IRAQ

Til LiseElsker Dig for Evigt

IRAQPeople, History, Politics

GARETH STANSFIELD

polity

Copyright © Gareth Stansfield 2007

The right of Gareth Stansfield to be identified as Author of this Work has beenasserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published in 2007 by Polity Press

Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK

Polity Press350 Main StreetMalden, MA 02148, USA

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposeof criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the priorpermission of the publisher.

ISBN-13: 978-07456-3226-1ISBN-13: 978-07456-3227-8 (pb)

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Typeset in 10.5 on 12 pt Sabonby Servis Filmsetting Ltd, ManchesterPrinted and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall

The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for externalwebsites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going topress. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and canmake no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or willremain appropriate.

Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have beeninadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to include any necessarycredits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

For further information on Polity, visit our website: www.polity.co.uk

Contentsx

Acknowledgements ix

List of Abbreviations and Glossary xi

Map xvi

Introduction: Artificiality, Identity, Dictatorshipand State-Building 1

Four Key Debates 2Analytical Theme 4Book Outline 6

1 Legacies of Civilizations and Empires 10Ancient Civilizations 11The Islamic Conquest 17The Arrival of the Ottoman Empire 23

2 State Formation, Monarchy and Mandate, 1918–1932 26

The Artificiality Debate 26The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire 30Planning the Carve-Up 33Occupation and Uprising 36The Cairo Conference 43The New State and Enduring Pathologies 46The End of the Mandate 49

3 Conceptualizing Political Mobilization in Iraq 51The Identity Debate 52Nationalism 55The Sunni–Shi�i Divide 57The Kurds 62Turkmens and Assyrians 70Identity and the State 74

4 From Authoritarian to Totalitarian State, 1958–1979 75

The Dictator Debate 76The Military in Political Life 81The Role of the Military and the Communalization of

Political Life 85The Intensification of Anti-Imperialist Sentiment 88Towards Totalitarianism 92The Totalitarian State 96

5 Iraq at War, 1979–1989 99History of Iran–Iraq Relations 100The Kurdish War 103The Decline into War with Iran 106Iraq Advances 109Iran Counterattacks 111The Kurdish Threat 112The Tanker War 116The Political and Economic Impact on Iraq 118Towards Kuwait 120

6 The Pariah State, 1989–2003 123Towards War 124The Invasion of Kuwait 126Operation Desert Storm 128The Uprisings 131The Coalescing of Opposition Movements 136Sanctions on Iraq 138The Arrival of the Inspectors 141Defection 143The Failed Coups 143

vi CONTENTSXX

The Opposition Defeated and Kurdistan Divided 147Oil for Food 148Sanctions Busting 150Hide-and-Seek with UNSCOM 151Towards Invasion 154State and Society on the Eve of the Invasion of Iraq 156

7 Regime Change, 2003– 159The State-Building and Democratization Debate 160Operation Iraqi Freedom 163The Chaotic Devolution of Political Authority 165The Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi

Governing Council 167The Transitional Administrative Law 173The Iraqi Interim Government 175Shi�i Rebellion and Sunni Insurgencies 176January 2005 Elections 182Constitutional Negotiations 184The Referendum 185December 2005 Elections 187Staring into the Abyss 189

Conclusion: The Passing of Thresholds? 192Making Sense of the Debates 192The Government of Nouri al-Maliki 199The Passing of Thresholds 202

Epilogue 205

Notes 209

Chronology 221

Internet Links 229

Bibliography 232

Index 249

XXCONTENTS vii

Acknowledgementsx

In this book I attempt to present an objective reading of Iraq’shistory and political development. With a subject so large,complex and increasingly controversial, I have found theadvice and counsel of colleagues and friends to be of crucialimportance. While I have benefited from the input of those Imention below, any errors of work remain solely my respon-sibility, of course.

Several individuals were kind enough to share with me theirown thoughts on the issues I attempt to cover in this book.Sajjad Rizvi guided me through the complexities of Iraq’sIslamic history in addition to being an unrivalled source oncontemporary Shi�i politics. Hassan Abdulrazak gave expertcommentary on the situation in Baghdad and Basra from2003 onward, and Hashem Ahmadzadeh ensured that Iremained informed regarding events in Kurdistan. TimNiblock was always available with insights and references,and Liam Anderson remained a constant ‘sparring partner’with whom to discuss the latest developments in Iraq. Lastly,Brendan O’Leary recommended that I attempt to adopt a‘thematic’ approach in analysing Iraq’s development. Theadvice of each of these academics proved invaluable.

I would also like to thank Tim Niblock, Michael Axworthy,Lise Storm, Hashem Ahmadzadeh, Faleh Jabar, Eric Davis,Robert Olson, Denise Natali, James Onley and MichaelGunter for (very) critically reading various drafts of chaptersthroughout the writing period. In addition, the advice of two

anonymous reviewers undoubtedly improved the quality ofthe book, as did the expert and precise copy-editing skills ofJennifer Speake. I remain very grateful to them all for givingme the benefit of their expertise.

Many of the ideas contained in this book can be traceddirectly to the searching questions asked by two consecutiveclasses of students (2004/5 and 2005/6) who took my moduleon The History and Political Development of Iraq in theInstitute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University ofExeter. With their unerring ability to ask questions for whichthere are no easy answers, they forced me constantly toappraise and re-appraise my analyses and views, for whichI am very much indebted. Similarly, regular meetings atChatham House with fellow members of the Middle EastProgramme were as enjoyable as they were informative.Discussions with Ali Ansari, Mai Yamani, Nadim Shehadi,Rosy Hollis, Yossi Mekelberg, Claire Spencer and Rob Loweassisted me in placing the post-2003 developments in Iraq intheir wider regional context, while also providing me with ahome-from-home in St James’s Square.

There are several people whose patience enabled me tocomplete the writing of this book and who ensured that otherresponsibilities were covered or allowed me the time tocomplete the work. These include Jane Clark, Ariel Edge,Catherine Bell, Jonathan Barry, Rasheed El-Enany and Khalidal-Dhaheri. I am very grateful to all of you, and hope yourpatience has not been overly stretched.

At Polity Press, Louise Knight and her assistant EllenMcKinley proved to be considerate and supportive editors,but also knew when to be pushy as well! They were a pleasureto work with, always on hand with advice and encourage-ment.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their love andsupport, especially, my parents, Roy and Lynn and my wife,Lise. It was Lise who put up with my researching and writingIraq from the signing of the initial contract and through to itsfinal submission, and it is to her that I dedicate it.

x XXACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

List of Abbreviations andGlossaryx

ADM Assyrian Democratic Movement. Politicalparty representing Chaldo-Assyriancommunity headed by Youndam YoussefKanna.

Al-Qaeda Sunni Islamist organization attackingforeign influences in Muslim countries,and the Shi�i community in Iraq.Nominally headed by Osama bin Laden,but with nebulous organization andstructure. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) headedby Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his deathin June 2006.

AMS Association of Muslim Scholars. Politicalassociation representing Sunni Islamisttrend headed by Dr Harith al-Dhari.

Anfal Codename of campaign in 1987–8 forsystematic depopulation of ruralKurdistan. Anfal refers to the eighth suraof the Quran.

Ansar al-Islam Partisans of Islam. Kurdish Islamistgroup.

ayatollah Literally, ‘Sign of God’. Highest clericalrank in Shi�i religious establishment.

Badr Army Military wing of SCIRI.Ba�th Party Arab Socialist Ba�th Party. Founded in

1947 as a secular Arab nationalist party

by Michel Aflaq. Came to power in Iraqin 1963 coup, then again in 1968.

CIA (US) Central Intelligence Agency.CPA Coalition Provisional Authority. Replaced

ORHA. Headed by Ambassador L. PaulBremer III.

Da�wa Hizb al-Da�wa Islamiyya (Party of theIslamic Call). Shi�i party formed in late1950s under guidance of AyatollahMohammed Bakr al-Sadr. Fractured intoseveral wings. Prominent leaders includeIbrahim al-Ja‘afari and Nouri al-Maliki.

hawza More fully, hawza al-marja�iyya. Thereligious establishment surrounding theleading clerical figures of Shi�ism.

GDP Gross Domestic Product.GNP Gross National Product.IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency.ICP Iraqi Communist Party. Formed in 1934.IGC Iraqi Governing Council. Appointed by

CPA to provide guidance and advice ongoverning Iraq between 13 July 2004 and1 June 2005.

IIG Interim Iraqi Government. Formed afterthe elections of 30 January 2005.Replaced on 3 May 2005 by the IraqiTransitional Government. Dr Iyad Allawiserved as prime minister, with Ghazi al-Yawer appointed president.

IIP Iraqi Islamic Party. Sunni Arab Islamistparty. Headed by Dr Muhsim AbdelHamid until July 2004, then by Tariq al-Hashimi.

IKF Iraqi Kurdistan Front. Political frontformed in the late 1980s of leadingparties based in Kurdistan.

IMK Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. KurdishIslamist party headed by Mulla Ali Abdal-Aziz.

xii XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

INA Iraqi National Accord. Political partylargely representing dissident figures fromthe Iraqi military and Ba�th partyunwilling to join Shi�i or Kurdish parties.Headed by Dr Iyad Allawi.

INC Iraqi National Congress. Umbrellapolitical organization established with USsupport in aftermath of Saddam’sinvasion of Kuwait. Headed by DrAhmed Chalabi.

ITF Iraqi Turkmen Front. Political partyfounded in 1995 to represent interests ofTurkmen community. Supported byTurkey. Headed by Farouk AbdullahAbdulrahman.

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party. One of thetwo main Kurdish parties in Iraq. Formedin 1946. Headed by Massoud Barzani.

KIU Kurdistan Islamic Union. ‘Moderate’Kurdish Islamist Party. Formed in 1994under leadership of Salahadin Ba�ahadin.

KNA Kurdistan National Assembly. The 105-seat legislature of the Kurdistan Region ofIraq. First assembled in 1992.

KRG Kurdistan Regional Government.Executive authority in the Kurdistanregion of Iraq. Divided into two followingKurdish civil war in mid-1990s. Reunifiedin 2006.

Mahdi Army Militia of movement of Muqtada al-Sadr.marja�al-taqlid ‘Source of emulation’. Honorific name

given to the most important religiousfigures in Shi�ism.

MI6 UK Secret Intelligence Service.MNF Multi-National Force. Title of Coalition

forces in Iraq following the 2003invasion.

mujtahid A scholar of Islam qualified to interpretIslamic law.

XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY xiii

neo-cons Neo-conservatives. Right-wing ideologicalgrouping in US advocating interventioniststrategies in Middle East.

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operationand Development.

OIP (UN) Office of the Iraq Program.OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries.ORHA Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance.pasdaran Iranian Revolutionary Guards.peshmerga Kurdish fighters in general, but most

often referring to the military wings ofKDP and PUK. Kurdish: literally, ‘thosewho face death’.

PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Formed in1970s by Abdullah Öcalan. Aims tocreate independent Kurdish state inTurkey. Has fallen into conflict with bothKDP and PUK.

PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. One of twomain parties in Kurdistan Region of Iraq.Formed in 1975 and led by JalalTalabani.

RCC Revolution’s Command Council (Ba�thParty). Highest legistative and executiveauthority in Iraq before 2003.

Sadr Movement Movement of Muqtada al-Sadr, son of Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr. Powerful force inpost-2003 Iraq.

SAM Surface-to-air missile.Sarok President (Kurdish). Title of president of

the Kurdistan Region, Massoud Barzani.SCIRI Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution

in Iraq. Umbrella organization formed inTehran in 1982 to bring togetherdisparate Iraqi Shi�i opposition groups.Headed by Ayatollah Mohammed Bakral-Hakim until his assassination in Najaf

xiv XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

in August 2003. Succeeded by his brother,Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.

SCR (UN) Security Council Resolution.TAL Transitional Administrative Law. Interim

constitution signed on 8 March 2004 bythe IGC.

TNA Transitional National Assembly.UAR United Arab Republic. Formed by the

union of Syria and Egypt in 1958.Collapsed in 1961.

UIA United Iraqi Alliance. Alliance of Shi�iparties, supported by Ayatollah Sistani, tocontest the elections of January 2005.

UNIKOM UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission.UNMOVIC UN Monitoring, Verification, and

Inspection Commission. UNSCOM UN Special Commission.vilayet Ottoman Turkish territorial division,

equating to a province.WMD Weapons of mass destruction.

XXLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY xv

0

0

100

100 200 300 miles

200 300 400 500 km

TigrisR

.

Mosul Erbil

Kirkuk

KIRKUK

Suleimaniyya

SULEIMANIYYA

NINEVAH

ERBIL

KRG

Samarra

I R A N

BAGHDADBaghdad

DIYALABaquba

Ramadi

WASIT

BABILHilla

Kut

Najaf

Karbala

ANBAR

NAJAF

Basra

MUTHANNA

MISANQADISIYA

DiwaniyaKARBALA

SALAHADINEuphrates R.

DOHUKDohuk

Amara

DHI-QARNasiriya

Samawa

KUWAIT Pers i an

Gu l f

S Y R I A

S A U D I

A R A B I A

JORDAN

CASPIAN

SEA

Lake Urmia

Lake VanT U R K E Y

Kurdistan Regional Government border

Supergiant oilfield

BA

SR

A

Eighteen governorates and the Kurdistan Regional Government region(as defined by the Transitional Administrative Law)

Introduction: Artificiality, Identity, Dictatorship and State-Buildingx

By the spring of 2006, Iraq stood on the verge of civil war.Indeed, many observers believed that one had alreadystarted.1 Suicide bombers commonly associated with theSunni Arab insurgencies were able to target Shi�i and Iraqigovernment targets with seeming impunity. Shi�i militiasresponded by undertaking raids in Sunni Arab areas ofBaghdad and its environs, more often than not in the guiseof Ministry of Interior security personnel, and stood accusedof committing grievous violence against their captives.2

Religious edifices attracted particular attention, with wor-shippers attending Sunni mosques and Shi�i Husseiniyyasalike being the targets of barbaric terrorist atrocities.

The destruction of the Askariyya shrine in Samarra, asacred site for Shi�i, was followed by at least 1,000 deaths ina spate of killings at the end of January 2006 and servedwarning that violence in Iraq, often blamed upon criminal ele-ments and opportunists, or ‘nationalists’ of various hues fight-ing against collaborators, had now taken on an infinitely moredangerous and apocalyptic sectarian colouring. Complicatingwhat was already a volatile situation was an additional ethno-political dynamic that threatened Iraq’s territorial integrity.The Kurds, in their relatively peaceful northern stronghold,watched events unfolding in the south intently, perhapswaiting for the moment when they could no longer remainpart of a failing, if not actually failed, state and therefore raisethe possibility of exercising their right to self-determination.

Faced with this plague of problems, the US and its alliesseemed powerless to halt what was appearing to be an inex-orable decline into conflict with an outcome nobody couldpredict.3 Indeed, their direct involvement would probablyhave made matters much, much worse.

Four Key Debates

How did Iraq get into this position? Why were communitiesthat once lived in seemingly peaceful harmony now subjectingeach other to ever-increasing levels of brutality and indiscrim-inate violence? What possible bonds could those attemptingto stabilize the situation appeal to in the face of such actions?Unfortunately, the answers to these questions have provedelusive.

Some observers, particularly those who were opposed tothe invasion of Iraq in the first place, focused upon the periodimmediately following the downfall of Saddam’s government.For them, the actions of post-Saddam Iraqi governments wereresponsible for the chaos, but the blame for creating the situ-ation in the first place could be laid squarely on the US andUK for invading Iraq without adequately considering what theconsequences of such an action would be. In so doing, theoccupying powers were forced to act in an increasingly reac-tive and myopic manner as they struggled to cope with thepost-invasion dynamics. Their reactivity was responsible forthe creation – wittingly or unwittingly – of a political systemunder which religious and ethnically based parties couldthrive (see, for example, Rangwala 2005).

Others, while considering the US government to be respon-sible for the problems of post-2003 Iraq, viewed the realproblem as being an innocent but disastrous failure to imple-ment a pre-designed plan for the ‘interim’ period during theoccupation (see Klingner and Jones 2005: 146).

A further approach was to contextualize what washappening within a wider historical analysis. With regardto recent historical events, the impact of UN-imposed sanc-tions in the 1990s rightly received attention, with prescient

2 INTRODUCTIONXX

observers warning before 2003 that the profound damageinflicted upon Iraqi society made it difficult to imagine ademocratic transition being able to occur in the foreseeablefuture (see Niblock 2001: 219). Casting the historical netfurther back in time, other commentators delved into Iraq’shistory to see whether the reasons behind Iraq’s turbulentpost-Saddam existence could be traced to the policies of theoccupiers, or to something deeper, perhaps found within thepathology of the Iraqi state construct itself (see Anderson andStansfield 2005).

Rather than pursue any one of these foci at the expense ofall others, the analytical theme of this book is assembledaround four (very) interrelated debates that, to my mind, havebeen and remain prominent in the expansive discussion aboutIraq’s formation, history, society, politics, and indeed, future.I refer to these as (1) the artificiality debate, (2) the identitydebate, (3) the dictator debate and (4) the state-building anddemocratization debate. To expand a little on these titles:

1 The artificiality debate focuses upon whether Iraq, at itsfounding, was an ‘artificial’ state or not, and, if it was, howhave the implications of any suggested ‘artificiality’ at thetime of state-building nearly a century ago affected state-building nearly a century later.

2 The identity debate revolves around the nature of identity inIraq – in essence, what it meant in the past and now meansin the present to ‘be’ an Iraqi. How powerful, as a mobiliz-ing force, is the concept of ‘Iraqi nationalism’, compared tothe power of religious association and ethnic solidarity?What were the causative factors of the reappearance of com-munal identities? Indeed, had they ever been hidden, or hadthey been merely glossed over by the combined effect of thetransformative nature of modernity with the confining stric-tures of Saddam’s government?

3 The dictator debate addresses the nature of politicalauthority in Iraq, and questions how and why the modernhistory of Iraq has been characterized by the involvementof the military in political life, and the reasons behind Iraq’ssuccumbing to an authoritarian method of governance that

XXINTRODUCTION 3

culminates with the totalitarian Ba�thist regime dominatedby the person of Saddam Hussein. Is the authoritarian/totalitarian state merely an unfortunate, anomalous devel-opment in the history of Iraq that need not have happened?Is there something that predisposes the Iraqi state to beingdictatorial in nature, or was this development a reactionto external pressures and influences? Perhaps the mostimportant question to ask is what was the impact uponIraqi society of decades of non-democratic politics and, attimes, brutal and omnipotent state control?

4 The state-building and democratization debate in effectattempts to synthesize the arguments presented in the pre-ceding three debates, and focuses upon the mechanics ofstate-building in plural societies and/or countries emergingfrom under the shadow of authoritarianism.

Analytical Theme

Together, the four debates form a moving analytical themeand overarching question. This is to construct an understand-ing of why, since the removal of Saddam’s regime, Iraqi polit-ical life has been dominated by actors and organizations thatare mobilized in terms of religious affiliation, ethnic origin ortribal association (and, at times, combinations of two or moreof these), rather than secular nationalism or class-based iden-tities that encompass all of Iraq’s peoples inclusively and whatthis then means for Iraq’s future. It is now clear that, for what-ever reasons, the prevailing political forces in Iraq would nowseem to be those associated with (a) Shi�i religious trends (b)the Kurdish nationalist agenda and (c) a ‘Sunni Arab’ positionthat has formed mainly in reaction to the first two forces.4

Other communal poles are also apparent within the Turkmenand Christian (Chaldo-Assyrian) communities. None of thesegroups may be considered cohesive in terms of internaldynamics and even aims (with the Shi�i religious establishmentdivided between different poles of authority, the Kurds noto-riously politically divided and the Sunni Arab insurgency splitbetween ex-Ba�thists, neo-Ba�thists and an array of Islamist

4 INTRODUCTIONXX

groups), but, even so, their very existence is evidence of dif-ferent conceptions existing within Iraq’s society that promotecontending, and at times exclusive, visions of the future of thecountry.

It is important to note that this book is not intending toattempt to prove that Iraq is consigned to a future of civil warbetween religious sects and ethnic groups as they vie for powerin the state, or secession from it. Rather, it seeks to ascertainwhy the elements of civil war began to coalesce in the post-2003 environment. As mentioned earlier, there are severalinterpretations of the evidence available: one is to focus uponevents post-2003 and hold the US and UK to account foreither their innocent lack of foresight or their gross negligence;another is to view the 1990s as being the decade in which Iraqisociety was transformed by the grotesquely disfiguring impactof UN-imposed sanctions; the last takes a longer view andattempts to trace the pathologies of communal tension inIraq’s history. I contend that a middle ground can be found bycombining elements of these interpretations. Such a synthesisviews the emergence and consolidation of communally basedpolitical life in Iraq as being a product of resurgent or resur-rected localized political forces (that were themselves trans-formed by Iraq’s political, social and economic development –and, at times, regression – over the twentieth century, andespecially in the ‘sanctions decade’ of the 1990s) combinedwith the effects of US- and Coalition-led policies towards Iraqbefore and after Saddam’s downfall. Communally based soci-etal cleavages existed before the regime of Saddam Husseinwas overthrown, but the clarity of such cleavages and thestrength of political movements mobilized according to par-ticular communal identities have varied at different momentsin Iraq’s modern history. Arguably, from 1958, a state-basedcivic nationalism emerged in Iraq due to improved educationand enhanced socio-economic conditions as a result of invest-ments made with funds derived from the country’s oil wealth.However, the divisive policies of Saddam’s regime, includinghis attempts to ‘atomize’ Iraqi society by breaking the bondsbetween individuals and non-state organizations (Al-Khafaji2003: 78–9), the re-empowerment of tribal structures

XXINTRODUCTION 5

(Zubaida 2000: 363), the traumatic events of the 1990s andespecially the impact of the UN-sanctions regime (Graham-Brown 1999; Niblock 2001: 97–198), culminating in theremoval of Saddam’s regime and followed by the chaotic polit-ical situation since 2003, have all acted to both uncover thefault-lines of ethnicity and sectarianism within Iraqi societyand to polarize and strengthen these identities to the point thatthey are now the pre-eminent structures of political power incontemporary Iraq.

In an attempt to defend myself from accusations of ‘essen-tializing’ Iraqi society, I do not contend that the chaos we seetoday need have been the case, or that the terrible scenesoccurring every day in Iraq mean that the country is now des-tined to fail and therefore split into different parts. It may wellfragment. But the pressure imposed by regional powers tomaintain Iraq’s territorial integrity, combined with a definitedomestic impulse from many Iraqis to find a mechanism bywhich their differences can be managed via a framework inwhich they can live in peace and harmony, free from the threatof state repression, means that the future of Iraq remains verymuch in the balance.

Book Outline

The purpose of this book is to provide a ‘thematic’ politicalhistory of Iraq. As such, the chapters proceed in chronologi-cal order, but with one of the four ‘key’ debates appearing atthe appropriate moment.

The ‘modern’ history of Iraq commences in chapter 2 withan outline of the artificiality debate – i.e. what is meant by thestatement that ‘Iraq is artificial’? The chapter investigatesthe first episode in state-building in Iraq, and considers thereasons why Iraq was created in the aftermath of World WarI, how its territorial parameters were identified and how theBritish set about constructing the state. It is argued that manyof the attributes of the Iraqi state can be understood by con-sidering how the British structured it to begin with, and thenhow British advisers attempted to influence Iraqi affairs in

6 INTRODUCTIONXX

subsequent years. I contend that the British designed a polit-ical system that had the potential to nurture increasinglyauthoritarian approaches to government. But it was also theBritish that acted to make this potential into a reality, by con-tinually meddling in Iraq’s affairs and provoking a reaction inthe form of a nationalist movement.

Chapter 3 investigates what is one of the most contentiousof issues when discussing modern Iraq, and that is howIraqis identify themselves, and how they are identified byothers. The identity debate considers how political mobiliza-tion in Iraq has been discussed primarily in Western academicliterature, and presents the two most prominent models: thefirst focusing upon vertical cleavages in society (i.e. forward-ing the saliency of communal association, whether sectarianor ethnic) and the second contending that horizontal cleavagesof class and socio-economic status are more powerful forcesthat manage to transcend the ties of religion and ethnicity.Again, I contend that a middle ground, which is in effect acombination of these two approaches to conceptualizingpolitical mobilization in Iraq, has greater explanatory valuethan either model applied in isolation. The chapter considersthe interplay between Iraqi and Arab nationalism, beforeanalysing the nature of the Sunni–Shi�i divide, the emergenceof Kurdish nationalism and the situation of the Assyrian andTurkmen communities.

The growth of the authoritarian state is taken up in the nextchapter. Beginning with the dictator debate, definitions fromthe political science literature on non-democratic regimes arediscussed in order to provide a framework by which Iraq’stransition from authoritarianism to totalitarianism in the1980s, and back to authoritarianism in the 1990s, can beunderstood. The essence of the debate itself focuses uponstatements made by US government officials, includingPresident George W. Bush, in the run-up to the invasion ofIraq in 2003. An implicit (and, at times, explicit) assumptionmade at this time was that Saddam Hussein and his immedi-ate circle of supporters were all that stood in the way of Iraqbeing democratic. Saddam was, therefore, an anomaly thatneeded to be removed. The counter to this argument is that,

XXINTRODUCTION 7

far from being anomalous in the history of Iraq, Saddam’sregime was, in fact, a product and, logically, the conditionsremain for Iraq to continue being governed by authoritar-ian/totalitarian regimes in the future. The chapter considersthe role of the military in political life following the creationof Iraq, and how the military, with a distinctly Arab national-ist world-view, served further to ‘communalize’ Iraqi society.The reaction of the military to the seemingly omnipresentBritish imperialist presence is considered, and viewed as aprimary causative factor in the rise and consolidation ofanti-imperialist and increasingly nationalist sentiment. Thechapter concludes by considering the impact of increased oilrevenue and the rise of the Ba�th Party – both of which wouldbe important factors in the Iraqi state moving from beingauthoritarian to totalitarian in nature.

The continued rule of Saddam Hussein is addressed inchapter 5, which focuses upon the events that would lead toIraq coming into conflict with Western powers in the 1990s.Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 sees the beginning of a periodwhich is still arguably ongoing, as a state of war has hung overthe country since 23 September 1980, the date that Iraqiforces entered Iran. The complexity of the causative factors ofIraq’s invasion of Iran are investigated, including the historyof the ‘trigger’ cause of the war – the status of the Shatt al-Arab waterway – and the role played by Kurdish rebel move-ments that had continued with their sporadic insurgencyagainst the central government since the formation of the stateitself. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the polit-ical and economic impact of the conflict, and how the inva-sion of Kuwait can be seen as being a consequence of theproblems generated by the inconclusive but hugely destructivewar with Iran.

The 1990s are considered in chapter 6. The reasons whySaddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait are assessed, buildingupon the findings presented at the end of the previous chapter.The uprisings which then occurred following the expulsion ofIraqi forces from Kuwait by the US-led ‘Coalition of theWilling’ are then considered, followed by an assessment ofthe opposition groups that formed in the 1990s. The impact

8 INTRODUCTIONXX

of the brutally comprehensive UN-imposed sanctions uponIraq are then described, followed by how Saddam managed tosurvive several US-sponsored coup attempts. The emergenceand institutionalization of the Kurdistan Region is alsoaddressed, with the chapter concluding with the events thatwould lead to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The final substantive chapter addresses the political devel-opment of Iraq since the removal of Saddam’s regime. Thestate-building and democratization debate explores howpolitical scientists and other observers viewed the chances ofIraq successfully democratizing after Saddam’s demise, andwhether the empirical evidence points to a democratic or anauthoritarian future for Iraq, or indeed whether it throws eventhe continued existence of Iraq into question. The chaptercovers the major issues that have characterized post-2003Iraq, including the political process started by the US that cul-minated in elections in December 2005, the communalizationof political life, the emergence of insurgent groups fromwithin the Sunni community, the strengthening of theKurdistan Region and the appearance of a radical movementin the Shi�i community.

Before all of this, however, it is necessary to delve intohistory and reflect on Iraq ‘before Iraq’. The modern state wasnot created out of thin air – indeed, the region that wasbrought together to form Iraq has perhaps the longest andrichest civilizational history of anywhere in the world, withevents of global importance taking place within its bound-aries. To understand Iraq’s modern history, one needs tocommence by appreciating the legacies of ages past.

XXINTRODUCTION 9

Legacies of Civilizationsand Empiresx

The modern state of Iraq, crafted by imperial powers follow-ing the defeat of the Ottoman empire in World War I, is merelythe latest in a long line of political structures to have existedin and around the watersheds of the rivers Tigris andEuphrates. Along with China, Egypt and India, Iraq has theoldest heritage of any state in the world. It is home to some ofthe earliest examples of agricultural activity, and its cities andrural areas alike display the remains of a palimpsest of ancientcivilizations. Later, Iraq was the imperial centre of theAbbasid Caliphate, recognized as being the apogee of Islamiccivilization and, before becoming part of the territories of theexpansive Ottoman empire, famed for its cosmopolitansophistication.

Three ‘elements of the past’ have been most important informing collective memories in modern Iraq: the civilizationsof ancient Mesopotamia, the Arab-Islamic conquests and her-itage and the Ottoman empire (Marr 2004: 3–8). The mech-anisms by which these elements have impacted on modernIraq varies, with the most ‘direct’ influences that havecoloured, even structured, modern Iraq being those of Islamand the Ottoman empire. The Arab-Islamic heritage contin-ues to shape social contours more than any other dynamic,particularly as its customs and traditions remain the mostpowerful of the forces governing social activity and interac-tion. The Ottoman empire is now consigned to history, butover a period of five centuries was responsible for ordering

1