Iran Nuke Forensics
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Transcript of Iran Nuke Forensics
Materials Science & Engineering
Iranian Nuclear Program
Alex L. Arias Materials Science & Engineering Dept.
University of Florida
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011
Materials Science & Engineering
Outline
• History of Iran • Current Facilities in Iran
– Natanz – Qom: Fordo
• Weaponization • Monitoring
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 2
Materials Science & Engineering
History of Iran
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 3
• Atoms for peace 1950s • Revolution in 1979 • Ousted Pro-Western Shah (King) • Ayatollah Khomeini became leader
of movement and declared Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Disorganized revolution that violated international law by taking over American embassy in Tehran.
• Conflicting reports on nuclear operations and clandestine enrichment facilities.
Materials Science & Engineering
Current Facilities2
• Current enrichment facilities: – Natanz – Qom/Fordo
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 4
Materials Science & Engineering
Natanz1
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 5
• Started operations in February 2007 • Produced 4,105 kg of LEU since
then • Between October 18th, 2010 and
May 13, 2011 • Produced 970 kg of LEU
• Environmental samples at the site show the facility has been operating as declared according to the IAEA
• Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) • Declared to produce Uranium 20% U-235 enriched • Using LEU feed to produce HEU (328 centrifuges) • 31.6 kg of UF6 enriched from September 19th, 2010 to May 21st, 2011 • Environmental samples indicate facility operating as declared
Materials Science & Engineering
Fordo1
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 6
• Fordo fuel enrichment plant (FFEP) declared for construction on September 2009 • For production of UF6 enriched up to 5% U-235 • 16 cascades with a total of approx 3000 centrifuges
• IAEA unable to confirm the chronology of the cronstruction of the plant since Iran has restricted this information citing that there is no legal basis upon which the Agency may request this information. • IAEA feels it does have legal grounds to request such
information.
• Environmental samples collected on February 2010 do not inidicate the presence of the presence of enriched uranium.
• No centrifuges have been installed.
Materials Science & Engineering
Weaponization4
• With HEU a covert plant can be constructed as small as 500 m2 – Impossible to detect with satellite imagery
• Iranian clandestine operations may have P-2 type centrifuges – ~5 kg-SWUs per year each – Most likely will start with 20% enriched Uranium from Natanz plant
• Assume 90% U-235 bomb – Only 30 kg required for simple bomb
• Time required for production if – 12 cascade plant with preenriched feed-stock – 90 kg/year – Within half a year have enough WGP for 1 bomb
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 7
Materials Science & Engineering
Monitoring1,4
• Continue taking environmental samples • Monitor construction of planned
processing and enrichment plants • Centrifugation plants operate with
cylinders under atmospheric pressure so leakage is undetectable
• Waste monitoring
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 8
Materials Science & Engineering
References
1. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, The International Atomic Energy Agency, June 9th, 2011
2. “Iran Facilities Map”, NTI.org, accessed June 18, 2011 3. “Iran Nuclear Profile”, NTI.org 4. “The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation”, H.G. Wood et. al., Physics Today,
p. 40, September 2008.
Alex L. Arias- WSU Nuclear Forensics Summer School – July 20, 2011 9