Iranian Military Capability 2011

1. Ground Forces

Open Source Intelligence Project

Independent and objective analysis of current Iranian military capability using open-source non-

classified information. Assessments and views expressed represent those of the authors and are not

affiliated with any special interest group or political agenda.

V 1.0 March 2011

About the Project

The Open Source Intelligence Project 2011 is an attempt to draw together the most salient bits of currently

available Open Source material to piece together a broad and largely complete analysis of Iranian military

capability. Open Source refers to unclassified, public sources.

The co-authors and reviewers come from a wide range of backgrounds, including in some cases extensive

military intelligence experiences and/or relevant specialist knowledge. However, their primary connection is an

appreciation and active participation in the Open Source intelligence scene. All those involved have contributed

on an amateur/civilian basis. Some have requested to remain anonymous, for various reasons, which we must

respect.

The project was started in April 2010 and took months of writing, research, drafts and revisions to make it into

the form you are reading. We have attempted to provide a single text that will be easy to navigate and digest.

However, it is the work of multiple people and this may be apparent in different writing styles and minor

formatting differences. We apologize for this, but believe it is inevitable in this type of undertaking.

We hope that you find the document interesting and informative – we are hopeful that there is some

information and analysis which although open source in nature, is fresh and stimulating to even a highly

informed reader.

Authors (This Section) · Galen Wright

Main Reviewer/Contributor (This Section, No Order) · ‘TLAM Strike’

· Sean O’Connor

· Anonymous (1)

Additional Reviewing Pool (No Order) · Anonymous (4)

· Eagle2009

· Dave Matteson

Acronyms AAA – anti-aircraft artillery

AD – Armored Division

AFV – Armored Fighting Vehicle, hereafter usually in reference to a non-MBT platform

AP – Armor Piercing

APC – Armored personnel carrier

APFSDS – Armor piercing fin stabilized discarding sabot

AT – Anti-Tank

ATGM – Anti-Tank Guided Missile

AVLB - Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge

BDU – Battle Dress Uniform

CBW / CBRN – Chemical Biological Weapons / Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear

CB – Commando Brigade

CD – Commando Division

CEP – Circular Error Probability

CEV – Combat Engineering Vehicle

CT – Counter Terror

DCU – Dessert Camouflage Uniform

EO – Electro-Optical

ERA – Explosive Reactive Armor

FCS – Fire Control System

GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council. Alternately PGCC, or CCASG. Use of the term does not qualify as an endorsement of the

term “Arabian Gulf” or other term over “Persian Gulf”.

GOA – Government of Afghanistan

GOI – Government of Iraq

HE – High Explosive

HE-FRAG – High Explosive Fragmentation

HEAT – High Explosive Anti-Tank

HESH – High Explosive Squash Head

MANPADS – Man Portable Air Defense System

MCLOS – Manual Command Line of Sight

ID – Infantry Division

IEI – Iran Electronics Industry

IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle

IMINIT – Image Intelligence

IRIGF – Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces

IRIA – Islamic Republic of Iran Army

IRIAA – Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation

IRIP – Islamic Republic of Iran Police

IRGC – Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

IRGCGF – Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

KE – Kinetic energy, usually in reference to KE penetrators uses as an anti-armor weapon

MANPATS – Man Portable Anti-Tank System

MBT – Main Battle Tank

MID – Mechanized Infantry Division

MLRS – Multiple Launch Rocket System

MG – Machine-gun

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RAP – Rocket Assisted Projectile

RHA – Rolled Homogenous Armor

SAR – Search and Rescue

SACLOS – Semi Automatic Command Line of Sight

SIGINT – Signals Intelligence

TBM – Tactical Ballistic Missile

TEL – Transporter Erector Launcher

TO&E – Table of Organization and Equipment

1.1 –Overview

The backbone of the Iranian military is the Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Forces (IRIGF) and is

composed of the regular army as well as the IRGC ground forces.

Islamic Republic of Iran Army

The IRIA is made up of 350,000 active-duty troops organized into roughly 4

armored divisions, 6 infantry divisions, 2 commando divisions as well as numerous

independent brigades scattered throughout the country. Another 350,000 are

available as reserve troops. The IRIA exists as a conventional army designed to fight

3rd generation wars against state powers, though retaining some asymmetric capability.

Following the disaster of the Iran-Iraq war where the IRIA lost up to 50% of its assets, it has

rebuilt a small amount of its inventory through domestic projects and modest procurements from

Russia and China. Today it suffers continued disfavor due to the overall favoring of the IRGC and the

preference for asymmetric warfare rather then conventional forces.

The IRIA remains largely modeled on the post-WWII western force structure, maintaining a

large amount of antiquated western equipment such as Patton tanks, and the M113 APC in place of

what is required for a modern army. However they do maintain a modest asymmetric capability.

Iran continues to suffer from the usual ills of a conscript army including low retention and a

low amount of intensive training programs for the majority of its troops.

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Ground Forces

The IRGCGF, as well as its sub-entity, the Basij militia exists as a parallel

army to the IRIA and is tasked primarily with internal security as well as

maintaining the Islamic Revolution. In recent years, it has radically transformed

its identity and has become possibly the worlds first 4th generation state army.

They maintain 100,000 active-duty soldiers along with 90,000 active Basij. These are organized

into provincial "corps" optimized for an asymmetric defensive doctrine.

Originally founded following the revolution as a police force to prevent counter-revolutions, it

evolved during the Iran-Iraq war into a full-sized parallel army.

Their internal security role means that they, along with the police, are the primary force

combating groups like Jundallah and Kurdish separatist groups. Many perceive them as the vanguard

of the neo-hardliners like Ahmadinejad.

But more important is their asymmetric capability. Instead of maintaining a regular army like

the IRIA, the IRGCGF has developed into a very sophisticated force whose capabilities ranges from

cyber- deterrence to guerrilla warfare.

Soldiers in the IRGC are usually well equipped and extremely motivated with a strong sense of

support for the Islamic Republic. Despite this, unit reliability still varies due to varied training and a

degree of political cronyism.

A sub-set within the IRGC, The Basij militia is designed to act as a mobilization for local

resistance against any enemy force. It is estimated there are around 4 million Basij who are at least

somewhat ready for callup at any given time. These are organized into battalions within the regular

IRGC provincial corps.

The Basij are primarily light infantry, though some units are comparable to the regular IRGCGF,

complete with paratroopers, artillery battalions and AT weapons. However, these are few and far

between. Like the IRGC, the Basij membership usually comes from the poor, ultra-religious classes who

have a strong interest in maintaining a conservative Islamic Republic government.

The Basij have an important internal-security role which is not explored in this document.

1.2 – Islamic Republic of Iran Ground Force Military Capability

Conventional Warfighting Overview

The IRIGF's conventional war-fighting capability has steadily degraded since the overthrow of

the Shah though in recent years they have attempted to rebuild their forces including a modest

procurement strategy in the 1990's with Russian and Chinese equipment. However this would only

account for 50-65% of what was required to re-equip the IRIGF.

To fix this, Iran turned inward, in some areas this campaign has been remarkably successful;

Iran has one of the most credible ballistic missile programs outside the former cold-war powers and

their indigenous anti-armor and small arms capabilities are strong. However, major systems like

domestic AFVs and artillery, the core of any modern army, remains conspicuously lacking in

widespread service.

This leaves the IRIGF's conventional forces in poor shape, with an inventory composed mainly

of antiquated US designs as well as Soviet and Russian weapons that have long since passed their

heyday. Meanwhile, their Arab neighbors have procured large amounts of Western technology like the

Abrams tank and the Bradley AFV.

However, Iran still holds one advantage, and that is training and motivation. While this might

not be a positive factor when imagining a ground war between Iran and the US it is when considering

a war between Iran and any of its Arab neighbors. Saudi Arabia displayed during its brief intervention

in Yemen that technological superiority can't function if the soldiers fall back to the same old

strategies they've known for tens of years. The Saudis were unable to effectively use air supremacy or

successfully gain the initiative through superior maneuver tactics.

Iran on the other hand, has historically always had an extremely motivated military cadre.

While their equipment still limits their potential, military units participate in large, combined arms

exercises with numerous smaller ones between them. This is in addition to a strong sense of

nationalism as well as religious fervor, which Iran has managed to combine into a very unique ideology

that cannot be discounted as a strategic tool.

Unconventional Warfighting Overview

Because the disparity between Iran and the US and their Arab allies is so great the IRIGF has

been forced to search elsewhere for a strategy to both defend itself and boost its regional power. The

result is what has become a service-wide effort to adopt a defensive asymmetric warfare strategy that

focuses on several overall goals such as deterrence with conventional arms, winning battles through

superior small-scale defensive tactics, and using political pressure to win the war.

The principle of deterrence within the IRIGF begins with generating a fear of a ground war with

Iran. It's no surprise that much of the recent training in Iran has focused around guerrilla warfare and

defensive strategies. The aim, much like Switzerland, is to create a country that bogs down any

invader. Another key element of deterrence is through the use of tactical ballistic missiles like the

Nazeat and Zelzal as a stand-in for air-power which gives the Iranians the power of having a strike

capability against US bases or Gulf Arab oil assets.

A powerful element to this strategy is cyber-deterrence, a battle strategy that focuses on

presenting the image of a deterrent, directly shaping perceptions to replicate a conventional

deterrent. In Iran we see it through the broadcasting of exercises, and the announcement of every

new military weapon; the Iranians are participating in an active information-war with the US over the

representations of what a shooting war would look like. While the Pentagon paints a scenario of clean,

surgical action, the Iranians are creating fear over the activation of infiltrator elements within Iraq and

Afghanistan, the risk of ballistic missile strikes against oil facilities, and so on and so forth. At this

point, the Iranians seem to be winning, the fact that the media frequently abounds with stories of

rumored Iranian 'super-weapons' prove that they are having at least some effect on the world psyche.

But what if the strategy of deterrence fails? Should war break out, how would Iran fight it? All

evidence points to their response being disproportionately asymmetrical. The Iranian military,

particularly the IRGC, is moving toward a more network-centric combat force modeled somewhat

after Hezbollah. Divisions and brigades are replaced with lightweight, mobile infantry units equipped

with weaponry such as MANPATS/MANPADSs that serve as foils to counter or deflect an enemies

strengths without challenging them on their own level. These units would fight on the defensive,

alternately pulsing and swarming around an invading army, aiming to bleed them out not through

decisive engagements but through consistent, omnipresent attrition reducing their enemy’s ability to

wage war.

A key part of this 'Mosaic Doctrine' as it is called is the focus on autonomy. What this boils

down to is the replacement of traditional military hierarchies with a looser network-centric

organization in which the different units, whether they are a 4-man squad, or a full-sized battalion

aren't linked via a top-down control structure, but operate as individual nodes that are largely

independent from another. The abolishment of hierarchies within military organizations have been

consistently demonstrated to increase tactical initiative, and in turn, allow the network to respond

more fluidly to an attack, an important tactic considering the US’s concept of a neo-blitzkrieg relies on

disrupting the enemies chain of command, and by doing so, preventing them from being able to take

any action.

Thanks to the politically favorable position of officials such Generals Jafari, Safavi, Salami and

Abbasi who are the greatest promoters of this strategy, asymmetrical deterrence and war-fighting has

made tremendous leaps and bounds in recent years, receiving nearly unlimited funding compared to

other branches as well as directing arms procurement strategies.

It should be heavily emphasized that the successful execution of these plans requires total

focus on strategic goals and it would be entirely viable for a scenario to unfold where the IRIA

attempts to fight an enemy in a head-on battle and loses horribly, and by doing so, compromises any

gains an asymmetric strategy could attain. Also, because so many of the weapons, like TBMs, focus on

the deterrent value, their value plummets if they ever have to be used in anger.

Note that this strategy of information warfare has many different targets. Iran has cast itself

throughout the developing world as a champion of anti-colonialist struggles everywhere, from

Venezuela to Hezbollah as well as internally. Any war would seek to preserve this image, and in

keeping with the notion, the mere act of fighting the US/Israel, of resisting, might be enough to secure

the image, internally and externally.

1.3 – The War with Iran

A ground war involving Iran could break out in a number of different ways, fortunately for

those involved, none are very likely at this point in time.

For instance, the Arab states in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could decide that they fear

the regional ambitions of Iran so much that it warrants a pre-emptive strike by the combined armies of

the main Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, this remains unlikely as the Gulf

Arabs are more then content to let the US military in the region act as their sword and shield. After all,

why risk your military, especially with all its expensive toys when there's someone else willing to do

the fighting? No less important is Iran's deterrence credibility. With hundreds of anti-ship missiles

lining the Persian Gulf coast, fleets of small boats ready to lay naval mines, and even more rockets and

missiles aimed at Arab oil facilities, any state would be loathe to risk a war that would endanger the

only thing holding their country together. Due to this, any short term conflict involving aggression on

the part of the GCC is extremely unlikely due to the acute danger it poses to their economic lifeline –

however 15-20 years down the line when their oil is beginning to run out, they might get desperate,

and then it's anyone's game.

On Iran's eastern borders they face Afghanistan, a failed nation that will be unable to field an

army competent enough to police its own territory let alone attack Iran for quite sometime. Iran is

also making strategic inroads into western Afghanistan. Afghanistan has always existed in the Iranian

sphere of influence since the first days of the Persian Empire but more recently Iran has funded

development of the greater-Herat area and are attempting to play GOA (Government of Afghanistan

against anti-GOA forces and visa versa. However, it is worth noting that instability continues to spill

over into Iran as smuggling, both of drugs and other materials, wrecks havoc on eastern Iran and

armed clashes often erupt on the border region between IRIP or IRGC forces and well-armed

smugglers. Also, unlike in Iraq or other Arab countries, Iran has been unable to find a faction willing to

fight under the Iranian banner, however they have been making inroads to some groups, reportedly

attempting to win over and coopt certain elements of the Taliban and other anti-GOA) forces.

Pakistan's focus on the other hand is still directed toward India in the east and to a limited

degree, inward on its own problems with militant Islam. However Pakistan is an increasingly fragile

country held together by nothing more then it’s military; because of this it is possible that in the

future years a collapsed Pakistan might spill-over into Iran's Baluchistan region, exacerbating existing

separatist conflicts. Smuggling and other criminal activity is as much a problem with Pakistan as with

Afghanistan.

To the north, Iran maintains positive relations with Turkmenistan, Turkey and Armenia making

armed conflict unlikely. Iran's relations with Azerbaijan, although not perfect, show no sign of breaking

into war any time soon.

The most likely scenario for any ground war involving Iran would undoubtedly involve the US.

However, the US is functionally incapable of waging a full-scale war against Iran, while it might

technically be possible, the US after all has the worlds preeminent armed forces, the simple fact of the

matter is that the US doesn't have the political will or desire to. After two wars spanning almost the

whole decade, the US population is war-weary, combine a struggling economy, a towering national

debt, a divided government and a military that is bogged down fighting a strengthening insurgency in

Afghanistan. Taking this all into account, it is very unlikely that a full-scale ground war will ever erupt

between the US and Iran for the foreseeable future.

However, there are several scenarios on how armed conflict could break out. They would most

likely center around a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, whether it was by the US themselves, or after

becoming drawn in after an Israeli strike.

The first scenario involves a limited-war featuring a short push into Iranian territory in order to

preempt any Iranian response to a nuclear strike. This is the less likely scenario, but it's the most

illustrative of Iran's capability vs a technologically superior enemy in a conventional war. The second

scenario focuses around small skirmishes and battles as part of retaliation for strikes on their nuclear

facilities.

In either scenario, Iran's primary strategic goals would remain the same. Iran knows that they

no longer need to win battles to win the war, such a mythos has been built up around the might of the

US military that anything less then complete and total victory becomes viewed as a loss and when the

war in question doesn't decisively end in a capture of the enemies capital as it once did, the

representations and perception of the war is what really counts. This explains why Iran's war-fighting

strategy likely centers around two main principles – 1) maintain overall military and civilian

infrastructure survivability, and 2) giving the US a bloody nose.

Maintaining survivability serves a very real purpose, since any war with the US is unlikely to be

decisive, there is no incentive to expend large amounts of equipment and manpower because no

matter how much is spent, the threat isn't going away, and the US always has the ability to attack

again. For instance, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran could justify total war because, at least in theory, the

war was going to end either with the collapse of the Islamic Republic or the collapse of Baathist Iraq.

In this case, the US has no intention of conventionally overthrowing the Islamic Republic by sheer

military might, and likewise, Iran simply doesn't have the ability to destroy the US. It should also go

without saying that survivability of military targets is important as it allows them to keep fighting.

Protecting civilian infrastructure on the other hand has a far more long-term goal. Iran knows how

devastating a war can be, they're still recovering socially and economically from the damage inflicted

in the 1980's, and they have no desire to repeat the process. Both of these factors also are key to

winning the representations of the conflict because any conventional battles would likely be judged by

the same standards of the 1st

and 2nd

US wars with Iraq – if the US military can't achieve total victory,

even if just because Iran refuses to engage in conventional battles, the US suddenly finds itself in a

much less advantageous position when arguing why it won the war.

Giving the US a bloody nose also serves both a practical and perceptual purpose. Because of

the mythos of invulnerability, if Iran was able to deal a deadly blow, even if in the grand scheme of

things it is largely inconsequential, Iran could emerge victorious. This could take many forms, for

instance it could be as simple as being able to destroy a number of tanks, or as complex as being able

to execute extensive airborne assault operations in Iraq. While it is unlikely to the point of

impossibility that Iran would ever be able to launch an offensive operation that would uproot the US

presence in Afghanistan and the Gulf, on the defensive they aim to create a defensive net, a mix of

conventional and unconventional warfare that would attempt to repel or at least bog down and injure

an invader.

One of the major questions associated with Iran's favoring of asymmetrical warfare strategies is

whether or not they would even attempt to field a conventional army with the foreknowledge that the

US would, in all likelihood, destroy it. This is entirely up in the air, in a scenario where the US physically

invades and attempts to capture and hold land, deployment of conventional assets like armored

divisions in a defensive role would be likely, but in a retaliatory situation their use in an offensive

would be unlikely because perceptually it elevates the conflict from skirmishes and low-level action to

a full-scale war which would evoke a much different response from the US military. Rather, some sort

of hybrid would evolve – we could see IRIA artillery, TBMs and rotary-wing aircraft acting in a

conventional role to support the IRGC's unconventional warfare. Of course this is not an exact

prediction on how the IRIA and IRGC will cooperate, but it is one possible way and illustrates the

hybridization that could evolve.

It must be remembered that Iran's strategy revolves around winning the virtual battle-grounds,

every move they make is made with this principle in mind. Whoever wins the discourse, wins the war.

Conventional Limited War

In this model, the US would seek to quickly enter and temporarily occupy Iranian territory in

order to pre-empt any Iranian retaliation for a strike on their nuclear facilities. This would be

accomplished by armored spearheads driving into the country, designed to break Iran's force cohesion

and disrupt their organization, with infantry following behind to mop up resistance and secure the

flanks. This would be combined with heavy use of air support for strike operations and close air

support.

It bears repeating that this is not meant to predict how a war will unfurl down to the last

brigade but merely present an illustration of the kind of war Iran would be fighting – namely against a

foe that relies on technological and doctrinal superiority to win battles combined with a reliance on air

power and ground-force mechanization. It's also important to note that many of the features of both

scenarios will overlap, for instance, in event of a limited-war, TBMs and infiltration missions would

also occur, even though they're only specifically mentioned in the second scenario.

It is important to consider

geography when considering how a war

would unfold. Because the US strategy

would center on blitzkrieg-like armor

tactics, any hypothetical invasion route is

actually fairly easy to envision. Because

the US depends on heavy and light

armor, strong roads are a must for

maximum speed for both the AFV's and

their supply columns. Combined with

mountainous terrain, the potential

avenues of attack are anything if not

predictable.

Because of this, the value of the

Mosaic doctrine, which emphasizes unit

An illustration of Iran's major highways – the likely invasion route of

any attack against Iran

autonomy, becomes apparent. Because the blitzkrieg relies in crushing an enemy’s cohesion with the

first rapid punch through, any force that survives with an intact decision-making process instantly

becomes a danger to the rear forces as soon as the first wave has passed through.

This presents quite a few complications for an invading army as well as granting an advantage

to the defenders. For instance, Iran no longer needs to engage in strategic wars of maneuver because

the highways and mountains funnel attackers into predestined locations. In this sense, conventional

troops can be organized into defensive formations operating in urban or mountainous terrain. This

narrows the playing-field at least somewhat as Iran's inferiority in this sense is less important when

they only have to defend certain choke-points. One tactic Iran might use in this scenario is to “bury”

their armor in underground ramps that would enable them to hide from optical surveillance and wait

until the opportune moment to launch their attack on a passing enemy; this tactic has been observed

being performed by IRGC or IRIA T-72's on the western border with Iraq. Extensive bunker

fortifications and supply depots are also a likely feature that would serve to slow any invader.

But the real advantage in Iran's terrain goes to the light infantry that form the bulk of Iran's

armies. In Iraq, Coalition AFVs with their electronic sights and long-ranged guns dominated the

battlefields, being able to look out and deliver fire as far as they could see across the flat desert. But in

the mountains of western Iran, they would face a much different environment. The valleys and

mountains obstruct long-range field of views and fire, while roads restrict vehicle mobility and offer

tempting points of ambush. Iran on the other hand appears well-adjusted for mountain warfare. One

interesting, though non-scientific measurement of this fact is that the mountain warfare badge,

jokingly called the 'Rambo patch' by some IRIGF soldiers, is one of the most frequently seen patch on

soldiers on parade or exercise. Infantry units are well equipped with heavy use of man-portable

artillery, anti-tank weapons, and an emphasis on high-mobility vehicles like motor-bikes and light

Jeeps and trucks. Moreover, the territory is perfectly suited for defense. Artillery can be situated in

valleys and pre-sighted and is largely protected from counter-battery fire as the mountains make

discerning the location difficult. Infantry equipped with light-weight direct fire weapons like ATGMs

and recoilless rifles can be situated within concealed bunkers inside the hill-sides, a tactic which

photos of war-games show us is in use. In this case, both the IRIA and IRGCGF would both be operating

in this function, in a zone somewhere between maneuver and guerrilla warfare, emphasizing just how

much they've made unconventional, conventional.

However, this doesn't apply to one area in Iran – the south-west of the country in the

Khuzestan province. Mostly flatland's and covered in light desert, Khuzestan is perfectly suited for the

US style of warfare, with no where to hide, US air-power and armor would reign supreme. In fact,

many Iranian analysts consider it a given assumption that an invading power would occupy Khuzestan

in the opening salvo. Iran is caught between a rock and a hard-place when it comes to defending this

region. Committing a tactical retreat into more favorable terrain risks losing a very important symbol,

however rushing to defend it could also invite a disastrous result. If they were to fall back to the cities

for their defenses, initiating a 'Battle for Khorramshahr version 2', it would evoke a very powerful

patriotic response, though the long term risks of the potential damage to their infrastructure would be

great. Perhaps Iran has one more then one trick up their sleeve and it would be presumptuous to

instantly write off this portion of the country as ready to be invaded. Saddam did and he spent the

better part of a decade fighting over it.

The Basij would play an interesting role in a defensive war. There is an estimated 10 battalions

of “battle-ready” Basij per province, battalions which due to being light infantry, are probably fairly

large. The role of the Basij, excepting certain elite units, would be to form an organic defense matrix

throughout the embattled areas. In this manner, they wouldn't likely pose that much of a threat to the

first enemy spearhead breaking through, but as a partisan force they would be valuable in slowing an

enemy’s advance and bolstering regular troops and disrupting the supply line needed to keep a

modern mechanized western army running. They would seek to pulse around an attacker, focusing

swarming efforts around a passing enemy that would dissolve back into the country side and the city

when the threat has passed.

Retaliatory Attack

Iran in this scenario is the tactical aggressor, retaliating against US forces in Iraq and

Afghanistan for an attack on their nuclear program. They would likely be attempting to walk a very

thin line, deal enough damage to the US that perceptually their reputation is sustained, but they

would also not want to escalate the conflict too much and risk full-out war with the US, something

they could not afford.

One element of this would likely involve attacks with TBMs and long range artillery. While the

mechanics of a TBM strategy are discussed in its own section, what will be investigated here is the

actual battlefield application. Iran's targets in Iraq are becoming scarcer as the US winds its troop

presence down. In Afghanistan, the deployment of ISAF/NATO troops means that relatively few US

troops are actually in range of Iranian TBMs and those that are, share facilities with other foreign

soldiers and civilian entities, which means that they would be unlikely targets if Iran wished to avoid

escalation.

One such potential target might be Balad air base in Iraq, while the US is officially withdrawing

all combat troops (which is a loose definition by itself), in event of a war with Iran, the US would

undoubtedly use the country as a base for it’s troops as with Saudi Arabia in 1991. This alone would

have a whole host of potential political ramifications that is beyond the scope of this piece. However,

assuming the US was using Balad to base fighters out of, it would be a tempting target for Iranian

TBMs. The question is whether they stand a good chance of hitting the base without significantly

endangering Iraqis, and if so, what damage could they do?

The available launching zones are actually fairly limited because the minimum ranges of several

of the rockets means there is actually a very small track of land where the missiles can be fired from.

The only two rockets that don’t fit this pattern are the guided Tondar-69 and Fateh-110.

One advantage the Iranians would have going for them however is that Balad is such a large

static target, which means they would have ample time to set up and prepare launching zones that

are pre-sighted for quick launches.

One of the more common missiles in the Iranian inventory is the Zelzal-3 which is often seen

on exercise fired in large salvos. Iran has also demonstrated against Kurdish militias that they have

both the proclivity and the ability to sustain these large salvos. The missiles are often seen being

launched in battalion or larger formations

This map shows the circular error probability (CEP) of two missiles in Iran’s inventory, the

Fateh-110 and the Zelzal-3. A missiles CEP roughly translates to 50% of all missiles fired landing in a

circle with a radius that large.

With accuracies this poor, they would be restricted to area bombardment rather then precise

strikes, such as in an attempt to destroy the runway. That’s why bases like Balad are really the only

viable targets for TBMs. One way to increase the lethality would be to use submuniton bomblets, a

tactic Iran has already announced they are pursuing as a way to disable aircraft carriers.

Lethal zone of HE submunitions vs the lethal zone of a unitary warhead of the Fateh 110.

Lethal zone of HE submunition warhead of the Zelzal-3. Unitary warhead unknown.

The slight difference of submunition weights is attributed to following the “RAND Model” elaborated

on within the TBM section (used on the Fateh-110), and the calculated weight of submunitions carried

by the Shahab-3 (used on the Zelzal-3). Ultimately, the increased lethal-radii balance out the reduced

number of bomblets and there is no more then 1-2 m difference between the two models.

As one can see, when combined with cluster-warheads, there is potential for damage, even if it

is just light shrapnel which would only harm exposed personnel or thin-skinned aircraft. However this

assumes that full volley of rockets can be coordinated between multiple, relatively large assets, a risky

gamble so close to the border.

Another threat comes from the IRGCGF infiltration abilities. It's reasonable to suspect that

Iran has already prepared for the eventuality of a war and already has a substantial amount of sleeper

cells residing within Iraq and Afghanistan, let alone the rest of the world. Given Iran's cultural

connections with both of these countries, soldiers and weapons could easily be smuggled behind US

lines by concealing them as Shia pilgrims traveling to Najaf and Karbala, or blending in with the

multitude of merchants that do business across the border daily. Indeed, Iran is already being accused

of using these avenues to smuggle weapons to their proxies in these countries. The IRGC also

maintains thousands of independent squad-sized teams with the goal of harassing and infiltrating any

invaders rear. The IRGC already conducts regular infiltration operations in and around Iraqi Kurdistan;

it is likely that they already have plans in place for the de facto “occupying” of Iraqi Kurdistan, an area

the US and Baghdad have little control over as it is. For instance, the 3 hikers that are currently being

held in Iran on charges of spying are believed to have been captured by Iranian forces in Iraq and

journalists who have ventured close to the border report that Iran, not Iraq, approves or forbids travel

in the region.

Though somewhat more conventional, Iran also maintains a substantial army aviation

contingent that has always shown an extreme affinity for airborne and airborne assault operations.

With these assets, the IRIAA or IRIGCAF could be used to carry troops for infiltration or flanking

attacks, particularly in remote areas where helicopters are the only mode of transportation such as in

Northern Iraq or Afghanistan. However it is questionable whether they would survive long enough in a

war to still carry out effective operations, the US after all has veritably made it their specialty to

destroy aircraft on the ground, and airbases make irresistible targets to an enemy with air supremacy.

This question ultimately depends on how the war actually unfolds, if Iran is aware of the military

buildup that would likely precede any strike on their nuclear facilities, they might choose to disperse

their fleet in order to increase survivability, though this would almost necessarily degrade combat

effectiveness. But if it was a surprise US attack, it is entirely conceivable that the majority of the IRIAA

would be caught unprepared.

This is to say nothing of the possibilities of using their proxies for retaliation. However, as it

deals more with politics and less with Iran's ground forces, it has purposefully been omitted.

In the end, just as with the cold-war between the US and the USSR, any scenario for a large

ground war with Iran in the near future is unlikely. Iran's enemies are either embroiled with their own

struggles, or have been successfully deterred. Just as important however, is the fact that Iran has no

interest in conquering territory with their military. Rather, they're content with expanding their soft-

power, letting their proxies do the fighting and achieving the dream of empire by political means, or at

the very least, with someone else pulling the triggers on the guns.

1.4 – Organization and Order of Battle - IRIA

Note: Unless otherwise specified, the term corps refers to the general forces rather then the specific organization, in other

words, "armored corps" refers to armored units rather then a corps-sized armored force. Also, when referring to brigades,

they are referred to as ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ – these designations should not be taken to represent actual unit names,

but as placeholders for when the actual designation is unknown, which is currently the case for every brigade excepting

independent ones.

The IRIA is currently composed of around four armored divisions, six infantry divisions and a

number of independent brigades located throughout the country. These are made up by 350,000

soldiers, and of these, 220,000 are conscripts serving their 16 months as required by law. In addition

to this, there are 350,000 first-tier reservists.

All soldiers who complete their 16 months of required conscription (or however long their

voluntary time lasts) are obligated for roughly 28 years of service, perhaps best comparable to how

the Finnish reserve system works. The 28 years are divided into 4 periods which can be translated into

the 'cautionary period', lasting 8 years, the 'first storage period', lasting 10 years and the 'second

storage period' with each period logically indicating the readiness level. Reservists do not receive

additional training after their initial military service, meaning that any reservists more then 1 or 2

years out of active duty would only have nominal capability.

Recruits go through a two-month long basic training camp where they receive general military

training. Then they depart to a more intensive service training course across the country, such as the

infantry training center in Shiraz, the armored center, also in Shiraz, or the artillery center, in Isfahan.

Exemptions can be obtained from disabilities while deferments and reduced terms are granted for

various academic reasons or various socio-economic requirements.

They still maintain a heavily western TO&E, though by how much they've integrated ex-Soviet

and Chinese influences as they've switched weapons remains unknown.

Soldiers with the IRIA, with few exceptions, wear US pattern woodland BDU's and carry G3 or

AK-47 variant assault rifles. It is possible at this point, but still unconfirmed, that the safariflage pattern

usually associated with the 23rd

commando division is becoming standard throughout the Army,

replacing woodland BDUs. Body armor, such as ballistic helmets and vests are still restricted to specific

units, a 'steel pot' helmet being far more common. Squad support weaponry includes the MG3 and

PKM machine-guns as well as the RPG-7. Deployed at a slightly higher level are recoilless rifles, light-

mortars and light rocket launchers supplemented heavily, compared to other countries, with ATGM's

and MANPADS's.

These soldiers, both in conventional light infantry units and mechanized infantry are organized

into companies averaging 85 - ~125 soldiers each.

Note that in addition to the specific units detailed below, there also exists large number of

garrisons and barracks across the country in different cities. Recent announcements indicate that all

Army bases located in cities will be moved in the future. This was known to be previously affecting

selected bases (mentioned below), but now apparently applies to most/all Artesh units.

Infantry Corps

The IRIA has six infantry divisions, at least three of them are mechanized with a number of

independent brigades throughout the country.

According to some sources, mechanized infantry divisions are made up of one armored

brigade, three mechanized infantry brigades, one reconnaissance battalion, one SPA battalion, one

towed artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a supply battalion, a transport battalion as well as

containing an army aviation and air defense contingent. However this organization cannot be

confirmed by real-world observations. A regular infantry division would likely look the same, but

replacing mechanized and armored brigades with light infantry, and replacing the self-propelled

artillery battalion with another towed gun battalion. Also included is a commando battalion, though

this might be labeled as a secondary light-infantry unit.

The approximate location of all known major IRIA units. Note that only divisional headquarters are shown (with the

exception of the 16th AD which spans 3 provinces) - brigades are then located within the province. Exact location of 41st

Infantry Brigade is unknown.

Mechanized units are the primary users of APCs like BTR-60s and M113s, while regular infantry

units still rely primarily on light vehicles like Toyota trucks, Safir jeeps and 5-ton transport trucks.

Artillery battalions are composed of towed guns, mainly weapons like the M-46 and D-30.

The known infantry units are:

64th Infantry Division

Headquartered near Urmia in the West Azerbaijan province in north-western Iran. Currently,

the first brigade is located in Urmia, the second in Salmas, and the third in Piranshahr. Its composition

is unknown.

Up until recently, the headquarters was located directly within the city, however in April 2010,

the decision was made to move the base outside the city in order to alleviate urban congestion.

21st Infantry Division

Based out of Tabriz in the East Azerbaijan province in north-western Iran. The first brigade is in

Tabriz, the second in Maragheh and the third in Marand. A fourth brigade may exist but its existence

remains unlikely given the usual composition of divisions with three rather then four brigades.

They may use the both the D-30 and the M-46 towed guns, but the fact that the 2nd

brigade

shares a compound with the 11th

independent artillery group prevents knowing which unit the latter

belongs to.

30th Infantry Division

Based in the city of Gorgan, in the Golestan province in northern Iran. It also serves as a

training center for troops from all across Iran, graduating 1500-2000 troops monthly. It is unclear

exactly what training this is for.

Artillery support is provided at least in part by the M-46 towed gun.

40th Independent Infantry Brigade

The 40th independent infantry brigade is based out of the city of Ardabil in the Ardabil

province in north-western Iran.

41st Independent Brigade

Not necessarily, but presumed to be, an infantry brigade. Based somewhere in the West-

Azerbaijan province.

28th Mechanized Infantry Division

Based out of Sanandaj in the Kurdistan province in western Iran. 1st

brigade is in Sanandaj, the

2nd might be in Baneh, but recent satellite imagery shows no build-up, compared to others who put

them at Saqqez and Marivan, where there are visible military facilities.

The division is most likely equipped with M-60A1 MBTs and M113//BTR-60/BMP-1 AFVs.

Artillery support is provided at least in part by the D-30 towed gun.

84th Mechanized Infantry Division

Based out of Khorramabad in the Lorestan province in western Iran. The 1st

brigade is located

in Khorramabad, the 2nd

is in a rural setting around 20 km west of Khorramabad.

It is plausible that the 84th uses the remaining Chieftains as part of their armored brigade.

Mechanization appears to be mainly BTR-60's rather then being split between them and M113's.

Artillery support is provided at least in part by the D-30 towed gun around 2 battalions of an unknown

gun, possibly the GHN-45. The 2nd

brigade uses 2 battalions of D-30 towed guns.

77th Mechanized Infantry Division

Based out of Mashhad in the North Khoresan province in north-eastern Iran, on the border

with Afghanistan. They recently made the decision the move their base out of the city of Mashhad to

the surrounding country-side as better to relieve urban congestion. Brigade location is unknown,

however Neyshabur and Bojnurd are likely candidates.

As a mechanized division, it has one armored brigade in Mashhad equipped with M-47M and

more recently, T-72 tanks as well as M113 and BTR-60 APCs. BMP-type AFVs are likely as well.

55th Airborne Brigade

Based out of Shiraz, the 55th is notable for being a

primarily paratroop brigade in addition to being a more

general airborne unit. It is occasionally called a division.

They make heavy use of the ~10 IRIAF C-130's and

IRIAA fleet of transport helicopters, though are not heavily

mechanized otherwise.

They are identifiable by their duck-hunter

camouflage, black beret and unit insignia on the upper right

sleeve. More recently they have been seen wearing uniforms in the desert safariflage pattern.

65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade

Along with the 23rd commando division, the 65th

is one of the most adept units within the IRIA. The 65th is

headquartered in Tehran. They operate as a rapid-

deployment airborne light-infantry unit with counter-

terror abilities. They are a HALO-capable force.

They are identifiable by their green-dominant

safariflage camouflage, as well as a distinctive unit patch

of a green parachute canopy and a single bird-wing

swooped back. Instead of the usual G3, they are usually

The 55th airborne during Sacred Defense Week

2009

Members of the 65th brigade on a training exercise

in Spring 2010

seen with AK-47 variant rifles as well as MP5 and Uzi sub machine-guns. Recently they have been seen

wearing uniforms in a digital green and tan pattern.

Commando Corps

Commando units are a subset of infantry rather then

being an entirely separate branch. The most likely difference,

judging from what is available is that commandos are specialty

troops designed for light insertion in rough terrain with

emphasis on a variety of deployment such as motor-bikes,

trucks and aviation assets. They often function as rangers and it

is not uncommon to see soldiers with patches from ranger

school as well as mountain-warfare, desert-warfare and airborne

badges.

They are usually identifiable by their duck-hunter

camouflage and tan berets. Most units use AK-47 variant rifles

instead of the usual G3 found within the IRIA.

They operate both as independent divisions and brigades

as well as functioning as infantry battalions within larger IRIA

units. Brigades are split up into 3 infantry battalions, one

artillery battalion, 1 air defense battalion, and one instruction

battalion; divisions are likely just scaled up with 3 brigades.

58th Commando Division

Based out of Dezful. Named the "Zulfiqar" division.

23rd Commando Division

The 23rd commando division is one the most elite

units in Iran. Originally started as a brigade, but was

expanded to a full division with 4+ brigades during the war

with Iraq. Most sources put its number at 5,000, but this

number still dates from its days as a brigade. The unit is

reported to be made up entirely of volunteers and

consistently has top-notch equipment and what is likely the

best training available. They are identifiable by their desert-

dominant safariflage camouflage and their widespread use of

body armor.

25th Independent Commando Brigade

Based out of Pasveh in West Azerbaijan south of Lake Urmia, on the western border with Iraq.

35th Independent Commando Brigade

Based out of Kermanshah on the western borer with Iran. They wear a black beret, compared to the

usual tan beret favored by commando units.

45th Independent Commando Brigade

Based out of Dezful, uses D-74 towed artillery pieces.

Provisional illustration of an independent

commando brigade's organization

Soldiers from the 23rd commando division on

parade

There are also rumored to be several other independent units including the 4th commando brigade

and the 99th air defense commando brigade, both based out of Tehran. But these cannot be

independently verified.

Armored Corps

The IRIA has 4 armored divisions, as well as

several independent brigades. Armored divisions have

been cited has having around 12,000 soldiers,

compared to an average of 10,000-15,000 for other

nations. This puts it on the low end of things, though

not nearly as low as some have asserted. Each division

is made up of 3 brigades. Armored brigades probably

have 1+ tank battalions, while mechanized have 1 each.

Tank battalions have 34 tanks in 3 companies, assuming

100% strength. Each brigade is then allotted at least two

artillery battalions, one self-propelled unit usually

consisting of M109s, and another of towed guns usually

the M-46 or the D-30. Infantry mechanization is

provided by BMPs organized into battalions of 27 with 9

AFVs per company and M113s or BTR-60s organized into

battalions of 33 with 11 AFVs per company.

Mechanization is not always homogenous in that

battalions may be made up of both M113s and BTR-60

companies.

At first glance it would appear that the current

order of battle for IRIA armored brigades is lighter then

that for a mechanized brigade! However it’s important to remember that the mechanized OOB is at

maximum theoretical strength, while the estimates on armored strength comes from observable

assets on satellite imagery, with the best imagery coming from what is perhaps Iran’s lightest armored

division (the 88th

AD in Baluchistan), it would only be safe to assume that this would present the lower

end of the scale in terms of assets.

92nd Armored Division

Purportedly the most formidable of Iran's armored units. The 92nd is based out of the

Khuzestan province in south-western Iran on the border with Iraq near Basra. They have three,

possibly four brigades, based out Ahvaz, Dezful and Susengard.

They use the T-72 MBT, most recently painted in a two-tone brown camouflage; infantry

mechanization is provided by M113s, BTR-60s and BMP-2s. Artillery support is provided by M109 and

M-46 battalions. Appears to be fairly robust compared to, say, the 88th

.

81st Armored Division

Based in Kermanshah in the Kermanshah province in western Iran on the border with Iraq. The

location of the brigades are unknown though the 2nd or 3rd brigade likely resides in Eslamabad Gharb

Provisional illustration of a very generic organization

for an armored brigade

and Pol Zohab.

The 81st likely uses the M-60A1 MBT as well as BMP-1 IFVs, and possibly BMP-2's. Artillery

support is much the same as with the 92nd, with M109's and M-46's.

16th Armored Division

Based out of Qazvin in the province by the same name, the 16th AD has brigades in Qazvin,

Zanjan, and Hamadan.

The 16th uses Chieftain MBTs. They wear a few different camouflages, including a pattern with

a light-sand base and odd brown splotches, while others wear the same pattern as the 92nd, but with

a lighter sand color. Their APCs, including the M113, also wear this unique camouflage. M109 SPGs.

M-46 towed guns and possibly other towed guns provide artillery support. Appears to be fairly robust

compared to, say, the 88th

.

88th Armored Division

Based out of Zahedan in the Baluchistan province in south-eastern Iran on the border with

Pakistan. The brigades are located in Zahedan, Khash and Zabol.

They are distinguished by green and sand splotch camoflage pattern applied to their armor.

Due to their non-central, non-critical basing, they are on the low end of the procurement totem pole,

as such they rely on older equipment such as early-model Patton tanks.

Provisional Organization of the 88th AD – based on assets visible on Google Earth

37th Armored Brigade

Based out of Isfahan. Armor is possibly the T-72.

71st Armored Brigade

Based out of Ilam on the border with Iraq. Armor is the Safir-74. Rumored to be equipped with the

Zulfiqar, however this is unlikely and may be in a reference to which unit the prototypes were assigned

to for testing.

38th Armored Brigade

Based out of Torbat Jam near the border of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan.

Artillery Corps

Independent artillery units within the Iranian military are organized by "groups" rather then

the traditional brigade structure. Groups have 3 artillery battalions each. It is likely that they function

as artillery brigades in other armies, that is, they are intended to function as supplementary units to

be attached to larger divisions rather then function independantly as maneuver brigades.

The central training hub is located in Isfahan.

The independent artillery groups include the:

33rd - Tehran, Tehran Province

11th - Maragheh, East-Azerbaijan province

44th and 55th - Isfahan, Isfahan province

22nd - Shahreza, Isfahan province

1.5 – Organization and Order of Battle - IRGC

The IRGCGF has 100,000 active duty soldiers, with another ~800,000 - 4 million Basij who are

slowly being integrated into the main ground forces. There are an unknown number of IRGC reserves.

Up until very recently they were organized into conventional divisional and brigade elements,

including 3 infantry, 3 armored and 2 special forces divisions, and at least 7 other divisions of

unverified type. There were also numerous independent brigades and battalions, up to 15 by some

estimates. The majorities of these were light, with divisions the size of brigades, and brigades the size

of battalions.

However, following the appointment of Gen. Jafari to head of the Revolutionary Guards, in

2007 the service was swept with major reforms reorganizing the IRGC in line with the Mosaic Doctrine

of defensive warfare. First was the abolishing of traditional system of brigades and divisions and

replacing them with provincial "corps", 31 in total, one for each province with an extra one in Tehran.

Within the corps, they have also shifted toward battalions rather then brigades forming the backbone

of independent maneuver units with an emphasis on mobility, autonomy and defensive foil weapons

like ATGM’s or MANPADS’s. In addition to the maneuver battalions, Iran also maintains thousands of

squads that operate without parent units and are designed to roam the battlefield autonomously.

The 2nd major organizational change associated with Jafaris reform was to combine the Basij

militia and the regular IRGCGF. Instead of being an entirely separate force, the Basij is now part of

specific IRGCGF units. This has the advantage of streamlining command-and-control line and allowing

for a standardized training, logistics and organization. However it should be emphasized that the Basij

are really remaining the same – they will remain primarily a light, geographically localized first-

responder militia force tied to their local communities.

Specifically, 10 battalions of Basij are now assigned to each provincial corps. It is unclear if this

number includes only active-duty, or incorporates the reserves as well. These battalions rely on Basij

organizations networked across cities and neighborhoods. Quite literally, they have redeployed the

Hezbollah concept of the part-time guerrilla who lives in his village, practices in occasional drills and

keeps a modest stock of weaponry, but for the most part remains a citizen and only rises to fight when

the threat arrives and who blends in with the local civilian populace because for all intents and

purposes, he or she is part of the local civilian populace

Within the Basij organization, Dr. Saeid Golkar asserts that there are three tiers of troops. First

are the ‘regular Basij’ which comprise the vast majority of the corps at 3 million men strong. They are

loosely connected to the military having only passed the most basic of training. 800,000 2nd

tier

troops, or ‘active Basij’, receive supplementary training and coordinate with the IRGC on active duty.

200,000 first tier troops are designated as ‘special Basij’ and are considered honorary Pasdars in the

IRGC.

However, it appears that the IRGC still retains designated heavy “corps” with conventional AFV

and artillery support. Also, since the Mosaic Doctrine calls for autonomy and self-reliance, support

units such as artillery groups which are only designed to act in support of other larger formations

rather then accomplish objectives are fading from use. Also, because of this, battalions would likely

retain a greater range of equipment within their organization in order to facilitate greater autonomy

from their parent units.

Since these programs were undertaken relatively recently, no information exists on them yet,

and since it is a continuing project, it becomes impossible to know for sure which units have fully

transitioned to this new model. Fortunately, most units have retained their general orientation, for

instance, the Ashura Corps in East Azerbaijan is made up of the former 31st AD which was based out

of Tabriz and can be assumed to still be a “heavy” division.

The following are the existing provincial corps as is currently known. Note that most are

brigade sized elements, though this is not an absolute and sizes may vary. The term "commander" is

used when actual rank is unknown.

IRGC Provincial Corps

IRGCGF infantry varies widely in terms of quality of both training and equipment. Some are ill-

trained and armed with nothing more then olive-drab, whereas others are armed with the latest

individual weaponry available including night-vision, body armor, and new uniforms.

The basic equipment of IRGCGF troops includes AK-47 variants, though SF and airborne units

have adopted the Sayyad 5.56 rifle, like with the rest of the armed forces, they maintain a high

dispersion rate of anti-tank weapons as well.

Mechanization is provided by the Safir-74 and T-72 tanks supported by BMP-1/2 IFV's . With

some use of the M113, the Boragh being more common, though with overall mechanization still

lacking. The Type-63 APC is also used, but at what rate is unknown.

Self-propelled artillery appears to remain limited to 2S1s and the few M-1978 remaining in service,

though at least 2 battalions of Raad-2s are likely. HM 41s, M-46s and D-30s are common when it

comes to towed systems. The IRGC also operates rocket artillery.

Imam Sadegh Corps

Bushehr

Col Fath-Allah Jamiri

Qamar Bani Hashem Corps

Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari Province

Commander Raza Mohammad-Soleymani

Ashura Corps

East Azerbaijan Province

Commander Mohammad Taqi Osanlu

Fajr Corps

Fars Province

Commander Gholam-Hossein Gheib-Parvar

Qods Corps

Gilan Province

Commander Hamun Mohammadi

Neynava Corps

Golestan Province

Brig General Naser Razaghian

Ansar Al-Hossein Corps

Hamedan Province

Commander Abdolreda Azadi

Imam Sajjad Corps

Hormozgan Province

Amir al-Emenin Corps

Ilam Province

Brig General Seyyed Sadeq Kaki

Saheb al-Zaman Corps

Isfahan Province

Commander Gholamreza Soleymani

Sarallah Corps

Kerman Province

Commander: Ruhollah Nuri

Deputy Commander Gholam-Ali Abu Hamzeh

Kermanshah Province Corps

Commander: Mohammad Nazar Azimi

Vali-ye Asr Corps

Khuzestan Province

Commander Mohammad Kazemeyni

Beit al-Moghaddas Corps

Kordestan Prov

Commander Allah-Nour Nour Allahi

Fath Corps

Kohkiluyeh & Boyer Ahmadi Province

Commander Shahabifar

Abol-Fazl al Abbas Corps

Lorestan Prov

Commander Shahrok

Rouh-Allah Corps

Markazi Prov

Commander Mohammad Taghi Shah-Cheraghi

Karbala Corps

Mazandaran Prov

Brig general Ali Shalikar

Javad al-A’emeh Corps

North Khorasan Province

Commander Ali Mirza-Pour

Saheb al-Amr Corps

Qazvin Province

Commander Salar Abnush

Ali Ibn-e Abi-Taleb Corps

Qom Prov

Brig Gen Salar Abnoush

Imam al-Reza Corps

Razavi Khorasan Province

Commander Ghodrat-Allah Mansouril

Hazrat-e Gham’em al-Mohammad / Neynava Corps

Semnan Prov

Col. Mohammad Hossein Babayi

Salman Corps

Sistan-Baluchistan

Ansar al-Reza Corps

South Khorasan Prov

Brig General Gholam-Reza Ahmadi

Seyyed al-Shohada Corps

Tehran Province

Commander Ali Fazli

Mohammad Rasulollah Corps

Greater Tehran

Commander: Abdollah Aqaqi

Shohada Corps

West Azerbaijan

Brig General Mehdi Mo’ini

Al Ghadir Corps

Yazd

Brig General Mohammad-Ali Allab Dadi

Ansar al-Madhi Corps

Zanjan Prov

Commander Seyyed Mehdi Mousavi

Hazrat-e Abbas Corps

Ardebil

Col. Jalil Baba-Zadeh

1.6.1 – Inventory - Armor - Main Battle Tanks

Zulfiqar

Named after the legendary sword of the Shia leader Ali, the Zulfiqar is an indigenous Iranian MBT

derived from the M-48/60 and T-72 tanks and consists of three known versions.

Zulfiqar-1 Zulfiqar-2 Zulfiqar-3

Crew: 4 3-4 3-4

Weight: ~36 tonne NA NA

Length: * 6.7 m 7.6 m 7.6 m

Width:* 3.6 m NA NA

Height: * 2.4 m 2.4m 2.4m

Engine: 750 hp AVDS-1790 750 hp AVDS-1790 750 hp AVDS-1790

Max Speed: NA NA NA

Range: NA NA NA

Armor: NA NA NA

Primary Weapon: 125 mm 2A46(M) 125 mm 2A46(M) 125 mm 2A46(M)

Secondary

Weapon:

12.7 mm MG 7.62 mm Coaxial

MG, 12.7 mm MG

7.62 mm Coaxial

MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS/Optics: Zrak FCS-T-72,

DNNS-1/2

NA NA

NA = Unknown

Zulfiqar-1

First revealed in 1994, and rumored to be in production since 1996, the Zulfiqar-1 is based off

the Patton series tanks with T-72 influences. It features a conventional layout with a driver sitting

center of hull with three daylight periscopes. The commanders hatch on the right, and loaders on the

left of the turret. Some confusion surrounding its weight can be traced to lack of clarification

regarding “tons” vs. “tonnes”

Its hull bears similarities to both the M-48A5 and M-

60, the overall length and internal parts resembling the M-

48A5, while the front glacis resembles the M-60A1.

Meanwhile, as evident in the picture to the right, the track

and running gear come from the M-48A5.

The turret is short and boxlike, likely made from

homogeneous welded steel; it has obvious similarities to the

Patton, particularly on the inside.

Zulfiqar-1

The Zulfiqar-1 carries the 125 mm 2A46 smoothbore cannon from the T-72. This is

accompanied by the either the DNNS-2 gunners sight manufactured by Zrak, the same system used on

the M-84 tank. The DNNS-2 features a day and 2nd generation night sight, with a laser range finder

and 5.5 x magnifications that is effective out to 1,300 meters. This is supplemented by a 12.7 mm

machine-gun mounted on the loaders hatch. It does not, as some say, have a 7.62 mm coaxial gun.

Smoke dischargers are also equipped. The Zulfiqar-1 is not equipped with an auto-loader; in fact, the

ammunition storage in the turret is still configured for the 105 mm ammunition for the M68 gun.

One model has been shown with the 105 mm M68 gun from the M-60A1, though this has been

scrapped in favor of the 125 mm 2A46. It also has a slightly different shaped turret indicating at least

some degree of variability between the different prototypes.

Most sources point to the 780 hp V-12 or V-46 engine. Yet the exhaust in the rear of the tank

points to the Continental AVDS-1790 engine, the same from the M-48A5 and M-60A1.

The reported mass production cannot be verified with only two prototypes confirmed, and 6

more 'semi-industrial' reported to exist. This can be traced to the lack of funds existing for serial

production.

Should it actually be deployed, the Zulfiqar-1 remains a mediocre system, because, at its heart

it's an upgraded M-48A5. While it might serve well as a life extension upgrade, it doesn't currently fill

the role of a front-line main battle tank.

The official statements on the capability of the Zulfiqar-1 are very different then the

capabilities of the models the public have been shown, including a new 1,000 hp engine among other

things. While this can be chalked up to propaganda, another possible explanation is that the semi-

industrial prototype is radically different then the original prototype that's been publicly displayed,

which in turn would force the reexamination of the basic assumptions about the tank.

Zulfiqar-2 / Zulfiqar-3

The Zulfiqar-2 and Zulfiqar-3 are developments of the same tank, the former serving as a test

bed for the latter. The prototypes attributed to both designations appear to be the same tanks with

direct upgrades.

The Zulfiqar-2/3 design shifted radically from the Zulfiqar-1.

While it maintained the overall Patton-inspired hull design, it

was lengthened, now carrying seven road-wheels instead of the

original 6. The hull now has a distinctive "stepping" pattern

that gives it a superficial similarity to an M1 Abrams tank. Side

skirts are now standard on the Zulfiqar-3.

Zulfiqar-2/3

The turret looks even more like it was inspired by the M1 design. It now features a large bustle

as well as a steeply sloped front profile, all while providing a much lower silhouette then it's

predecessor. Three stowage racks are visible, two boxes on the side, one basket in rear. Smoke

discharger's derived from the Chieftain are mounted on the sides. A coaxial machine-gun as well as a

gunners auxiliary sight are mounted on the gun mantlet.

It maintains the original Continental AVDS-1790 engine. Intuitively this would present

problems with the power when combined with the much heavier platform compared to the earlier

generations of the tank. It's presence in the prototypes/mockups may only be as placeholders, or Iran

may have found some way to upgrade the AVDS, possibly to the rumored 1,000 hp figure frequently

mentioned.

As with the Zulfiqar-1, it is not yet in service. Some have even called it a mock-up. However,

given that the hull shows exhausts marks, we know that it is at least somewhat of a functioning

prototype. The turret is another story, lack of any primary optics or apparent functionality of the

commanders hatch point to it being a mock-up, or at least, an early development prototype. It is

entirely likely the third incarnation, like the second, is just a prototype for a later generation.

The combat efficiency of the Zulfiqar-3 is questionable and given the unknowns in the

equation, it's frankly impossible at this point to make a judgment about the capabilities of this tank.

Iran was set to unveil a new generation of Zulfiqar tanks in June 2010, however this never

materialized.

Chieftain

Chieftain

Crew: 4

Weight: 56 tonne

Length: 7.51 m

Width: 3.50 m

Height: 2.89 m

Engine: 750 hp L60

Max Speed: 48 km/h

Max Range: 400-500 km

Armor:** Glacis: 388 mm, Turret: 390 mm

Primary

Weapon:

120 mm L11A5

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm coaxial MG

FCS: Barr and Stroud TLS

** = RHA equivalent, not necessarily actual thickness

Delivered to the Imperial Army in the 1970's, the Chieftain was one of the best tanks of its day,

being heavily armed and armored; even today it promises to remain dangerous. It continues service

with the IRIA 16th armored division headquartered in Qazvin

The Chieftain features a heavily sloped design, enabling a better armor efficiency and low

profile. Both the turret and the hull are made from a combination of rolled and cast steel.

It is armed with a 120 mm L11A5 rifled cannon and a 7.62 mm coaxial machine-gun. Smoke

discharger's are also equipped.

Independent of the Mobarez program below, Chieftains can also being upgraded with the

EFCS-3 fire-control system.

Mobarez

While the Chieftain is theoretically one of Iran's more powerful tanks, it's reputation is far from

perfect, particularly with regard to the power pack. The engine is notoriously underpowered and has a

tendency to overheat in the hot desert air.

These issues were addressed in the Mobarez upgrade program. While specifics are not known,

its features include a newer, more robust fuel tank, new gearbox, upgraded suspension, a new engine

and increased armor. Upgrades to the 120 mm gun include night-vision and a laser range finder,

complete with an electrical generator power supply.

Chieftain MBT, in the paint scheme of the 16th AD, during a

news segment from PressTV

Assessing these claims verifies most of them; the engine compartment is noticeably larger,

though the armor appears to be largely unchanged, with a slightly redesigned hull due to the larger

engine compartment. There is also a new laser range-finger located on the right hand side of the

turret above the smoke discharger's.

Ultimately the viability of Iran's remaining Chieftains depends on the type and widespread use

of upgrade programs like the Mobarez. The Chieftain design gave us the British Challenger tank after

all so it is possible for the tank to remain a valuable asset, but not in it's current state.

Purportedly, Iran still has enough Chieftains to outfit one full division (the 16th) as well as an

unspecified brigade.

T-54/55 and T-72Z/Safir-74

An ancient tank, Iran's inventory of T-54/55s consists of captured Iraqi vehicles, and a litany of

variants purchased from around the world. Currently they are receiving credible upgrades that

promise to extend its service life.

Both turret and hull are cast steel. The T-55 is armed with a 100 mm rifled gun, 12.7 mm

machine-gun mounted on the loaders hatch, and coaxial 7.62 mm machine-gun. The hull and the

turret are cast steel.

T-72Z/Safir-74

T-72Z / Safir-74

Crew: 4

Weight: 36 tonne

Length: 6.45 m

Width: 3.37 m

Height: 2.40 m

Engine: 780 hp V-46-6 V-12

Max Speed: 65 km/h

Max Range: NA

Armor:** 450-480 mm RHA vs KE, 700-900

mm RHA vs HEAT + ERA

Primary

Weapon:

105 mm M68

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: Fontana EFCS-3

** = RHA equivalent, not necessarily actual thickness

The T-72Z/Safir-74 is a set of domestic Iranian upgrades for T-54/55 type-tanks. The T-72Z is the

name for upgraded Type-59's, while Safir-74 refers to upgraded T-54's. However, since they are

brought to the same standard, and to avoid confusion, they will both hereafter be referred to by the

name 'Safir-74'. They are far more common within the IRGC, though do exist in some degree within

the IRIA.

The upgrade program consists of a new modular power pack with a 780 hp V-46 diesel engine

and associated gear box, brakes, hydraulics, steering and cooling system. This compares to the original

581 hp engine on the T-54/55.

A

Safir-74, with either the Seyyed al-Shohada or Mohammad

Rasulollah Corps in Tehran province - May 2009

The tank was also up-gunned with the HM-49L, a copy the 105 mm M68, the same gun used

on the M-60A1. It has been coupled with the Fotana EFCS-3-55 fire control system. Kontakt-3 ERA

supplements the original armor. But it lacks any direct smoke discharger's.

The Safir-74 program has substantially increased the lethality of the T-54/55 platform, the M68

gun is accurate out to longer ranges and when paired with a modern FCS, is still deadly. However, you

can only upgrade a platform so much and such is the case with the T-54/55, it's too obsolete, and small

to compete effectively against modern MBT's.

Iran purchased roughly 200 V-46 engines for the upgrade program, and since this is the limiting

factor in this case, so we can assume the total number of Safir-74's in service is around 200, with the

remaining T-54/55's being phased out of service. However, this assumes that Iran hasn't attempted to

reverse engineer the engines, something well within their capability.

T-62

T-62

Crew: 4

Weight: 40 tonne

Length: 6.63 m

Width: 3.30 m

Height: 2.39 m

Engine: 581 hp V-55

Max Speed: 50 km/h

Max Range: 450 km

Armor:** Turret: 153-242 mm, glacis: 102

mm, upper hull: 79 mm

Primary

Weapon:

115 mm 2A20

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: Volna

**=actual thickness, RHA equivalent unknown

Ordered from Syria and Libya during the early days of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran also received the

North-Korean version known as the Chonma-ho. Exact designations are likely the T-62M and T-62K.

The T-62 is designed like other Soviet tanks, featuring a larger, more sloped turret then the T-

54/55 but with the same overall layout. It carries a 115 mm smooth bore gun, a 12.7 mm machine-gun

mounted on the loaders hatch, and a 7.62 mm machine-gun mounted coaxially.

Details about it’s current use are unknown, but one was present at a border fort during a

skirmish with US and Iraqi forces several years ago.

T-72

T-72S

Crew: 3

Weight: 46.5 tonne

Length: 6.95 m

Width: 3.59 m

Height: 2.28 m

Engine: 840 hp V-84

Max Speed: 60 km/h

Max Range: 480 km

Armor: 520 mm steel and ceramic on turret face +

ERA (950 mm RHA equivalent vs HEAT)

Primary Weapon: 125 mm 2A46M

Secondary Weapon: 7.62 mm Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: 1A40

Iran purchased T-72M1s and T-72Ss during the 1990's to rebuild their armored inventory

depleted during the war. The T-72 is in service with IRGCGF and IRIA armored units across the country.

The hull is all welded steel design with the driver sitting center of the glacis. The turret

however is cast and features the commander to the right and the gunner to the left.

Armor is a composite mixture of high-

strength steel, tungsten, and ceramic balls.

Combined with the shape of the turret, the T-72

is theoretically well armored, despite this; the

tank has a tendency to catastrophically cook-off

when hit due to the shape of the ammunition

carousel. Kontakt-3 ERA is standard.

Its armament is the 125 mm 2A46 (2A46

for early-model T-72M1's and 2A46M for later

model T-72S's) smooth-bore cannon with 1A40

FCS which is paired with gun stabilization and a

laser range-finder, though lacks an automatic fire

solution computer. Some have been replaced by the EFCS-3.

A

T-72 from the 92nd AD on an exercise in June 2009

There are several minor upgrade programs, first is the

'Khorramshahr' tank, a T-72 with ERA that is visually similar to

Kontakt-5. The second is called the ‘Rakhsh’ and consists of

adding slat armor over ERA. This upgrade was seen in 2004 and

then nothing until the Sacred Defense Week 2010 parade where it

was again. While these are the only changes visible, it is

important to keep in mind that no more information on the two is

available. Neither upgrade has been observed with any active

units.

The T-72 is Iran's most credible threat from their armored

units. This is because the T-72 is far more numerous then any

other type, while IRIA tanks like the Mobarez and Zulfiqar may

have successful prototypes, they largely never progress beyond

that point and tanks like the M-60A1 and Chieftain remain largely

as they did when they were delivered to the Shah. Meanwhile,

the IRIGF acquired the more modern T-72Ss.

Most sources quote the number of T-72s in service as

being around 422. However this only takes into account the

number purchased from Russia. Adding in the tanks from Poland

and Belarus brings the number to around 563. Reports indicate

that, as of 2005, Iran is now locally producing, not just assembling, additional T-72Ss at a factory in

Esfahan; the previous impediment to mass-production, inability to work the thick steel on an

industrial level, being overcome.

Kontakt-5 style ERA on a T-72 rolling out of

what is likely the T-72 assembly plant in Dorud

M-47 Patton

M-47M

Crew: 4

Weight: 46 tonnes

Length: 6.36 m

Width: 3.51 m

Height: 3.35 m

Engine: 750 hp AVDS-1790

Max Speed: ~48 km/h

Max Range: 483 km

Armor: NA

Primary Weapon: 90 mm M36

Secondary

Weapon:

.30 Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: NA

NA = Unknown

The first of Iran's Patton tanks, the original M-47s were overhauled with 750 hp engine and fire

control from the M-60A1 as well as removing the 5th crewman.

Most have been retired from service, with some still in an armored brigade with the 77th

infantry division in Khoresan and possibly with the 88th armored division in Baluchistan. An exact

estimate of remaining tanks is unavailable.

Iran's M-47Ms, while horribly out of date and obsolete by nearly all standards, remain barely

sufficient for its duties. The geography in Eastern Iran is not conducive to armor battles, so any tanks

would serve a secondary role at best. Meanwhile, their enemies in the region don't present that much

of an armored threat, Afghanistan can't field an army, let alone tanks, while the ISAF and US forces in

the region don't maintain a large armored presence either, and Pakistan is focused on India and

internal battles.

One of the few M-47M's left, on parade with the 77th ID

in Mashhad

M-48 Patton

M-48A5

Crew: 4

Weight: 48.98 tonnes

Length: 6.41 m

Width: 3.63 m

Height: 3 m

Engine: 750 hp Continental AVDS-1790

Max Speed: 48.2 km/h

Max Range: 499 km

Armor:** Glacis: 110 mm, Hull Sides: 51-76 mm , Turret face:101-120 mm

Primary Weapon: 105 mm M68

Secondary Weapon: 7.62 Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: NA

** = actual thickness, RHA equivalent unknown

NA=Unknown

The second of the Patton series, the M-48 features a completely redesigned body with boat

shaped hull and a larger turret, both made of cast steel. All Iranian M-48's have been upgraded to the

M-48A5 level with the 105 mm M68 gun as well as the Continental AVDS-1790 engine, raising it

roughly to the level of the M-60A1.

As with the M-47M the remaining number constitute the bulk of the 88th armored division in

Baluchistan. Also like the M-47M's, the M-48A5’s, while not ideal, remain sufficient for their role on

the Eastern border.

M-60 Patton

M-60A1

Crew: 4

Weight: 51 tonnes

Length: 6.94 m

Width: 3.6 m

Height: 3.2 m

Engine: 750 hp Continental AVDS-1790

Max Speed: 48 km/h

Max Range: 502 km

Armor:** Glacis: 93-143 mm, Hull sides: 35-74 mm, Turret face: 180 mm Turret sides: 76 mm

Primary Weapon: 105 mm M68

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 Coaxial MG, 12.7 mm MG

FCS: NA

**=actual thickness, RHA equivalent unknown

NA = unknown

Most advanced of Iran's Patton series tanks, the

M-60A1 is a development of the M-48 series with

moderate overall changes including a redesigned turret,

and a reduction in the number of track return rollers,

though the M-60A1 compared to the M-48A5 are very

similar.

Both the turret and the hull are cast

homogeneous steel and the gun lacks modern fire

control systems found on other Iranian front-line tanks.

It also maintains a poor power-to-weight ratio at only

14.5 hp/ton. Despite this, no known comprehensive

indigenous upgrade program like the Mobarez exists for

Iran's M-60A1's which is surprising. However these

deficiencies have been remedied at least in part by upgrading them with night-vision periscopes for

the driver as well as an auto-stabilized sight and laser range-finder for the commander that is

independent of the turret. Also upgraded is the main gun which is now hydraulically and gyroscope

stabilized. Perhaps most importantly, an EFCS-3-55 fire-control computer has been added. Most

recently, M-60A1's have been seen with Kontakt-3 ERA protection. However neither programs appear

to be in mass service.

The not-all-together insignificant stock of M-60A1's which still exist serve with the 81st

M-60A1 on exercise in western Iran.

armored division near Kermanshah as well as in an armored brigade within the 28th infantry division

in Sanandaj.

Inventory - Armor - Armored Fighting Vehicles

Boragh AFV

APC IFV AAA AMV AT AAC

Crew: 2+10 3+7 NA NA NA 2

Weight: 13 tonne NA 13 tonne NA NA 11 tonne

Length: 6.65 m 6.65 m 6.65 m 6.50 m 6.50 m 6.43 m

Width: 2.94 m 2.94 m 2.94 m 2.94 m 2.94 m 3.2 m

Height: 1.88 m * 2.28 m 1.88 m * 2.02 m* 2.02 m* 2.26 m*

Engine: See text See text See text See text See text See text

Max Speed: 65 km/h 65 km/h 65 km/h 65 km/h 65 km/h 75 km/h

Max Range: 500 km NA NA NA NA 430 km

Armor: NA NA NA NA NA NA

Primary

Weapon:

12.7 mm MG 30 mm 2A42

cannon

Zu-23-2 AAA 120 mm

mortar

Toophan

ATGM

12.7 mm MG

Secondary

Weapon:

NA 7.62 mm MG,

AT-4

NA 12.7 mm MG NA NA

* = hull only

NA = unknown or not applicable

The Boragh family of armored fighting vehicles, based on refurbished BMP-1 chassis, includes

an APC, an IFV, a supply carrier, SAR, mortar carrier, and an anti-tank variant. It is in service with both

the IRIA and the IRGCGF throughout the country. The total number of Boraghs is at least 190, though

the number is likely higher by now. Sudan has imported and now operates an unknown number of

Boraghs.

The original BMP-1 engine has been replaced; one possible candidate is the German 320 hp

BF8L diesel engine which Iran ordered 190 of in 1996 (hence the minimum number of Boraghs). The

Raad-1(which uses the same hull as the Boragh) is described as having an “8-cylinder air-cooled

engine” by MODLEX which matches the BF8L. However there is a discrepancy between the power-to-

weight ratio of the Boragh(25.3 hp/t) and the capabilities of the BF8L, though one possible

explanation to this is that Iran found some way to modify the engine. However, the fact that this

discrepancy exists suggests some other unknown, possibly indigenous, engine could be used.

Iran also manufactures appliqué armor for the Boragh that takes the form of bolt on panels

that provide protection from up to 30 mm AP ammunition.

Overall, the Boragh has, for the short-term, the potential to fulfill Iran's light-armor needs,

providing a common, modular program that allows for a streamlined logistical system in an army that

is filled with a hodge-podge of different systems. Ultimately it depends how far the program will go

and whether older carriers are phased out in favor of this new universal system instead of buying or

developing something new. Basing it on the BMP-1 means there will always be inherent limitations in

the system however.

APC

The first variety is the most common. The 73 mm

cannon on the BMP-1 is removed and replaced with a 12.7 mm

machine-gun with protective cupola. This frees up the

originally cramped interior to carry 10 infantrymen. The

majority of firing ports have been removed, with only the most

forward remaining on either side. The original configuration of

the BMP-1 with the infantryman facing outwards has been

replaced with benches lining the outer wall facing inward,

reminiscent of the M113. This begs the question on how the designers intend for the infantryman to

use the firing ports comfortably.

IFV

The infantry fighting vehicle version amounts to an

upgrade to BMP-2 level, replacing the original turret with the

turret of the BMP-2 with ATGM launcher and 30 mm cannon.

None have been observed in service although it is easy to

confuse them with regular BMP-2's.

Air Defense

In this version, a Zu-23-2 is mounted on the APC body.

The gun can either be mounted to a rotating platform where

the 73 mm gun used to be, or the entire Zu-23-2 system, as it

would normally be set up is simply placed on top on the hull.

Notably, only the former variety has been observed in service.

Some versions of it have been rigged for automatic control,

though details are unknown about this specific aspect.

Also of note is the "Cobra" AFV which is largely the

same, a Zu-23-2 on BMP-1 chassis, except it had a much lower

clearance and was not directly a member of the Boragh family.

It is likely that the project was scrapped in favor of the newer, design of the Boragh.

APC Variant

IFV Variant

AAA Variant

Armored Mortar Vehicle (AMV)

The mortar carrier version features a

redesigned hull compared to the basic APC version

and serves as the basis for variants such as the AT

and supply carrier models as well as the Raad-1 SPG.

The passenger section of the hull has been replaced

with what is, essentially, a large box that is slightly

bigger then the equivalent APC compartment. It

holds a 120 mm mortar tube on a rotating base. Two

large swinging doors open on top allowing the

mortar to be fired. The rear doors have also been

replaced with a small access door as well as a larger,

downward folding ramp. The carrier has an internal

capacity for ~36 120 mm rounds. The commanders’ position has been given a 12.7 mm machine gun.

This version has seen widespread deployment with IRGC units.

Anti-Tank

The anti-tank version builds off the mortar carrier,

but instead of a mortar, it carries a Toophan/TOW missile

launcher mounted just rear of where the 73 mm cannon

would be mounted. It has not been seen deployed, or

even on parade.

Armored Ammunition Carrier (AAC)

A radical redesign of the BMP-1 chassis, featuring an

enlarged drivers cab with a machine-gun mount and a soft-shell

cargo area. It retains amphibious capability and can carry 4

tonnes of ammunition.

Search And Rescue

Most likely operated by the IRIP or other non-military

forces. It has a large truck like cab placed above the engine

compartment and has an enlarged cargo area covered by a

soft shell, much like that on a transport truck.

SAR Variant

AAC Variant

AMV

Command

Though not officially identified, the similarity to other

APC command variants betrays the likely identity of this

model. It features a large superstructure at the rear of the

hull.

Unidentified Variant

M-113

M-113A1 APC

Crew: 2+11

Weight: 12.3 tonnes

Length: 4.86 m

Width: 2.68 m

Height: 2.5 m

Engine: 275 hp 6V53T diesel

Max Speed: 67.6 km/h

Max Range: 480 km

Armor: 12-38 mm aluminum

Primary

Weapon:

12.7 mm MG,

Toophan ATGM, Zu-

23-2

Secondary

Weapon:

none

The distinctive box-shaped APC has long been a staple of the Iranian military, serving with large

number of IRGC and IRIA, armored and mechanized units. Iran uses the standard M-113A1 as well as

the Canadian Lynx and the M577 command vehicle. Iranian M-113's can be armed with 12.7 mm

machine-guns as well as Toophan ATGM launchers or Zu-23-2 AAA.

The original M-113A1 does however have shortcomings, prime among them being very thin

armor which has been somewhat addressed by several small upgrade projects. The first of these

upgrades involves several mm thick plates of perforated spaced armor applied some distance off the

main hull. It can also use the same appliqué armor the Boragh uses (pictured above).

The M-113 will continue to serve Iran as a primary battle-taxi but like the BTR-60, will remain a

dated system that does its job sufficiently, but only because there's nothing else stepping up to fully

replace it. Estimates put the total number in service at 200.

IRGC M-113 with appliqué armor - May 2009

BMP-1

BMP-1

Crew: 3+8

Weight: 13.2 tonnes

Length: 6.7 m

Width: 2.94 m

Height: 2.1 m

Engine: 300 hp UTD-20

Max Speed: 65 km/h

Max Range: 600 km

Armor: 6-33 mm welded steel

Primary

Weapon:

73 mm 2A28 cannon

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm coaxial MG, AT-3 ATGM

The original Soviet IFV, Iran purchased a

large quantity from it's allies such as Syria, Libya

and China during the Iran-Iraq war, and still

maintains a considerable quantity, the only

estimate puts the number at around 210,

though the overall number has been reduced by

retirement and conversion to Borah AFV.

However, it still continues in front line service in

both IRGC and IRIA armored units.

(top and bottom) – IRGC BMP-1 on the western border with

Iraq

BMP-2

BMP-2

Crew: 3+7

Weight: 14.3 tonnes

Length: 6.7 m

Width: 3.1 m

Height: 2.4 m

Engine: 300 hp UTD-20

Max Speed: 65 km/h

Max Range: 600 km

Armor: 6-33 mm welded steel

Primary

Weapon:

30mm 2A42 autocannon

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm coaxialMG, AT-4 ATGM

Iran began purchasing and assembling BMP-2s in order to rebuild it mechanized forces in the

1990s following the Iran-Iraq war, but as is the case with the T-72 MBTs, as funds became scarcer and

exasperation with Russian reliability grew, the original 1500 ordered dropped to 413 of which, most

would be assembled in Iran.

The BMP-2 now serves across the country with both IRGC and IRIA units, often paired with M-

113 and BTR-60 APCs.

The BMP-2 may now be manufactured in Iran under the name BMT-2, though an accurate

number of total produced is unavailable. This project is distinct from the previous licensed assemblies

of kits.

The BMP-2 is Iran’s most potent light armor asset, despite maintaining some of the

vulnerabilities of the BMP-1 such as thin armor, it has improved somewhat in this regard and also

carries an effective cannon and credible anti-tank capability as well as having plenty of room for future

upgrades such as the appliqué armor applied to the Boragh and the M113. Iran's BMPs may have

night-fighting capability.

Like the T-72, the BMP-2 maintains a sizable presence and is also relatively easy to track.

Originally slated to purchase 1500, the number was reduced to 413 both directly sold and assembled

in Iran. This has been supplemented by an unknown number of Boraghs in IFV configuration, though it

is likely that number isn't that great as they haven't been seen on parade or exercise.

IRGC BMP-2 on exercise - May 2009

EE-9 Cascavel

The 4x4 wheeled EE-9 armored

car is made from welded steel and is

armed with a 90 mm cannon. It has little

in the way of fire-control, or battle-

management technology.

Exact numbers of the EE-9 in

service are unavailable and if it

continues to serve at all, it would likely

be as an armored recon asset.

Some of postulated that the EE-

9s 90 mm gun is used on the indigenous

Tosan light tank.

Type-63

A lightweight, Chinese APC similar to the many other

early APC designs features a welded steel hull, infantry

firing ports and a roof-mounted 12.7 mm machinegun.

BTR-50

The BTR-50 is a tracked, amphibious APC that dates to procurements even before M-113s or

BMP-1s. Due to its antiquity, it is likely retired from service.

BTR-60

BTR-60PB

Crew: 3+14

Weight: 10.3 tonnes

Length: 7.56 m

Width: 2.82 m

Height: 2.31 m

Engine: See text

Max Speed: 80 km/h

Max Range: 500 km

Armor: 5-10 mm welded steel

Primary

Weapon:

14.5 mm MG

IRIA BTR-60PB with the 37th armored brigade in Isfahan

A questionably operable (note the condition of the wheel closest to

camera) EE-9 on parade during Sacred Defense Week 2010 in Zahedan.

Type-63 APC, probably IRGC

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm coaxial MG

A wheeled, amphibious APC with an all-welded steel hull, the BTR-60PB is one of the primary

APCs in the Iranian Army. The earlier BTR-60P with an open top has been retired along with the BTR-

50. In Iranian service, they have been seen armed with the usual 14.5 mm machine-gun as well as the

12.7 mm DShK and are reported to carry the TOW ATGM. At least since 2004, Iranian BTR-60s have

sported a new, unknown engine, replacing the original twin 90 hp GAZ-40 they were fitted with.

Like the M-113, the BTR-60 is sufficient for its intended purpose, if nothing more.

Most sources list the number of BTR-60s in service as around 150, however, given the rate at

which they are deployed across the country, the number is likely much higher. To support this

scenario, it was announced by General Hossein Dadras in 2003 that mass-production of "BTR" vehicles

had started, though he doesn't specify more. In this manner it is easy to imagine that Iran's already

significant BTR-60 stocks have been enlarged.

Scorpion Light Tank and Sayyad AFV

Scorpion Sayyad AT Sayyad MLRS

Crew: 3 2 - 3 2 - 3

Weight: 8 tonnes NA NA

Length: 5.2 m 4.6 m 4.6 m

Width: 2.1 m 2.1 m 2.1 m

Height: 2.1 m 1.7 m* 1.7 m*

Engine: 190 hp Cummins BTA 190 hp Cummins BTA 190 hp Cummins BTA

Max Speed: 72.5 km/h NA NA

Max Range: 756 km NA NA

Armor: 12.7 mm welded aluminum NA NA

Primary

Weapon:

76mm L23A1 2x Toophan ATGM 2x 70 mm rocket pod

Secondary

Weapon:

7.62 mm coaxial MG none none

* = hull only

The Scorpion is a British light tank made from

welded aluminum, is armed with a 76 mm gun, and can

maintain a brisk 72.5 km/h, functioning more as a dedicated

reconnaissance vehicle then a modern tank.

The Scorpion is deployed as an armored recon asset

with armored and mechanized forces. Estimates put 80

The Scorpion light tank...

remaining in service.

Sayyad

The Scorpion also serves as the basis for the Sayyad

AFV family of vehicles which include an anti-tank and

artillery support version.

Based on the Scorpion hull, the overall length has

been shortened, from five road-wheels to 4, though the

engine remains the same. The Hull has been slightly

redesigned as well as removing the external storage

baskets.

Most notably though, the turret has been removed and is replaced by either a single or double

Toofan/TOW ATGM launcher with six extra rounds carried on the outside of the tank,or two clusters of

23 77mm rockets each. These are probably intended as if they were used from a helicopter, in the

direct-LOS role.

The Sayyad concept represents an interesting fusion of conventional battle doctrine of lightly

armored reconnaissance AFVs with the more asymmetric notion of using tank-killers in light, mobile

packages like the Toofan-armed Sayyads. Depending on how they're used, they could be a game

changer, or if used conventionally, they could be restricted to being no more valuable then the scouts

they were designed to be.

The Sayyad does not appear to be in service due to its paint scheme indicating its status as a

development project.

Tosan Light Tank

The Tosan light tank is one of the more interesting cases in the Iranian military, it was designed

as a long-range, high endurance rapid reaction tank with a 90 mm gun and as with the Sayyad, it has

the potential to fulfill a very unique and potentially valuable role within the Iranian military.

The tank was first publicly referenced in 1997 with the promise that mass production would

soon follow, however in a move that is symptomatic of the army's larger procurement issues, it was

not until 2008 that the production line was officially inaugurated, assuming the most recent

announcement to be genuine and not another bluff.

However, the curious thing is that we have never seen or even heard a concrete description of

the Tosan. Many have tried to pass Scorpions or Sayyads off as Tosans, but they inevitably always lack

the 90 mm gun.

It is generally accepted that the Tosan is based off the Scorpion, but there is no real proof for

this beyond it being a logical progression. This path of reasoning began with a ‘Janes’ article which

suggested the Tosan may be based off the Scorpion, however, they never took a definitive stance on

this possibility. Another option is a reverse engineering and upgrading of the EE-9 Cascavel, whose

wheels rather then tracks would give it the long range and rapid response ability that is touted in the

...and the Sayyad

media. Another option would be another version of the Boragh. Regardless, it is likely that the 90 mm

gun comes from the EE-9.

The Tosan is said to have an advanced firing and targeting system which is likely given the other

upgrades we have seen Iran produce for its armored vehicles.

The Tosan light tank, only just entering production, would only have a few assets available,

even assuming it's been deployed and isn't still in trials.

Rakhsh APC

Rakhsh

Crew: 2+8

Weight: 7.5 tonnes

Length: 6.06 m

Width: 2.40 m

Height: 2.43 m

Engine: 155 hp DO824LFL09

Max Speed: 80-95 km/h

Max Range: NA

Armor: welded steel w/ protection up to 7.62 mm.

Appliqué ceramic w/ protection up to 14.5 mm

Primary Weapon: 12.7 mm MG in cupola, or 14.5 mm MG in

turret, or Zu-23-2 AAA

Secondary Weapon: none

The Rakhsh APC is a lightweight 4x4 APC designed for

policing actions more then full-on combat. It is in service with

both the IRIP and IRGC. The APC is extremely similar to the

North Korean M-1992 APC.

The Rakhsh comes in two variants, an early

development model, which has apparently still been produced,

and the later, export model, that due to sanctions, ended up

being produced for domestic service as well.

The earlier model most commonly carries a 14.5 mm

machine gun in a turret while the later model has only been

seen with a 12.7 mm in a cupola. Though there is no reason

why one couldn't carry the other. In earlier models, the side-

doors consisted of two pieces, while the later model has single

piece side-doors. Some models have been shown with a Zu-23-2 AAA.

Other differences between the two are minor, mostly aesthetic likely reflecting a changed

manufacturing technique rather then any significant changes. The differences include a flattening of

the top of the engine compartment, elimination of certain angles and shifting air intakes.

The hull is welded steel with a very distinctive blocky, angled appearance. This offers protection

against 7.62 mm ammunition with an available spaced appliqué armor set at steep angles to the hull.

It can also use the bolt-on armor plates designed for other AFVs.

A late model Rakhsh offered for export

Other features include remote tire inflation-deflation, run-flat tires, a winch, air-conditioning,

optional smoke dischargers and NBC protection.

The APC can carry 8 passengers in addition to the 2 crewman. Each passenger has access to

firing and observation ports. They can dismount via a single rear door, two side doors, or via a roof

hatch.

It is powered by a MAN DO824LFL09 diesel engine taken from a heavy general purpose truck,

giving it a power to weight ratio of 20 hp/t and speed of 95 km/h

In addition to service with the IRIP and IRGC, the Rakhsh has been exported to Sudan.

The Rakhsh can't navigate overly-treacherous ground, destroy other armored vehicles, or

protect it's passengers from large caliber ammunition, but it's important to remember it's not meant

to do those things, it's not being slated to replace the Boragh or BMP-2 any time soon. In it's job as a

policing or light-duty APC it's acceptable, but not outside that zone.

Inventory – Armor – Armament

30 mm

Iran uses the 2A42 autocannon on its BMP-2s and Boraghs in IFV configuration. While they

don’t advertise it, if Iran is manufacturing turrets for the Boragh, it would stand to reason they are also

manufacturing the cannon. Recently the 2A42 has been seen mounted in a manually-controlled mount

attached to medium trucks in much the same way a DShK might be. (separate entry) It uses either HEI

or APT ammunition through a dual-feed setup.

2A42 HEI APT

Caliber: 30 mm Caliber: 30 mm 30 mm

Weight: 115 kg Weight: .83 kg .85 kg

Length: 3.0 m Length: .14 m .14 m

ROF: 300-600 r/m Muzzle Velocity: 960 m/s 970 m/s

Effective Range: 1,500-3000 m 1,500-3000 m

Max Range: NA NA NA = unknown or not applicable

76 mm

The 2A28 low-pressure, smoothbore cannon is used on Iran’s BMP-1s. It fires the same PG-9

ammunition as the SPG-9 recoilless rifle. The round is manufactured under the name “Zafar”

2A28 HEAT

Caliber: 76 mm Caliber: 76 mm

Weight: 115 kg Weight: 4.3 kg

Length: NA Length: 1.11 m

ROF: 6-8 r/m Muzzle Velocity: 715 m/s

Effective Range: 1,500 m

Max Range: NA

Penetration: 350 mm RHA NA = unknown or not applicable

105 mm

The HM-49L is an Iranian copy of the US M68 rifled gun used on the M-60A1 MBT. It is used on

the Safir-74 as a replacement for the original 100 mm D-10T gun and possibly replacing some of the

original M68’s on Iran’s M-60A1s as the barrels become worn from use. There are a few differences

between the HM-49L and the M-68, but for all intents and purposes, they are the same gun. It is not

fitted with an autoloader. It fires either HEAT-T or HE shells.

HM-49L HEAT-T HE

Caliber: 105 mm Caliber: 105 mm 105 mm

Weight: 760 kg (barrel only) Weight: 22 kg 27 kg

Length: 5.3 m (barrel only) Length: .99 m 1.0 m

ROF: 10 r/m Muzzle Velocity: 1174 m/s 864 m/s

Effective Range: 2,000 m NA

Max Range: 7,000 m NA

Penetration: 356 mm RHA NA NA = unknown or not applicable

120 mm

The rifled L11A5 is used solely by Iran’s Chieftain Tanks. Iran does not openly produce the gun,

and only just recently began producing 120 mm HESH ammunition. It is not fitted with an autoloader

L11A5 HESH

Caliber: 120 mm Caliber: 120 mm

Weight: 1,778 kg Weight: NA

Length: 6.85 m Length: NA

ROF: 10 r/m Muzzle Velocity: NA

Effective Range: NA

Max Range: NA

Penetration: NA NA = unknown or not applicable

125 mm

The largest of all Iran’s tank guns, the smoothbore 2A46M is

produced in Iran under the name “HM-50”. It is used in Iran’s T-72Ss,

while the T-72M1s use the earlier 2A46, although the HM-50 may be

phasing out the 2A46’s as they are famed for having a low service life

and Iran has been using the T-72M1’s for close to 20 years. The gun can

be fitted with an autoloader (as it is in the T-72) or not (as in the

Zulfiqar prototypes) It can fire HE-FRAG (3VOF22 equivalent), HEAT

(3BK-18M equivalent), or APFSDS (no equivalent, but close to the 3BM-

26/29) rounds as well as the AT-11 ATGM. Unlike the 105 mm and 120

mm guns, the 2A46M’s ammunition comes in two parts, a projectile

and a separate propellant charge.

NA = unknown or not applicable

HM-50 HE-FRAG HEAT APFSDS

Caliber: 125 mm Caliber: 125 mm 125 mm 125 mm

Weight: 2,500 kg Weight (projectile): 23 kg 19.3 kg 6.5 kg

Length: 6.6 m Length (projectile): .67 m .67 m .58 m

ROF: 8 r/m Muzzle Velocity: 850 m/s 905 m/s 1,715 m/s

Effective Range: NA NA NA

Max Range: 12.2 km 4,000 km NA

Penetration: NA 550 mm RHA 470 mm RHA

Iranian domestic APFSDS.

Inventory - Armor - Support Vehicles, Upgrades and Spare Parts

In addition to the main categories listed above, Iran also maintains, and manufactures several

other armored vehicles. Among the list of vehicles in Iran's inventory but not manufactured

indigenously is the Chieftain armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) as well as a the T-72 combat

engineering vehicle (CEV). Iran meanwhile manufactures the Taftan mine-clearing vehicle.

As the drive toward a domestic tank and AFV industry advanced so to did the need for a

domestic ammunition and spare parts supplier, AMIG(Ammunition and Metallurgy Industrial Group),

and VEIG(Vehicle and Equipment Industrial Group), both branch's of DIO (Defense Industries

Organization), stepped up and began producing ammunition and spare parts as early as the Iran-Iraq

war.

Today they produce ammunition for all their tanks as well as for export. This includes 100 mm

HEAT, 105 mm HEAT and HE, 120 mm HESH, 125 mm HE-FRAG, HEAT and APFSDS rounds. In addition

to conventional rounds Iran also produces the AT-11 Sniper ATGM under the name "Tondar" for the T-

72.

Iran also produces applique armor, including ERA (explosive

reactive armor) similar to Kontakt-3, though at least one tank has

been seen with Kontakt-5 type ERA. A third type of ERA has the same

length and width of Kontakt-3, but with close to twice the depth.

Iran also manufactures bolt-on armor for light AFV's that provides

protection up to 30 mm AP ammunition. These come in the form of

rectangular plates that range in size from only a few cm long that

protect from 7.62 mm bullets, up to larger plates that are

significantly larger. These can be applied to any AFV in Iranian

service, though are most commonly seen on M113 and BMP-style

AFV's.

Iran is also manufacturing accessories and spare parts for

their armored vehicles including day/night periscopes, suspension,

power plants, auto-loaders, cannons, cooling and lubricant systems as well as the litany of small

mechanisms such as gears and sprockets required to operate and maintain armor systems.

Applique armor packages for light

AFVs

Inventory - Armor - Analysis

Iran's armored forces might be making significant headway in their ability to produce advanced

prototypes, but how effective are they, do their armored divisions still retain any potency as their

equipment has aged without replacement. The answer is probably not, today, Iran's armored forces

are outmatched technically and numerically.

The first step in any analysis is determining what Iran actually has. Unfortunately, this is is

much harder then it should be. This complicates the matter of analysis significantly for obvious

reasons. While estimates vary, the number of medium/high quality MBTs is around 1,035 – 1,171,

ignoring tanks like the T-54/55, T-62 and M-47/48 tanks because they're simply too old to be relevant in

a modern tank battle, or are geographically non-relevant to most contemporary conflict estimates.

This number allows for the T-72s, Safir-74s and a moderate level of M-60's and Chieftains. To put this

in perspective, Saudi Arabia has around 833 tanks, mostly M-60A3s and M1A1/A2s. the UAE has 469

tanks, mostly Leclerc's. In this light, Iran has only a slight numerical advantage over the Gulf Arab

states, assuming some kind of cohesive cooperation between the states; however should conflict arise

with only one nation, the balance swings toward Iran.

MBT*** Quantity In Service APC/IFV Quantity In Service

Zulfiqar: 0 Boragh: >190

Chieftain: 136*-204*+ M113: (200)**

T-54/55/Safir-74: 200 BMP-1: (210)**

T-62: NA BMP-2: 413

T-72: 563 BTR-60: (150-300)**

M-47: ~68 Scorpion: (80)**

M-48: ~68 Rakhsh: NA

M-60: 136*-204*+

Total, High Quality: 1,035 – 1,171 Total: 1,243-1,393

* = Using combat battalion/brigade/divisional strength as a guide, assumes 100% unit strength with no reserves.

** = Parenthesis indicates default to conventional estimate when no other sources exist.

*** = Also note that, in conjunction with the first asterisk, that there are several more armored brigades with

unaccounted-for armor, the fact that they have to be equipped with something indicates the numbers are likely much

higher.

NA = Unknown

Iran's APC/IFV holdings largely follow the same mold, assuming a moderate estimate of

strength, Iran has around 1,393 non-MBT AFV's composed mainly of M-113s, BTR-60s and BMP-1/2s.

This compares to 4,370, 1,381 and 6,592 for Saudi Arabia, UAE and Turkey respectively. In this light,

Iran is lagging behind its neighbors at a significant rate, even without considering rate of use.

But even within the numbers-only game, it doesn't tell the whole story, a good indicator is not

just sheer numbers, but the rate of mechanization, what capabilities do units as a whole have to

mechanize themselves. For Iran, the situation isn't good. Given conservative assumptions about total

holdings, there is only one tank for every 434 active-duty infantrymen and a whopping 362

infantryman for every APC or IFV. Compare this to their nearest rivals, for Saudi Arabia, the rate is

1/180 and 1/34 respectively, and for the UAE, it's 1/93 and 1/31. These are telling numbers to say the

least. Speaking in conventional terms, the problem with this is that while they might have roughly the

same overall numbers, they're dispersed among a far larger force, leaving some units without

sufficient armored mechanization, and many with none at all.

Another problem is quality. The majority of Iran's holdings are a mix of Western or Eastern

technology creating a logistical nightmare, and the equipment they do have is aging faster then they

can be replaced, to say nothing of keeping pace with their neighbors’ oil-fueled procurement binges.

More then half of Iran's MBT's date from the Shahs era and have not seen meaningful upgrades, while

their more modern T-72's are still outclassed by the Saudis M1's and the UAE's Leclerc's. The same is

true with their APC's, BTR-60's and BMP-1's can't hold a candle to BMP-3's and Bradley's. While it is

possible that the domestic upgrade program will put Iran's MBT's on par with current generation

tanks, from the little can be have observed, these programs are not yet near widespread or developed

enough. Though emphasis must be placed on the fact that the amount of information we have access

to is infinitesimally small.

It should be mentioned that while a lot of Iran's MBT's like the M-47M and the M-48A5 are

obsolete, they're sufficient at what they do. For instance, the M-48A5's of the 88th AD in Sistan and

Baluchistan are ancient, but they don’t face any pressing armored or anti-armor threats.

That being said, Iran's armor on the western border with the Arab states is ridiculously

inadequate for a conventional battle, either with the US, or with the Arab states.

But it's important to remember, that's not Iran's strategy. Iran's geography is the farthest thing

from being conducive to armored warfare. Save for a small portion of low-lands in the south-west, Iran

is bordered on all sides by mountains; mountains which prove extremely taxing on armor compared to

the flat sand's of it's neighbor, Iraq. Within the context of a defensive war, it's easy to see how armor

isn't a core pillar of Iran's military strategy. This produces a force which is effective in a defensive

battle, but is only good at what it does, which is fight defensively; this has left Iran with an armored

corps that is obsolete in the short term.

This begs the question, what is the long term future of Iran's armored force. While the short

term strategy of focusing on defensive warfare and anti-armor technology is working for now, it does

have a long term flaw. As we are seeing now, Iran's armored forces are languishing, programs like the

Mobarez, KAT-72 and Zulfiqar exist, but never progress beyond small-scale technology demonstrators

for a want of funds, the money is just flowing elsewhere right now

This is why the real test is to see whether domestic industries can successfully emerge in the

next decade or two. The projects demonstrate feasibility, of that there is no question, but when we

finally see Zulfiqar-5's being rolled out of the factory, and equipping IRIA divisions can we declare

Iran's armored force satisfactory, up until that point, anything else is merely a stop-gap measure.

1.6.2 – Inventory - Soft-Skin Vehicles

Motorcycles

Motorcycles are omnipresent within the Iranian military, almost defining their preference for

fast, non-traditional tactics then for a conventional military. They function almost as modern-day

dragoons. Note that this section refers to both two-wheeled bikes as well as 4-wheeled ATV's, though

the former are far more common.

Motor-bikes are deployed throughout the ground forces, in the marines, IRGCGF, and the IRIA.

They are commonly deployed at the squad level in hunter-killer teams, such as with a team of 5+ bikes

of two men each carrying RPG's and assault rifles. Other organizations include mechanizing an entire

squad or platoon, complete with rifleman, support gunners, and anti-air/tank soldiers. It's also not

uncommon to see a "swarm" of motor-bikes with 10-20 RPG's and supporting rifleman. Sniper teams

are also a common sight on motorbikes.

The exact type of motor-bike varies,

though they are often commercial models, such

as Honda, converted for military use. One point

of note is that they are often unpainted and

appear in their bright-red factory finish. One

explanation for this might be that they just

haven't been painted yet or that it's just laziness;

another might be that it's just another

camouflage pattern. While this might seem

counterintuitive, by blending in with the rest of

the thousands of Iranian bikes on any major

street, they are better allowing themselves to

blend in with the environment they intend to

fight in, the urban battleground rather then

singling themselves out as a military target.

Some videos of exercises actually show Basij and IRGC conducting military drills on motorcycles in a

bustling cityscape, giving some indication on how they might be used in urban terrain.

In the war with Iraq, Iran used motorcycles in this manner to destroy Iraqi armor by running

circles around the cumbersome tanks with their slow-to-traverse turrets. These tactics depended on

the lack of infantry support for the armor, a situation that is unlikely to be the case with any ground

battles against US or even GCC Arab states.

This brings up questions of their effectiveness in combat. To get a good idea, we have only look

to Iran's neighbor Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have a long history of using Honda

motorcycles as transportation and to mount ambushes against ISAF/NATO and GOA forces. Even the

US has taken to deploying motorcycles. The advantage to this is the maneuverability; geography in

many parts of Iran, such as the Alborz and Zagros mountains, is similar to that in Afghanistan, and the

small mobile motorbikes can go places a tank, APC or even a truck can't, the same holds true on the

opposite type of terrain, within Iranian cities with their twisting alleyways and congested buildings.

Another advantage to these systems is that they're smaller, and by this virtue they attract less

An RPG "hunter-killer" team from a commando unit attached

to the 88th armored division

attention and are easier to hide then any other vehicle.

Ultimately, as with so many other weapons, their effectiveness depends on their use. If used to

set up ambushes and carry hunter-killer teams across cities or mountains the Iranians might have a

deadly system, but if used to launch a charge across flatlands they would likely be mowed down by

tanks or gunships.

Ranger and Samandar Tactical

Vehicles

The Ranger (literally

‘Ranger’/ رنجر rather then the

Persian word for ranger as one

might expect) as well as the

Samandar are light tactical vehicles

that are comparable to the US

DPV/FAV/LSV with the Samandar

being a veritable copy in terms of

configuration. Neither vehicle is

reported to have entered serial

production.

Both types are built on a

light sand-rail frame and emphasize

off-road mobility and speed. Both

have a crew of 3 and mount a

machinegun. This however remains

the only concrete details on the two

vehicles.

Samandar during Army Day 2010 – or at least one version of it. Slight

differences between it and the model that was shown later in the year exist,

however these slight changes are consistent with Irans history of prototype

development

Ranger during Sacred Defense Week 2010 - note the presence of Akhgar minigun

¼ Ton Tactical Vehicle

Safir

Crew: 1+5

Weight: 1.5 tonne

Length: 3.51 m

Width: 1.69 m

Height: 1.88 m

Engine: Nissan 105 hp Z24

Max Speed: 130 km/h

Max Range: 500 km

Weapons: 106 mm or 76 mm recoilless rifle or

12.7 mm MG, or mortar or Toophan

ATGM, or 107 mm MLRS

Capacity: .6-.75 tonne (1/4 ton)

¼ Ton tactical vehicles are among the most common vehicles in the IRIGF, serving as transports,

weapon platforms and multipurpose vehicles. Iran's stock centers around the ubiquitous “Jeep” design

and includes the M-38 and it's civilian counterpart, the CJ-5 named 'Shahbaz' in Iran, which has an M-

151 style front-grill, leading to some confusion over a vehicles actual ID. Also used is the later M-151

and rarely, a few other types such a land rover, or a Soviet Gaz, but these are rarely used.

Safir

The Safir is a ¼ ton tactical vehicle modeled after the

M-38 light utility vehicle. A new generation of 1 ¼ ton-

class Safir tactical vehicles is under development.

However, no hard data is available yet.

The Safir is a light, open topped utility vehicle

with optional soft cover. It's suspension is beam-axle,

which is one of the way's to tell it's based off the M-38

rather then the later M-151 also in Iran's inventory.

The Safir can be distinguished from the M-38 by its

sharper angled body panels, hood and by its distinctive

grill.

The Safir features a new 105 hp Nissan Z24 engine. It can be outfitted in various forms, from a 4 seat

passenger model to carrying weapons such as 107 mm MLRS system, recoilless rifles or ATGM's.

IRGC Safir tactical vehicle

Prototype of the 1 ¼ ton Safir Photo Credit:

Internet/Military.ir/Mir Hossaini

Land Cruiser

Toyota Land Cruiser

Crew: 1+5-8

Weight: 3.2 tonnes

Length: ~4.9 m*

Width: ~1.8 m*

Weight: ~2.0 m*

Engine: 240 hp 1HZ Diesel

Max Speed: NA

Max Range: NA

Weapons: 12.7 mm MG, Zu-23-2, 81/82/120

mm mortar, 122 mm rocket

Capacity: NA

*specifications for the SUV version, the truck version is roughly

the same but might differ by a small degree

The Toyota 70 series pickup truck is another

common light troop transport in service all across

the services especially patrolling the rugged eastern

border region. Overall, the light truck is very much

like the Safir, intended to provide a light, fast all-

terrain capability but with a larger carrying capacity.

It can carry 5-8 troops in it's bed, or it can

have a number of weapons systems installed, such

as the Zu-23-2, 12.7 mm machine-gun or an

81/82/120 mm mortar. One interesting version

replaces the bed of the truck with an 8 round 122

mm MLRS.

Land Cruiser with the 30th Infantry Division in Gorgan

Land Cruiser with border police near Zahedan

3/4 ton Tactical Vehicles

Sepehr (2 door) Sepehr (4 door) Toofan Thistle

Crew: NA NA 1+7 NA

Weight: NA NA NA NA

Length: NA NA NA 4.6 m

Width: NA NA NA 1.9 m

Height: NA NA NA 2.2 m

Engine: Unknown 139 hp Unknown 139 hp NA NA

Max Range: NA NA NA 700 km

Max Speed: NA NA NA 120 km/h

Weapons: 12.7 mm MG, Zu-

23-2, other

none 30 mm 2A42

autocannon,

other

NA

Capacity: .68 tonne (3/4

ton)

.68 tonne (3/4

ton)

.68 tonne (3/4

ton)

.68 tonne (3/4

ton)

NA=Unknown

Sepehr Note: The name may either be "Sepher", meaning sky or "Sepehr"

meaning a journey or expedition.

The Sepehr is an entirely indigenous 3/4 ton tactical

vehicle. It comes in both a two-door and 4 door versions.

The production line for the vehicle was inaugurated in

February 2008.

It is powered by an unknown 139 hp engine and has a

rigid beam-axle suspension. Both versions feature almost

no armor.

The two-door version externally resembles a light truck while the 4-door version more closely

resembles an early model Humvee with a passenger compartment rather then a truck bed. The roof

and walls are still composed of a soft-shell over a metal frame. Unlike the two door version, it cannot

be fitted with weapons. It also features a front-mounted winch.

In September 2010, the “Kaviran” vehicle was unveiled which is externally identical to the Sepehr.

Sepehr on parade

Toofan

The Toofan is another incarnation of the

¾ ton design with several known styles and

development models.

What can be assumed to be the

production model of the Toofan is very similar to

the 2-door Sepehr, resembling an open topped

truck with a soft top passenger compartment

that has two rows of padded benches facing

inward which can carry at least six soldiers.

Thistle

The only official model for export, the “Thistle” is advertised by

Modlex but has not been seen in Iranian service of even at all

outside of the single front view used by the export catalogue.

Toofan (pictured left) and an unknown 3/4 ton class vehicle

that has been recently seen with a 2A42 autocannon mounted

Source: Tuning Talks Forum

1 ¼ Ton Tactical Vehicle

1.25 ton tactical vehicle

Crew: 1+1

Weight: 3.06 tonnes

Length: NA

Width: NA

Height: NA

Engine: Mercedes Benz OM364

Max Speed: 100 km/h

Max Range: NA

Weapons: none

Capacity: 1.13 tonne (1.25 ton)

NA = unknown

A relative mystery, this vehicle's name is

unknown. It is a short flatbed truck, with a large two-

door driver’s cab that can either be hard or soft-top.

The truck itself is intended to carry a variety of

modular cargo containers that appear to be custom

designed, at least in part, for the vehicle. This means

that the truck is the major carrier for Iran’s mobile EW

and networking assets and is often paired with radars

and other communication “pods”, such as the BSR-1

air-defense radar pictured right.

The truck relies on a Mercedes Benz OM364

engine with 120 liter fuel capacity and a combination

leaf-spring and telescopic shock absorber beam axle

suspension as well as a 5-gear transmission.

Inventory - Soft Skin Vehicles Analysis

Iran's stock of light, soft-skin vehicles, such as the Safir, Toofan and Toyota Land Cruiser, are the

most common vehicles within the Iranian military (in addition to the larger 5-ton class trucks which

are not mentioned here), they are used for mechanization, scouting, support, and for direct offensive

operations. They even have, to some extent, been used as a substitute for armor support and true

mechanization.

As with Iran's use of anti-tank and anti-ship missiles, the favoring of vehicles like motorcycles

and other light-weight tactical vehicles are another part of the choice by Iran to fight their otherwise

superior enemies by throwing up a foil rather then facing them directly, in what I am calling 'counter-

technology'.

Vehicles like Jeep's and motorcycles enable Iran to maintain a mobile force with an all-terrain

capability, all while remaining relatively independent of the long supply chains that heavier vehicles

necessitate. The primary advantage would be in a large conflict with any of their more heavily

armored neighbors, the mountainous and varied Iranian terrain would be more conducive to light

transportation. However it should be mentioned that this advantage is entirely dependent on Iranian

tactics, this advantage would be lost should they allow themselves to be drawn out into open ground,

an unlikely, but not inconceivable situation.

Another often overlooked advantage lies in the status quo. Iran's current war against smugglers

and insurgents in the eastern border regions necessitates lightweight troop carriers like 4WD trucks to

navigate the treacherous canyons and mountains of Khoresan and Baluchistan.

They're also largely a substitute for armor in the infantry mechanization role when there just

aren't enough APC's and IFV's to go around - which is always. This is a move more of convenience then

anything else, they don't have enough AFV's, so they are forced to use trucks and Jeep's. It's literally a

choice of either use these vehicles in place of armor, or march on foot, which just isn't an option on

the modern battlefield. This is largely because soft-skin vehicles are cheaper and easier to produce.

This translates into an easy alternative to the pressing need by the army.

However this doesn't come without a cost, easily apparent in the very name of the class of

vehicles - "soft skinned". Cars and trucks like those used don't afford any protection to their

occupants. BMP’s may get a bad rap due to their vulnerabilities to weapons like RPG's, but compared

to a Land Cruiser, it's downright luxurious. Combine this with a battlefield where individual soldiers

has access to powerful, accurate weapons and the potential for mass casualties on the Iranian side is

apparent.

The gamble Iran is making is that the agility granted by these vehicles as well as the use of

concealment can overcome, at least somewhat, this lack of protection. As with most everything, and

as is specifically mentioned under the motorcycle section, it will entirely depend on how they're used.

1.6.3 – Inventory - Artillery

Iran's artillery force emerged from the Iran-Iraq war in relatively strong shape compared to the

rest of their forces; this was due in part to the tactics employed near the tail end of the war which

emphasized long-ranged attrition over maneuver combat.

However, because of this, a large portion of their stock consists of towed artillery while only a

small part consists of self-propelled guns. However, in recent years Iran has shifted toward focusing

production on lightweight mobile towed guns such as a domestic copy of the D-30 as well as

producing their own type of self-propelled guns, such as the advanced Raad-2 as well as investing in

credible upgrades for their MLRS's.

Artillery units exist, both as independent artillery "groups" which are composed of three

artillery battalions, and as integrated artillery battalions within regular divisions and brigades.

Self-propelled guns are usually deployed in battalion's with 3 batteries of 4 guns each. This

compares to the normal 16-gun battalions found elsewhere. Towed gun battalions on the other hand

have on average 3 batteries of 6 guns each, though this often varies widely. These are of course

supported by numerous towing trucks, repair facilities, personnel transports and other support

vehicles.

MLRS systems, at least the larger calibers (Fajr series), are organized into battalions of 16

launchers. The organization starts out as a "troop" with four launchers each, as well as a repair truck,

two transports, and two loading vehicles. Two troops make up a battery that has an added command

vehicle. Four batteries then make up a battalion.

One point of note is the chemical and biological capability of Iran's artillery. A good portion of

the available information about Iran's artillery makes a specific point of noting which rockets and

shells are capable of carrying CBW's, which is nearly all of them. While this isn't false, it also isn't the

whole truth. The explicit mention of this capability often becomes transformed into presenting Iran as

a country which is capable and willing to use CBW's, a situation which is an overblown legacy of the

mis-perceptions surrounding the Iranian use of chemicals during the Iran-Iraq war. At the end of the

day, while it is possible for Iran to use CBW's on rockets and artillery shells, it is very unlikely as they

have never expressed a proclivity for their use, and due to the fact they were on the receiving end of

chemical-warfare during their war with Iraq, it is exceptionally unlikely that they would ever be used.

Artillery - Mortars

60 mm

HM-12 Fateh HM-13 Narollah HM-14

Caliber: 60 mm 60 mm 60 mm

Barrel Length: 570.5 mm 570.5 mm 740.5 mm

Max Range: 1,050 m 800 m 2,550 m

Min Range: 100 m 200 m 150 m

Elevation: 45 - 85 45-85 45-85

Traverse: 360 360 360

ROF: 20 rd/min 20 rd/min 30 rd/min

Weight: 6.25 kg 8 kg 17.5 kg

The smallest mortar in Iranian service, there are three distinct kinds of the 60 mm "Hadid"

mortars. Each is man-portable and designed to be operated by an individual.

The first, the HM-12 Fateh, features a spade-type baseplate like that found on the British 51

mm mortar as well as a carrying handle and locking angle markers. It also has a carrying handle and a

cap that protects the mortar from the elements. The maximum range of

the system is 1,050 meters.

The HM-13 on the other hand is little more then a firing tube with

protective webbing and cap. The lack of a baseplate or any aiming

mechanism beyond an aiming line on the barrel reduces the effective

maximum range to 800 m.

The HM-14 features an adjustable bipod and a full-sized base plate

as well as a simple optical sight.

All three mortars fire fin-stabilized 1.80 kg HE or smoke rounds. Mortars

can accept either the AZ111-A2 impact fuse, or the M120 proximity fuse.

HM14

HM13 HM12

81 mm

HM-15 Hadid

Caliber: 81 mm

Barrel Length: 1.55 m

Max Range: 4,900 m

Min Range: 150 m

Elevation: 45-85

Traverse: NA

ROF: 20 rd/min

Weight: 50.5 kg

NA = unknown or not applicable

The 81 mm HM-15 features a 1.7 meter long tube on a bipod with locking angle markers and a

large base-plate. An ET-1 elbow telescope is used for sighting. It can also use the HM32 sight for

indirect sightings, which includes illumination for low-light and nighttime operation.

It is often mounted on vehicles such as the Safir or the Land Cruiser, or towed behind them,

but it can also be carried by dismounted infantry.

The HM-15 has a max range of 4.5 km and fires fin-stabilized 4.05 kg HE, 3.01 smoke and 4.5 kg

illumination rounds. Mortars can accept either the AZ111-A2 impact fuse, or the M120 proximity fuse

81 mm HM15

120 mm

HM-16 Razm

Caliber: 120 mm 120 mm

Barrel Length: 1.72 m NA

Max Range: 6 km (10.06 and 16 km w/ extended

range shell)

6 km (10.06 and 16 km w/ extended

range shell)

Min Range: 250 m NA

Elevation: 45-85 NA

ROF: 10 rd/min NA

Weight: 138.5 kg NA

HM-16

The mortar is largely the same as the HM-15 with a large base-

plate and a bipod with locking angle markers and an ET-1 telescope. It

can also use the HM32 sight for indirect sightings, which includes

illumination for low-light operation.

The HM-15 has been adapted for use in the Boragh mortar

carrier. Instead of a base-plate, it is locked into an integrated rotating

base. In addition to these modes, it is still nominally man-portable.

It fires 13 kg HE and smoke rounds out to 6 km and 12 kg

illumination rounds out to 5.7 km. It also can fire the

16.7 kg extended range HE shell out to 10 km. Mortars

can accept either the AZ111-A2 impact fuse, or the

M120 proximity fuse. More recently, an extreme-long

range shell was unveiled alongside the Razm with a

range of 16 km. It is assumed to be backward

compatible with the HM-15.

Razm

The Razm is the 2nd

generation of Iranian 120

mm mortar tube systems. It is composed of a 120 mm

mortar tube with an exceptionally large base plate.

Because of this, it is unlikely that it would be deployed

as a man-portable weapon like the HM-15. It was

displayed mounted in both the Toyota Land Cruiser

truck and the Kaviran tactical vehicle.

HM-15

Razm mounted in a Kaviran tactical vehicle

Extreme long range mortar bomb unveiled alongsize

the Razm

1.4.3.2 - Artillery - Towed Guns

M-101

M-101A1

Caliber: 105 mm

Barrel Length: 2.31 m

Weight: 2.26 tonnes

Length: 5.94 m

Width: 2.21 m

Height: 1.73 m

Max Range: 11.27 km

ROF: NA

Traverse: 46

Elevation: -5 - 66

Ammunition: HE, illumination, smoke, chemical

Crew: NA

NA = unknown

The smallest of Iran's towed guns, the 105 mm howitzer is supported on a single-axle, split-trail

carriage. On top of this is a 105 mm M2A2 cannon with a hydro-pneumatic shock absorber which can

fire semi-fixed rounds of HE, illumination, or smoke shells out to 11.5 km.

Most estimates put around 200 out of the original 250 M-101's left in service. Shells can accept

the M203-A proximity fuse.

M-101 on parade with the 23rd commando division on

Armed Forces day 2010

D-74 / Type-60

D-74 / Type-60

Caliber: 122 mm

Barrel Length: 6.45 m

Weight: 5.62 tonnes

Length: 9.87 m

Width: 2.35 m

Height: NA

Max Range: 24 km

ROF: 8-10 rd/min

Traverse: 45

Elevation: -5 - 45

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination, chemical

Crew: 7-9

NA = unknown

The D-74, as well its Chinese copy,

the Type 60, serve within IRGC artillery

battalions.

The gun shares the same type of

single-axle, split-trail carriage as the D-20.

This supports a 122 mm cannon with a

long 6.4 m barrel with a double-baffle

muzzle brake.

Exact ammunition is unknown,

though it is likely the same as the others,

semi-fixed HE, smoke and illumination

shells.

100 were originally delivered

during the Iran-Iraq war with an unknown amount remaining, likely fairly close to the original number.

They remain in service, at the least, with IRGC artillery battalions within armored units.

D-74 / Type-60 pictured left

HM-40 / D-30

HM-40 / D-30

Caliber: 122 mm

Barrel Length: 5.88 m

Weight: 3.21 tonnes

Length: 5.4 m (transport configuration)

Width: 1.9 m (transport configuration)

Height: 1.6 m (transport configuration)

Max Range: 15.4 km

ROF: 1-8 rd/min

Traverse: 360

Elevation: -7-70

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination

Crew: 7

NA = unknown

The D-30 is a primary medium-weight gun within artillery battalions. It is an effective design

intended to be mobile but still pack the punch of a larger gun against relatively un-entrenched units.

Iran domestically manufactures the D-30 under the name HM-40.

It features a distinctive tripod design which allows it a full 360 degree traverse range. However

this the gun from fully elevating when located directly in line with each leg. It's extremely low

depression allows it to be used in the direct fire role.

The 122 mm 2A18 cannon is the same used on the 2S1 self-propelled howitzer. The gun has a

very distinctive box-shaped cover on the recoil mechanism, making it easy to identify. It also features

either a double-baffle or cylindrical muzzle brake. It can fire a variety of semi-fixed ammunition

including HE, smoke, and illumination rounds. Shells can accept the M203-A proximity fuse.

In the late 90's, Russia delivered 100 D-30's directly to Iran. Iran has also produced an

unspecified number under the name HM-40. Given the ease of manufacture it is likely the number is

much higher, some estimates put the total number now at around 500.

HM-40 as advertised by Diomil

M-46 / Type-59

M-46 / Type-59

Caliber: 130 mm

Barrel Length: NA

Weight: 7.69 tonnes

Length: 11.73 m

Width: 2.45 m

Height: NA

Max Range: 27.5 km (36 w/ BB. 42 km w/RAP)

ROF: 5-8 rd/min

Traverse: 50

Elevation: -2.5 - 45

Ammunition: HE,, HE-RAP, illumination, smoke,

chemical

Crew: 8

NA = unknown

The 130 mm M-46, or more usually, the Type-59 Chinese copy, is one of the most numerous

towed artillery pieces in Iranian inventory. This came on the tail end of Iran-Iraq war where the war

had devolved into a war of attrition featuring artillery duels where guns like the D-30 were too short

ranged and weak to effectively target well-entrenched positions and there was no need for its

mobility, this produced a situation that favored the long-ranged static fire of guns like the M-46.

Iranian M-46's fire standard HE, smoke rounds, HEAT sub-munitions as well as HE base-bleed

shells which boost the range from 27.5 km to 36 km, and more recently HE-RAP shells. Shells can

accept the M203-A proximity fuse.

Iran purchased 1,006 M-46/Type-59's, both from China as well as from North Korea during the Iran-

Iraq war. These remain service as the backbone as many of the artillery groups. Some estimates put

the remaining number in service as around 800. Iran is not domestically producing this gun meaning it

is likely slated for removal from front-line service in favor of larger calibers.

D-20

Little is known about the possible deployment of this weapon, if it is used at all.

M-46 on exercise with the IRIA in June 2009

HM-41 / M-114

HM-41

Caliber: 155 mm

Barrel Length: 6.03 m

Weight: 6.89 tonnes

Length: NA

Width: NA

Height: NA

Max Range: 30 km

ROF: 4 rd/min

Traverse: 25 - 23.5

Elevation: 0 - 66

Ammunition: HE, illumination, smoke, chemical,

HE base bleed

Crew: ~11

NA = unknown

The 155 mm HM-41 is a domestic upgrade and production line of the M114 howitzer originally

delivered from the US in the 1960's. The gun is a medium battlefield howitzer and is experiencing an

increased presence in Iran's inventory following domestic production.

The gun features a conventional carriage with a single-axle split-trail design.

The original M-114 had a short barrel with no muzzle brake, while the HM-41's barrel has been

lengthened and features a double baffle muzzle brake.

Iran now manufactures a variety of semi-fixed ammunition for the new HM-41's, including HE,

smoke, illumination, HEAT sub-munitions and HE-base bleed shells. Shells can accept the M203-A

proximity fuse.

The original number of M-114's delivered, reduced during the Iran-Iraq war has now been

boosted by an unknown amount by indigenous production

of the HM-41.

Early in 2011, a variant of the HM-41 was unveiled that

mounted the gun on the rear of a MAN truck. The role of

such a system would be to provide a low cost, self-propelled

artillery support capability to units that would otherwise be

forced to rely on towed guns due to a shortage of

conventional self-propelled units.

HM-41

GHN-45

GHN-45

Caliber: 155 mm

Barrel Length: NA

Weight: 11 tonnes

Length: 14 m

Width: NA

Height: 2 m

Max Range: 39.6 km (w/ base bleed)

ROF: 2-5 rd/min

Traverse: 534 - 711

Elevation: -89 - 1280

Ammunition: HE, illumination, smoke, chemical,

HE base bleed

Crew: NA

NA = unknown

Purchased illegally from Austria during the Iran-Iraq war, the 155 mm howitzer is another long-

ranged gun that was heavily favored during the Iran-Iraq war for its long range and power which was

deemed superior to the 130 mm M-46.

Unlike most towed guns in the Iranian inventory, the GHN-45 has a double-axle design for its

carriage, while maintaining the usual split-trails. The gun has a distinctive hydro-pneumatic recoil

system.

It fires 155 mm shells including HE, smoke, illumination, HEAT sub-munitions and HE-base

bleed. Shells can accept the M203-A proximity fuse.

300 were originally purchased from Austria, current estimates put the remaining number at

100. It still maintains a prominent role within Artesh units on the western border with Iraq.

GHN-45, pictured left, with a 122 MLRS system to the

right

M-115

M-115

Caliber: 203 mm

Barrel Length: 5.14 m

Weight: 14.51 tonnes

Length: 10.97 m

Width: NA

Height: NA

Effective Range:* 16.8 km

ROF: .5 - 1 rd/min

Traverse: 60

Elevation: -2 - 65

Ammunition: HE

Crew: 14

NA = unknown

* = maximum not available

The largest of Iranian towed artillery, the massive 203 mm M-115 is a super-heavy howitzer. It

features a double-axle design much like the GHN-45 and a large, short barrel with a hydro-pneumatic

recoil system. Out of the original 50 delivered, only handfuls remain in service with the army in

Isfahan; estimates put 30 still in service. Shells can accept the M203-A proximity fuse.

M115 on parade

Artillery - Self-Propelled Guns

M-107 / M-110

M107 M110

Caliber: 175 mm 203 mm

Barrel

Length:

NA NA

Weight: 28.3 tonnes 28.3 tonnes

Length: 6.46 m 5.72 m

Width: 3.15 m 3.15 m

Height: 3.47 m 3.47 m

Max Speed: 80 km/h 54.7 km/h

Engine: 450 hp GM 8-cylinder 405 hp GM 8-cylinder

Ammunition: HE HE

Max Range: 34 km 16.8 km

ROF: 1-2 rnd/min 1-2 rnd/min

Traverse: 360 NA

Elevation: -5 - 65 NA

Crew: 5 5

NA = unknown

The 175 mm M-107 along with its

bigger brother, the 203 mm M-110 are heavy

guns designed for the massive bombardments

needed to stop cold-war era formations.

The chassis is the same on both

models, a tracked body with five road-wheels

with the engine front and right and featuring a

hydraulic spade attached to the rear that could

be lowered for stabilization. The vehicle is

powered by a 450 hp GM 8-cylinder engine.

The gun is what differentiates the M-

107 from the M-110; the M-107 features a longer 175 mm gun which is mounted in an unprotected

base at the rear of the hull. It has a power traverse operated by a hydraulic pump. This can fire a 66.6

kg HE shell up to 34 m. The M-110 on the other hand has a 203 mm howitzer gun designed for short,

lobbing shots of a 90.7 kg HE shell. Both guns have no muzzle brakes. Shells can accept the M203-A

proximity fuse.

M110 (front) and an M107(behind) at an 2009 Armed Forces Day

show in Tehran

It is unclear how many are left in service; while some are definitely still active, estimates put

the number at around 25 M-107's and 30 M-110's out of the 38 and 40 respectively, delivered.

M109

M-109A1

Caliber: 155 mm

Barrel Length: 6.03 m

Weight: 24.94 tonnes

Length: 6.11 m

Width: 3.1 m

Height: 3.3 m

Max Speed: 56 km/h

Engine: 450 hp diesel.

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination

Max Range: 18.1 km

ROF: 1-4 rnd/min

Traverse: 360

Elevation: NA

Crew: 6

NA = unknown

The most common self-propelled gun in Iran's inventory, the M109 is a general-purpose SPG

and is a common feature in IRIA artillery battalions.

The hull is tracked and has 7 road-wheels with a forward engine compartment and a fully

enclosed turret to the rear.

The turret provides a semblance of armor, enough to protect against shrapnel and small arms,

but not against direct fire. The system was originally delivered with the 155 mm M126A1 cannon,

though they may now be replaced by the HM-44, a domestic Iranian copy of the M185. Sighting is

accomplished via direct, or indirect sights. They have been upgraded with fire-control systems that are

likely similar to the Raad-2 layout (see below).

The 155 mm cannon can fire HE, smoke, HEAT sub-munitions and illuminating rounds 18.1 km

and base-bleed shells out to 24 km. Shells can accept the M203-A proximity fuse.

The only estimates on the number in service put the number at 150-180.

M109A1 on exercise with the IRIA in western Iran

2S1 Gvozdika

2S1 Gvozdika

Caliber: 122 mm

Barrel Length: 5.06 m

Weight: 14.51 tonnes

Length: 7.26 m

Width: 2.85 m

Height: 2.73 m

Max Speed: 60 km/h

Engine: NA

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination

Max Range: 15.4 km

ROF: 4-5 rnd/min

Traverse: 360

Elevation: -7 - 70

Crew: 4

NA = unknown

The first attempt to repair the mobile artillery service following the Iran-Iraq war; the 122 mm

2S1 Gvozdika is a tracked, amphibious light howitzer.

The turret provides minimal protection as with the M-109 and houses a 122 mm 2A18 cannon,

the same used on the D-30 towed howitzer. The improved recoil mechanism within the turret

improves the stability of the platform compared to the towed gun; loading is assisted by an automatic

loader. The gun can fire HE, smoke or illumination rounds. Shells can accept the M203-A proximity

fuse.

Iran procured 60, maybe 80 Gvozdika's, enough to equip the few IRGCGF battalion's they are

deployed with.

IRGC Gvozdika's near Tehran - May 2009

Raad-1

Raad-1

Caliber: 122 mm

Barrel Length: 5.06 m

Weight: NA

Length: 6.5 m

Width: 2.67 m

Height: 2.14 m (to barrel center)

Max Speed: 65 km/h

Engine: See text

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination

Max Range: 15.4 km

ROF: 4-5 rnd/

Traverse: 360

Elevation: -7 - 70

Crew: ~4

NA = unknown

The Raad-1 is the first in the family of indigenously manufactured self-propelled guns. It

combines major elements of the Boragh APC and the Russian 2S1 Gvozdika SPG.

The hull is based off the Boragh. It relies on the same 320 hp engine powering the Boragh (if

that is what the Boragh uses, see separate entry) as well as the same torsion bar suspension.

Amphibious ability has been retained as evidenced by the trim vane. The turret is mounted at the rear

of the hull, where the twin doors would be on the mortar-carrier Boragh. Maximum armor thickness is

17 mm, substantially less then the 2S1.

No noticeable external changes are apparent to the turret. However it has a new computerized

fire-control system as well as the addition of a night vision system. The Raad-1 can carry 35 rounds for

the gun.

The main question is whether or not Raad-1's are being produced. This also begs the question

if they are producing the 2S1 turrets or just reusing one from the original 2S1's, this obviously would

limit the number they could build. Also, where are the Boragh bodies coming from, are they from the

pool of 190 Boraghs, or are they separate BMP-1 conversions? Lastly, would they be co-produced

along with the Raad-2, or has it been entirely replaced by the later model? Many of these remain

unanswered, but it is that because we haven't seen any production plants, or any on parade compared

to the numerous sightings of the Raad-2, this leads one to believe the Raad-1 was just a prototype.

Raad-1, clearly showing influences from both the 2S1 and the

Boragh

Raad-2

Raad-2 Raad-2M

Caliber: 155 mm 155 mm

Barrel Length: 6.03 m 6.03 m

Weight: 36 tonnes 36 tonnes

Length: 9.14 m (incl. barrel) 9.05 m

Width: 3.38 m 3.38 m

Height: 2.60 m 2.60 m

Max Speed: NA NA

Engine: 840 hp V-84MS 700 hp 5TDF

Ammunition: HE, smoke, illumination, BB HE, smoke, illumination, BB

Max Range: 18.1 km, 24 km w/BB 18.1 km, 24 km w/BB

ROF: 1-4 rnd/min 1-4 rnd/min

Traverse: 360 360

Elevation: NA -3 - 75

Crew: 5 5

NA = unknown

The successor to the Raad-1

program, the Raad-2 exhibits a much

closer similarity to the 155 mm M-109

SPG with major influences from the

Russian "T-series" tanks. The Raad-2

program comprises two different models,

the Raad-2 and the Raad-2M.

The turret and gun is the same on

both models. It uses the 155 mm M185

cannon, the same as on the M109A2-A4.

This is odd considering how Iran was only

ever delivered the M109A1. However

there are multiple ways Iran could have

got their hands on a later system,

including, purchase from the grey/black-market, or previously-available technical documentation. The

gun-control system has been retrofitted with an automatic turret-laying system, night-vision, GPS (it is

unclear if this is navigation only or for targeting as well) and a fire-control computer. The gun is fitted

with an auto-loading system, which would explain the reduction in crew size to 5. The turret also

features a "boxier" appearance compared to the original M109 with slab sides instead of a curved

profile. The platform carries 30 rounds internally.

Raad-2 on parade

The hull bears some similarity to the M-109, however this is only superficial, notably, the road

wheels, suspension and drive train are derived from the T-72.

Compared to the M-109, it weighs significantly more, at 36 tonnes. Although interestingly

enough, the weight doesn't come from the armor, which has been actually reduced by a 1 cm in the

heaviest areas (now with a maximum of 2 cm) when compared to the M-109.

The difference between the two models is

in the engines, the Raad-2 features a

powerful 840 hp V-84MS diesel engine.

The Raad-2M on the other hand has the

Ukrainian-made 700 hp 5TDF engine. The

Raad-2 is far more common then the Raad-

2M

Other features include an air-conditioning

system, automatic fire-extinguishing

system, digital communication, networked

displays, and NBC protection

The number of Raad-2's, both -2 and -2M's

in service is unknown. The most likely

limiting factor with regard to production is

the engines. Unfortunately, no export records exist of the original number of engines purchased by

Iran, to say nothing of the possibility that they are now producing them. However, given that we have

seen them in the current camouflage of at least 3 unique units (2 IRGC and 1 IRIA) and because it is a

safe bet that the smallest deployed unit size is battalion, we can make the assumption that there, are

at the bare minimum, 36+ currently in service.

The Raad-2 is a solid improvement to Iran's artillery inventory. The improvements to the power

pack as well as the significant, if unverifiable, upgrades to the fire-control and targeting mechanism

could well make the Raad-2 equivalent to the newer (if not newest) generations of the M-109.

Raad-2M: Note that Diomil mirrors their images, so the -2M actually

has the exhaust on the right side of the hull, not the left as it appears

here. Another dead giveaway to this mirroring technique is the

position of the periscope on the turret.

M-178 Koksan

M-1978

Caliber: 170 mm

Barrel Length: NA

Weight: NA

Length: 6.45 m (hull)

Width: 3.37 m (hull)

Height: NA

Max Speed: NA

Engine: NA

Ammunition: NA

Max Range: 40 -60 km (RAP shell)

ROF: 1-2 rnd / 5 m

Traverse: NA

Elevation: NA

Crew: NA

The M-1978 Koksan is a massive North Korean artillery piece based on a turret-less Type-59

tank chassis with two stabilizing spades at the rear.

The gun is 170 mm, though of an indeterminate origin. It is mounted near the rear of the hull

without a superstructure, much like the US M107 also in Iran's inventory. It has no on board

ammunition supply.

Iran purchased at least 20-30 from North Korea during the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war;

however several were captured by Iraqi forces during fighting. The remaining number, around a

battalion sized element, serves with the IRGC forces in the Kerman province. The small number

remaining indicates that this is likely the only unit they remain in service with.

M-1978, pictured in front of the BMP-2 and behind the towed guns,

during a parade in Kerman

1.4.3.4 - Artillery - Multiple Launch Rocket Systems

107 mm

Single Double 12 round -

vehicle

12 round -

towed

RL-11 RL-19 Haseb Rocket

Caliber: 107 mm 107 mm 107 mm 107 mm 107 mm 107 mm 107 mm

Weight: 12.5 kg 39 kg 430 kg 475 kg 280 kg 400 kg 19 kg

Length: 80 cm

(barrel )

80 cm

(barrel )

93 cm 280 cm 90 cm

(barrel )

90 cm

(barrel)

83.7 cm

Width NA NA 140 cm 235 cm NA NA NA

Height NA NA 81 cm 102 cm NA NA NA

Barrels: 1 2 12 12 11 19 NA

Max Range: 8.5 km 8.5 km 8.5 km 8.5 km 8.5 km 8.5 km 8.5 km

ROF: NA NA 12 / 6-10 s 12 / 6-10 s 11 / 7-9 s 19 / 19-20 s NA

Elevation: 0 - 45 0 - 50 0 - 60 0 - 60 5 - 45 5 - 45 NA

Traverse: -11 - 11 -10 - 10 -50 - 15 -50 - 15 -90 - 90 -90 - 90 NA

Warhead: NA NA NA NA NA NA 6.39 kg

NA = unknown or not applicable

The 107 mm rocket system is a short range support weapon designed to provide saturation fire

in a relatively mobile package. It can be used in both direct and indirect fire. Indirect fire sighting is

accomplished by optics similar to mortar sights. The rocket most commonly has a contact fuse, but

can also be equipped with a proximity fuse.

The single and double launchers are deployed in

man portable configuration officially intended for use by

irregular forces. This was displayed in Iraq when

insurgents used 107 mm rockets in scattered attacks

against US and GOI (government of Iraq) facilities.

The larger 12-round carriers can both be

mounted directly on vehicles like the Safir, or towed

behind trucks on a wheeled carriage, as well as being

moderately man-portable.

There is also a naval variation which features a bank of 11 or 19 rockets which are gyro

stabilized in an electrically controlled mount and with a rudimentary fire control. These are sometimes

referred to as RL.2’s and RL.4’s which may be a slightly different earlier version.

These systems fire the unguided 107 mm Haseb rocket which is spin stabilized and can be fitted

with an immediate or delayed impact fuse, and less commonly, a proximity fuse. It has an 8.5 m range

107 mm rockets mounted on a Safir Jeep

and it carries a 6.39 kg HE or HEI warhead. The lethal radius is 12.5 m. They are sometimes referred to

as the Fajr-1

122 mm

Launcher: HM-20 HM-21 HM-23 Rocket: Arash 1 Arash 2 Noor/Arash 3

Caliber: 122 mm 122 mm 122

mm

Caliber 122 mm 122 mm 122 mm

Weight: 13.15

tonnes

90 kg 800 kg Weight: 65 kg 72 kg 45 kg

Length: 3 m 3 or 1.9 m 1.9 m Length: 2.81 m 3.2 m 2.05 m

Barrels: 40 1 8 or 16 Max Range: 21.5 km 30 km 18 km

ROF: 1/0.7 s - NA CEP: NA NA NA

Elevation: -1 - 55 5 - 50 -1 - 25 Warhead: 18.3 kg 18.3 kg 18.3 kg

Traverse: 72-102 -12 -12 360

NA = unknown

The 122 mm rocket systems are a step

up from the 107 mm, transitioning from

infantry support to full-size artillery designed

to provide a high volume of rapid indirect fire

against large area targets.

The HM-20-1 is actually closer to the

107 mm single and double launchers in terms

of doctrinal use. Its single-launch nature

means it's more ideally suited for irregular

troops or a guerrilla insurgency.

The HM-20 is four banks of 10 tubes in

two sections, which is one way to tell them apart from single large mass found on of the BM-11/21.

The system is mounted on a variety of 6x6 vehicles such as the MAN truck pictured above. It features a

hydraulic traversing and elevating system with electronic firing controls.

As with the 107 mm, a naval version also exists, the HM-23 which features an 8 or 16 barrel

launcher. The HM-23 has also been used on ground vehicles, in one instance replacing the bed on a

Land Cruiser truck.

In addition to this, Iran maintains sizable stocks of the original BM-11 and BM-21 MLRS launchers.

Some types use the same telescopic and panoramic sights as the BM-21 while others use an

unknown fire-control system.

Three rocket types exist, all unguided, the first, the Noor, sometimes called the Arash 3, is the

smallest and has the shortest range. The Arash 1 and Arash 2 provide a boost in the maximum range of

the system. All of them can be carried in racks which facilitate quick reloading. Iranian 122mm rockets

carry a basic HE warhead as well as AP and AT submunitions, while HE-FRAG, and fuel-air explosives

are suspected. It carries both an impact and 'M-112K' proximity fuse. The rockets are both spin and

fin stabilized.

Oghab

Oghab

Caliber: 230 mm

Weight: 360 kg

Length: 4.82 m

Barrels: 3

Max Range: 34-45 km

CEP: 500 m

Warhead: 70 kg

ROF: NA

Elevation: NA

Traverse: NA

NA = unknown or not applicable

An early product of Iran's foray into indigenous artillery systems, the Oghab had several early

setbacks, but eventually saw extensive use at the tail end of the Iran-Iraq war. It was heavily

influenced by the Chinese Type-83 MLRS.

The Oghab is fired from a three rail launcher mounted on the back of a Mercedes Benz 4x4, it's

static fins differentiating it from more traditional rocket artillery fired from tubes.

The rocket has a 45 km range and a 70 kg HE, HE-FRAG or chemical warhead and is spin and fin

stabilized.

Rumors surround its possible deployment as an air-to-ground weapon, but if there were ever

any truth to these rumors, it's unlikely to be deployed as such now.

The Oghab has likely been retired from service as it has largely been supplanted by newer

systems and hasn't been seen since the time of the Iran-Iraq war.

Falaq

Falaq-1 Falaq-2

Caliber: 240 mm 333 mm

Weight: 111 kg 225 kg

Length: 1.32 m 1.82 m

Max Range: 10 km 10.8 km

CEP: NA NA

Warhead: 50 kg 120 kg

ROF: NA NA

Elevation: NA NA

Traverse: NA NA

NA = Unknown

Another short range weapon, the Falaq is similar to

the Soviet BM-24 system.

The rockets are launched from a six cell

launcher mounted on the back of a light tactical

vehicle like a pickup truck. It requires stabilizers to

be deployed before firing. Nothing is known about

the Falaq-2 launch differences, though it probably

remains the same with less total capacity due to

size constraints.

However, a single tube, man-portable

configuration is also possible and would then be

used as the same manner as described in the 107

mm section, as a weapon primarily for irregular forces (pictured right).

Both rockets are short ranged, only being able to reach out 10-11 km, though they carry large

warheads.

The Falaq does not appear to be in widespread service.

A dated image of the 6-cell launcher for the Falaq-1

Hezbollah Falaq-1

Fajr-3

Fajr-3 Launcher

Caliber: 240 mm Length: 10.45 m

Weight: 407 kg Height: 3.34 m

Length: 5.2 m Width: 2.5 m

Max Range: 43 km Max Speed: 60 km/h

Warhead: 90 kg Barrels: 12

CEP: NA ROF: NA

Elevation: 0 - 57

Traverse: 90 Left - 100

Right

NA = unknown

The Fajr-3 is a 240 mm self-propelled MLRS system originally derived from the North Korean M-

1985. Some sources say mass production began in 1990 while others say it was first tested in 1996.

This might be explained by the difference with producing a copy, and then later, testing a newer

generation of the weapon.

The weapons system was first mounted on the original 6x6 Izuzu used by the North Koreans

where the Mercedes-Benz 2631 has become the standard for newer generation models.

The MLRS itself consists of two banks of six tubes each. The rockets can be fired in a salvo, in

48-96 seconds, or individually. It is a safe bet that the same fire-control system used in the Fajr-5,

described below, is also used in the Fajr-3.

The 240 mm rockets have a 90 kg warhead, usually HE, HE-FRAG, but can likely carry

submunitions, incendiary, smoke and chemical payloads as well; they have a maximum range of 43

km. They are spin and fin stabilized, but unguided.

The inaccuracies inherent in an unguided rocket system combined with small number of

rockets that can be launched in a salvo prevent the Fajr-3 from being a truly effective system in the

tactical role.

Fajr-3 on a Mercedes-Benz 2631

Fajr-5

Fajr-5 Rocket Launcher

Caliber: 333 mm Length: 10.45 m

Weight: 915 kg Height: 2.34 m

Length: 6.48 m Width: 2.54 m

Max Range: 75 km Max Speed: 60 km/h

Warhead: 175 kg Barrels: 4

CEP: NA ROF: NA

Elevation: 0-57

Traverse: 45 Left - 45 Right

NA = unknown

The Fajr-5 uses the same mount as the Fajr-3, with

the newer generation using the Mercedes-Benz 2631

truck.

Also added is a networking system that enabled

data-links within and between batteries. Another

feature added is remote fire capability under which

the command vehicle can link all Fajr-5's within a 20

km range.

However, most interestingly is the reported

installation of a naval surface search radar which

indicates Iran might use the MLRS in an anti-shipping role. At the very least, they appear to be able to

link together with other anti-ship assets like the Noor or the Raad and share their targets.

The rockets have a 175 kg warhead, which can likely carry a variety of payloads including HE,

HE-FRAG, incendiary, smoke or sub-munitions. They are spin stabilized, but unguided.

The inaccuracies inherent in an unguided rocket system combined with small number of

rockets that can be launched in a salvo prevent the Fajr-5 from being a truly effective system.

Fajr-5 during a Basij parade - November 2008

Shahin

Shahin 1 Shahin 2

Caliber: 333 mm 333 mm

Weight: 498 kg 564 kg

Length: 3.9 m NA

Max Range: 20 km 30 km

CEP: NA NA

Warhead: 190 kg 190 kg

ROF: 3 rnd/min 3 rnd/min

Elevation: NA NA

Traverse: NA NA

NA = Unknown

Another legacy of the Iran-Iraq war, the Shahin 1

and 2 are heavy, short-mid ranged weapons a step up

from the Falaq. The Shahin 2 is a slightly larger and longer ranged version of the Shahin 1. They are

both launched from rails reminiscent of the Nazeat or Oghab more then other MLRS's,.

The rockets carry HE, HE-FRAG warheads with impact fuses and are fin-stabilized.

A version of the Shahin, the Shahin-3 has been adapted to air-to-surface attack.

The Shahin does not appear to be in extensive service.

Not an Iranian Shahin, but an export version in

service with Sudan. Note the triple-rail launch

configuration

Shahin-1

Artillery - Detection and Fire-Control Systems

Fire coordination is one area that has seen significant expansion in recent years Battery-wide

fire control systems are making an appearance, for instance, networking is being introduced allowing

batteries to share targeting data and even allowing the commander to control them remotely.

One example is the AFC (artillery fire-control) which appears to be a copy,

or at least, influenced by the Fotona ARTES-1000 system.

The ARTES-100 is composed of three parts an observers module that

designates the target, a gun module that calculates fire-solutions for the

gunners and a command module that networks data within the battery.

The observer’s module features laser range-finders, GPS receiver, possible

thermal imaging, as well as multiple types of data-links to the gun module.

It can either be used with a forward observer, or with the gun itself. The gun-module features graphic

displays and a ballistic computer and can be linked directly into a gun-laying system. All three modules

are made with solid-state electronics

Another system is the artillery fire control computer” (FCSS-85) which is manufactured by IEI

and is a smaller man portable system designed to be used with most of Iran’s towed guns and rocket

artillery.

Newer generation self propelled guns like the Raad-2 have night and all-weather sights

installed increasing their engagement potential. While these improvements are not revolutionary nore

represent a concerted advantage over their neighbors, they nonetheless are a step up for Iran’s

artillery groups.

Other tools for artillery coordination include the use of ground surveillance radars like the Basir

or GSR series and UAV's like the Mohajer for target spotting.

Artillery Fire Control (AFC)

1.4.3.6 - Artillery - Analysis

As with armor, the first part of the analysis is determining what Iran actually has, which also, is

a great deal more troublesome then it should be.

Towed Quantity In

Service

Self-

Propelled

Quantity In

Service

MLRS Quantity in Service

M-101: 200* 2S1: 60-80 Type 63 NA

D-74: 100* M-107: 25* BM-21/HM-20: NA

D-30/HM-40: 500 M-110: 30* Oghab: NA

M-46: >800 M-109: 140* Falaq: NA

M-114/HM-41: 100 Raad-1: 0 Fajr-3: ~100*

GHN-45: 100 Raad-2: >36 Fajr-5: ~100*

M-115: 30* M-1978: ~18

Total: 1800 Total: 329 Total: NA

NA = Unknown

* = Default to conventional estimates due to absence of evidence for alternative analysis

First is towed artillery, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran built up a substantial number of guns that

favored the mass static bombardments that characterized the final stage of the war. Low-level

estimates put the total number still in service as around 1800 pieces, this is a very general number and

is composed mostly of 500 D-30 / HM-40 and around 800 M-46's, though the number could be much

higher depending on total production levels of the HM-40 and HM-41.

The trend emerging is a standardization of calibers, we are seeing a favoring of the lighter

Soviet 122 mm in guns like the HM-40 and the 155 mm as in the HM-41.

Holdings of self-propelled guns are much smaller; only 60-80 2S1 Gvozdika's have been

procured and few M-1978s ever existed. The large caliber M-107's, and M-110's, with an estimated 25

and 30 left, respectively, are approaching the end of their service-life and will slowly be phased out in

favor of the newer generation guns. M-109's on the other hand, sharing the same configuration as the

newer self-propelled guns will likely remain in service for far longer. Estimates on the number of

remaining M109's in service hover around 140. The newer generation SPG's being designed by Iran is

the Raad-1 and Raad-2 with the former likely never entering production. It seems, as the towed guns

are being standardized, the same has happened with the SPG's, with the 155 mm being the caliber of

choice.

The expansion of MLRS platforms compared to pre-revolution times also reflect the preferred

style of combat during the Iran-Iraq war, which was massed fire bombardments. Smaller caliber

weapons like the 107 mm Type-63 have been mass-produced and are omnipresent within the IRIGF.

That is why low-end estimates of around 100 being in service (despite more then 750 directly

delivered) are probably wrong. Combine 750 with the large amount being produced domestically and

it's probably greater then 1000 total. However it is important to remember that with this weapon,

they're often deployed as an integrated infantry support weapon, not necessarily with artillery groups

or battalions where it's short range would restrict it's usefulness anyway. Because of this, one might

not even consider them as an actual artillery asset, but rather, more as an infantry support weapon

like a recoilless rifle.

The majority of Iran's stock of 'true' rocket artillery is composed of 122 mm BM-21 and its

domestic equivalent, the HM-20, maintaining a stock of more then 200 pieces, though by how much

depends entirely on how far domestic production has progressed. Larger caliber pieces like the Fajr-3

are probably around 100 pieces assuming a low level of production. Estimates on the total numbers of

the larger Fajr-5 are totally absent, though they seem to be deployed at a rate similar to, or slightly

less then the Fajr-3, making "somewhere around 100" as close a guess as is possible at this point.

Mortars fit into much the same category as the 107 mm rockets - technically artillery, but

deployed in such a manner that they are integrated directly into infantry units making them more of

an infantry support weapon, then a direct artillery asset - the exception being the 120 mm mortars.

However, it is difficult to estimate the total numbers because they are smaller assets compared to

larger artillery and as they are heavily produced domestically, making them much harder to track

Iran's next largest rival when it came to artillery strength was Iraq, but following the 2003

invasion, this threat was eliminated. This leaves the GCC countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE,

countries with a relatively minor holding of artillery, instead preferring armor and mechanized

infantry. Both countries have less than 500 total pieces of artillery each, 468 for the KSA and 346 for

the UAE, both favoring self-propelled guns. Other GCC states have a relatively insignificant amount

compared to the main parties. Iran clearly has the numerical advantage in this case, even assuming an

Arab coalition.

But as with everything, numbers only tell half the story - what about quality?

As mentioned above, Iran's stocks of artillery tend heavily toward large caliber towed pieces as

a legacy from the war of attrition that characterized the last stages of the Iran-Iraq war. This manifests

itself in the large number of M-46 guns that make up Iran's inventory. We also see it in the use of tube

artillery like the 122 mm BM-21.

These guns often lacked any advanced fire-control systems, or battery coordination as well as

night-fighting capability. They were often literally just wheeled guns.

In an attempt to remedy this, Iran has followed the ‘North Korea example’ and mounted some

of its towed guns on self-propelled chassis. However, none of these types have ever been observed so

it’s questionable how far this program has progressed.

This pattern is beginning to change however. First is the procurement strategy. We are seeing

emphasis placed on standardized artillery, as shown by the production of 122 mm and 155 mm guns

as well as on revamping their self-propelled artillery stock with the advanced Raad-2 as well as

upgrades for MLRS systems in the form of new HM-20's and the Fajr-family. If this pattern continues,

it will eventually remove the more antiquated systems from use, replacing them with more mobile

and logistically easier-to-manage equipment.

Next is the improvement in networking and battlefield awareness, while before, Iranian

artillery largely relied on radioed orders and within-visual-sight direct and indirect targeting, with the

range determined by how far forward observers could see. Now, artillery battalions have increasing

access to battlefield surveillance radars, UAV's and networked data from other batteries. This is

probably the most significant update as it allows precise fire rather then relying on sheer volume

alone to hit a target

However it would be foolish to assume that they are yet up to the same caliber as their more

advanced neighbors, let alone the United States, if only because of the level of technological disparity.

This has been ameliorated, at least somewhat, by the dispersion of artillery directly into the role of

infantry support. Instead of relying upon traditional communication lines to ensure that artillery

groups are able to provide rapid, pinpoint artillery support when requested, an easier solution has

been adopted. This solution is the dispersion of short range artillery systems directly into the infantry

units, specifically with weapons systems like 107 mm rockets and mortar systems that don't require

constant support by dedicated artillery units. They are simple and numerous enough that they are

able to be widely dispersed across all units. The failure to do this has been one problem the US

military has faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, critical time is lost calling in air or artillery support where a

small, short ranged system like an 81 mm mortar could easily do the job of a LGB or 155 mm shell.

Speaking from a doctrinal level, the preference for static fire might have seem perfect for Iran's

doctrine of a defensive warfare that isn't aimed at quick maneuver which would necessitate self-

propelled guns like the M-109, or at least light-weight towed guns like the D-30. However, it's also

important to note that Iran isn't focused on static defense, but rather favors small mobile forces that

operate within their own borders, so in this sense; large guns like the M-46 don't fit with Iran's

defensive doctrine.

This is why we are seeing the dispersion of small artillery to infantry units; it eliminated the

weak link and encourages autonomous self-reliance. Though of course, it should be emphasized that

it's not known just how much Iran has embraced this reorganization rather then it just being

propaganda being produced.

As with armor, the eventual effectiveness of Iran's conventional artillery strength depends

heavily on just how far the domestic industry can advance and actually produce weapons rather then

just prototypes, meanwhile, an effective, if somewhat add-hoc solution has been adopted as a stop-

gap measure for a very specific type of war Iran is intending to fight.

1.6.4 - Tactical Ballistic Missiles

Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM’s) or theater ballistic missiles fulfill a unique role between

conventional artillery and ballistic missiles. The weapons are designed to be used to support tactical

battlefield objectives by attacking strategic targets like military headquarters and other vital

structures.

Iran has taken this doctrine to heart using the Nazeat, Zelzal and other similar sized missiles for

this very role. Iran views these sorts of tactical ballistic missiles, both guided and unguided, as a

defacto "poor man's air force". They are being deployed, virtually with the assumption that air

supremacy has been lost and so air power cannot be used in the traditional role of attacking enemy

infrastructure such as the number of US bases in the region,.

It should have been no surprise when Khamenei's envoy to the IRGC publicly announced Iran's

ability to hit each "every one of the US's 32 bases in the region", in a not-so-subtle nod to Iran's large

stocks of TBM's (…in addition to their stock of larger BMs).

This specific threat was outlined in a 1999 RAND report which emphasized US airbase

vulnerability to attacks by cruise missile and TBM's. While the report itself is fairly dated, the

principles remain the same. Iran has and is gaining ever more accurate weapon systems and may have

the ability to produce advanced cruise missiles, with a variety of payloads including sub-munitions.

Meanwhile, targets, not just the airbases RAND chose to highlight, are abundant and relatively

vulnerable to attack by non-traditional aerial assault. Several scenarios are specifically outlined,

including missile attacks on 'tent cities' that form the backbone of the infrastructure supporting the US

bases in the Gulf. Other possibilities include attacking airfields and destroying planes on the runway as

a much easier alternative then trying to shoot them down in the air.

Much of Iran's early progress was thanks to Chinese assistance, though after the first few steps,

Iran quickly gained their stride and began producing indigenous designs.

Iran's TBM arsenal falls under the command of both the IRGC and IRIA. They tend to be

organized along what looks like similar lines to Soviet TBM organization; specifically, it appears that

there are 4 TEL's per battalion in addition to support vehicles.

Tactical Ballistic Missile Inventory

Nazeat

Nazeat-6H Nazeat-10H

Configuration: Single stage, solid fuel Single stage, solid fuel

Weight: 960 kg 1830 kg

Length: 6.29 m 8.02 m

Diameter: 356 mm 455 mm

Max Range: 100 km 130 km

Min Range 80 km 110 km

Warhead: 130 kg 230 kg

CEP:* <500 m <650 m

Guidance: none none

* = at maximum range

The Nazeat family of rockets was an attempt by

Iran to develop a FROG-7 equivalent during the 1980's

with considerable help from China. They are sometimes

called “Mushak”, which simply means missile.

The Nazeat system can be mounted on several

platforms, including the 6x6 Mercedes-Benz trucks that

also carry the Fajr-series rockets such as the 2631 series.

The rocket itself comes in two

variants, the Nazeat-6H and the Nazeat-

10H. Both are single-stage, solid-fueled

and carry HE warheads, though can be

equipped with a variety of warheads

including sub-munitions or even CBRN

payloads. They are unguided and fin-

stabilized by four rear fins.

Nazeat-10H

One of the more non-standard TEL’s for the Nazeat series

Zelzal

Zelzal-1 Zelzal-1A Zelzal-2 Zelzal-3 Zelzal-3B

Configuration: Single stage,

solid fuel

Single stage,

solid fuel

Single stage,

solid fuel

Single stage,

solid fuel

Single stage,

solid fuel

Weight: ~2,950 kg ~2,950 kg ~3,450-3,545 kg 4,000 kg 3,600 kg

Length: ~8.3 m ~8.3 m ~8.3-8.46 m 9.58 m 9 m

Diameter: ~601 mm ~601 mm ~601 m 616 mm 616 mm

Max Range: ~125-130 km ~160 km ~300 km 200 km 260 km

Min Range: NA NA NA 180 km 235 km

Warhead: ~600 kg ~500 kg ~210 - 600 kg 900-950 kg 600 kg

CEP:* NA NA NA <1000 m <1300 m

Guidance: none none none none none

~ = only information available, but the source is Global-Security which is very unreliable so it is best to take it with a very large grain of

salt

* = at maximum range

The Zelzal family of rockets is another development of the attempt to build a FROG-7

equivalent. It is a later development then the Nazeat and is considerably larger. The project was

started in the early nineties, though it is

unclear in exactly what year. They are

sometimes called “Mushak”, which simply

means missile.

The launch platform is the same as

the Nazeat, a 6x6 Mercedes-Benz truck with

elevating launch ramp. Though now, the

Mercedes 2631 trucks are becoming more

common (foreground, pictured right).

Though rarely used, the Zelzal is also able to

be launched from the ZIL 8x8 TEL used with

the FROG-7 system. Most recently,

specifically, September 2009, a new

configuration was tested, mounting three

missiles on a single static launch ramp. The fact that it is static is surprising given that mobility is often

seen as one of the key attributes of the system. One explanation for this is that the static launch is just

for testing, this is backed up by early pictures of the Fateh-110 (separate entry) being tested on a

similar static mount.

The rocket is considerably larger then the Nazeat and comes in several versions, the Zelzal-

1/1A/2/3/3B. The most commonly seen is the -3/3B with the earlier versions becoming harder to spot.

The Zelzal-1 is then shortest of all the variants, has a bullet shaped nose and lacks the distinctive spin

stabilization nozzles of the later models. The Zelzal-2 also has a bullet nose and appears extremely

Zelzals during an exercise, showing both kinds of launch vehicles

used

similar to the Zelzal-1. However, it features the

spin stabilization nozzles just below the warhead.

The Zelzal-3 and -3B both have conical warheads,

the latter with a smaller warhead that begins to

taper off almost immediately after the

stabilization nozzles.

The Zelzal-2 is often seen in conjunction

with the Zelzal-3 TEL (which is labeled as such)

which has led to confusion over the identity of the

Zelzal-2 and 3. Pictured lower right.

All variants are single-stage, solid fueled, unguided

and fin stabilized by four rear non-moving fins.

They are also spin stabilized by jets just below the

warhead which fire at launch giving it a distinctive

profile. They are usually equipped with unitary HE

warheads, though can be equipped with sub-

munitions or CBRN payloads.

Supposedly, production halted or at least slowed

down in 2001. This may or may not be true, it is

also possible that it only referenced a specific

generation of Zelzal, for instance, phasing out the

Zelzal-2 in favor of the Zelzal-3, something that

appears to have happened. At any rate, if it was

true that the Zelzal program was at one time canceled, it appears to have been revived following the

renewed focus on asymmetrical deterrent

weapons like TBM's. Or maybe, the stocks are

just so large that, while production has in fact

stopped, they are still maintained as keystone

part of the strategy. The possibilities are near

endless with one guess nearly as good as

another at this point.

Some have claimed that the latest

versions of the Zelzal have inertial and

terminal guidance. The fin configuration

however rules this out. This may be a

reference to the Fateh-110.

Zelzal-3 firing its spin-stabilization jets during wargames in Fall

2009.

The difficulty in identifying Zelzals - Note that the label on the

TEL says it's a Zelzal-3, but that is only in reference to the TEL,

the missile is actually a Zelzal-2. Source: Internet / Military.ir

Fateh-110

Fateh-110 Fateh-110A Fateh-110 block 3*

Configuration: Single stage, solid fuel NA Single stage, solid fuel

Weight: 3,620 kg NA NA**

Length: 8.76 m NA NA**

Diameter: 616 mm NA NA**

Max Range: 250 km NA 300 km

Min Range: 150 km NA NA

Warhead: 450 kg NA NA

CEP: 750 m NA NA

Guidance: INS + ?? NA INS+??

NA = Unknown or not applicable

* = actual designation unknown

** = Unknown, but can presumed to be equal to original model.

The Fateh-110 is a refined TBM, being a guided missile rather then a rocket like the Zelzal or

Nazeat. The system emerged in May 2001 with full-scale production beginning at the earliest in late-

2002 or 2003. There are three versions, the -110, and the -110A, and a yet unnamed third generation

that was unveiled in August 2010. The program is likely directly connected with the Zelzal program as

the basic dimensions between the two are nearly the same.

Some have asserted that it is a copy of the Chinese DF-11, but the dimensions of the two

missiles make this unlikely. While the two share battlefield roles and it is plausible that the China used

their experience with the DF-11 to lend assistance to Iran, there exists no concrete connection

between the two projects that is apparent.

The Fateh-110(A) is mounted on a 6x6 truck similar to the Zelzal and Nazeat, though the TEL

mechanism more closely resembles the SA-2 or Tondar-69 TBM (see below). Recently the missile was

shown mounted on the exact same TEL as that associated with the Zelzal (1st

picture under the Zelzal

entry)

The missile is externally

very similar to the Zelzal, both are

single-stage solid-fueled designs of

the same size. Though there are

several differences. First is the

warhead, unlike the symmetrical

warheads on the Zelzal or Nazeat,

the Fateh-110(A)'s nose narrows

sharply at the top. The next major

difference is the configuration of

the fins. The Fateh-110(A) features

Close up of the guidance and control unit of the 3rd generation Fateh-110

during it's delivery to the IRGC in September 2010

a set of four movable control surfaces mounted on the guidance unit just below the warhead, in

addition to this there are four non-moving stabilizing fins at the rear of the missile with another set of

four smaller static fins located just fore of the

rear set.

The difference between the -110 and

the 110A is unknown, though if the pattern of

other TBM's is any indication, it relates to the

size of the warhead and the corresponding

range of the missile.

The third generation is also externally

identical to the -110 though, according to DM

Vahidi, it features improved accuracy and the

ability to perform evasive maneuvers against

ABM systems. This announcement was accompanied by a video of the impact from testing, a rarity

among Iranian missile announcements; this lends at least some credence to the claim of improved

accuracy. However this is by no means definitive. Video evidence suggests the missile uses a gimbaled

gyro, most likely mechanical, for the INS guidance. The third generation is in production, with the first

batch being delivered to the IRGC in time to coincide with Sacred Defense Week 2010. Later, during

the same week, Fars News announced that the missile had a range of 300 km.

Some sources have claimed a combination of inertial and GPS guidance, however this is

unconfirmed. Other sources have claimed EO terminal guidance, but this is not supported by the

missiles appearance. Its poor CEP is attributable to its small control surfaces; instead of having regular

jet vanes at the rear of the missile. The warhead may separate from the missile body in the terminal

phase.

Gimballed gyro of the 3rd generation Fateh-110 shown in August

2010

Tondar-69

Tondar-69/CSS-8

Configuration: 2 stage, solid and/or liquid

fuel

Weight: 2,650 kg

Length: 10.8 m

Diameter: 1.00 m

Max Range: 150 km

Min Range: 50 km

Warhead: 190 or 250 kg unitary,

submunition warhead

CEP: Unknown

Guidance: INS

NA = Unknown

The Tondar-69 is a conversion of the HQ-2 SAM to a guided surface-to-surface missile like the

Fateh-110. The missile is likely a domestic production of the Chinese CSS-8 which is an HQ-2 adapted

for the same role.

The system is mounted on a static launcher like the HY-2, though can probably be easily towed

and a self-propelled platform like a 6x6 truck is not out of the question given the mounting of missiles

like the Fateh-110. Some sources indicate that the liquid-fueled 2nd

stage has been replaced with solid

fuel, but this is unconfirmed.

Some sources list the CEP as ranging from 50 m – 150 m, while this is possible, there is no

conclusive evidence. Moreover, such a small CEP is significantly better then that found on the Fateh-

110 which should be assumed to use a comparable system because they’re roughly of the same

generation and if the Tondar-69 carried a much more effective INS, it would logically find it’s way into

the Fateh-110.

Tondar-69 on exercise - Fall 2009

Analysis

Iran's TBM's are among the first lines of defense against the US or even a hostile neighbor.

They are intended to provide long-range strike capability against strategic enemy bases primarily

within the Persian Gulf region. They would be used, both to degrade the operational capacity of any

enemy attacking them, as well as to inflict political wounds designed to win the conflict at a meta-level

rather then change the "facts on the ground". The ultimate success of both strategies depends on

several factors. First among them is the targeting capability and actual accuracy of the missiles, second

is the damage potential, what threat the missiles actually pose if they can hit their target. Third is their

capability to maintain a sustained campaign, and lastly we'll explore the deterrent value of such

systems compared to their actual combat capability and what the implications are for their use.

First is the accuracy and targeting capability of the TBM systems. TBMs, particularly those

modeled on eastern-bloc weapons like the FROG missiles, have a reputation for being notoriously

inaccurate, and to be fair, this reputation is well-deserved. Missiles like the Nazeat and Zelzal, which

are roughly comparable to the FROG, have a CEP of 500-1000 m. This means that, at their maximum

range, 50% of all rounds fired land within 500-1000 m of the intended target, not a great rate. The

chances are somewhat improved in this specific example however because the vast majority of the

targets (US bases, airfields, economic targets) are very large, so that even a near miss is often as good

as a hit. Also, because the targets are static and well known they have maximum time to properly

practice setting up and laying the TEL without having to do in-field calculations or adjustments. That

being said, with unguided rockets, they are subject to all sorts of climactic and environmental

influences that can be as minor as humidity and wind speed that can effect their path and cannot be

planned for up until the second one is ready to launch.

More modern, guided missiles like the Fateh-110 offer the improvement of being able to adjust

their course mid-flight. The current navigational system in use is a combination INS and possibly GPS

system that works by using accelerometers to determine the missiles location along a preplanned

route, the disadvantage to this compared to GPS is that it doesn't account for unpredictable changes in

flight, like the slight variances that happen with every batch of fuel, or the changing temperature on a

specific day, and because these changes build-up over the course of the flight, the overall accuracy is

inversely proportional to the distance traveled. Of course, even with the most advanced GPS guidance

system, it's still largely dependent on the actual manufacturing process and the tolerances of the

missiles which can degrade accuracy significantly.

The next major factor, should the missile be able to hit the target, is the kind of damage it

does. The unitary HE warheads that so often are used are inefficient. One easy way to remedy this

would be through the use of sub-munitions such as cluster bomblets released at a predetermined

height which can cover a much larger area. This begs the question, does Iran even use sub-munitions?

Iran is known to operate and manufacture a variety of sub-munitions for it's MLRS systems including

anti-personnel, anti-vehicle as well as dual-purpose munitions (DPICM's). Also, it is not altogether

unreasonable to assume that a robust defense industry such as Iran's, especially, one that has invested

so much in advancing the use of ballistic missiles wouldn't have substantial stocks of them. We have

also seen the use of sub-munitions with larger missiles such as on the latest versions of the Shahab-3.

So all-in-all, it is very likely that Iran would use sub-munition bomblets in any attack using TBM's,

though it would be unlikely it would to be the exclusion of unitary warheads.

The actual damage caused by the missiles assuming an even mix of unitary and cluster

warheads were used could be large. Many of the bases that make up the US presence in the Persian

Gulf are comprised of unarmored office buildings, barracks, even tent cities. Meanwhile, planes,

another potential target, are more often then not just parked on the tarmac, lacking hardened

shelters. Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, many of the buildings remain unprotected. Not only could

warheads deal massive damage to buildings, but the use of cluster munitions would be powerful area

denial weapons, unexploded ordinance, or even purposefully laid mine-bomblets could make cleanup

efforts slow and dangerous. Aircraft on a tarmac or taxiway could be damaged and rendered

inoperable by small bomblets or even shrapnel. Meanwhile, attacks on runways, while improbable

that they could ever fully destroy the runway could reduce the combat potential by littering them with

debris and craters that would require cleanup and repair.

But this begs the question, is Iran capable of keeping up a sustained campaign of attacks on

bases in the Gulf (and Afghanistan to a smaller degree)? The US's experience with the closest

analogue, SCUD hunting missions in Operation Desert Storm says no, US airpower proved incapable of

reliably destroying SCUDS and were only saved by the poor quality of Iraqi weapons and training. But

then again, US technology has advanced exponentially since 1991. For instance, the US now deploys

fleets of UAVs and IMINT/SIGINT resources whose sole purpose would be loitering above the

battleground to detect rocket launches. But to be fair, the Iranians today aren't comparable to the

Iraqis of 1991. The Iraqis relied on large, cumbersome, liquid-fueled SCUDs who were much harder to

hide, produced a larger firing signature, and had a much longer response time, compared to Irans TELs

which are barely distinguishable from normal trucks. Iranian geography is far more varied then the flat

Iraqi dessert, the prime launching zones for strikes against US Gulf bases are right smack dab in a

mountains and valleys where it is significantly easier to conceal a launch, to say nothing of the

increase in sheer size of the potential battle-area involved. The bottom line in this equation is that it's

simply to hard to tell at this juncture, there are too many unknowns and variables that could go either

way, it just depends on how each side conducts themselves in a war, it is entirely possible for the US to

use their superior technology to hunt down and destroy TELs effortlessly, but Iran could also make the

job much harder, or even downright impossible if they operate proficiently.

However, one of the most powerful impacts of these missiles has remained unmentioned –

deterrence power. These missiles exist not just as a warfighting weapon, but also as a powerful

deterrent because it holds the threat of the ability to inflict large casualties and monetary loss on a

military that hasn't felt large, single-incident casualties since the Vietnam War. Iran knows this; they

are well aware that this threat places pressure on US policymakers and top brass to not put their bases

in such a situation where this could happen. The USAF might be able to successfully hunt down all the

TBM TELs, or use their new missile-defense shields to protect themselves, but what if they can’t? Iran

is betting they won't take that risk.

This brings up an interesting problem - will Iran risk attacking US bases when they know a

misplaced missile (a real possibility given the CEPs of the missiles) in an Arab urban neighborhood

could turn the Arab-Muslim community, if not the entire world, against Iran, even drawing countries

into a war they would otherwise be spectators of. In this scenario it remains in Iran's best interests to

maintain the threat as a deterrent only, and not actually use it in battle.

A case study examining the potential real-world implications of this theory with regard to a

potential US-Iran conflict can be found early on in the “The war with Iran” section.

1.6.5 – Inventory – Arms and Equipment

1.6.5.1 – Inventory - Arms and Equipment – Small Arms

Small Arms - Pistols

PC-9

PC-9

Cartridge: 9x19 mm

Length: 196 mm

Weight: 845 g

Muzzle Velocity: 335 m/s

Effective Range: 50 m

Magazine: 15 round

Iran's main service pistol, the PC-9 is a copy of

the Sig Sauer P226. The gun competed with and

eventually lost out to Beretta to provide the US's main

service pistol. It has a reputation for accuracy, reliability

and ease of use. The pistol is in service with the IRIP

and all military branches.

Besides the PC-9, a small number of other

handguns are in service with special units. For instance,

bodyguards for high-level officials often use revolvers.

Small Arms - Submachine-guns

MPT-9 Uzi PM-12S

Cartridge: 9x19 mm 9x19 mm 9x19 mm

Length: MPT-9: 670 mm (500 mm

closed), MPT-9S: 690 mm,

MPT-9K: 325 mm

640 mm (470 mm

closed)

660mm (418 mm closed)

Weight: MPT-9: 3.08 kg, MPT-9S: 2.54

kg, MPT-9K: 2.2 kg 3.5 kg 3.2 kg

Muzzle Velocity: MPT-9/9S: 400 m/s, MPT-9K:

375 m/s 390 m/s NA

Effective Range: MPT-9/9S: 100 m, MPT-9K: 25

m 100 m 150 m-200 m

Magazine: 30 round 20-50 round 20-32-40 round

MP-5

The MP-5 is one of the most well known submachine

guns in the world and serves within the Iranian military in the

IRIA, IRIN, IRGCGF and the IRIP.

The MP-5 is essentially a scaled-down G3 battle rifle. Iran

produces the MP-5 domestically under the name MPT-9. The

basic model features a collapsible stock, while the MPT-9S has a

fixed stock. Iran also produces the MPT-9K, the compact SMG

variety complete with a folding stock.

The MP-5 and variants in use by IRIP forces are used mostly in cities and CT units as border patrol units

mostly carry AK-47's. It is also in service with IRIA units such as the 65th airborne brigade, certain

naval marine units, and rare IRGC units.

Uzi

An Israeli submachine-gun, it has largely been replaced by

the MPT-9, but still is used by select units such within the 65th

airborne and some naval marines. One unique feature on pre-

revolution Iranian Uzi's is a lion and crown imprinted on the rear

of the gun as well as a stamped "IMI" and Persian lettering above

the grip.

Soldiers from the 65th airborne brigade with

MPT-9's

Naval marines practicing a hostage-

rescue operation with Uzi SMG's

PM-12

An Italian submachinegun manufactured by Beretta, the

PM-12 is used by police forces throughout Europe. In Iranian

service, the PM-12S is used by IRGC security forces, police, and

some special forces.

Basij, or IRGCGF soldiers, on parade

during Sacred Defense Week 2009

Small Arms - Assault Rifles

AK-47/KL-7 Sayyad 5.56 G3 Khaybar

Cartridge: 7.62x39 5.56x45 mm 7.62x51 mm 5.56x45 mm

Length: KLS: 890 mm, KLF: 895

mm (655 folded), KLT:

895 mm (690 folded)

986 mm G3A3: 1,025 mm, G3A4:

1,025 mm (collapsed: 840

mm)

Short: 680 mm, Middle:

730 mm, Long: 780 mm

Weight: KLS: 3.57 kg, KLS: 3.80 kg,

KLT: 3.60 kg

3.2 kg G3A3: 4.4 kg, G3A4: 4.7

kg

3.7 kg

Muzzle Velocity: 715 m/s 990 m/s 800 m/s 900-950 m/s

Max Range: 2,000 m 2,653 m NA 2,500 m

Effective Range: 300 m 460 m 400 m 450 m

ROF: 600 rnd/min 700-950 rnd/min 500-600 rnd/min 800-850

Magazine: 30 round

detachable

20 or 30 round

detachable

20 round

detachable

20 or 30 round

detachable

AK-47/KL-7

The KL-7 is an Iranian copy of the Chinese Type 56 assault rifle that, like

the AK-47 it was based on, emphasizes rugged simplicity and power.

Both the Type 56 and the KL-7 are distinguishable from conventional

AK-47 designs in that they have a hooded front sight. KL-7’s are

distinguishable from Type 56’s in that they have ribbed receiver covers.

The KL-7 comes in 3 varieties, the fixed stock KLS, the KLF with an

under-folding metal stock and the KLT, with a sideways folding stock. All

varieties either have the original wood hand-guard, and if fixed stock, a

wooden butt-stock, or in same cases, synthetic furniture. Iran also maintains large stocks of other AK-

47 variants acquired over the years. Occasionally one is seen with an M203-styled under-slung

grenade launcher.

G3

The G3 is the main battle rifle of the IRIA. It is somewhat an

anomaly in modern infantry combat as it is a powerful weapon designed

for long range combat but with a small ammunition capacity.

Iran domestically manufactures the G3 with either a fixed stock

(G3-A3), or a retractable stock (G3-A4). They are recognizable by olive-

green synthetic furniture. A lighter bull-pup model exists, however it

appears to have remained a prototype. The same UGL mentioned above

is also used on the G3.

Fixed-stock G3's straight off the

production line

KLS (top) and KLF (bottom)

Sayyad 5.56

The S.5.56 is a licensed copy of the Chinese

CQ rifle, itself a copy of the M-16A1. It is in service

with elite units within the IRGC.

It is a 5.56x45 mm weapon based on the

M-16A1 with a 20 or 30 round box magazine and

two types of rifling that will accept NATO or

Chinese rounds depending on the barrel. Visually

it's distinguished from the M-16 family by a

unique revolver type pistol grip and cylindrical

hand guard.

Khaybar KH-2002

The KH-2002, or Sama as the newer version is called, is an

indigenous Iranian rifle first unveiled in 2004 designed to

be a lightweight replacement for the G3 as the main rifle of

the Iranian military. It is a bull-pup conversion of the S.5.56

rifle already manufactured by Iran.

Like the S.5.56 it has the same direct impingement action

of the M-16A1. It uses both 20 and 30 round magazines.

The rifle has a four-position fire-select lever near the rear

of the rifle, enabling, single, burst or automatic fire, with the charging handle below the carrying

handle. Two different styles of carrying handles exist in the KH-2002 (excluding the later Sama).The

first having a CQ-like carrying handle with a separate forward sight assembly (pictured above). The

second has a carrying handle that contains rear and forward sights and is more similar to the FAMAS.

There are three lengths determined by barrel

size, a 730 mm rifle, a 680 mm carbine and a 780 mm

marksmans rifle. The rifle can mount a bayonet, bipod

or a variety of optics.

The 2nd

generation of the rifle, the Sama has a

few key differences, first is a cosmetic change to

charging handle, second is the mounting of several

tactical rails on the forward section of the gun. There is

also a wind adjustment knob on the rear sight. On the

front of the trigger guard, they have added a forward

hand support. As with the first model, there are two

different types of forward sights, the first type maintains the FAMAS-style with both sights integrated,

the second has a forward sight mounted directly to the barrel (pictured).

So far, the rifle has not made any headway into replacing the G3, but it has been deployed with

at least one special forces unit, possibly IRGC or a commando unit, probably only for testing. The fact

1st generation KH-2002

The 2nd generation of the rifle - the Sama

that it has not been deployed widely is evidence of the fact that the rifle was not found to be

satisfactory, a fact backed up by low esteem most gun experts have of it.

Small Arms - Machine-guns

MG 3 PKM DShK Akhgar

Cartridge: 7.62x51 mm 7.62x54 12.7x108 mm 7.62x51 mm

Length: 1.22 m 1.19 m 1.59 m NA

Weight: 10.5 kg 7.90 kg 32.32 kkg NA

Muzzle Velocity: 820 m/s 825 m/s 800 m/s NA

Effective Range: 800 m 1500 m 3,300 m 2000 km

Max Range: 4000 m 3800 m 7,000 m NA

ROF: 1000-1300 rnd/min 650 rnd/min 600 rnd/min 4000-6000

rnd/min

Feed: belt Belt or drum belt belt

NA = Unknown or not applicable

MG 3

A descendant of the venerable German MG 42 from

WWII, which gives it its distinctive shape; the MG3 is the

primary general-purpose-machine-gun in the IRIA. The MG 3 is

domestically produced in Iran, both conventionally with a

bipod as well as with a larger tripod mount.

PK Machine-gun

The PKM is a Soviet general purpose machine-gun that

supplements the MG3 within the IRIA serves as the primary

machine-gun for the IRGCGF and IRIP. The PKM is license

produced in Iran under the name PKM T-80.

It fires the 7.62x54 mm round fed from either a belt or drum. It

has a distinctive skeleton stock and fluted barrel with a long flash

suppressor making it easy to identify.

The gun is frequently mount on light vehicles such as light trucks. The electrically operated

PKMT is also used on heavier armored vehicles as a secondary weapon.

A PKM being used during an IRIA exercise

in June 2009

IRIA MG3 on parade

DShK

The Soviet DShK (nicknamed Dushka) is an

anti-aircraft machine-gun that is now mostly used as

heavy infantry machine-gun. The DShk is license

produced in Iran.

It fires the 12.7x108 mm round in automatic-

only fire from a belt. It features dual spade grips in

the rear and a distinctive somewhat-circular muzzle

brake.

The DShK is the standard vehicle armament

today, replacing all original Browning .50 in service. It

is used on light skinned vehicles like the Safir and

Land Cruiser as well as heavier armored personnel carriers and tanks.

Akhgar

The Akhgar is an Iranian minigun roughly equivalent to

the GAU-2/M134. The weapon likely traces it’s origins

to the miniguns used by the IIAA and IRIAA on their

helicopters. The weapon has only been recently shown

mounted on the ‘Ranger’ light tactical vehicle (pictured

lower-left), though can also probably be mounted on

helicopter platforms as well.

It was only recently displayed during Sacred Defense

Week 2010.

DShK in use by the 88th AD commando unit.

Small Arms - Sniper Rifles

SVD HS .50 W-03

Cartridge: 7.62x54 mm 12.7x99 12.7x 'XX' mm

Length: 1225 mm 1370 mm NA

Weight: 4.30 kg 12.4 kg 112 kg

Muzzle Velocity: 830 m/s NA NA

Effective Range: 600 m 1,500 m 2,000 m

Magazine: 10 round detachable

magazine

None Unknown

NA = Unknown

SVD

A designated marksman rifle the SVD is lightweight,

rugged design visually similar to the AK-47. It fires the

7.62x54

Iran manufactures the SVD domestically under the

name Nakhjir with the original wooden furniture as well as

with synthetic hand-guards as well as with a full synthetic

stock.

Steyr HS .50/Sayyad-2

The Steyr HS .50, produced domestically under the name

Sayyad-2, is a single shot anti-material sniper rifle used by

the IRGCGF.

Steyr generated considerable controversy when Iran bought

800 of them under the auspices of combating the drug

trade; however fear persisted that they would be funneled

to the Iraqi insurgency, a fear which ultimately proved

unfounded.

The original HS .50 and the Iranian Sayyad-2 are differentiated by their pistol grip. The Sayyad-2

has the revolver type grip that is found on the S.5.56 assault rifle.

W-03

A relative mystery, even in Chinese service, the 12.7 mm bullpup sniper rifle has only been seen once

SVD example partially equipped with synthetic

hand guards

Sayyad-2 on display

on static display.

Unknown

This rifle was observed in an undated video segment from

Sepah News. This weapon may not have entered widespread

service

The unnamed rifle is a bullpup-configuration sniper rifle

chambered in an unknown, probably large caliber, round judging

by the magazine size. Other features include a bipod and a large

muzzle brake.

.

Unknown AMR

Observed in the same video as the unknown rifle

above, this anti-material rifle’s actual designation is also

unknown. It features a large muzzle brake and a bipod

mount located directly on the barrel. It also is a bull-pup

design with the shoulder-rest being mounted below the

barrel, being the trigger unit. The weapon is single shot,

though it is of an unknown caliber, probably 14.5 mm or

up. This weapon may not have entered widespread

service.

1.6.5.2 – Other Infantry Support Weapons

Mark 19 AGL

IR-19*

Cartridge: 40x53 mm

Length: 1.09 m

Weight: 35.3 kg

Effective Range: 1500 m

Max Range: 2200 m

ROF: 300-400 r/m

Feed: Belt

* = assuming equivalent to Mk. 19 mod 3. Also, the

designation “IR-19” is purely provisional in the same way

Iran's long ranged SAM is often called the IR-300.

Iran operates an automatic grenade launcher that is similar to the US-made Mark 19 Mod 3,

but has enough differences to warrant a separate classification. One likely explanation for this, due to

their first being seen in the 2008-2009 timeframe, is that they were reverse engineered from models

smuggled in from Iraq. Since then it has been in use by select IRGC units

The minor differences between the actual mk 19 and this copy include the copy feeding from

the right rather then the left as well as the trigger unit which features horizontal spade grips like on

the AGS-17 in addition to the vertical grips found on the mk 19; the trigger is also located below the

weapon safety and is no longer of a butter-fly design. However, overall, these are minor changes when

compared to the overall similarities between the two weapons.

The mk 19 fires 40 mm grenades out to an effective range of 1,300 m and in Iranian service has

been seen mounted on fast attack vehicles and man-portable tripods.

Great Prophet 5 Wargames - 2010

2A42 Autocannon

2A42 HEI APT

Caliber: 30 mm Caliber: 30 mm 30 mm

Weight: 115 kg Weight: .83 kg .85 kg

Length: 3.0 m Length: .14 m .14 m

ROF: 300-600 r/m Muzzle Velocity: 960 m/s 970 m/s

Effective Range: 1,500-3000 m 1,500-3000 m

Max Range: NA NA NA = unknown or not applicable

While originally mounted on Iran's BMP-

2’s, the 30 mm 2A42 autocannon has recently

been seen being used on soft-skinned vehicles in

the same manner as a DShK or mk 19. Two

versions at least exist, both mounted in the bed

of ¾ tonne-class vehicles. One, observed during

the Great Prophet 5 wargames in 2010 (pictured

left) is manually operated and in essence is very

similar to the 20mm GAM-BO1 the IRIN operates

The second version appears to be automated in

some manner (pictured bottom left).

Great Prophet 5 Wargames

Unknown time period, likely recent

1.6.5.3 - Infantry Support Weapons - Anti-Tank

Anti-tank weapons, are another category of weapons that epitomizes Iran's preference for

weapons that serve as a foil to an enemies strength. The theory is, why invest in a tank when you can

just use an anti-tank missile that does the job just as well. While this isn't entirely true (for instance,

an ATGM can't hold ground like a tank can), it represents an interesting tactical and strategic choice.

Because of this, we see light AT weapons like RPG's and recoilless rifles being deployed at a rate within

infantry units that is rare in modern armies. We also see investment in heavier weapons like the latest

generation of Toofan missiles as well as investment in deploying them in innovative manner, such as

using para-gliders to transport anti-tank teams. While Iran might not have the best AT weaponry

available on the world today, they certainly have good equipment. Warheads are getting bigger and

better, and daylight-only sights are being replaced by 3rd generation thermal imaging sights.

RPG-7

Launcher:

RPG-7 RPG-7 Commando RPG-7 - Breakdown

Caliber: 40 mm 40 mm 40 mm

Weight: 6.6 kg 5.28 NA

Length: 95 cm 73.8 cm NA

Warhead:

Nader/Fath Nafez/Optimized Fath Tandem Saeqeh/Fath 1

Caliber 80-85 mm 93 mm* 80-85 mm 40 mm**

Warhead: RDX HEAT HMX HEAT Tandem RDX HEAT RDX HE-FRAG

Weight: 2.4 kg 2.65 kg 2.6 kg 1.4 kg

Length: 90 cm 101 cm 115 cm 31 mm

Penetration: 270-300 mm 500 mm 270- 300 mm + ERA NA

Lethal Radius NA NA NA 7 m***

Velocity: 300 m/s 120 m/s 300 m/s 150 m/s

Effective Range: 400 m 500 m 300 m 180 m

* - Assuming equivalent to PG-7VL

** - Assuming equivalent to OG-7V

NA – Unknown/Not Applicable

The RPG is a light-weight shoulder-fired ant-tank weapon

designed for use against lightly armored targets. In Iranian

service it also functions as a squad support weapon.

Iran manufactures the RPG-7 domestically, albeit with a few

changes; wooden furniture has been replaced by synthetic;

three sizes are produced, a standard version with a grip behind

the trigger unit. The second, shorter 'commando' version, has

its secondary grip in front of the trigger unit, the third type, for

airborne troops has a break-down barrel, similar to the RPG-

7D. Also available, though probably still only in prototype development, is an under-slung launcher

that can be mounted onto assault rifles much like a grenade launcher. Iran also offers a new optical

sight, the Jooya-7.

Iran also produces different types of PG-7 rocket's.

Nader / Basic Fath : Roughly equivalent to the basic PG-

7V HEAT warhead produced under the name Fath or

Nader which are distinguished by having a more curved

body and the lack of a separate contact fuse on the tip

of the rocket. However, both can be assumed to be roughly

equivalent to each other.

Nafez /Optimized Fath: Roughly equivalent to the PG-7VL,

the Nafez, or optimized Fath, feature a larger warhead and

a more triangular profile.

Saeqeh/Fath-1: Anti-personnel fragmentation rocket similar to

but smaller then the OG-7V

Tandem Warhead Rocket: Surprisingly, without an

actual domestic name, the tandem warhead is

based on the Nader platform but with a 30 mm

precursor warhead to defeat ERA.

Nader / Fath

An Israeli official inspects a tandem-

warhead rocket recovered from the

Karine-A, a vessel used by the

Iranians to smuggle arms to the

Palestinians.

Two types Iran's RPG launchers

Saeqeh

Nafez / Optimized Fath

Tandem-warhead

RPG-18

RPG-18

Caliber: 64 mm

Weight: 2.6 kg

Length: .70 m (1.05 m extended)

Penetration: 375 mm RHA

Muzzle Velocity: 115 m/s

Effective Range: 200 m

The RPG-18 is a single-shot, disposable light-AT

weapon similar to the US LAW, it is not usually

associated with being in Iran's inventory, however at

least two pictures exists of them being used by IRGC

soldiers as well as their presence on the Karine-A.

RPG-29

Another rumored weapon in Iranian service. The possibility of an Iranian RPG-29 generated

considerable controversy when it was alleged Iraqi insurgents were using them. However, they were

never traced back to Iran, but to Syria and other suppliers. Second is that the weapon is not among

any of Iran's officially recorded arms deals from Russia, something that's generally well reported in

recent years, but this alone is not definitive enough as there are several weapons systems that Iran

operates that don't show up on official transfer lists. Iran has also never publicly displayed the RPG-29,

but again, this isn't definitive proof. But as with the KH-55, it cant be forgotten that a large portion of

Iran's strategy is in deception and focuses around just creating the fear that they have the weapon.

A poor quality image showing a soldier from

the Basij 106th battalion using a single shot

disposable AT weapon that is possibly the

RPG-18

An Israeli official inspects an RPG-18 recovered

from the Karine-A, a vessel used by the Iranians

to smuggle arms to the Palestinians.

Recoilless Rifles

SPG-9 M-40 PFF HE M344A1 HEAT Zafar

Caliber: 73 mm 105 mm Caliber 105 mm 105 mm 73 mm

Weight: 47.5 kg 209.5 kg Type: HE HEAT HEAT

Length: 2.11 m 3.40 m Weight: 9.89 kg 7.96 kg 4.39 kg

Width: .99 m NA Length: NA .99 m NA

Height: .80 m 1.12 m Penetration: NA >400 mm RHA 350 mm RHA

Elevation: -3 - 7 -17 - 65

Traverse: 30 360

ROF: 6 rnd/min 1 rnd/min

Muzzle Velocity: 250-400 m/s 503 m/s

Effective Range: 800 m 1,350 m

NA = unknown or not applicable

Recoilless rifles, both the SPG-9 and the M-

40, provide anti-tank capability and tank-equivalent

fire power to small infantry units. While they have

largely been supplanted by ATGM's, they still persist

in service because they are simple and cheap to

both manufacture and maintain ensuring a far

greater rate of deployment then guided-missiles.

SPG-9

The 73 mm SPG-9 is a small, man-portable

system that fires a HEAT or FRAG-HE warhead in

much the same manner as the RPG-7. The SPG-9 is

used both as a vehicle mounted weapon as well as

a by dismounted infantry.

M-40

The US-designed 106 mm M-40 is technically a 105 mm

gun, but is referred to as 106 mm. It fires both HEAT

and HE rounds. The M-40 is most commonly mounted

on vehicles or on a wheeled frame (pictured left).

SPG-9 cutaway on display at a DIO expo

M-40 on the factory floor

TOW/Toofan

Toofan-1 Toofan-2 Toofan-5 Qaem

Weight: 18.5 kg 19.1 kg ~19.1 kg* NA

Length: 1.16 m 1.45 m ~1.51 m* NA

Diameter: 150 mm 150 mm 150 mm 150 mm

Wingspan: .45 m .45 m .45 m .45 m

Warhead: 3.6 kg HEAT 4.1 kg HEAT** ~5.9 kg HEAT* NA

Penetration

:

550 mm RHA 760 mm RHA** ~900 mm RHA* NA

Eff. Range: 3,500 m 3,500 m NA NA

Max Speed: 310 m/s 310 m/s NA NA

ROF: 2-3 rnd/min 2-3 rnd/min 2-3 rnd/min 2-3 rnd/min

Guidance: Wire-guided

SACLOS

Wire-guided

SACLOS

Beam-riding /

Wire-guided

SACLOS

Beam-riding /

wire-guided

SACLOS

* - assuming similar performance to the TOW-2A

** - see text

NA = Unknown or not applicable

The BGM-71 TOW is one of the primary ATGM's of the

IRIGF and multiple versions are produced

domestically under the name Toofan.

The TOW and the Toofan-1/2 are wire-guided SACLOS

missiles with a variety of warheads. Due to it's large

size, it is barely man-portable and is most often seen

mounted on vehicle platforms such as the M113 APC,

Safir tactical vehicle and AH-1 attack helicopter. The

launchers have night-vision that is effective out to

2,500 m. The Toofan-1/2 is interchangeable with

conventional TOW systems.

The Toofan-1 is modeled after the Basic TOW. The

Toofan-2 is modeled after the BGM-71C. It has two versions, the first is a copy of the basic TOW with a

nose probe (pictured far-left above). The second model (pictured far right above) has a larger 4.1 kg

warhead in addition to the nose probe. Basic TOW's and Toofan-1's can be upgraded to either

designation by replacing the warhead.

From left to right, Toofan-2, Toofan-1, Toofan-1, and and

modified Toofan-2

The Toofan-5 on the other hand is not a copy

of any previous TOW versions. Unlike previous

versions of the Toofan, it may use wire guidance in

conjunction with laser (probably beam-riding)

guidance. The missile itself resembles the TOW-2A,

the nose probe indicating it does not have the top-

down attack capability of the TOW-2B. It also features

an extra set of 4 short control surfaces rear of the

warhead.

Presumably, one of the reasons that beam-

riding has been adopted in conjunction with wire

guidance is to support the use of the Qaem SAM. The Qaem is a modified Toofan that features a

second flight motor located just forward of the first, increasing the maximum speed and range. It

should be noted that this system is not designed to replace MANPADS like the SA-”X” but supplement

them for self defense against slow-flying helicopters.

The TOW/Toofan continues to serve as Iran's primary ATGM, and given the production history

compared other ATGM's appears to be the path Iran is choosing to pursue.

Toofan-5: note the canards and the nose probe

AT-3 / Raad

AT-3 / Raad Raad-T I-Raad I-Raad-T

Weight: 10.9 kg NA 10.9 kg NA

Length: .83 m .98 m .83 m .98 m

Diameter: 120 mm 120 mm 120 mm 120 mm

Wingspan: NA NA NA NA

Warhead: HEAT HEAT HEAT HEAT

Penetration: NA 400 mm RHA 500 mm RHA 400 mm RHA

Max Range: 3,000 m 3,000 m 3,000 m 3,000 m

Max Speed: 120 m/s 120 m/s 120 m/s 120 m/s

Guidance: Wire-guided

MCLOS

Wire-guided

MCLOS

Wire-guided

SACLOS

Wire-guided

SACLOS

The AT-3 gained notoriety as the first mass-produced man-portable ATGM. In Iranian service, it

has received upgrades through the Raad and I-Raad program.

The AT-3 is a wire-guided MCLOS ATGM with a HEAT warhead. Unlike many other ATGM's, the

missile is fired from a separate launch platform then the guidance unit. The AT-3 is largely ineffective

against modern MBT's compared to other systems and its MCLOS guidance is particularly

troublesome.

Iran has upgraded their models with the Raad

and I-Raad programs. The Raad, is a straight copy of the

AT-3 design, while the Raad-T features a tandem

warhead. The I-Raad however is a marked improvement

featuring a SACLOS guidance unit as well as the ability

to fire-link 4 separate missiles to one guidance unit. The

I-Raad-T is the I-Raad with a tandem warhead.

Iran ordered directly, or license produced at least

6,000 AT-3 / Raad's, with the later models possibly being

new builds or upgrades. The Raad remains a second-line

asset.

Purportedly, the AT-3 can be mounted on the Safir tactical vehicle, though this would require a

redesign of the launching platform in order to avoid the obvious difficulties in firing the AT-3/Raad

from a vehicle.

I-Raad-T - note the SACLOS guidance unit and the

tandem warhead

AT-4 / AT-5

AT-4 Spigot AT-5 Spandrel / Tosan-1 / M-113

Weight: 11.5 kg 24.6 kg

Length: NA 1.26 m

Diameter: 120 mm 130 mm

Wingspan: NA .46 m

Warhead: HEAT 3.2 kg HEAT

Penetration: 480 m 925 m

Effective Range: 2,500 m 4,000 km

Max Speed: 186 m/s 200 m/s

ROF: 2-3 rnd/min 2-3 rnd/min

Guidance: Wire-guided SACLOS Wire-guided SACLOS

NA = unknown

The AT-4 Spigot and the AT-5 Spandrel both belong to the same family of second generation

Soviet ATGM's based around the same design, differing only in scale. Iran produces the AT-5

domestically under the name Tosan.

Both missiles have wire-guided SACLOS with HEAT warheads and are fired from a low-profile

launcher with day or night sights, or from the BMP-2 IFV.

AT-4

The AT-4 is the smaller of the two, designed to be a man-

portable system. Iran licensed 11,250 AT-4's from Russia in

1991.

AT-5 / Tosan-1 / M-113

The bigger brother to the Spigot, the AT-5 Spandrel simply scales

up the AT-4 design. This means it is primarily mounted on BMP-2’s, but can

also be fired from late-model AT-4 launchers.

Iran licensed 1,800 AT-5's and now produces them domestically

under the name Tosan-1, though it is occasionally called the M-113.

With regards to deployment, the AT-4/5 appears to play second fiddle to the TOW/Toophan. It

is in service with specific units such as IRGC paratroopers as opposed to mechanized infantry

battalions who prefer to mount Toofans on their light vehicles. However, the AT-4/5 also maintains a

AT-4 during the Great Prophet exercises

Tosan

sizable niche as the primary ATGM for the BMP-2. These factors ensure they won't be entirely be

replaced by the Toofan in that role any time soon.

AT-6

9M114 AT-6A 9M120 AT-9

Weight: 31.4 kg NA

Length: 1.62 m 1.83 m

Diameter: .13 m .13 m

Wingspan: .36 m .36 m

Warhead: 5.3 kg HEAT 5-8 kg HEAT

Penetration

:

560 mm RHA 800 RHA

Effective

Range:

5 km 6 km

Max Speed: 345 m/s 550 m/s

Guidance: Radio SACLOS Radio SACLOS

NA = unknown

The AT-6 Spiral is a Soviet radio-controlled SACLOS anti-tank missile. Iran purchased 540 of an

unknown sub-type, possibly the later AT-9 version, for their Mi-171 helicopters. Further details are

unknown.

AT-11

Tondar

Weight: 17.2 kg

Length: .69 m

Diameter: 125 mm

Wingspan: NA

Warhead: 3.5 kg tandem HEAT

Penetration

:

700 mm RHA

Effective

Range:

4 km

Max Speed: 370 m/s

Guidance: Beam-riding SACLOS

NA = Unknown

A Tondar being fired from a T-72S as illustrated by

MODLEX

IRGC aviation Mi-17 equipped with the AT-6 Spiral.

Source: Internet

The AT-11 sniper is a laser beam riding SACLOS anti-tank missile, though unlike most, it is designed to

be fired from the 125 mm main gun on the T-72 tank. Iran produces them domestically under the

name Tondar.

The Tondar appears to be somewhat different from the AT-11, having a smaller body (17.2 kg vs 24.3

kg) and a correspondingly lighter warhead (3.5 kg vs 4.5 kg), though this might just be a function of

misreporting the data by the ministry of defense.

M-47 Dragon / Saeqeh-1/2

M-47 / Saeqeh-1 Saeqeh-2

Weight: 6.1 kg 7.4 kg

Length: .74 m 1 m

Diameter: 127 mm 127 mm

Wingspan: NA NA

Warhead: HEAT Tandem HEAT

Penetration: 500 mm RHA 650 mm RHA

Effective Range: 1,094 m 1,094 m

Max Speed: 100 m/s 92 m/s

Guidance: wire-guided SACLOS wire-guided SACLOS

The M-47 Dragon and the Iranian copy, the Saeqeh, is a light man-portable, shoulder fired US

anti-tank system.

The M-47 is a wire-guided SACLOS ATGM with a HEAT warhead that uses a unique system of

small explosives mounted in the side of the missile (pictured below as the spherical nodes) for

propulsion and steering.

The M-47 is domestically manufactured by Iran under the

name Saeqeh. The Saeqeh-1 appears to be a direct copy of

the basic M-47 missile, while the Saeqeh-2 features a nose-

probe to defeat ERA.

While the Saeqeh remains in production and service, it is

not widely deployed, apparently losing out to the more

preferred strategy of using lighter RPG's as a short range

weapon while AT-4/5's with their longer range fulfill the

medium-weight ATGM role.

A Saeghe 1 (front) and a Saeghe 2 (rear)

Land Mines

YM-II YM-II-E YM-III YM-16 M-19

Weight: 3.4 kg 3.4 kg 6.9 kg NA 12.56 kg

Height: 90 mm 90 mm 110 mm NA 94 mm

Width: 232 mm 232 mm 270 mm NA 332 mm

Explosive

Content:

2 kg Comp B 1.6 kg Comp B 5.7 Comp B NA 9.53 kg Comp B

Operating

Pressure:

150-300 kg 150-300 450-900 kg NA 118-226 kg

Lethal Radius: 50 m 30 m 1,000 m NA NA

Iran also produces a number of anti-tank mines, though logically they are not as central to their

anti-tank strategy as ATGM's or other stand-off weapons.

Initial reports labeled them as having slightly

different specifications then the mine they were based on,

this however is not the case.

YM-II

A copy of the Italian SB-81, the YM-II is a circular

minimum-metal anti-tank mine. It is waterproof, and can

be dispersed by hand or by an automated system.

The YM-II-E contains a remote control arming and disarming mechanism.

YM-III

A copy of the Chinese Type 72 is also circular and with minimal metallic parts; the YM-III is

resistant to overpressure or explosive breaching.

YM-16

No information available.

M-19

A rectangular US anti-tank mine, almost entirely plastic is still a

common feature in the Iranian military. It is unknown if Iran is producing

them, a likely possibility.

EFP

Iran notably produces EFP's, as anyone who followed US

involvement in Iraq would know. It is a shaped charge specifically

optimized for IED placement or demolition. It is essentially just a large

amount explosive behind a metal cone in an easy-to-carry tube.

Yellow YM-III and green YM-II anti-tank mines

An EFP - note the legs which

provide the correct stand-off

distance for the shaped charge.

1.6.5.4 – Inventory – Additional Infantry Equipment

Besides the larger weapon systems that attract attention, a fair

amount of less-specific, miscellaneous equipment exists that can't be

grouped into neat categories but is worth mentioning.

Amour - While armor is not standard in the Iranian military, it is making a

more frequent appearance, especially within the IRGC. Iran notably

purchased a large amount of body-armor from the UK, under the UN's

anti-drug campaign. In addition to imported armor, Iran also produces

several varieties of armor, ranging from lightweight concealable vests, to

battle armor with ceramic inserts rated to class IV. Iran also produces

ballistic helmets which are replacing the M1 ‘steel pot’ helmets currently

worn by most of the IRIGF.

Communication Technologies - Iran's stock of ancient analog radios has

been renovated by solid-state digital models in addition to being supplemented by non-traditional cell

phones and satellite phones. What isn't clear is their level of technical networking, or total battlefield

awareness abilities.

Optics – Advanced optics, like thermal imaging, while

existent and definitely deployed, is unlikely to be available

for the average soldier.

The majorities of Iran’s night-vision holdings are mostly in

2nd generation models, and come as binoculars, sights and

observation scopes. Recently, Iran has began conducting

wargames emphasizing night-fighting ability indicating a

renewed focus on what has been the traditionally

untouchable domain of western armies

Other optics like rifle scopes and binoculars are also

produced.

CBW Equipment - A lesson learned from the Iran-Iraq war, one of the first areas Iran sought be self-

sufficient in was CBW-protection gear including detectors, protective suits, all the way up to full scale

truck-transported decontamination centers.

One design of body armor

offered for export

NVS-700 individual weapon night sight

1.6.5.5 – Inventory – Uniforms and Camouflage

One of the most recognizable features of the IRIGF is their eclectic blend of camouflage patterns and

uniforms across the services.

Woodland BDU - Standard issue to the IRIA as well as select IRIP and IRGCGF units. Newer

uniforms are identifiable by curved flaps on the breast pockets and a pocket on the

upper-left sleeve. Pattern same as original US issue. Slight variants exist, such as with the

IRIADF which has a dark blue swatch added.

3-Color Desert BDU - Used by several IRGC units as well as Police border-guards. Pattern

same as original US issue. Cut is same as Woodland uniforms.

6-Color DBDU - Used by IRGCGF coastal defense and other select IRGCGF units. Pattern

and cut same as original US issue.

Brown-Dominant Panther - Used by IRIA commando units. Very similar to AUSCAM

with grey, sand, and brown splotches. Occasionally different types can be seen with

rust, dark-green or different tan shades can be seen, however this is very rare.

Green-Dominant Panther 2 – Substitutes Brown for an olive-drab. Less common

then brown-dominant

Safariflage - The distinctive uniform pattern of the 65th airborne brigade, with green,

black and two tan color pattern.

Desert-Dominant Safariflage - Used by the 23rd commando division, the desert

dominant pattern is the same as the regular safariflage, but has dulled down the green

to better fit in a desert environment.

Grey-Dominant Chocolate Chip Safariflage – Used by the IRIN marines, blend of

sage, gray, black and off-white safariflage combined with a chocolate chip pattern.

Brown-Dominat Chocolate Chip Safariglage – also used by IRIN marines, far less

common then grey-dominant patterns. Grey is replaced with brown, and sage is

darkened.

ACU / Universal Digital - Visually a straight copy of the US army camouflage uniform

rather then just the digital pattern, features appropriate Velcro tabs and cut. The uniform

is used by certain naval marine units as well as IRGC airborne.

MARPAT / Desert Digital - Another copy of a digital US uniform, it is used by IRGC airborne and

special forces units. It appears slated to replace the 3-color desert BDU's.

Afghan Digital - Another interesting pattern, direct copy of the digital pattern

used by the Afghan national army. So far it has only been seen in a select

IRGCGF/Basij unit.

Unknown Digital - only seen recently during the Armed Forces Day 2010 parade with the

65th airborne this new camouflage is a mix of light-sand, brown, black and green pixelated

patterns.

Olive Drab - Iran actually uses a few different solid patterns that can be classified as 'OD'.

First is the original olive-drab pattern uniforms that are simply surplus, these have mainly

been replaced, though they do remain with several 2nd line units. The IRGC also issues a

more evergreen uniform that is very similar to its officers dress uniform pictured right).

A number of other uniforms are used by smaller units, often within the Basij

or IRGC, the soldiers either supply their own uniforms or are issued multiple

different designs that make up excess inventory. These include lizard patterns

(pictured right), as well as slight variations on other types, such as combining the

DCU with a chocolate chip pattern and green-safariflage swaths. However these are

rare.

1.7 – Facilities

Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) Facilities

Facility: Latitude: Longitude:

77th

MID, 1st

Brig. HQ 36°16'53.83"N 59°34'59.61"E

77th

MID, 2nd

Brig. HQ 36°16'54.62"N 58°47'52.08"E

77th

MID, 3rd

Brig HQ 37°29'0.08"N 57°19'34.96"E

84th

MID, 1st

Brig. HQ 33°25'58.92"N 48°16'5.65"E

84th

MID, 2nd

Brig. HQ 33°32'5.07"N 48° 8'17.63"E

28th

MID, 1st

Brig. HQ 35°20'10.64"N 46°58'21.67"E

28th

MID, 2nd

Brig.HQ 35°32'6.72"N 46°12'8.74"E

28th

MID, 3rd

Brig.HQ 36°13'56.70"N 46°15'6.88"E

64th

ID HQ 37°32'21.57"N 45° 3'44.15"E

30th

ID HQ 36°50'19.99"N 54°26'53.10"E

21st

ID, 1st

Brig. HQ 38° 3'40.45"N 46°18'4.49"E

21st

ID, 2nd

Brig. HQ 37°20'46.32"N 46°10'28.21"E

21st

ID, 3rd

Brig. HQ 38°26'20.40"N 45°43'47.26"E

92nd

AD, 1st

Brig. HQ 31°19'55.70"N 48°39'35.70"E

92nd

AD, 2nd

Brig. HQ 32°24'26.29"N 48°23'30.10"E

81st

AD, 1st

Brig. HQ 34°17'31.78"N 47° 4'23.66"E

81st

AD, 2nd

Brig. HQ 34° 7'6.38"N 34° 7'6.38"N

81st

AD, 3rd

Brig HQ 34°28'37.78"N 45°48'39.46"E

16th

AD, 1st

Brig. HQ 36°17'17.75"N 50° 1'55.37"E

16th

AD, 2nd

Brig. HQ 36°41'22.92"N 48°29'5.15"E

88th

AD, 1st

Brig. HQ 29°28'49.01"N 60°52'11.79"E

88th

AD, 2nd

Brig. HQ 28°14'27.19"N 61° 9'27.29"E

88th

AD, 3rd

Brig. HQ 31° 2'32.81"N 61°30'29.72"E

38th

AB 35°14'31.91"N 60°36'36.14"E

25th

CB 36°48'46.46"N 45°16'35.10"E

23rd

CD 35°30'22.00"N 51° 0'59.00"E

55th

ArBn 29°37'4.00"N 52°30'37.00"E

65th

ArBn 35°39'46.01"N 51°30'16.32"E

11th

AG 37°20'43.57"N 46°10'28.27"E

22nd

AG 31°57'24.18"N 51°49'19.66"E

55th

AG 32°37'9.57"N 51°37'43.09"E MID – Mechanized Infantry Division

ID – Infantry Division

AD – Armored Division

AB – Armored Brigade

CD – Commando Division

CB –Commando Brigade

ArBn – Airborne

AG – Artillery Group

HQ – Headquarters

1.8 – Further Research

Due to the unique nature of most of the information pertaining to Iran's military, mainly, the

vague and unsubstantiated nature of many of the sources, where much information exists only as

“public knowledge” rather then the intellectual property of any now-known author, a complete and

extensive works-cited page is impossible.

However, these resources proved invaluable to the project, and present an opportunity for further

research on the topic:

Iran Defense Forum

Iran Military Forum

Military Photos Forum

ACIG Database and Forum

Global Security

Iran Ministry of Defense

Iranian Aviation Review Magazine

CSIS

IISS

SIPRI

Google Earth

Wikipedia

RAND Corporation

“The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij” by Dr. Saeid Golkar

If you feel that any of your ideas were present and want a more extensive citation, please contact the

authors. We will be more then happy to accommodate your wishes.

Reviewers:

Eagle2009

Dave Matteson