Cameron Corbin

Monday, April 18, 2016

The Former Axis of Evil: A Tale of Diverging Paths

Iran and North Korea alongside Iraq was deemed to be the axis of evil by then President George

Bush in 2002 during his State of the Union Address and accused the following countries of helping

terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction.1 However, focusing solely on North Korea and Iran

we can begin to paint a picture of two countries striving for nuclear empowerment but taking very

different paths as a result to increased sanctions, condemnation, and scorn directed from all over the

world. Starting with Iran, the biggest factors that influenced the outcome of their choices regarding

uranium enrichment were the staggering amount of sanctions that the United States and other powerful

nations placed on every facet of the Iranian economy including reducing oil purchases from 2.5 million

barrels per day in 2011 to a measly 1.057 million barrels per day in 2015 as well as barring all U.S. banks

and 80 foreign banks from ceasing to handle all financial transactions with Iranian banks.2

The diplomatic process concerning Iran first began in 2004 and lasted for four years. During this

time the number of centrifuges and 3.5% LEU Iran owned began to grow more quickly each year. The

international community tried to bargain with Iran by allowing them to keep their LWRs and will get

WTO membership and technology sanctions will be lifted but they have to totally end nuclear

enrichment. These proposals were soundly rejected by the new president of Iran, Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad who stated that Iran had a right to enrichment.3 At the last minute Russian offered a

1 The North Korea Nuclear Problem Lecture Outline pg.32 Iran’s Nuclear Program Lecture Outline pg.43 Iran’s Nuclear Program Lecture Outline pg.3

compromise that allowed Iran to keep a small enrichment plant of a few hundred centrifuges but this

was soundly rejected by the U.S. and E.U. As a result of this refusal, several UN Security Council

Resolutions were adopted to put more pressure on Iran to compromise.4 Resolution 1696 was passed on

July 31, 2006 giving Iran a month to suspend enrichment and the construction of a heavy-water reactor

at Arak. After Iran refused again, Resolution 1737 was adopted unanimously on December 23,2006 and

demanded for Iran to cease enrichment by February 21,2007 and banned all sales of technology that

could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. Resolution 1747, 1803, and 1835 were adopted during the

next two years and increased sanctions on Iran to include arms supplies, dual use items to Iran, banned

travel of certain Iranians and authorized inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo and Shipping.

These resolutions did nothing to slow down Iran’s plans for enrichment so as President Obama

took office, new plans were needed to be drawn up. At first it was proposed in 2009/2010 that Iran

quickly transfer 1200 kg of 20% LEU to Russia and France but Iran stalls and wants a longer period of

time leading to the proposal to fall through. More proposals in 2011 and 2012 by the Russians and the

P5+1 group also tried to get Iran to shut down the enrichment process but the talks failed miserably

every time. However, after years of cyberattacks via the stuxnet virus, Iranian scientists being

assassinated, Israel contemplating going to war against Iran in 2012 and severe economic problems

resulting from the sanctions, Iran finally was ready to come to the bargaining table in 2013 and would

finalize a lengthy agreement in July of 2015. Iran agrees to freeze the number of centrifuges they own,

stop enriching uranium above 5% and agree to convert 20% LEU to 5% LEU in exchange for 60-100

billion dollars of sanctions lifted over several years for compliance for the next 10 to 15 years. Iran also

agreed to 20 years of continuous surveillance and turning its Arak reactor into a LWR and the Fordow

enrichment facility into a nuclear physics and technology research center.5

4 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress 2015 pg.25 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress 2015 pg.6

While the Iran nuclear agreements were relatively successful, North Korea is an entirely

different story; with severely unpredictable leaders and strong militaristic attitude of “us versus them”,

North Korea has been much more of a challenge to work with on ending their nuclear enrichment

program and to this day a concrete policy option has not been achieved yet. The biggest factors that

affect what North Korea does in terms of its nuclear program are usually based off one or two things.

The first is the perceived threat from other countries and a need to defend itself and the second is a

need for economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance and a cessation of heavy sanctions lobbied at

the country.

If there was one word to describe that process of trying to get North Korea to agree to a deal to

end nuclear enrichment it would be “Tit-For-Tat”. Seemingly every time North Korea and worldwide

leaders agree to an agreement something later down the line occurs and the agreement is broken most

of the time by North Korea. Starting in 1994 an Agreed Framework was agreed upon that North Korea

would dismantle 3 reactors and account for pre-1991 Pu in exchange for 500,000 tons of oil annually +

building 2 LWR as well as a normalization of political and economic relations and the formal assurance of

U.S. against the threat or use of nuclear weapons against North Korea.6 This agreement was slowly

implemented and was hindered by a severe famine in North Korea as well as North Korean submarine

provocations. In 1999 and 2000 a second effort to create a deal to lift sanctions was put into effect that

would freeze missile tests and allow nuclear inspectors to visit North Korea. In October of 2000 the U.S.

and North Korea were very close to creating a deal and ending the hostile intent toward each other but

when Bush was elected president all talks fell through and became hostile.

The next major agreement was the Beijing Accord in September of 2005 which came after

several years of deteriorating ties and increased distrust between North Korea and the rest of the world.

What was decided that North Korea would abandon all nuclear weapons and programs in exchange for

6 The North Korea Nuclear Problem Lecture Outline pg.2

the promise that the US would not attack or invade North Korea as well as normalize relations with each

other. Less than a year after this agreement following problems of ambiguity of the agreement North

Korea launches a long range missile test on July 4th 2006 which failed and a nuclear test in October of

2006 which resulted in heavy sanctions being applied to North Korea. The nuclear test was partially

successful and had a yield of around 1 kiloton compared to 21 kilotons for the bomb at Nagasaki.7

Following North Korea’s first nuclear test the February 2007 Accord was drawn up and demanded that

North Korea shut down their nuclear facility within 60 days and completely declare all nuclear systems

and give up nuclear enrichment in exchange for 50,000 tons to 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil and

normalized relations in exchange for keeping their word. Since then North Korea has launched several

more long range missile tests as well as nuclear weapons tests and continues to agree to provisions to

end its nuclear program than immediately breaks these agreements in exchange for more humanitarian

supplies or as a result of a perceived threat from the United States. Looking ahead there are really only

two options to try and make a permanent agreement with North Korea. The first of which is to redo the

1994, 2005, and 2007 deals and the second is to forget about making a deal and just severely increase

the pressure on North Korea’s economy until it breaks and they agree to a deal. Seeing as Pyongyang

uses sanctions as an excuse to walk away from talks and ignore nuclear obligations which lead to more

sanctions creating a logic loop, it seems that unlike in Iran, a deal might not be reached with North

Korea for some time which is unfortunate as it is the poor people of North Korea who suffer and not the

leadership from sanctions.8

7 Siegfried S. Hecker, Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crises pg.4 8 Siegfried S. Hecker, Lessons learned from the North Korean nuclear crises pg.7