effects on partisan election results an# pu"lic policies,

an# those effects %ill "enefit the #isa#vantage# su"set of citi)ens %ho other%ise %oul# have a"staine#

from the political process!


17/64

O-0U7.ORL VOTING DOE. NOT INRE/.E TURNOUT

Lo4 turnout r#tes #re not enoug5 to ust!y "ompulsory ot!ng. /le6an#roexpl#!ns6 7?#nn# *le#ndro 8De#ns

0ello46 Georgeto4n Un!ers!ty L#4 Center;6 more voters in#icates a higher level of consent to

outcomes an# therefore increase# legitimacy for the system! =utpre"!sely"ecause our anemic turnout rates

either fail to "other or actively "enefit parts of the electorate, mere increases in turnout num"ers %ill

pro"a"ly never #rive a movement to%ar#s compulsory votingF those %ho value the vote sho% up for

elections an# those %ho #on(t stay home4!t5out #pp#rent "ompl#!nt 8!ner#Ale Ay t5e!r


18/64

Indeed6the evi#ence suggests that compulsory voting #oes nothing other than raise turnout B an# there are,

in fact, some *uestions a"out ho% far it is "etter than other means of #oing this 6 too 8%#rgetts 2$$6 ;.Re"ent 4or@ suggests

t5#tcompulsory voting has no noticea"le effect on political &no%le#ge or interest,8)ngelen #nd ?oog5e6 2$$+;nor6 more

surpr!s!ngly6any evi#ent effect on electoral outcomes8'elA #nd L#"5#t6 2$$+;. Unortun#tely6it also #oes not seem to force

parties to compete for the votes of the poor, the %ea& or the marginali)e#, as 7i6phart hope#, or even

re#uce the costs of electoral campaigns!?en"e6 #ll!nger "on"ludes6

The significant effects of compulsory voting on election results suggest that compulsory voting may have

influence# pu"lic policy as %ell! The 7a"or 0arty hel# systematically #ifferent positions than the other

parties over many issues inclu#ing unions, social spen#ing, immigration policies, an# the si)e of

government! Therefore, a greater presence of 7a"or mem"ers in state assem"lies an# the national

0arliament may have ha# significant effects on the lives of /ustralians at the time! %oreoer6 t5e ne4 4#e o 4or@!ng"l#ss oters m#y 5#e led #ll p#rt!es to s5!t !n # progress!e d!re"t!on. * 5!stor!"#l #""ount o *ustr#l!#s n#t!on#l pol!t!"s #round t5!s t!me per!od suggests seer#l potent!#l ee"ts o

"ompulsory ot!ng on puAl!" pol!"y.The ma6ority party(s platform change# #ramatically after the a#option of

compulsory voting for fe#eral elections in ?@94! In the ?@99 election the Nationalist 0arty maintaine#

po%er, announcing a conservative #omestic policy>HH0!rst #nd oremost6 4e #re #g#!nst "l#ss leg!sl#t!on #nd "l#ss goernment 8?ug5es6 1922;.In

?@95, the first election un#er compulsory voting, the Nationalist 0arty maintaine# po%er "ut shifte#

#ramatically on these issues>HHIt 5#s to Ae re"ogn!ed t5#t een under t5e "ond!t!ons ex!st!ng !n *ustr#l!#6 t5e 4#ges o our 4or@ers #re not su!"!ent to en#Ale t5em to

s#egu#rd #g#!nst t5ese e!ls 7s!"@ness6 unemployment6 #nd old#ge> 8ru"e6 192/;.In 6ust a three+year span, the ma6ority party ma#e a clear

turn to%ar# progressive #omestic policies, an# the intro#uction of more %or&ing+class voters into the

electorate an# increase# presence of the 7a"or 0arty may have provi#e# impetus for such a change!

't#t!st!"#l d#t# proes t5e !nluen"e o "ompulsory ot!ng on pol!t!"#l pol!"!es. o%lerexpl#!ns67*nt5ony 0o4ler

8Dep#rtment o Goernment6 ?#r#rd Un!ers!ty;. )le"tor#l #nd &ol!"y ConseBuen"es o Voter Turnout )!den"e rom Compulsory

Vot!ng !n *ustr#l!#. Pu#rterly Journ#l o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e6 2$1,6 E 1/91E2.>

.tatistical evi#ence of the effects of compulsory voting comes from #ata on social spen#ing across various

nations over time8L!ndert6 199-;.I focusspe"!!"#llyon pension spen#ing, "ecause this %as a &ey issue of

#isagreement "et%een the parties,ust #s t5ere 4#s tens!on Aet4een t5e let #nd r!g5t !n m#ny #d#n"ed demo"r#"!es oer pens!on pol!"!es 8#ld4!n6 199$;.In

/ustralia, the political parties #isagree# strongly regar#ing the si)e an# structure of the fe#eral pension

program, "ut for various reasons, they #i# not #iverge significantly on other social issues such as

e#ucation, health, %elfare, an# housing8?!rst6 2$$2;.e"#use t5e L#Aor rty #nd 4or@!ng "l#ss oters system#t!"#lly preerred # more progress!e pens!on


33/64

progr#m rel#t!e to t5e "o#l!t!on p#rt!es #nd upper"l#ss oters6 I 5ypot5es!e t5#t "ompulsory ot!ng !n"re#sed pens!on spend!ng !n *ustr#l!#. To test t5!s 5ypot5es!s6I estimate the

effect of compulsory voting at the national level on voter turnout an# pension spen#ing "y comparing

/ustralia %ith 9: other #evelope# nations across three #ifferent time points> ?@?:, ?@9:, an# ?@2:.*g#!n6 I relyon # d!eren"e!nd!eren"es des!gn. ?o4eer6 !n order to m#x!m!e t5e pl#us!A!l!ty o t5e p#r#llel trends #ssumpt!on6 I employ synt5et!" "ontrol met5ods 8*A#d!e et #l.6 2$1$; to "onstru"t

synt5et!" "ontrol un!ts t5#t #re "omp#r#Ale 4!t5 *ustr#l!# Aeore t5e #dopt!on o "ompulsory ot!ng.or each test, the synthetic control unit is the

%eighte# average of other nations that "est mirrors /ustralia in terms of voter turnout or pension

spen#ing in ?@?: an# ?@9:!Ne4 e#l#nd6 0r#n"e6 C#n#d#6 #nd t5e Un!ted 3!ngdom re"e!e t5e gre#test 4e!g5ts !n t5e turnout #n#lys!s6 Ae"#use t5ey "losely m!rror*ustr#l!#s leel #nd trend !n turnout Aeore "ompulsory ot!ng6 45!le Denm#r@ #nd Ne4 e#l#nd re"e!e t5e gre#test 4e!g5ts !n t5e pens!on #n#lys!s. T5e !n"orpor#t!on o ot5er e"onom!"6

demogr#p5!"6 #nd pol!t!"#l #r!#Ales !nto t5e 4e!g5t!ng #lgor!t5m does not "5#nge t5e suAseBuent results. %oreoer6 s!mpler d!eren"e!nd!eren"es des!gns 45!"5 4e!g5 #ll "omp#r!son un!t

eBu#lly y!eld s!m!l#r results. %ore det#!ls on t5ese #n#lyses #re ##!l#Ale !n t5e Onl!ne *ppend!x. 0!gure , presents t5e trends !n oter turnout 8top p#nel; #nd pens!on spend!ng 8Aottom p#nel;

or *ustr#l!# #nd t5e synt5et!" "ontrol un!ts.J/ustralia(sKT5e!rlevels of turnout an# pension spen#ing are nearly i#entical in

?@:: an# ?@?:! Co%ever, after the a#option of compulsory voting in ?@94, voter turnout an# pension

spen#ing increase# #ramatically relative to the synthetic control units! Difference+in+#ifferences

calculations in#icate that compulsory voting increase# voter turnout "y ?H!1 percentage points an#

pension spen#ing "y :!4? percentage points of gross #omestic pro#uct GD0F! In ?@2:, the pension

spen#ing of the control group %as 6ust un#er ? percent of GD0, so this effect represents a more than 4:

percent increase in the num"er of fe#eral #ollars going to%ar# ol# age pensions a su"stantively

significant effect!

0o4ler expl#!ns 45y to preer t5e results o t5ese stud!es. o%ler expl#!ns6 7*nt5ony 0o4ler 8Dep#rtment o Goernment6



The analysis presente# here largely overcomes the pro"lems of previous stu#ies! The timing of the

intro#uction of compulsory voting in #ifferent /ustralian states appears to "e eogenous to partisan

attitu#es an# other political events, so #ifference+in+#ifferences metho#s can estimate the causal effects of

compulsory voting la%s!-oreover, "ecause compulsory voting cause# a su"stantial increase in voter

turnout, the su"set of citi)ens influence# "y the policy is nearly the entire population of nonvoters! T5!s

#n#lys!s Ar!ngs us "loser t5#n eer Aeore to #ns4er!ng t5e extreme "ounter#"tu#l Buest!on HH45#t ! eeryone otedK


34/64

O-0U7.ORL VOTING I. NOT DE-OR/TI

*T Compulsory ot!ng s#egu#rds demo"r#t!" #lues. Engelen summ#r!es t5e #rgument6 7#rt )ngelen 8Rese#r"5

*ss!st#nt o t5e 0und or '"!ent!!" Rese#r"5 : 0l#nders;6


35/64

transformation from politically ignorant an# #isintereste# to politically savvy, simply "y "eing force# to

cast a "allot!In some "#ses6 !nd!!du#ls 4!ll undouAtedly Ae"ome more #""l!m#ted to t5e pol!t!"#l pro"ess #nd deelop # t#ste or !t !n t5e 4#y t5#t6 s#y6 "ompell!ng "5!ldren to dom#t5em#t!"s m!g5t !nst!ll # loe or !t. ut or eery student 45o 5#s deeloped # #epen#s on state+fun#e# chil#care of various sorts, the mere threat of losing a place %oul# "e far more

alarming than the prospect of even a hefty fine!W5#t seems l!@e # tr!!#l pen#lty to some people6 t5en6 !s # ery gr#e t5re#t to ot5ersF #ndthere is

nothing a"out compulsory voting that means the penalties for non+voting must "e trivial!

T5e r!g5t to not ote !s #n !mport#nt leg#l r!g5t. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o )"onom!"s

#nd &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e;.

Desp!te t5e "l#!ms o proponents o "ompulsory ot!ng6 I #m not persu#ded t5#t t5e r!g5t not to ote !s # tr!!#l one6 45et5er 4e "ons!der


36/64

t5oug56 #sRa%ls claims, people have a natural #uty to support 6ust, or nearly 6ust, institutions819+1;. In some"!r"umst#n"es t5!s n#tur#l duty m!g5t pl#"e "!t!ens under # mor#l oAl!g#t!on to ote #nd6 een6 to ote one 4#y r#t5er t5#n #not5er. 0or ex#mple6 ! t5ere 4#s # re#l d#nger t5#t # r#"!st

"#nd!d#te 4ould Ae ele"ted !n # "onst!tuen"y 45ere one 5#s t5e ote6 one m!g5t 5#e # n#tur#l duty to ote !n #our o t5e Aest o t5e #ltern#t!es6 5o4eer un#ppe#l!ng. 'u"5 # n#tur#l duty

4ould6 I !m#g!ne6 ex!st !n #dd!t!on to 45#teer dut!es o sol!d#r!ty #nd support one 5#s #s # "!t!en6 or #s # memAer o # so"!#lly #d#nt#ged group to t5ose 45o #re t5re#tened Ay su"5 #n

ele"tor#l prospe"t. 't!ll6it %ill not "e easy to groun# a general #uty to vote on this natural #uty, "ecause in general

it is unclear %hy support for 6ust institutions shoul# ta&e the form of 8electoral participation


37/64

Compulsory ot!ng !s not ust!!ed #s # leg#l or mor#l duty. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o

)"onom!"s #nd &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e;.

%oreoer6the case for forcing turnout, "ut not voting, is o"scure! /fter all, it is lo% an# une*ual voting, not

turnout, that is the cause of moral an# political concern! W5!le !t !s l!@ely t5#tmany people %ho have "een force#

to turn out %ill then go on to cast legally vali# votes 6 4e #re 5ere t#l@!ng psy"5olog!"#l proA#A!l!t!es6 r#t5er t5#n #ny "on"eptu#l or norm#t!e

"onne"t!on Aet4een enor"ed turnout #nd demo"r#t!" ot!ng. T5#t !s6 t5e re#son 45y people #re l!@ely to ote6 ! t5ey #re or"ed to turn out6 !s t5#t mostpeople #o not li&e to

%aste their time! .o, if they are force# to *ueue at polling stations, in or#er to tic& their name off a list,

they may %ell go on to vote, although other%ise they %oul# not have "othere#! =ut from the fact that

people #o not li&e to %aste their time, an# therefore ten# to vote, it #oes not follo% that %e are 6ustifie# in

forcing them to *ueue in or#er to tic& their names off an electoral register! Pueu!ng s!mply to t!"@ your n#me o #n ele"tor#l

reg!ster seems pretty po!ntless #nd #nnoy!ng. Nor #re !ts po!ntless #nd #nnoy!ng e#tures !n #ny 4#y #lle!#ted Ae"#use t5ey 5#e Aeen turned !nto # leg#l duty..uch a #uty,

in#ee#, seems pretty insulting an# #emeaning, an# ill suite# to promoting the i#ea that voting is an

important civic #uty!'5#rply d!st!ngu!s5!ng t5e duty to turnout rom t5e duty to ote m!g5t meet some mor#l oAe"t!ons to "ompulsory ot!ng t5e duty to ote.?o4eer6

the #uty to vote, so un#erstoo#, is no moral #uty at all!

Compulsory ot!ng !ol#tes !nd!!du#l l!Aerty. 7acroiexpl#!ns6 7Just!ne L#"ro!x 8&roessor o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t t5e

0ree Un!ers!ty o russels;6


38/64

#l4#ys good udges o t5e!r o4n !nterests6respect for people(s free#om an# e*uality an# capacities for reasone# 6u#gment

generally tells against forcing them to eercise their rights6 or to m#@e t5e most o t5e!r l!Aert!es #nd opportun!t!es 8Leer6 2$1$6 p. 9$;.

*T Del!Aer#t!e demo"r#"y. Vot!ng !s # A#d me#ns or del!Aer#t!e demo"r#"y. T%omeyexpl#!ns6 7*nne

T4omey 8&roessor o Const!tut!on#l L#46 Un!ers!ty o 'ydney L#4 '"5ool;6


39/64

*lt5oug5 m#ny m#y d!sp#r#ge t5e *mer!"#n ele"tor#te or Ae!ng orgetul or l#y6 lo% voter turnout #oes not necessarily mean that something

is #rastically %rong %ith /merican voters! The #ecision not to vote can "e a rational one! Demo"r#t!" goernment !s #

"l#ss!" puAl!" good6 #ndl!@e #ny puAl!" good !t !s suAe"t to # reer!der proAlem! One can en6oy the "enefits of living in a free, #emocratic

society %hether one incurs the costs of voting time spent traveling to polls an# %aiting in line,

information costs of choosing %hom to vote for or not! Even potential voters %ho have a strong

preference for one can#i#ate over another are li&ely to have a rational "asis for not voting since theli&elihoo# of any single vote influencing the outcome of an election is negligi"le! This gives rise to %hat

scholars call the 8para#o of voting the fact that some people #o vote even though a simple rational

choice mo#el of human "ehavior suggests they ought not to!

Vot!ng !s # r!g5t6 not # duty6 #nd t5ere !s # r!g5t not to ote. =roo&ieexpl#!ns6 7J#mes ?#rr!son roo@!e 8Gr#du#te

'"5ool o Clemson Un!ers!ty;.

T5ere #re m#ny Aene!ts "!ted !n support o "ompulsory ot!ng l#4s6 Aut t5ere !s #lso # lot oppos!t!on. T5ose t5#t oppose t5e l#4s put or4#rd m#ny proAlems 4!t5 t5e "ompulsory ot!ng

system. T5e most A#s!" o t5ese "ontent!ons !s t5e Ael!e t5#tvoting is a right, not a #uty! It %as create# to "e a means through %hich

or#inary citi)ens to ma&e their preferences hear#! In a nation %ith compulsory la%s, for many the civil

right "ecomes a re*uirement! Instea# of a #efense of #emocracy, it may "e seen as an infringement on

in#ivi#ual(s li"erties! The right to not vote coul# "e as important as the right to vote! =y forcing citi)ens,

you ta&e a%ay their free#om of epression in the form of non+participation!

Compulsory ot!ng l#4s #re A!#sed to4#rds m#or p#rt!es. =roo&ieexpl#!ns6 7J#mes ?#rr!son roo@!e 8Gr#du#te

'"5ool o Clemson Un!ers!ty;.

*not5er m#or "ompl#!nt ocompulsory voting la%s!s t5#t t5eyonly "enefit ma6or political parties! The la% frees parties

from the #ifficulty of campaigning to energi)e passive voters an# these ne%ly voting, "ut still uninforme#

voters ten# to%ar#s mainstream political parties8*C)6 199+;.Those %ho %oul# not vote un#er a voluntary

system are less li&ely to "e informe# enough to un#erstan# the platforms of minor parties! *ustr#l!#n "olumn!st

0a#raic-cGuinnessclaims that "oth of the ma6or parties in his country support the current compulsory

voting system "ecause it 8o"liges their loyal voters, ho%ever apathetic, to turn up to vote the party tic&et?F #oes not increase uninforme#


48/64

voting' 9F #oes not #ecrease informe# voting' an# 2F increases informe# voting in some cases . T5e model pred!"ts"5#nges !n Ae5#!or !n some reg!ons o t5e p#r#meter sp#"e. W5et5er t5!s y!elds pred!"t!ons or Ae5#!or#l s5!ts !n oAser#t!on#l ele"t!ons depends on 45et5er oAser#t!on#l p#r#meters #ll

4!t5!n t5ese reg!ons6 #nd on 45et5er #"tors #"t !nstrument#lly #s pred!"ted.

'5!nem#n #lso "ondu"ted # l#Aor#tory exper!ment A#sed on t5e C model. ?ere !s t5e exper!ment#l des!gn.

.hineman expl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e Center or t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"etonUn!ers!ty;.

T5e exper!ment 4#s progr#mmed !n Tree 80!s"5A#"5er 2$$+; #nd 4#s"ondu"ted !n # s!ngle sess!on #t t5e Center or )xper!ment#l 'o"!#l '"!en"e #t Ne4 (or@ Un!ers!ty !n J#nu#ry 2$1$.

Eighteen university stu#ents4ere re"ru!ted #s suAe"ts !# #n em#!l !n!t#t!on sent t5roug5 t5e "omputer l#As m#!l!ng l!st. 'uAe"tsplaye# ??? perio#s

of an in#ivi#ual+level voting game #t sep#r#te "omputer st#t!ons. *ll de"!s!ons #nd results 4ere pr!#te #nd #nonymous6yiel#ing a total of ?@@H

o"servations!Each su"6ect %as epose# to all treatments, ma&ing #ecisions in multiple states of the

%orl#!R#t5er t5#n rely!ng on r#ndom!ed #ss!gnment to !ner "ounter#"tu#ls rom ot5er suAe"ts Ae5#!ors6

the %ithin+su"6ect #esign ena"les #irectcomparisons "y allo%ing each su"6ect to serve as his or her o%n "aseline! This approach also controls for

uno"serva"le #ifferences across su"6ects, such as variations in interest, &no%le#ge, a"ility, effort, an#

moo#!T5e seBuen"e o tre#tment m#n!pul#t!ons 4#s m#nu#lly r#ndom!ed. To mot!#te suAe"ts to 5#e t5e s#me preeren"es #s #ssumed !n t5e t5eory6 suAe"ts pl#yed or exper!ment#l

po!nts !n e#"5 round6 45!"5 4ere "onerted to doll#rs #t # r#te o \-./$ per 1$$ po!nts.To control for accumulate# %ealth effects, su"6ects %ere

pai# "ase# on their earnings in three roun#s, %hich %ere ran#omly selecte# at the en# of the eperiment!On #er#ge6 suAe"ts e#rned \2.1/ or t4o #nd # 5#l 5ours6 !n"lud!ng #n \E s5o4up ee.)#"5 suAe"t 4#s pro!ded 4!t5 s"r#p p#per #nd # 4r!tten "opy o t5e !nstru"t!ons6 45!"5 expl#!nedt5e ot!ng g#me !n det#!l6 #nd do"umented 5o4 e#"5 de"!s!on 4ould #e"t expe"ted p#yos. T5e !nstru"t!ons 4ere #lso re#d out loud6 #nd #ll suAe"ts 4ere reBu!red to p#ss # Bu! #Aout t5e

!nstru"t!ons Aeore Ae!ng #llo4ed to p#rt!"!p#te.

?ere 4ere t5e !nstru"t!ons o t5e exper!ment. .hinemanexpl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e

Center or t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.

Each su"6ect playe# her o%n separate game against the computer, an# each roun# %as a separate game!

/ 8team color< %as ran#omly chosen "lue or yello%F in each roun#, "ut %as not reveale#! In .tage ?,

su"6ects chose %hether or not to invest a 8cost of information< 8C!;to learn %hich color %as chosen!

.u"6ects then chose %hether or not to enter stage 9, an# if they entere# stage 9, #eci#e# %hether to vote

for "lue, vote for yello%, or a"stain! If the su"6ect entere# stage 9 an# vote# for her 8team color,< she

%on a re%ar#!I s5e oted ot5er4!se6 s5e 4on not5!ng.If she #i# not vote, a %inner %as chosen at ran#om, an# she %on

the re%ar# if the ran#om %inner %as the 8team color!< Entering stage 9 incurre# a 8cost to enter stage

9


49/64

vF in or#er to cast a vote for either color,"ut a"staining ha# no cost an# incurre# no fine!To ensure t5#t #llde"!s!ons 4ere endogenous to t5e ull p#r#meter set6 #ll "osts 8C!6 CA6 CnA6 C; 4ere #nnoun"ed #t t5e Aeg!nn!ng o e#"5 per!od6 Aeore #ny de"!s!ons 4ere m#de6 #nd rem#!n l!sted #t t5e top o

t5e s"reen !n e#"5 st#ge. )#"5 tre#tment "ons!sted o # set o p#r#meters 8C!6 CA6 C;6 4!t5 #r!ed #lues o CnA.T5e exper!ment spe"!!ed p#r#meters !n e#"5 round del!Aer#tely des!gned totest t5e pred!"t!ons o t5e C %odel. et4eenreg!on "omp#r!sons test 45et5er str#teg!es "5#nged #s expe"ted 45en t5e p#r#meters moed Aet4een t5e reg!ons !n Gr#p5 1. W!t5!n e#"5 reg!on

expe"ted responses #re !dent!"#l6 #nd 4!t5!nreg!on "omp#r!sons test 5o4 sens!t!e Ae5#!or#l responses #re to t5e "ut po!nt pred!"t!ons o t5e model. W!t5!nreg!on "omp#r!sons #lso en#Ale #

test o 45et5er Ae5#!or de!#ted rom pred!"t!ons !n system#t!" 4#ys6 su"5 #s !n response to expe"ted 4!nn!ngs6 r!s@ e#lu#t!ons6 or sun@ "osts.

*""ord!ng to t5e l#Aor#tory exper!ment6 "ompulsory ot!ng 4!ll not !n"re#se un!normed ot!ng. .hineman

expl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e Center or t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.

Results : ?ypot5es!s 1-oving from voluntary "alloting to compulsory "alloting #oes not increase uninforme#

voting! T5e !rst 5ypot5es!s #rgues t5#t "ompulsory A#llot!ng 4!ll not !n"re#se un!normed ot!ng. 'pe"!!"#lly6t5e C %odel pred!"ts t5#t un!normed ot!ng 4!ll neer 5#ppen undere!t5er system. To test t5!s pred!"t!on6 I "omp#re un!normed ot!ng #"ross t5e V #nd C tre#tments. T#Ale 2 presents t5e reBuen"y o un!normed ot!ng6 sorted Ay tre#tment type. T5e ex#"t

po!nt pred!"t!ons o t5e model #re not re#l!ed./cross all treatments, su"6ects cast uninforme# votes ?!553 of the time! This

occurre# 9!5:3 of the time in V= treatments an# ?!243 of the time in = treatments! T5e reBuen"y o un!normed

ot!ng 4#s s!gn!!"#ntly l#rger t5#n ero !n #ll t5ree tre#tment "#tegor!es 8p X $.$$1-;.Co%ever, in response to concerns that = penalties might

increase uninforme# voting, the #ata in#icates this is not the case! Uninforme# voting actually occurre#

?!?13 more often un#er V= than it #i# un#er =6 #nd t5e d!eren"e !s m#rg!n#lly s!gn!!"#nt 8p $.$/-;.

*""ord!ng to t5e l#Aor#tory exper!ment6 "ompulsory ot!ng !n"re#sed !normed turnout 4!t5out !n"re#s!ng

un!normed turnout. .hineman expl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e Center or t5e 'tudy o

Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.

T5e pred!"t!ons o t5e C %odel 4ere tested t5roug5 # "omputer!ed l#Aor#tory exper!ment. T5e exper!ment en#Aled ull "ontrol o extern#l #r!#Ales6 #nd pro!ded # d!re"t test o t5e models

pred!"t!ons.The eperimental results foun# strong support for the su"stantive pre#ictions of the mo#el> =

#i# increase informe# turnout in some cases, "ut #i# not increase uninforme# turnout! *lt5oug5 t5e "ut po!nt

pred!"t!ons o t5e model 4ere not #l4#ys re#l!ed6 t5e "omp#r#t!e st#t!" pred!"t!ons 4ere supported6 # result "ommonly ound !n ot!ng stud!es 8see %orton #nd W!ll!#ms 2$1$;.Theeperimental results also foun# that = further increase# informe# turnout in cases %here "ehavioral

changes %ere not pre#icte# !n reg!ons 45ere !normed turnout 4#s neer pred!"ted6 #nd 45ere !t 4#s #l4#ys pred!"ted.

Compulsory ot!ng #dds #n !n"ent!e to Ae"ome !normed. .hineman expl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng

'"5ol#r #t t5e Center or t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.


50/64

It !s #lso 4ort5 not!ng t5#t#dd!ng # s#n"t!on or not "#st!ng # A#llot s5ould 5#e #n !dent!"#l ee"t on !normed ot!ng #s redu"!ng t5e "ost o "#st!ng # A#llot Ay t5e s#me #mount. On #

Aro#der s"#le6"y com"ining an# en#ogeni)ingF costly information an# costly participation, the = -o#el

#emonstrates that a re#uction in participation costs %ill similarly lea# to an increase in incentives to

invest in information an# informe# voting!0rom # "omp#r#t!e perspe"t!e6a##ing = la%s is effectively i#entical to

re#ucing the cost of "alloting, ecept for the #isutility it forces on actors %ho #o not fill out vali# "allots!

T5ere #re t5ree #dd!t!on#l ee"ts o "ompulsory ot!ng. 7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l



51/64

*T Compulsory ot!ng !ol#tes !nd!!du#l reedom.7i6phartexpl#!ns6 7*rend L!p5#rt 8Dep#rtment o &ol!t!"#l



52/64

%hich eligi"le voters fail to vote in any election! These nonvoters %oul# "e notifie# "y mail of their failure

to vote an# assesse# a small fine!The agency %oul# also offer them a chance to provi#e a legitimate

reason for their nonvote, such as illness, emergency, or conscientious o"6ector status! If the agency

accepts the ecuse, then the fine %oul# "e %aive#!Ot5er4!se6 #!lure to p#y t5e !ne 4ould potent!#lly le#d to # ud!"!#l #"t!on #nd6 ult!m#tely6 # pr!son

senten"e. *ustr#l!# 5#s #"5!eed ery 5!g5 oter turnout us!ng su"5 # system..ince the /ustralian Electoral ommission ta&es less than 93

of nonvoters to court, the costs of enforcement are relatively lo%! inally, there is the possi"ility of usingre%ar#s instea# of punishments! There coul# "e a ta "rea& or a cash payout given to any eligi"le voter

%ho votes8or Bu#l!!es #s # "ons"!ent!ous oAe"tor;.Using re%ar#s is li&ely to "e more costly than punishments, ho%ever,

"ecause it %oul# "e #ifficult to i#entify those people %ho %oul# not vote in the a"sence of payment,

re*uiring the government to pay all voters!


53/64

O-0U7.ORL VOTING I. UTI7 =/D

Compulsory ot!ng !s # ruse o solen"y. Engelen summ#r!es t5e #rgument. 7#rt )ngelen 8Rese#r"5 *ss!st#nt o t5e

0und or '"!ent!!" Rese#r"5 : 0l#nders;6 to Ae"ome Aetter!normed.* "ross n#t!on#l study Ay Gordon #nd 'egur# 8199+; !nds # sm#ll t5oug5 st#t!st!"#lly s!gn!!"#nt !n"re#se !n pol!t!"#l sop5!st!"#t!on !n "ountr!es 4!t5 "ompulsory ot!ng6 Autot5er4!se6 t5e e!den"e or "ompulsory ot!ng promot!ng gre#ter "!!" #4#reness !s s"#nt.

'tud!es s5o4 t5#t "ompulsory ot!ng !n"re#ses un!normed ot!ng. .hinemanexpl#!ns6 7V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n

8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e Center or t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.

/nother series of stu#ies uses survey #ata a##ressing hypothetical "ehavior to estimate ho% V affects

the political sophistication of the electorate8%#r!en 2$$+F )ngelen #nd ?oog5e 2$$+F 'elA #nd L#"5#t 2$$9F Cesn!@ 2$$+;.These results

generally agree that voluntary non+voters %ho %oul# "e compelle# to vote "y V la%s ten# to "e less

informe#, less e#ucate#, an# less politically intereste# than those %ho report they %oul# vote un#er

either system!


54/64

.hinemanexpl#!ns proAlems 4!t5 t5e C model. '5e 4r!tes67V!"tor!# *nne '5!nem#n 8V!s!t!ng '"5ol#r #t t5e Center or

t5e 'tudy o Demo"r#t!" &ol!t!"s #t &r!n"eton Un!ers!ty;.

The = -o#el is inten#e# as a "aseline #esign! It only consi#ers a single actor, an# #oes not account for

the possi"ility of #iverse preferences, group "ehavior, interactive strategies, or any other game theoretic

components!*lt5oug5 t5e de"!s!ont5eoret!" r#me4or@ !s # s!mpl!!ed model o pol!t!"#l de"!s!onm#@!ng6 !t !s useul or extr#"t!ng Aro#d !neren"es #Aout pol!t!"#l Ae5#!or 8seeTom #nd V#n ?ou4el!ng 2$$E;.T5e C %odel !s !ntended to !ntrodu"e t5e #d#nt#ges o model!ng ot!ng #s # 2st#ge pro"ess6 #nd to demonstr#te 5o4 C l#4s : #s pr#"t!"ed : ee"t!elyde"re#se t5e "ost o ot!ng 4!t5out "ompell!ng un!normed turnout. )xtens!ons o t5e A#sel!ne model #re d!s"ussed !n t5e "on"lus!on.

Turn Compulsory ot!ng !s # ruse o solen"y. /le6an#roexpl#!ns6 7?#nn# *le#ndro 8De#ns 0ello46 Georgeto4n Un!ers!ty

L#4 Center;6


55/64

sanctions %oul# therefore function as a ta on people %ho are least a"le to pay an# most 6ustifie# in their

a"stention from politics!T5e tot#l ee"t ocompulsory votingt5en6 t5e "r!t!Bue goes6 !s t5#t !tconfers moral high groun# to

political lea#ers %ho are completely un#eserving6 t5#tthis moral high groun# suffocates the potential for

meaningful progress to%ar#s 6ustice, an#t5#tthe people %ho suffer most from the policy are the same

people %ho al%ays suffer in the /merican game of life B those alrea#y at the "ottom!


56/64

O-0U7.ORL VOTING I. GOOD OR 7I=ER/7.

Compulsory ot!ng 4ould s5!t oters preeren"es to t5e let. ac&man expl#!ns6 7'!mon J#"@m#n 8&roessor o

pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

It #lso ollo4s t5#tthe high turnout rates engen#ere# "y V also have partisan an# i#eological implications!

.ince support for parties of the left is correlate# %ith socioeconomic status 8not4!t5st#nd!ng # de"l!ne !n HH"l#ss ot!ng;6as

socioeconomic "ase# #ifferentials in turnout #iminish, support for parties of the left increases8"e@ #nd R#d"l!

199/F N#gel 19EEF %"*ll!ster #nd %ug5#n 19E;. In turn6increase# support for parties of the left results in higher %elfare

spen#ing an# more state interventions in the macro+economy an# la"or mar&ets 8?!"@s #nd '4#n@ 1992F C#stles #nd

%"3!nl#y 19+9;.'o #g#!n6to the etent that V increases turnout, an# turnout increases support for left parties an#

their policy agen#as, then V can "e sho%n to have policy implications! &ut d!erently6 CV 5elps moA!l!e oters 45o 4ouldot5er4!se #Ast#!n6 #nd 45ose preeren"es #re 8on #er#ge; to t5e let o "enter. CV t5us s5!ts t5e d!str!Aut!on o oters pol!"y preeren"es urt5er to t5e let t5#n 4ould ot5er4!se result6

pull!ng p#rty "ompet!t!on #nd pol!"y !n t5#t d!re"t!on #lso.


57/64

REE+RIDER 0RO=7E-

Compulsory ot!ng soles or t5e reer!der. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London '"5ool o )"onom!"s #nd

&ol!t!"#l '"!en"e;.

T5e !n#l6 #nd "ru"!#l6 step !n t5e "#se or "ompuls!on !s t5e "l#!m t5#tnon+voters are free+ri#ing on voters!They are, it is claime#,

selfishly "enefiting from the pu"lic goo# of a #emocratic electoral system %ithout #oing their part to

maintain it!T5!s "l#!m "#n Ae ound !n eery #rgument or "ompulsory ot!ng6 #lt5oug5 !t !s r#rely spelled out !n #ny det#!l.T5e @ey !de# 5ere !s t5#ta #emocratic

electoral system is a pu"lic goo#, in that all citi)ens get to "enefit from it, even if they #o nothing to

contri"ute to it! =ecause it is a pu"lic goo#, it is possi"le to free+ri#e, or to en6oy the "enefits of that goo#,

%ithout contri"uting oneself#nd6 !ndeed6 most people 4!ll 5#e #n !nterest !n do!ng pre"!sely t5#t.Non+voters, therefore, can "e seen as

free+ri#ers, selfishly an# immorally eploiting voters!The moral force of this point is t%o+fol#! irst, it

reinforces the i#ea that no morally significant li"erties are threatene# "y compulsory turnout an#,

secon#ly, it carries the "attle into the enemy camp! It is sel!s5 #ndeploitative to "enefit from the efforts of

other people %ithout ma&ing any effort to contri"ute!'o6 #r rom "ompuls!on Ae!ng unust!!ed6 or een mor#lly neutr#l6 !t seems pos!t!elydes!r#Ale6 #s # "urA on sel!s5 #nd explo!t#t!e Ae5#!our. *s L!p5#rt puts !t6 ree+Ri#er0ro"lem. Nonoters #rent sel!s5 reer!ders.7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London


The i#ea that non+voters are selfish eploiters of voters is har# to s*uare %ith the picture of political

ine*uality that un#erpins other aspects of the case for compulsory voting! *t t5e st#rt o t5e "#se6 #s 4e 5#e seen6non+

voters are"on"eptu#l!ed #ssocially #eprive# in various %ays6 #nd #s #ppropr!#te oAe"ts o so"!#l demo"r#t!" "on"ern.Nonvoters6 on t5!s p!"ture6

fin# it #ifficult to protect their o%n interests+ they are, after all, less e#ucate#, less eperience# an# less

%ell+organise# than other people + an# so are lia"le to eploitation "y the more po%erful, &no%le#gea"le

an# politically astute!T5e "#se or "ompuls!on6 !ndeed6 erges on t5e p#tern#l!st6 #t le#st #s reg#rds t5!s so"!#l group6 Ae"#use nonot!ng !s 5ere presented #s # t5re#t to t5e!r

!nterests6 #lAe!t # p#rt!#lly sel!ndu"ed t5re#t.=y contrast, the free+ri#ing 6ustification of compulsion assumes that non+voters

are "ehaving in a self+intereste# fashion, an# see&ing to en6oy the "enefits of a #emocratic electoral

system %ithout #oing their fair share to maintain it! T5ey seem6 t5ereore6 to Ae explo!t!ng t5e good 4!ll6 puAl!" sp!r!t #nd sense o duty o oters6#nd to Ae Ae5#!ng !n 4#ys t5#t #re sel!s5 #nd !mmor#l. T5ese t4o p!"tures o nonoters seem to Ae !n"ons!stent #lt5oug5 proponents o "ompuls!on6 su"5 #s L!p5#rt6 seem not to 5#e

not!"ed t5e tens!on Aet4een t5em. Conersely6 45!le 4e m!g5t 4#nt to des"r!Ae t5ose 45o oted or Le &en !n 0r#n"e6 or t5e r!t!s5 N#t!on#l rty !n t5e U.3.6 #s selless "ontr!Autors to #

demo"r#t!" puAl!" good6 t5!s 4!ll reBu!re "ons!der#Ale #rgument #nd "#nnot Ae tre#ted #s #n # pr!or! trut5. Nor s5ould 4e orget t5#t !nd!!du#ls 45o ote


58/64

/T> ree+Ri#er 0ro"lem. 0ree r!ders #rent destroy!ng demo"r#"y. 7everexpl#!ns6 7*nn#Aelle Leer 8T5e London


T5e se"ond d!!"ulty 4!t5 t5e reer!d!ng #rgument turns on t5e d!!"ulty o de s"r!A!ng t5e puAl!" good 45!"5 "ompuls!on !s supposed to prote"t. The case for compulsory

voting is fre*uently characteri)e# "y analogies "et%een compulsion in the case of voting an# compulsion

in t5e "#se om!l!t#ry ser!"e6 t5e edu"#t!on o "5!ldren6 or !nthe cases of taation an# 6ury #uty!Democratic societies often re*uire

people to contri"ute to some pu"lic goo# an#, in the case of compulsory voting, the level of sacrifice or

effort re*uire# is comparatively small!The argument turns on the assumption that compulsory voting is

necessary to protect a pu"lic goo#! =ut ho% that goo# shoul# "e characteri)e# is uncertain, given that the

etent of turnout one #eci#es upon may have pre#icta"le implications for %ho %ins or loses an election 6 #s

L!p5#rt #ssumes.It might "e sai# that the pu"lic goo# in *uestion is 8legitimacy< or a 8#emocratic electoral

system< or 8a representative political system

inconsistent %ith the i#ea that there are #emocratic an# legitimate political systems %hich lac&

compulsory voting!*s t5ese6 !ndeed6 seem to Ae t5e m#or!ty o


59/64

le#d to # sm#ll m!nor!ty "ontroll!ng t5e goernment result!ng !n unpopul#r rul!ng. Neert5eless one s!ngle oter "#nnot "5#nge t5!s s!tu#t!on.This can lea# to a free ri#er

pro"lem! .ince there are pu"lic "enefits to have a minimal amount of turnout, some may not vote in

hopes that their fello% citi)ens %ill #o it for them! They plan to "enefit from others voting %ithout having

to #o it themselves!Then again this may not "e such a pro"lem!/s the num"er of people %ho vote

#ecreases, the value of a single vote increases! /s the value of the vote increases, turnout increases! This

may &eep turnout from "ecoming %hat some %oul# #eem ina#e*uately lo%! *s un"omort#Ale #s goernment enor"ed ot!ng

m#@es m#ny people6 !t !s !mport#nt to note t5#t goernments regul#rly #s@s "!t!ens to do t5!ngs #g#!nst t5e!r 4!ll or t5e gre#ter good. y!ng t#xes6 ser!ng on ur!es6 #ttend s"5ools #nd

"ons"r!pt!on to !g5t !n t5e deense o your "ountry #re #ll ex#mples o goernment "oer"ed pol!t!"#l #"t!!t!es.


60/64

/TT/; /D. I-0/T.

&ol!t!"#l #dert!sements #re 4!despre#d. /nsola"ehere#nd Iyengarexpl#!n6 7'tep5en *nsol#Ae5ere 8&roessor o Goernment #t

?#r#rd Un!ers!ty; #nd '5#nto Iyeng#r 8&roessor o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;. hun#re#s of millions of #ollars are poure# into %hat has "ecome the main means of political

communication in the Unite# .tates!

Voters 5#e ery lo4 "on!den"e !n t5ese pol!t!"!#ns. /nsola"ehere#nd Iyengarexpl#!n6 7'tep5en *nsol#Ae5ere

8&roessor o Goernment #t ?#r#rd Un!ers!ty; #nd '5#nto Iyeng#r 8&roessor o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;.


61/64

*l#A#m# to Wyom!ng6 Ne4 (or@ to C#l!orn!#:can#i#ates have ta&en the attac& #og tenor, an# their "ar& has &ept many

voters a%ay from the polls!Oureperiments, an#"orroAor#t!ngevi#encefrom actual .enate election results,

reveal that high+tech a#vertising campaigns can stimulate people to vote an# instill a sense of confi#ence

in government, "ut only through positive campaign messages! e monitore# each of the 24 U!.! .enate

campaigns in ?@@9!'en#te ele"t!ons pro!de #n espe"!#lly good test o our "l#!ms6 s!n"e 'en#te "#nd!d#tes rely 5e#!ly on #dert!s!ng #nd s!n"e m#ny o our exper!ments de#lt

4!t5 t5e t4o C#l!orn!# 'en#te "#mp#!gns dur!ng t5e 1992 ele"t!ons.

e recor#e# %hether the tone of the overall campaign in the state%as negative, mie#, or positive!* r#"e 4#s neg#t!e ! Aot5 "#nd!d#tes !n t5e gener#l ele"t!on rel!ed 5e#!ly on #tt#"@ #dert!sements. * r#"e 4#s pos!t!e ! Aot5"#nd!d#tes l#rgely #o!ded person#l or !ssueA#sed #tt#"@s #nd6 !nste#d6 o"used on re#sons to ote or t5e "#nd!d#tes. * r#"e 5#d m!xed tone ! one "#nd!d#te rel!ed on pos!t!e #nd t5e ot5er on

neg#t!e mess#ges or ! Aot5 "#nd!d#tes used # #!rly een m!x o pos!t!e #nd neg#t!e mess#ges. *lt5oug5 1992 4#s t5e ye#r o 5ope #nd "5#nge6the tenor of the .enate

campaigns %as over%helmingly negative!0ositive campaigns occurre# in ?9 states *l#s@#6 ?#4#!!6 Id#5o6 Io4#6 3#ns#s6%#ryl#nd6 Ne#d#6 Nort5 D#@ot#6 'out5 D#@ot#6 Ut#56 Vermont6 #nd W!s"ons!n. W5!le t5ese st#tes #""ounted or # t5!rd o t5e 'en#te r#"es6 t5ey "ont#!ned only 1, per"ent o t5e n#t!ons

ot!ng#ge popul#t!on. T5e rest o t5e ele"tor#te e#sted on neg#t!e #dert!s!ng. '!x st#tes6 "ont#!n!ng # Bu#rter o t5e ele"tor#te6 5#d m!xed "#mp#!gns *l#A#m#6 *r!on#6 0lor!d#6 Ill!no!s6

%!ssour!6 #nd O@l#5om#. 0!teen st#tes6 4!t5 2 per"ent o t5e ot!ng#ge popul#t!on6 5#d ullAlo4n neg#t!e "#mp#!gns *r@#ns#s6 C#l!orn!# 8t4o 'en#te se#ts;6 Color#do6 Conne"t!"ut6

Georg!#6 Ind!#n#6 3entu"@y6 Ne4 ?#mps5!re6 Ne4 (or@6 Nort5 C#rol!n#6 O5!o6 Oregon6 &ennsyl#n!#6 'out5 C#rol!n#6 #nd W#s5!ngton. T5e Aest s!ngle pred!"tor o "#mp#!gn tone6 !t turns

out6 !s t5e "loseness o t5e r#"e. T5e t!g5ter t5e "ontest6 t5e me#ner t5e "#mp#!gn.The hostility of the ?@@9 .enate campaigns #raine# the

electorate as much as it %ore #o%n the opposition! The positive .enate campaigns average# high turnout

ratesB5A percent of the voting+age population! Turnout in the mie# tone races %as almost five

percentage points lo%er, 59!4 percent, an# turnout in the negative races %as #o%n even further, to 4@!A!

/fter removing the effects of other factors, the #ifference in turnout "et%een the positive an# negative

races %as 4!5 percentage points:str!@!ngly s!m!l#r to t5e s!e o t5e ee"t produ"ed Ay our exper!ments.

Neg#t!e #dert!sements 5#e ot5er neg#t!e ee"ts6 su"5 #s 5!g5er r#tes o A#llot rollo6 45!"5 proes t5#tt5ey le#d to lo4er turnout r#tes. /nsola"ehere#nd Iyengarexpl#!n6 7'tep5en *nsol#Ae5ere 8&roessor o Goernment

#t ?#r#rd Un!ers!ty; #nd '5#nto Iyeng#r 8&roessor o &ol!t!"#l '"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;.


62/64

unintentionally #epress turnout among their o%n supporters "y using negative a#vertising!I t5!s 4ere true6 t5e

ee"ts o neg#t!e #dert!s!ng 4ould set !n eBu#lly #mong t5e r#n@s o Aot5 t5e "#nd!d#tes supporters #nd nonp#rt!s#ns.inally, negative campaigning may

#iminish the po%er of civic #uty an# may un#ermine the legitimacy of the entire electoral proccess!

ampaigns that generate more negative than positive messages may leave voters em"ittere# to%ar# the

can#i#ates an# the rules of the game!T5e neg#t!e tenor o "#mp#!gns "#n 5e tr#"ed to t5e "ompet!t!e n#ture o pol!t!"#l #dert!s!ng6 to t5e #"t!!t!es o

org#n!ed !nterests6 #nd6 l#st Aut not le#st6 to t5e 4#ys !n 45!"5 reporters "oer t5e "#mp#!gn.

0oliticians, interest groups, an# 6ournalists all act in%ays that serve their o%n "est interests! e% of these players really %ant to pro#uce highly negative

campaigns, "ut the interplay among them pro#uces the &in# of campaigns that voters have come to

loathe!


63/64

-I.

ac&manel#Aor#tes upon seer#l met5ods o ensur!ng t5#t ot!ng !s "ompulsory6 7'!mon J#"@m#n 8&roessor o

pol!t!"#l s"!en"e #t 't#nord Un!ers!ty;6

ompliance %ith compulsory voting is most commonly in#uce# %ith a system of small to mo#erate fines

8e.g.6 *ustr#l!# #nd elg!um;6#lt5oug5 # suAst#nt!#l numAer o "ountr!es 4!t5 "ompulsory ot!ng do not rely on !nes.Other penalties inclu#e ineligi"ility for

electe# office for a prescri"e# perio#8e.g.6 *rgent!n#;6ineligi"ility for certain types of government employment

8e.g.6 Veneuel#;6an# #isenfranchisement8e.g.6 T5#!l#nd;.In other countries compulsory voting operates as a norm,

%ith social em"arrassment an important sanction for non+compliance8e.g.6 It#ly;.'omet!mes "ompulsory ot!ng #ppe#rs #s #

"onst!tut!on#l pro!s!on or !n st#tute6 Aut 4!t5 no ment!on o pen#lt!es or non"ompl!#n"e 8e.g.6 ol!!#6 C5!le6 L!e"5tenste!n6 )gypt;. -any countries#lsohave large

classes of eemptions!or instance, /ustralia(s fe#eral compulsory voting statute eempts non+voters

%ith $$vali# an# sufficient(( reasons for not turning outF *ustr#l!#s "ourts 5#e r!gorously den!ed nonoters "l#!ms o !nd!eren"e Aet4een t5e

"#nd!d#tes or #l!en#t!on rom pol!t!"s #s #l!d #nd su!"!ent re#sons./ge eemptions are also common> for instance, =ra)il ma&es

voting optional for citi)ens "et%een the ages of ?1 an# ?H, citi)ens over the age of A:, an# for illiterates!

Turn+Compulsory ot!ng !s good due to !ts "oer"!e propert!es. /le6an#roexpl#!ns67?#nn# *le#ndro 8De#ns

0ello46 Georgeto4n Un!ers!ty L#4 Center;6


64/64

t5ereore #s@ 45et5er !nd!eren"e 8oten mot!#ted Ay "ontempt; !s # re#son#Ale puAl!" #lue #t #ll !n t5e ot!ng "ontext. W5en e#"5 memAers "ontr!Aut!on to # "ommon good !s #lued

eBu#lly : su"5 #s our s5#re o t#xes6 or presen"e on # ury : "oer"!on "#n express eBu#l reg#rd #nd t5e gu#r#ntee o eBu#l opportun!ty.

Isaac's File

Documents

Transcript of Isaac's File