Is the Humanitarian System Fit for Purpose? · Is the Humanitarian System Fit for Purpose ... HEA...

www.planningfromthefuture.org 1

PLANNING FROM THE FUTUREIs the Humanitarian System Fit for Purpose?November 2016

ContentsAcknowledgments 2

Acronyms 5

Foreword 6

Executive summary 7

Future humanitarian action: A six-point plan 9

Introduction 11

About this study 11

Methodology 11

1. A history of game changers 13

1.1Whyhistorymatters 13

1.2 Historical game changers: Triggers and trajectories 14

1.3 Conclusion: What history tells us 19

2. The current humanitarian landscape 22

2.1. The changing nature of crisis 22

2.2Thechangingnatureofhumanitarianaction 25

2.3. The humanitarian malaise 41

2.4. Reform? 50

3. Planning from the Future: Conclusions and recommendations 57

3.1 The future: Preparing for threats to come 57

3.2Conclusionsandrecommendations 59

Future humanitarian action: A six-point vision 60

A roadmap for change 62

Bibliography 66

Chapter 1: A history of game changers 66

Chapter 2: The humanitarian landscape today 67

Chapter 3: Planning from the Future 72

4 www.planningfromthefuture.org

Project leader: Randolph Kent

Chapter 1: A history of game changers: Christina Bennett, Humanitarian Policy Group, ODI

Chapter 2: The current humanitarian landscape: Antonio Donini and Daniel Maxwell,

Feinstein International Center, Tufts University

Chapter 3: Planning from the Future: conclusions and recommendations: entire team

Contributors: Joanne Burke, Nici Dahrendorf, Phoebe Donnelly, Kimberly Howe, Jeeyon Janet Kim,

Norah Niland, Nisar Majid, Dyan Mazurana and Giulia Scalettaris

Project officers: Sophie Evans and Amanda Taylor

Acknowledgments

Planning from the Future is a joint undertaking of three humanitarian policy research institutions:

the Policy Institute at King’s College London, the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas

Development Institute (London) and the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University (Boston).

The PFF partners would like to thank the governments of Denmark and Sweden for their support

and generous contributions to the project.

The PFF partners also wish to thank the numerous colleagues who contributed to the research; the

members of the project’s advisory group, who provided strategic-level steerage and insight; and

the study’s peer reviewers, who dedicated considerable time to providing extensive and insightful

comments on the study’s drafts:

The views and opinions expressed in this report are the authors’ own.


AcronymsACAPS Assessment Capacity ProjectASEAN AssociationofEastAsianNationsAU African UnionCAP Consolidated Appeals ProcessCARE CooperativeforAmericanRemittances toEurope,laterCooperativefor AmericanReliefEverywhereandthen CooperativeforAssistanceandRelief EverywhereCBO Community-basedorganisationCMAM Community-based management of acutemalnutritionCERF CentralEmergencyResponseFundCHS Common Humanitarian StandardCRB CommitteefortheReliefof Belgium CRED CenterforResearchonthe EpidemiologyofDisastersCRS CatholicReliefServicesDFID DepartmentforInternational DevelopmentDHA DepartmentofHumanitarian Affairs(UN)ECOSOC EconomicandSocialCouncil(UN)ELHRA EnhancingLearningandResearchfor Humanitarian AssistanceERC EmergencyReliefCoordinatorFAO FoodandAgricultureOrganization (UN)HAP Humanitarian Accountability PartnershipHEA Household economy approach GWOT Global War on TerrorHC HumanitarianCoordinator(UN)HCT Humanitarian Country TeamHPG Humanitarian Policy Group

HRR HumanitarianResponseReviewIASC Inter-AgencyStandingCommitteeICC InternationalCriminalCourtICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRed CrossIDP InternallydisplacedpersonIFRC InternationalFederationofRedCross andRedCrescentSocietiesIHL InternationalHumanitarianLawIRL InternationalRefugeeLawISP InternallystuckpersonMSF MédecinsSansFrontièresNGO Non-governmentalOrganisationNRC NorwegianRefugeeCouncilOCHA OfficefortheCoordinationof HumanitarianAffairs(UN)ODA OfficialdevelopmentassistanceODI OverseasDevelopmentInstituteOECD OrganisationforEconomic CooperationandDevelopmentOIC OrganisationofIslamicCooperationPFF PlanningFromtheFuturePLA ChinesePeople’sLiberationArmyRC ResidentCoordinator(UN)R2P ResponsibilitytoProtectRUF RightsUpFrontinitiativeTA TransformativeAgendaUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerfor RefugeesUNISDR UnitedNationsInternationalStrategy forDisasterReductionUNICEF UnitedNationsChildren’sFundUNRRA ReliefandRehabilitation Administration(UN)WFP WorldFoodProgramme(UN)WHO WorldHealthOrganisation


ForewordFour concerns explain the origins of the Planning from the Futureproject.Thefirstistheincreasinglyacceptedfactthat,intheforeseeablefuture,humankindwillbefaced with unprecedented technological and societal change.Thesetransformationsmaywellhavepositiveeffectsthatwillenhancethelivesofagrowingnumberofpeoplearoundtheworld.Atthesametime,aswithallsuchtransformations,there,too,isadownside.Thatdownsidewillbereflectedinthevulnerabilitiesthatarefrequentlyconcomitantwithchange.Hence,thesecondconcern that led to the Planning from the Future project was the plausible prospect that the dimensions and dynamics of disasters and emergencies in the future will increase,perhapsevenexponentially.

From this concern came the third. To what extent is theglobalcommunitysensitivetosuchprospects?Beyond even those who are directly responsible for dealingwithdisastersandemergencies,issocietymoregenerallypreparedtoanticipateandmitigatethesourcesoffuturecrisisdrivers?Finally,thisconcernledto the more immediate issue that underpins the overall Planning from the Futureproject,namelywhatdoesthehumanitarian sector’s past and present record suggest aboutitscapacityforadjustingandrespondingtorapid,complex change in the future?

We,thePlanning from the Futurepartnership,believethattheseconcernsingeneral,butmorespecificallythelast,needwhereverpossibletobebroughttotheattentionofallthosewhohaverolesandresponsibilitiesfor dealing with ever-more complex and uncertain disastersandemergencies.Innosensearewesuggestingthattheanalysisthatfollowsisdefinitive,butwearesuggestingthatadebateneedstobegeneratedtotestapropositionthathasgraveand,inagrowingnumberofinstances,existentialhumanitarianimplications.

WewouldhopethatintheaftermathoftheWorldHumanitarianSummit,therewillbeincreasinginterestintestingtheviabilityofthehumanitariancommunity and the challenges that lie ahead. With thatinmind,thepartnershipwillmaintainawebsite,planningfromthefuture.org,asonesteptowardspromotinghumanitarianfutures-orienteddiscussionanddebate.So,too,isthepartnershipcommittedtojoiningwith others in a wide range of forums to present its findingsandtheirimplications.

Astheacknowledgmentsabovesuggest,abroadspectrumofexpertisewassoughttodevelopthisanalysis.Inmanyinstances,thatexpertisehasgonewellbeyondtheconfinesofthehumanitariansector.Ithasinvolvedthenaturalandsocialsciences,theprivatesectoraswellasthemilitary,socialnetworksandlocalcommunities–alltoassesswhetherthepastand the present should or should not be a guide to a humanitarianfuture.And,ifthelatter,whatneedstobedonetomakethesectorfitforthefuture?

Thisisthequestionthatultimatelyunderpinstheeffortsof the Planning from the Future partnership.

Randolph KentPlanning from the Future

November 2016


Executive summary Isthehumanitariansectorfitforpurpose?Doesithavethecapacityandvisiontotacklethecrisesoftoday,tomorrow and deep into the future? The scale and complexityoftheconflictsanddisastersconfrontedbyhumanitariansandthepopulationstheyaimtohelpleavethembruisedandsometimesabused.Thereisawidespreadfeelingoffrustrationamonghumanitarianorganisationsanddonors,bothinthefieldandattheirheadquarters.

Ifthehumanitariansystemisunabletodealwiththechallengesoftoday,whatdoesthistellusaboutitsabilitytoprepareforthechallengesthenextgenerationwillface?Imperfectasitis,buffetedbypoliticsandchronicallyunderfunded,humanitarianactionremainsessentialforpeopleinextremis.ThequestionthatPlanningfromtheFuture(PFF)raises,therefore,ishowwillthesetensionsandinteractionsbemanagedinthefuture–twentyorthirtyyearsfromnow?Whatdoweneedtodonowtoprepareforthen–forahumanitarianfuturethatwillbeparadigmaticallydifferentfromthe past? The PFF project explores the reasons why fundamentalreformiscriticaltoachievingamoremodern,effectiveandadaptivehumanitariansystem,andarguesthatthisgoalrequiresarethinkofhowthesectorlooksandoperates.

The report is organised into three main chapters. Chapter 1–Ahistoryofgamechangersidentifieskeymomentsin the history of the humanitarian system and discusses howtheyinfluenceditsstructures,powerdynamicsandprocesses,layingthefoundationfortheanalysisthatfollowsintherestofthereport.Ithighlightscontinuitiesin the system: many of the problems and pathologies thatitsuffersfromtodayaredeeplyrootedinitshistory.Whilethesystemhasexpandedanddiversified,itsbasicpower,structuresandapproacheshavelargelyremainedthesame.Thehumanitarianarchitecturelooksremarkablysimilartothewayitdidinthe1950s–onlymuch bigger.

Chapter2–Thecurrenthumanitarianlandscapedescribescurrentglobaltrendsaffectingthesector,whatworkswellandwhatdoesn’t,andmakesthecase for change. The total number of people in need hasrisensharply,especiallythecaseloadresulting

fromviolentconflict,butsohasthegapbetweenneedandcoverage.Institutionshavegrownapaceandsignificantadvanceshavebeenmadeinthetechniqueof humanitarian response; the growing use of cash and marketmechanismsisperhapsthemostsignificantgamechangerinhowthesystemworks.Therehasbeensomestreamlininginthehumanitarianarchitecture,butkeyissuesofleadershipanddecision-makinghavenotbeenaddressed. The system remains over-proceduralized and complex.Atthesametime,counter-insurgencyagendashaveheightenedthesecuritizationandmilitarisationofhumanitarianaction.Principlesarecontinuouslythreatenedbytheconductofwarand,notwithstandingincreasedcommitment,thesystemremainsessentiallyreactiveonprotectionissues.

This report analyses the malaise in the humanitarian communitydrivenbytheover-archingrealizationthatthesystemisnot‘fitforpurpose’.Muchofthispessimismresultsfromthefactthathumanitarianactioncannotbreakoutofthespacethatpoliticsassignstoit.Newpracticesandchangeshavenotmadeoldproblemsgoaway,whetheritisintermsoffailuresofleadership,governanceorthepowerrelationsinthesystem.Theserelationsarestilllargelydominatedbyasmallnumberofcoreactors,akindofself-governing‘oligopoly’ofmainlyWesterndonorsandlargeinternationalandnon-governmentalaidagencies–overwhichtheformalintergovernmental system has only limited oversight.

Chapter3–Planningfromthefuturelooksatfuturethreatsandrisksandhowtheymightbeaddressedbyamoreadaptiveandresponsivehumanitariansectoroftomorrow.Whileattemptingtopredictthefutureishazardousandalltoooftenfutile,therearefewanalystswho do not recognize that disasters and emergencies over the next two decades will be more complex and uncertain,andtheirdimensionsanddynamicsfarmoreextensive.Chapter3,reflectingonthemixedrecordofthehumanitariansector’spastandpresent,suggeststhatthe present humanitarian sector is faced with a serious capacitieschallenge–onethatrequiresfundamentalinstitutionalchange.Humanitarianorganisationswillhavetobemoreanticipatoryandadaptive,andwillhavetoadoptnewwaysofworkingandcertainlynew approaches to leadership. This is followed by


conclusions,includingasix-pointvisionforfuturehumanitarianactionthattakesamoreanticipatory,protectiveandaccountableapproachtocrisisresponse,andrecommendationsthatofferaroadmapofquickwins,systemicoverhaulandfuture-proofingforachieving that vision.

PFF shares the sense of outrage expressed by the UN Secretary-General in his report to the World HumanitarianSummitaboutthesufferingofciviliansandthefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytodoenoughaboutit;aboutthefactthatalltoooftenhumanitarianactionissubordinateto,orsubstitutesfor,politics;thatsovereignintereststrumpindividualrights–evenincasesofmassatrocities;andtheblatantinequitiesthatprivilegesomelives–somecrises–aboveothersintermsofmoneyandattention.ThefindingsofthePFFprojectalsopointtoasenseoffrustrationthat,despitevastimprovementsinanalyticsandforecasting,humanitarianactionisstillreactiveandthat,despitethededicationofindividualaidworkersandsomeattemptsatreform,thehumanitariansystemasawholestillunder-performs,andlacksthetrustofthe people it aims to help.

Currentfrustrationswiththesectoraretheresultofarecognitionthathumanitariansalonehaveneitherthedepthnorthebreadthofknowledgeorabilitytoaddresshumanitarianneedsandvulnerabilitiesinalltheircomplexity,nowandintheforeseeablefuture.Theresultisasystemicdiscontentthathascalledintoquestionthefoundationsofhumanitarianaction–itsethos,itsemblemsandtheconstellationofinstitutionsthatpursuehumanitarian goals.

ThePFFpartnerinstitutionsrecognisethatmajorchangeisdifficult,andperhapsevenunlikelyinthecurrentcontext.Ifthepastisanyguide,radicalchangeininternationalinstitutionsonlyhappensinthecontextofamajorshock,suchasthetwoworldwarsandtheconsequentreshufflingofinternationalinstitutionaltectonics.Sincethen,changeintheinternationalsystem

hasonlyhappenedbyaccretionand,withfewnotableexceptionshaslackeddepth.Fundamentalreformisnecessary but there are too many vested interests withinthesystemandtoomuchresistancetothinkingbeyondtheinstitutionalbox.Thetriggerforchangewilllikelycomefromwithout,startingfromabalancedanalysis of what needs to change and related remedies. Aconstituencyforchangewillneedtoemergeincivilsocietyandamongthoseaffectedbycrisesthemselves.

ThisPlanningfromtheFuturereportoffersadiagnosisofwhat ails the system and a broad outline of what change couldlooklike,whatneedstobedonetoincreasetheeffectivenessofhumanitarianassistanceandprotectiontoday and to boost its capacity to adapt and equip itself for an uncertain future. The appointment of a new UN Secretary-General with years of humanitarian experience provides an opportunity to put change on theinternationalagenda.Whether‘broke’or‘broken’,the humanitarian system of the future needs to do more than simply muddle through.

Basedonthevisionoutlinedabove,thisstudyproposesthreelevelsofrecommendations:(i)‘PracticalMeasuresforImmediateImplementation’,thatis,high-impactimprovements for which there is already near-universal support;(ii)‘SystemOverhaul’,whichcallsformajorreformofthestructures,governanceandmodusoperandiofthesystem,includinganindependentreviewthatwouldidentifyhowchangecouldbeimplemented;and(iii)‘PlanningfromtheFuture’,tohelpthehumanitarian sector adapt and plan for an ever-more complex and uncertain future.

ThereportisthefinaloutputofthePlanningfromtheFutureproject,an18-monthstudyconductedbyKing’sCollegeLondon,theFeinsteinInternationalCenterattheFriedmanSchoolofNutrition,TuftsUniversityandtheHumanitarianPolicyGroupattheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute.Thissynthesisreport,anditssupportingresearchandcasestudies,canbeaccessedathttp://www.planningfromthefuture.org.

www.planningfromthefuture.or 9

FUTURE HUMANITARIAN ACTION. A 6-POINT VISION:

REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL HUMANITARIAN STAKEHOLDERS

• Itis‘oftheworld’–neither‘oftheNorth’norpartialtoanyagenda.Itisdirectedtoallcrisis-affectedpeopleinneedofhumanitarianaction.

• Itislocal,butexternalexperienceisvaluedandavailabletosupportlocally-ledaction,ortoactwherelocalpartiescannot.

• Itsalliancesarebasedonstrategicpartnershipsbetweeninternational,nationalandlocalorganisations,fromawiderangeofsectors.

• Itsactivities,wherepossible,arebasedontheprincipleofsubsidiarity,whichputscontrolanddecision-makingascloseaspossibletowhoseactions on the ground.

• ItisguidedbythehumanitarianprinciplesembodiedinInternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL),internationalrefugeelawandtheIFRC/NGOCodeofConduct.

• Itisalwaysimpartial.Itisabletoactinanindependentandneutralmannerwhenrequired,particularlyinconflictsituations.

• Itishonestandtransparentinthewayitinvokesthose principles and respects them.

• Itworksflexiblytoprotectlife,rightsandlivelihoods,bothincontextswhereIHLrequiresanarrowfocusonprotectinglifeanddignityandinthosewherelonger-term strategies can be developed.

01 02 PRINCIPLED

s


NON-PARTISAN

• Itismindfulofpoliticsbutisnon-partisaninallitsactivities,includingpublicpronouncements.

• Itisabletoworkwithabroadconstellationofactors,includingwarringparties,nationalandregionaldisastermanagementauthorities,civilsocietyandtheprivatesector,whileretainingitsindependent character.

• Itisabletosupportresilienceprogramming,socialprotectionandlivelihoodsinitiativeswhenapplicable to the context.

PROFESSIONAL

• Itvaluesprofessionalism,butembodiesthevoluntary spirit that lies at the root of the humanitarianimperative.

• Itsprogrammesanddecision-makingareinformedbyevidence–independentlyverifiedwhere possible.

• Itsactionsaredrivenbyadeepunderstanding ofthecontextinwhichtheyaretakingplace.

• Itisgovernedbyindependent,transparentandaccountableinstitutions,withleadersthatembody the humanitarian ethos and strive for excellenceinmanagementpractice.

• Itisabletomobilisesufficientfundstoanticipate,prepareforandrespondtocrisesirrespectiveoftheir causes or human impacts.

• Itishonestandtransparentaboutitsmistakes–and applies the lessons inferred by them.

• Itdevelopsstrategiesthataredesignedtoanticipateemergenciesanddisastersinthe longer term.

• Itisfocusedonthedynamicsandcircumstancesthat threaten the safety and dignity of people affectedbyarmedconflict,displacementandothercrisissituations

• Itisinformedbytheaspirationsandagencyofthoseatimminentrisk–whetherdisplaced,besiegedorunwillingtoflee.

• Itdevelopscrisis-specificstrategiesthatprioritiseissuesofgreatestconcerntoaffectedgroups,whileinvestinginrelationshipsandinitiativesthat safeguard the space needed to uphold humanitarian values.

• Itfocusesonprotectionoutcomesnotagencyinterests and rhetoric.

• Itinvestsinevidence-basedadvocacyandmechanismstomaximisecompliancewithIHL,refugee law and human rights norms.

• Itputstheprotectionofat-riskgroups–insitu,displaced,refugees–atthecentreofallhumanitarianaction,withinandbeyondtheimmediatecrisissetting.

PROTECTIVE03

04

05

06

ACCOUNTABLE

• Itisaccountabletoaffectedpeopleandprioritisestheir interests and needs over mandates and agencyinterests.Itputsdignityandchoiceoverpaternalism and control.

• Itisaccountabletoitsfunderstotake,andmanage,calculatedriskswhilemakingeffectiveuse of limited funds.

• Itisaccountabletoitspeers,workingincomplementwithorganisationsthatsupplementitsskillsandresourcestowardcollectiveoutcomes.

FUTURE HUMANITARIAN ACTION. A 6-POINT VISION: (continued)


Introduction Isthehumanitariansectorfitforpurpose?Doesithavethecapacityandvisiontotacklethecrisesoftoday,tomorrow and deep into the future? From Afghanistan toUkraine,fromSyriatoGreeceandTurkey,fromSouthSudantotheCentralAfricanRepublic,thescaleandcomplexityoftheconflictsanddisastersconfrontedbypopulationstheyaimtohelphumanitariansandleavethembruisedandsometimesabused.Thereisawidespreadfeelingofmalaiseandfrustrationamonghumanitarianorganisationsanddonors,bothinthefieldand at their headquarters. The World Humanitarian Summit(WHS),whichtookplaceinMay2016,setouttoaddresssomeoftheflawsinthesystem.Itspreparationscatalyzed much-needed discussion about fundamental change,butitsoutcomesfellshortofdeliveringacomprehensive change agenda.

Ifthehumanitariansystemisunabletodealwiththechallengesoftoday,whatdoesthistellusaboutitsabilitytoprepareforthechallengesthenextgenerationwillface?Imperfectasitis,buffetedbypoliticsandchronicallyunderfunded,humanitarianactionremainsessentialforpeopleinextremis.ThequestionthatPlanningfromtheFutureraises,therefore,ishowwillthesetensionsandinteractionsbemanagedinthefuture–twentyorthirtyyearsfromnow?Whatdoweneedtodonowtoprepareforthen–forahumanitarianfuturethatwillbeparadigmaticallydifferentfromthepast?ThesequestionsunderpinthePFFproject,whichexploresthereasonswhyfundamentalreformiscriticaltoachievingthemoremodernandeffectivevisionofhumanitarianactionoutlinedintheconclusionsandrecommendationsofthisreport.Tinkeringwithcurrentstructureswillyieldsomequickimprovements,butachievingthevisionrequiresarethinkofhowthesectorlooksandoperates.

About this study

ThisreportisthefinaloutputofthePlanningfromtheFutureproject,an18-monthstudyconductedbyKing’sCollegeLondon,theFeinsteinInternationalCenterattheFriedmanSchoolofNutrition,TuftsUniversityandtheHumanitarianPolicyGroupattheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute.Theprojectlaysoutthereasonswhythehumanitariansystemisnotfitforpurpose,andsuggests

both immediate and longer-term remedial measures thatwillmakeitfitforanever-morecomplex,uncertain,andinmanyrespectsunknown,future.Thissynthesisreport,anditssupportingresearchandcasestudies,canbeaccessedathttp://www.planningfromthefuture.org.Assuch,thestudyisorganisedintofourchapters.ThisintroductionsummarisestheimpetusandinspirationforthePlanningfromtheFutureproject.Chapter1–Ahistoryofgamechangersidentifieskeymomentsinthehistory of the humanitarian system and discusses how theyinfluenceditsstructures,powerdynamicsandprocesses,layingthefoundationfortheanalysisthatfollowsintherestofthereport.Chapter2–Thecurrenthumanitarian landscape describes current global trends affectingthesectorandmakesthecaseforchange.Chapter3–Planningfromthefuturelooksatfuturethreatsandrisksandhowtheymightbeaddressedbyamoreadaptiveandresponsivehumanitariansectoroftomorrow.Thisisfollowedbyconclusions,includingasix-pointagendaforfuturehumanitarianactionthattakesamoreanticipatory,protectiveandaccountableapproachtocrisisresponseandrecommendationsthatofferaroadmapofquickwins,systemicoverhaulandfutureproofingforachievingthatvision.

Methodology

This study is based on the accumulated research of the threePFFpartnerinstitutionsoverthepastdecade.Itbuildsonathoroughliteraturereview,hundredsofinterviewswithpractitionersandotherinformantsandnumerous brainstorming sessions and events held in the African,Asian,MiddleEasternandNorthAfricanandLatinAmericanregionsaswellasinLondonandGeneva.Importantly,itincorporatesthefindingsofnewresearchspecificallycommissionedaspartoftheproject.ThisincludescasestudiesinSomalia,SouthSudan,SyriaandintheSahelandbriefingpapersonprotectioninthecontextofhumanitarianactionandontheCubanapproachto disaster response. These studies are referenced as appropriateinthefollowingpages.Italsoincludedaseriesof roundtables and small group discussions held in 2014 and 2015 to consider alternate humanitarian futures and paradigms. All outputs are available at the PFF website. A summaryofthePFFfindingswaspresentedatasideeventat the WHS in May 2016.


The PFF research focuses primarily on Western-organized humanitarianism. This choice was deliberate because of its dominance and because any reform agenda will need to engage with the power holders in the humanitarian system.Moreover,thereisasyetanimperfectunderstandingofnon-Westernhumanitariantraditionsandpractices.ThePFFteamrecognizesthatthisisaresearchgapthatneedstobeurgentlyaddressed,butthis was not the primary purpose of this report.

The analysis and conclusions were also guided and facilitated by an external expert advisory group made up oftheproject’sdonors,representativesfromWesternandnon-Westernorganisationsinvolvedinhumanitarianpolicyandpracticeandprofessionalsfromacademicinstitutions,mediaorganisationsandprivatesectorcompanies. The advisory group helped to set the report’s directionandreviewedandcommentedonthestudy’sdrafts.Apreviousversionofthisreportwasalsopeerreviewedbyaselectionofacademicsandhumanitarianpolicy experts.

The Planning from the Future project comprises:

The PFF report:• Introduction• Chapter 1: Humanitarian history and its game-

changers• Chapter 2: The current humanitarian landscape• Chapter 3: Planning from the future

Briefingpapers:• Canrevolutionarymedicinerevolutionisethe

humanitarian system?• Protectioninthecontextofglobalisation• Sweden’sFeministForeignPolicy:Implications

for humanitarian response

Case studies: • The Somalia famine of 2011-2012• The return to violence in South Sudan• No end in sight: A case study of humanitarian

actionandtheSyriaconflict• Regional humanitarian challenges in the Sahel

Exploratoryroundtablediscussions:• Testingthefuturetoolkit• Exploringalternativewaysofunderstanding

crisesandsolutions


1. A history of game changers Theinternationalhumanitariansystem1 has developedsignificantlyoverthepastdecades,innosmallpartduetokeymomentsinitshistorythatfrequentlyencourageit to introduce change. The two world wars catalysed theformationoftheformalhumanitariansector;conflictsinBiafraandthegenocideinRwandaraisedfundamentalethicalquestionsabouttheroleandimpartialityofinternationalhumanitarianaid;large-scaledisasterssuchasthe1970Peruvianearthquake,theIndianOceantsunamiin2004andthe2010Haitiearthquakealltestedtheresponsecapacityandeffectivenessofthecurrentsystemtoitslimits;whilethecivilwarsinSpain,Afghanistan,Iraq,Sudan,SriLankaandSyriahaveallchallengedthepresumeduniversalityofhumanitarianactionandhighlightedthelackofconsistentpoliticalsolutionstosituationsofextreme violence.

Theseevents,alongwithslower,systemicshifts,suchasdecolonisation,theincreaseinglobaltrade,theriseofmiddle-incomestatesandmobiletechnologies,havepromptedchangesbothinthestructureoftheformal,Westernhumanitariansystem,andinthenatureofitspracticesandrelationships.Criticalamongthesehavebeenitsinteractionswithnon-Westernindividualsandorganisations,manyofwhomhaveparallelhumanitarianhistories of their own.

Whatisstrikingaboutthiscollectionofhistoriesistheextenttowhichthereisacommonalityinthenotionofsharedhumanity,compassionandanimperativetoaddresshumansuffering.Whatisalsostrikingarethemanydifferentformsthatsuchcompassioncantake,initsunderlyingethosandthepracticalexpressionofcare,andinthewaysinwhichsuchdifferenceshaveshapedstateandcivilianperceptionsofandbehaviourinhumanitarianactiontoday.

1.1 Why history matters

Circumspection,self-reflectionandself-criticismareingrainedinthehumanitarianpsyche.Evaluationshavea well-established role within the humanitarian system: thesectorpublisheshundredsofformalevaluationsandlessons learned studies each year2 and pages upon pages of grey literature exist as internal documents within humanitarianorganisations(Borton,2009;ALNAP,2016).However,despitethewealthofcriticalreflectionandself-examination,thesectorhasdifficultyapplyingthelessonslearnedfromitsmistakes.Thisis,inpart,duetothefactthatitisdecidedlya-historic,ashumanitariansoperateinaperpetualpresentthatdiscourageslookingback.Theimmediacy and instability of crises and the fast-paced natureofresponsegivetheimpressionthatinformationisrapidlyobsolete.Fundraisingpressureandtheinstinctto dub each new crisis ‘unprecedented’ obscures analysis ofhistoricalprecedents.Thedoomsdaynarrativeoftenpromotedbyoperationalagencies–‘we’veneverhaditthisbad’–effectivelycutsofforganisationsfromhistoryand the lessons it can teach. Such a-historicism also maintainsashort-termviewofthehumanitarianrole,when today’s recurrent and protracted crises demand that humanitarianpracticemustbegroundedinlong-termanalyticalperspectives(Davey,2014).

Suchhistoricalamnesiahasoperationalconsequences,includingalackofpreparationandinstitutionalmemory,theassumptionthatproblemsareallnewordifferent,andtheperpetuationofcertainmyths(forinstancethathumanitarianspaceisshrinking,whenit is the nature of humanitarian engagement that has changed)(CollinsonandElhawary,2012).Itishardertothinkofnewresponsestochallengeswithoutknowledgeofhowandwhycurrentmethodsweredeveloped.Itisalsohardertorecogniseoranalysethe precise dynamics you are dealing with when you can’tcomparethemwithotherexamplesindifferenttimesandplaces.Livinginaperpetualpresentinhibitsyourthinkingaboutyourownidentity,itnarrowsyour

1 While there are myriad definitions and interpretations of the word ‘system’ as applied to the humanitarian sector, this analysis follows the most recent State of the System report by ALNAP, which defines the humanitarian system as ‘the network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian assistance is provided when local and national resources are insufficient to meet the needs of a population in crisis’ (ALNAP, 2015). Unless indicated otherwise, the use of the term ‘system’ here also refers to the formal, Western-inspired humanitarian system that operates today

2 In 2015, 446 evaluative resources were submitted to ALNAP’s resources library, up from 243 in 2013. However, this may be more of an indicator of the numbers of evaluative reports being shared, rather than being undertaken.


horizonstowhatyouareabletoexperiencedirectly,depriving you of the bigger picture.

Engagementwithhistory,ontheotherhand,canhelptosharpenanalysisofcauseandresponsefactors(forexample,formultiplelayersofdisplacement)andhelpinfindingcreativesolutionstoseeminglyintractableproblems.Itmayalsosuggestalternativeoperationalconcepts,approachesandtoolsbydrawingouttheconditionsunderwhichcurrentpracticesandconceptshaveemerged(Davey,2014).Forinstance,humanitariansworkinginSyriamightfindresonanceintheItalianinvasionofEthiopiain1935,whentheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)andvariousRedCrossNationalSocietiesworkedonbehalfofthevictimsontheEthiopianside,whiletheiroffersofassistancewererefusedbytheItalians.Italyusedmustardgas,whichhadbeenbannedininternationallaw,andattackedaidinstallations.TheLeagueofNationstooknoactiondespitetheimpactonciviliansandreliefworkers,andtheICRCconcludedthatitcouldnotspeakoutaboutwhatwashappening(Bridel,2003).Inotherwords,understanding the complex historical context within whichthestructures,cultures,practicesandprinciplesof humanitarian assistance have evolved will enable the sectortoseethattheproblemsidentifiedandanalysedin subsequent chapters of this study have been present from the start.

Finally,as‘new’or‘emerging’governments,individualsandinstitutionsbecomemoresignificantandactivehumanitarianplayers,afullerengagementwithwhataremyriad humanitarian histories can help the humanitarian systemmoreaccuratelyseeitsoriginsandidentityaspart of a long and truly global story of concern for the sufferingofothers.Inthisway,ananalysisofhistorycontributes to our planning from the future by providing a more comprehensive understanding of its past.

1.2 Historical game changers: triggers and trajectories

Whiletheideaof‘gamechangers’isoftenassociatedwitheventsandsinglepointsintime,thehistoryofhumanitarianactiondemonstratesthatchangewithinthe sector might be best characterised as an interplay of

concepts,trendsandevents.Itisimpossibletocoverallofthegeopolitical,economic,socialandtechnologicalchangesthathaveinfluencedhumanitarianactionsinceitsorigins.Belowisaselectionofthemoreprevalentgamechangingthemesthatstilloperateinthesectortoday.

A continuity of empire? Indeed,thecoloniallegacyandpost-colonialpowerdynamics have profoundly shaped contemporary humanitarianaction,andmanyoftheinstitutionsandpracticesofthecurrent,formalhumanitariansystemhave their roots in colonialism and the post-colonial era. Whathistorianshavecalledthe‘dominantnarrative’ofhumanitarianhistoryisoftentoldasastoryofcolonialism and charity.

Architecture and institutionsThearchitectureandinstitutionsoftheformalhumanitariansystemarespecificallyWesternconstructsthathavechangedverylittlesincetheirorigins.Fromthesector’sso-called‘inauguralmoment’(Barnett,2010)ofthefoundationoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)in1863tothetheestablishmentoftheCommitteefortheReliefofBelgium(CRB)asthefirstinternationalcross-borderreliefoperation,theLeagueofNations(1919–20),andLeagueofRedCrossSocieties(1919)andtheformationoftheSavetheChildrenFund(1919),thesectorconsistedlargelyofWesterninstitutionsproviding charity and material relief to war-ravaged nationsinEurope.ThisexpandedintheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWarwiththecreationoftheUnitedNationsitself,andnotablytheReliefandRehabilitationAdministration(UNRRA),aswellaskeyspecialisedUNagenciessuchasUNICEF,FAOandWHO.EuropeanandAmericanNGOssuchasOxfam(1942),CatholicReliefServices(CRS)(1941)andCooperativeforAmericanRemittancestoEurope(CARE)(1945),3flourishedasreliefprovidersinEuropeinaftermathofthewar.Faith-basedmissionsocietiesalsoprovidedhumanitarianassistance.TheLutheranWorldFederation(LWF),whichbeganlifein1947,focusedmuchofitsearlyworkonrespondingtotheneedsofLutheransdisplacedbythewar(Ferris,

3 In 1953 the name was changed to Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere and in the 1990s to Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, enabling the retention of CARE’s well-known acronym.


2005).ReverendBobPiercefoundedWorldVisionin1950followingavisittoanorphanageinNationalistChinaon‘a vision of evangelicals combining personal evangelism withsocialaction’(Barnett,2011).OtherChristianorganisations,suchastheQuakersandtheMennonites,disavowedtheirevangelicalworktoimplementtheirhumanitarianmission.TheAmericanJewishCommitteelobbied the US government against the Russian treatment ofUSJewsapplyingforRussianvisas,forcingtheUSCongresstooverturnan80-year-oldtreatyregulatingUScommercialtieswithRussia(Ferris,2005).

Frommid-centuryonwards,humanitarianinstitutionsexpandedtheir‘reachandremit’(Borton,2011).DrivenbythecombinedeffectsofdecolonisationandtheanimositiesandrivalriesoftheColdWar,theyworkedinconflictsandnaturaldisastersinAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmerica,inthenameof‘saving’peoplefromtheirown under-development and driven by a fear that the Soviet Union and socialist rhetoric could turn the newly independentstatestowardsSovietinfluence.EmblematicofthiserawasthewarinBiafra(1967),deemedthefirstgreatmodernhumanitarianemergency,whereanunprecedented humanitarian response ‘was refracted throughtheprismofdecolonisationanditsimpactonboththeWestandtheThirdWorld…[creating]aroleforNGOsbasedontheprimacyofinterventionandtheimmediacyofemergencyrelief’(O’Sullivan,2016).

Tools and techniquesManyofthetechniquesofassistancetoday,includingfaminerelief,cashassistanceanddiseasecontrol,werepioneered in the colonies in the late nineteenth century (Davey2012).FaminereliefandcashassistancewerepioneeredincolonialIndia,wheretheBritishdrewupasetofregulationsandproceduresdesignedtoidentifyandcontrolfaminevictims(Simonow,2015).IntheFrenchempire,assistanceeffortstendedtofocusmoreprominently on medical relief and disease control in theshapeof‘thegoodwhitedoctor’,theemblemofa‘civilisingmission’that,likeitsBritishcolonialcousin,legitimiseditselfthroughthesupposedbenefitsWesterncontrolbroughtwithit(Davey,2012).GrowingaffluenceintheUnitedStatesandWesternEuropemadecharityaffordable,bilateralandmultilateralaidincreasedandOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)emergedasan

early model of concessional giving between powerful Northernorganisations,individualsandgovernmentsandthenewlyestablishedSouthernstates,manyofwhom were struggling with inadequate resources and infrastructureaftertherapidwithdrawalofthecolonialpowers(Davey,2012).

Protection and solidarityButtheearlynarrativeofWesternhumanitarianhistorycouldequallybetoldasawayofmitigatingtheeffectsofcolonialism,protectingthesecurityandrightsofcivilianpopulationsandcreatingsolidaritywithgovernmentsand movements in the service of broader societal change.TheICRC’sfoundationandtheadoptionoftheGenevaConventions,althoughWesternintheiroriginsandconstruction,wereintendedtopromoteacceptableconduct in warfare based on growing public concern for itshumanimpacts.Thenormativeframework,includingtheadoptionoftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948)andtheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(1948),andtheexpansionoftheGenevaConventions(1949),developedin the immediate post-war world in direct response to theinhumanityoftheriseofNazism,theHolocaustandtheHiroshimabomb(Barnett,2010).

Atthesametime,manyorganisationsofferedreliefforciviliansanddisplacedpeopleaffectedbythewaronthe basis of solidarity as well as humanity. The Soviet Unionsponsoredanetworkofleft-winghumanitarianassociationsunderthebannerof‘InternationalRedAid’,aso-called‘People’sRedCross’indirectoppositiontotheICRCandnationalRedCrossSocieties,whichtheSovietsconsideredbourgeois,counter-revolutionaryandtoodependentontheEuropeanmiddleclassesandnobility.Inasimilarvein,NorwegianPeople’sAid(NPA),foundedin1939,cameoutofthetradeunionmovementand support for the Republican government during the SpanishCivilWar(Davey,2012).

Theriseof‘newwars’andintra-stateconflictsledtoamoremuscularformofinternationalengagementandpromptedashiftintheemphasisofhumanitarianresponsethatputaidworkersincreasinglyinthecentreofconflicts.Italsoputmoreemphasisoncivilianprotectionandinitiatedanumberofnormativeshifts


thatrecognisedthatprotectingtherightsanddignityofvictimswasasimportantasupholdingthesovereignrightsofstates.WarsintheBalkans,includingtheSrebrenicamassacre,andthe1994genocideinRwandaandmorerecentlythefinalyearsoftheconflictinSriLanka(2008–2009),inparticular,catalysedlandmarkchangesinhumanitariannorms,policiesandpractices.These generated increased focus and programming oncivilianprotectioninconflict,suchastheInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDP)GuidingPrinciples(1999),adedicatedagendaontheprotectionofciviliansintheSecurityCouncil(1999),asuiteofinternationalconventionsonparticularprotectiveelements,suchasbanninglandminesandclustermunitionsorgrantingprotectiontochildren,theArmsTradeTreaty,theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)andtheHumanRightsUpFrontInitiativein2013.Theeffectsofdecolonalisationand the Cold War also brought about a new ‘development agenda’,andwithitanincreasingpublicawarenessof needs in what was increasingly referred to as the ‘ThirdWorld’andmoreactivecampaigningbyNGOsand solidarity movements on broader issues of poverty reduction.Anincreasingfocusonhumanrightsinthe global North saw increasing numbers of NGOs as purveyorsofhumanrightsinadditiontomorenarrowformsofessentiallymaterialsupport(GordonandDonini,2016).InLatinAmerica,forexample,humanitarianactionhas largely been synonymous with solidarity with the pooranditsdutytowardthecommunity.InColombiaduringthe1980’s,forexample,manyOxfampartnerorganisationsrefusedtotakepartinhumanitarianwork,choosing instead to hold government to account for their responsibility for disaster relief on behalf of the country’s poor(Vaux,2016).

Instrumentalisation and politicisation An analysis of events across the history of humanitarianism is also a sobering reminder that the manipulationandpoliticisationofhumanitarianactionin countries of strategic interest is not as new as some contemporarycommentarywouldliketosuggest(CollinsonandElhawary,2012).

KeyhistoricaleventssuchastheBoerWar(1899–1900),theArmenianGenocideof1915,theSpanishCivilWar(1936–39),theItalianinvasionofAbyssiniain1935,the

SecondWorldWar,theBiafranCivilWar(1967–69),theVietnamWar(1955–1975)andtheUSinterventioninSomalia(1992–94)allpointtotheconsistentuseofhumanitarianassistance‘asatooltopursuepolitical,security,military,development,economicandothernon-humanitariangoals’(Donini,2012).Likewise,theidea of using aid as a way of winning ‘hearts and minds’ andlocalsupport,seentodayinAfghanistanandIraq,hashistoricalprecedentsinAlgeria’sindependencewar,when the French provided services in rural areas thought tobesympathetictothenationalistcause,andinMalayainthe1950s,whenBritishtroopsprovidedmedicalcareand built infrastructure as part of the counter-insurgency campaignagainsttheMalayanCommunistParty(JacksonandDavey,2014).

TheintersectionofdecolonisationandColdWarcompetitionforinfluenceledkeyNGOsintocloserelationshipswiththeirhomegovernments,particularlyincountriesofstrategicinterest.InVietnam,forinstance,USNGOssuchasCatholicReliefServices(CRS)andCAREwereexplicitlypartoftheUSgovernment’spoliticalandmilitaryeffort.CRSinparticularhadclosetieswiththeUS-backedregimeinSouthVietnam,andchannelledfoodaidtoaUS-supportedmilitiagroup. As the Planning from the Future case study on Cubaattests,Cubandoctorsweredeployedinpursuitof ‘health diplomacy’ in 1962 in newly independent Algeria and in alignment with the People’s Movement fortheLiberationofAngola(MPLA).

Theuneasyrelationshipbetweencivilianandhumanitarianactivitiesandmilitaryintervention,whichbeganwiththerebuildingpost-warEuropeandthecodificationoftheuseofforceintheUNCharter,cametoprominencewiththefirstPersianGulfCrisisin1991andaSecurityCouncil-authorisedexpansioninpeacekeeping(CollinsonandElhawary,2012).Thisusheredinamoreassertiveandpartisanformofmilitaryinterventionforhumanitarianpurposes,withUN-sanctionedoperationsbyECOWASinLiberiaandNATOinBosnia-Herzegovina,andthen the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslav forcesinKosovowithoutSecurityCouncilauthority,finallyculminatingwiththedoctrineoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P),whichexplicitlyprovidesfor‘theuseofcollectiveforce’incasesofmassatrocity.


NGOs’experienceduringthewarinBiafra,Nigeria,whenthehumanitarianeffortwasco-optedbytheBiafranleadership,servingtheircampaignforinternationalrecognitionandprovidingresourcesfortheirwareffort,exposedhoweasilyandeffectivelyhumanitarianactorsand humanitarian assistance could be manipulated bybelligerentstofurthertheirpoliticalandmilitaryobjectives(Barnett,2011).InSomaliaduringthe1980s,theBarreregimeranalucrativeracketoutoftheaidresources delivered by UNHCR and NGOs into camps accommodatingSomaliEthiopianrefugees(Menkhaus,2010).Theregimealsorecruitedlargenumbersofrefugeesintoitsmilitary,turningtherefugeecampsintodefactotrainingbasesandinternationalaidintologisticalsupportforthemilitaryunitsestablishedthere.

Historythereforeexplodestheoft-citedmyththattherewas a ‘golden age’ when humanitarianism could operate in a principled manner and enjoy greater security and freedomsasaresult.ForWesterngovernments,aidhasalwaysofferedawaytosupportclientregimesandstrategicinterests,andforSoutherngovernments,thenon-alignedmovement(NAM)andnon-stateactors,aidhasbeenasourceoffunds,legitimacyandpower.Whileaid agencies themselves have secured public support by presentingthemselvesasnon-political,theyhavealwaysfounditdifficulttoupholdsuchclaimsinpractice.

Systematisation, professionalisation and growthThehistoryofhumanitarianactionisalsooneofsystematisation,professionalisationandgrowth,whichoverthecourseofacenturytookthesectorfrom its modest and voluntary roots to an increasingly bureaucraticandinstitutional‘enterprise’(Smillie,2012)ofmorethan4,000knownorganisationsandtensofthousandsofaidworkersinanindustryworthatleast$24billionin2015(ALNAP,2015,GHA,2015).

Themassiveexpansionofthehumanitarian‘marketplace’promptedanincreaseinthenumberoforganisationsandlevelsoffundsinvolvedinhumanitarianwork.IntheimmediateaftermathoftheSecondWorldWar,Barnett(2011)estimatesthatnearly200reliefNGOswereformedintheUSandEuropetohandlethescaleandseverityofpost-warsuffering.AsneedsinEuropedeclined,NGOssoughttoexpandtheiroperationsbeyondEurope

(Borton,2011).Inlate1948,forinstance,Oxfam(originallyestablished in response to famine in Nazi-occupied Greece)decidedtorefocuson‘thereliefofsufferingarising as a result of wars or of other causes in any part of theworld’(Barnett,2011:120).

ForUS-basedNGOssuchasCAREandCRS,theimpetusforexpansioncamefromUSgovernmentlegislationin1949allowingtheuseofsurplusagriculturalproductionforreliefanddevelopmentpurposes,enablingUSNGOsto distribute government-funded food aid in response tofamineinIndiain1950andthedisplacementandsufferingresultingfromthe1950–53KoreanWar.Thesearrangementswereexpandedandinstitutionalisedthroughthe1954AgriculturalTradeDevelopmentandAssistanceAct(PublicLaw480),whichstillgovernsUSfoodaidtoday(WalkerandMaxwell,2009).

With the expansion of the sector has come a greater focusonprofessionalisation.ThiswasinpartduetohighlyvisibleresponsefailuresinBiafra,Ethiopia,EastPakistanandRwanda,wheretheneedformoreprocedure,transparencyandaccountabilityinaidoperationsledtomorestandardisedandformalisedhumanitarianoperationsandpractice.Thisincludedthe establishment of dedicated disaster response units inUNagenciesandbilateraldonororganisations,andthedevelopmentofgroups,researchcentresandpublicationsdedicatedtoimprovingunderstandingofdisastersanddisasterresponse.InternationalshockattheRwandangenocideinparticularpromptedagroupofdonorstoundertakeacomprehensiveandground-breakingjointevaluationoftheinternationalresponse,leadingtoaslewofinitiativesintendedtoimproveaccountabilityandstandardsinthesector.Keyimprovements include the establishment of People in Aid (1997),theSphereProject(1996)andHandbook(1998),theHumanitarianAccountabilityPartnership(HAP)(1997),theCoreHumanitarianStandard(CHS)(2015)andtheActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianAction(ALNAP–1997).

Someoftheresultshavebeenpositive:humanitarianstandardsgainedcurrency,programmesbecamemorecontextualisedandprofessionalismimproved(Doninietal.,2008).Universitycourseswereestablished,jobswere


created and ‘humanitarianism’ became a profession andacareer,inadditiontobeingamovementandanideology.Atthesametime,asgovernancebylarge,internationalhumanitarianorganisations,includingUNagenciesandinternationalNGOs,becamemorecentralisedandbureaucratic,thesystembecameoverlyfocusedonorganisationalprioritiesandcompetitionand increasingly distanced from those it was meant tohelp.Throughthecreationofindustryjargon,complexcoordinationstructuresandcostlycompliancemechanisms,professionalisationcreatedhighbarrierstoentry.Theseweredesignedtoidentifywhoshouldprovideassistance,whenandhowbasedonWesternmodelsofcare,ethicsandvaluesandthenatureandlimitsofthestate’sresponsibilitiestowardsaffectedgroupsintimesofdistress(Simonow,2015).

Finally,professionalisation,ascolonialismhaddonebeforeit,prioritisedinternationalsolutionsovermoreindigenoussolutionsandlocalknowledge,andtechnicalfixesoverunderstandingandaddressingthepoliticalproblemsthatledtocrisesinthefirstplace.Forexample,whensleepingsicknessbrokeoutinSouthSudaninthe1930s,itwastreatedfirstthroughaseriesofmassscreenings and coercive methods that mirrored the colonial power dynamics and security concerns of the time.Bythetimethediseaseresurfacedinthe1990s,controloftheoutbreakinvolvedahighlymedicalisedapproachinvolvingagloballogisticalsupplychaintobringdiagnostictoolsandmedicinesfromEuropetoAfrica and was held hostage by large but reluctant pharmaceuticalcompanieswhoproducedthemedicineforthisdeadlybutcommerciallyunviabledisease.Inbothcases,treatmentdenigratedmorelocal,holisticstrategies which combined medical and environmental approaches,alongwithbroaderattemptstoencourageagriculturaldevelopment(PalmerandKingsley,2016).

One humanitarianism or many?Atthecoreofthenotionof‘humanitarianism’asaconcept,anethosandapracticeisanassumptionofuniversality:becausebeinghumanitarianisfirstandforemostabouthumanity,itsprinciples,normsandpracticearevalidforallpeople,atalltimesandinallplaces.Thereisalsoanassumptionthathumanitarianprinciplesareimmutable,monolithicandsetinstone,

and must be maintained to preserve the universality ofthehumanitariancause,topromoterespectforitsemblems and methods and to render humanitarian assistancemoreeffectiveforthepeopleitserves.AcloserlookathumanitarianhistorybeyondtheWesternnarrativeshowsthat,whilehumanitarianactionmaybeuniversalinitsconcernforhumanity,itis,andhasalwaysbeen,distinctiveinitsinterpretation,adaptable to its circumstances and driven by a variety of motivationsandpractices.

Forexample,theevolutionandinterpretationofhumanitarianismasaconceptdifferedacrossculturesandregions.IntheArabworldduringthetwentiethcentury,theterm‘humanitarianism’doesnothaveasingleacceptedrenditioninArabic,withdifferent,moreseculartranslationsincludingkhayir(charitable),(al)-insaniyyah,(al)-shafaqa(pity)and(al)-honow (compassion).Islamicnotionsofphilanthropyandcharitablegivingmayhaveinfluencedthedevelopmentofhumanitarianactionamonglocalactors,withhistoricaluse of zakat and waqf4 to provide assistance to refugees (Moussa,2014).TheJewishheqdesh(similartotheIslamicwaqf)wasdesignedtobenefitboththereligiousinstitutionitselfandthepoor(Cohen,2005).InChina,theword‘humanitarian’,rendao,hasitslinguisticoriginsinConfucianideasofhumaneness,benevolenceandphilanthropy.JapanesehumanitarianthinkinghasbeenshapedbyShintoism,ConfucianismandZenBuddhism,alongside ‘a moral duty to other less fortunate members ofone’ssocialgroup’(Yeophantong,2014:9).

Differentinterpretationsofhumanitarianismalsomeanthattherolesandattitudesofthestateasahumanitarianactordifferprofoundly.Theconceptof ‘humanitarianism’ in China has been shaped bytheancientConfuciannotionoflegitimacyandresponsibility.Forcenturies,China’semperorbore

4 Commonly translated into English as ‘Islamic alms’, zakat constitutes one of the five pillars of Islamic worship. It involves the giving away of material or financial wealth , in an act of devotion to God. Waqf is defined as ‘religious endowment,’ a charitable act of giving up one’s property ‘for the sake of God’. Waqf endowments led to the building of ‘mosques, Sufi khanqahs, hospitals, public fountains, soup kitchens, traveller’s lodges, and a variety of public works, notably bridges (Davey and Svoboda, 2014). Zakat is a religious obligation whereas Waqf is voluntary.


ultimateresponsibilitytoproviderelieffollowingdisasters,andhisabilitytodosoeffectivelyconstitutedstatelegitimacy.Conversely,failuretodosocould,andoftendid,leadtothelossoftheemperor’srighttorule(Krebs,2014).Inpre-colonialIndia,thedistributionoffood,thepracticeofsharingwealthwiththepoororneedyandthepublicfinancingofeducational,medicalorreligiousinstitutionswascommonamongrulersandmerchantgroups(Simonow,2015).InOttomanPalestinezakatwasbothaprivateobligationandaformofpublicprovisiongovernedbylegislation(Schaeublin,inDaveyandSvoboda(eds),2014).

Humanitarianismacrossdifferentculturesalsoexpressesavarietyofdifferentphilosophies.Withintheformalsector,themore‘classic’or‘Dunantist’formofcrisisresponse,basedonthehumanitarianprinciplesandenshrinedinIHL,hasalwayssatuneasilywith a more expansive form of support and solidarity. Thisso-called‘consequentialist’formofhumanitarianaction,asthenamesuggests,isasconcernedwiththeconsequencesofaidinterventionsasmuchastheprovision of aid in its own right. Such an approach eschewsneutrality,championshumanrightsandaimstotacklethestructuralcausesofsufferingandpovertyinsolidaritywiththepoor(GordonandDonini,2016).Thesedualformsofhumanitarianaction–andthetensionsbetweenthem–oftencoexistwithinthesameorganisation.

Oxfam’s experience in Africa during the 1980s is emblematicofsuchtensions.DuringtheEthiopianfamine,Oxfamaspiredtoamoreclassicalformofhumanitarianismdisconnectedfrompoliticswhenitmaintainedarelationshipwiththegovernment,whileengaginginillicitcross-borderoperationsfromneighbouring Sudan to bring relief to rebel-held areas. However,duringthesameperiodOxfamtooksidesintheconflictinMozambique,publiclyaligningitselfwithanti-apartheid forces on the grounds that aid agencies should notassociatewithorganisationsguiltyoflarge-scaleviolationsofhumanrights(Vaux,forthcoming2016).

Outsidetheformalsystem,humanitarianismhasneverbeenmonolithic,butratherhasevolvedasaby-productofthepoliticsandpoliticalcultureofitstimeandplace.

Thewell-knownworkofCubandoctors,whohaveprovidedmedicalpersonnel,suppliesandsupporttocrisesacrosstheworldsince1960,isbasedonastrongpoliticalcultureofsolidarityandaltruismandthereforehasalwaysbeen,bydesign,anextensionofsocialistideology(Dahrendorf,2015).AkeyfeatureofNordichumanitarianismisitscloseandpositiverelationshipbetweengovernmentandcivilsociety,derivedfromapoliticalculturethatinvolvescivilsocietyinpolicy-makingprocesses(Marklund,2016).

ItisimportanttolookbeyondthehistoricalnarrativeofcodifiedIHLtootherinstancesofthepromotionandadoptionofhumanitarianvaluesandpractices.AmirAbdelQader,wholivedinAlgeriaandfoughtagainsttheFrenchinthenineteenthcentury,isrememberedforhistreatmentoftheweakandhisprotectionoftheinnocent,forurginghistroopstoshowpatienceandforgivenesseveninthemidstofbattleandforensuringthat prisoners were treated humanely. This was before thefirstGenevaConventionandthecreationoftheICRC(JacksonandDavey,2014).DuringtheChineseCivilWar(1927–50),thePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA)adoptedanumber of measures related to the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners intended to maintain popular supportaswellasmilitarydiscipline.ThePLA,andotherarmedgroupsinawiderangeofcountries,articulatedtheirowncodesofconduct,oftenwithoutreferencetoIHL(Xiaodong,2001).

1.3 Conclusion: What history tells us

Theglobalhistoryofhumanitarianactiontellsusthatadaptationandchangehavealwaysbeenpartof humanitarian culture. But what history also tells usisthat,whilethehumanitariansystemishighlyadaptabletoexternalchanges,enduringtensionsthathave been present from the sector’s origins perpetuate outdatedassumptions,dynamicsandpractices–andtheinstitutionsthatmaintainthem–thatpreventitfromimplementingmorefundamentalchange.

Tensions between charity and solidarity Onthepartofhumanitarianagencies,operatingaccording to ‘pure’ humanitarianism has always been difficult;inparticular,theconceptofneutralityhas


always been an elusive goal. Fundamental disagreements aboutthesector’sunderlyingethoscontinuetocontrastimpartial,materialassistanceagainstwiderviewsofprotection,humanrightsandsolidaritywiththepoor.ThiswasequallytrueforinternationalNGOsduringtheBiafranwarinthe1960sandtheEthiopianfamineinthe1980sasitwasduringthefinaldaysoftheSriLankancivilwarin2008(Niland,2014).Withintheformalsystem,principlesofneutralityandimpartialityarenotalwaysappliedinpractice.Outsidethesystem,humanitarian principles are either rejected as Western constructsoradaptedtofitamoreappropriateandrelevantinterpretationoftheirmeaning.

Tensions between politics and principlesHumanitarianactionhasbeenusedtopoliticaladvantageanddisadvantageforcenturies.ExperiencesinVietnamresonatewiththemorerecentchallengesthathavefacedhumanitarianactorsinplaceslikeAfghanistan,IraqandSomalia.Whiletheideologicalstakesaredifferent,manyoftheoperationalandethicaldilemmasremain.TheassociationbetweenWesternliberaldemocracyandhumanitarianactionwasandis extremely strong. The same could be said of non-Westernhumanitarianorganisationsandtheirpolitical-religiousaffiliations:thehealthdiplomacyoftheCubandoctors;thefactthatIslamicorganisationsframetheir own deeply ingrained version of humanitarian assistance in terms of solidarity with fellow Muslims inplacessuchasPalestineandSomalia;andtheimportance of Confucian ideals of responsibility and statelegitimacyinChinesenotionsofassistanceallpointtothefactthatotheractorsfromothertraditionsmayworktoverydifferentprioritiesandprinciples.

Tensions between voluntarism and enterpriseThehumanitariansector,whilevoluntaryinitsoriginsandaltruisticinitsaims,hasoftenfocusedontheperpetuationofitsownintereststothedetrimentofmoreeffectiveactionandaccountabilitytothepeopleitserves.Thegrowthandprofessionalisationofthehumanitarianindustry,itsorientationtowardsdonorfunding and interests and its high barriers to entry areforcingasystematisationofhumanitarianactionthatprioritisescertaintypesandstylesofassistanceoverothers,andwidensthedistancebetweenaid

organisationsandtheir‘clients’ontheground,overlookinglocalorganisationsandindigenouspracticesbecause they do not conform to formal principles and practicesandmaynotspeakthesamelanguage,andbecausetheyriskdivertingpowerandmarketshareawayfromwell-establishedorganisations.ThiswasequallythecaseininternationaleffortstocontrolsleepingsicknessinSouthSudanthroughoutthetwentiethcenturyasitwasduringtheEbolacrisisinWest Africa in 2015.

Tensions between diversity and controlAdoptingahistoricallensdemonstratesthatthereisnohomogenous,‘pure’or‘traditionally’correctconceptionofhumanitarianaction.Instead,therearemultipletraditions,drivenbyavarietyofphilosophical,moralandpoliticalpositions,whichhaveevolvedthroughcontactwitheachotherovertime.However,formal,Western-inspiredhumanitarianismcontinuestoputhumanitarianactionintoamonolithiccontainerthatconformstonarrow,Western-inspiredconceptsofwhathumanitarianactionshouldandshouldnotbe.

Viewinghumanitarianhistorythroughawiderhistoricallenstellsusthatmanyofthecultural,structuralandfinancialfoundationsuponwhichtheformalsystemoperatestoday–thecharitymodel,thedominanceofUNagenciesandlargeNGOs,thepredominanceof Northern and Western concepts of care and the impulsetocreateparallelstructuresandimposepettysovereignty–findtheirdirectrootsinthedynamicsoftheimmediatecolonial/post-colonialandColdWarperiods.However,itistoosimpletoseethehistoryofhumanitarianactionasamerecontinuationofempire:humanitarianactionhasbeenshapedbyawidervarietyofinfluences.Claimstoatimelessuniversalismofhumanitarianism as a concept and ideology are just that.

Asdiscussedatthebeginningofthischapter,historycanhelpincriticallyexploringsomeofthefoundationalassumptionsonwhichthecurrentsystemrests,andhelpusfindcreativesolutionstoseeminglyintractableproblems.Itdemonstratesthatthereisverylittleabouthumanitarianactionthatis‘unprecedented’,andapproaching current events and responses as though they aremakesourunderstandingofthemincomplete,narrows


the scope of analysis and limits the chances of progress. HistoryalsoallowsustofindamoresophisticatedunderstandingofperceptionsandidentityandallowsformoresympatheticengagementwithtraditionsofhumanitarianismoutsidethedominantWesternnarrative.

Infact,fewhumanitarianswoulddenytheimportanceofunderstanding at least some aspects of past experience intheirwork.However,thesector’sengagementwithhistoryistenuousandunsystematic.AstheWorldHumanitarian Summit aims to chart a new course for a moreeffectivehumanitarianfuture,thosegovernments,

humanitarianorganisationsandindividualsthatwillbechargedwithimplementingitshouldconsider,asafirststep,adeeperandmoremethodologicalengagementwith the past. This might be achieved through trainingmodules,throughdeeperandfar-reachingcontextanalysis,throughprioritisinghistoricalandanthropologicalunderstandingandknowledgeinhiringforhumanitarianpositionsandbysupportingdecision-makingwithhistoricalreferenceguidesandtools.Thehumanitariansectorwouldalsobenefitfromacloserexaminationoftheverydifferenthumanitariantraditionsthat have inspired it.


2. The current humanitarian landscapeChapter 1 explored the lessons of history and what wecanlearnfromtheblockagesandgamechangersthathaveaffectedhumanitarianactioninthepast.Ithighlighted that many of the tensions and pathologies affectingthehumanitariansectortodayarenotnewandthatthereisaremarkablecontinuityinthewayinwhichthesectorfunctions.Inthischapterwedelvedeeperintothequalitativeandquantitativechangesthatareaffectinghumanitarianactiontoday.Thehumanitarian landscape is rapidly changing: growth andinstitutionalizationhavereachedunprecedentedlevels,muchprogresshasbeenmadeinhumanitariantechniquebut,asweshowbelow,humanitarianactionisstillbesetbythefamiliarproblemsofthepast.Politicsstilldefinesthespacethathumanitarianscanoccupy,perhaps as never before. Humanitarian response is hostagetotheavailabilityoffunds,whoseuseisoftensubjecttopoliticalormilitaryagendasratherthantoimpartialresponse.PrinciplesareunderthreatandIHLviolateddespitemuchrhetorictothecontrary.Asaresult,agrowingmalaiseisperceptibleinthehumanitarian community the main elements of which are highlighted in this chapter.

2.1. The changing nature of crisis

Thescale,scopeandnatureofcriseswithhumanitarianconsequenceshaveundergonemajorshiftsinrecentyears. These changes have challenged humanitarian effortsinpreparedness,andmitigation–andhavegenerated much higher demands on humanitarian action,bothwithinandoutsidetheformalhumanitariansystem.Withregardtodisastersresultingfromboth‘natural’and‘man-made’hazards,thetrendseemstobeoneofincreasingmagnitudebut(atleastoverthepastcoupleofyears)decreasingfrequency(ALNAP,2015).Thesetrendsareafunctionofglobaldynamicsthatincludeinterrelatedpatternsofclimatechange,resourcecompetition,fragilityandpoliticalinstability,conflictandchronicinsecurity,underdevelopmentandrapidurbanisation(Bernard,2013;BurkleJr,MartoneandGreenough,2014;McGoldrick,2011;Thowetal.,2013).Thetrendtowardsprotractedorlong-lastingcrises–while more a symptom of change than a cause per se –isalsoamajorconsiderationinunderstandingthechangingnatureofcrisis.Thissectionsummarisesthesechanges.

While the number of crises appearstobedeclining,albeitmodestly,thetotalnumber of people in need has risensharply,ashavebudgetsand,critically,budgetaryshortfalls.Table1summarisesthesetrends.Theassessednumber of people requiring assistance has tripled in thepasteightyears,ashasthetotalbudgetoftheformalhumanitarianresponsesystem.However,thegapbetweenassessedneedandbudgetallocationshasgrownaswell.By2015,thehumanitariansystemhadneverhadlargerbudgets–andneverhadalarger‘gap’betweenassessedneedandcoverage(ALNAP,2015;DevelopmentInitiatives,2015).HumanitarianfinancingisdiscussedbelowinSection2.3.Thepointhereistosimply highlight the rapid changes under way.

Categorising humanitarian emergenciesALNAPhassuggestedaschemeforclassifyingcontemporary crises. The categories include rapid-onset‘naturaldisasters’,conflict,protractedcrises,recurrentcrises,urbandisastersand‘mega’disasters(ALNAP,2015).However,thebulkoftheevidenceoncontemporarycrises,aswellascasestudiesconductedforthePFFstudy,confirmthatonlyahandfulofcontemporary humanitarian emergencies can be neatly categorised:theSyriacrisis,forexample,includeselementsofconflict,urbandisastersandprotractedcrisis–andindeedisprobablythebestcurrentexampleofa‘mega’disaster(Howe,2016).5Indeed,manyofthesecouldbelabelled‘wickedproblems’inthattheyaredifficulttodefineprecisely,multi-causal,unstable,havenoclearsolutionandattemptstoaddressthemhaveunforeseenconsequences(Ramalingam,2013).SeveralpointsshouldbenotedabouttheALNAPcategories.First,thislistexcludestechnologicalormulti-causaldisasterssuchasFukushima.Whiletriggeredby‘naturalhazards’,rapid-onset natural disastersoftenputpopulationsatriskduetohuman-madefactors.Second,conflict is the classic‘human-made’crisis–displacingpeoplefromtheirlivelihoods,destroyingcivilauthorityandinfrastructureandleadingtohorrifichumanitarianconsequences.But there are many other human-made factors that put peopleatrisk,bothinconflictandincrisestriggeredbynaturalhazards.Somepoliticalcrisesdonotnecessarily

5 Howe (2016) is the Syria case study undertaken specifically for the Planning From the Future project.


Table 1. People in need, funding requests and gaps

Category 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Peopleinassessedneed(m) 26 28 43 53 65 62 73 76 82.5 125

TotalUNCAPappeal($bn) 5.5 8.1 10.0 12.9 9.5 10.5 13.2 19.5 19.9 20.1

TotalCAPfunded($bn) 4.0 5.5 7.1 8.0 5.8 6.2 8.5 12.0 9.7 N.A.

Budgetarygap($bn) 1.5 2.6 2.9 4.9 3.7 4.3 4.7 7.5 10.2 N.A.

% of CAP funded 72.7% 67.9% 71.0% 62.0% 61.1% 59.0% 64.4% 61.5% 49.0 % N.A.

Source:DevelopmentInitiatives,2015;CHSAlliance,2015;OCHA,2016;ALNAP,2015

resultinviolentconflict,butmayresultinsignificanthumanitarianemergenciesallthesame(forexamplethefamineinNorthKoreainthemid-1990s).Currently,about80%ofthehumanitariancaseloadisdrivenbyconflict(DevelopmentInitiatives,2015).Third,protracted crises arelong-lastingsituations(bydefinitionlongerthaneightyears,andcausedbymultiplefactors,(FAO/WFP,2010)).Recurrent crisesaredifferentfromprotractedcrisesinthattheyhavespecificcauses,andonecrisismayfollowanother,buttheyarenotnecessarilycontinuous.Witharapidlyurbanisingglobalpopulationandrisingurbanpovertyandvulnerability,urban disasters have become a category on their own. Mega disasters havethepotentialto spiral out of the control of any authority. The Syria crisisisthebestcurrentempiricalexample,althoughtheEbolaepidemicinWestAfricain2014–15wasconsideredapotentialmegadisaster.

Changes in the ‘landscape’ of crisisChanges in the nature of humanitarian crisis include the frequencyandseverityofcrisis,changesinthedurationofcrisisandchangesinthenatureofconflict.

Changes in the frequency and severity of crises.DatafromCRED-EMDATdepictsasteadyincreaseintheincidence of disasters triggered by natural hazards for nearlyacenturyleadinguptoabouttheyear2004,butwithasmalldrop-offinnumbersperyearsincethen.Likewise,thenumberofpeopleaffectedincreasedsteadily,butthendeclinedinrecentyears.Thenumberofpeoplekilledinnaturaldisastershasdroppedsteadily

overthepastcentury,andwithafewexceptionssuchastheIndianOceantsunami,hasbeenverylowinrecentyears. The 2015 State of the Humanitarian System report (ALNAP,2015)alsonotedasharpdeclineindisasterstriggeredbynaturalhazardsthatrequiredinternationalassistance–butnotedthat,inmanycases,thisisbecauseaffectedcountriesareincreasinglycapableofhandling the impact of natural disasters on their own.

Informationaboutthefrequencyorincidenceofviolentconflictiscontradictory.HarrisonandWolfe(2012)arguethatwarsandconflictareincreasinginfrequency.Pinker(2011)andtheHuman Security Report(HumanSecurityResearchGroup,2013),ontheotherhand,contendthatviolentconflicthasbecomelessfrequent.Whatisclear,however,isthatthehumanitarian caseload resulting from violent conflict is increasing. UNHCR(2015)notesthat13.9millionpeopleweredisplacedbyviolenceandpersecutionin2014alone,with the total reaching an unprecedented 60 million and,increasingly,numbersondisplacementdonotcapturethefullimpactofconflict–peoplemaybetrappedbyconflictratherthandisplacedbyit.Between2002and2013,86%ofallfundsrequestedforCAPappealswereforpeopleaffectedbyconflict(OCHA,2015b).Andalltenofthelargestcurrenthumanitarianappealshavecomefromconflict-relatedemergencies.In2016,peopleinneedofhumanitarianaidareestimatedatastaggering125million,apointmaderepeatedly at the World Humanitarian Summit. The implicationsofthesetrendsarediscussedbelow.


Changes in the duration of crisis. Humanitarian emergencieswereclassicallyconceivedofasbrief,acuteepisodesofsuffering,broughtaboutbyaspecificcause,withaclearbeginningandend,andfollowedbysomekindofperiodofrecoveryorrehabilitation(FAO/WFP,2010).Recentevidence,however,showsthatanincreasing number of humanitarian crises are protracted (and/or‘recurrent’),andthat,onceinthemodeofaprotractedcrisis,itisverydifficultto‘recover’(FAO/WFP,2010).Accordingly,some70–80%ofhumanitarianfunding now goes into crises that have lasted eight years orlonger(DevelopmentInitiatives,2015).

Changes in the nature of conflict. Since the end of theColdWar,themajorityofactiveconflictsintheworldhavebeeninternalratherthaninter-state,andprotractedorrecurrentinnature(LangeandQuinn,2003).Duffield(2001)andKeen(2008)describethenatureof‘newwars’–conflictsthathadbeenpresumedtobeproxywarsbetweenrivalsuperpowers,butwhichcontinuedintheaftermathoftheColdWar,andwerefuelledbylocalgrievancesthatwerelargelymaskedwhenthepartiesweresuperpowerclients.Theseconflictsoften,butnotalways,reflectedastruggletocontrolresourcesandmarketsinaneraofincreasingglobalisation.Theseconflictshighlightthenatureofstatefragilityandtheinabilityofstatestocontrolactivitieswithintheirboundaries,andtheriseofarmednon-stateactors(Duffield,2001).Atfacevalue,theymaybetiedtoreligious,tribalorethnicidentities(Micheletti,2010),butPFFcasestudiesshowthatpolitical,economicandideological factors underpin many such crises as well. Whateverthecause,inmostcasesciviliansbearthebruntofconflict.Insome,i.g.Syria,thedirecttargetingofciviliansandthedenialofhumanitarianactionhavebecomeprincipalwarobjectives.

Since2001,moreideologicallymotivatedformsofconflicthaveagainemerged,manyofthemrevolvingaroundcounter-insurgency or the ‘global war on terror’. This has complicatedhumanitarianresponseinseveralways.First,ithasincreasedrestrictionsonaccess:bothrestrictionsimposedbyarmednon-stateactorsthemselves,andbyinsecurity.Second,donorsputrestrictionsonaidthatlimithumanitarianresponse,andvariousactorsinstrumentally manipulate humanitarian assistance

fortheirownpoliticalends(Donini,2012).Andthird,theremaybeagenerallackofrespectforInternationalHumanitarianLawbypartiesinconflict,whetherstateor non-state actors. All of these lead to a phenomenon labelledthe‘collapseofhumanitarianspace’,althoughthere is disagreement over whether humanitarian ‘space’reallyhasdisappeared,orwhetherthenatureofhumanitarianactioninsuchspaceshaschanged(CollinsonandElhawary,2012).Insum,humanitarianactioncontinuestooccupysuchspaceasisdeterminedbypolitics,or,moreprecisely,thefailuresofpolitics.

Drivers of conflict and crisisClimate change. Thefirst-levelimpactsofclimatechangeon the frequency and severity of natural disasters such as drought and tropical storms have been evident for some time(Walkeretal.,2010).Butclimatechangeinvolvescomplexinteractionsatanumberofdifferentlevels,withunpredictableoutcomes(Pachauri,MayerandIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange,2015).Thesecondaryeffects,suchasthegreaterrangeofdiseasevectorsastemperatureswarm,displacementcausedbyprospectivechangesinsealevels,increasedconflictovernaturalresources,waterinparticular,andthecapacityofpoliticalsystemstoadapttorapidchangeandcontainthepotentialdamagearealllong-termconcernsrelatedto climate change.

Demographic shifts. Three major forms of demographic shiftshavechangedthenatureofvulnerability.First,whilechildrenremainperhapsthegreatestsingleat-riskgroupinemergencies,muchoftheglobe’spopulationisagingandtheneedsofavulnerableagingpopulationaredifferent(HelpAgeInternational,2015).Second,insomepartsoftheworld,theHIV-AIDScrisishassubstantiallyreducedthenumberofworking-ageadults,makingbothchildren and the elderly more vulnerable in crises of all types,andhasweakenedtheinstitutionsthattypicallyhelptoprotectpeopleincrisis(deWaalandWhiteside,2003).Butthemajorshiftisurbanisation.Withthedramaticpaceofurbanisationprojectedtocontinue,citiesareincreasinglyareasofextremevulnerability.‘Stressbundles’whereclimate-relateddisasters,conflict-inducedmigration,poverty,poorgovernanceandlimitedlocalcapacityallconverge(ZetterandDeikun,2010).Urbanenvironments,andtheircortegeofrisksand


vulnerabilities,havelongexistedoutsidetheexpertiseofthehumanitariancommunity,asstandardsandpracticesarosemainlyfromcampsituationsinruralareas.ForcedmigrationofmainlyurbanSyriansandothernationalsfleeingconflictareanadditionaldimension,whichhasledtothenearcollapseofEurope’sasylumsystemanditsabilitytoprovideassistanceandprotectiontovulnerable groups within its borders.

Globalisation. Globalisationhasbroughtgrowthanddevelopment and the rapid expansion of opportunity to manypopulationgroups,butithashadclearwinnersandlosers.Thelinksbetweenborrowedcapitalforeconomicdevelopment,structuraladjustmentpoliciesmeanttoensure debt repayment and the interconnectedness of globalmarketshaveresultedinincreasedvulnerabilityformany.O’DemseyandMunslow(2006:501)citea‘downwardspiral…ofdebt,disease,malnutrition,missededucation,economicentrapment,poverty,powerlessness,marginalization,migrationandinstability’. The food price crises of 2008 demonstrated that few places on earth are insulated from the impact ofaglobalmarketshock,withwidespreadfoodinsecurity reported in many places as the result of the near tripling of the price of basic food grains on global markets(HeadeyandFan,2008).Asimilarphenomenonwasnotedin2011thatmayhave,amongotherthings,contributedtotheArabSpring(Barrett,2013).

Geopolitics. Geopoliticalconcernshavealwaysshapedhumanitarian crises. State fragility is increasingly thecontextfor–ifnotthecauseof–humanitarianemergencies.Belligerentsinconflict,particularlyinthecontextofchallengestonationalsovereignty,continuetoattempttoco-optormanipulatehumanitarianactiontotheirstrategicadvantage(Donini,2012).Thisisdiscussedfurther below.

2.2 The changing nature of humanitarian action

Humanitarianactionisrapidlyevolving.Someofthesechanges are occurring within the formal humanitarian system,manyareeffectivelyoutsidethe‘system’asithasbeenunderstood.Thissectionanalysesbothsetsofchanges.

Trends in the formal systemAsdiscussedinChapter1,someofthepivotaltrendsobservedwithinthe‘system’bearmentioningagainhere.Theseincluderapidgrowthandinstitutionalisation;supply-driven responses largely dictated by donors; on-goingdifficultieswithprinciples,protectionandsovereignty;andrepeatedattemptsatreform,whichhaveatbestbeenonlypartiallysuccessful.Despitethechallenges,therehavebeenimprovementsinseveralnotableareasaswell.Thissectionreviewsallofthese,beginningwithrecentimprovements,thenturningtosome persistent challenges.

Key areas of improved humanitarian performance. Whilethecontoursofthepoliticaleconomyofthesystemhaveremainedrelativelystatic,anumberofchangesinhumanitarianpracticehavealteredthefieldin the past decade. Some have improved its overall effectiveness.Theseareoutlinedhere.Manyofthesewere built upon at the recent WHS.

• Market-based and private-sector responses. Perhapsthemostsignificantchangeinthepracticeof humanitarian response in the past decade hasbeentheshiftawayfromafocusonin-kindassistancetowardsgreaterrelianceonmarketsandmarket-basedprogramming.Earlieremphasisonin-kinddelivery–particularlyfoodaid–wasdriveninpartbylargesurplusesofagriculturalproductionindonorcountries,makinghumanitarianandother forms of assistance a means of dealing with adomesticproblem(BarrettandMaxwell,2005).Beginningwiththeresponsetothe2004IndianOceantsunami,theemphasishasincreasinglybeenon cash transfers or commodity and value vouchers toreplacein-kindaid,particularlyinplaceswheremarketsstillfunctionwellinspiteofthedisaster(HarveyandBailey,2015).Thismodeofinterventionhassincebeenusedtogreateffectincrisesthatarelargelyinaccessibletohumanitarianagencies,suchasSomalia(Hedlundetal.,2013;Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015)andSyria(Howe,2016).Andyet,whilethismodeofprogramminghasincreasedsubstantiallysince2005andisadvocatedbynearlyeveryoneincurrentpolicydebates(HarveyandBailey,2015),itstillaccountsforonlyasmallpercentage


ofoverallhumanitarianfunding(HighLevelPanelonHumanitarianCashTransfers,2015;HarveyandBailey,2015;DevelopmentInitiatives,2015).Cashincreasesthefreedomofchoiceofaffectedgroupsandreducescostsforaidagencies.Itspotentialishuge,asdemonstratedbythehighlevelofinterestevidentattheWHS–andsoaretheimplicationsforagenciesthathavetraditionallyprovidedfoodandotherin-kinditems.

• Private sector engagement. Incontextsofnaturalhazards,andparticularlyindealingwiththeimpactofclimatechange,thereisincreasingexperienceinusinginsuranceandotherrisk-financinginstrumentstoanticipateriskandputinplacedifferentmeasuresfordealingwithpredictableshocks(AfricanRiskCapacity,n.d.).Claimsarefrequentlyassertedthatinsuranceandriskfinancingcanreduceandeven eliminate the requirement for post-disaster humanitarianassistance(Linnerooth-BayerandMechle,2009;UNISDR,2015).Thisincludesbothmicro-insuranceinterventionsatthehouseholdandlocallevel,andnationalleveleffortsatrisk-pooling.Whencombinedwithapproacheslikecashtransfersorvouchers,theseprogrammeshavebeenshowntoreducethetimeittakestotriggeraresponseandgetassistanceintothehandsofdisaster-affectedgroups(Rahimi,2014).Theseprogrammestendto be more developed in high- and middle-income countries,buttheyholdpotentialforapplicationinlow-income,chronicallyvulnerablecountriesalso.Public/privatepartnershipsinriskreductionandinsurancehavegreatpotential,butwillstillrequiretraditionalmodesofhumanitarianresponsewheretheseapproachesfail(KentandZyck,2014).Theevidenceisfairlyclear,forinstance,thatoveralllevels of insurance against predictable hazards are lowestincountrieswhereexposuretoriskishighest,leading many analysts to advocate for greater levelsofinvestmentinthesepartnerships.Littleofthiskindofrisk-financingappliesinunpredictablecircumstancessuchasprotractedconflicts,exceptperhapsinthecontextofprotectingspecificbusinessinvestments,i.e.notat-riskhumanpopulations(CrossinandBanfield,2006).

• The revolution in treating malnutrition in emergencies. Untilthemid-2000s,thetreatmentofsevereacutemalnutritioninemergencieswaslargelyrestrictedtoclinic-based,in-patienttreatmentcentres. This approach could not handle the caseload,andchildrenfrequentlyfellbackintoacutemalnutritionafterrelease.Newapproachesthatrelyonout-patient,community-basedmanagementofsevereacutemalnutritionhavedramaticallyimprovedcoverageandmadeidentificationofcaseseasier.Ready-to-usetherapeuticfoodhasmadehome-basedtreatmentamoreviableoption.Thecombinationofthese(boththeproductandtheprocess)hasledtodramaticimprovementsintreatingacutemalnutritioninemergencies(SadlerandMaxwell,2011).Thischangeinpracticeinemergencieshasin turn led to similar changes in social safety net programmes in non-emergency contexts. Given the protractednatureofcontemporarycrises,thereisadditionalattentiontothetreatmentofmoderatemalnutritionandmicronutrientdeficiencydiseases,andanemphasisonpreventionofundernutrition.Inthiscontext,theenhancementofthenutrientcontentoffoodaidhasalsogainedattention(FoodAidQualityReview,2011).Thesearchforthemosteffectiveandcost-efficientsupplementaryandtherapeuticfoodscontinues.

• Increasing emphasis on protection. Non-material needs,inparticularprotection,aregainingincreasingprominenceinhumanitarianrhetoric,butonlypartlyinpractice.ThefailureoftheinternationalcommunityinSriLankawasatragicreminderofhowprotectionplayssecondfiddletoassistance,nottomentionRealpolitik(UnitedNations2012;Nilandetal.2015).Awarenessisincreasingbutprogressispatchy;institutionalandstaffresistancetoaddressingprotectionissues,evenatthehighestlevel,isstillwidespread.Despitestrongexhortatorystatementssuch as the Human Rights Up Front agenda of the UNSecretary-GeneralortheInter-agencyStandingcommittee(IASC)statementontheCentralityofProtection,progressisslowandprotectionconcernscontinuetobeignoredorunderminedbymainstreamhumanitarianstakeholders(Nilandetal.2015;HealyandTiller2014;SvobodaandGillard2015).Ourown


casestudiesandthePFFBriefingPaperonprotection(Niland2015)documentmanysuchinstancesinSyria,andelsewhere.Insum,thereismoreawarenessofthecriticalimportanceofprotection,particularlyinconflictsettings,but,challengesremain(seebelow).

• Technological changes. Humanitarian response has seenadramaticincreaseinrelianceoninformationandcommunicationtechnologies.Thisishailedasa‘fundamentalshiftinpowerfromcapitalsandheadquarters to the people aid agencies aim to assist’(UNOCHA,2013:2).ThisincludestheuseofTwitterandothersocialmedia,internetplatformsandmobilephonestocrowd-sourceinformationandallowformoreinteractiveengagementwithcrisis-affectedpopulations.Forthosepopulationswithaccesstothesetechnologies,thishasbeenatruegamechanger.Ithasenabledgreaterself-help and has started to rebalance power between humanitarianactorsandaffectedcommunities.Forhumanitarians,ithascreatedmuchstrongerlinkswithprivatesectoractors,strengtheningprivatesectorinvolvement.Ithasledtothecreationofanewgenerationofhumanitarianvolunteers(bothintermsofcrowdsourcingandcrisismapping,butalsotheuseofsocialmediatohelpwithreunificationorotherissues).Othertechnologies,includingGIS,crisismappingandmobilecash,haveimprovedthequalityofresponse,orpermittedaffectedpopulationstobecome‘firstresponders’(Vinck,2013;Meier,2015).‘Big data’ approaches have led to monitoring and earlywarninginnovationssuchasGlobalPulse(High-LevelPanelofEminentPersonsonthePost-2015DevelopmentAgenda,2013).

However,accesstotechnologyisstillunequal,andexperienceindicatesthat,inmanycases,thosemostlikelytoexperienceacrisisaretheleastlikelytohaveaccesstosomeofthesetechnologies(Vinck,2013).Widespread access to cell phones and electronic moneytransfersystemspermittedamajorresponsetotheSomaliafamine,theSyriacrisisandotherrecent humanitarian emergencies. But cell phone networksdonotexisteverywhere(SouthSudan,CentralAfricanRepublic)andcanbeshutdownbygovernments. Money transfer companies have been

targetedinthe‘globalwaronterror’,underliningthatthesetechnologiesareneitherrisk-freenorguaranteed,evenwheretheyworkwell.Importantly,also,theuseofnewtechnologiestendstoreducethephysicalproximitybetweenconventionalaidworkers,‘respondentsoffirstresort’andthepeoplethey intend to support. Remote technologies also havethepotentialtooutsourcemuchoftheriskofhumanitarianresponsetothelatter(DoniniandMaxwell,2014;Duffield,2012;ALNAP,2015).

• Responding to the challenges of urban programming.Theworld’spopulationhasbeenrapidlyurbanising.Virtuallyallthepopulationgrowthglobally to 2050 is projected to occur in urban areas ofdevelopingcountries(FAO,2012).Thishasledtoa sharp increase in urban vulnerability and urban crises,butthecapacitiesneededtorespondtourbanhumanitarianemergenciesareverydifferentfromthetraditionalhumanitariantoolkitpredicatedontheassumptionof(mostly)ruralcrises(ZetterandDeikun,2010).ThislackofurbanexpertisealongwithenvironmentalconditionshaspromptedashiftinthehumanitarianagendatowardsDisasterRiskReduction(DRR),particularlyinurbanareas(ACAPS,2015;IFRC,2010).Increasingattentionisbeingpaidtourbanassessmentpractices,thechallengesoftargetingvulnerablepopulationsandaccesstodifficulturbanareas(Sandersonetal.,2014).TheissueofIDPsinurban areas and how best to target them is also beingmoreactivelypursued.ExperiencefromtheSyria crisis has shown that people displaced from urbanareasarelesslikelytomoveintocampsettings,meaningthatorganisingassistanceandprotectionforurbanIDPsandrefugeesisaratherdifferenttaskthancurrent models. While low-income urban dwellers arelikelytofacearaftofhazardsforwhichruraldisasterriskreductionprogrammesarenotprepared(ZetterandDeikun,2010;Sandersonetal.,2014),urbanpopulationsaremuchmorelikelytopossesssmartphonesandbelinkedintotheinternetorsocialmedia,andthusmuchbetterabletoaccessservicesandmaketheirneedsknown.

• Evidence and the use of evidence. Amajorcriticismofhumanitarianactionfromadecadeagonoted


that,principlesnotwithstanding,humanitarianresponsewasnotimpartial,andindeeddidnothavetheevidencebaseneededtobeimpartial(DarcyandHofmann,2003).Sincethen,majoreffortshave been made to improve the evidence base on which humanitarian programmes and policies are based.Thisincludesmajorinter-agencyeffortstoimproveassessment,includingtheAssessmentCapacityProject(ACAPS)project,IntegratedPhaseClassificationanalysisandotherdiagnostictools(Darcyetal.,2013).Greaterrelianceonevidencehasenabledamoveawayfromcountinginputsandoutputstowardsmuchmoresophisticatedimpact assessment based on outcomes and impacts (Dijkzeul,HilhorstandWalker,2013),andhassimultaneouslyenabledmuchgreaterparticipationofaffectedgroupsinbothassessmentandimpactevaluation(Catleyetal.,2014).

Betterevidencehasallowedforgender-andage-disaggregated analysis of crisis and the impact ofcrisis(Mazuranaetal.,2011).Evidence-basedapproachesarenowregularlyutilisedinevaluatingtheimpactofdifferentinterventionsinhumanitariancontexts,eventhoughtherearedifficultiesinreplicatingclinically-basedrandomisedcontrolledtrialsinhumanitariancontexts(KrystalliandEmerson,2015).Newanalyticalmethodshaveenabledevidence-based approaches to determine which modalitiesbestfitthespecificcontextofagivencrisis(Maxwell,ParkerandStobaugh,2013).Althoughinmanycasesvalidinformationandevidenceremainelusive,thehumanitarianfieldhasmadeimportantprogressinthisareainthepastdecade.Manypartiesare now calling for independent needs assessments as a guarantor of the credibility and validity of the analysis(DuBoisetal.,2015).

• The ‘resilience’ agenda. Several major reviews ofhumanitarianactionhaverecommendedthatthequestionofbuildingresilience–notsimplyrespondingtocrises–needstobebuiltintohumanitarianpolicy(Ashdown,2011).ThiswasoneoffiveprioritythemesfortheWorldHumanitarianSummit(UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016).Much emphasis at WHS was placed on increasing the

effectivenessofprogrammesinprotractedcrises,includingbyadoptinglongertermorsustainableapproaches.ParticularlysincetheSomaliafamineof2011andtheSahelcrisisof2012,bothdonorsandagencies have developed policies and programmes aimedatbolsteringthecapacityofat-riskandaffectedcommunitiestobettermanagerisksposedbyvarioushazards,andtomitigate,copewithandrecoverfromshocks.Buildingontheevidencethatinvestmentsinpreventionandpreparednesscanresult in major savings in humanitarian response budgets(Cabot-Ventonetal.,2012),‘resilienceprogramming’isaconcertedattempttointegratedisasterriskreduction,earlywarningandcontingencyplanning,crisismitigation,andacuteresponseandrecovery,withsocialservicedeliveryandlivelihoodimprovements–allinanover-archingprogrammingframework(DFID,2011;USAID,2012).

Ofequalconcernisthequestionofwhatkindofhazardsorshocksat-riskcommunitiesface,andhowexternalsupportcanorshouldhelptomanagerisks.Few doubt the importance of building resilience in thefaceoflonger-termclimatechange,orbuildingsystemsthatreducetherisksofnaturalhazards,betheyclimaticortectonic.Thenotionofbuildingresilienceinthefaceofviolentconflictismorecontested,anddespitetherhetoric,manypolicystatements and resilience programmes tend to focus on‘natural’hazardsratherthanonconflictsituations,whilefewspecificallyembracethenotionofbuildingcommunityresilienceinconflict-pronesituations(Scott,2014).Itclearlydoesnotmeanmakingpeople more ‘resilient’ to indiscriminate military attacksorviolationsofIHL.Butnotionsofprotectinglivelihoodsorenablingrecoverymustnotbeleftoutofresponsestoprotractedconflictsituationseither.

There is increasing consensus around the need to closethe‘humanitarian–developmentdivide’,andmost analysts believe that resilience analysis and programmingisthewayforward.Emphasisingasitdoesthelinksbetweenanticipationandpreparedness,riskreductionandriskmanagement,rapidandeffectivehumanitarianresponseandrisk-informeddevelopmentinterventions(UnitedNationsSecretary-


General,2016;HPG,2016).Incontextscharacterisedbyrecurrentnaturalhazards,thisisarelativelyuncontroversialconclusion.Incontextscharacterisedbyprotractedconflict,andespeciallybythepresenceofarmednon-stateactors,theapplicationofresilienceapproachesisstillbeingworkedout.Thisintegrationrequiresattentiontoitsimplicationsforprinciplesandprotection,aswellasadifferentkindofleadershipthanhasoftenbeeninevidence.Some‘Dunantist’humanitarianactors–forexampleICRC–haveexpressedconcern,includingattheWHS,withregard to approaches purportedly aimed at merging humanitariananddevelopmentaction.

• Response to ‘natural disasters’. Crises caused by naturaleventssuchashurricanesortyphoons,droughts,earthquakesandfloodsareoftendescribedas ‘natural disasters’. The State of the Humanitarian Systemreportnotesthat‘onlyinthefunctionofrapid response to major sudden-onset disasters can thesystemclaimclearsuccess’(ALNAP,2015:15),evenifthis‘success’sometimescomesatthepriceofthemarginalisationoflocalauthoritiesandNGOs.TheSendaiFrameworkforDisasterRiskReduction,approvedinMarch2015,isalandmarkagreementthat aims to reduce both the mortality from and the economicimpactofthiskindofdisasteroverthenext15years.TogetherwiththeSustainableDevelopmentGoals,animprovedframeworkhasbeenputinplaceforaddressingnon-conflict-relatedcrisesinthefuture.Thisisnosmallachievement,butisonlyonekindofdisaster. Only very limited improvements have been made in addressing natural hazards in the context of conflictorotherpoliticalcrises–inparticular,slow-onsetdroughtinthecontextofconflictandinthepresenceofarmednon-stateactors(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015).Itshouldalsobenotedthattheresponseto pandemics is usually treated separately from ‘naturaldisasters’,giventhedifferentsocialdynamicsaround pandemics. The State of the System report did notfindimprovementsinpandemicresponse,notingparticularlythestrainthattheEbolaoutbreakof2014/15putonthehumanitariansystem.

• Finally,itisimportanttomentionthenumerouspan-systeminitiatives,suchasthedevelopment

of minimum standards for humanitarian response (SPHERE),theintroductionofstandardsforaccountabilitytoaffectedpopulations(CommonHumanitarianStandard)andvariousinitiativesrelatedtolearningandimprovedqualityandaccountability,monitoringandevaluation(ALNAP,ELRHA,PHAP,theHumanitarianAcademy,etc.).Whileattentiontoaccountabilityisincreasing,therelatedissueofindependent needs assessments and monitoring is alsoreceivingmoreairtimeinhumanitariancircles.Practicalsolutionsarestillbeingsought,however.

Whiletherehavebeenimprovements,thehumanitariansectorsstillfacesmanypersistentchallenges.Theseareoutlined below.

Growth and institutionalisation. The rapid expansion ofanorganisedinternational‘humanitariansystem’hasbeenarevolutionininternationalrelationsoverthelastthreedecades.ItrepresentstheconsciouseffortofmainlyNorthernstatesandcivilsocietiestorelievethesufferingofdistantstrangersbutalsotocontaincrisesthat might threaten peace and security. Humanitarian actionhasthusemergedasapotentformofcontemporarygovernance:asetofinstitutions,norms,policies,ideologiesandrepresentationsthataregearedtowardsprovidingassistanceandprotectionintimesof disaster and crisis. Organised humanitarianism also functionsasamoralcommunity:publicopinionintheWest,andincreasinglyelsewhere,hasbecomeusedtotheglobalspectacleofsufferingandexpectstheglobaldisplayofsuccourwhencrisisanddisasterstrike.

Humanitarianismhasalonganddiversehistory,butthequalitativeandquantitativetransformationssincethe end of the Cold War are unparalleled. Organised internationalhumanitarianismhasmutatedfromarelativelymarginalandspecialisedactivitytoonethatisatthecentreofcontemporaryinternationalcooperationandgovernance.From$2.1billionin1990,thecombinedhumanitarianspendofstates,UnitedNationsagencies,non-governmentalorganisations(NGOs)andtheRedCross and Red Crescent movement has increased more thanten-foldtoatleast$24billionin2015(DevelopmentInitiatives,2015)andabove$30billionin2016.Thisdoesnotincludethecontributionsoflocalcharities,


religiousgroupsandtithes,communityorganisationsandaffectedpeoplethemselves,whoarethefirstonthescenewhendisasterstrikes.Thevisibleandstructuredhumanitarian enterprise now employs a quarter of a millionpeople,thevastmajorityofwhomarenationalsofaffectedcountries.Withthegrowthoffundshascomeasimultaneousprocessofinstitutionalisation,proceduralisationandprofessionalisationofthediverseinstitutionsthatcomprisewhatinsomewayshas become the world’s humanitarian welfare system. Inaddition,thereisalsoagrowingsuperstructureofcoordination,qualityandaccountabilityentities(OCHA,NGOcoordinationbodies,ALNAP,Sphere,CommonHumanitarianStandard)andacottageindustryofmonitoring,evaluationandhumanitarianresearchoutfits(includingthoseattheoriginofthepresentreport).Thesizeofthissuperstructureanditsrelationshipwithactualhumanitarianresponseisitselfproblematic.

Manyreportsprovideadescriptionofthesystemanditsfunctioning(Tayloretal.,2012;ALNAP,2015;Doninietal.,2008).Likeitsdevelopmentcousin,ithasgrownbyaccretionratherthanaccordingtosomegrandplan.Ithasmanymovingpartsandmanydifferenttypesofstakeholders.Newinstitutionshavebeencreated,amalgamatedandaddedtooldones(Adinolfietal.,2005;Ashdown,2011;Inter-AgencyStandingCommittee,2012).Withtheperceivedemergenceofnewproblemsandsituations,WesternNGOshavegrownanddiversifiedbeyondrecognition.Andsohavenorms,standards,procedures,layers,clusters,customs,hierarchies,coalitionsofagencies,coordinationmechanisms,interagencybodies,newmechanismsattemptingtosubstituteforolderones,andthelike.Asoneinformantforthisstudynoted,‘ithasbecomeamillefeuille’(apuffpastry).

Many would dispute there is a system.6 Former EmergencyReliefCoordinator(ERC)JohnHolmesquipped:‘Itisnotasysteminanyrecognisablestate’but‘ahaphazardcollectionoforganisations’(Cornish,2011).Nevertheless,thesystem,suchasitis,doesfunctioninthesensethatitdelivershugelyimportantservices.Someofitspartsworkmoreeffectively

thanothers.Itsavesandsometimeshelpstoprotectinnumerablelives.Itcanmountextraordinarilycomplexoperations–asinDarfurortheresponsetothe2004tsunami,the2010HaitiearthquakeorthemillionsofrefugeeswhohavefledSyria.Althoughhobbledbybureaucracy,instrumentalisationandunendingturfwars,itcanmobiliseitselfintoeffort.Withgrowthhascomeprofessionalisation,thedevelopmentofstandardsandaccountabilitiesthatmakethehumanitariansectormorepredictable,moretechnicallyableandsometimesmoreeffectivethanbefore.However,intheprocessit has lost some of the can-do voluntary spirit and flexibilitythatcharacteriseditsformerethos.Ithasbecomemoreriskaverse.No-goareashaveincreasedbecause of security and insurance concerns or because anti-terrorlegislationproscribescontactwithcertaingroups.Face-to-faceinteractionhasoftenbeenreplacedbyface-to-screen,andmanyofthesescreensaresituatedinbunkerisedcompoundswherehumanitariansworkandlive(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;DoniniandMaxwell,2014;DoniniandScalettaris,2016).7

A supply-driven, top-down complex system. The systemis‘oftheNorth’andnot‘oftheworld’(Donini,MinearandWalker,2004).Becauseitcommandshugeresourcesandcandecidewheretheyareused,organisedhumanitarianismconstitutesanimportantformofglobalgovernance–notinthesensethatthereisasingleforceorsourceofpowerthatdirectsitswork:ratherthanprinciplesoroverarchingstrategies,whatkeepsthesystem(somewhat)togetherisitsnetworkpower(Grewal,2008).ItistheNorthern-basedagenciesthathave set the standards and norms by which the system operates.Thisnetworkpowerdefinestherulesofthehumanitarianclub,whichnewplayerseffectivelyneedtoacceptiftheywanttobecomemembers.Assuch,thisnetworkpowerprovidesthegluethatkeepsthesystem somewhat together and allows its disparate parts to communicate with one another. But it also creates the dominant structures of what has been called the ‘EmpireofHumanity’(Barnett,2011).Despitemuchrhetoric,thecurrent‘supply-ledparadigm’–topdown,

6 See Chapter 1 for the definition of ‘system’ used for this report.

7 Note that the first and last of these references mentioned here are case studies conducted specifically for the Planning from the Future project.


externallydriven,withafocusonrapidactionandshort-termfundingcycles–doesnotprovideincentivesforengagingwithaffectedpeople(BrownandDonini,2014).Itproducesisomorphismandcreatesbarrierstoentryfornewordifferentactors(Hopgood,2008).Likemanysystems,organisedhumanitarianismsuffersfromtheclassictransitionofinstitutionsfrommeanstoanendtobecominganendinthemselves(Slim,2015).

Recent research and reports have documented the growth andcomplexificationoftheinstitutionalised‘oligopoly’centredaroundthesixUNagencies,theICRCandsixtosevenfederationsofinternationalNGOsthataccountfor80%ofthehumanitarianspend(ElsandCarstensen,2015).Thisoligopolyor‘club’workscloselywiththeOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)donorsthataccountforroughlytwo-thirdsofthefunding(DevelopmentInitiatives,2015).WiththeexceptionofMédecinsSansFrontières(MSF)andafewsmallerNGOs,noneofthekeyhumanitarianagenciescanaffordtobreakawayfromtheir‘cozyrelationship’withahandfulofNortherndonors(Doninietal.,2008:30).Atthesametime,thecomplexityofthesystemandthetransactioncostsinvolvedinmakingitworkthroughmultiplelayersofcoordinationbyconsensushaveledtothecreationofaninordinatelylargesuperstructurewhichappears to be increasingly remote from those it purports tohelp(DoniniandMaxwell,2014).

A system beholden to the powers that be. Since theendoftheColdWar,theagendasunderpinninghumanitarianresponsehavebeenincreasinglylinkedtothecontainmentofcrisesandthepromotionofliberalpeaceand,moregenerally,Westernforeignpolicyaims(BarnettandWeiss,2011;DoniniandWalker,2012;Duffield,2001).Bydesignorbydefault,whileitaspirestofunctionasakindofglobalsafetynet,thehumanitarianenterprise,whichgrewinparalleltothecapitalistsystem,alsoservestoreducetherisksofcrisesescalatingandthreateningthecitadelsoftheNorth.Humanitariansareoftentheonly(foreign)civilian actors on the ground in countries in crisis. They performessentialfunctionstopreventprotractedcrisesfrom spiralling out of control or to prepare the terrain forthereturnofinternationalindustryandfinance(Donini,2010;Currion,2015).

Inrecentyearshumanitarianactionhasbecomemoreovertlypoliticisedthroughitssubordinationtorealpolitik(BarnettandWeiss,2011;DoniniandWalker,2012;Duffield,2010).Decisionsonwhereandhowmuchtofundarehardlybasedsolelyonneed.Variousstudiesdocumentthepoliticalfactorsthatinfluencedonordecision-making(Olsenetal.,2003;WalkerandPepper,2007;Doninietal.,2012).Donorstatesprovidefundingtosupporttheirinterests,andconditiontheirsupportto agency partners based on these interests. ‘States will usetheirintereststodeterminewhoseneedsmatter–andtheyhavethepowertogettheirway’(BarnettandWeiss,2011:91).Donorstatesareofcoursewellawareoftherisksofpoliticizinghumanitarianaction;theEU’sHumanitarianConsensus,forexample,hashelpedtolimitsuchrisks(asinthecaseofLibya,whichsomestateswantedtoqualifyasa‘humanitarianintervention’).Nevertheless,statesandnon-statearmedactorsallowordenyhumanitarianaccessbasedonpoliticalconsiderations.AccesstoAleppoandotherbesiegedareasinSyriaisacaseinpoint,wherehumanitarianconvoysareheldhostagetocomplexpoliticalnegotiations(ParkerandSlemrod,2016).

Thecriminalisationofhumanitarianactivitiesundercounter-terrorismlegislation(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015)andcomprehensiveorintegratedapproachesthatincorporatehumanitarianaidintopoliticalinterventions(Donini,2016)havefurtherblurredthelinesbetweenaidandpartisanpolitics(DoniniandWalker,2012;Duffield,2010).Suchinstrumentalisationinsupportofpolitico-militarygoalsofcontainmentand‘stabilisation’isnowadistinctivefeatureofmanyofthecontextsinwhichhumanitarianagenciesoperate(DoniniandWalker,2012).Moreover,evenifagenciesanddonorshavetosomeextentrecognizedtheneedforaclearerseparationbetweenprincipledhumanitarianactionandotherformsofinternationalengagement,itistheperceptionofsuchsubordinationthatundermineshumanitarianactivitiesandputsaidworkersindanger. Engaginginhumanitarianactiontopursuesecurityagendasorasasubstituteforpoliticalsolutionsnecessarily means that impartiality –nottomentionindependence or neutrality–isundermined.AnexampleofthiswastheEbolaresponse,whichwasframedin


security terms in order to facilitate the deployment of Western military forces: a perhaps necessary but worryingprecedent(deWaal,2014).Geopoliticsandglobalisationremainthekeydeterminantsofthespaceforhumanitarianaction.Mostobserversassumethattheprocessesofglobalisationwillcontinueunabatedtowardsasmaller,ever-moreinterconnectedworld(HardtandNegri,2001;Grewal,2008).However,fragmentationorevenatomisationmayalsooccur.

Capitalist ideals underpin the Western development aidmachinerywithafocusonmarketsolutions,choice,responsibility and accountability. Humanitarian aid largely shares the same underpinnings despite the rhetoric aroundprinciples(Duffield,2012).Formanyobservers,humanitarianismhasbecomeabusiness,withNGOsmodelledafterfirms,andpoorpeopleasconsumers(Hopgood,2008).Krause(2009)viewsNGOworkintermsofmarketdynamics,likeningrelieftoa‘formofproduction’.Agenciesor‘producers’selltheirproductstodonors.CooleyandRon(2002)concludethat,tobesuccessful–toincreasetheirbottomline–NGOsneedtoactlikeabusinessand/orlikeastate.However,WeissandHoffman(2007),amongothers,notethat,unlikeprivatebusinesstransactions,thereisnostraightforwardfeedbackloopbetween‘buyer’and‘seller’becausetheconsumer(crisis-affectedpopulations)isnotthesameasthe‘buyer’(donors)andthereforedoesnothavethepowerorleverageatraditionalconsumerwouldenjoy.Numerousmeanshavebeentriedtoredressthisgap,notably the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP)andtheCommonHumanitarianStandard(CHS)but,fornowatleast,accountabilityismainlyframedintermsofdonorsratherthanaffectedpopulations.

The ‘global war on terror’8 has heightened the securitisationandmilitarisationofhumanitarianaction.Manystrategiesandactivitieshavebeendevelopedbasedontheassumptionthatpovertyleadstoextremismand can be remedied through the ‘winning of hearts and minds’ by providing civilians with development and humanitarianaid(Wilder,2010).Thislogichasbeenchallengedinanumberofcontexts,includingPakistan,Afghanistan,Haiti,KenyaandtheEbolaresponse(Bradbury

andKleinman,2010;deWaal,2014;FishsteinandWilder,2012;Greenburg,2013;Wilder,2010;Young,2010).First,thesecuritisationofaidrepresentsafundamentalerosionorviolationofhumanitarianprinciples(BradburyandKleinman,2010;Chandler,2001;FishsteinandWilder,2012;Foley,2008;Pugh,1998;Young,2010).Second,littleevidence exists that aid applied with such a strategy has beensuccessfulinincreasingsecurityandstabilisation.InAfghanistan,FishsteinandWilder(2012)showthataidincreasedcorruptionandcompetitionoverscarceresourcesandthusprovidedincentivesto promote violence.Italsoreinforcedexistinginequalities.Moreover,the term ‘humanitarian’ has been used as a cover for heartsandminds,orworse,counter-terroroperations(Donini,2009:6).BradburyandKleinman(2010)reportthat humanitarian assistance has not been successful in winning hearts and minds or increasing security in the Horn of Africa.

Oneoftheclearestmanifestationsofthesecuritisationandmilitarisationofhumanitarianassistanceisthelegislationprohibitingtheprovision,oreventheaccidentalleakage,ofmaterialassistancetoproscribedgroups(Maxwell,KimandMajid2015;MaxwellandMajid,2016).Counter-terrorismpoliciesaffecttheimpartialityofhumanitarianaction,increaseorganisations’complianceburdensanddecreasetheirabilitytoaccessfinancialresources,bothintermsoffundingandbankingservices(Metcalfe-Hough,KeatingeandPantuliano,2015).Ratherthanfocusingonthegreatestneed,muchenergyisdevotedtopreventingresourcesfrombeingcapturedorutilisedby‘terrorist’groups,imposingvettingrequirementsandadministrativehurdleswhichdisruptrelationshipswithlocalactors,draintheresourcesandcapacitiesoforganisationsanddecreaseaccessandaidefficiency(ClaridgeandCarter,2011;Metcalfe-Hough,KeatingeandPantuliano,2015;Pantulianoetal.,2011).Inthesecontexts,humanitarianassistanceisthusallocatednotaccordingtoneed,butaccordingtoriskmanagementcriteria(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015).Islamiccharitiesareparticularlyaffectedbyreductionsinfundingbasedoncounter-terrorismlegislation(Pantulianoetal.,2011).

Counter-terrorlegislationallowsfortheprosecutionofagenciesandstaffwhointentionallyorunintentionally 8 Sometimes now referred to as ‘countering violent extremism’.


support proscribed groups. A fundamental tension exists betweenIHLandcounter-terrorismlaws(Foley,2008;Hoffman,2007;Pantulianoetal.,2011).IHLallowsforhumanitarianaccessifactivitiesarecarriedoutinaneutralorimpartialmanner.Butcounter-terrorlegislationcriminalises the provision of any assistance to proscribed individuals and groups. A Supreme Court case in the US in 2010includedtrainingonIHLas‘materialassistance’(NRC2013).AsGlaseraptlynotes,‘aidisnotsupposedtotakesidesinconflict,butinthecontextoftheGWOTitmayhavetocrosssometimesinvisiblefrontlinesandengagewithentitiesconsideredtobeterrorist’(2007:19).PFFcase studies in Somalia and Syria document the hurdles faced by humanitarian agencies and the debates about whetherornot,andhow,toengagewithgroupssuchasAlShabaabandIslamicState.Interestingly,inAfghanistanthecounter-terrorlegislationcardhasbeenusedmuchmorerarelytodiscouragecontactwiththeTaliban(Benelli,DoniniandNiland,2012).

A system that struggles with principles … Classical humanitarianprinciplescontinuetobeamainstayinthediscourseofallstakeholdersoforganisedhumanitarianism. Their importance is regularly reaffirmedbydonors,aidagenciesand,ofcourse,theRedCrossmovement,butadvancesinrespectforprinciples have been more rhetorical than real. The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a ‘new humanitarianism’thatreaffirmedtheimportanceofimpartialitybutsawneutralityasanimpedimenttoaddressingtherootcausesofcrises(Fox,2001;Macrae,1998;Leader,1998).Newhumanitarianismcoincidedwithageopoliticalinterventionistphase–rationalisedas ‘ethical foreign policy’ by the Blair government and the emergence of rights as an important element in thehumanitariandiscourse.Deontologists–whoareguidedbytheirdutytosavelivesinthehereandnow–andconsequentialists–whofocusonthelonger-termconsequencesoftheiractions–arguedtheircases,sometimesvociferously(Duffield,2001;Labbé,2013;Slim,2015;DeTorrente,2004;O’Brien,2004).

DeontologicalorganisationslikeICRCand,morerecently,MSF,tendtofocusontheintrinsicvalueofprinciples,inparticularneutrality,whichisseenasbothameanstoanend(unlikeimpartialityandhumanitywhichareat

thecoreofthehumanitarianmessage)andasabetterguaranteeofaccessinparticularlyfraughtenvironments(Harroff-Tavel,1989;Harroff-Tavel,2003).‘Wilsonian,’‘solidarist’andfaith-basedagencies,aswellasthevariouscodesofconductandhumanitarianstandards,recognisetheimportanceofhumanitarianprinciples,but have a much more nuanced approach to neutrality (Minear,1999;NorwegianRefugeeCouncil,2012).

Muchofthedebateonprinciplesishoweveraspirational,ifnotideological.Evidenceonwhetherneutralityisaprerequisiteforeffectivehumanitarianoutcomesinconflictsituationsishardtofind.Fieldstudiesstresstheimportanceofprinciplesfromanoperationalperspectiveand/orthelonger-termconsequencesofignoringorviolatingthem(Terry,2013;Benelli,DoniniandNiland,2012;Hansen,2007).PFFcasestudies–inparticularSyriaandSomalia–documentthetrade-offsbetweenaccess and neutrality and the consequences of alignment oraccommodationwithbelligerents.Yetmostoftheevidenceisderivedfrom‘qualitative,generalanalysisandthink-piecesratherthanempirical,field-basedresearchoveranextendedtimeframewithconcretefindingsandguidance’(SchreterandHarmer,2013).A recent study found that the humanitarian system ‘remainslargelyanecdote,ratherthanevidence-driven’(Mazuranaetal.,2011:1).Thepoorevidencebaseiscompounded by the disconnect between the claims of keyactorsinsupportofneutralityandpracticeontheground.Forexample,inAfghanistan,inthecontextofan integrated UN mission and where all major donors werealsobelligerents,thenormstowhichdonorshadsubscribedwerequicklyputasideashumanitarianactorswereincorporatedintotheWest’snation-buildingagenda(Egeland,HarmerandStoddard,2011;Benelli,DoniniandNiland,2012).

Onerecentstudyconcludesthat,overall,thereisnostrong case in the evidence base that neutrality would initselfimproveaccessorotherpositiveoutcomesforcivilians(Combaz,2015).Theliteraturesuggeststhatmajordeterminantsofoutcomesforciviliansarespecificto the context and do not centrally involve neutrality as a variable. This does not mean that principles should bejettisonedor,asclaimedbysomepredominatelyWesternNGOs,used‘forreferenceonly’(Minear,2007).


Evensolidaristandmulti-mandateagenciesrecognisethat,insomesituations,neutralityprovidesthebestopportunityforaccess,andthatalignmentwithpoliticalagendas can be extremely detrimental in the longer term as evidence from Afghanistan and other crises shows (Terry,2013;Donini,2012).

Twopointsdeservetobestressed.First,whilenoseriouscalls so far have been made to open Pandora’s box by revisingtheclassicalhumanitarianprinciples,callshavebeen made to add to them. The debates in humanitarian accountabilitycircleshavesometimessuggestedthataccountabilitytobeneficiaries,responsibilityandsolidarity should be added to ensure that humanitarian actionisnotonlyprincipledbutalsoeffective.Second,thediversificationofthehumanitarianenterprise,andparticularlythegreaterprominenceofnon-Westernactors,havechallengedWesterndominance.ThishasresultedinperceptionsthatWesternprinciplesarefineforWesternagencies,butnotnecessarilyforagenciesthatderivetheirlegitimacyfrom,forexample,Islam.Similarly,actorsfromtheChinesephilanthropictradition,whilenotopenlyrejectingthem,donotrecognisethemselvesinclassicalhumanitarianprinciples,butratherinconceptssuchasresponsibilityandlegitimacydrawnfromtheConfuciantradition(Krebs,2014a).

Insum,debatesshowanincreasingdiversificationofpositions.Noonechallengesthecoreprinciplesofhumanityandimpartiality,butitisclearthatthemerefactofbeingunabletointerveneincertaincrises,eitherbecauseoflackoffundsordeniedaccess,underminestheveryessenceofimpartiality.Viewsonthepertinenceofindependenceandneutralitydifferandareperhapsmore divergent than in the Cold War era. Neutrality remainscontested.ItisseenbyDunantistagenciesasameanstoanend–togainaccessforexample,ortoguaranteethesafetyofaidworkers.Butitisrejected,moreorlessvigorously,byproponentsofrights-basedordevelopmentalapproachesthataimtotackletherootcausesofcrises.Independenceisoftenunderminedthroughtheinstrumentalisationandsubordinationofhumanitarianactiontopoliticalagendas,includingforexample in UN integrated missions. Our case studies showthemanydifficultiesinnavigatingprinciplesandtherisksofromancingthem.Classicalhumanitarianprinciples

maintainintrinsicvalue,buttheyareunderthreat.Whether they retain this value in the future is an open questiontowhichwereturninChapter3.

… struggles with protection … Protectionfacessimilarchallenges.Despiteformalresponsibilitieslodgedwithmandatedagencies(ICRC,UNHCRandUNICEF)andmuchagencyandsystem-widerhetoric,protectionhasuntilrecentlybeenmainlyanafterthoughtformainstreamhumanitarianagencies,whoseattentionhastraditionallybeenfocusedonmaterialassistance(Nilandetal.,2015;Niland,2015).Manystudies,includingthePFFBriefingPaperonprotection(Niland,2015),havedocumentedthereluctanceofstakeholderstoengagewithprotectionissuesandthedifficultiesofdoingso.Protectionisoftenseenaspoliticalorconfrontational.Trade-offsbetweenaccessandprotectionareoftenmentionedasanexcusenottoraisecontentiousissueswithbelligerents;agenciesoftenequateprotectionwithhumanrights;someaidworkersfeelthatprotection‘isnottheirresponsibility’(Nilandetal.,2015;HealyandTiller,2014).Othershavearguedthatprotectionisatbestafig-leafforinaction,ifnot a delusion that humanitarians can actually protect anyone(DuBois,2010).

Protectionconcernsarerarelydealtwithinastrategic,system-widemannerbyhumanitarians,notwithstandingincreasedcommitmenttodoso–atleastatthelevelofrhetoric–andinvestmentinbuildingexpertiseandcapacityaswellasstrengthenednormativeframeworks(Nilandetal.,2015).EvidencefromSriLankaandAfghanistanandPFFcasestudiesinSomalia,SouthSudanandSyriashowsthatthepersistentdefaultpositionofmostpractitionersandpolicy-makersisthetraditionalprovisionofmaterialgoods.Realtimeandotherevaluationsrarelydealwithprotectionissuesinmorethanacursorymanner(Nilandetal.,2015).Moreover,protectionissuesarerarelyprioritisedatthedecision-makinglevelinthefieldandatHQ,andstrategicvisionandcontextualintelligenceonprotectionissuesisoftenveryweakinIASCcoordinationmechanismssuchastheHumanitarianCountryTeam(HCT)andprotectionclusters(Nilandetal.,2015;Niland2015).

ThesystemicfailuresoftheUNinSriLankadocumentedintheUNInternalReviewpanelreport(UnitedNations,


2012)triggeredmuchsoulsearchingintheUNSecretariat,leadingtotheadoptionofastatementontheCentralityofProtectionbytheIASCandtheHumanRightsUpFrontagendabytheUNSecretary-General,whichcommitsallstafftopromotinghumanrightsastheir‘lifeblood’.Thisrecentincreasedawarenessofthesignificanceofaprotectionlensisanimportantadvance.However,suchdeclarationsareparalleledbythegrowthofafragmentedandatomised‘system’thathasnotkeptpacewithmultiplechangesintheoperatingenvironment.Inaddition,thereissignificantconfusionastowhat‘protection’meansinpractice(Nilandetal.,2015).

Theineffectivenessofthecurrentarchitectureanddivisionoflabouronprotectionissuespointstotheneedforadramaticre-thinkingofthesystemsandmethodologiesneededtoworkeffectivelyandinpartnershipwithfirst-linerespondersandthosedirectlyaffectedbycalamitousevents(Nilandetal.,2015).Currently,thereislimitedpoliticalwillamongstakeholderstoacknowledgetheneedforradicalreform.Insideandoutsidetheformalsystem,protectionissuescontinuetoproveparticularlychallenging.However,thosewhoaredirectlyaffectedaremoreandmorevocalindemandingactiontoaddresspatternsof abuse that undermine their safety and dignity. The expectationisincreasingthattheUNandNGOswill‘come to the rescue’. Numerous studies show that the UN and the humanitarian system more generally are essentiallyreactiveonprotectionissues,lackstrategicunderstandingofhowissuesmightbeaddressedand,eveninthehigherechelons,leadershiponprotectionissuesisoftensorelylacking(UnitedNations,2012;Nilandetal.,2015).

Toomanyhumanitarians,includinginleadershippositions,stillconsiderthatraisingandaddressingprotectionissuesisnottheirproblem(Sparrow2016;Gutman2016).Asaresult,protectionactivitiesareroutinelyghettoised,inadequateandoflimitedeffectiveness.Often,thereisafocusontheuprooted–IDPsandrefugees–andtheneedsofinternallystuckpeople(ISPs)tendtobediscounted.Evenconcernfortheprotectionofrefugeesisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic:doorsinrichcountries are rapidly closing and the refugee regime itself issorelytested–asthecurrentrefugeecrisisinEurope

isdemonstrating.Meetingprotectionneedsremainsacriticalunresolvedissueinthehumanitariansystem.Practicalwaysneedtobefoundtodemystifyprotectionand to ensure that humanitarian leaders and agencies prioritiseprotectionbothatthestrategicandoperationallevels(Nilandetal.,2015).

… and with state sovereignty. Traditionally,theconceptof sovereignty has been grounded in non-interference intheinternalaffairsofnations.ThiswassetforthintheUNCharter,andwaslargelyrespecteduntiltheendof the Cold War despite major superpower-supported proxywars.AftertheColdWar,internationalattitudestowardsexternalinterventionsstartedtoshift.Asobserved by the former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1991 ‘We are clearly witnessing whatisprobablyanirreversibleshiftinpublicattitudestowards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in thenameofmoralityshouldprevailoverfrontiersandlegaldocuments’(Cohen,2008).SuccessiveSecretaries-Generalhaveechoedsimilarviewsthatthetimeofabsoluteandunconditionalsovereigntyhadpassed(seeforexampleBoutros-Ghali,1992).

Overthepasttwodecades,constructionsofsovereigntyhaveevolvedwithglobalisationandtheprogressivedisappearanceofalternativestothedominantcapitalistmodel.Theassumptionthatweakstatesthreatenedglobalsecurityhasmeantthatinternationalattentionhasturnedtowardissuesofgovernance,rightsandprotectionandhumanitarianintervention(KahnandCunningham,2013;Weiss,2007).Sovereigntyhasthusbeenseenasconditional:tiedtoastate’sabilitytoprotectandassistthosewithinitsborders(KahnandCunningham,2013).WiththedoctrineoftheResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)(ICISS,2001;GulatiandKhosa,2012),interventioninthefaceofserioushumanrightsviolationswithouttheconsentofthestatewaselevatedabovesovereignty(Zanon,2012:105).However,regardlessofevolvingunderstandingsofsovereignty,R2Pasamodeofinterventionisnowmuchlesslikelytobeinvoked–aftertheinterventioninLibyaandthefailureoftheinternationalcommunityinSyria.

There are three main trends related to sovereignty that impacthumanitarianaction.Thefirstisglobalisation.


Powerdynamicsarechanging,bothvertically,awayfromstate-ruledprocessesandtosupranationalinstitutions,rangingfromtheEUtotheIMFandmultinationalcorporations,aswellasopaquefinancialcartels,ontheone hand; and to ungoverned contested spaces that escape the control of the state and that become the preserveofarmedandnon-armednon-stateactors,insurgents,criminalnetworksandthelike,ontheother.GlobalisationsubjectstheworldtoforcesthatchallengetheWestphalianstate-centricviewofinternationalrelationsandpointstothesignificanceofnon-stateentitiesinshapingapost-Westphalianorder.Powerisalsoshiftinghorizontally,fromtheWesttotheEast.Thishassignificantimplicationsforhumanitarianactionasthe West’s assumed monopoly on moral authority is challengedbydifferenttraditionsoftheroleofthestateandofthestate’sresponsibilityvis-à-visgroupsaffectedbycrisisorconflict.Recentstudieshavealreadyshownhowdifferent‘humanitarianism’looksfromChinaorSouthAsia(Krebs,2014a;Simonow,2015)(seebelow).

Thesecondrelatestointervention,whethercouchedin ‘humanitarian’ or counter-terrorism terms. The incorporationorsubordinationofhumanitarianactiontootheragendasisnothingnew(Donini,2012),butmanywould agree that it has reached unprecedented levels intheyearssince9/11.Theerosionofhumanitarianspacebothbypoliticalandsecurityagendasandbythereactionsofaffectedcountriestointerventionorthethreatofinterventionhasbeenwelldocumented,includingbyourowncasestudies(Howe,2016;Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015)andourearlierworkinAfghanistan(Benelli,DoniniandNiland,2012).Akeyconcernofhumanitarianorganisationsistheprospectofbeingassociatedwithexternalinterventionsthataffectedstatesornon-stateactorsfindobjectionablefromapoliticalorstrategicperspective.Thisisthecaseespeciallyforactivitiesthatareperceivedaslinked,forexample,toaccountabilityforwarcrimes,humanrightsviolationsorcrimesagainsthumanity,orinvolveexternalmilitaryactionforwhateverpurposeincludingactionauthorised by the Security Council.

Thethirdtrendistheaspirationofnationstorespondtotheirowncrises.Anincreasingnumberofcountries,followingtheleadofIndiaandChina,aremanaging

theirownemergencies(Harvey,2013:158).Othershaveimposedgreatercontrolovertheworkandmovementsofforeignaidagencies(Sudan,Rwanda,Myanmar,EthiopiaandSouthSudanforexample).Thishasledtotensions between host countries and humanitarians over whoshould‘calltheshots’whendisasterstrikes.Statesareaskedtoallowhumanitarianstooperate,whileatthesametimehumanitariansoperatebytheirownnormsandprinciplesandareoftenseenas‘stateavoiding’(Harvey,2013;KahnandCunningham,2013).AsKahnandCunninghamexplain,‘principleswereformulatedtoreassurestatesthathumanitarianorganisationswouldnotinterferewiththeirinternalaffairs;butincreasinglyhumanitarianorganisationswieldthemasameansofprotectingthemselvesagainsttheinterferenceofthestate’(2013:S146).Asinvestmentindisasterriskreductionincreasesatthenationalandregionallevel,moregovernmentsthaneverbeforeareinapositiontorespondtocrisesandasserttheirsovereigntyinrelationtohumanitarianaction(Harvey,2010).Thiseffectivelymeansthat,asnationalactors–governments,NGOsandothers–assumeabiggerroleinrespondingtodisasters,therewillbelessneedforexternalsupport.Italsomeansthatthebulkofhumanitarianactioninthenearfuturewillcontinuetobeinarmedconflictsettings.

Avariantofthistrend,encounteredintheSahel,isthe tension between humanitarian and development actorsaroundthedefinitionofthenatureofacrisisandwhoshouldtaketheleadintheresponse(OCHA,2015b).Sovereignty-basedandnationalistdiscoursestend,unsurprisingly,tofavourthelatterovertheformer,sometimeswithseriousconsequences,particularlywhenitcomestorespectforhumanitarianprinciples(DoniniandScalettaris,2016).ThistensionwashighlightedattheWHSwithaffectedstatesnotunexpectedlyaffirmingtheirprerogativestoleadandcontrolbutitwasalsomanifestbetween UN humanitarian and development agencies.

A system resistant to reform (and that is functional to the needs of its key stakeholders).Despitebeinglargelyembeddedintheglobalprocessesmentionedabove,thebasicsoforganisedhumanitarianismhaveremainedremarkablystableoverthelast20years(whilemoresignificantchangehashappenedinthemarginsoroutsidetheNorthern-drivenhumanitariansystem,


asweshallseeinthenextsection).Power,resourcesandactivities–thepoliticaleconomy–arestillcentredaroundtherelationshipbetweenOECDdonorsandthetriadofUNagencies,theRedCrossmovementandahandfuloffederationsoflargeNGOs.

TheendoftheColdWar,andtheexplosionofhumanitarianneedsthataccompaniedit,triggeredaprocessofinstitutionalreformthatledtoGeneralAssemblyResolution46/182andtheestablishmentoftheUNDepartmentofHumanitarianAffairs(DHA)andtheIASC,whichbroughttogetherthekeyplayersin the humanitarian movement including the Red Cross movementandtheINGOs.WithintheUNsystem,thesereformswereresistedinparticularbyUNHCR,whichwaspromotingthe‘leadagencymodel’thatithadimplementedintheFormerYugoslavia.Externally,the reforms were viewed with suspicion by developing countries,whichsensedapossiblechallengetotheirsovereigntyand/oratransferoffinancialresourcesfromdevelopmenttohumanitarianprogrammes(Kent,2004).ThesubsequenttransitionfromDepartmentofHumanitarianAffairs(DHA)toOCHAin1998confirmedthecentralcoordinationfunctionoftheIASCsystem,whileatthesametimetakingawayanyaspirationOCHAmighthavehadtomovebeyondcoordinationbyconsensustomorerobustapproaches.Italsoputpaidtoanyideaofmoreradicalreform,suchastheestablishmentofasinglehumanitarianagencyincorporatingtheoperationalarmsofUNHCR,WFPandUNICEF–whichhadbeenairedbyMauriceStrong,JamesIngramandafewothers(seeforexampleIngram,1993).

Overthepasttenyears,furtherinstitutionalstreamlininginthehumanitarianarchitecturehasbeenintroduced,but there has been no radical reform. The Humanitarian ResponseReview(Adinolfietal.,2005)commissionedbytheERCin2005identifiedsignificantgapsandweaknessesinthecoordinationofhumanitarianaction,namelythelackofaclearunderstandingofwhatcoordinationentailed,whoshoulddowhatandwithwhataccountabilities.Thisledtothecreationof‘clusters’thatwoulddefineclearerresponsibilitiesinthesystemaswellasautomaticityinresponse.Importantly,itresolvedtheissueoflackofclearresponsibilityforIDPsbyproposing to extend UNHCR’s role as lead agency in the

protectionofrefugeestoincludeconflictIDPs.However,itdidnotlookattherelationshipbetweenhumanitarianactivitiesfallingwithinthepurviewoftheIASCandthose,suchasrefugees,thatfelloutsideitsremit.Inotherwords,itdidnottakeawholeofhumanitariancaseloadapproach(Nilandetal.,2015).

TheHumanitarianResponseReview(HRR)andthesubsequent humanitarian reform agenda that launched the clustersystem,anexpandedCentralEmergencyResponseFund(CERF)andanincreasedrolefortheHumanitarianCoordinator(HC),followedbythe2011TransformativeAgendaprocesseshave,toanextent,addressedsomestructuralissues.ResponsibilitiesforIDPshavebeenclarified.Responsibilitiesforcampmanagement,waterandsanitation,protection,etc.,havebeenstreamlined.Muchnormativeandregulatorydevelopmentaswellastheproductionofguidanceandmanualshasoccurred.Mechanisms for interagency accountability have started tobeintroducedthroughOperationalPeerReviewsratherthanReal-TimeEvaluations.However,thereformshavefailedtoaddresscoreissuesofleadership,strategicplanningandjointdecision-making,aswellasconflictsofinterestbetweenUNagenciesasdonors,implementersandnormsetters(HealyandTiller,2014;Nilandetal.,2015).CasestudiescommissionedbythePFFprojectinSyria,Somalia,theSahelandSouthSudan(Howe,2016;Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;DoniniandScalettaris,2016;MaxwellandDonnelly,2015),aswellasearlierfieldvisitstoMyanmar(Nilandetal.,2015)andAfghanistan(Benelli,DoniniandNiland2012),documentmanyinstanceswheretheseissuesarestillrifeandwheremandate-specificagenciesstilltreatotherstakeholderspaternalistically(HealyandTiller,2014;Nilandetal.,2015).

Inanalysingthearchitectureofthecurrentsystem,anumberofstudieshaveconcludedthatreformeffortshavenotdelivered.Ifanything,thereformsofthepastdecadehaveossifiedthesystemratherthanmakingitmoreresponsiveandflexible(Howe,2016;DoniniandScalettaris,2016;Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015).Themanyanalysesthatspelloutthedysfunctionsofthesystem(Tayloretal.,2012;ALNAP,2015;DarcyandKiani,2013;DevelopmentInitiatives,2015;HPG,2016)tendtoconclude,tovaryingdegrees,thatthesystemisinneedofreform,thatitiseither‘broke’or‘broken’(orboth).


Many such studies recognise that rapid and informed decision-makingislacking,andthatthesystemisoverlyproceduralisedandcomplex.Most,however,conclude–asdomanyinformantsinterviewedforthisstudy–thatwhilesubstantivereformisnecessary,itisnotrealisticto expect that meaningful change can occur in the near futuregiveninstitutionalandothervestedinterests.Theincreasingly urgent need for such reform is stressed in Chapter3,whichlooksattheimportanceofpreparingforthelonger-termfuturenowandintherecommendationsthat appear at the end of that chapter.

Trends outside the formal systemEquallyimportant,majorchangehastakenplaceoutsidethetraditionalhumanitariansystem.

The rise of non-Western actors.Untilrecently,theWestdominatedtheshapeofinternationalhumanitarianresponse,butamultipolarsystemisemerging.Chapter1 reviews the history of non-Western humanitarian actorsbecauseofpersistentassumptionsthatmanyofthesehaveonly‘recentlyemerged’.Whilethisisoftenuntrue,manyhavegreatlyincreasedinvisibilityandprominenceinthepastdecade.Hence,bothChapters1and2addresstheroleofnon-Westernactors(orperhapsbetterlabellednon-OECD/DAC,sinceasnotedbelow,somearefromtheWesternhemisphere).RegionalentitiessuchasAssociationofEastAsianNations(ASEAN),theOICandtheAUarestartingtoinfluencetheglobaldevelopmentandhumanitariansystems(Davey,2012;Micheletti,2010).Westernactorshavemettheseentitieswitha‘mixtureofinterest,suspicion,concern,openness and opportunism: interest in their origins and attitudes;suspicionoftheirmotives;concernatalackofprofessionalismandcoordination’(Davey,2012:2).WhileWesternorganisationscontinuetodominatethehumanitarian landscape the fact remains that non-Westernactorsareprovidingasignificantamountofaid,andtheircontributionsareonlyreluctantlyacknowledgedby the dominant Western system.

Partofthisinterestreflectsthefactthat‘althoughtheideaofsavinglivesandrelievingsufferingishardlyaWesternorChristiancreation,modernhumanitarianism’soriginsarelocatedinWesternhistoryandChristianthought’(BarnettandWeiss,2008:7;Fassin,2012).

Embeddedinthismoralandhistoricalnarrativeisthepostulatethat,withsomevariations,thevaluesofcharityand compassion that underpin humanitarianism are universal.Inotherwords,Westernhumanitariansassumethat,becausethesevaluesareuniversal,theirorganisedexpressionintermsofassistanceandprotectionactivitiesandrelatedinstitutionsarealsouniversal(PacittoandFiddian-Qasmiyeh,2013;Fiori,2013).

GivenrecentglobaltransformationsandtheriseofstatessuchasBrazil,ChinaandIndiaintheworldeconomy,alongwiththeglobaleconomicpositionof,forexample,oil-producingMiddleEasternstates,statesintheglobalSouthwilllikelyplayanincreasinglyimportantrolebybothbeingbetterabletohelpthemselveswhendisasterstrikes,andbyprojectingtheir‘softpower’throughdevelopmentandhumanitarianinitiatives.Their‘zeropoint’–thepointfromwhichtheylookattheworld–isdifferent,asistheirhistoricalexperienceoftheprocessesofcolonialism,capitalist development and the expansion of Western rationality(Mignolo,2011;Quijano,2007).PacittoandFidian-Qasmieh(2013),Kot-Majewska(2015)andFiori(2013)allstressthedifferentstartingpointsandagendasofnon-Westernactors.Atthemoreoperationallevel,ourcasestudiesinSomaliaandSyriadocumentthegrowinginfluenceofsuchactorsandsomeoftheproblems,orambivalences,intheirrelationshipswithmainstreamagencies.

Someoftheliteraturestressesthesimilaritiesorthecompatibilitiesbetweennon-WesternapproachesandtheWesternhumanitariancanon.Forexample,overthepastdecadetheICRChasspentconsiderabletimeandeffortengagingwithIslamicscholarsinordertohighlightthecompatibilitiesbetweenIslamandIHL(Abdirashidetal.,2015).Turkey’sincreasingroleasareliefplayerwithitsown‘softpower’agendas,bothimplementedbythestateandbyTurkishNGOs,hasalsobeenstudied(BayerandKeyman,2012;BinderandErten,2013;Binder,2014;Tank,2015).

• China. The special case of China deserves to be underscored.Chinahasa2,000-yeartraditioninphilanthropy,largelybasedonConfucianpreceptsoflegitimacyandresponsibility.Thetermrendao (humanitarian)firstappearedinChineseliteraturetwomillenniaago,andwhileEuropewasstillintheMiddleAges,Chinaalreadyhadsophisticated


statesystemsforreliefintimesoffamineordisasters(Krebs,2014a;Krebs,2014b).BecauseofitshistoricalsuspicionoftheWest,theMaoistdismissal of ‘charity’ as ‘bourgeois’ and the emphasis onnon-interferenceintheinternalmattersofstates,considerableobstaclesstillexisttoChina’sinvolvementinhumanitarianmattersabroad.Muchemphasis is placed on disaster response within the country via the Chinese Red Cross and the People’s LiberationArmy.MostobserversexpectChinatobecomeincreasinglyactive,onitsownterms,inhumanitarian issues abroad. China contributed to theTyphoonHaiyanresponse(afterbeinginitiallyshamedfornotdoingso),andsentstate-sponsoredassistance through government-supported NGOs to theNepalearthquakeresponsein2015.Numerousmore-or-less independent ‘NGOs’ or philanthropic groupsareemerging–andareevenencouragedbythestate,particularlyinthehealthsector,wherestate structures are increasingly unable to cope.

• The Cuban model.ThePFF-commissionedbriefingpaperonCuba(Dahrendorf,2015)showsthatasmallcountry,actingoutsidethedominantsystem,usingitsown state resources and intelligently leveraging those offriendlystates,canhaveanimportantimpactinthe delivery of emergency medical assistance. Cuba’s participationinarangeofhumanitarianemergencies,primarilythroughitsexportablemedicalexpertise,datesbacktothe1960s.MorerecentsignificantengagementsincludeinPakistan,Haiti,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,inresponsetotheEbolacrisisinWestAfricaandinNepal.TheCubanapproachwithstrategicallytargetedactivitiesthatarefirmlyrootedinalonghistoryofsocialistideologyandpoliticalcultureisaninterestingcounterpointtomainstreamorganisedhumanitarianaction.Interventionsarelocalisedanddirectedthroughacentralisedgovernment,andareintegraltoaformof ‘health diplomacy’ which also involves large-scale training of foreign medical personnel in Cuba and their deployment in the remotest areas in countries intheregionandbeyond(Dahrendorf,2015).

• Turkey, the Gulf States and the rise of Islamic humanitarianism. TheTurkishgovernmentagency

TIKA,theTurkishRedCrescentandTurkishNGOswere prominent humanitarian actors during the Somaliafamineof2011anditsaftermath.ThatcrisisalsostimulatedaresponsefromGulfStatesaswellincludingQatar,Kuwait,theUAE,Oman,Bahrain,andIran.Turkishagencies–andtoadegreeotherMiddleEasternagencies–werenotableinthattheywerebasedinSomalia,notinNairobi,wherethe UN and most of the western humanitarian effortwaslocated(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015).TurkeyhasbeenamajorhumanitarianactorintheSyriacrisissinceitbegan,withprogrammesimplementedbothbythestateandbyNGOs(BayerandKeyman,2012;BinderandErten,2013;Binder,2014;Tank,2015).By2013,Turkeyhadbecomethe fourth largest humanitarian donor in the world (althoughitssharesubsequentlydeclined).SaudiArabiawasalreadyamajorhumanitariandonor,thoughnotasactiveintermsofputtingagenciesontheground.However,itisstartingtoprovideaidtoothercountries(e.g.Haiti),andreportedlyplanstoincreaseitshumanitarianbudget.Atthesametime,itcombineshard(bombing)andsoft(bankrollingaid)powerinYemen.Fartherafield,Malaysia–withMercyMalaysia–hasalsobecomeanestablishedhumanitarianplayer,ashasIndonesia,withthelarge-scaleinvolvementofMohammadiyah,thesecond-largestIndonesianNGO,indisasterrelief(Bush,2015).TheOICbecamethesecond-largestcoordinationplatformaftertheUNinSomalia,andcontinuestoplayaleadingroleamongmemberstatesincoordinatingIslamicagencies,bothgovernmentalandnon-governmental.Despiterepeatedrequests,ithasnotbeenadmittedintotheIASC–acauseofsomefrictionwiththeestablished‘system’.Islamicidentityandsolidarityisanunderlying theme that both characterises much of this sector and informs sources of funds as well as areasofactivity.Asnotedearlier,Islamicsolidarityandprinciplesofcharitymotivateddonationsofmoney and responses by many individuals and governmentsinTurkeyandtheGulfStates(AlYahyaandFustier,2011).

The rise of private donors. The number of non-state funders of humanitarian assistance is growing.


One-quarter of funding for humanitarian assistance comesfromprivatedonors,themajorityofwhomareindividuals(Stirk,2014).Suchdonorsaremorelikelytoprovidefinancialbackingfornaturaldisastersthanconflict-relatedcrises.SomelargefederationsofNGOsrelynearlyexclusively(MSF)orprimarily(WorldVisionInternational)onindividualcontributions.Privatesupport–whichconsistsofabout40%offundingforNGOsglobally–tendstobestable,whileinstitutionalfunds–whichrepresentthemajorityofUNsupportat95%–canbevolatileandareoftenearmarked(Stirk,2014).Public/privatepartnershipsareonthewholeincreasing(IRIN,2013).Fourofthetopfiveprivatehumanitarian donors from 2009 to 2013 are from the MiddleEast(Stirk,2014).Inmanyemergencysettingsthe private sector is increasingly involved either directly intheprovisionofassistance–asintheresponsetoTyphoonHaiyaninthePhilippines–ormoreindirectlythrough insurance schemes against drought or crop failure,particularlyinAfrica(seeabove).

Subsidiarity, devolution and localisation.Powerrelationsin the organised humanitarian system are increasingly beingcontestedbythegrowingnumberofnationalNGOsandCommunity-basedOrganisations(CBOs)–andincreasinglybynetworksofagenciesfromtheGlobalSouth–thatareoftenthefirstrespondersindisasters,but feel that they are at best considered as useful implementingpartnersforinternationalagencies,ratherthan as humanitarian actors in their own right. They challengetheinherentpaternalismofsub-contractingarrangements that frequently do not allow for any genuinecapacitybuildingofnationalorganisations,andthebarrierstoentrythatthe‘official’systemimposes.Accordingtooneestimate,lessthan2%ofinternationalfundsgodirectlytonationalNGOs.Therestischannelledthroughoneormoreintermediaries(GingerichandCohen,2015).PFFcasestudieshavedocumentedmanyinstanceswheretheinterestsofinternationalagenciestrumpthoseofemergingnationalNGOs(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;Howe,2016;DoniniandScalettaris,2016).MoreorganisedvoicesofNGOsfromtheglobalSouth have been heard in the run-up to the WHS and at theWHSitself,culminatingwiththelaunchoftheNEARsouthernNGOcoordinationnetwork.SomegroupingsofNGOshavearticulatedanobjectiveof‘20%ofdirect

fundingtonationalNGOsby2020’.Themantraof‘aslocalaspossible,asinternationalasnecessary’hasreceivedwide acceptance at the level of rhetoric. The ‘Grand Bargain’struckattheWHSproposesatarget25%offunding to local agencies in the global south.

Itisfarfromcleariftheincentivestructuresofthesystem,whichstillbenefittheglobalratherthanthelocal,areamenabletochangebeyondtheinstrumentaluseoflocalpartnersinareaswhereitistoodifficultordangerousforinternationalagenciestooperate(DoniniandMaxwell,2014).SomelargeinternationalNGOshaveinitiatedaprocessof‘nationalising’theirowncountryprogrammes.Othersaretalkingaboutshiftingprogressivelyfromadirectoperationalroletooneofnormsettingandadvocacy(GingerichandCohen,2015).Somehavearguedthatitistime(fortheNorthernagencies)to‘letgo’(HPG,2016).ThisissuereceivedalotofattentionattheWHSbeyondthe25%offundingtarget(seebelow).Thedifficultyfacingany reform in this area is that most Western donor agenciesdonothavethestaffcapacitytomanagehundredsofmodest-sizedgrants,andsoprefertoprovidelargegrantstoUNagenciesorinternationalNGOs,andoutsourcetothempartnershipswithlocalorganizations.Whilethisaddressesthecapacitygap,itleaveslocalorganizationsintheroleofsub-contractorstointernationalagencies.Thesuggestedalternativeis pooled funds that might be administered by a local NGO,oralocalconsortium.

Social networks, community agency and voluntary spirit.Inmanycasestechnologyanddistancehaveconspiredtotakethe‘human’outof‘humanitarian’.Thisismanifestedinmanyways.IntheSahel,forexample,evenestablishedhumanitarianagenciesarelosingtheir‘fieldcraft’,inthesensethattheymaybetechnicallyproficientintheirownfieldbutlessabletorelatetotheissuesasseenfromtheperspectivesofthecommunitiestheypurporttoserve:theyhavebecomemoreremote,bothphysicallyandemotionally.Oneexperiencedaidworkerquipped,‘Wearelosingour ability to be inside the crisis. We spend too much timeincoordination,writingplansandreportsandwearelosingourabilitytoactuallysavelives’(DoniniandScalettaris,2016).


Another telling example is the failure of the organised humanitariansystem,withtheexceptionofMSFandafewotherNGOs,tosetupacoherentresponsetotherefugeecrisisintheMediterraneanandtheBalkansinthelatterhalfof2015.Muchoftheresponsewasleft,atleastinitially,tovoluntaryinitiativesofordinarycitizensand‘pop-up’groups,whileestablishedagencieswereabsentfromthebeachesandborderfences–oroverlyconstrainedintheircapacitytorespond.InLesvos,wheresome500,000asylum-seekersarrivedondinghiesfromTurkeyinthesecondhalfof2015,anduptoseveralthousandadayinNovember,thebruntofthehumanitarianresponsewasbornebylocalpeople,theGreekCoastGuardandanassortmentofadhocgroups,ratherthanbyUNHCRorestablishedNGOs(Stevis,2015).Thereluctanceorinabilityofmainstreamagenciestoquicklymobiliseresourcesandpresenceissymptomaticofhowremotethehumanitariansystemhasbecomefromtheproblemsofordinarypeople,especiallywhentheseproblemsdonotfitinthescriptsthat agencies are accustomed to. We shall return to this issueintheconcludingsectionofthischapter.

Intheabsenceofadequateexternalsupport,communitieshavelongreliedontheirownmeanstocopewithcrisisasbesttheycan.Indeed,someanalysesshow that as much as two-thirds of the total support that crisis-affectedpopulationsaccessworldwidedoesnotcomefromorganisedhumanitarianagencies,butfrompeople’sowncommunities,localbusinesscommunities,diasporagroupsandothersocialnetworks(Hammond,2013).Thisphenomenonisnowcomingtobeknownas‘respondersoffirstresort’becausepeoplemustoftengetbywiththiskindofassistanceforsometimebeforeinternationalorstate-ledeffortscanreachthem(Maxwell,KimandMajid2015;MaxwellandMajid,2016).Thisislinkedtothetrendtowards‘localisation’discussedabove,butinmanywaysgoesbeyondit.Anyattempttoreorganisehumanitarianactionneedstotakeaccountofthisagency,butmustalsorecognisethatitisfrequentlyinsufficientonitsown,andcaneasilybeunderminedbyexternallydrivenaction.

2.3. The humanitarian malaise

Theprecedingsectiondescribedkeytrendsandchangesin the humanitarian landscape. Here we capture the creeping sense of malaise9 in the humanitarian communityanddigdeeperintothecriticalissuesthatneed to be urgently addressed.

The symptoms of the malaiseThehumanitariansystemhasseensubstantialgrowth,institutionalisationandprofessionalisation,butdespite(orinpartbecause of)this,thesystemisfacingsystemicproblems.PFFcasestudies,andrecentreportsanalysingfield-leveloperations,showthat,whiletime-testedtools,fundsandcapacitiesarereadilyavailable,awidespreadmalaiseisperceptibleamongagenciesandtheirleaders(Guterres,2015a;MilibandandGurumurthy,2015;Egeland,2016;BarnettandWalker,2015).RecentcrisesfromAfghanistantoSomalia,HaitiandSriLankaaswellascurrentemergencies–inSyria,SouthSudan,theCentralAfricanRepublic,Ebola,Ukraine,Yemen,theMediterraneanandTyphoonHaiyan/Yolanda,amongotherlessvisiblecrises–questiontheveryfoundationsandcapacitiesofhumanitarianactionandofthegalaxyofinstitutionsthatpursuehumanitariangoals.Theintractable nature of many crises and the instrumental useofhumanitarianactiontodeflectattentionfromthepoliticalfailuresoftheso-calledinternationalcommunityareleadingtoagrowingrealisationthatthehumanitariansystemaspresentlyconstitutedisnotfitforpurpose.Itfurtherhighlightsagrowingdissonanceaboutwhatthepurposeshouldbe.Indeed,theverynotionofahumanitarian‘system’isindispute.Inotherwords,thesystemisinakindofstasis:itisincapableof reforming itself and the external context is such thatnoappetiteexistsforexternallyinducedchange.Perspectivesvaryonwhetheritis‘broken’orjust‘broke’(Guterres,2015a;Aly,2015;Currion,2015),buteventheUN Secretary-General’s report for the WHS recognises thatitfacesacriticalmoment,insomewayssimilartothe discussions during the Second World War on the

9 Malaise refers to a sense of extreme discomfort and anxiety. Some observers refer to these same symptoms as an ‘existential crisis’. The use of the term malaise here is deliberate – the humanitarian system could continue in its current form but would eventually face a crisis of existential proportions.


futureinternationalsystem(2016,para.6).Organisedhumanitarianactioncontinuestosaveandprotectcountlesslives,butthereisayawninggapbetweenwhatit is able to do and the increasing magnitude of need (whichthehumanitarianfinancingreportestimatesasagapof$25billion).

Sayingthatthehumanitariansystemisnot‘fitforpurpose’hasbecomecommonplacewithinaidagencies,evenatthehighestlevel.Thoughtfulanalyseshavealsoemergedfromacademiaandthinktanksaddressingvariousaspectsofthismalaise(Duffield,2012;HealyandTiller,2014;BarnettandWalker,2015andamongmanyothers,includingaproliferationofinternalagencypositionpapersandinputsintotheWHS).Themostimportantaspectsofthismalaisearediscussedinthissection.

FormerUNHighCommissionerforRefugeesSadakoOgata was wont to say that there are no humanitarian solutionstohumanitarianproblems.InsituationslikeSyria,wherethereisageopoliticaldeadlockintheUNSecurityCouncil,humanitarianscanonlyoccupywhateverspaceisauthorisedbypolitics.Whenconfronted with barrel bombs or boat people drowning intheMediterranean,humanitariansfeelpowerless.All they can do is a rudimentary sort of triage between livesthataresacrificedandthosethatcanbesaved.InSomalia,despitegoodinformationandrepeatedwarnings,afamineresultedfromtherefusalofanarmednon-stateactortograntaccessanddonorsprioritisingcounter- terrorism over humanitarian concerns. Humanitarianismcannotbreakoutofthespacethatpoliticsassignstoit.Thisisthecoreofthemalaise(Nilandetal.,2015;Fassin,2012;MaxwellandMajid,2016).Oneislefttowonderiftheso-called‘internationalcommunity’isactuallycommittedtoaneffectivehumanitarianregime,orwhetherthestatusquoisfunctionaltotheinterestsofthepowersthatbe.

The symptoms of malaise fall into several categories. Somearerelatedtotheexternalenvironment,thelimitsand failures of the liberal peace and so-called ‘new humanitarianism’ agenda discussed in the previous section(Duffield,2001;Duffield,2012;Rieff,2002).Othersymptoms,aswehaveseen,relatetothemultiplicationofactorsinthehumanitariantheatre–reliefagenciesand

donorsfromdifferenttraditions,butalsonon-statearmedactorssuchasAlQaedaorDaesh.Andfinally,symptomsthatrelatetothepathologiesintheinternalfunctioningofthehumanitarianenterprise,thoughsomeofthesearerelatedtothepoliticsthatsurroundstheenterprise.

Symptoms of the malaise at field levelThe internal symptoms have been well documented inanumberofcrisissettings,includinginparticularAfghanistan,Darfur,Haiti,theresponsetoTyphoonHaiyanandinourowncasestudiesinSouthSudan,Somalia,SyriaandtheSahel.10 While many of the elements of the ‘humanitarian malaise’ explored here aremanifestattheleveloftheoverallsystem,therearealsowidespreadperceptionsofmalaiseatthefieldlevel,notedinPFFcasestudiesthat‘thesystemisrotten’.MuchofthewrittenmaterialreviewedforthecasestudyinSomaliawasoptimisticthat,whilemistakesweremadeduringtheresponsetothefamine,lessonswerelearned,newsystemswereputinplace and resilience approaches were now driving the agenda.Interviewswithindividualsonthegroundhadamuchmorepessimistictone.LikewiseinSouthSudan,SyriaandtheSahel,whilethedynamicsweredifferent,anauraofpessimismhaddefinitelysetinbymid-2015.Thissectionattemptstoillustratethis‘viewfromtheground’ by spelling out the observable symptoms of the malaise. These issues are explored in more depth intheindividualPFFcasestudies(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;DoniniandScalettaris,2016;MaxwellandDonnelly,2015;Howe,2016).

• Inaneraofincreasedremotemanagement,agencystaff–especiallyinternationalstaff–donotknowenough about what is happening on the ground. This feeds a fear that things might be going wrong; it also feeds the perceived need for ever-greater amounts ofinformation,muchofwhichgoesunusedandun-analysed.

• Staffsensethatthehumanitariansystemcorruptsbenefactorsandbeneficiaries.Itappearsbeholdentopoliticalagendasthatonlyvaguelyrelateto

10 On Afghanistan see Donini et al., 2012 chapter 3; Benelli et al., 2012; FIC reports on hearts and minds. On Darfur: Young, 2012; Haiti: Schuller, 2012.


protectinglifeorlivelihoodsandprioritisesotherobjectivesintheguiseofcaringaboutpeople.

• There is a sense that the possibility of real reform undercurrentcircumstancesisentirelyhostagetopoliticalprocessesandthathumanitariansalonecannot reform the system further.

• The ‘humanitarian community’ is fragmented; thecompetitivestructureoffundingmakesithard to share learning; everyone calls for greater accountability,butdespitemanyeffortstoadvanceaccountability there is a growing sense that real accountabilityaccruesmostlyonlytodonors,nottheaffectedpopulationsforwhomaidisintended.

• Staffturnoverishighandnewpeoplehavetorelearnthesamelessons,oftenthehardway.

• Diversionofhumanitarianassistance,especiallyinconflict,haslongbeenaproblem.Themore‘remote’themanagement,theworsetheproblemhasbecome.Itisverydifficulttomonitorlocalpartners–theriseinthird-partymonitoringhelpswithaccountabilityintheshortterm,butdoeslittletobuildgenuinetrustinthelongtermandinfactoftenundermines it.

• Examplesaboundofthe‘elitecapture’ofthebenefitsof programming and of collusion between local elites andlocalagencystaffaswellasinternationalstaff,hencetheperceptionofthesystembeing‘rotten’.

• Thereislittlejointsharingofrisk,andlittleincentivetoreportproblems.Therearerealincentivestostopdiversion,buthugedisincentivestoreportingit when it happens. Telling the truth about anything becomesverydifficult.Everyonehashadtotoleratesomedegreeofdiversion,butnoonecansayso.Thismakesanhonestdiscussionverydifficult,andcontributes,again,totheassessmentthatsomethingis very wrong with the system.

• The humanitarian community has tried to deal withtheseproblems,andatthelevelofindividualagencies and individual groupings of agencies progresshasbeenmade.Riskmanagementpracticesbyagencieshaveimprovedsignificantly.Ontheotherhand,therearereportsofagenciesapproachingthird-partymonitoringgroupsofferingtopaythemmoneyinexchangeforacleanratingthattheagencies can then use with donors or UN agencies.

• Attemptstoimproveriskmanagementhavealso

inevitablyhadtheeffectofreducingtheamountof assistance: when the emphasis is on stopping ‘leakage’,almostbydefinition‘under-coverage’increases.

• Professionalisationofstaffhasbroughtbenefits,butproceduralisationandtheheavyrelianceonshort-termcontractscombineinlossoffieldcraftandincreasedremoteness.Bureaucratisationresultsin lengthy procedures that favour conformity rather thanflexibilityorinnovationandoftenstiflesfieldcapacity.

• There is a general view that the humanitarian communitylacksacollectivevoice.UNHumanitarianCoordinatorsandcoordinationmechanismsarenotplayingthisrole.Thereislittleappetiteforcollectiveactionevenamongrelativelylike-mindedNGOs,witheachforcedintodifferentcompetitivearrangementsonfunding.CoordinationmechanismsoutsidetheIASCframeworkareburgeoning.TheNEARnetwork,launched at WHS is but one example.

• Difficultiesremaininidentifyinggoodpartners:ifoneagencyhasabadexperiencewithapartner,itdoes not necessarily inform other agencies. All this underlinesthelackoftrustinthesystem.

Much of this sense of pessimism results from the fact thatnewpracticesorchangeshavenotmadeoldproblemsgoaway.Multi-yearfundingisinplace,forinstance,butmanyrespondentsdonotbelievethatthehumanitariancommunityhastakenfulladvantageofthis.Mistrustunderminesrelationsamonghumanitarianagencies,governmentsanddonors,butalsorelationswithaffectedcommunities.Withinthehumanitariancommunityitself,betweeninternationalandlocalpartners,orbetweenagenciesworkingwithinanaffectedcountryandthoseworkingcross-borderorinneighbouring countries. All of these combine to produce highburn-outratesandhighturnoverof(particularlyinternational)staff,bothofwhichinturntendtoundermineagencylearning,andthusperpetuatetheproblem.Asaresult,thesystembecomesmorerisk-averseandlessinnovation-minded–whichismadeworse by the security regimes established by the UN andINGOs,andbytheincreasingholdofsecurity(non-humanitarian)personneloverhumanitariandecisions.Inmanyofthecontextsstudied,thereiswidespread


scepticismvis-à-vistheleadershipandarchitectureofthesystem–inparticularcoordinationstructuresseenasoverlycomplex,costlyandduplicative–andtheirrelationtotheneedsofcrisis-affectedpeople.

These internal symptoms represent some of the recurringfailingsthatputintoquestiontheraisond’êtreof the humanitarian enterprise. Some have to do with thepoliticalinstrumentalisationofhumanitarianaction(Donini,2012;Duffield,2001;Rieff,2002),butalsowithakindofstubborn‘condemnedtorepeat’syndrome(Terry,2002;CooleyandRon,2002;WeissandHoffman,2007;Barakat,DeelyandZyck,2010),aswellasadeepsenseof‘damnedifyoudoanddamnedifyoudon’t’(MaxwellandMajid,2016),allofwhichincludeissuessuchastheinability to learn from or deal with the past; the frequent ignoranceofthehistoryofcrises(oracrosscrises)andlowinstitutionalmemory.

Counter-terrorlegislation,insuranceconcernsandthedevelopmentofnewtechnologies(drones,cashtransfersviamobilephones,etc.)alsoconspiretoincreasethedistancebetweenaidagenciesandtheirpopulationsofconcern.Duffield(2012)hastermedthisshiftthebunkerisationandfortificationofaidwork,orthecreationof a protected ‘aid archipelago’ that puts distance betweenaidworkersandthecommunitieswheretheywork.Duffield(2012)questionswhetherrisinginsecurityforaidworkersisreal,orwhetheritisafunctionofgrowingriskaversionandthedeclineofWesterninfluenceglobally.Perhapsitwouldbemoreprecisetotalkoftheerosion of Western humanitarian space.

PFFcasestudies,inparticularonSyriaandSomalia(Howe,2016;Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015),documentthegrowingdistancebetweeninternationalactorsandat-riskgroupsaswellastheburgeoningofinitiativesthat do not conform to the Western humanitarian canon,orpurposelyrejectit.Theseinitiativesrangefromdiasporagroups,theuseofremittances,localself-help groups that are too small to compete for internationalresources,IslamicNGOsthateschewestablishedcoordinationandfundingmechanisms(orarenotinvitedtothem),andthelike.Insum,whileavarietyofsymptomsofthismalaiseareobservable,itisnotclearwhetherthecausesaresingular,universaland

predictable,orifthecausesaremultiple,contingent,idiosyncraticandcontext-specific. No-go areasHumanitarianaccess–alinchpinfortherightsofaffectedgroupstohumanitarianaction–hasmutatedinlockstepwiththechangingnatureofcrises.Asmosthumanitarianneedisadirectresultofconflict,accessisthustiedtothepoliticalandmilitaryagendasofarmedstateandnon-stateactors,andbroaderperceptionsandexperiencesofsecurity(Bernard,2013;Tayloretal.,2012).Accessisbothareflectionofwhocangetwhatwhere,andwhogetshurtintheprocess.

Thecurrentnatureofconflictputsciviliansinthelineoffiretoanunprecedentedextent.ThedenialofaccesstohumanitarianactionisaviolationofIHLandonethatstatepartiestotheGenevaconventionsdisrespectinpursuit of their war aims. The plight of the hundreds of thousandsofISPsbesiegedinSyriaisacaseinpoint.ItechoessimilarwilfuldisregardforthelawinSriLanka,SouthSudanandMyanmarandtheinabilityorunwillingnessoftheinternationalcommunitytotakeactiontostopthekilling.DespitetherhetoricofHumanRightsUpFrontandtheIASCstatementontheCentralityofProtection,thereisawidespreadperceptionthattheUNhumanitarianwinghasbeenineffectiveinconfrontingtherealityofbarrelbombsandtheuseofstarvationasaweaponofwar(Howe,2016;Gutman,2016;Sparrow,2016),andthathumanitarianassistancehasdefactosupportedbelligerents(MartínezandEng2016).

Contemporarywartacticsputaidworkersatparticularrisk.In2013,474aidworkerswereattacked,and155werekilled(HumanitarianOutcomes,2014).VictimsofattacksarepredominantlylocalstaffofNGOsandRedCross/RedCrescentSocieties.Thisviolenceoccurredalmostexclusivelyincountrieswithweakgovernanceoractivelyengagedinconflict,suchasSyria,SouthSudan,Sudan,AfghanistanandPakistan(HumanitarianOutcomes,2014).Figurefor2014havedecreasedslightly,butthisislikelyadirectresultoforganisationalwithdrawlbecauseofinsecrutiy.Inthatyear329aidworkerswereattackedin21countries,ofwhom121werekilled,88woundedand120kidnapped.Aidagencieshavebecomemorerisk-averseandarechangingtheirmodeofoperating(Egeland,


HarmerandStoddard,2011;Duffield,2012).Severalstudieshaveexploredthemotivesforandtypologyofattacksagainstaidworkers(Fast,2014;LabonteandEdgerton,2013;Steets,ReichholdandSagmeister,2012).

Theshrinking(Western)humanitarianspaceislargelyafunctionoftheGWOTanditswidespreadimplications,whichincludetheincreasedpoliticisationandmilitarisationofhumanitarianactionontheonehandand,ontheother,theintroductionofanti-terrorlegislationbymanyWesterncountries,whichproscribesinteractionwithlistednon-statearmedactorssuchasHamas,AlShababortheTaliban(Pantuliano,MackintoshandElhawary,2011;Mackintosh,2011;Fraterman,2013;MaxwellandMajid,2016).Thesecounter-terrorism laws and related measures have increasedoperatingcosts,sloweddownoperationalresponse,curtailedfundingandunderminedhumanitarian partnerships. They have also prevented access and altered the quality of assistance. Some argue thattheyviolateIHL(Fraterman,2013).Importantly,theyhavealteredtherelationshipbetweenagenciesandtheat-riskgroupsthattheyworkwith(Duffield,2012;DoniniandMaxwell,2014).Butitshouldalsobenotedthat some crises characterised by extremely restricted access,suchasSouthSudanortheCentralAfricanRepublic,donotinvolvespecificallylabelled‘terrorist’groups.Ineithercase,increasingproportionsofthehumanitarian caseload have now become unreachable. Thischallengestheprincipleofimpartiality.Moreover,insurance concerns further limit the reach of humanitarians.Newtechnologiesareonlyaverypartialsolutiontothisproblem,whichislikelytoincreasinglyaffectassistanceand,evenmore,protectionactivities.

Humanitarian financingWhilehumanitarianbudgetshavegrowndramatically,Table1makesitclearthatneedshavegrownevenfaster,resultinginaseeminglyever-increasing‘gap’betweenhumanitarian needs and the resources required to address them.Indeed,theHighLevelPanelonHumanitarianFinancing suggests that the current level of funding may only be about halfofwhatisactuallyrequired(HLPHF,2016).Thishasledtoadebateaboutwhetherthehumanitariansystemasitexistsis‘broken’ormerely‘broke’(Aly,2015).Whilethereareconsistentshortfalls,

andtheseshortfallsmustbeaddressedinasystematic(not ad hoc)manner,theproblemsrelatedtohumanitarianfinancegowellbeyondasimpleshortfallinresources.Theproblemsoffinancearesymptomsofthedeeperproblemsconfrontinghumanitarianactionmorebroadly.

First,notallcrises,orallaffectedpopulations,aretreatedequally.DarcyandHofmann(2003)pointedoutwell over a decade ago that the level of response to crisiscouldinnowaybeconsidered‘impartial’.Somecrisesandsomepopulationsaredeemedtobeofmuchgreaterstrategicimportancetodonorsthanothers,andhencethosecrisesandthosepopulationsreceivealotmoreattentionandresources.High-profilecrisesachieveamuchhigherproportionofneedsmetthan‘hidden’crises,andtheresponsetoagivencrisismayvarysignificantlyfromoneyeartothenext,dependingondonorpriorities.InSouthSudan,forinstance,90%ofhumanitarianneedswerefundedin2014,theyearthatthecurrentconflict/displacementcrisisreallybegan(DevelopmentInitiatives,2015),butonly46%oftheneedsofthesameaffectedpopulationswerefundedin2015,whendonorshadgrownexasperatedwiththerefusalofthemainpartiestotheconflicttoresolvetheirdifferencespeacefully(OCHA,2015a).DarcyandHofmann(2003)pointedoutthatthehumanitariansystem did not even have a mechanism by which to comparetheseverityofcrises.However,thathasnowchangedwiththeintroductionofinnovationssuchasIntegratedPhaseClassificationanalysis.Butacquiringtheanalyticalcapacityhasnotdramaticallychangedthepoliticsoffunding.

Second,asnotedinsection2.1,mostofthefundingarrangementsarepredicatedontheassumptionofshort-term,acute‘emergencies’.Yetithasbeenclearforatleast the past decade that protracted crises have become thenorm(FAO/WFP,2010;Maxwell,RussoandAlinovi,2012).Fundingmechanismshavebeguntoreflectthischanging reality. Some humanitarian donors now have multi-yearfundingoptions,butmanydonot.

Third,thereisanassumptionofacleandividebetweenwhatconstitutes‘humanitarian’and‘development’action–andthereforefunding–inprotractedcrisesorfragileandpost-conflictcontexts.Indeed,‘bridging


thehumanitarian/developmentdivide’isoneofthemost common refrains heard in humanitarian reform discussions in the run-up to the WHS and at the WHS itself (UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016).Yetfunding‘windows’–andthekindofassumptions,timeframes,analysisandreportingrequirementsthatgowiththem–remainmuchthesameastheyhavealwaysbeen.Inprotractedcrisesinparticular, both humanitarian and development actors have long recognised the importance ofprotectinglivelihoodsandenablingpeoplenotjusttosurvivecrises,butalsotoprotectthemselvesinadvanceandtorecoverafterwards–objectivesthatnowcometogetherundertherubricof‘resilience’.Despitetherhetoric,relativelyfewfundingmechanismshaveemergedtoseamlesslyfinance‘resilience’interventions.Mostresiliencefundingremainsapatchworkofoldmechanisms.However,thereareseveralmodestreformstotheprevioussystem:manydonorsnowmakemulti-yearhumanitariangrants,mixandmatchhumanitariananddevelopmentobjectivesandfundinginresilienceprogrammes,andbuild‘crisismodifiers’intodevelopmentprogrammes.Innon-conflictemergencies,manydonorsandnationalgovernmentshaveinvestedheavilyinscalable social safety nets that can assist chronically vulnerablegroupsin‘normal’years,andexpandtopickupanemergencycaseloadin‘bad’years.Donorsareincreasinglyprovidingindirectfundingtolocalactors,forexamplethroughcountry-basedpooledfunds.However,most donor countries are not able to provide direct funding to many small local actors due to capacity and accountability issues. Most donor countries do not have thepresenceincountriestoidentifyandvetlocalactors,enter into agreements with them or monitor them. The GrandBargain,whichcommitsdonorstolonger-term,lessearmarkedandmore‘local’funding,putsadditionalpressure on donors to overcome such hurdles.

Fourth,despitealotoflipservice,thereisstillapoorlyarticulatedlinkbetweenwhatcommunitiesthemselvesendeavour to do to be more resilient in the face of protractedorrecurrentcrisis,andwhattheinternationalcommunitydoestosupportthem.Thereisstillverylimiteddirectinternationalfundingoflocalorganisations(GingerichandCohen,2015)andlimitedunderstandingof–letalonegoodwaysofworkingwith–communities’ownefforts(Maxwell,KimandMajid2015).Whilethere

isdiscussionabouttheroleoflocalactorsanddiasporas,forexample,thereisrelativelylittleinthewayofconcreteexamplesofenablingorworkingtosupporttheirresponses–andindeedinmanycasespoliticalprioritiesunderminethesestrategies(forexample,pressuretoclosedownmoneytransferlinksintoSomalia–alifelineonwhichmanySomalisdependingoodtimesandcrises–because of the possibility that terrorist groups were being financedthroughsuchmechanisms).

Intherun-uptotheWHS,avarietyofproposalsemergedforreformingthefinancingofhumanitarianaction(FutureHumanitarianFinancing,2015;HLPHF,2016;UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016;HPG,2016).Theseincludegreaterattentionfromdonorstoaddressunderlyingcausesofconflictandcrises–or‘shrinkingtheneed’;expandinganddiversifyingtheresourcebase,includingattemptingtoengagewithdiasporasandnewformsoffinancesuchasIslamicSocialFinance;anda‘grandbargain’betweentraditionaldonorsandhumanitarianagenciesthatwouldeffectivelypromisemoreflexible,lessearmarkedandlargeramountsoffundingforhumanitarianactioninreturnforgreateraccountability,transparencyandcosteffectivenessonthepartofagencies,togetherwithacommitmenttojointneedsassessment(HLPHF,2016).TheGrandBargaincameinforwidespreadsupportattheWHS,buthowitplaysoutinrealityremains to be seen.

The Secretary-General’s report for the World HumanitarianSummitcallsforequalattentiontopeace-buildingandconflictresolution(notingthattheUNhumanitarianbudgetnowdwarfsitspeacekeepingandspecialpoliticalmissionsbudgetcombined)(UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016).Italsocallsforgreaterinvestmentinlocalorganisationsandlocalcapacities,betterriskmanagementandnewfundingarrangementsforsituationsofprotractedcrisis.Bothoftheseunderlinethe general trends towards a greater emphasis on resilienceasanintegralpartofhumanitarianaction,andgreateremphasisonlocalorganisationsinresponsetoprotractedcrises.Yettheimplicationsofproposedreforms–forlocalisation,forimpartiality,forprotectionorindeedevenforthelikelihoodofsecuringadequateamountsofmoney–areonlybeginningtobeexplored.


UntilrecentlyhumanitarianfundingwasthenearexclusivepreserveofarelativelyclosedclubofOECDdonors. Non-Western donors have either struggled tobeacceptedinthisclub(OIC)orhavestayedawayaltogether(Gulf,Saudis).Callshavebeenmadetofinda way of addressing this imbalance through assessed contributions11orthroughan‘automaticfunding’mechanismsuchasalevyonairplanetickets(HLPHF,2016).Whilebothsuchmeasureswouldgoalongwayin spreading the responsibility for funding humanitarian assistanceacrosstheglobe,neitherhasmuchlikelihoodofbeingadoptedinthenearfuture.Effortsinthisdirectionarelikelytocontinue.EventheintroductionofamodicumofassessedcontributionstoOCHAappeals,througharestructuredCERFforexample,towhichallmemberstateswouldbeaskedtocontribute,wouldprovideastrongsignalthathumanitarianactionisasocialgoodandthusacollectiveresponsibilityofallmembersoftheUN.Trulyinternationalfundingcombined with independent needs assessments and independentmonitoringandevaluationwouldamounttoawelcomerevolutioninthefunctioningofthehumanitarian enterprise.

Failure of leadershipLeadership–atalllevelsofresponsibility–iscriticalforhumanitarianeffectiveness.However,failuresarealltoocommon. These range from the systemic to the ordinary. Manyfallunderthedictum,attributedtoEdmundBurke,that ‘the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for goodmentodonothing’.SuchwasthecaseinthefinalmonthsoftheSriLankanwar,whentheinternationalcommunity and the UN humanitarian leadership in the countryaswellasatHQ,andtheIASC,essentiallystoodby,powerlessorunabletocountermassivetargetedattacksonciviliansorchallengethewarringpartiesandtheirbackers(UnitedNations,2012).SimilarsystemicfailureshaveoccurredinRwanda(Erikssonetal.,1996)

andmorerecentlyinSyria,wherethesystemseemsparalysed in challenging the inhumanity of the war and where,forexample,ittookfouryearsbeforetheUNhumanitarian leadership felt comfortable in including theterm‘protection’intheUNStrategicResponsePlan(Nilandetal.,2015:44;Howe,2016).TheobstaclestoprincipledandeffectivehumanitarianactioninSyria,andmanyotherconflictsituations,maywellbeformidable,but the PFF case studies and earlier visits to Afghanistan andMyanmarhavefoundmanyinstanceswherestaffwerereluctant,orfeltunsupported,orthatitwasnottheirdutytoactondifficultorcontroversialissuessuchasprotection.Toalargeextentthisdependsonorganisationalcultureandseniormanagementsupport,inadditiontopersonalcommitment.

DespitetherhetoricofHumanRightsUpFrontandtheIASCstatementontheCentralityofProtection,therearelimitedincentivesfortheHCorHCTtotakebolddecisions,andthistricklesdownthestaffhierarchy.Theorganisationalcultureprefersconformitytochallengingauthority. Short-term contracts and high turnover of staffcompoundtheproblem.Asonerecentstudynotes,whenyoustepoutofthemouldand‘irritateagovernmentoramajoragency,andifyoudonothavealotofexperience,thenyouareputtingyourwholecareerontheline’(Buchanan-SmithandScriven,2011:49).Similarconcerns,combinedwiththelackofconsensuswithintheIASCandthechallengeofparallelcoordinationframeworks,areinhibitingbolder,proactiveleadershipintheSyriancrisis(Howe,2016).Inasystembasedonconsensusandwithmanylayersofcoordination,reachingagreementsoncriticalissues,suchashowtodealwithabusivebelligerents,isaverylabour-intensiveprocessthatrequiresmuchvertical(toHQ)andhorizontal(acrossagencies)consultation.Turfandmandateissues,asour case studies in Syria and the Sahel and many other contextsshow,oftencompoundtheproblem.

Incrisissettings,includingdisasters,HCsarefrequentlydouble-hatted,withfunctionsasRCsthatresultinmultipleresponsibilitiesincludinghumanitarian,humanrights,governanceanddevelopment,aswellasstaffsecurity. Prior experience greatly determines the extent towhichanHCunderstandsIHLandhumanitarianprinciples and has the capacity to be visionary and

11 On the use of assessed contributions for humanitarian action, see Stoddard, A., ‘A practical Response to MSF’s ‘Where is Everyone’’, The Guardian, 23 July 2014; and Antonio Guterres’ statement at the Third Committee of the UNGA, 5 November 2014: ‘I believe that in the future, humanitarian response should be able to rely partially on assessed contributions … This would be a way to minimise the dramatically increasing gap between needs and available resources in humanitarian response.’


strategicincontestedgovernancesettings.EvidencefromourSahelcasestudyamongothers(Afghanistan,Myanmar,SriLanka),pointstoagreatdealofhesitationamongHCsinprioritisinghumanitarianactionoverlonger-termdevelopmentagendasandtherelationshipwiththegovernment.HCswithtraditionaldevelopmentbackgroundsaremorelikelytosubordinatehumanitarianprioritiestolonger-termdevelopmentgoalsandrelationswithgovernmentauthorities.Debateson‘endingneed’,promptedbytheUNSecretary-General’sWHSreport,andonmerginghumanitariananddevelopmentcoordinationmechanisms,alsoairedattheWHS,potentiallyaddresssomeofthecoordinationissuesandgaps,particularlyinpostcrisisearlyrecovery,butontheotherhandcouldpotentiallyhaveadeleteriouseffectonprincipledhumanitarianaction.

InUNpeacekeepingsettingswherethereisanintegratedmission,HCscanhavetriplefunctions.IntheDRC,Afghanistan,Mali,SomaliaandSouthSudanamongstothers,theHC/RCisalsotheDeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-General.Humanitarianissuescanbecomesecondarytopolitical/militaryorstate-buildingagendas.UNintegrationeffortsrepresent,intheoryatleast,increasedcoherencefromapoliticalandprogrammaticperspectiveandpotentialformorestrategicpositioningofhumanitarianissues.Todate,eventhoughtherisksofintegrationhavebeenrecognised,andspecificpolicytoolsdeveloped,tensionsbetweenpeace,developmentandhumanitarianprioritiesstillexist,asourworkinMaliorSouthSudanshows,aswellasearlierworkinAfghanistan(Benelli,DoniniandNiland,2012).ThefundamentalcontradictionofplacingunderapoliticalmandateactivitiesthatdrawtheirlegitimacyfromIHLand humanitarian principles has not been resolved. There havebeencallsforseparatingtheHCfunctionfromtheRC(andSRSG)inordertoinsulatehumanitarianactionfrompoliticisation,andastand-aloneHCwasappointedintheCentralAfricanRepublic.Butthetrend,asnotedabove,seemstobetowardmoreintegrationthanseparationorinsulationofhumanitarianfrompolitical/developmentfunctions.Ataminimum,wheretherearecallsforgreatercollaborationbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentactors–particularlyinsituationsofprotractedcrisis–anRC/HCrequiresdeepexperienceofbothinordertobeabletofunctioneffectively.

The recent move to appoint Regional Humanitarian Coordinators–asintheSahelandSyria–complicatesleadershipevenfurther.IntheSahel,theRHChasnoauthorityovertheHC/RCsatthecountrylevel,whosefocusisprimarilydevelopmental.Intheviewofsomeobservers,thisresultsinadilutionratherthanastrengtheningofleadership(DoniniandScalettaris,2016).ThesameoccursbetweenHCsandtheOCHAcountryofficeswhicharenowseparateentitieswithdifferentreportinglines(OCHA,2011).TheHeadoftheOCHAofficenolongerreportsdirectlytotheHC.Thisdilutesleadership,addsanadditionallayerandincreasesthepotentialfortension,especiallywhentheHC/RChasadevelopmentalratherthanhumanitarianbackground(DoniniandScalettari,2016).TheformalseparationoftheIASCcoordinationmechanismfromtheresponsibilityforcoordinationofrefugeeassistanceandprotection,whichremainswithUNHCR,alsoaffectsleadership and precludes a whole-of-crisis and whole-of-caseload approach.

Whiletheissueofleadershiphasoftenbeenidentifiedasamajorconstrainttoprincipledandeffectivehumanitarianaction(Buchanan-SmithandScriven,2011),recentreforms(HRRandTA)havenotresultedinastepchange.Infactthesystemhasbecomesocomplexthat meaningful leadership remains an elusive goal. The HRR and TA seem to have made the system more homogeneousandresistanttochange(Nilandetal.,2015).Mandateissueshavebecomemorepronounced(Howe,2016;DoniniandScalettaris,2016).Inpre-DHA/OCHAdays,whenhumanitariancoordinationwasdonethroughadhocarrangementssuchastheUnitedNationsBorderReliefOperation(UNBRO),theUnitedNationsRegionalOfficeforCentralAfrica(UNOCA),OperationLifelineSudan(OLS)ortheOfficeforEmergencyOperationsinAfrica(OEOA),therewas,often,moreflexibilityandclearerleadershipoverdifferentcoordinationmechanismsconcernedwithaffectedgroups,insidethecrisiszoneandthosewhohadcrossedinternationalborders,andbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentagendas(Minear,2002;Ingram,1993).

ArchitectureDespite,orperhapsbecauseof,thevariousattemptstoreformthehumanitariansystemoverthepast20years,


theevidencefromthePFFresearchconfirmsthatitisdebatable whether there actually is a ‘humanitarian system’and/orwhetheritfunctionsasone.Describingthearchitectureofhumanitarianismisdifficult.Dependingonwhereyouareinthisamorphousgalaxy,itcanlookverydifferent.

Organisedhumanitarianismiscomposedofarelativelysmallnumberofcoreactorswhocalltheshots,andvarious more or less concentric circles of increasingly peripheralactors.Atthecore,wefindsome15stakeholderswhoplayanoverwhelmingroleindetermininghowthesystemruns(ElsandCarstensen,2015).Ifitdoesnotrunsmoothlyitisbecause,rhetoricaside,theseactorshavesometimesdivergentinterestsinthehumanitarianmarketplaceandpoliticaleconomy.Whatunitesthebig15–themajorWesterndonors,theoperationalUNhumanitarianagenciesandOCHA,theICRC/RedCrossMovementandthelargefederationsofINGOs–beyondabroadcommitmenttosavingandprotectingthelivesofpeopleinextremis,isacommonlanguage,cultureandnetworkpower.Theyformanoligopolythatexercisesagravitationalpullonalltheothermoredistantconstellationsofthesystem.Theirunwrittenmessage is: ‘you can join us on our terms; the rules of ourclubarenotupfordiscussion’.Ofcourse,thistriggersnegativereactionsfromnegativereactionsfromnon-Westerndonorsandageagencieshobuttintothebarrierstoentryintothesystemorsimply,likestakeholdersintheGulf,decidetoignoreit.Despitemuchtalkofdownwardaccountability,theusersofthesystemhaveevenlessofasayinhowitisrun(BrownandDonini,2014).

Oneofthepeculiarcharacteristicsofthissituationisthat,althoughorganisedhumanitarianismisacriticalmodernformofglobalgovernance,thereisnogovernanceofthesystemandevenlesscollectiveaccountability.Unlike,forexample,UNpeaceoperationsorhumanrights,thereisnointergovernmentalorganatthehelmthatcandecidewhat,whereandhowmuchisneededtoaddresshumanitarianneed.ECOSOConlyprovidessomeminimalorientationinthisrespect,and outcomes are largely engineered by humanitarian agenciesthemselves,butthereisno‘HumanitarianCouncil’akintothePeacekeepingCommissionortheHumanRightsCouncil–andthisdespitethefactthat,as

theUNSGrightlypointsout,peacekeepingexpendituresareonlyasmallfractionofhumanitarianspend(UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016).

So,ifthereisnointergovernmentalgovernance,whoruns the humanitarian machine? The short answer is thatnoonedoes.OECDdonorscontrolsomeparts,UNagenciesandNGOsaswell,andtheICRChasitsown managerial structure. Non-Western donors and agenciesareinaseparatesphere.UnlikeWFPorUNHCR,OCHAhasnointergovernmentaloversighttospeakof.TheIASCworksonthebasisofconsensusonly,andsofaritdoesnotincludeemergingordifferentformsofhumanitarianactionsuchastheOIC.NGOsareself-governingifnotself-referentialbydefinition.Insum,thereislittleintergovernmentalsupervisionforasystemthatmovescloseto$30bnperyear.Infact,thefurtheryougofromthecore,thelesserthegovernance.Humanitarianactionisapublicgoodbutonethatisnotsubjectedtoanyformofdemocraticoversight.Manywould argue that it represents a form of sovereignty thatisaccountabletonoone(Fassin,2012;Barnett,2013).Themachineissupposedtointelligentlycontrolitself–byconsensusnoless–butithasbecomesocomplexandunwieldy,andrivenbysuchinternalturfwars and vested interests that it is a wonder that it is stillabletodeliveratall.Inourfieldstudies,wehaveidentifiedanumberofcrucialareasthatexplainwhythearchitectureisunfitforpurpose:

• Complexification.Theformal,IASC-centredhumanitarian system has become so complex that it functionslikeanendinitselfratherthanameanstoanend(Slim,2015:15;Barnett,2013).Layershaveproliferatedbeyondcomprehension,creatinghugecoordinationtransactioncoststhatslowdownthesystem.Moreover,onlythebigplayerscanaffordtoengagefullyinclustersandothercoordinationbodies,e.g.forsecurity,accountabilityandmonitoringandevaluation.Smallplayers,particularlylocalNGOs,cannotaffordthetimeandfacebarrierssuch as language and the vicious circle of not being part of the humanitarian establishment and therefore notabletogetin(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;DoniniandScalettaris,2016;Schuller,2016).Astudyofthetransactioncostsofcoordinationand


ofalltheotheractivitiesnotdirectlyrelatedtosavingandprotectingliveshasneverbeendoneand is long overdue. The costs of this humanitarian ‘superstructure’arelikelytobeconsiderable,andcompoundedbythecostsofconsensus-building,whichassumesthatallstakeholdersneedtobeatthetable(ratherthanjustthosewhocancontributetothesolutionofaparticularproblem).

• Gaps and overlaps in coordination. TheIASCanditsmyriadglobalandlocalmechanisms,functionsasthemainconsensus-basedcoordinationsystemforhumanitarianaction,butitisnottheonlyone.CoordinationofrefugeeresponsesistherealmofUNHCRandguardedfiercelyagainsttheimpositionofclusters(Guterres,2015b).Mandate/status-basedapproachessometimesclashwithneeds-basedapproachesandworkagainstwhole-of-crisisor whole-of-caseload strategies and approaches. Similar gaps occur between humanitarian and developmentpoliciesandperspectives.WesterndonorssetupNGOcoordinationbodies,andsodothe NGOs themselves. Non-Western donors do the same.

• Hegemony. The system remains very much a top-down,dominantstructureinwhichtheoligopolydefinespriorities,modalitiesandnarrativesofsuccess.Therhetoricofinclusionandlocalisation–whichwasstronglyreaffirmedattheWHS–isstillseen as suspect by many non-Western actors and localNGOs,inparticularbecausetheyhavesolittleaccesstothemoneyandthedecision-making.

Threeadditional,relatedconcernsarise,thatarenotnecessarilydirectlyafunctionofarchitecture:

• The local and the global. While there are clear justificationsforincreasingtheroleof,andfundingprovideddirectlyto,localorganisations,thereisasyet no clear consensus on the appropriate balance betweenrelianceonlocalactorsandorganisationsandtheon-goingrequirementforinternationalengagement.Thebuzz-phraseis‘aslocalaspossible,asinternationalasnecessary’.Butthissayslittleaboutthecriteriaforeither.Clearly,incasesofextremelimitationsonaccess,buteveninlessfraughtcircumstances,itmakessenseforlocal

agenciestolead.Butthereisnoclearcategorisationofa‘local’agency.InSyria,forexample,‘local’or‘national’organisationsaremostlypartisansupportersofonefactiontotheconflict,nottheleastofwhichistheSyrianArabRedCrescentSociety,which is clearly controlled by the Assad regime (Howe,2016).Underthesecircumstances,eveniflocalorganisationshavethebestaccess,thereisstillaclearneedforsomelevelofinternationalengagementtoensureadegreeofimpartialityandadherencetoIHLintheresponse.However,insomecasesthestaffofeveninternationalagenciesmaybedominatedorwhollycontrolledbyoneparty,ethnicgrouporclan(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015).Inothercases,localagenciesornationalgovernmentsmaybethebestpositionedtoensureanimpartialresponse.Thisisclearlyamatterforgreatercontextualanalysisratherthanglobal‘standards’,evenif,aswasveryclearattheWHS,thereisgeneralagreementthattheroleoflocalorganisationsshouldbeprioritised.Andcareshouldbeexercisedthat‘localisation’isnotjustahandylabelforout-sourcingtheinherentrisksofoperatinginconflictsituationsfrominternationalagenciestolocalactors.NorshoulditaffordawayofavoidingtheneedtotackledifficultissuesofrespectforIHLandprotection.ThelaunchoftheNEARsouthernNGOcoordinationnetworkattheWHSwasuniversallywelcomed,but it is yet unclear if the focus on the local will be sufficienttomakeadentinthepowerrelationsinthehumanitarian arena.

• Declining fieldcraft.OneofthestrikingfindingsofthePFFcasestudies,particularlyintheSahel,isasenseofdecreasingfieldcraftamongmainstreamhumanitarian agencies. Some agencies have become ‘toobigtosavelives’–or,toputitdifferently,they are no longer present where lives need to be savedorprotected(HealyandTiller,2014).Thesetasksareconductedthroughever-longerchainsofintermediaries.Agenciesfinditdifficulttoremainoperationalinfraughtcontextsandinternationalstaffarelosingbasichumanitarianskills–howtobehavewithabusivestrongmen,howtonavigateacheckpoint,howtoremainfirmbutpolite,howtoexpress solidarity and eschew arrogance. This loss offieldcrafthaspartlytodowiththefactthatthe


systemisbecomingmoreadversetostaffsecurity,legalandreputationalrisks.‘EveninTimbuktu’quippedoneobserverintheSahel,‘whenthetownwascontrolledbytheinsurgents,humanitarianspacewastheretobetaken.Thoseinchargevaluedourservices,butwejustdidnottry’.

• A reactive, not anticipatory, humanitarianism. Despiteadvancesinearlywarning,anddespitelongexperiencewithhazardsthatarepredictable,humanitarianactionisstilllargelyreactive.Humanitarianactiononlyscalesupafterthefullextentofthecrisishasbecomeclear(Maxwell,KimandMajid,2015;MaxwellandDonnelly,2015).Progress has been made in some cases where predictable hazards and predictable caseloads have been more successfully managed by scalable social protectionprogrammes–Ethiopia’sProductiveSafetyNetProgram(PSNP)beingthemostfrequentlycitedcase(althoughthePSNPwillbetestedintheresponsetotheElNinodroughtof2015–16).Amoreanticipatoryapproachtohumanitarianactionrequires both greater levels of joint analysis and coordination,andastrongerconsensusaboutearlyaction.Theevidenceinthecaseofnaturalhazardsonboth improved humanitarian outcomes and reduced costisconvincing(Cabot-Ventonetal.,2012),butincomplexemergenciescompetingimperativesconfoundthesearchforconsensusandcoordination(MaxwellandMajid,2016).

2.4 Reform?

The run-up to the WHS triggered a number of proposals forreform(BarnettandWalker,2015;MilibandandGurumurthy,2015;Malloch-Brown,2015;GingerichandCohen,2015;HPG,2016;ALNAP,2015);moreareboundtofollowinitswake.Despitetheuseofloftytermssuchas‘regimechange’,veryfewoftheproposalsreviewedsofargobeyondtinkeringwithorganisationalchartsandincrementalreform.TheexceptionsareHPG(2016),Oxfam’spleaforturningthesystemonitshead(Gingerichetal.,2015)andtheSOHSreport(ALNAP,2015),whichatleastmakesomeconcreterecommendationson,forexample,devolutionandlocalisation.TheWHSitself,however,didnotreallyentertain any strong reform ideas.

The WHS: a glass half full or half empty?Itisstilltooearly for a balanced assessment of the reportedly morethan3,000commitmentsmadebygovernments,aidagenciesandotherstakeholders.Mostofthecommitmentswereindividualratherthancollective,and exhortatory rather than measurable. More detailed assessmentsandfollow-upactionswillemergeinthecomingmonths.ThePFFpartnersparticipatedintheSummit by co-organizing a side-event on the current challengesandthefutureofhumanitarianaction.Our overall impression was that the Summit was longonrhetoricbutshortondetail.Or,asonedonorrepresentativeputit,‘thereweremanylittlegoodthings,butnobigoutcomes’.Specifically,wenotethefollowingitems–‘half-fulls’–whichcarryatleastsomepotential.

Perhaps the most important signal was the widespread recognition,byallstakeholders,thatconflictandprotracted crises were their greatest concern and that respectofIHLisacentralresponsibilityofstates.Muchrhetoric,andapplause,re-affirmedtheimportanceofhumanitarianprinciplesandprotection.Butintermsofbeingadefiningpoliticalmomentforthesector,WHSwasdisappointing.Whilegovernments,particularlyWesterngovernments,restatedtheircommitmenttotheimportantfoundationsofhumanitarianaction,statesfellshortofcommittingtoexplicitactionstopreventandendwar,addresshumansuffering,includingbycurbingarmsalestobelligerentcountries,puttinginplaceawatchdogandsanctionsmechanismforupholdingIHLandimprovingtheconductofwar,suchasbyproscribingthetargetingofmedical centres.

The centerpiece of the WHS was the Grand Bargain. Thesector’spowerhouses–its15largestdonorsand15largestrecipientsoftheirfunds–agreedtoincreasingtheuseofcashandmarketmechanisms,directingmorefundingtonationalandlocalorganisationsandfundingmoreflexiblyandforlongerwithsimplifiedreportinginexchange for more transparency on how that money is applied.Post-WHS,anumberoftechnicalbodieshavebeensetupfortheimplementationoftheGrandBargain(GB)butitistooearlytotellwhetherandhowtheGBwillchangethewayhumanitarians–andtheirdonors–dobusiness.Thesameappliestolocalization,whichwasanotherhigh-visibilityagendaitem,underscoredbythe


launchoftheNEARnetworkofsouthernNGOsjustbeforethe summit. The target of up to 25% of direct funding to nationalandlocalNGOswasendorsedbothinthemoreformalsessionsandintheside-events.However,muchambiguity remains on how this target might be achieved and,importantly,onhowmuchdonorsandNGOsareactuallycommittedtolettinggoofsomeoftheirpower:somedonors,forexample,arepointingoutthattheydonot have the capacity to directly manage large numbers oflocalprojects.Inaddition,theissueoftheimplicationsoflocalizationfortherespectforhumanitarianprinciplesinfraughtorconflictenvironmentswaslargelyavoided.Variousotherlargescalenewinitiativeswerealsolaunchedsuchasanewplatformforeducationinemergencies with a target of close to $4 billion in the next fiveyearsoranewRegionalOrganisationsHumanitarianActionNetwork(ROHAN).

While the main events were largely scripted and did not allowformuchdebate,therealenergywasinthe115orsosideevents,whichbroughtasenseofpromiseandpurposetothemeeting.Manyinnovationsandinitiativeswereshowcased,suchastheCharter4Change,anewcoalitiononmeetingtheneedsofpeoplewithdisabilities,initiativesbyphilanthropistsandprivatesectorbusinesses,anewhumanitariandatahubinTheHague.Newfinancialinstruments,suchasthehumanitarianimpactbondslaunchedbytheICRCandtheOICIslamicendowmentfund,deservemention.Thewealthofinitiativesisanindicationofthediversificationofthehumanitariansystem–orecosystem–andsuggestsviableandsometimesnon-Westernalternativestothesector’srigidmodels.

Inthe‘morethanhalfempty’category,therewasmajordisappointmentatthelevelofparticipationofstates. None of the P5 countries sent heads of state orgovernment.Moreover,theparticipationofG77states,includingheavyweightslikeChinaandIndia,wassomewhatmuted–merelyobservingratherthanparticipating.NGOsattendedenmasse–exceptforMSF,whichpubliclyboycottedtheSummit–andlargely dominated the side events. Because it was amulti-stakeholdereventinwhichnonegotiatedintergovernmentaloutcomeorpoliticaldeclarationwasanticipated,therewasnoincentivetounifythecommunityofstatesaroundcriticalissues.The

multi-stakeholdernatureofthemeeting–neitherintergovernmentalnoracivilsocietyforum–didnotgodownwellwithmanySouthernstates.Thelackofgovernmental support from the global South became evidentattheJuneECOSOCmeeting,whichwasunableto agree on wording recognizing the importance of the Summit.12

Asmentioned,rhetoricaside,therewasnoprogressonIHL,humanitarianprinciplesandprotection.ThelackofengagementofSouthernmemberstatesonIHLisseenbysomeasaharbingerofagreaterNorth–Southdivideonissuesofprinciple.Moreover,despitetheextenttowhichprotectionhadbeenflaggedasanimportantissueinthepre-Summitconsultationsandespeciallyinconsultationswithaffectedpeople,theSummitwasmuchmoreaboutassistancethanaboutprotection.NonewideasonhowtoadvancetheprotectionagendaemergedeitherintheSecretary-General’s report or at the Summit itself. Refugee andmigrationissueswereabsentfromtheSummit,allegedly because they were being ‘reserved’ for the SeptemberSummitinNewYork.Manysawthisasalostopportunitytohighlightthelinksbetween,forexample,theinhumanityofthewarinSyriaanddeterioratingasylumconditionsinEurope.Discussionsofrelationshipsbetweenhumanitarianactionandpeacekeepingorpeace-building,particularlyinthedifficultcontextsofUNintegratedmissions,werenotablyabsent.

Thehumanitarian–developmentrelationshipgainedalotofairtime.Theissuewasframedinthecontextof‘endingneed’andwiththeSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)astheoverarchingframework,includingforhumanitarianaction.Whiletherewassupportforthenotionthatdevelopmentagenciesshouldbemoreactiveandbeseenearlierinprotractedcrises,theimplicationsofthe proposed merger of relief and development were not discussedinanydetail,whetherintermsofarchitectureatHQortherisksofpoliticisinghumanitarianactioninthefield.ICRCandotherDunantistorganisationshadexpressed their concerns before the Summit on how thisshiftwouldaffectprincipledhumanitarianaction,particularlyinconflict,andhaveconfirmedtheirconcerns

12 ECOSOC resolution E/RES/2106/9 of 30 June 2016, para.41, simply ‘notes the holding’ of the WHS.


initsaftermath.Thesameappliedtoissuesaroundinteractionwithnon-statearmedactors–whichwerehowever a topic much referred to in a number of side events. Much of the discussion revolved around greater developmentactiontoprevent,mitigateandassistinrecovery from ‘natural’ disasters. This is an important area,buttherewasmuchlessdiscussionaboutthehumanitarian–developmentrelationshipinconflict.ThereweresomepositiveattemptstogettheUNhumanitariananddevelopmentsystemstoworkbettertogether,e.g.throughasignedcommitmentto‘NewWaysofWorking’,butthearchitectureandincentivesforsuchcollaborationare not in place.

Despitetheundercurrentsinthepre-Summitconsultationsthatchangeandreformweretobehighontheagenda,verylittleorspecifictranspiredattheSummititself. The Secretary-General’s report had steered clear of anyissueimplyingchangeinthearchitecture,governanceandpowerandinstitutionalrelationsintheUNsystem.TherewerehintsthatcoordinationstructuresneededtobereviewedinordertoaccommodatetheincorporationofhumanitarianaffairswithintheSDGsbut,byandlarge,thecurrentarchitectureandgovernanceofthesystemwereacceptedasagiven–certainlyintheformalsessions.Neithercoordinationnorleadershipissueswerebroached,ortheimplicationsofincreaseduseofcashasapossibleentrypointforstreamliningthe(UN)system.ManyleftIstanbulwiththefeelingthatthiswasalostopportunity.

Finally,exceptinthesideevents,therewasnodiscussiontospeakofaboutthefutureandhowagencieswouldneedtochangetoadapttoemergingandpotentiallyescalatingthreatsandrisks.ThenetresultwasaSummit that either dealt with today’s challenges or was backwardlooking.Eventheattentiongiventoinnovationwasembeddedforthemostpartinthepresent,rarelyventuringbeyondwhatisavailablenow.Yet,inaworldinwhichtechnologies,societalconstructsandeconomicsystemswillundergoexponentialchange,muchgreaterattentionneedstobegiventothefuture–tothe‘whatmightbe’.Nevertheless,theWHS’sattentiontothepotentialimpactofinsuranceandre-insuranceformitigatingriskandrespondingtocrisisimpactsdemonstrated how this single instrument has the

potentialforchangingsomeofthemostfundamentalassumptionsaboutprevention,preparednessandresponse.Expandingthefullpotentialofthissortofinnovationalongwiththefocusoncashmaywelltransformnotonlythewayweassistthoseinneed,butalso the way we perceive the vulnerable.

TheunevenoutcomesoftheSummitwereemblematicofthe never-ending tension in the humanitarian endeavor –atonceneutral,independentandimpartialinitsethos,buthighlyvulnerabletopoliticalinfluenceinitsapparatus.Perhapsitwasunrealistictoexpectthatthisfundamentaltension could be discussed and addressed given the natureoftheSummit.Inanycase,neithertheERCnorthe Secretariat had the capacity or authority to lead the stakeholderconsultationsandengagegovernmentstodrumupthenecessarypoliticalsupport.

Steppingbackandtakingabroaderview,whatdowe learn from the WHS and the other major recent internationalintergovernmentalconferencesincludingtheRedCrossconferenceofDecember2015andtheNewYorkUNrefugeesummitinSeptember2016?Noneofthesemajoreventsreachedanysignificantbreakthrough,whetherintermsofadvancingprinciplesoraddressinginstitutionalandgovernanceissues.StatesattheRedCrossConferenceweredeadlockedontheissueofsettingupanIHLcompliancemechanism;reformnever really made it to the agenda of the WHS and the samelackofintergovernmentalconsensus-buildingplaguedtherefugee/migrantsSummit.

Forthemostpart,leadersusedtheseconferencesasopportunitiestoemphasisewhattheywerealreadydoingratherthantoagreetoanythingnew,oreventheurgencyofagreeing.Onrefugeesandmigrants,a possible new compact was postponed for possible adoptioninanothertwoyears.Asoneobserverputit,ratherthanaholisticfocusondisplacement,therewasastrongsuggestionbysomecountriesthat‘ifwewanttohelptherefugees,wehavetokeepoutthemigrants’.13 The issues of the Red Cross Conference the WHS and the NewYorkSummitareintimatelylinked.Theyareatthe

13 Josephine Lebed of Oxfam, quoted in ‘Plenty of Hype, No New Ideas at UN Migration Summit’, IRIN, 22 September 2016.


coreofinternationalengagementinconflict.Thefactthat they are being addressed separately and that there isnopoliticalwilltoworktowardsanintergovernmentalagreementisatellingreflectionnotonlyofthestateofthehumanitariansystembut,moreimportantlyperhaps,oftheparlousstateofmultilateralism.

Prospects for reform. Atsomepointinthefuture,amajor overhaul of the humanitarian architecture and coordinationmachineryisboundtobeputontheagendaagain.Nationalandexternalreliefactorsneedasystem that is able to address urgent humanitarian need inatimelyandeffectivemanner,ratherthanimpededbyinstitutionalturfandmandatebattles.Somestreamliningissurelyrequired,especiallyintheUN.Ofcourse,fornowboldreformisconsideredradicalorimpractical.AttheWHSitselftherewaspreciouslittlediscussionofthearchitectureofthesystemandthefunctionsthatitperforms,butmanyobserversareoftheviewthatfurthertinkeringor,worse,procrastination,willonlymakeoverduechangemoredifficult.

Thekeyquestionis‘wherewillchangecomefrom?’Manyofthekeyandpowerfulstakeholdersarecomfortablewiththecurrentarchitecture,asexpressedforexampleindonorstatementstoECOSOC2015ortheERCinterviewtoIRIN(Aly2015).Somewillrecognizeprivatelythatitisfunctionaltotheirneeds,asitallowsthemtomaintaincontrolofthemoneyandwhereitgoes.Itisthusunlikelythat change will come from within.14

Four critical questionsOne system or several? Although the idea of saving livesandrelievingsufferingishardlyaWesterncreation,organised humanitarianism’s historical origins are locatedintheWest(BarnettandWeiss2008,7).Whilemanyobserversrecognisetheexistenceofamultitudeofshadesofhumanitarianism(Kennedy,2005:xv),therealityoftheinstitutionsandofthepowerrelationsisstillverymuchNorthernandWestern.HumanitarianactionnotborneoftheNorthern-dominatedandhighlyinstitutionalisedinternationalregimehasremainedlargelyneglectedbeyondrhetoricalaffirmationsofthe

universalityofthesystem.Asmentionedabove,theconsistent message of the dominant system is ‘you canjoinus,onourownterms’(Fiori,2013;DoniniandWalker,2012;Donini,2016).

AslongastheWestdominatedtheworld,itswayofdoinghumanitarianworkwasnaturallydominantaswell.ButnowpowerisleakingawayfromtheWest.Many states in the global South are occupying a larger spaceontheinternationalscenebybothbeingbetterabletohelpthemselveswhendisasterstrikesandbypromotingtheirownsoftpowerthroughdevelopmentandhumanitarianinitiatives.Whilerecognitionoftheexistenceof‘other’or‘recentlynoticed’humanitarianismsisincreasing,universalityisstillverymuch the ‘universality’ of the West. This claim may well start to ring hollow.

So,whatliesaheadforthehumanitarianenterpriseasweknowit?WillWesternhumanitarianismbeincreasinglychallengedandevenovertakenbyothermodelsofsuccourforpopulationsatrisk–forexamplebymorestatistor‘Eastphalian’models(Ginsburg,2010)?Willthehumanitarianfuturebemorepluri-versal,withmanydifferenthumanitariansystemsbloomingandsomehowco-existing(Donini,2016)?Thisnowseemstobeafundamentalquestion.

Is change necessary? The evidence put forward in this report suggests that it is. There is a deep malaise across the humanitarian enterprise fuelled by the realisationthathumanitarianactionispronetoinstrumentalisation,isusedasafigleafforpoliticalinaction,andcannotbefixedbyincrementaltweaks.SyriaandYemen,comingontheheelsofSouthSudan,Somalia,SriLanka,Afghanistanandothercrises,showthe limits of the humanitarian endeavour. Respect for humanitarian principles has fallen to new lows and Syria may be a game changer for the future of humanitarianism.Itcaneitherleadtoashake-upand revival of the humanitarian discourse or usher in furtherdeclineandmarginalisation.Needshaveneverbeensohigh,butthegapbetweenneedsandcapacitieshas never been wider. Much will depend on how this criticalcrossroadsisapproachedbykeystakeholders,andtheirpoliticalwilltoeffectreform.

14 As the American feminist poet and activist Audre Lorde once noted, ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house.’


The big picture malaise is complemented by a litany of problemsrelatedtotheinternalfunctioningoforganisedhumanitarianism,manyofwhichhavebeenanalysedabove. They result from failures of leadership and architecture; they have to do with how humanitarian workisorganisedandfinanced,whetheritisprincipledornot,whetherrightsandprotectionareforcefullypursuedorneglected,whetherneedsareassessedinarationalmannerorpiecemeal,whetherdownwardandupwardaccountabilitiesareinplaceandmanyothersubstantiveandtechnicalissues.Thecommonfeatureoftheseproblemsisthat,whiletheyretainakindof‘condemnedtorepeat’flavour,theyarenotintractable.

Is change possible? Yes,evenifpastattemptsatreform,some of which resulted in much-needed improvements intermsofthereachandaccountabilitiesofhumanitarianaction,havefallenshortofexpectations.Theobstacles,includingthefactthatthestatusquoisfunctionaltotheinterestsofthepowersthatbe,aredaunting.TheUNSecretary-General’sreporttotheWHSisapotentwake-upcallthatthecurrentsystemisfailingtheassistanceandprotectionneedsof65millionpeopleonthemove,andcountlessmorewhoaredeniedassistanceandprotectionbecausetheyareunabletomove,orcannotbereached,orwhoarelivinginextremis.Butpoliticalwillhasyettobemobilised,although public opinion worldwide has increasingly come to expect a rapid expression of global succour when confronted with intolerable levels of human suffering.Affectedvulnerablegroupshaveneverbeenso well informed of their rights and of the failings of the internationalsystem–orsoenabledtotaketheircasedirectlytothepublicviasocialmediaorcitizenreporting–andarealreadydemandingaccountabilitiesinwaysthat would have been unimaginable only ten years ago.

Citizensandhumanitarianagenciesaswellasaffectedpopulationsformamoralcommunitywithcomplementaryinterests.Itwouldbesurprisingifpressurefrombelowdid not materialise in the near future to demand change.Thelevelsoffrustrationarehighandhavebeenrecognisedevenatthehighestlevel(UnitedNationsSecretary-General,2016:3).Nowisthetimetobuildonthisfrustrationanddelineatethecontoursofaneffectivehumanitarian system.

What would change look like?Vulnerablegroupsand humanitarian actors need a system that is able to addressurgentneedinatimelyandeffectivemanner,ratherthanonthebasisofpoliticalexpediency,institutionalturformandatebattles.Needsshouldbeassessed in an independent and transparent manner rather than through a system that privileges agency vestedinterestsandmarketshare.Monitoring,evaluationandaccountabilitiesshouldbesimilarlyindependent and removed from agency interests. UNcoordinationmechanismscouldbeconsiderablysimplifiedwithasingleleadershipandstructurecoveringallaffectedgroupsinaparticularcrisis–whetherrefugees,IDPsorISPs.Suchchangeswouldrequirenorevisionofexistingmandatesandcould,therefore,beimplementedintheshortterm.Butagain,the challenge would be to develop a single leadership that embraces the full panoply of humanitarian actors,whichmaywellmeanthattheold‘club’doesnot necessarily decide who that single leadership comprises. And the leadership ‘model’ would have to recognise that the quality of leadership is not the same as the quality of structure or architecture.

Othermeasureswouldrequiremorework.Effectivechangewouldmeancomingtogripswiththeshackleshumanitarianactionputsonitself:thehumanitarianimperativevs.securityimperativeparadox;theprofessionalizationvs.voluntarismparadox;theconstraintstolearning;the‘earlywarning/lateresponse’paradoxandtheimperativeofbecomingmoreanticipatorygenerally.ThelackofinvolvementoftheentireUNmembershipinthepoliciesandmanagementofhumanitarianactionwouldneedtobeaddressed;humanitarianoperationsarestill,inthemain,thepreserveofahandfulofdonorstates–unlikeUNpeaceoperations,whereallstateshaveasay.Asystemofassessedcontributionsforhumanitarianactionwouldaddressthisdemocraticdeficit.ItmightbeinstitutedgraduallybybuildingupanassessedcontributionswindowintheCERF.This,combinedwith the establishment of a governance structure that reflectsallUNmemberstateswouldgoalongwaytotransform the current system from one that is ‘of the North’ to one that is genuinely ‘of the world’.


Changewouldmeanlearningtodealwiththepoliticsofprotractedcrisis–inwhichmultipleactorshavetoengage;protectingthehumanitarianimperativebutrecognisingthathumanitarianactionisnottheonlyformofintervention;andaddressingthetroublesomeoverlapwithotheragendas–humanitarian/developmentand,morecritically,humanitarian/security.

An even bolder move would be to solve at least the UN partoftheleadershipandcoordinationconundrumbycreatingasingleUNoperationalhumanitarianagency(Ingram,1993).Ofcourse,fornowsuchideasmayappeartobepipedreams,butfurthertinkeringwithorganisationalchartsor,worse,procrastinationwillonlymakeoverduechangemoredifficult.Weshallreturntothese issues in the following chapter.


3. Planning from the future: Conclusions and recommendationsThe global community will be confronted with an ever-expandingrangeoffuturethreats,theirdimensionsanddynamicsgrowinginmanyinstancesexponentially.Thosewithinthetraditionalhumanitariansectorwillhavetofacetheprospectthatthewaysthattheirorganisationsarecurrentlyconfiguredandtheircapacitiesmaybeinadequatetodealwithsuchrisks.Suchinadequacieswillinevitablyhaveasignificantimpactuponthelivesandlivelihoodsofuntoldnumbersaroundtheworld–East,West,NorthandSouth.

Humanitarians need to recognise that causal factors infuturecriseswillbefarmoremultidimensionalandinterlinked,andthatsuchcriseswillbecomeever-moreglobal–theirimpactsspillingacrossregionsandcontinents.Thedimensionsanddynamicsoffuturehumanitarian crises mean that more and more people will beaffected.Inthismostfundamentalsense,theglobalcommunitywillhavetopreparetoaddressadifferentconceptofrisk,abroaderdefinitionofahumanitarianactorandorganisationaltransformationsthatinvariousways run contrary to today’s humanitarian ethos.

3.1 The future: preparing for threats to come

Thethreatsofthefuturewillcreatevulnerabilities,butinwaysfarmorecomplexthanweseetoday.Innosense do these deny the importance of those categories withwhichwearealreadytoofamiliar–theprotractedcrises,theplightofrefugees,thewar-affected.Thenewcategoriespositedhere,however,areintendedtodemonstratethelinksbetweenthosetransformativefactorsthathavebeendiscussedearlier,emergingsocietalvulnerabilitiesandrelatedcrisisdrivers.

Eachofthenewcategorieshascommoncharacteristics,and indeed may inter-relate in various ways. Their boundariesmayblurandoverlap.They,too,inonewayoranothermayfrequentlyresultinviolence,warsandmassdisplacementofpeoples,orconverselyeachcategory in its own way may be triggered by the same. Although these might be termed ‘human crises’ or crises forhumanity,theywillhavehumanitarianconsequencesand require a humanitarian response.

Existential threats, or threats to large swathes of humanity and in certain instances to the planet itself. Manysuchthreatsaretechnology-driven,butnotall.Their common denominator is the sheer magnitude oftheirimpact.And,whiletheeffectsofsuchthreatswouldindeedbepotentiallycataclysmic,thatshouldnotsuggest that there will not be ways to prepare for them andmitigatetheireffects.Pandemicsareoneofthebestknownofthesethreats.

Cascading threats and risks. Whileanexistentialriskassumes that a single factor will trigger catastrophic crises onaplanetaryscale,whichinturnwillresultinmassivelossoflifeandmeansofsubsistence,cascadingriskscancause catastrophes that may eventually be global but notexistentialintheshortterm.Theireventualimpactsaretheendresultofasequenceofeventsresultinginphysical,socialoreconomicdisruptionsfarbeyondtheinitialimpactofanysinglecrisisdriver.Cascadingcrises,forexample,couldbetriggeredbyadroughtthatledtoafamine,whichinturnledtoconflictandindustrialcollapse,allofwhichinturnmightresultinstatecollapseandanarchy.Breakdownsincommunicationsystems,failuresofback-upsystems,flawsindecision-makingorevensimplythelackofcapacitytorespondtoacrisiscanfurther intensify that chain of events. Mass and long-term displacement and the development of ‘slumscapes’ and ‘noman’slands’,bothinvolvingintractablepovertyandvulnerability,arepotentialconsequences.

Simultaneous crises. As opposed to the types of crises notedabove,simultaneouscrisesdescribeasituationinwhichtheinternationalcommunity–inthiscasesocietiesasreflectedinstablecountries–maybefacedwithcrises simultaneously in which total needs far exceed the internationalcommunity’scapacitiestorespond.Asonelooksatthefirsttwodecadesofthetwenty-firstcentury,it would seem that the number and types of crises faced bytheinternationalcommunityarealreadyoverwhelmingthehumanitariansector.Multiplecrisesoccurringatthesametimeincountriesdeemedtobe‘developed’aswellas those regarded as developing might well stretch the capacity of those with humanitarian roles well beyond theircapacitiesandcapabilitiestorespond.


The humanitarian sector is generally focused on the immediate,afteracrisishastakenplaceandtowhichitfeelscompelledtorespond.Yet,evenforthosewhounderstandtheneedtoplanbeyondtheimmediate,thereisadisconcertinglackofcoherent,consistentandglobalapproachesforidentifyingandanticipatingfuturerisks.Thispresentsabarriertomoreconsidered,strategicplanning.Thisfailuretobemoreproactivethroughfuturesplanningalsoreflectsanoverlynarrowfocus throughout much of the sector on internal organisationalinterestsandprioritiesandstandardoperatingprocedures.

Anorganisationthatissufficientlyanticipatoryandadaptivestillremainsararityinthehumanitariansector.AlltoooftenWesternhegemonicassumptionsaswellasinstitutionalsurvivaldefinethenatureofthreats,standardhumanitarian responses and indeed the humanitarian policies and principles which ostensibly determine the response.Whiletoolsusedforthisproject–Futures Roundtables,Testing the FutureinitiativesandtheOrganisational Self-Assessment Tool–demonstratedaveryclearinterestinfuturesthinking,participantsfromawiderangeofhumanitarianorganisationsfeltthattherewaslittleinstitutionalincentivetodoso,andanassumptionthattherewasneitherasystemnorsourcestowhichonecouldturnfordirection.

Similarorganisationalperspectivesalsodefinedthenatureofcollaborationformanyofthoseinthehumanitariansector.Dealingwithfuturedisastersandemergencieswillincreasinglyrequireexpertisethatreflectsmulti-sectoralperspectives.Privatesectorcompanies,themilitary,socialnetworksandthesciencesallofferanunderstandingoffuturethreatsandpossiblesolutions,buthereagaintheself-referentialnatureofmanywithinthehumanitariansectorisreflectedinverynarrownetworksthathamperawiderperspectiveaboutfuturerisks,andpotentialsolutionstoreducesuchrisks.Collaboration,onceonegoesbeyondtheconventionalhumanitariansector,isinhibitedbyafundamentallackofunderstandingaboutthemotivesandcoreinterestsofpotentialcollaborators,andthere are few forums in which this is consistently explored.

Collaboration,too,needstobebaseduponaclearsenseoftheobjectivesforwhichpossiblepartnershipsmight

beneeded.InaseriesofstudiesofUNcountryteams,itwasapparentthatpotentialpartnershipswithlocalnaturalandsocialscientistswouldclearlyhaveprovideda deeper understanding about the viability of UN country programmesandprojects.However,suchobviouscollaborativenetworkshadneverbeenpreviouslyused,althoughtheirutilityintheaftermathofthesestudieswasacknowledged.

Theanticipatoryandadaptiveorganisation–onethatacknowledgesnewformsofcollaborationandnewtypesofcollaborativepartners,andthatrecognisestheimportanceofnewapproachestoidentifyinginnovation–willbeessentialindealingwiththechallengesofthefuture.Thekeyistheextenttowhichorganisationsinthe sector understand the importance of preparing now forwhatmaywellbe,andtheextenttowhichthereissupportfromamuchwideranddiverseinternationalcommunity to help to prepare for an ever-more complex and uncertain future.

And,yetdespiteageneralawarenessthroughouttheworldthattransformativechangesareimpactingonvirtuallyallaspectsofhumanexistence,thehumanitariansectorfindsitselfonceagaininreactive–notproactive–mode.Itexpendslittleenergyonlookingforplausiblelinksbetweensuchchangesandtheirpossiblehumanitarianconsequences,anddoesevenlesstoinculcatesuchconcernsintotheirorganisationalstrategies or their training programmes.

Whilesuchgapswillbecomeincreasinglyevident,it is also very clear that the humanitarian sector is givenfewincentivestothinkmorestrategicallyaboutthe challenges of the future. There is no consistent supportforeffortstoenhanceanticipatoryandadaptivecapacitiesinordertoconsiderpotentiallonger-termthreatsandtheirconsequences.Whileattemptstopredictthefuturearealltoooftenahazardousandunrewardingexercise,effortstomakeorganizations‘thinkoutsidethebox’canhavesignificantbenefits,which,inthehumanitariancontext,canbelife-saving.Hence,greaterattentionmustbegiventoinitiativesdesignedtostrengthenorganizationalagility,andthesemustbeadoptedbygovernments,internationalandregionalorganizationsaswellasotheremerging


humanitarian actors in the private sector and social networks.

3.2 Conclusions and recommendations

The Planning From the Future project partners share the sense of ‘outrage’ expressed by the UN Secretary-General in his report to the World Humanitarian Summit aboutthesufferingofciviliansandthefailureoftheinternationalcommunitytodoenoughaboutit;aboutthefactthathumanitarianactionsubstitutesforpolitics–alltoooften;thatsovereignintereststrumpindividualrights–evenincasesofmassatrocities;thataidagencieshavetoomuchvoice–andaffectedpeoplenotenough;andtheblatantinequitiesthatprivilegesomelives–somecrises–aboveothersintermsofmoneyandattention.ThefindingsofthePFFprojectalsopointtoasenseoffrustrationthat,despitevastimprovementsinanalyticsandforecasting,humanitarianactionisstillreactiveandthat,despitethededicationofindividualaidworkersandsomeattemptsatreform,thehumanitariansystemasawholestillunder-performsandlacksthetrust of the people it aims to help.

ThisdeficitislinkedinparttotheemergenceofanewmultipolarorderandthediminishinginfluenceoftheWestandvaluesdeemedtobeWestern.Itisalsodrivenby a funding gap: despite the largest amount of available fundinginhistory,thepercentageofassessedneedscovered in the global humanitarian appeal in 2015 was thelowestinrecentmemory(49%).Thisisparticularlythecaseinlong-runningconflicts,protractedcrisesandsituationsofmassdisplacement,wherebasicneedsmaypersistfordecades.Currentfrustrationswiththesectoraretheresultofarecognitionthathumanitariansalonehaveneitherthedepthnorthebreadthofknowledgeorabilitytoaddresshumanitarianneedsandvulnerabilitiesinalltheircomplexity,nowandintheforeseeablefuture.The result is a systemic discontent that has called into questionthefoundationsofhumanitarianaction–itsethos,itsemblemsandtheconstellationofinstitutionsthat pursue humanitarian goals.

Atthesametime,thereisbothmomentumandappetiteforchangingthewaythehumanitarian

enterpriseworks.Thereisnewpotentialinviewinghumanitarianresponseasaglobalresponsibility,inwhichadiversesetofstakeholdershavearoletoplay:statesofcourse,butalsoanarrayofnon-stateandcivilsocietyactors,publicopinionand,importantlyandincreasingly,crisis-affectedpeoplethemselves.Recentreforminitiatives,suchasthetwoHigh-LevelPanelsonhumanitarianfinancingandcashassistance,andtheSecretary-General’s report to the World Humanitarian Summit,andmanyotherstudiesandreports(referencedinthebibliographyofthereport),concurthat change is both urgent and necessary.

ThePFFpartnerinstitutionsrecognisethatmajorchangeisdifficult,andperhapsevenunlikelyinthecurrentcontext.Ifthepastisanyguide,radicalchangeininternationalinstitutionsonlyhappensinthecontextofamajorshock,suchasthetwoworldwarsandtheconsequentreshufflingofinternationalinstitutionaltectonics.Sincethen,changeintheinternationalsystemandinthehumanitariansub-systemhasonlyhappenedbyaccretionand,withfewnotableexceptions,thehumanitarianarchitecturelooksremarkablysimilartothewayitdidinthe1950s,onlymuch bigger.

Fundamentalreformisdifficult:therearetoomanyvested interests within the system and too much resistancetothinkingbeyondtheinstitutionalbox.The‘powersthatbe’areunlikelytovoluntarilyletgooftheirpower.Thetriggerforchangewilllikelycomefromwithout,startingfromabalancedanalysisofwhatneedstochangeandrelatedremedies.Aconstituencyfor change will need to emerge in civil society and among thoseaffectedbycrisesthemselves.

ThePlanningFromtheFutureprojectoffersbelowabroad outline of such change. This includes a vision forfuturehumanitarianaction:whatitmightaspiretoinordertoincreaseitseffectiveness.Italsoincludesaproposalforshort-,medium-andfuture-orientedactionsthatmustbetakentogetherandsimultaneouslytoachievethisvision.Whether‘broke’or‘broken’,thehumanitarian system of the future needs to do more than simply muddle through.


FUTURE HUMANITARIAN ACTION. A 6-POINT VISION:

REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL HUMANITARIAN STAKEHOLDERS

• Itis‘oftheworld’–neither‘oftheNorth’norpartialtoanyagenda.Itisdirectedtoallcrisis-affectedpeopleinneedofhumanitarianaction.

• Itislocal,butexternalexperienceisvaluedandavailabletosupportlocally-ledaction,ortoactwherelocalpartiescannot.

• Itsalliancesarebasedonstrategicpartnershipsbetweeninternational,nationalandlocalorganisations,fromawiderangeofsectors.

• Itsactivities,wherepossible,arebasedontheprincipleofsubsidiarity,whichputscontrolanddecision-makingascloseaspossibletoactions on the ground.

• ItisguidedbythehumanitarianprinciplesembodiedinInternationalHumanitarianLaw(IHL),internationalrefugeelawandtheIFRC/NGOCodeofConduct.

• Itisalwaysimpartial.Itisabletoactinanindependentandneutralmannerwhenrequired,particularlyinconflictsituations.

• Itishonestandtransparentinthewayitinvokesthose principles and respects them.

• Itworksflexiblytoprotectlife,rightsandlivelihoods,bothincontextswhereIHLrequiresanarrowfocusonprotectinglifeanddignityandinthosewherelonger-term strategies can be developed.

01 02 PRINCIPLED


NON-PARTISAN

• Itismindfulofpoliticsbutisnon-partisaninallitsactivities,includingpublicpronouncements.

• Itisabletoworkwithabroadconstellationofactors,includingwarringparties,nationalandregionaldisastermanagementauthorities,civilsocietyandtheprivatesector,whileretainingitsindependent character.

• Itisabletosupportresilienceprogramming,socialprotectionandlivelihoodsinitiativeswhenapplicable to the context.

PROFESSIONAL

• Itvaluesprofessionalism,butembodiesthevoluntary spirit that lies at the root of the humanitarianimperative.

• Itsprogrammesanddecision-makingareinformedbyevidence–independentlyverifiedwhere possible.

• Itsactionsaredrivenbyadeepunderstanding ofthecontextinwhichtheyaretakingplace.

• Itisgovernedbyindependent,transparentandaccountableinstitutions,withleadersthatembody the humanitarian ethos and strive for excellenceinmanagementpractice.

• Itisabletomobilisesufficientfundstoanticipate,prepareforandrespondtocrisesirrespectiveoftheir causes or human impacts.

• Itishonestandtransparentaboutitsmistakes–and applies the lessons inferred by them.

• Itdevelopsstrategiesthataredesignedtoanticipateemergenciesanddisastersinthe longer term.

• Itisfocusedonthedynamicsandcircumstancesthat threaten the safety and dignity of people affectedbyarmedconflict,displacementandothercrisissituations

• Itisinformedbytheaspirationsandagencyofthoseatimminentrisk–whetherdisplaced,besiegedorunwillingtoflee.

• Itdevelopscrisis-specificstrategiesthatprioritiseissuesofgreatestconcerntoaffectedgroups,whileinvestinginrelationshipsandinitiativesthat safeguard the space needed to uphold humanitarian values.

• Itfocusesonprotectionoutcomesoveragencyinterests and rhetoric.

• Itinvestsinevidence-basedadvocacyandmechanismstomaximisecompliancewithIHL,refugee law and human rights norms.

• Itputstheprotectionofat-riskgroups–insitu,displaced,refugees–atthecentreofallhumanitarianaction,withinandbeyondtheimmediatecrisissetting.

PROTECTIVE 03

04

05

06

ACCOUNTABLE

• Itisaccountabletoaffectedpeopleandprioritisestheir interests and needs over mandates and agencyinterests.Itputsdignityandchoiceoverpaternalism and control.

• Itisaccountabletoitsfunderstotake,andmanage,calculatedriskswhilemakingeffectiveuse of limited funds.

• Itisaccountabletoitspeers,workingincomplementwithorganisationsthatsupplementitsskillsandresourcestowardcollectiveoutcomes.


Basedonthevisionoutlinedabove,thisstudyproposesthreelevelsofaction:‘PracticalMeasuresforImmediateImplementation’,thatis,high-impactimprovementsforwhich there is already near-universal support; ‘System Overhaul’,whichcallsforanindependentreviewofthesystemitselfacrossitsmanyfunctions;and‘PlanningfromtheFuture’,tohelpthehumanitariansectorplanfor an ever-more complex and uncertain future.

Level 1: Practical measures for immediate implementationSome humanitarian reforms have near-unanimous support,butremainonlypartiallyimplemented–ornot implemented at all. The following points represent actionsthatcanbetakenimmediatelytoaddressthegaps highlighted by this research and within the context of the current system.

1. Statesshouldrecommitto,andhumanitarianagencies should act to improve compliance with International Humanitarian Lawandinternationalrefugeelaw(IRL).Thisincludesstrengtheningnationalandinternationaleffortstomonitor,investigateandprosecuteviolationsofIHL;improving trust between states and humanitarian organisationsonthetermsofengagementwithnon-stategroups;andfacilitatingtheengagementofnon-stateactorswithIHL.

2. Governments with counter-terrorism legislation

in place should implement a process to rapidly grant humanitarian exceptions to minimise the consequencesofsuchlegislationforhumanitarianaction,andtomonitortheimpactofsuchexceptions.ThisshouldbeaccompaniedbyongoingdiscussiononIHLobligationsandtheimpactofcounter-terror measures between humanitarian actors and the security organs of states and non-state actors.

3. Donorsandinternationalhumanitarianorganisations

should enable local organisations to take the lead andrespondquicklytocrises,whenappropriate,includingthroughdirectfunding,significantinvestmentincapacitydevelopment,andstrategicpartnerships.

4. Internationalhumanitarianagenciesshouldacttoprotect and nurture their fieldcraft,thatis,theirabilitytoengagedirectlywithaffectedcommunitieswherepossibleandappropriate.Internationalhumanitarianagencies,whetherUNorNGO,shouldavoid simply playing an intermediary role between donors and local agencies.

5. Donorsandhumanitariananddevelopment

organisationsshouldensureagreaterrangeofcapacitiesandresourcesinprotractedcrisesbyengaging in collective crisis management. This meansworkingtogethertoanalyse,planandimplement short- and longer-term responses while employing the full range of humanitarian and developmentcapacitiesandfundstostrengthentheresilienceofat-riskcommunitiestothehazardstheyface.Thisalsomeansresolvinginstitutionaldivideswithinaidorganisationsanddonoragenciestoensurejoined-upworking,andrequiringthathumanitarianactionembracesomedevelopmentgoalsandmethods,apartfromthosecontextswhereaprincipledapproachtohumanitarianactionisessential.

6. Humanitarian agencies should ensure that protection

of civilians is at the core of humanitarian work by implementingtheUNHumanRightsUpFrontandIASCCentralityofProtectionagendas.

7. A number of good programme practices should be implemented by donors and agencies:a. When supported by context and response

analysis,humanitarianorganisationsanddonorsshouldprioritisecashtransfersorothermarket-basedinterventionsthatenablechoice,supportlocalmarketsandreducehandlinganddistributioncosts.

b. Humanitarianorganisationsshouldinvestincapacitytorespondtourbancrises,andtoreachandprotectrefugeesandIDPsinnon-campsettings.

c. Donorsandagenciesshouldbuildflexibilityintodevelopmentprogrammesinchronicallyat-riskareas,forexamplethroughbudgetaryflexibilitythatenablesobjectivestobeshiftedrapidlyto

A roadmap for change


humanitarianprotectionandassistanceintheface of developing emergencies.

d. Humanitarianorganisationsanddonorsshouldimprovetheirevidencebaseandanalyticalcapacityforcrisisresponse,throughimprovingstandards of evidence and developing independentearlywarning,needsassessmentand monitoring mechanisms.

8. Donorsshouldaddress chronic problems in

humanitarian financingbyprovidingflexible,long-termaid.Humanitarianorganisationsshouldcommitto greater transparency and accountability in the use offunds(implementingthemaintenetsofthe‘GrandBargain’betweendonorsandaidagencies).

9. Agencies,donorsandhostgovernmentsshould

buildincentivesforcandid reporting and for learning from mistakes.Currentincentivesfavourhidingmistakesorfailuresinordertoguaranteecontinuedfunding.

10.Humanitarianorganisationsanddonors,withthe

supportofotherswithspecialisedexpertise,shouldstrengthen their capacity to analyse and consider future crisis threatsandinvestinopportunitiestomitigatethem.

Level 2: System overhaul Quickwinsareimportantbutwillnotfundamentallychangethewaythesystemfunctionsnow,orinthefuture. The PFF partners thus recommend a sector-wide overhaul.Ourfindingspointtotheneedforasystemicapproachcomprisinganumberofinterlinkedmeasures,including: 1. IHL compliance. A mechanism should be put in place

todocumentandholdtoaccountstatesandpartiestoconflictforbreachesofIHLandrefugeelaw.Thiscould be done through the appointment by the UN Secretary-GeneralofaspecialenvoyforIHL/IRLorthe establishment of an independent monitoring group,possiblyoutsidetheUN.

2. Governance. This report has highlighted the fact

thatorganisedhumanitarianismlacksatransparent

systemofgovernance.Itremainsverymuch‘oftheNorth’andfunctionaltotheinterestsofthebigplayers even if there is growing resistance to such dominationasreflectedbytheemergenceofparallelsystems. A governance model that ensures that alltraditionsandsensibilitiesofhumanitarianismareengagedinhumanitarianwork,andthatthehumanitarian endeavour is perceived to be ‘of the world’,shouldbeinstituted.Thiscouldbeachievedthrough:a. The establishment of a UN Humanitarian Council

thatwouldensurerepresentationofallmemberstatesandhumanitarianstakeholders.TheCouncilcouldbecomposedofthreesegments:(i)anintergovernmental segmentthatwouldtakeoverthefunctionsofECOSOCastheyrelatetohumanitarianissues;(ii)aninteragency segment whichwouldbeanexpandedIASCopeneduptoemergingstakeholderssuchastheOrganisationofIslamicCooperationandnetworksofSouthernNGOs;and,(iii)aThird Estate segment in which representativesofaffectedpopulationswouldparticipateinpersonorthroughsocialmedia,particularlyonissuesofaccountabilitytoaffectedpopulations.Thethreesegmentswouldmeettogether as a UN Humanitarian Council and separately(muchastheInternationalLabourOrganisationtripartitebodiesdo).Whereappropriate,regionalhumanitariancouncils,includingregionalIASCs,shouldbeestablishedtoensureparticipationofregionalbodiesindisaster preparedness and crisis response. The Council would have a wide remit on humanitarian policyissues,andcouldissuespecificreviewsorundertakefactfindingmissions;itcould,forexample,commissionabiennialreviewofthestate of the humanitarian system.

b. Inordertoreinforcetheethosthathumanitarianresponseisthesharedresponsibilityofallstates,PFFrecommendstheprogressiveintroductionofassessed contributionsforhumanitarianaction,startingwithan‘assessedwindow’intheCERF,recognising that such an instrument would need to be adjusted to allow for the funding of NGOs. Moreover,non-OECDdonorsshouldbeincludedinajointdonorcoordinationbody.


3. Protection. TheUNSecretaryGeneralandtheIASCmustensurethathumanitarianstaff,particularlythoseinseniorpositions,areheldaccountableforprotectionfailuresoccurringundertheirwatch,andthatprotectionofciviliansisatthecoreofhumanitarianworkincludingbyspeakingoutagainstabuses,withoutcompromisinghumanitarians’abilityto reach those in need of assistance.

4. Architecture. Inordertomaximiseeffectiveleadershipinhumanitarianresponse,PFFisconvincedthatthereisanurgentneedtotakeahardlookatthearchitectureofthesystem,andrecommends that the following changes be seriously explored.a. RemovetheERCfunctionfromtheUNSecretariat

toensuretheERCrepresentsallhumanitarianstakeholders–includingINGOs,nationalNGOsandaffectedpopulations;andtoinsulateitfrompoliticalpressurefromtheUNandtheSecurityCouncil.

b. InordertoensureacoherentandeffectiveUNsystemhumanitarianresponse,theERCshouldleadamuchsimplifiedUNhumanitarianstructure,ifnotasingleagency,withmanagerialresponsibilityoveroperationalactivitiesofUNhumanitarianagencies.Inthisconnection,the growing focus on cash provides an opportunitytorethinkthefunctionsoflargeUNorganisations.

c. Streamlinefieldcoordinationresponsibilitiesandstructuresbyadoptinga‘wholeofcrisis’or‘whole of caseload’ approach to ensure that all humanitariancaseloads,includingrefugees,areaddressedwithinonecoordinationstructure.

5. Accountability. The humanitarian sector needs to

bemoreaccountabletothepeopleitseekstoassist,while maintaining transparency to its donors and stakeholders.Thiscouldbeachievedthroughtheintroductionofindependentneedsassessmentsandanindependentmonitoringandevaluationbodythatwould decouple assessment from fundraising and institutionalvestedinterests,andencouragemoreauthenticassessmentofandlearningfromresponsesuccesses and failures.

6. Capacity and fieldcraft. Theinternationalhumanitariansectormustmaintainitsfieldreadinessandtechnicalexpertise,whileatthesametimebuilding the capacity of governments and local organisationstoactasfirstrespondersintheirownright.Itisessentialtoleveragethefullextentoftheavailablecapacitiesinthehumanitariansector,whileenhancing respect for humanitarian principles and IHL,whennecessary.

7. Collaborative action in protracted crises.

Humanitarianactioninprotractedcrisesmustberecalibratedtoenablenotonlytheprotectionofhumanlife,butalsotostrengthenlivelihoodsandcapacity-building,whileensuringrespectforhumanitarianprincipleswhenrequiredinconflictorotherextremecrises.Thisinvolvesworkingmorecloselywithdevelopmentactors,focusingonriskmanagementandriskreduction,andenablingcommunitiestobuildresiliencetopredictablethreats.

8. Future threats. Humanitarian agencies must increase

theircapacitytofocusattentionandresourcestodayonanticipatingfuturecrisesandpreparingfortheirimpacts,including‘blackswan’events.

How can such a reform agenda be achieved? PFF is fullyawareofthepoliticalandinstitutionalobstaclestochange,butisnonethelessconvincedthatpiecemealapproacheswillnotwork,andthatthepossibilityofacomprehensive overhaul must be put on the table. The PFFstudy’soverarchingrecommendation,therefore,isaddressedtotheincomingUNSecretary-General,whoofcourseiswell-versedinmattershumanitarianandwho is best placed to put forward a number of reform ideas in the humanitarian arena and in other spheres ofinternationalaction.PFFthereforerecommendsthatthe Secretary-General review the details of the proposed overhaul and consider how it could be best implemented. Itwouldbeuptohimtoweighwhetherthisshouldbedonethroughanintergovernmentalinitiativeofmemberstatesthathewouldencourage,orthroughanoutsidemechanismsuchasanIndependentCommissiononthefutureofhumanitarianaction.Eitherway,thePFFteamstandsreadytosupportthiseffortandassisttheofficeofthe Secretary-General with more detailed proposals.

www.planningfromthefuture.or 65

Level 3: Planning from the Future Whiletheaboverecommendationshighlightedtheneedforbothimmediateandlonger-termshiftsinthewaythehumanitariansectoroperates,thePFFpartnershipproposes a third level of change that underscores the needtoconsiderthosefuturerisks,dimensionsanddynamicsofcrisisthatareyetunknown.Organisationswithhumanitarianrolesandresponsibilitiesneedtobetterunderstandandprepareforthoseplausibletransformativefactors currently outside the humanitarian purview butlikelytoshapesocietyandchangefuturedisastersandconflicts.PFF,therefore,suggestsfourinterlinkedmeasures to prepare for the future: 1. AspartoftheworkoftheHumanitarianCouncilandits

regionalaffiliatesdescribedabove,theUNSecretary-General should publish a biennial Register of Future Risks.Thisregisterwouldidentifyplausiblerisksandmitigationmeasuresthatinturnwouldbeusedtoadvocate for addressing new types of crisis threats and tomonitorprogressinlonger-termpreventionandpreparedness. The Register would bring together the viewsoforganisationsoperatinginthehumanitariansectorwiththoseofmajorgovernmental,regionalandprivateresearchinstitutionsandofspecialistbodies,suchastheWorldEconomicForumandtheInternationalCouncilforScience.

2. LinkedtothedevelopmentofthebiennialRegisterofFutureRisks,theUNSecretary-Generalshouldestablish multi-stakeholder technology forums to disseminatetheRegister’sfindingsandpromotegreaterunderstandingoftheroleandtransformativepotentialoftechnologyinsocio-economicdevelopmentandcrisismitigationandresponse.

3. Donorgovernmentsandtheprivatesector,(e.g.

foundationsorbodiesfocusingonemergingrisksandhazards)shouldprovidefinancialandin-kindincentivesandmethodologiestoenable the humanitarian sector to be more anticipatory and adaptive in order to prepare for ever-more complexanduncertaindisastersandemergencies,includingbydevelopingbetteranalysisonfuturethreats and a more robust evidence base for anticipatoryaction.

4. The humanitarian sector should strengthen links

with academic research and policy institutions focusedonriskanalysisandmitigationandtheapplicationofinnovativepracticesandnewformsofcollaborationtowardsbecomingmoreanticipatoryandadaptive.


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Selected readings for Chapter 3: Planning from the Future

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Brooks,M.(2014)At the Edge of Uncertainty: 11 Discoveries Taking Science by Surprise.London:Profile.

Brynjolfsson,E.andA.McAfee(2014)The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies.NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company.

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Dobbs,R.,J.ManyikaandJ.Woetzel(2015)No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends.PublicAffairs.

Ford,M.(2015)The Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of Mass Unemployment.London:BasicBooks.

Henderson,V.etal.(2012)‘MeasuringEconomicGrowthfromOuterSpace’. American Economic Review,102(2).

Hewitt,K.(1983)Interpretation of Calamity.Boston,MA:Allen&Unwin.

HumanitarianFuturesProgramme(2013)Mapping the Way Forward: Urban Futures Project Report.King’sCollegeLondon.

Jones,S.(2015)‘SatelliteWars:ANewArmsRaceThreatensSecurityinSpace’. Financial Times,21November.

Karoly,L.andC.Panis(2004)The 21st Century at Work: Forces Shaping the Workforce in the US.WashingtonDC:RandCorporation.

Lorenz,E.N.(1993)The Essence of Chaos.Seattle,WA:UniversityofWashington.

Mack,E.(2015)‘“TrillionDollarBaby”AsteroidHasWannabeSpaceMinersSalivating’.Forbes,19July.

Marks,P.(2016)‘SolarPower’.New Scientist,13February.

Matthewmann,S.(2015)‘DealingwithDisasters:SomeWarningsfromScience and Technology Studies’. Journal of Integrated Disaster Risk Management4.1(2014).

McChrystal,S.(2015)Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World.NewYork:Portfolio/Penguin

Moises,N.(2009)‘Minilateralism:“TheMagicNumbertoGetRealInternationalAction”’.Foreign Policy,June.

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Pamlin,D.andS.Armstrong(2015)Global Challenges – Twelve Risks That Threaten Human Civilization. Oxford: Global Challenges Foundation.

Price,H.,J.TalinnandM.Rees(2012)Humanity’s Last Invention and Our Uncertain Future.FutureofHumanityInstituteUniversityofOxford.

Ramalingam,B.etal.(2015)Strengthening the Humanitarian Innovation Ecosystem. University of Brighton.

Ramalingam,B.(2013)Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Richard,J.F.(2002)High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them.NewYork:BasicBooks.

Rutkin,A.(2016)‘FirstTimeSurfers’.New Scientist,6February.

Sample,I.‘AntibioticResistantDiseasesPose“ApocalypticThreat”,TopExpertSays’.The Guardian,23January.

Schmidt,E.andJ.Cohen(2013)The New Digital Age: Reshaping the Future of People.London:JohnMurray.

Schultz,P.(2015)‘MeetingoftheAmericanGeophysicalUnion’.SanFrancisco,14December2015.

UnitedKingdomMinistryofDefence(2015)‘StrategicTrendsProgramme. Global Strategic Trends-out to 2045’.

Walker,B.etal.(2015)‘SynchronousFailure:TheEmergingCausalArchitectureofGlobalCrisis’,Ecology and Society.

Wall,M.(2013)‘AsteroidHunt:PrivateGroupsJoinSearchforDangerousSpaceRocks’.Space.com,28February.

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