FACULTE DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE

Ecole liégeoise de Criminologie J. Constant

Département de Science Politique

The Transformations

of the Welfare State

Is immigration to welfare states a burden?

Case study of anti-immigration sentiments in Belgium

Professeur : Dr. Geoffroy MATAGNE

Clara NOIRHOMME

Master en science politique

Année académique 2013-2014

2

Table of contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 3

1. Changes in immigration and changes in attitudes .................................................................... 3

2. Why are people opposed to immigration? Theories ................................................................. 4

3. Anti-immigration sentiments: trends .......................................................................................... 5

4. Case study: Belgium ..................................................................................................................... 7

4.1. The situation in Belgium .............................................................................................. 7

4.2. (Sub)nationalism in Belgium ....................................................................................... 8

4.3. Divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels ............................................. 9

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 12

3

Introduction

If immigration is not the first thing that comes in mind when thinking about the welfare state,

it does not mean either that it is at the margin of welfare states. Indeed, for most people, the

representation of the welfare state is linked with taxes and redistribution. To some extent, the

redistribution of income implies that money is given to the ones in need, including people that

don‟t work. Immigrants are often seen as „lazy‟ people coming to „our‟ countries to benefit

from this income redistribution system. Indeed, more and more these days, we can see a

discourse on immigration that incriminates it for being a burden for the welfare state.

However, the aim of this paper is not to try to establish if immigrants are a burden or not for

welfare states. If such considerations could be interesting in an economic perspective, it is not

the stance that we are taking, because we want this paper to be explicative and not normative.

What we will try to explain here is why such anti-immigration sentiments emerge. By

analysing the specific case of Belgium, the aim is indeed to show the indicators to which

these sentiments are linked. By looking at the case of Belgium, we will see that anti-

immigration sentiments have different echoes in different parts of Belgium, and we will try to

understand why, using „marginality‟ theory and „economic self-interest‟ theory.

In order to do so, the paper will be divided in four parts. The first one will globally examine

the changes in immigration as well as the changes in attitudes. In the second one, we will look

at both theories previously mentioned in order to see how negative attitudes towards

immigration could be explained. In the third part, we will make an overview of the anti-

immigration sentiments trends in Europe. Finally, the fourth part will consist in our case

study: Belgium. This part will be sub-divided in three: the situation in Belgium,

(sub)nationalism in Belgium and the divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels.

1. Changes in immigration and changes in attitudes

Immigration to western have always existed, but it has definitely increased these last

decades1. Twenty years ago, net immigration to the European Union was six times less

important than it is today2. It is clear that Europe has become a continent of immigration.

But if this increase is quantitative, there is also a qualitative change as the purpose of

immigration has also changed. After the Second World War, European States needed

immigrants because they were a source of labour3. As economies were growing, the social

1 Meuleman, B. and Reeskens, T. (2008). The relation between integration policy and majority attitudes toward

immigration. An empirical test across European countries. Paper presented on the “Dag van de Sociologie” of

29th

May 2008, Leuven, p. 1. 2 Ibid.

3 Hjerm, M. (2005). Integration into the Social Democratic Welfare State. Social Indicators Research, Vol. 70,

No. 2, p. 117.

4

rights arising from the welfare state also grew. However, after the crisis caused by the oil

shock of the 1970s, the European countries started to want to restrict immigration4.

Nowadays, immigration is more of an „asylum‟ type of immigration. This (not so) new type

of immigration is often considered to bring less than what it actually costs to the welfare state.

This first consideration shows how negative attitudes towards immigration have arisen.

Indeed, the indigenous population‟s negative view of immigrants is becoming more and more

common, driven by the idea that “immigrants threaten certain prerogatives of the own social

group”5.

2. Why are people opposed to immigration? Theories

In order to explain public opposition to immigration, Fetzer chooses to articulate two theories,

namely „economic self-interest‟ and „marginality‟. Before trying to apply these theories to our

Walloon case, we will examine both theories and look at Fetzer‟s major findings.

The well-known economic self-interest theory argues that “people‟s political attitudes

primarily reflect their narrow, material self-interest”6. According to authors like Harwood, the

lower classes would thus excessively oppose legal and illegal immigration because of

economic concerns. Indeed, the CIRES states that “these social groups are the ones most

affected by immigration process, whether in its labour aspects (greater competition in the

search for work) or in everyday coexistence (housing and schools)”7.

The alternative theory, i.e. marginality theory, maintains that marginalised groups tend to

express sympathy for other oppressed groups. Following Allport, lower classes would stand

for the other marginalised groups, since “These people are victims exactly as [we are]

victim[s]. Better stand with them, not against them”8.

The implications of these two theories on anti-immigrations attitudes are thus really different.

Indeed, following the first one, being marginalized would induce that people oppose

immigration because it is against their self-interest. However, according to the second one,

marginality would on the contrary reduce such sentiments.

At first sight, economic self-interest theory may seem more likely. But using public-opinion

surveys and polls conducted in France, Germany and the United States, Fetzer actually

4 Hjerm (2005), op. cit., p. 117.

5 Blumer, H. (1958). Race prejudice as a sense of group position. The Pacific Sociological Review, No. 1, in

Meuleman and Reeskens (2008), op. cit., p. 1. 6 Fetzer, J. S. (2000). Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist

political movements in France, Germany and the USA. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1,

p. 7. 7 CIRES [Centro de Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social]. (1991). La Realidad Social en España, 1990-91,

Bilbao: Fundación BBV, Bilbao Bizcaia Kutxa and Caja de Madrid, p. 399, in Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 7. 8 Allport, G. (1979). The Nature of Prejudice, 25th anniversary edition, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, p. 155,

in Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 7.

5

demonstrates that economic self-interest theory is weak in explaining people comportments.

According to him, being unemployed, suffering from declining personal finances or working

as a manual labourer had statistically no major effect on anti-immigration sentiments in the

three countries analysed. However, marginality theory – in its cultural forms if not economic

– is generally confirmed by multivariate analysis9.

Nevertheless, on education, income and occupation, the data are not really favourable to

marginality theory, but Fetzer try to give explanations about those divergences, that are

sometimes weak. As an example, he explains that people with higher level of education tend

to have more positive views on immigration by the fact that a vast literature finds that higher

education socialises student into pro-egalitarian norms10

. However, this does not account for

the fact people with lower level of education still have negative opinions towards immigrants.

If the economic form of marginality theory is thus not really confirmed, the cultural one still

have credence. Indeed, in the three countries, having origins in a foreign country decrease

anti-immigration attitudes, as well as belonging to religious minorities11

.

To be able to apply these findings to our case, we choose to underline some characteristic of

the respondents that are particularly evocative, which are: employment status, level of

income, occupation, level of education and foreign origin. We will thus come back to these

variables in our analysis of Belgium.

3. Anti-immigration sentiments: trends

When it comes to anti-immigration sentiments/attitudes, we can distinguish two categories of

sentiments12

. The first ones are related to national identity, i.e. they are linked to the feeling

that immigrants are posing a threat to cultural identity. The second category involves

economic interest and includes the sentiments that are welfare state related, which means that

they are linked with the services the welfare state provides, like social security.

Graph 1 provides us with significant data over the welfare state related sentiments, namely the

ones we are most interested in, by showing that the presumed negative effect of immigrants

over the reduction of natives‟ job perspectives (blue) and over social security (red) constitutes

a negative image of immigration in public opinion.

9 Fetzer (2000), op. cit., p. 5.

10 Ibid., p. 16.

11 Ibid., p. 13.

12 Ciftci, S. and Smith, D. L. (2008). The Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe: The Impact of

Existing Immigrant Populations and National Political Parties. Boston: Annual Meetings of the American

Political Science Association, p. 2.

6

Graph 1: Threat posing by immigrants on the balance of accounts of social security and on natives’ employment prospects.13

According to the EVS (European Values Study)14

, globally, in the European Union, 56% of

respondents agree on the idea that “immigrants are a burden to social security”. In Belgium,

people are even more concerned about this same issue (59%), Belgium being the 10th

country

in descending order15

. However, it is in Malta (92%), Cyprus (73%), Germany (71%), United-

Kingdom (71%) and Ireland (70%) that respondents provide the most over settled opinion

regarding immigrants‟ contribution to the maladjustment of social security16

. Moreover, 40%

of Belgians also consider that “immigrants are taking away natives‟ job”.

On another statement, i.e. “whether legal immigrants contribute more in taxes than they

benefit from health and welfare services”, the findings of the Eurobarometer 71 (2009)17

are

the following: 45% of the general sample disagree with the idea (compared to 28% who agree

with it). However, when we look at the trends country by country, Belgium appears to be one

of the countries where the figures are the highest, with 63% disagreeing with the statement18

.

Figures are also high in France (64%) and Malta (70%), compared to 26% recorded in

Sweden, 28% in Portugal and 29% in both Poland and Romania19

.

13

Marfouk, A. (2013). Préjugés et fausses idées sur l‟immigration et les immigrés, vecteurs de discrimination en

matière d‟accès à l‟emploi. Working Paper de l’IWEPS (Institut Wallon de l’Evaluation, de la Prospective et de

la Statistique), No. 14, p. 6. Source of the graph: EVS (2008) and calculations of the author. 14

EVS (European Values Study) is an international survey that aims to examine changes in values, attitudes and

beliefs. This survey has been conducted over four period of time: 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-

2010. One of the modules of the survey is very helpful because it is based on how immigration and immigrants

are perceived. In this paper, we will use data from the last „wave‟ of the survey (2008-2010), which is also the

period analysed by Marfouk (2013) in his paper. 15

Marfouk (2013), op.cit., p. 6. 16

Ibid. 17

European Commission (2010). Future of Europe. Eurobarometer 71 (2009), p. 61, available on:

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb713_future_europe.pdf 18

Ibid. 19

Ibid.

7

4. Case study: Belgium

4.1. The situation in Belgium

As we have seen with the Eurobarometer and the EVS, many Belgians have anti-immigration

attitudes, often because they believe immigrants are taking advantage of Belgium‟s social

security. But what they forget is that the integration process cannot occur if the „host society‟

is not open to immigration20

. Indeed, for immigrants to socially and culturally integrate, they

first need to be economically integrated, namely to be able to access the labour market.

However, immigrants are confronted to discrimination when it comes to enter this market in

Belgium21

.

In order to examine what creates these anti-immigration sentiments and why do they have

such a big echo, it is interesting to have a look at the differences between both main parts of

Belgium: Flanders and Wallonia. Indeed, the differences (mainly economic but also related to

identity) between both regions may help us to put some light on key factors that might

influence the population‟s view.

Belgian media often talks about the expansion of Flanders‟ nationalist parties and the great

popularity of their leaders22

. This vision of an ultra-nationalist Flanders is reinforced by the

conclusion of various studies, which underline the fact that extreme right-wing parties get

higher scores in Flanders than they do in Wallonia at Belgian elections23

. When we look at

facts, the nationalistic parties are indeed overrepresented in Flanders compared to Wallonia.

Today in the Belgian Parliament, i.e. “la Chambre des représentants”, on 150 members, 11 are

coming from the Vlaams Belang24

, far-right wing party that is known for its

anticulticulturalism agenda (even if the position over immigrants is less strong than it was

when the party was known as the Vlaams Blok a few years ago)25

. However, Wallonian far-

right wing parties are not represented in the Parliament. These differences are even more

obvious in the Regions‟ Parliaments. In the Flemish Parliament, the Vlaams Belang obtained

21 seats in 200926

, i.e. 16.9% of the seats. As in the national Parliament, far-right wing parties

are not represented in the Walloon Parliament27

.

20

Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 3. 21

Ibid. 22

Ibid., p. 8. 23

De Witte, H. and Scheepers, P. (1998). Origin, Evolution and Future of the Vlaams Blok and Its Electors in

Flanders. Pouvoirs, No. 87, in Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 8. 24

La Chambre.be, Députés actuels par groupe politique, avaible on :

http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/depute&language=fr&rightmenu=right_depute&cfm

=cvlist53.cfm?sorttype=group&legis=53 25

Barker, L. (2007). Immigration and Belgium’s Far-Right Parties. Migration Information Source, available on :

http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=606 26

IBZ, résultats officiels (2009). Parlement Flamand : Répartition des sièges, available on:

http://elections2009.belgium.be/fr/vla/seat/seat_VLR00000.html 27

Le Parlement Wallon, Composition - Les députés, available on:

http://parlement.wallonie.be/content/default.php?p=01-01

8

Moreover, in their analysis of Flemish anti-immigration sentiments, Billiet and Swyngedouw

emphasize on the fact that negative attitudes of Flemish people towards ethnic minorities are

among the highest of all European countries28

. More generally, as we have seen, nationalist

parties in Flanders are more visible in Flanders compared to Wallonia, what may suggest

Flemish people are more hostile to immigration than the rest of Belgians.

4.2. (Sub)nationalism in Belgium

In order to understand negatives attitudes towards immigration in the Belgian context, it is

important not to forget that there are two kinds of identities: national and sub-national.

In their analysis of Belgian‟s attitude towards immigration, Maddens, Billiet and Beerten state

that there is a link between the fact that citizens identify either with the official Belgian

identity or with sub-national identities (Flanders and Wallonia) and their attitudes towards

foreigners. What is really interesting about this research is that it shows that “both attitudes

are inversely related in Flanders and Wallonia”29

.

In Wallonia, citizens with a strong Walloon identity tend to have a positive attitude towards

foreigners, while those with a strong Belgian identification are more negative. In Flanders, it

is the opposite: people with a stronger Flemish identity tend to be more opposed to

immigrants/foreigners, while those with a strong Belgian identification are more positive.30

This means that the relationship between both variables (national identity and attitudes

towards immigration) is not intrinsic, but is determined to some extent by the social

representation of the national identity in the social and political context31

. Indeed, the history

of Wallonia and Flanders is not the same; neither is the political landscape and discourse32

.

First of all, sub-nationalism in Flanders is akin to separatism, which is historically right-wing,

while it resembles regionalism in Wallonia and is traditionally left-wing33

. Moreover, if

extreme-right parties in Flanders are strong nationalist/separatist parties, in Wallonia, the

extreme-right emphasises on belgicism34

.

If these findings are not new (the paper was written in 2000), according to Billiet, who draws

upon the ISPO35

rapports of 1995, 1999, 1993 and 2007, they are stable over time36

.

28

Billiet, J. and Swyngedouw, M. (2009). Ethische minderhedenen de Vlaamse kiezers. Een analyse op basis

van de postelectorale verkiezingsonderzoeken 1991-1995-1999-2003-2007. Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek

Opinieonderzoek (ISPO) – K.U.Leuven, p. 22. 29

Maddens, B., Billiet, J. and Beerten, R. (2000). National identity and the attitude towards foreigners in multi-

national states: the case of Belgium. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 45. 30

Ibid. 31

Ibid. 32

Billiet, J. (2011). (Sub)nationalism and attitude towards immigrants. CeSO – K.U. Leuven, PowerPoint

presentated at Re-Bel event “Right-wing Flanders, left-wing Wallonia? Should the obligation to vote be

abolished?”, available on: http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-files/events/fifth-public-event-right-

wing-flanders-left-wing-wallonia-and-obligation-vote/Billiet.pdf 33

Maddens, Billiet and Beerten (2000), op. cit., p. 52 and Billiet (2011), op. cit. 34

Billiet (2011), op. cit. 35

Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek.

9

Why is this interesting? Because it shows that both parts of Belgium are very different and

that the findings are not always what we could have guessed. Indeed, as we will see, anti-

immigration sentiments in Flanders may be high, but they are not as high as in Wallonia.

Brussels also have its particularities: those sentiments are less high than anywhere in

Belgium. We will thus try to explain the reasons of these trends, and in which way they are

related to the theory of economic self-interest or the one of marginality.

4.3. Divergences between Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels

When we look at facts, the first clear difference is that people from Brussels are relatively

more open to immigration than the rest of the Belgian population. This could actually support

marginality theory, because the immigrant population is larger in Brussels than in other parts

of Belgium (see table). The cultural version of marginality theory implies that the most

diversity, the less the anti-immigration sentiment. With no certainty, it seems to be the case in

Brussels... but not in Wallonia. Indeed, even if the immigration population is larger in

Wallonia than it is in Flanders, this is, as we will see, not correlated with the „level‟ of anti-

immigration sentiment. Marginality theory can thus not be applied to Belgium, at least not to

the country as a whole.

Foreigners Belgians Foreigners and

Belgians % of foreigners

Region of Brussels-Cap. 381.771 772.864 1.154.635 33 %

Flemish Region 467.882 5.913.977 6.381.859 7,3 %

Walloon Region 345.469 3.217.591 3.563.060 9,7 %

Belgium 1.195.122 9.904.432 11.099.554 10,8 %

[Population on 1st January 2013. Source: be.STAT37

]

Contrary to what we could have thought, Walloons tend in fact to be the most opposed to

immigration, with a significant half of respondents thinking that to be truly Belgian, people

must have Belgian origins, compared to 39% in Flanders („Tableau 2‟)38

. Indeed, Walloons,

more than other Belgians, share the cliché of the “myth of invasion by immigrants”: 60% of

respondents believe that there are too many immigrants in Belgium nowadays, compared to

56% in Flanders („Tableau 1‟)39

. Moreover, 41% of Walloons agree with the statement

“because of the number of immigrants in Belgium, I sometimes feel like a foreigner”, in

comparison to 35% in Flanders, and 30% in Brussels („Tableau 1‟).

36

Billiet (2011), op. cit. 37

Statistics Belgium, Population par sexe et nationalité pour la Belgique et les régions, 2003 et 2013, available

on: http://statbel.fgov.be/fr/statistiques/chiffres/population/structure/natact/beletr/#.UswMM_TuJ_Q 38

Marfouk (2013), op. cit. 39

Ibid.

10

In fact, on most issues (the rise of criminality excluded) Walloons tend to be more negative

than Flemish40

, what make us think that contrary to given ideas, anti-immigration sentiments

are higher in Wallonia compared to Flanders.

In order to see why Walloons are so reluctant to immigrants and immigration we need to

examine the profile of the people that express those anti-immigration sentiments. In the

meantime, that will allow us to see if either the „economic self-interest‟ theory or the

„marginality‟ theory can be applied to our Walloon case.

The latest social barometer of Wallonia, survey conducted by the IWEPS41

, permits to do so.

In correlation with the findings of the IWEPS‟ working paper based on the EVS, 40.3% of

Walloons think that foreigners take away jobs from natives (for 42% in 2008 for the EVS).

However, one of the most significant findings of the survey is that 66.8% of the people

interrogated think that “foreigners are a burden for the country‟s social security”42

. Building

40

Marfouk (2013), op. cit., p. 10. 41

Institut Wallon de l‟Evaluation, de la Prospective et de la Statistique. 42

Cardelli, R. and Bornand, T. (2013). Attitudes des Wallons vis-à-vis des immigrés et de l’immigration :

Analyse des données du Baromètre social de la Wallonie 2012-2013. IWEPS, available on:

http://socialsante.wallonie.be/sites/all/modules/DGO5_MoteurRecherche/

11

from the responses to this specific question, respondents‟ „profiles‟ are being analysed, using

variables such as nationality, level of education, location of residence, employment status,

occupation and income.

Percentage of respondents that agree with the statement: “Immigrants are a burden for the

country’s social security”.

Nationality

71,5% Belgians

55,7% Belgians with foreign origin

38,1% Foreigners

Level of education 77,6% High school to age 15

48,8% University degree

Location of residence 94,1% Farm or isolated house

62,4% Big city

Employment status 71,8% Unemployed

65,2% Employed

Occupation 74,4% Manual workers

46,9% Chief executive

Income43

71,1% With big difficulties

62,7% Very easily

While looking at this table it is hard to support „marginality‟ theory. On cultural aspects, it is

true that foreigners, who are supposedly at the margin of the society44

, are more positive

about immigration. However, all the other data are opposed to the economic marginality

theory and clearly hold up more for the „economic self-interest‟ theory. High level of

education and „high-ranking‟ occupation highly influence people view on immigration, as

well as level of income and employment status (even if divergences are less strong).

Not only „economic self interest‟ theory explains the situation in Wallonia, but it can also

explain the differences between Wallonia and Flanders. Indeed, if we make the assumption

that attitudes towards immigration are globally related to indicators such as income,

employment status, occupation or level of education, then it is explains why Wallonia gets

higher figures than Flanders. Indeed, poverty and unemployment rate are higher in Wallonia

than they are in Flanders. To establish those facts in statistics, in 2010, the risk rate of

poverty45

is 19.2% in Wallonia, compared to 9.8% in Flanders46

. As for the unemployment

download.php?download_file=Attitudes%20des%20Wallons%20vis%20a%20vis%20des%20immigres%20et%

20de%20immigration.pdf 43

Question asked: “Are you able to make ends meet with your income?” 44

It is important not to forget that within Belgian immigrants, 68% are coming from within the European Union

[see Direction générale Emploi. (2009). L’immigration en Belgique: Effectifs, mouvements et marché du travail,

Rapport 2009, available on: http://www.emploi.belgique.be/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=28772 ]. 45

The threshold of poverty for an isolated person established at €1.000 46

Taux de risque de pauvreté par région et en Belgique, revenus 2004-2010. Observatoire de la Santé et du

Social de Bruxelles-Capitale, available on: http://www.observatbru.be/documents/indicateurs/pauvrete/2013-

decembre/fr/01_seuil-de-risque-de-pauvrete-par-region-revenus_2004-2010.pdf

12

rate, in 2012, in the active population aged from 15 to 64 years old, 10.1% were unemployed

in Wallonia, while the rate was more than half big in Flanders (4.6%)47

.

Conclusion

With this paper, we have been able to make the assumption that motives for anti-immigration

sentiments can be found in economic self-interest. Since it is clearly the case in Wallonia, it

gives us an explanation about the reason why negative attitudes towards immigration tend to

be more common in this part of Belgium than it is in Flanders. Indeed, Flanders appears to

suffer less from unemployment, as well as from poverty.

If this was not the aim of the paper, an analysis of what is really happening in terms of

immigration could also be an opportunity for reflection. Indeed, as we have mentioned

briefly, 68% of the immigrants living in Belgium are coming from countries within the

European Union. However, the ones immigrants that are often discriminated against are the

32 remaining percents, and if everyone realised this, it may be less easy to fall for the whole

„invasion‟ myth. Moreover, what people often do not know is that immigration remains a

small proportion of the spending of the welfare state. Indeed, following a study conducted by

the OECD in 2013, the fiscal impacts of immigration in Belgium only represent 0.76% of the

gross domestic product48

.

A more extensive study could also have enlightened more the ambiguous links that exist

between the dominant parties and negative sentiments towards immigration in Belgium.

Indeed, if economic self-interest theory helps us understand why Walloons have such

sentiments, it can be seen as contradictory with the fact that Wallonia is on the left side of the

political spectrum. This brings us to the idea that in certain situations, individual

comportments should be maybe examined out of the sphere of the parties, but in a broader

historical and societal context.

47

Conseil Supérieur de l‟Emploi (2013). Rapport 2013 : Les personnes faiblement qualifiées sur le marché du

travail. Service public fédéral Emploi, Travail et Concertation sociale, p. 51, available on:

http://www.emploi.belgique.be/publicationDefault.aspx?id=39096. 48

OCDE (2013). Perspectives des migrations internationales 2013, Editions OCDE, p. 171, available on:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-fr

13

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