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o RECT)oBAL NSTITUTION

5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2012

STEVEN INGRAM,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D1.2-2666

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

/

Opinion filed November 30, 2012

3.850 Appeakfrom the Circuit Courtfor Marion County,Scott Polodna, Judge.

Steve Craig Ingram, Bushnell, pro se.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, AssistantAttorney General, Daytona Beach, forAppellee.

PER CURIAM.

We issued a Spencer1 show cause order directing Steven Ingram to demonstrate

"why he should not be prohibited from filing any appeal, petition, pleading or motion

pertaining to the conviction and sentence rendered in Case No.1997-CF-870." Having

carefully considered Ingram's response, we conclude that he is abusing the judicial

process and should be barred from further pro se filings.

1 State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALSTATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

STEVE CRAIG INGRAM,Appellant,

v. CASE NUMBER: 97-CF-870

STATE OF FLORIDA,Appellee.

APP.EAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURTNINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA

INITIAL BRIEF

Counsel for AppellantSteve Craig IngramSumter Correctional Institution9544 CR 476BBushnell, FL 33513

TABLEOFCONTENTSPAGE (S)

Table of Contents ......................................................................................................ii

Table of Citations.....................................................................................................iii

Preliminary Statement............................................................................................... 1

Statement of the Case and Facts ............................................................................... I

Summary of Argument...........................................................................................4-5

ARGUMENT

ISSUE ONE:DID THE POST CONVICTION COURT FOLLOWING WITHOUTAN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAWIN DENYING APPELANT S 3.850 CLAIM THAT HIS TRIALCOUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKEOBJECTION TO INFORMATION WHICH FAILED TO ALLEGEELEMENTS OF SECTION 777.06 AND 777.011 FLORIDASTATUTES.....................................................................................................6

ISSUE TWO:DID THE POST CONVICTION COURT FOLLOWING WITHOUTAN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAWIN DENYING APPELANT'S 3.850 CLAIM THAT TRIALCOURT'S ERROR WHICH IT ALOWED HIS CO-DEFENDANTOUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIALWHEN NO CONSPIRACY EXIST............................................................. 13

Conclusion................................................................................................................16

Certificate of Service............................................................................................... I 6

11

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASE LAW PAGES

Baker v. State, 34 Fla. Law Weekly D526,.D527(Fla. 4* DCA March 10, 2009)......................................................................... 11, 12

Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1" DCA 1982)............................................... 14

Bedford v. State, 970 So.2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4* DCA 2008)..........................:......... 10

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)................................................... 9

Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63-64 (Fla. 2001) ...................................................... 4

Burgess v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 140-141 (Fla. 2002)............................................... 5

Burnside v. State 656 So.2d 241.2.45 (Fla. 5* DCA 1995)............................. 13, 15

Calvert v. State, 730 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 5* DCA 1999)............................... 13, 15

Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1986).................................................. 8

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. I96, 201 (l948).......................................................... 10

Ford v. State, 802 So.2d I 121, 1 30 (F a. 2001).................................................... I

Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1996)............................................................. 5

Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1997)............................................... 13

Frew v. State, 947 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2007)...................................... 9

Garrett v. Morris Kirschmann & Co., 336 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 976)................... 5

Gray v. State, 435 So.2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)........................................................ 0

Haliburton v. State, 7 So.3d 60 l, 606 (Fla. 4* DCA 2009)............ ................... 5

Health Options. Inc. v. Agencyfòr Health Care Admin,889 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1" DCA 2004) .................................................................. 7

Hodges v. State, 22 So.3d 338, 336 (F a. 2004)............................... ............... 3, 5

Hughes v. State, 22 So.3d 132, 133 (F a.2"d DCA 2009)......................................... 3

Ingrarn v. State, 748 So.2d 283 (Fla. 5* DCA 1991)................................................ 1

Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002)........................................ 3, 4

Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (Fla. 1983)................................................. 14, 15

Kneale v. Kneale, 67 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1953)............................................................. 1

Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 424 (Fla. 2002).................................................. 7

111 -

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant, Ingram, was the Defendant in the trial court; this appellate review

will refer to the Appellant as such, Defendant, or by proper name.·Appellee, the

State of Florida, was the prosecution below; the Appellate Review will refer to

Appellee as such, the prosecutor, or the State.

The record on appellate review consists of the charging information, and this

court should take judicial notice of this issue in transcripts in this District Court

files. See, Ingram v. State, 748 So.2d 283 (Fla. 5 DCA 1999). Section 90.201-

204, Fla. Stat. (2012).

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

The Appellant considers the statement of the issues and the statement of the

case and facts in appellate reviews to be inextricably intertwined and to be critical

to the proper argument and resolution of such appellate review'.

Statements of issues should be concise, accurate, and scrupulously fair. They

should incorporate the standards of review, including preservation or non-

preservation of the issue in the trial court, and be neutrally cast to present only the

appellate question to be resolved.

Statements of the case and facts should focus on the issues presented and

See, Kneale v. Kneale, 67 So.2d 233 (1953); Phillip J. Padovano, FloridaAppellate Practice (2"d Edition 1997)

should not include distracting or irrelevant material unrelated to those issues. The

facts should be presented in a non-argumentative manner consistent with the

standards of review and presumptions of correctness afforded to trial court

judgments, including recitation on whether the issue and arguments presented were

properly reviewed below.

The appellant declines to accept statements of the issue or of the case and

facts which do not meet the above criteria. Trial court and state's statement omits

facts critical to the issue presented and the applicable standard of appellate review

it i.s-accepted subject to the following relevant facts:

1. At the trial court, on May 10 2012, without evidentiary hearing; appellant

former trial court ruled as follows:

In the instant motion, the defendant alleges two grounds for relief. The court

will address each ground separately.

GROUND ONE:

THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THAT COUNSEL WASINEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE CHARGINGAFFIDAVIT

[w]hich failed to allege the elements of trafficking in cocaine. The court

finds that this claim is procedurally barred. Rule 3.850 states, in pertinent part

"Time limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided

by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered

pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence

become final in a non capital case..." Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5*

DCA 2002) (emphasis in decision), citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(b) The Defendant's

mandate was issued on January 7, 2000. See, Mandate; The Court finds that the

Defendant has failed to establish facts that demonstrate that his claim was unknown

or could have not been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, the

Court finds that the Defendant should have raised this claim in his first Motion for

Postconviction Relief or prior to the expiration of his two year time limitation.

Consequently, this claim is denied.

GROUND TWO:

THE DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT TRIAL COURTCOMMITTED FUNDAMENTAL ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWEDHIS CO-DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS TO BEADMITTED AT TRIAL.

A claim of trial court error is not cognizable in a motion for post conviction

relief. See, Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629 (Fla.. l'" DCA 2008) (Holding that

claims of trial court error should be raised on direct appeal , not in a rule 3.850

motion (citing, Hodges v. State, 885. So.2d 338, 366 (Fla. 2004)). Furthermore, it is

a "common misconception among prisoners the 'fundamental error' can be

reviewed in a post conviction proceeding at any time." Hughes v State, 22 So.3d

132, 133 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009). If the is were truly a matter of fundamental erroi·, it

could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. Id. at 135. Therefore, this

claim is denied. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and

adjudged that the defendant's motion for post conviction relief is denied.

SUMARYOFARGUMENT

ISSUE ONE:

Appellee concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

procedurally barred. Citing Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002).

Appellant asserts that the trial court conclusion is misplaced. See, Bruno v. State,

807 So.2d 55, 63-64 (Fla. 200]). ("[W]hereas the main question on direct appeal is

whether the trial court erred, the main question in a Strickland claim is whether

trial counsel was ineffective. Both claims may arise from the same underlying

facts, but the claims themselves are distinct and . . . of necessity . . . have different

remedies: A claim of trial court error generally can be raised on direct appeal but

not in a Rule 3.850 Motion, and a claim of ineffectiveness generally can be raised

in a Rule 3.850 but not on direct appeal. A defendant thus has little choice: as a

rule, he or she can only raise an ineffectiveness claim via Rule 3.850 Motion, even

if the same underlying facts also supported, or could have supported, a claim of

error on direct appeal. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that Bruno's claim

4

was procedurally barred.") See Also, Wuornos v. State, 676 So.2d 972, 974 (Fla.

1996). Id. at 64.

ISSUE TWO:

Appellee concluded that a claim of trial court erred is not cognizable in a

Motion for Postconviction Relief. Citing: Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1"

DCA 2008) and Hodges v State, 22 So.3d 338, 336 (Fla. 2004). Appellant asserts

that the trial court order summary denying Appellant's claim does not set forth

sufficient reasons for its denial, and further fails to address the "manifest injustice"

exception, where Appellant shows over-whelming evidence in the police arrest

reports of his innocence. See, Section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes (1997); Burgess

v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 140-141 (Fla. 2002); See also, McCrap v. State, 919 So.2d

647, 649 (Fla. 1" DCA 2006), Citing Garrett v. Morris Kirschrnan & Co., 336

So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1976)). See, Haliburton v. State, 7 So.3d 601, 606 (Fla. 4

DCA 2009); See also, State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d 835, 840 (Fla. 2007) ("[I]f an

illegal conviction is not well within the concept of exceptional circumstances and

manifest injustice requiring .a relaxation of the law of the case of the law of the

case, it is not easy to imagine what would be "); Sigler v. State, 881 So.2d 14, 17

(Fla. 4* DCA 2004). Therefore, this District Court must respectfully granted relief

and quash trial court order.

GROUND ONE

DID THE POSTCONVICTION COURT FOLLOWINGWITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS AMATTER OF LAW IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 3.850CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WASINEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE OBJECTIONTO INFORMATION WHICH FAILED TO ALLEGEELEMENTS OF SECTION 777.03 AND 777.011FLORIDA STATUTES

Appellee concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

procedurally bai:red, because Rule 3.850 time limitation. No other motion shall be

filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the

judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case. Appellant asserts that

this trial court conclusion is misplaced, and he asserts that the Trafficking in

Cocaine conviction should be reversed on this appeal and that the Appellant can

institute a 3.850 Motion predicatèd on the ineffective assistance of his counsel as

evidences by his counsel's failure to argue on his motion for judgment of acquittal

that there was no evidence that Appellant was a principals, aides and abettors, and

accessories before or after the fact to trafficking or conspiracy trafficking in

cocame.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing an order denying a motion for Postconviction Relief

asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Appellant must defer to a trial

court's factual findings which are supported by competent, substantial evidence.

6

The legal conclusions may be reviewed de novo." Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 811

So.2d 819 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2002); See, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698,

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, (1984); Stephens v. State 748 So.2d 1028 (Fla.

1999).

A trial courts "finding of fact . . . will be sustained on review if supported by

competent substantial evidence." Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 424 (Fla.

2002). However, under the de novo standard of review, the appellate court pays no

deference to the trial court's ruling. Rather, the. appellate court makes its own

determination of the legal ISSUE. See, Health Options, Inc. v. Agency for Health

Care Admin., 889 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 14 DCA 2004).

BURDEN OF PERSUASION

Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. §924.051(7),

Florida Statute (2005), provides:

In a direct appeal . . . the party challenging the judgment or orderof the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicialerror occurred in the trial court. A conviction or sentence may notbe reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial erroroccurred in the trial court.

PRESERVATION

In this first issue, Appellee contends that the trial court correctly denying

Appellant Post conviction claim that his trial counsel, rendered constitutionally

ineffective by failing to argue on a motion for judgment of acquittal or object to the

7

bill of particulars that the information by which Appellant was charged, which

correctly specified trafficking or conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, did not

adequately inform appellant, he would be subject to convictions on trafficking and

conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, when the inforrnation did not allege the

elements of the offenses as set out in §777.03 and 777.011, Florida Statutes, which

identifies the offenses allegedly committed by the principle or accessory before and

after the fact, was procedurally barred. Appellant asserts that the trial court

concluded that this claim was barred because it either was, or could have been,

raised on direct appeal; this was error.

In discussing how this procedural gap arises, the Defendant asserts that Rule

3.850(f) specifically permits a defendant to file a second or successive Rule 3.850

Motion, which can be denied as successive only, "if the judge finds that it fails to

allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the

merits . . ." See, Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) Quoting

Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1986); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(f).

therefore, "[a] trial court may not summarily dismiss a successive motion for

postconviction relief that raises issues that were either summarily denied or

dismissed for legal insufficiency in the initial motion." Id, 489 So.2d at 24; See

also, McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 1983) Stating that the

prohibition against successive motions applies "only when the grounds raised were

8

previously adjudicated on their merits, and not where previous motion was

summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency."); Frew v. State, 947 So.2d

1275, 1276 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2007) Stating that the circuit court's discretion to

dismiss a motion as successive under Rule 3.850(f) "does not apply when the

previous motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency.")

Therefore, a defendant whose post conviction claim is denied as facially

insufficient has the right under rule 3:850 (F) to file successive2 motion raising the

same or new claim but remedying the insufficiency.

This provision of Florida's Declaration of Rights Article I, §l6(a), together

with a nearly identical provision in the United States Constitution Sixth

Amendment, establishes one of the cornerstones of western jurisprudence, that

those against whom the state wishes to exercise its power and authority be

accorded due process of law. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 968 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 3"'

DCA 2007) Noting: due process consists of "adequate notice and an opportunity to

be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'", (Quoting, Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Ray v State, 403 So.2d 956, 959. (Fla.

1981) "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that

Appellant recognized that the word "successive" often carries negativeconnotation in the postconviction arena. However, the word appears to be used inRule 3.850(f) to mean a "second or sequential" motion with no intended negativegloss.

9

notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised

by that charge, if desire, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a

criminal proceeding in all courts, state and federal.'; (Quoting: Cole v. Arkansas,

333 U.S. I96, 201 (1948) and Bedford v. State, 970 So.2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4* DCA

2008) "Generally it is a denial of due process to convict on a crime not charged . .

." as the courts suggest, such error is fundamental in our constitutional system and

compels redress.

Although it is doubtful that a showing of prejudice is required in cases such

as this, where the error is structural in nature. See, e..g., Price v. State, 995 So.2d

401, 405 (Fla. 2008); Gray v. State, 435 So.2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1983); (holding that

where the charging instrument completely fails to charge a crime, the conviction

violates due process), it nevertheless is clear the trial counsel's failure to object on

the day of trial prejudiced the appellant in this instant case.' See also, McMillan v.

State, 832 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002) (This rule is designed to

"[d]iscourage defendants from waiting until after a trial id over before contesting

deficiencies in charging documents which could have easily been corrected if thev

This is so even though defense counsel almost certainly knew, or at least had theability to know through discovery provided by the state, that the co-defendant wasthe one that purchased and possessed the cocaine at the time of the offense. In anycriminal case, facts creating the elements of additional uncharged crimes mightarise during discovery, but the state ultimately chooses not to charge those crimes.It is apodictic that discovery supplied by the state or actual knowledge by defensecounsel can not function as a substitute for constitutionally required notice.

10

had been pointed out before .trial."); Ford v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1130 (Fla.

2001); Baker v. State, 34 Fla.L.Weekly D526, D527 (Fla. 1" DCA, March 10

2009).

In Baker, appellant seeks review of his conviction, following a jury trial, for

accessory after the fact to second-degree murder with a firearm, in violation of

§777.03(1)(3)(c), Florida Statues (2005). Appellant contends that; (1) the

information was fundamentally defective because it did not include either the

essential elements of the second-degree murder to which he was allegedly an

accessory after the fact or a reference to the statute that proscribes that offense. Id.

at D526. At no time, either before or after his trial, did appellant complain that he

believed the information to be defective. Instead, for the first time on appeal,

appellant now complains that the information is fundamentally defective because it

failed to allege a criminal offense and failed adequately to allege the charge against

him, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due process of law. His argument is

that, although the information essentially tracked §777.03(i ). it was fundamentally

flawed because it failed also either to allege the elements of the offense allegedly

committed by the principal (second-degree murder with a firearm) or to make

reference to the statute that proscribes that offense, (i.e., ß782.04(2), Florida

Statutes). /d, at D526. The District Court per curiam affirmed, but certifies to our

Supreme Court the matter of great public importance.

I I

Here in the instant case, unlike Baker, the trial counsel failed to object to the

information did "wholly [ ] to allege one or more of the elements of the crimes" of

principal, accessory before or after the fact. On the contrary, the state alleged in the

instant case that appellant purchased and possessed cocaine of the elements of

trafficking and conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, essentially - did not track the

language of §777.03(1) and §777.011(1), Florida Statutes. Appellant asserts that

the trial counsel failed to make an objection to the information fundamentally

defective, prejudiced appellant by being convicted of a crime he did not commit.

See, Williams v. State, 516 So.2d 975, 977-978 (Fla. f DCA 1987); "[I]t would be

grossly unjust to reject Williams' appeal and affirm his wrongful conviction of

robbery and keep him in prison for a crime that never occurred.") As this District

Court held in Williams, regardless of the procedural technicalities that the criminal

justice system imposes upon itself, that system has but one product - - justice - -

and it is unjust for a defendant to be in prison for a crime that never occurred. Id, at

978.

Therefore, this District Court should respectfully grant this issue, either grant

appellant and evidentiary hearing or deem entitlement to appellant for immediate

relief from a wrongful conviction.

12

GROUND TWO

DID THE POSTCONVICTION COURT FOLLOWINGWITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS AMATTER OF LAW IN DENYING APPELANT'S 3.850CLAIM THAT TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT ALLOWEDHIS CO-DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTSTO BE ADMITTED TO TRIAL WHEN NO CONSPIRACYEXIST

Appellee contends that a trial court eiTor is not cognizable in a Motion for

Postconviction Relief. Appellant asserts that the trial court conclusion is misplaced.

Out-of-court statements made by co-defendant to admit evidence under co-

conspirator exception to hearsay rule, state must establish; (1) that conspiracy

existed; (2) that co-conspirator and appellant against whom statements are offered

were members of conspiracy; and (3) that statements were made during course and .

in furtherance of conspiracy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Trial court admission of codefendant's statements to witness and officer

after trafficking in cocaine were not admissible under co-conspirator exception to

hearsay rule, in absence of evidence demonstrating that statements were made

during continuation of conspiracy and agreement it encompassed. See, e.g., Calvert

v. State, 730 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 5* DCA 1999); Burnside v. State, 656 So.2d 241,

245 (fla. 5* DCA 1995); See also, Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla.

13

1997) Finding that codefendant's confession was substantially incriminating to

defendant and that the circumstances of codefendant's confession did not

demonstrate the particularized guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to overcome

the presumption of unreliability that attaches to accomplices' hearsay confessions

implicating the defendant.

PRESERVATION

In this second issue, Appellee contends that the co-defendant's statements

were properly admitted as staten1ents of a co-conspirator under §9Ó.803(3) and

90.803(18)(e); which is not cognizable in a motion for postconviction relief as

trial court error. The appellant asserts that "statements made which tend to shield

co-conspirators' after the objective of the conspiracy is completed do not give rise

to an additional conspiracy to cover up the original crime." See, We//s v. State, 492

So.2d 712, 719 (Fla. 1" DCA 1986); Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1" DCA

1982) Stating that statements by a victim are not admissible to prove subsequent

acts of a Defendant; See also, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (fla.1983).

therefore, Rule 90.803(3) also renders codefendant's statements inadmissible to

prove appellant's intent and motive. See, e.g., SanDoval v. State, 689 So.2d 1258,

1259 (Fla. 3M DCA 1997), the defendant sought to introduce her codefendant's

statements to show the defendant's state of mind and to explain her actions. The

14

trial court sustained the state's objection to the introduction of the evidence. On

appeal, the Third District agreed with the trial court and held:

"§90.803(3) permits the admission of a defendant's statementsto prove the declarant's state of mind or explain the declarant'ssubsequent conduct. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577(Fla. 1983). The declarant here, is the codefendant and notSandoval."

Id, as 1259. As in Sandoval, the trial court here should not have allowed

codefendant's statement to be used against appellant to establish motive, absent

any evidence of a conspiracy at the time the statements were made.

Appellant also asserts that to qualify under the co-conspirator exception of

§90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes, a statement must be made during the course of the

conspiracy and in furtherance of it. See, §90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes (1997).

Moore v. State, 503 So.2d 923, 924 (Fla. 5* DCA 1987); Burnside, 656 So.2d as

245; Calvert, 730 So.2d as 319; Usher v. State, 642 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 2* DCA

1994); See also, Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1996). There is simply no

recorded evidence suggesting that at. the time most of the above statement were

made any conspiracy existed. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary and

demonstrated that if any conspiracy existed it was formed shortly before the

trafficking, or purchasing the cocaine. See, Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300 310

(Fla. 1997); See also, Williamson v. United State, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994), 114

S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed 2"d 476 (1994) (Rule 804(b)(3)).

15

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the reasons stated above, this District Court of Appeal must

respectfully grant relief and quash the trial court summarily denying appellant

Postconviction Motion, and grant evidentiary hearing or new trial with direction to

exclude codefendants statements.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVE CRAI INGRAM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Initial

Brief has been furnished to Attorney General's Office: Honorable Pamela Jo

Bondi, Sea Breeze Blvd., Fifth Floor, Daytona Beach, Florida 32844, via U.S. Mail

on this // day of ßf 2012.

STEVE CRAIG dÑGRAM

16

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT

STEVE CRAIG INGRAM,Appellant,

V.Case No. 5D12-2666

STATE OF FLORIDA,Appellee.

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED ON APPEAL FROMSUMMARY DENIAL OF COLLATERAL MOTION

Appellee, the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of

Appellate Procedure 9 . 141 (b) , f iles this response to Appellant ' s

initial brief and states:

Appellant appeals from the summary denial of a Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3 . 80 0 (a) · or 3 . 850 motion. The S tate declines to

file an answer brief in this cause, unless this ·Court so requests.

See Ketion v. State, 548 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Toler v.

State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Respectfully Submitted,

PAMELA JO BONDIATTO EY GENE

WESLEY HEIDTAssistant Attorney GeneralFla. Bar #0773026444 Seabreeze BoulevardFifth Floor

.Daytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990(Telephone)(386) 238-4997 (Fax)wesley.heidt@myfloridalegal . com

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THEN1NTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 1997-CF-870STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION: 11-A

Plaintiffv.

STEVEN CRAIG 1NGRAM,Defendant.

/

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

THIS MATTER came before. the Court upon the Defendant's pro se "Motion for

Postconviction Relief," filed on May 4, 2012, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.800(a). The Court having reviewed the Motion, the court file, and being otherwise fully

advised of the premises, finds as follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 16, 1998, the Defendant was convicted of trafficking in 400 grams or more

of cocaine. On June 8, 1998, he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life in the

Department of Corrections, with credit for 136 days time served. The Fifth District Court of

Appealper curiam affirmed. Ingram v. State, 748 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

Meanwhile, the Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was granted

on November 30, 1999 and the case was set for resentencing. On December 14, 1999, the State

filed a Motioi1 to Vacate Court's Order Granting Motion to Correct Sentence, and on December

28, 1999, the State filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence. On April 6,

2000, the Court issued an Order granting the Motion to Vacate, vacating its prior order, and

denying the Motion to Strike.

On September 29, 2000, he filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Postconviction

Relief, and on February 15, ,2001, a pleading titled "Motion to Correct Sentence and

Supplemental Heggs." Both motions were denied on April 25, 2001. The Fifth District Court of

Appeal affirmed. Ingram v. State, 951 So. 2d 854 (Fla (belated appeal).

On December 27, 2005, he filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied

on April 10, 2007. The Fifth District Court ofAppeal affirmed. Ingram v. State, 968 So. 2d 579

(Fla. 5th DCA 2007). On December 17, 2007, he filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,

which was denied on May 1, 2008. He did not appeal. On June 30, 2008, he filed a Motion to

Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied on January 22, 2009. The Fifth District Court of

Appeal per curiam affinned. Ingram v. State, 29 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). On June 3,

2009, he filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Fifth District of Appeal, which was

transferred to this Court as a Motion for Postconviction Relief. However, this Court denied this

Motion on November 25, 2009.

ANALYSIS AND RULING

In the instant Motion, the Defendant alleges two grounds for relief. The Court will

address each ground separately.

Ground One: The Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the charging affidavit, which failed to allege the elements of trafficking in cocaine. The Court

finds that this claim is procedurally barred. Rule 3.850 states, in pertinent part: "Time

Limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed

at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule iffìled more than

2 years after the judgment and sentence become fìnal in a noncapital case..." Johnson v. State,

814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (emphasis in decision), citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(b). The

Defendant's Mandate was issued on January 7, 2000. See Mandate. The Court finds that the

Defendant has failed to establish facts that demonstrate that his claim was unknown or could

have not been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, the Court finds that the

Defendant should have raised this claim in his first Motion for Postconviction Relief or prior to

the expiration ofhis two-year time limitation. Consequently, this claim is denied.

Ground Two: The Defendant asserts that trial court committed fundamental error when

it allowed his codefendant's out-of-court statements to be admitted at trial. A claim of trial court

error is not cognizable in a inotion for postconviction relief. See Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629

(Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that claims of trial court error should be raised on direct appeal,

not in a rule 3.850 motion (citing Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 366 (Fla. 2004)). Furthermore,

it is a "common misconception among prisoners that 'fundamental error' can be reviewed in a

postconviction proceeding at any time." Hughes v. State, 22 So.3d 132, 133 (Fla. 2nd DCA

2

2009). If the issue were truly a matter of fundamental error, it could have and should have been

raised on direct appeal. Id at 135. Therefore, this claim is denied.

Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

that:

(1) The Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

(2) The following portion of the record is attached to tbis Order and incorporated by

reference: Mandate.

(3) The Defendant is advised that he may file a Notice of Appeal in writing within thirty

(30) days of the date of rendition of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Osceola County, Kissimmee, Florida, this

day ofMay, 2012. /S/ Scott Polodna

SCOTT POLODNACircuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order has been provided via interoffice mail

or by U.S. Mail to: Steven C. Ingram, DC# 339162, Sumter Correctional Institution, 9544

County Road 476B, Bushnell, Florida 33513-0667; and the Postconviction Felony Unit-Office

of the State Attorney, 2 Courthouse Square, Suite 3500, Kissimmee, Florida 34741 this

day ofMay, 2012.

Judicial Assistant

3

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIALCIRCUIT IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNT, FLORIDA

CRIMINAL DIVISION

STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM,Defendant,

Case No: CR 97-870Vs.STATE OF FLORIDA,

Plaintiff

MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW, The defendant, pursuant to Florida rule of criminal

procedure 3.850(b)(1)(2)(3), moves this circuit court to granted this motion for

Postconviction relief pursuant to trial counsel ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to object or being to the attention of the court before trial and before states

rests its case to challenge propriety of information of trafficking in cocaine must

show that information is so fundamentally defective that it cannot support

judgment of conviction; (2) Trial court erred when it allowed the state over trial

counsel objection to admits out-of-court statements made by codefendant, who was

one purchase the cocaine, and not defendant, evidencing codefendant's motive,

plan, and intent to purchasing cocaine, were not admissible under co-conspirator

exception to hearsay rule, in absence of evidence suggesting that at time most of

statement were made any conspiracy ever existed. The defendant states the

follows:

1). The trial by judge was located in and for Osceola County, Florida, on

February 16, 1998.

2). The judge that presided over this proceedings was Honorable Anthony H.

Johnson.

3). The represented for the state of Florida was Phillip Townes, esquire.

4). The represented for the Defendant was Robert J. Nesmith, esquire.

5). Defendant was tried and convicted on February 16, 1998, of trafficking

in cocaine of two hundred grams or more. (R. 66). Defendant was sentenced as an

habitual offender, to a term of life imprisonment, on June 8, 1998. (R. 120-140).

6). Defendant filed and timely notice of appeal and the Fifth District Court

of Appeals, per curiam affirmed.

7). Defendant has filed numerous of motions on his judgment and sentence,

and this court has ruled on the issues, but not on the merits of the cause of actions.

8). Defendant does only have one motion to correct sentencing errors, in this

trial court, and there is no other motions, petitions or applications pending in the

Federal or state couits.

I. DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT THESE TWO ISSUESARE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSEDEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED FOR CRIME WHICHDID NOT TAKE PLACE IS A FUNDAMENTAL ERRORWHICH TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULDHAVE CORRECT EVEN WHEN NO TIMELYOBJECTION OR MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL WAS

MADE AT TRIAL AND WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILEDTO PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELBEFORE TRIAL HAD STATED AND AFTER OR BEFORESTATE RESTS IT'S CASE IS A MANIFEST INJUSTICERESULT WHEN DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OFTRAFFICKING IN COCAINE FOR WHICH HE DID NOTCOMMIT.

Defendant raised a total of two claims: 1) Ineffective assistance of counsel

failed to object or bring attention to the trial court that charging information did not

allege the elements of the Trafficking in cocaine offense allegedly committed by

the principal or accessory before and after the fact, did set out in section 777.03 or

90.803(18)(e), Florida statutes (1997); and 2) Trial court erred when it allowed the

state over trial counsel objection to admits out-of court statements made by

codefendant, who was one purchase the cocaine, and not defendant, evidencing

codefendant's motive, plan, and intent to purchasing cocaine, were not admissible

under co-conspirator exception to hear-say rule, in absence of evidence suggesting

that at time most of statements were made any conspiracy ever existed.

Defendant find that this successive motion is governed by Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.850(f), which allows a trial court to dismiss a successive

petition if it fails to allege new or different grounds and the prior determination

was on the merits; or if new and different grounds are alleged, the trial court finds

the failure to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the

procedures governed by the rule. A second or successive motion for Postconviction

Relief can be denied on the ground that it is an abuse of process if there is no

reason for failing to raise the issues in the previous motion. See, Pope v. state, 702

So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1997). Although claims that could have been raised in a prior

Postconviction motion are procedurally barred, these Florida courts has held issues

which have previously been addressed by the court may be reconsidered where

there have developed material changes in the evidence or where reliance on the

prior decision would result in manifest injustice. See, State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d

835, 840 (Fla. 2007); Henry v. State, 649 So.2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. 1994)(citing

Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984); Strazzulla v Hendrick, 177 So.2d

1,3-4 (Fla. 1965)(quoting Beverly Beach Properties v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604 (Fla.

1953)); See also, Williams v. State, 516 So.2d 975, 977-78 (Fla. 5* DCA

1987)("[I]t would be grossly unjust to reject Williams appeal and affirm .his

wrongful conviction of robbery and keep him in prison for a crime that never

occurred."); Miller v. State, 988 So.2d 138, 139-40 (Fla. lf DCA 2008); Bruno v.

State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla. 2001). In order to overcome a procedural bar, a

defendant must show that a trial court could not convict him, and that this crime of

a similar nature had been committed by another person. See, Rivera v. State, 561

So.2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990)(quoting Moreno v. State, 418 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla.

3d DCA 1982)). Reconsideration is warranted because of exceptional

circumstances and where reliance injustice. Therefore, this court must respectfully

granted acquitted, are any relief deemed lawful.

IL TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCEOF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO OBJECT OR BEINGATTENTION TO COURT BEFORE TRIAL OR BEFORESTATE RESTS ITS CASE THAT INFORMATION FAILSTO ALLEGE ELEMENTS IN TRAFFICKING IN COCATNEOFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED PRTNCIPAL ORACCESSORY BEFORE OR AFTER FACT DID SET OUT INSECTIONS 777.03 AND 90.803 (18)(E) FLORIDASTATUTES (1997)

Defendant asserts that the incident occurred on April 24, 1997, which the

trial counsel was ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object or bring to

trial court attention that the information failed to allege the elements of the

trafficking in cocaine offence allegedly committed by the principal or accessory

before or after the fact set out in section's 777.03 or 90.803(18)(e), Florida statutes

(1997), in which there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had an

agreement with co-defendant Mr. Sebastien, to purchase three (3) kilo of cocaine

from undercover Federal Agents, on April 24, 1997.

Before April 24, 1997, the evidence at trial established that an agent with the

Drug Enforcement Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Metropolitan

Bureau of Investigation (MBI) was contacted by a federal agency to assist in

undercover capacity drug case. The agent was told that he would be meeting with

codefendant Mr. Sebastien regarding a sale of cocaine that had been prearranged

by a confidential informant.

Mr. Sebastien asked defendant to ride with him to Tampa, Florida, from the

Orange County, Florida area. After a telephone conversation between the agent and

codefendant Mr. Sebastien and to arrange a meeting, the confidential informant,

Mr. Sebastien and defendant met at a business location. The federal agent was

wearing a concealed microphone and much of the events were recorded on a DVD

by a nearby surveillance team. The negotiations were conducted by the agent and

codefendant Mr. Sebastien while defendant v/ere seating in the passenger side of

the vehicle, in which the owner of the vehicle was codefendant Mr. Sebastien. At

trial, the co-defendant testified that during his negotiations, he indicated that "they"

were there to purchase three (3) kilo of cocaine. At know time did defendant exits

the vehicle to talk with the agent, and defendant were never know by the

confidential information or the federal agents until defendant were stop on the

highway by MBI and State Trooper Perkins and Santemasir and his K-9 Zorro of

the Florida Highway Patrol.

When codefendant Mr. Sebastien and defendant left the area in Tampa,

Florida, and started going back to the Orange County, Florida area, they were stop

by Florida Highway Patrol Officers with assist of MBI agents Charles Moore, in

which the federal agency advised agent Moore that a 1992 Nissan Sentra (maroon

6

in color) bearing Florida tag (LBY06R) that would be leaving the Tampa area

within the hour with three (3) kilo's of powder cocaine in the trunk. Agent Moore

was also advised that the vehicle would be occupied by two black males whose

identity was unknown at that time. Agent Moore was advised that the three (3)

kilo's of power cocaine would be in a blue duffle bag with red stripping.

The Florida Highway Trooper initiated a traffic stop on the 1992 maroon

Nissan Sentra and Trooper ran a check of the Florida tag and driver license of the

driver which came back as codefendant Mr. Sebastien was the owner of the

vehicle, and Sgt. Berke asked for consent to search the vehicle and Codefendant

denied consent. Trooper Santemaria and his K-9 Zorro walked around the vehicle

and Zorro alerted to the left rear quarter panel of the trunk in which the officers

located the powder cocaine, and a .25 caliber pistol with six (6) additional rounds

in the magazine; both Codefendant and Defendant were placed under arrest for

armed trafficking in cocaine on April 24, 1997. (See information and amended

information).

On May 27, 1997, Defendant was charged with an amended information of Count

one: Possession Of A Firearm By A Convicted Felon. The state later dismissed

count two; and Defendant went to trial on Count one of the information. (See

Exhibit A). Trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object before trial by jury,

and before the state's rests its case, that the information was fundamentally

7

defective, because it fails to alleged that the defendant did unlawful maintain or

assist Andre N. Sebastien before or after the fact, or gave the offender any other

aid, knowingly that Andre N. Sebastine had committed the felony of purchase or

trafficking in cocaine, with the intent that Andre N. Sebastien should avoid or

escape detection, arrest, to the offender in violation of section 777.03 and 90.803

(18)(e), Florida statues (1997). Defendant was charged by information as follows:

COUNTONE

CHARGE: STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, ON THE 24" DAYOF APRIL, 1997, IN SAID COUNTY AND STATE, DID, INVIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATUE 893.135 (1)(-B)(1)(C),KNOWINGLY POSSESS, SELL, PURCHASE,MANUFACTURE, DELIVER OR BRING INTO THESTATE OF FLORIDA, FOUR HUNDRED (400) GRAMS OROF COCAINE OR OF A MIXTURE CONTAININGCOCAINE, A SUBSTANCE CONTROLLED BY FLORIDASTATUTE 893.03(2)(A)(4).

(See exhibit A).

At no time, either before or before the state rests its case, or after trial, did

trial counsel tried to preserve this fundamental error, that the i.nformation to be

defective; because it failed to allege a criminal offense and failed adequately to

allege the charge against defendant, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due

process of law. Trial counsel should have argued that, the information fails to

essentially tracked the elements of section 777.03 (1), its failure to either object or

bring this constitution violation to trial court's attention, that the state failed to

8

allege the elements of the offense allegedly committed by the principal

(Trafficking in Cocaine) or to make reference to the statute that proscribes that

offense (i.e., sections 777.03 (1) and 893.135 (1)(b)(1)(c), Florida Statutes).

Because trial counsel failed to object or bring this non-preserve issue by

raising it and securing a ruling in the trial court, counsel's deficient performance,

prejudice defendant from receiving an judgment of acquittal to the offense of

trafficking in cocaine and if it had been preserved it would have constitutes

"Fundamental Error". See, Mcmillan v.State, 832 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. 5th DCA

2002) ("[T]his rule is designed to discourage defendants from waiting until after a

trial is over before contesting deficiencies in charging documents which could have

easily been corrected if they had been pointed out before trial."); Ford v. State, 802

So.2d 1121, 1130 (Fla. 2001); See also, Mosely v,State, 688 So.2d 999(Fla. 2d

DCA 1997). Defendant has demonstrate the two prongs in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. et. 2052, 80 L. ed. 2d 674 (1984).

A claim of ineffectiveness in failing to present important exculpatory

evidence cannot be resolved on the basis of the mere existence of conflicting

evidence in the record. "Rather, the record must 'conclusivelv' rebut the claim if

the claim is to be resolved without a hearing'." Jacobs v. State, 880 So. 2d 548,

555 (Fla. 2004); See also, Florida Rule ofCriminal Procedure 3.850(d). Therefore,

this court must respectfully grant relief.

H. TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWEDSTATE OVER TRIAL COUNSEL OBJECTION TOADMITS OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE BYCODEFENDANT WHO WAS ONE PURCHASECOCAINE AND NOT DEFENDANT EVIDENCINGCODEFENDANT'S MOTIVE, PLAN, AND INTENT TOPURCHASING COCAINE WERE NOT ADMISSIBLEUNDER CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION TOHEARSAY RULE IN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCESUGGESTING THAT AT TIME MOST OFSTATEMENTS WERE MADE ANY CONSPIRACYEVER EXISTED.

Defendant asserts that the trial court violated Florida statutes 90.803(3) and

90.803(18)(e), when Codefendant's statements to officer after trafficking in

cocaine were not admissible under Coconspirator exception to hearsay rule.

The trial court allowed Codefendant testimony at trial as an exception to the

hearsay rule under section 90.803(3), Florida statutes (1997), which provides an

exception for evidence of the state of mind of the maker of the statements when

such state of mind is relevant to an issue at trial. Defendant asserts that this error

because a statement admitted to show state of mind is only allowed to prove the

state of mind or subsequent act of the declarant, not of a Defendant. Here,

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce these

statements directly against Defendant to show that Codefendant traveled to Tampa,

10

Florida with Defendant on April 24, 1997 to purchase three (3) kilo's of powder

cocame.

Hearsay is defined as a "statement, other than one made by the defendant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted." Section 90.801(1)(c), Fla. stat. (1997). Section 90.803 provides

an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as

evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(3) Then-existing mental, •emotional, or physicalcondition.--

(a) A statement of the declarant's4hen-ex-isting state ofmind, emotional, or physical sensation, including astatement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,pain, or bodily health, when such evidence is offered to:

1. Prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, orphysical sensation at that time or any other time when suchstate is an issue in the action.

2. Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of thedeclarant.

Section 90.803(3), Fla. stat. (1997).

Under this exception, however,. a Declarant's statement of intent under

section 90.803(3) is only admissible to infer the future act of the Declarant, nofthe

future act of another person. See, Bailey v. State, 419 So. 2d 721 (Fla. l* DCA

1982) (stating that statements by a victim are not admissible to prove subsequent

acts of a defendant). Further, Ordinarily, a victim's state of mind is not a material

issue, nor is it probative of a material issue in a murder of trafficking case. See.

11

DECLARATION

Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read this post-conviction

motion and states that it is true and correct. Executed under section 92.525(2),

Florida statues (2012).

teven Crai n

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true arid correct copy has been furnished to state

attorney office: Lawson Lamar, 20 South Rose Avenue, Suite 2 , Kissimmee,

Florida, 34743, by via U.S. mail on this day of 30 , 2012.

Steves Craig InSumter correctional institution9544 county road 476bBushnell, 11 33513-0667

14

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2012

NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME EXPIRES,TO FILE REHEARING MOTiON, AND,

STEVEN INGRAM, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. -

Appellant,

v. Oase No. 5D12-2666

STATE OF FLORIDAr -- - - - -

Appellee.

Decision filed September 4, 2012

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Courtfor Osceola County,Scott Polodna, Judge.

Steve Craig Ingram, Bushnell, pro se.

.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, AssistantAttorney General, Daytona Beach,for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

TORPY, EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT

STEVEN INGRAM ,

Appellant,

v. CASE NO. SD12-2666

STATE OF FLORIDA ,

Appellee.I

DATE: September 05, 2012

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

Apnellant, Steven Ingram, continues to appeal orders denying successive

and meritiess postconviction motions. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Appellant shall file with this Court and show cause, within

thirty (30) days of the date of this order, why he should not be prohibited from filing any

appeal, petition, pleading or motion pertaining to the conviction and sentence rendered

in Case No. 1997-CF-870, unless reviewed and signed by an attorney licensed to

practice in the State of Florida. See Spencer v. State, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

I hereby certify that the foregoing is(a true copy of) the original Court order.

PAMELA R. MASTERS CLENK no

cc:

Office Of Attorney General Steven Ingram

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OSCEOLA COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA

AMENDEDTHE STATE OF FLORIDA INFORMATION # CR97-870

VS.

STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM 1. TRAFFICKING IN 400 GRAMS ORMORE OF COCAINE (MinimumMandatory) (F1-L9)

. POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY ACONVICTED FELON (F2-L5)

IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA:

LAWSON LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit

prosecuting for the State of Flor'ida in Osceola County, OR LAWSON

LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit prosecuting for

the State of Florida in Osceola County, by and through the undersigned

Designated Assistant. State Attorney, under oath, CHARGES that

STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, on the 24th day of April, 1997, in said County

and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute 893.135 (1) (b) (1) (c) ,

knowingly possess sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver or bring

into the State of Florida, four hundred (400) grams or more of

cocaine or of a mixture containing cocaine, a substance controlled

by Florida Statute 893.03(2) (a) (4).

Page 1 of 2 Pages S.T. 10/15/97

COUNT TWO

LAWSON LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit

prosecuting for the State of Florida in Osceola County, OR LAWSON

LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit prosecuting for

the State of Florida.in Osceola County, by and through the undersigned

Designated Assistant State Attorney, under oath, CHARGES that

STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, on the 24th day of April, 1997, in said County

and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute 790.23, unlawfully

possess a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM having

been prior thereto, on the 8th day of January, 1996, convicted in

the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida of a

felony, to-wit: Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, or,

having been prior thereto, on the 1st day of June, 1992, convicted

in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida of a

felony, to wit: Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Sell.

T s a gngmga eN e ac d

e a n rm t

STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF ORANGE LAWSON LAMAR, State torneyAs s all p et Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida

cu a e sSe rece veO t s mony 6 th

wouTO on tit e e ofYeoSe e ein d thatfo eg t a "e By ,

o em n sŸst y w Ol/ the Designated Assi tan g g Attorneypersona y nown to me an e sai oath. O f a

h. m Robbe7

MELISSA D. DOWLINGNotary Public, State of Florida Bond $2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 HE/HE

Mycomm.expires ri Page 2 of 2 Pages

Bonded thru Ashton Agency, Inc.