Is India Bcoming More Democracy

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Is India Becoming More Democratic?Author(s): Ashutosh VarshneyReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 3-25Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2658582 .

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Is India Becoming MoreDemocratic?ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

(A) long tradition f deological ubjectionhas made the ower astes) tagnate....Centurieshave instilled nto them a meek acceptance f the existing order)....This can change. n fact, hismust hange.The revolt gainst aste s theresurrectionof ndia or, hallwe say, hebringing ntobeingof uniquely nd hitherto nrealizedoccasion,when ndia shall be truly nd fully live. s sucha revolt ossible?Rammanohar ohia, The Caste ystemA great deal of confusion exists on how to discuss, and theoretically haracterize,political developments in India during the last decade and a half. There is, ofcourse,a consensus that the Congress party, a towering political colossus between 1920 and1989, has unambiguously declined. While there are legitimate doubts about whetherthe decline of the Congress partywill continue to be irreversible,t is clear thatmuch

of the political space already vacated by the Congress has so farbeen filledby threedifferent ets of political forces. The firstforce, Hindu nationalism, has attractedagreat deal of scholarly attention (Basu 1997; Hansen and Jaffrelot 998; Jaffrelot1993; Varshney 1993). The second force,regionalism,has also spawned considerableresearchof late (Baruah 1999; Singh forthcoming; ubramanian 1999). A thirdforce,not so extensively nalyzed, coversan arrayofpolitical parties and organizationsthatencompass groups normallyclassified under the umbrella categoryof "lower castes":the so-called scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes,and the "other backward classes"(OBCs). How should we understandthepolitics ofparties representing hesegroups?How farwill they go? What are the implications of their forwardmarch, if it doestake place, for ndian democracy?In an attempt to answer these questions, this essay compares politicaldevelopments in Northern and Southern India. My principal claim is that ourjudgmentsabout contemporaryNorth Indian politics will be wrongifwe do notplaceSouth India at the center of our analytic attention. In this century,the South hasexperiencedcaste-based politics much more intenselythan the otherregionsof ndia.If theHindu-Muslim cleavage has been a "masternarrative"ofpolitics in North Indiaformuch of the twentieth entury, aste divisions have had the same status n Southern

AshutoshVarshneys an AssociateProfessorf Governmentnd International tudies ttheUniversityfNotreDame. Forcomments, he writer s grateful o Hasan Askari-Rizvi,JagdishBhagwati,KanchanChandra,RobertHardgrave, ratap Mehta, Philip Oldenburg,Vibha Pingle, Sanjay Reddy,Alfred tepan,the late MyronWeiner,Yogendra Yadav, andtwoanonymous eviewers f this ournal.

TheJournal fAsian Studies 9, no. 1 (February 000):3-25.C) 2000 bythe Association orAsianStudies, nc.3


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4 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEYIndia (Dirks 1997; Varshney orthcoming).' artly because electoralpoliticswasorganized round aste ines ntheSouth ndnot round Hindu-Muslim xis, owercastes, onstitutingnelectoralmajority,ameto power n virtuallyll southerntatesby the 1960s. Our analysisof recentNorth Indian politics will be deeper fweappreciate ow theempowermentf ower astes ookplace ntheSouth.An exclusivefocus on Hindu-Muslimdivisionsdeflects ttention way fromwhat is clearlysignificantaste-based hurningn the North.ThemajorSouth ndian conclusion bout caste s culturally ounterintuitiveutpolitically asilygrasped. ocially ndritually,astehasalways ymbolized ierarchyand inequality; owever,when oined with universal-franchiseemocracy,aste canparadoxically eaninstrumentf qualization nd dignityBeteille1996;Dirks 1997;Kothari1970; Rudolph nd Rudolph 1987 and 1967; Weiner 1997). Weigheddownby tradition, ower castes do not give up their caste identities;rather, hey"deconstruct"nd "reinvent" astehistory, eploy npolitics readily vailable ndeasilymobilized ocialcategory"low caste"), se their umbers o electoraldvantage,and fight rejudice nd domination olitically.t is theuppercastes, eneficiariesfthe caste system or enturies,hat typicallywishcaste did not existwhena lowercastechallenge ppearsfrom elow.NorthIndia today,and in future,maynot follow n South India's footstepsentirely, ut the rise of lower-caste oliticsin the North alreadybearsstrikingsimilarities. ven Hindu nationalism, houghfundamentallypposed to lower-castepolitics n ideological erms ndquiteformidablen theNorth,has notbeenable todictate erms o northernower-casteoliticians. y implications wellas intention,Hindu nationalismtandsforHindu unity,notfor asteconsciousness.ower-casteparties reagainstHindu unity.Arguing hatHindu uppercasteshave ong deniedpower,privilege, nd evendignity o thelowercastes, hey re advocates fcaste-based social justiceand a caste-based estructurationfpower.Such has been thepowerof ower-casteolitics n recentyears hat t hasforcedHindu nationalists omake deologically istastefulutpragmaticallyecessary olitical oalitions. or thesake of power,the Hindu nationalists-after he twelfth nd for the thirteenthnational lectionsheldin 1998 and 1999, respectively-had o teamup withotherparties, everal fwhomwerebasedamongthe ower astes.The latter,mongotherthings, nsuredthat the ideologicallypure demands of Hindu nationalism-thebuildingof a temple n Ayodhya; common civil code and no religiously asedpersonal aws forminorities;bolitionofthespecialstatusofJammu nd Kashmir,theonlyMuslimmajoritytate of Indian federation; limination f the MinoritiesCommission-weredropped nda programmore cceptable othe ower-casteartieswas formulated.Thus, in theirmoment fglory, he Hindu nationalists avebeenideologicallydeceived.As theyhave ended their ong isolation n Indian politicsand formedgovernmentsnDelhi, theyhave also been forced y ower-casteoliticians o makeprogrammaticompromises.While Hindu nationalists ave ndeedcometopower nDelhi, Hindu nationalisms an ideologyhasnot.Can Hindu nationalism inally verpower he lower-castemobilization n theNorth?Alternatively,re lower-caste oliticians trong enoughto defeatHindu

'With the prominent xception f the former rincely tateof Hyderabad Varshney1997). As to howBritish ule may have turned aste nto a masternarrative f South ndianpolitics,paralleling he Hindu-MuslimnarrativenNorth ndia,see Dirks 1987). In strictlypolitical erms, irkssays,Hindu Brahmins an bedescribed s "the MuslimsofSouth ndia"(Dirks 1997, 279).


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 5nationalists,r, ess radically, ransformhe character fHindu nationalisms it triessomehow to accommodatea lower-caste urge? Our understanding f India'sdemocracy ill be shaped by howthese uestions reansweredn thecomingyears.Hindu nationalisms majoritariann impulse. n its ideologicalpurity,t is deeplythreatening o non-Hindu minorities,who constitute bout 18 percentof thecountry's opulation. ower-casteolitics lso endeavorso be majoritarianut,muchas working-class olitics was in late nineteenth-century estern Europe, itsideological aim is to put together plebeian, not a religious, majority. t isnonthreateningo religiousminorities nd inclinedtowards he socioeconomicallydisadvantaged.Morethaneverbefore, e needto pay greater ttention o the determinantsnddynamics f ndia'splebeianpolitics.As is becoming ncreasinglylear, ower-castepartiesmay not be able to cometo poweron their wn, but it is unlikely hat anygovernmentn Delhi in theforeseeableuture an be formedwithout hem.Evenifthe Congress arty eturns o power, t is almost ertain hat ucha return ill eitherincorporatehe ower-caste artiesna coalition, r havemany ower astepoliticiansas visiblepower-centersn theCongress artyhierarchy.

The Larger Picture:Froma North-SouthDivide to an EmergingSouthernization fNorth IndiaLet us begin witha brief omparison fthe castecomposition f ndianpoliticstoday with the situation oon after ndependence.n the 1950s, India's nationalpoliticswas dominated y English-speaking,rbanpoliticians rainedn law. Mostpoliticians ame from heuppercastes, ndmany eadersweretrainedbroad.Lowerdownthepoliticalhierarchy,n agrarian nd "vernacular" litedominated ocalandstatepolitics Weiner 1962), but eventhe ower-levelolitical eadership ended ocome from heuppercastes nNorth ndia.South ndia was different.outhern oliticianswerenot only"vernacular" ut,as the 1950s evolved, heywere also increasinglyrom he lowercastes Hardgrave1965; Subramanian 999). By the 1960s,much of South ndia had gone thoughrelativelyeacefulower asterevolution:heDravidaMunetraKazgham DMK) cameto power n TamilNadu as an anti-Brahminartyn the1960s,and theCommunistparty, irstnpower nKerala n 1957,wasprimarilyased ntheEzhavacommunity,a lowcaste f raditionaloddy-tappersngaged ntheproductionf ndigenousiquor(Nossiter 982).2The social indignitiesnflicted n theNadars of Tamil Nadu, another oddy-tapping asteoftraditionalouth ndia,are all too wellknownHardgrave 969). Toappreciate owmuch the stateof Kerala haschanged, twould be instructiveogeta senseofthe humiliation he Ezhavasroutinelyuffered ntiltheearlydecadesofthiscentury:Theywerenot llowed owalkonpublic oads.... TheywereHindus, uttheycouldnot nteremples.While heir igs ndcattleouldfrequenthepremisesf2in the two otherSouth Indian states,Karnakata nd AndhraPradesh, he lower castethrust fpolitics, hough resent, as been esspronounced. orKarnataka, eeManor 1990);forAndhra,Ram Reddy 1990).


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6 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEYthe temple, heywere notallowed to go eventhere.Ezhavascould not use publicwells orpublic places....

... An Ezhava should keep himself, t least thirty ix feet away fromNamboodiri nd twelve eet way from Nair. ... He mustaddress caste Hinduman,as Thampuran My Lord)and woman s Thampurati MyLady).... He muststandbefore caste Hindu in awe and reverence,ssuming humbleposture.Heshould neverdress himself p like a casteHindu; never onstruct house on theupper astemodel.... The womenfolk fthecommunity.. were equired, oungand old, to appearbefore asteHindus, always topless.About theornaments lso,therewererestrictions. herewere certainprescribed rnaments nly whichthey(could) wear. (Rajendran1974, 23-24)By the 1960s, in much of the public sphere in Southern India, not simply inKerala, such egregious debasementand quotidian outrage had been radicallycurtailed,if not entirelyeliminated. A democratic empowerment of the lower castes was thecatalyticagent for he social transformation. he lower castes werealwaysnumericallylarger than the Brahmins, but were unable to use their numbers before the rise ofuniversal franchise.A classic distinction between horizontal and vertical political mobilizationproposed by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1967) captured the essence ofNorth-Southpolitical differences t the time. In South India, lower castes had already developed

their own leaders and parties by the 1950s and 1960s, whereas in North India themodel ofmobilization was top-down,with lower castesdependent on theupper castesin a clientelistic relationship. At the national level, the Congress party aggregatedhorizontally,as it brought togetherdifferentinguistic and religious groups, but atthelocal level, itwas a typicalclientelisticparty,building a pyramidofcaste coalitionsunder the existing social elite (Weiner 1967).In the 1980s and 1990s, a southern-style lebeian politics has rockedNorth India.The names ofMulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Yadav, Kanshi Ram, and Mayawati-all"vernacular"politicianswho have risenfrombelow-repeatedly make headlines. Theyare not united. Indeed, substantial obstacles to unity, both vertical and horizontal,remain. Vertically, though all lower castes are below the upper castes/varnas(Brahmins, Kshtariyas,and Vaishyas), thereare serious internaldifferentiations ndhierarchieswithin the lower-castecategory.And, horizontally, ven thoughcasteystemis presentall over India, each aste as only local or regionalmeaning, making it hardto build extralocal or extraregionalalliances. Thus, horizontal mobilization tends tobe primarily regional or state-specific,not nationwide.Nonetheless, these and other lower caste leaders have often made or brokencoalitions in power. Their total vote share continues to be lower than that for theCongress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) respectively,but it is enough to forceconcessions fromthe two largest parties. In the threenational elections held between1996 and 1999, the various parties explicitly representing lower castes, in theaggregate, received between 18 to 20 percent of the national vote, as against 20 to25 percentforthe BJP, and 23 to 29 percentforthe Congress Party.3Disunity at the

3Basedon theElectionCommission1996, 40-51, and ElectionCommission1998, 49-56. The 1999 dataareprovisional. he explicitlyower-caste arties re:JD (various ersions),RJD, SP, BSP, JP,ADMK, DMK, MDMK, PMK, BJD, and RPI.


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 7level ofpolitical arties otwithstanding,ower-caste olitics as come to stay.4 t haspressed hepolity nnew policydirections,nd introduced new coloring fphrases,diction, nd stylesnpolitics.The powerofthe newplebeianpoliticalelite is no longer onfined o the statelevel, though hat s where t is most prominent. he centerhas also been sociallyreconfigured.elhi has twicehad primarilyower-casteoalitions n power-between1989 and 1991 and between1996 and 1998. In K. R. Narayanan, ndia todayhasits firstx-Untouchable resident.n a parliamentaryystem, fcourse, hePresidentis only head of tate,nota head of government.What lendsNarayanan's lectionspecial politicalmeaning s thatno politicalpartyn India,with theexception f aregional arty theShivSena), had thecourage o opposehisnomination. arayananwas electedPresident ya near-consensusote n 1997, a featnot easily chievablein India's adversarialolity.Governmentolicies ndprograms avealsoacquired new thrust. n enlargedaffirmativectionprogram nda restructuringf hepower tructuren theground-street-levelureaucraciesnd police stations-have been thebattlecryofthenewplebeianelite. By far, heirmost triking ational uccess s the addition fan extra27 percent eservationor he ower astes o central overnmentobsand educationalseats. n the1950s,only22.5 percent f uch obswerereserved,nd more han hree-fourths ereopenly ompetitive. oday,theseproportionsre49.5 and50.5 percent,respectively. t thestate evel,the reserveduotahas beenhigher or longtime nmuchofsouthernndia.

Indianpolitics hushasa new ower-castehrust, owprevalent oth n muchoftheNorth as well as the South. Democracyhasbeen substantiallyndigenized, ndthe shadow of Oxbridge has left India's political center-stage. oes the risingvernacularization ean that ndia's democracys becomingmoreparticipatoryndinclusive,or simplymore chaotic and unruly?Or, are such developmentsmerecosmeticchanges on the surface, political veneerconcealingan unchangingsocioeconomic tructurefpower ndprivilege?To understand hat the riseof ower astes ando topolitics, tate nstitutions,andpolicy,we needtounderstandhetwentieth-centuryistory fSouth ndia,wherethe ower asteshave xercised emarkableower ince he ate1950sandearly 960s.Plebeianpolitics n South ndia wasprimarily onceptualizedn terms fcaste,notclass. Even the deologically lass-basedCommunistsn the stateofKeralafound tnecessary o plug intoa discourse f caste-based njustice n the 1930s and 1940s,and they reliedheavilyon the traditionally epressedEzhava caste for their rise(Nossiter1982).Indeed,with isolatedexceptions, aste rather han class has been theprimarymode ofsubaltern xperiencen India. The risingmiddleclass ofa low castehascustomarily ad to fight ocial discrimination nd disadvantage.For contestinghierarchynddomination, herefore,he mergingliteof ower asteshaseveryeasonto use caste dentitiesn politics.Whether hisstrategymeans that n the ongruncaste itselfwill disappear, s some lower-castentellectualsnd leaders have longwished (Ambedkar1990), remainsunclear. What is clear is that, relyingon ahorizontalmobilization, large proportion f the lower castes would rather ightprejudicehere ndnow,whateverhe ong-run onsequences.

4In the 1999 elections, t was widelypredicted hat the electoratewould deal a seriousblow to lower-caste arties n the North. n Uttar Pradesh, P and BSP increased heir hareof seats, venas their otes marginally eclined; n Bihar,RJD kept ts vote share ntact, utlost seatsdue to the BJP's superior oalition-makingtrategy.


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8 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

The Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes,and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) inNorth IndiaThepapers n this ymposium o beyond he ggregate rofile ummarizedbove,and address n detail the recent olitical fortunesfthreedifferentnd historicallyunderprivilegedocial groups nNorth ndia:5 heex-Untouchables,fficiallyamedscheduled astesby ndia's constitution,nd often lso called theDalits; thetribals,called scheduled ribes ince 1950;6 and the otherbackward lasses OBCs) amongthe Hindus. Technically, he termOBC incorporates wo differentisadvantagedcommunities-Hindu and non-Hindu.Of these,Hindu OBCs are the low casteswhose raditionalocial nd ritual tatushasbeen bovethe x-Untouchablecheduledcastes,butbelow theuppercastes figure ). Hindu OBCs overlapmostlywith theSudravarnaof traditional ierarchy, category onsistingmainlyof peasants ndartisans.According othe1991 census, he cheduled astes onstitutedbout 16.5 percentof ndia'spopulation,nd the cheduled ribes .1 percent. ecausenofull aste ensushas beentaken nIndia since 1931, statistical xactitude n theOBCs, Hindu or non-Hindu, is not possible. We do have approximate igures, owever.The MandalCommission,heonlynationwide ource vailableontheOBCs, suggests hatHinduOBCs constitute bout43.7 percent f the totalpopulation OBCs hereafter,nlessa distinctionsnecessary etweenHindu and non-HinduOBCs).7 Thesethree roupsconstitute majorityf ndia'spopulation ndelectorate.8Since ndependence,he scheduled asteshaveprimarilyupportedheCongressparty n India. Though the leadersoftheCongressparty ypically amefrom heupper astes, heywere ble togetscheduled aste upport artly ecause heCongresspartywas the first rchitect f the affirmativectionprogram, nd partlybecausetraditional atron-clientelationshipsnvillageswereon the wholealiveand robust.In 1984, a newpolitical partyofthe scheduledcastes-the Bahujan Samaj Party(BSP)-was launched.Receiving .0, 4.7, and4.3 percent f ndia's vote n the1996,1998, and 1999 national lections, espectivelyup from .6 percentn 1991), theBSP maynotyetbe a powerful orcen nationalparliament. owever, n the basis5Strictlypeaking, he arguments n this essay pplyonly to North nd South ndia butthey an, in a modified orm, e extended o the western tatesof Gujarat and Maharashtratoo. Lower-caste artiesmay not have played a similarrole in the West, but a lower castechurning rom elowhas affectedolitics eriouslyWood 1996; Omvedt 1993). It is,however,not clearhow far hese rguments ill apply to states astof Bihar.6Though echnically cheduled ribes re not part ofthe Hindu caste system, herehasbeena consensusnpolitical ircles hat longwiththe cheduled astes, heywerehistoricallythemostdeprived roup n India. t should lso be noted hat nsomecircles, he erm tribal"is viewed as pejorative.However,we don't yet have an appropriate ubstitute. or want of abetter erm, will use the term tribal" n thisessay,withoutmplying nything ejorative.7Non-HinduOBCs are about 8.40 percent f ndia'spopulation.Thus,in all, the OBCsconstitute 2 percent fthe countryMandal Commission, 980, 1:56).8There s some dispute over whether heMandal Commission verestimatedhe size oftheOBCs, butthe nature fthatdisputedoesnotchange heprofessionalonsensus hat hesethree roups ogether onstitute majority f ndia's population. ince thepopulation rowthrates, ccording odemographers,retypically igher t lower nds of economic cale, t alsomeans that the OBC proportion f the electorate s likely o be higher han their ercentagein thepopulation.


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 9

Dominantastes%

Sudras43% HinduOBCs (mostly)

ScheduledCastes16.5%andScheduledTribes .1%

Figure1. All-IndiaHindu Ritual Hierarchy. ote: (1) The non-ScheduledCastes and Tribes figures re best guesses.Beyond heScheduledCastes and Tribes, astecensushas not been taken ince1931. Thesebestguesses,however,rewidelyviewed s statisticallyreasonable,fnotstatisticallyxact. 2) Since a fraction fScheduledTribes reChristians,he numbers bove add up to more han82%.Source: 1) For ScheduledCastes andTribes,Governmentf ndia,Census f ndia, 1991; (2) for ther astes,Government f ndia, ReportftheBackward lasses ommissionMandal CommissionReport),FirstPart,Vol. 1 (1980).

of the share f national ote, t hasalready ecomethefourthargest artyn India,followingheCongress,heBJP, nd the Communist artyMarxistCPM).9More importantly,he BSP has developeda substantial olitical presence nalmost ll North ndianstates, speciallyUttarPradesh UP), Punjab, Haryana, ndMadhyaPradeshMP). InUP, India's argest tate, heparty as been twice npower,though achtimebrieflynd withthe upport fother arties. y 1996, theBSP hadstarted eceiving whopping20 percent f UP's vote,crippling heonce-mightyCongressn ts citadel fgreathistorictrength.n the1996, 1998,and1999 nationalelections, heCongress arty's otein UP was considerablyelow that of theBSP.Well untilthemid-1980s,such scenarios or heCongress n UP werealtogetherinconceivable.?

9At 5 to 5.5 percent, he CPM's shareof the nationalvote has been only lightly igherthan thatof theBSP in 1996, 1998, and 1999. But the CPM has each timewon manymoreseatsthan heBSP, for heBSP's vote s notas geographicallyoncentrateds that f heCPM.'Olt s arguable hat f Mrs. Gandhi had not been assassinated arely -4 months eforethe 1984 national lections, he lower caste upsurgewould have shakennationalpolitics n1984 itself, nsteadof waiting ill 1989. Her assassination hanged he ssuesentirelyn the1984 elections.


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10 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY

How did the BSP break he dependence fthe scheduled astes n theCongress?Kanchan Chandra, n her paper forthe symposium, rovides n answerby takingresearch own to the constituencyevel. The results romHoshiarpur, unjab, arereported ere, upplementedlso withresearch oneat theconstituencyevel nUttarPradesh.Chandra rguesthat the BSP's success n replacingCongress s builtupon twofactors. irst, ffirmativectionfor he scheduled asteshas led to the emergence fa middle class among them. The new middle class is made almost entirely fgovernmentfficersnd clerks.Despite experiencingpwardmobility,hese fficershave continued to face social discrimination. ndured silently earlier, suchdiscriminationasby now ed toa firmesolve o fight or espectnddignity. econd,the scheduled castes within the Congress experiencedwhat Chandra calls a"representationallockage." Most district ommittees f the Congresshave beendominated y upper-caste oliticians. cheduled aste eadersweremere okens ndsymbols n the party structure. ince the early 1990s, such meagerrewards fclientelism avebeenconsidered argelynsufficientythenewlymobile scheduledcastes.The new middleclasseventually ook overas local BSP leaders.Theirstrategywas toargue hathumiliation,ather han conomic eprivation,as themainproblemof the scheduled astes, nd thatgreater oliticalrepresentation,nstead f materialadvantage,was theprincipal olution.The scheduled astes had to be horizontallymobilized,hadtohave a party f their wn, nd had to winassemblyeats.Financedbythe new middleclass,the BSP took offn muchof North ndia anddevelopedlargegroupofcadres.However, s theBSP hasprogressed urther,ewpoliticalrealities avedawned.Inno ndian tatedo the cheduled astes onstituteven30 percent f hepopulation,norarethey eographicallyoncentrated,orfor hatmatter o all scheduled astesvotefor heBSP, though large proportion oes (Chandra, n thisvolume).As aconsequence, he BSP cannot apture ower t thestate evel,unless t incorporatesothergroupsordevelops llianceswithotherparties.The need for lliancemakinghas led to a moderationn BSP's rhetoric. till,such moderation s differentrombeinga client n theCongress ierarchy,or he BSP nowcaptures etween and 20percent fthevote nHaryana, unjab,MP, and UP (ElectionCommission 996 and1998) and thus, n a fragmentedolitical space dominatedbyno single party, heBSP has thepoliticalmuscle to strike argains ver egislative eats, ppointments,policies, ndmaterial oods. n thepast,benefits erenotbargained or, ut handedtop-down ytheCongress arty nd assumed o be sufficient.Unlikethe cheduled astes, he cheduled ribes regeographicallyoncentrated.Forexample,n thestateofBihar, hesite ofStuartCorbridge's esearcheportednthissymposium, hey ivemostly n the South. Since 1981, Corbridge's ieldworkamongBihartribalshasrepeatedlyakenhimfrom ome of thestate'surban enters,wheremostof hetribal overnmentndpublicsectormployees ork, o three ribalvillages,fromwheretheycome.Combiningparticipantbservationnd statisticalresearch, orbridge s able systematicallyo comparethe situationof tribals ngovernmentobswith heir ural ackgrounds. e argues hatboth ffirmativectionanddemocracy aveoffered ewopportunitiesothetribes. heyhavemadepossiblematerial dvancementormany, nd led toa newawareness fpolitics ndpowerforthewholegroup.One consequenceof affirmativection is that the tiny middle class of thescheduled ribeshas becomeconsiderablyarger.And a result f democratic olitics


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is that tribal-based oliticalparty asbeen heading movement or separate tatein the ndianfederation, here hetribal opulationwould be in a majority. houghseveralprejudicesand exclusionsremain,Corbridge rgues that the benefits fdemocracyndaffirmativectionhavebeen quite considerable,nd may venexpandfurtherf a newstatewitha scheduled-tribe ajority s born n the comingyears.The latter ossibility an no longerbe ruledout.TheOBCs, covered y Christophe affrelotn this ymposium,redifferentromthe other wo groups.As already oted, ompared o the scheduled astes nd tribes,theOBCs commandmuch largernumbers: ccording o the Mandal Commission,Hindu OBCs constitute bout 43.7 percent f ndia's totalpopulation.Being mostlySudras, heOBCs have facedmany social and economicdisadvantages,ut the fitbetween hetwocategories-OBC andSudra-is notperfect.

If one goes by the all-India classificationfcastes, national-levelbstraction,the picture that emerges s unable to capturethe many regional variations ndominance ndpower. ociologistsndsocialanthropologistsonstrueheterm udrato include,butthecategoryfOBC on thewhole excludes, heso-called dominantcastes": theJats, Reddys, Kammas, Patels, Marathas, nd others.The notion of"dominant astes"was coinedbyM. N. Srinivas1966) to specify hose roupswhich,in a ritualisticr formal enseofthe ll-India astelvarna ierarchy,avebeen termedSudras,but the ritualistic sage of the term s vacuousbecause thesegroupshavehistoricallyeen substantialandownersnd rather owerfulntheir ocalor regionalsettings.n anyrealistic ense,the term udra can not be appliedto them,nor arethey ypicallyncluded mongtheOBCs.Jaffrelotrgues hattheriseoftheJanata arty o national ower n 1977 was aturning ointfor heOBCs. Sincethen, heshare fupper-casteegislatorsnNorthIndianassemblies nd national arliament as, byandlarge,beendeclining ndthatoftheOBCs going up, thestate ofRajasthanbeingtheonly exception.n thefirstLok Sabha (1952-57), Jaffrelotalculates, 4 percent fNorth ndian Members fParliamentMPs) werefrom heuppercastes nd only4.5 percent rom heOBCs;by 1996, the formerroportion addeclined o 30.5 percent nd the atter isen o24.8 percent.Jaffrelotlso showshow the contradictions ithin hesprawling udracategoryhaveproduced wodifferentindsofplebeianpolitics n North ndia. Forpoliticalmobilization,nurbanversus ural deologywasproposed ytheredoubtable haranSingh, nd an upperversus ower aste constructionyRamManohar ohia. CharanSingh'swas a sectoralworldview.t subsumed he lowercastes n a larger oliticalcategoryfthe rural ector,nwhich he ower asteswere clearmajority. is maindemandswere conomic: igher rop nd owernputpricesnagriculture,ndgreaterpublic nvestmentn thecountryside.11n contrast,incebothcities ndvillageshavelowercastes,Lohia's ideology ut through heurban-ruralectors s well as Hindusociety.Affirmativectionfor he ower asteswas Lohia'sprincipal hrust nda socialrestructuringf state institutions-especially he bureaucracy nd police-hisprimary bjective Lohia 1964).After everalups and downs,thebiggestvotaries fsectoral oliticshave beendefeated n electoralpolitics.Nonpartypolitics is now theirprincipalarena offunctioning,ndcastehastrumpedectornplebeianpolitics. fdemands orhigheragricultural rices reexpressed oday, t is the ower-castearties hatprimarily oso,notruralparties.

11Forurtheretails, ee Varshney1995).


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Checking hefurtherise fOBCs, however,retwocountervailingorces: indunationalism ndthe disunitywithin heOBCs. With an ideological tress n Hinduunityrather hancaste distinctions,heHindu nationalists eek to co-optOBCs inthe larger Hindu family"; nd newdistinctions re also getting nstitutionalizedbetween heupper BCs, such as theYadavas,and the ower BCs,such as the Telisand Lodhas.These differencesavealready ndermined he OBC cohesion vident tthe time ofthe Mandal agitation f theearly1990s.It is notyet lear, aysJaffrelot,hetherhe owerOBCs will risefurther,r onlythe upper OBCs will. But, at any rate, reestablishmentf uppercaste dominance,he suggests,s nowrather nlikelynNorth ndianpolitics.Politicalpower nNorthIndia has moved downward.Even Hindu nationalists,he biggestproponents fHinduunity, re ncreasinglyaughtbetween iving greater hare f nternal owerto the OBCs and emphasizingHindu unity over caste considerations. he lattertendency,traditionally nquestioned in Hindu nationalistpolitics, is beingchallenged. ightingtis a new deological osture- "social ngineering"proposedby someparty deologues,who wouldrather iveOBCs morepower ndvisibilitynthe BJP. "Social engineering" s not another expression f vertical clientelismorganizedunderuppercasteleadership, ut an attempt o build Hindu unitybyincorporatingower astesmore qually.

The New Plebeian Upsurge and DemocracyHas the rise of lower castes in the North, now added to their southernempowerment,hanged ndiandemocracy?he collectiveudgment bove, s wellasthe viewofseveral thers, s that ndia's democracy as becomemore nclusive ndparticipatorySheth1996; Nandy 1996; Varshney 998; Weiner1997; Yadav 1996aand b, 1999). A relativeprofessional onsensus is building around Yadav'scharacterizationhat ndia is goingthough "seconddemocratic psurge."The firstupsurge, orhim,was thebeginning fthe endofCongress ominance n the mid-1960s. In a century-longerspective,owever,t isperhaps air osaythat his s the

fourth emocratic psurge n India. The rise of masspolitics n the 1920s underGandhi's leadershipwas the first, nd the universalization f franchise fterindependencehesecond.Such udgments,fcourse, avenot remained ncontested.ven thosewhoagreethatpowerhasdecisivelymoved down thecastehierarchyreunsure boutwhat tmeansfor hecountry'semocratic ealth r ongevity.ndia'sEnglish-languageresshas, on thewhole,bemoaned heriseofthenewplebeianpoliticians, olding hemoften esponsibleor hedecline fpolitical tandards.he anxious horus f verydaycriticism asacquired tandard efrains:ow the anguage fpoliticshas becomemorecoarse nd thestylemorerough, ompared o thesophisticationfpoliticaldialogueandconduct nderNear;howmen of"dubiousprovenance" avetaken ver lectoralpolitics; nd howthegovernmentaltabilityf previous rahasgivenway o unstableand unrulycoalitions, n which mutual differencesuicklyturninto unseemlybickering nd intemperateutbursts. hough rarely penly tated,the subtextofEnglish-language ommentaryppearsto be that a democracymovingdownwardsmaywellbe a poorer nd shakier emocracy.Such anxietys genuinely elt nd shouldnotbe lightly ismissed. t is not implya swan song of an anglicized,globally linked, upper-caste lite, dominating he


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 13powerful nglish-languageressbut findingts politicaldeclinefrustrating. e do,however, eed to put theanxietynperspective.

A large number of political theorists today, not simply the so-calledcommunitarians,ament hedeclineof moralvalues,or "civicvirtue,"n all liberaldemocracies.No currently unctioning emocracy n the world seems to haveinstitutionsr mechanismsnplace to ensure durablemoralor civicenhancementof hepolitical ife.Democratic oliticians, ay hese heorists,re ncreasinglyurningpolitics nto a marketplace,ayingattentionmerely o the utilitarian alculusofroutinepolitics: winningelectionsregardless f what it takes to do so; makingpromises o citizens hat annot e fulfilled;misbehaving" hile nofficeut seekingcover f egal principles nd technical ormalities.fthequalityofgoalspursued npolitics becomesimmaterial, hesepolitical theorists ontend, ven procedurallycorrect emocratic oliticscan onlyweakenthemoraland civic fiber f nations.Democracies oday re ceasing obe "civic republics"; hey rebecoming proceduralrepublics" Sandel 1996; Taylor1998).Lest t shouldbe believed hat uch ament s confined nly o the nsulated vorytowers funiversities,onsider ome of thepopulardiscourse, eflectedn thepress."How low canthey o?,"moanedNorthAmerica'seadingbusinessnewspapern itseditorial, eporting n campaigns n the U.S. for heNovember1998 elections ndhighlightinghecorruptlectoral racticestillfollowedn someparts f hecountry:

(V)oter raudsslowly ndermininghe egitimacyfmorendmore lections....Since lmostllstates on't equire photo D, it sfairlyasy ovote nthenameofdeadpeople, ote fyou re n llegal lien, alsifynabsenteeallot rvotemorethan nce.... Twoyearsgo,groups sing ederalundsegisteredundredsfnon-citizensinOrange ounty,alifornia.he HouseOversightommittee . cameupwiththename f1499voters ho hould eremovedromhe olls, ut lectionfficialsclaim t s too ate opurge hem or oday'slection. hismonth,heLosAngelesCountryegistrardentified6,000phony egistrationsubmittedytwogroupsalignedwith heDemocraticarty. (TheWall StreetJournal,November998)Unvirtuous olitics,n otherwords,snot pecifico ndiandemocracy. declineinmoralitynda debasement fpoliticalpracticesnd anguage re ndeed ignificantproblemsforany society, s theyhave been for ndia. But unless they entirelyinvalidatecitizenpreferences,heydo not amount to a negationof democracy.Fortunately,he atter s not theconclusion f ndia'sEnglish-languageress. t is acall for orrection, hichwemay ll share,notan argumenthatdemocracyn Indiahas becomemeaningless.

Democratic Authoritarianism?A second challengeto the view that India's democracy s becomingmoreparticipatorys rathermoreradical nconceptionnd thrust. imply ut, tsprincipalclaim s that ndia'sdemocracys a sham. nJalal 1995), wehave themostdetailedstatement f thisview, though ofter ersions an also be found n Bonner 1994),Brass 1990), Lele (1990), Shah 1990), andVanaik 1990).According o thisview,changes t the evel of elections nd elected nstitutionsare of ittle onsequence o longas the ocial and economic nequalities fcivil ociety


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14 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEYremainunaltered,nd thenon-elected tate nstitutions,specially hebureaucracyandpolice,continue o act in an authoritarian anner is-a-vis hecitizens,muchastheyused to whenthe British uled.Fordemocracyofunctionn a real,notformal,sense,therehas to be greater riorequalityamongits citizens.A deeplyunequalsociety annot heck he uthoritarianunctioningf he tate tructuresndthereforecannothave a polity hat s "really" emocratic."Democratic uthoritarianism,"alalargues, s the bestway to describendia'spolity,and there are no fundamental ifferencesetween ndia, Pakistan,andBangladesh,except at the level of political superstructure.ll have profoundsocioeconomicnequalitiesnd all have nheritednsensitive,olonial tate tructuresinwhich henonelectednstitutionsasily rump heelectedpowers-that-be:

The imple ichotomyetweenemocracyn ndia ndmilitaryuthoritarianismnPakistanndBangladeshollapsess soon sonedelves elow he urfacehenomenaofpoliticalrocesses.. . (P)ost-colonialndia ndPakistanxhibitlternateormsof uthoritarianism.henurturingf he arliamentaryormf overnmenthroughthemeticulousbservancef theritual felectionsnIndiaenabled partnershipbetweenhe oliticaleadershipnd henon-electednstitutionsf he tate opresideover democraticuthoritarianism. (Jalal 995,249-50)Thus,evenwhenmeticulouslybserved, lections rebasically "ritual."Atbest,they ombine"formal emocracynd covert uthoritarianism"99). If societies re

unequal,thepoorwill inevitably e manipulated ythepolitical lite:Unlesscapableof extendingheirvotingrightsbeyond he confinesf theinstitutionalizedlectoralrenas o aneffectivetrugglegainstocial nd conomicexploitation,egalcitizens remore ikely o be handmaidsfpowerfuloliticalmanipulatorshan utonomousgents erivingoncreteewardsromemocraticprocesses. (48)In its theoreticalnchorage,we shouldnote,this kindofreasonings notnew.

Commonly ssociatedwithMarx,Lenin,Gramsci,Mosca,and Pareto, t hasa longlineage astingovera century. he arguments fGramsci nd Mosca are themostelaborate.12ramsci 1971) reasoned hat o longas theeconomically owerful adcontrol ver he culturalmeansofa society-its newspapers,tseducation,ts arts-they ould establish hegemony ver thesubaltern lasses nd essentiallybfuscatethe ubalternbouttheir wn nterests. ndMosca 1939) argued hat ndemocracies,giventheirmany nequalities, omination fa small elite was inevitable.Forourdiscussion boutcasteanddemocracy, here retwo levelsatwhich heclaimabout theemptiness f Indiandemocracyompelsattention: heoretical ndempirical. he keytheoreticalssue s: Shouldwe consider ocioeconomicqualitypreconditionor emocracy? ndsince change n the ocialbase ofparties-to reflecta closercorrespondenceetweenpartypoliticsand India's caste structure-andachange n thecomposition f state nstitutionshough ffirmativection-to makethestaterespond etter o theneeds of thedeprived-are the twoprincipal ims oflower astepoliticians,hekey mpirical uestions re: s therise f ower-casteartiesonlyformal, otreal?And is affirmativection llusory?'2For detailedtreatment,eeDahl 1989, ch. 19


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Is Socioeconomic Equality a PreconditionforDemocracy?A theoreticallyefensiblenotion of democracy s not possible based on theexample fSouthAsia,a region n whichonly wocountries-India and Sri Lanka-havehad theinstitutions fdemocracy, ormal r real, n place for ny substantiallengthof time. Anyreasonable ense of theorymeansthat we should cast ournetwider, especially f the larger universe s where most of the actually existingdemocracies avehistoricallyxisted. ither outhAsianmaterials an be interpretedin theframeworkfa larger,morehistoricallymbedded, emocratic heory, rtheir

empirical pecificitiesan beusedtomodifyhebroader nsights fdemocraticheory(Varshney 998). In and ofthemselves,outhAsian instances fdemocracy annotmakedemocraticheory.In the leadingtextsof democratic heory Dahl 1998, 1989, 1981, 1971), thetwo basic criteria fdemocracy ave been: contestationnd participation. he firstprinciple,n effect,sks how freely oes the political opposition ontest herulers,and thesecond nquireshow manygroupsparticipaten politics nd determine hothe rulers hould be. The first rinciple s about liberalization; he second aboutinclusivenessDahl 1971, ch. 1).Contestation ndparticipationo notrequire ocioeconomicquality; heymayaffect, r be affectedy, nequality.Democratic heoristsxpectthat fsociallyoreconomically nequalcitizens repolitically qualizedandif thedeprived onstitutea majority f the electorate,heirpolitical preferences ould, sooner or later,bereflectedn who therulersre nd whatpublicpolicies hey dopt.By giving veryoneequal vote rrespectivefpriorresource-endowments,niversal ranchisereates hepotentialmechanismsorunderminingertical ependence.n Europe, aborpartiespushingforworkers'nterestsmergednpolitics, ncefranchise as extended o theworking lass.Anotherwell-known heoretical oint s germane o a discussion f nequalitiesanddemocracy.finequality, espitedemocraticnstitutions,omes n thewayofafree xpression fpoliticalpreferences,uch nequalitymakes polity ess emocratic,but it doesnot make t undemocratic.o longas contestationndparticipationreavailable, democracys a continuousariable expressed s "more or less"), not adichotomousariable expresseds "yesorno"). Variationsn degree nddichotomiesshouldbe clearly istinguished.n theclassicformulationfRobertDahl, theUnitedStates was less of a "polyarchy" Dahl's preferredermfor an actually existingdemocracy)eforehecivilrights evolutionfthemid-1 60s,thoughtcan nfuturebe evenmoredemocraticf nequalitiest the evelofcivilsociety omedownfurther(Dahl 1971, 29). Similarly, y allowinga greatdeal of contestation utrestrictingparticipation ccording o gender nd class, England n the nineteenthentury asless democratic han it is today,but it was democraticnonetheless, ertainly ynineteenth-centurytandards.Given contestationnd participation,reater qualitycertainlyakespolitymoreemocratic,ut reaterquality,nandoftself,oes ot onstitutedemocracy.here s nodemocracy ithout lections.The claims above are empirical,not normative. hey are not a defenseofinequalities, ordo they mply hathavinguniversal ranchises better hanhavingequality.Relative conomic quality, or xample,maywell be a value itself,ndwe may wish to defend t as such. But we should note that economic quality nd


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16 ASHUTOSH VARSHNEYdemocracyredistinct ategories. ocietieswithhigh evelsof conomic qualitymaywell be quite authoritarian:outh Korea and Taiwan until the late 1980s, Chinaunder Mao, and Singaporetoday come to mind. And societieswith considerableeconomic nequalitymay have vibrantdemocracies: ndia and the U.S. are bothbelieved to havea Gini Coefficientf 0.4-0.45, as opposed to a more equal GiniCoefficientf0.2-0.25 for he pre-1985, authoritarianouth Korea and Taiwan."3Precisely ecause economicequality and democracy re analytically istinct, omepeople may quite legitimately e democrats ut not believersn economic quality;othersmaybelieve n democracys well as economic quality; nd stillothersmaybedemocratsut ndifferentothequestion f conomic quality.A similar rgumentcan also be madeabout social nequalities.In lightof thetheoretical iscussion bove, etus nowturn o India.Has Indiandemocracy ecome more inclusive or not? And hasn't greater nclusion reducedsocioeconomicnequalities?n case inequalities avecomedownas a consequence fthepoliticalprocess, t will, n the theoreticalerms roposed bove,make ndia moredemocratic,ven hough ninability o reduce nequalitiesmorewillnotmake ndia'spolityundemocratic.

Are the OBCs an Elite Category?If"the so-called ther ackward astes OBCs) are n many egions he better fffarmers nd peasant proprietorswho benefitedfromthe Zamindari absenteelandlordism) bolition n the fifties"Jalal1995, 205), theirrise would indeednotconstitute significanthange n thepatternsf"socialand economic xploitation."An old setof"exploiters"would simplybe replaced ya classonly lightly essrichandprivileged.Are theOBCs an elitegroup n the atter enseof the term?To call the OBCs "better off farmersnd peasant proprietors" s a seriousconceptual nd empirical rror, or t conflates BCs with "dominant astes."MostOBCs are notdominant astes.The latter erm, s already tated,representshosegroupswhich n thenational-levelbstractionfa varnalcaste ierarchyave beentermed udras, utfor wholevariety fregional r local reasons, histermmakesno sensefor hem.Theirpower nd statushasfar xceeded nythinghatthetermSudra mplies Srinivas 966). Theall-Indiahierarchyassimplyrrelevantor roupsof substantial andowners uch as theJats, Patels, Kammas, Reddys, Nairs, andMarathas. heyhavebeenmuchtoopowerfulndrich, ven fthey renotBrahmins,Kshatriyas,rVaishyas,hecustomarypper hreeHindu varnas/castes.any f hesecastes did indeed benefit rom heabolitionofZamindari,fthe Zamindari ystemprevailedn their reas.14The dominant castes and OBCs have some intersections-for xample,theOkkaligas ndLingayatsn Karnataka ount s both-but the wo renotoverlappingsets Figure2). Byand arge, he ategoryfOBCs sequalto he udrasminus he ominant13Measuringncome istributionn a society,heGiniCoefficientanges etween and1. The closer countrys to 1,themore nequal t is,andthe loser o0, themore qual.Given imilar iniCoefficients,ountries ithhigher er apitancomesUSA)wouldhavefaresspovertyhan hosewithower er apitancomesIndia).14This, owever, ouldnotbe true ftheRyotwarireas,where heMarathas, eddys,Kammas, nd Patels ave eendominantor veryong ime.


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Castes\about e.g.6.3% Okkaligas,Lingayats

Hindu OBCs43.7%/o

Figure2. OBCs andDominantCastes.castes. he dominant astes n northernndwesternndia-the Jats nd Patels,forexample-have in fact pposedthe extension f reservationso theOBCs.Can theargumentboutthe relative litism ftheOBC category e extended oanyOBCs atall?The upperOBCs, such s theYadavas, re ndeedpeasant roprietorsand also beneficiariesf Zamindari bolition.Much likethe Patels nGujaratat thebeginningof the twentieth entury, heYadavas have achieved ufficientpwardmobility ince thegreen revolution,nd have used theirnumbers o considerableeffectn a democracy. ne can indeedsaythatthey refastbecoming dominantcaste, ndwill in all probability e viewedas suchin thecomingdecades.But thelower BCs, suchas theLodha, Pal, Mali, Teli andMaurya, renotas privileged.This bifurcation f the OBC categoryraises an important uestion: whatproportionf the OBCs can be called economically eprived? hough landholdingdatafor asteshas notbeencollected or ecades ndthereforerecise stimates annotbegiven, imple alculations-combining he eparateaste nd andholdingtatisticsin an empirically efensibleway-can showthata majority fthelowerOBCs aremost ikely o bemarginal armersowning essthan2.5 acres f and)or mallfarmers(lessthan5 acres).In 1993-94, about36 percent f ndiawas belowthepovertyine Ravallion ndDatt 1996; TheWorldBank 1997). Therewouldvirtually e no OBCs in thisgroupifwe assumedthat a) all scheduledcastes 16 percent f India's population), llscheduled ribes 8 percent), nd all Muslims 12 percent)were below thepovertyline; and that b) all uppercaste householdswere above it. Both assumptions, eknow, rewrong.First, s Chandra ndCorbridgehow nthis ymposium,oththescheduled astes nd tribesnowhave a middle class.Moreover,here s a substantialMuslimmiddleclassin India: especiallyn southernndwesternndia fromwheremigration o Pakistanwas minuscule, ut also in northernndia where Muslimmiddle classhasreappearedfter he ate 1960s.Let us supposefor he sakeofargumenthatof the36 percent opulation elowthe poverty ine, nearly 0 percent of the total)comes from he scheduled astes,


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tribes,Muslims and a tiny number lso from he uppercastes. With this morereasonable upposition, bout 5-6 percent fthepopulation alling elowthepovertyline would consist f the OBCs.Since thepovertyine s primarily utritionaln thedevelopingworld-meaningthatbelowthe ineone could not even buy enoughfoodtoget a basic minimum fcalories (The World Bank 1997, 3)-another 15-20 percent of the country'spopulation,widelybelieved obe only lightly bove thepovertyine,would also bequite poor.TheOBCs thuswould constitutet least 20-25 percent fthepopulationthat s below, or just above, the povertyine. That, n turn,would make up 50-55percent fHinduOBCs (constituting,s theydo, 43 percent f ndianpopulation).We also know hatmarginal armers,aving ess than2.5 acres f and, onstituteabout 50 percent fall landedhouseholdsnIndia Visaria ndSanyal1977).15 Thus,putting hecaste and landholding ata together, e can safelynfer hatmarginalfarmers onstitute n overwhelming roportion f OBC households. ven after hegreenrevolution,he evelofproductivitynIndianagriculture as not reached ucha level thatwe can justifiablyall these atter lasses "peasantproprietorsr betterofffarmers."6 In agrarian olitical economy, he terms peasantproprietors"nd"better ff armers" o not indicatedebilitatingconomicdisadvantage, ut ratherconsiderabledvantage. heseareterms hat annot e appliedtomarginal ndsmallfarmers.In short, o say thatpeasant proprietors r better-offarmers enefited romZamindaribolition s correct; utto conclude hatpeasantproprietorsnd better-offfarmersrebyand largetheOBCs is a nonsequitur.Most lowerOBCs are notonlysocially ubaltern ut also economically o, andonly lightly ettern bothrespectsthan he cheduled astes.That s why, sJaffrelotrgues, key uestion ncreasinglyis: can the lowerOBCs be incorporated ith the scheduledcastesin a BSP-ledcoalition, s opposedtoparties ed bytheupperOBCs?

Is Affirmative ction Illusory?Theoretically peaking, t is possible that affirmativection leads to the co-

optationof a tiny ower caste and scheduledcaste elite into the existingverticalstructure,ithout nywidely ispersedwelfare-gainsor heir astes.Afterll, ndia'saffirmativectionconcerns nlygovernmentobs,not theprivate ector. n 1992, ofthe nearly 00 millionpeoplein the work-force,nly20 millionwere n thepublicsector.One canthereforeaythat ffirmativection n thepublicsectorwilldirectlybenefit nlya smallproportionf thedeprived, nd one can, in principle, uggestthat "accessto education,government mploymentnd statepatronagebased onreservations ay nfacthavehampered ather han trengthenedhe utonomyfthemoreprivilegednd talentedmembers fthe cheduled astes nd tribes"Jalal1995,209-10; alsoGokhale1990, andSachchidananda 990).Is thereevidencethat this theoretical ossibilityholds up empirically? hisquestioncan, in turn, e broken own intotwoparts: a) affirmativectionfor he"5Theseroportionsavenot ignificantlyhangednthe ast wodecades-atany ate,not owardsarger oldings hich,f rue,wouldhave hangedhe onclusionsf his ara-graph.'6Only n Punjab s tpossible o generate surplus n a 2-3 acre arm odayChaddha1986).


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 19OBCs (in additionto the scheduled astes),which has taken the form fquotas inmuchofSouth ndia sincethe 1920s; and b) affirmativectionfor he cheduledastes,implementedll over ndia since1950, to whichtheOBCs have beenaddedoutsidethe South onlyafter1990. Clearly, t is fartoo early to evaluatethe impact ofaffirmativectionfor the OBCs beyond outhernndia. For the scheduledcastes,however, ur empirical udgments anbe national n scope.In southernndian tates, verndabovehe cheduledasteuota, loseto50 percentofthestategovernmentobshavebeen reserved orOBCs in thestateof Karnatakasincethe1960s; in TamilNadu, the OBC quotawas 25 percent o begin with, ndwas increased o over50 percent ater; nKerala, heOBC quotahas been40 percent;and in AndhraPradesh, 5 percent.What has been theimpactof such large-scalereservations?ave the nonelected tate nstitutionshanged?No detailedbreakdownfstatebureaucracies,ccording ocaste, s availableforSouth ndia, but there s no mysteryeft bouttheresults.t is widelyknown hatmany Brahmins imply migratedout of South India as the OBC quotas wereinstituted.Once access to government obs, their traditional tronghold,wassubstantially educed,some Brahminswent into the private sector, becomingbusinessmenor he first ime,but a largenumbermigrated oDelhi, Bombay, heUnitedKingdom, ndtheUnitedStates. ndeed, olargewastheflightndsocapablewere theBrahmins f getting obs anywhere hat theirmigration o, and risein,Bombay ed to a serious nti-southern ovementn the ate 1960s and early1970s(Katzenstein 979). By now,bureaucraciesf outherntates avebecome emarkably,thoughnotentirely,on-Brahmin.17Moreover, hough ystematicmpirical tudieshavenot been undertaken,t is also widely recognized hat the South is governedbetter hanNorth ndian states ikeBihar and UP. Large-scaleffirmativection nbureaucratic ecruitmentoes not appearto have undermined overnancen theSouth.Let us now turnto theimpactofreservationsor he scheduled astes.KanshiRam, theleading scheduled astepoliticianofIndia today nd the leader ofBSP,argues hat ffirmativectionhas "now doneenoughfor he cheduled astes,"notingthat n thestateofUP, ofthe500 officersn the elite ndian Administrativeervice,137 arefrom hescheduled astes Mendelsohn ndVicziany1998, 224). However,affirmativection,KanshiRamadds, s "useful or cripplebuta positivehandicapfor omeonewho wantsto run on his owntwofeet"; nstead,he says, hescheduledcastes houldfocus nwinning owerthrough lections, or thecapture fpoliticalpowerwill automaticallyransformhecompositionf thebureaucraticlite" 224).Comparedto the theoretical ossibility f affirmativection leading to co-optation, oticehowdifferentheclaim of ndia's leading cheduled astepoliticianis. Affirmativection, n his judgment, s already uite considerable, hough t is atthe same time an inadequate tool forempowerment.n a new sign of politicalconfidence,ffirmativection,he says, s for hedisabled,whereas t is timenow toplaythegameof democratic oliticsmore qually. Finally,hispolitics repremisedupon the assumptionthat nonelected nstitutionsdo not trump the electedinstitutions;ather, apturinglected nstitutions illtransformhebureaucracyndpolicemuchmorefundamentally.t is theelected nstitutions f ndia thatset the

17Andhe acultiesfScience ndEngineeringn many mericanniversities,s well sAmericanoftwareompanies,ave lot of outh ndian rahmins!


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tonefor henonelected tate nstitutionsfbureaucracynd police,not theotherwayround.8After ll is said and done, the most telling vidence fthe mpactof affirmativeactionon thescheduled astesmaywell be indirect,ot direct.Affirmativection, sChandra nd Corbridge rgue,has produced newcounterelite, hich has startedleading political mobilization.Chandra shows that scheduled caste governmentofficers,eneficiariesf ffirmativection, inancedheBSP and were ts early eaders.Rather than leading to a vertical o-optation, ffirmativection, by producingscheduled asteelite, ppears ndirectlyo havefacilitatedorizontalmobilization.hampering fautonomy ollows irectly rom ertical lient-patroninks,not fromhorizontalmobilization.

Deeper,butUnfinished'9None ofthe aboveshould be construed o meanthat ndiacannot be madestillmoredemocratic. here s no doubt thatmanybattles or ocialdignity nd equalityfor he lower castes still lie ahead,even in South India (Bouton 1985); and so dostruggles orwomenand minorities. he continuinghostility etween he upperOBCs and scheduled astes nseveral arts f ndia s anotherxample f nunfinishedsocial transformation.owever, hepapers here, s well as earlier tudies Frankel1990; Omvedt 1993), showthatdemocracy as already nergized ndia's plebeianorders. heyhavechallenged he traditionalorms f clientelisticolitics ndstartedfighting or reater ower.Whether rnoteconomicnequalities avegonedown, ocial nequalities ertainlyhave, venfor he cheduled astes Mendelsohn ndVicziany1998). This is a seriousachievement.f in SouthIndia it was notpossibleforEzhavas to walk on publicstreets,f twasimpossible orNadarwomen o cover heir reastswhenwalking nfront f highercaste Hindus, if scheduledcastes in much of India could nottraditionallyave access to schools,public transport,nd public wells, then theemergencefthenotion fbasicdignity mong, ndfor, he ower astes nthepublicspheremustbe taken xtremelyeriously,venthough conomicnequalitiesmaynothave essened o the same degree.There s no uniquely cceptable eason o supposethat conomic nequalitiesmustbe givenprimacyver ocial nequalities. he battlefor ocialdignitys being ncreasingly onin thepublicsphere.By all accounts,ndia's democracy as made such social victories ossible. nIndia,unlikemany ther emocraciesntheworld, he ncidencef otingshighermongthe oor han monghe ich, monghe ess ducatedhan monghe raduates,n the illagesthan n the itiesYadav 1996a andb, 1999). The deprived eem to havegreater aithin India's elections han the advantaged.Unless we assumeshort-sightedness,hesubaltern eem to think hatthe electoralmechanisms fdemocracyan be used tofightocioeconomic isadvantages.

l8Jalal1995) argues heopposite.During thecolonialperiod, henonelectednstitutionswere ndeedmorepowerful han he nstitutions ased on limited lections. he reason implywas thatthe formernstitutions ereBritish-dominated,hereas he atter awmany lectedIndians t the op.Universal-franchiseemocracy as reversedhe olonial elationshipetweenthe elected nd the nonelected nstitutionsn India.19Thissectionhas been inspiredby discussions f American emocracy nd its achieve-ments. ndeed, t comesvery lose to the ast paragraph f a greatbook onAmerican olitics:"Critics ay thatAmerica s a lie because tsreality alls o short f ts deals.Theyarewrong.America s not a lie; it is a disappointment. ut it canbe a disappointmentnlybecause t isalso a hope" Huntington1981, 262).


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IS INDIA BECOMING MORE DEMOCRATIC? 21It should also be noted that many scholars who accept these claims havenonethelesseen quitecritical fsomeother spects f ndianpolity.Butwe should

specify ow their riticisms re differentrom he claim that ndia'sdemocracys asham.The threemostcommon riticismsre:(1) That a serious risis f ungovernabilityas arisendue to increasing oliticalparticipationnd the nability f the state o responddequately otherising roupsanddemands Kohli 1991).(2) That India's politicalelite has focused ar oo muchon narrow dentities ntheone hand nd purely conomic oalsontheother, utfar oo ittle nusingpublicpolicy to expand social opportunitiesorthedeprived Dreze and Sen 1995). (By"social," I might add, Dreze and Sen primarilymean educationand health, not

everyday ignity nd ritual tatus, hesense nwhich hetermhasbeenusedin thisessay.Thoughthe ocialperformancef ndiandemocracysundoubtedly oor tthelevel of education nd health, tssocialperformancet the evel of everyday ignityandrespect, s arguedhere,has been rather ubstantial.)(3) Thatthere s nothing nnatural boutthepoliticiansmakinguse of dentitiesin democratic olitics,but that does notexplain why ndia's politicianshave paidsuch inadequateattention o issues of public policy in general,both oncerningeducation nd healthon the one hand and incomeson the other Bhagwati 1993;Weiner 1991, 1986). Nothing nIndia's democracyrecluded switch rom irigismetoa market-orientation,s was demonstratedn 1991, nordoes democracy uleout agreaterfforttuniversal rimaryducation ndpublichealth, s Sri Lanka nd someIndian states how. Failures f public policyhave ess to do with democracy er se,more with the ideologynd mind-setof India's political and bureaucratic lite(Bhagwati 1993; Sachs, Varshney nd Bajpai 1999; Weiner 1986). Quite differentideologieshavebeen, nd can be, pursued n a democracy.Moreover, ensiblewelfare-enhancingublic policiesdo notalwayshave to waitfor opularpressureso buildup; they anemergewithan ideological hangefromabove.20 houghthesubaltern, hroughhe electoral rocess, ave not so far ressedIndia's decision-makersorbetter ncomes, ducation nd health, nly for veryday

dignity nd respect,ucha lack ofpressuren theformerbjectives id not dictaterelativenaction, r lack ofboldness, n thepartofthegovernment.ndia'sgreatestfailures one of maginationndawareness n thepart f hepolitical ndbureaucraticelite.Noticethe mplicationsf the third ritique. t accepts hat lections ave real,notsimply ormal nd ritualistic,alue andyet t claimsthat fpopular emands eredifferentr fthe tate esponsesere,heresults f ndia'sdemocracy ould be so muchmore mpressive. he admittedly nremarkableunctioningf the Indian state nenhancing conomic, ducational, nd healthopportunitiesor tsmasses s viewednot as a negationof democracy, ut a problemanalytically eparableand oneattributableo elite deologies. or balanced ecord,uchfailuresmustbecontrastedwith the success of India's democracy,reflectedn rising participation ndinclusivenessn the one handandvictoriest the evel of socialdignity ndrespecton the other.By privileging umbers nd givingfreedom o organize, emocracy

20Thehiftn ndia's griculturalolicynthemid-1960ss anexampleVarshney995);so saffirmativection nshrinedn ndia's onstitution.oth ame nto orce ithoutpopularmovementn favor f ither.


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has become the biggest enemyof the hierarchiesnd degradations f India's castesystem.Conclusion

Insteadof arguing hatonly relative quality anproduce democracy, muchmore empiricallygrounded claim would be that democracy an help reduceinequalities, t least social ifnot economic.Understanding ow thishappened nSouth India in the 1950s and 1960s is increasingly necessityfor a deeperunderstandingfcontemporaryorth ndia.Not onlyhavesocial humiliations onedown significantlyn the South,but there s a consensus hatSouth ndia is on thewhole ess unequal today han heHindi-speaking orth as wellas better overned).It is clear hat he riseof ower astes o powerbetween he 1950s and 1960shashad a greatdeal to do with the transformationf South ndia since then.WhethertheNorth will replicate heSouth is still an open question;theproportion f theupper castes,for ne,has alwaysbeensubstantially igher n theNorth, nd lowercastemovementsn the South,for nother, id not have to contendwith Hindunationalism.However, should the northern utcomes even approximate outhernoutcomes n thecomingyears, s would seem ikely,both votaries f the iberatingpotential fdemocracynd thoseofreducing nequalitieswill have much to cheerabout. India is, indeed, still farfrom becominga democracy rombelow, butdemocratic ower s increasingly ovingdownward. emocracy s no longer giftfrom bove.

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