Iran: Are We Out Of Options?

7/27/2019 Iran: Are We Out Of Options?

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Iran: Are We Out Of Options

Kurt Volker: [0:27] Welcome. Thank you for coming this evening to our debate on U.S.

policy concerning Iran. Are we out of options? My name is Kurt Volker. I'm ExecutiveDirector of the McCain Institute for International Leadership, which is a part of Arizona

State University. It is based here in Washington D.C. with a strong footprint in Tempe,

Arizona, as well. [0:49] Our mission at the McCain Institute is to promote character

driven leadership at home and around the world, to contribute to humanitarian action, andto contribute to better designs for better decision-making in national and international

policy.

[1:02] You can find us at www.mccaininstitute.org.

[1:07] Tonight's debate is the next in a series of structured timed foreign policy debates

around the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing our nation. Our goal was tohelp shape better decisions in foreign and national security policy.

[1:22] Prior debates have focused on Syria and Afghanistan. Our next debate, in

partnership with Intelligence Squared, will be about the U.S. defense budget. Will the

cuts be seen as a gift to our enemies? That will take place on June 19th.

[1:38] We intend to continue our debate series in the fall, as well. If you're enjoying these

please sign up on our email list and we'll be sure to get you invitations as those are

scheduled.

[1:47] The purpose of these debates is to illuminate the issues and express different points

of view, but to take out the partisanship and really get to the heart of the issues inquestion. We aim to have a scrupulous examination of America's national interests and

America's role in the world. I think you'll see that reflected in the structure of tonight'sdebate.

[2:08] Again, tonight's debate is focused on Iran. What if all of our diplomatic efforts and

sanctions fail? Successive U.S. administrations, including President Obama'sadministration, have said that the use of military force remains an option if those other

measures fail. As the clock winds down, are we now out of other options?

[2:29] On the other hand, would military force succeed in stopping Iran and what would

be the consequences of military force?

[2:36] We have four distinguished panelists tonight to address different perspectives

surrounding these questions. We hope that their debate helps illuminate these issues for

you and illuminate the choices facing our nation.

[2:47] It's a structured and timed debate. Each side will have six minutes to present an

initial view, three minutes to respond each side. The moderator will then present

questions. An equal amount of time for each side to respond.


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[2:58] There will be an opportunity for the audience to ask questions, as well, so be

thinking about that. But please, if you do choose to ask a question, keep it brief, to thepoint, and do make it a question.

[3:09] Tonight's event is open to the press. We are live streaming. We are also connected

to Arizona University Television, going live there.

[3:19] We have a number of guests who are from Iran or are connected to Iran, so thank

you for coming. You are very welcome to this debate.

[3:28] Please put your cellphones on silent. Don't turn them off because you're going towant to use them for tweeting. [laughs] The hashtag is #MIDebateIran. Please feel free to

use that throughout the debate. If you post a question in the Twitter process, as well, we

will try to pull something out of that. We'll also be getting students in Arizona an

opportunity to ask a question during the course of the debate, as well.

[3:54] Let me now introduce our moderator for the debate, the editor of Foreign Policy

magazine, Miss Susan Glasser. Thank you.

[applause]

Susan Glasser: [4:09] Thank you so much to Kurt and thank you to all of you for

coming out on a beautiful spring night. I see the promise of popcorn and a little foreign

policy wonk-ery is alluring, even in Washington spring. Thank you for that and I'mlooking forward to everyone's participation in this debate, as well. [4:27] As Kurt

mentioned, this is a structured debate so we're going to try to stick very closely to the

time frame. I think we'll see a real back and forth in a way that should be illuminating to

everybody. We won't ask you to vote, but I certainly will be interested to hear if anyonecomes out with their mind changed at the end of this conversation.

[4:46] For now, I'd love to start off by introducing a very distinguished set of panelists.

You have a full brochure, I think, that we're handing out with their long and distinguishedresumes. I'll introduce the teams for you, so you'll have a sense of what our adversaries

are up against each other.

[5:03] Starting right here with Danielle Pletka who is the vice president of the AmericanEnterprise Institute and her partner for the purposes of tonight's debate, former

congressman Robert Wexler who is now the president of the Abraham Center for Middle

East Peace. Thank you very much. They will be arguing on the side that now is the time

when we need to look at the military option.

[5:26] Up against them is a formidable pairing of, call them the ambassadors. We have

two of them. They have served in just about every possible place and way and have

teamed up. Just today, I believe, they have both signed a new report from a distinguishedgroup arguing the case for negotiations and for letting diplomacy work with Iran.


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[5:48] First, we have Ambassador Jim Dobbins who is the Director of International

Security and Defense Policy at Rand and his colleague, Ambassador Thomas Pickeringwho is now the vice chair of Hillson Company.

[6:01] I want to join all of you in thanking our distinguished panelists today and our

debaters and hoping that they will let her rip and not be nearly so polite as their

distinguished titles would have us suggest. Thank you to all of you in advance, and maythe best team win, as we say.

[applause]

Susan: [6:28] A quick recap on the rules. We are going to try to get to as many of your

questions as possible. In order to do that, we're going to stick close to our time frame.

Each team will have six minutes to begin in the order that they choose. [6:43] They can

each take as much time out of their six minutes as they like. Then it will come back, andthey will each have a three-minute rebuttal. Then we'll go to various rounds of questions.

I must say just a couple of introductory words on behalf of not only myself but perhaps

the audience as well.

[7:00] I'm particularly looking forward to this conversation. I don't know about the rest of

you, but I do feel that there is a certain Groundhog Day type quality to the Iran

conversation. It's spring in Washington, so we must be having a discussion about whether

it's finally time for us to take this debate to the next level and whether we've run out ofother ways to do it and we need to strike now.

[7:25] President Obama, as I'm sure everyone here is familiar with, has said that, in

essence, we're one year away from that moment. Others believe the time frame is sooner.As Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu has said, the red lines are approaching

ever closer.

[7:47] The circularity of the debate, and, believe me, if you go back and do a search, youcan find this very same conversation occurring down to the one year timeframe before all

the events will play out every spring since at least 2004.

[8:05] This might really be year, and if that's the case then this debate might really be the

one that shapes all of our thinking on what should happen next and how the Washingtonpolicy conversation should go. So with no further ado, the lots have been drawn. The first

team to kick off is the team of Pletka and Wexler. I will go right to them for their six

minute opening. Thank you very much.

Danielle Pletka: [8:33] Thank you, Susan. I'm not going to waste a lot of time withpleasantries, since I see that the timer hit instantaneously. You're exactly right. We have

engaged in this discussion innumerable times in Washington. [8:47] Now is the right time

to have a discussion not about the "Has time run out? Is there more time for negotiations?Is there more time that's available? Is now the time to end?" It's a question about what

happens when/if those negotiations fail. We've been looking at this challenge of a

nuclear...


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[break in tape]

Danielle: [9:11] ...here in Washington, but of course the implications for the region aresubstantial. It's not just about Israel and the threat to Israel. It's also about the entire Gulf.

It's about Iraq. It's about the Levant. It's about the influence that Iran will have if, indeed,

they succeed in fashioning a nuclear weapon and having a nuclear capability. [9:32]

We've been engaged in negotiations over the question of Iran's nuclear capacity for sometime, most recently, a couple of weeks ago in Almaty, at which point the United States

tabled yet another offer for the Iranians to persuade them to come and give up some of

their capabilities, some information, in exchange for some concessions on sanctions and avariety of issues.

[9:55] Those talks reportedly went nowhere. No future talks have been scheduled, though

there are still technical conversations going on. It's not often that you see someone like

me sitting here with someone like former Congressman Wexler, a pretty staunchDemocrat...I suspect we probably voted differently in November...on the same side of an

issue.

[10:19] If you wanted to push Ambassadors Pickering and Dobbins aside, I'm betting wecould probably engage in a pretty lively debate, just the two of us, about whether we've

given too much time to negotiations, whether time is running out, whether the President

is really willing to make a tough call.

[10:38] But there's something that we agree about 100 percent. That is that once

negotiations have run their course, the right choice, unfortunately the only choice, if Iran

is not willing to give up its nuclear weapons program, is for the United States to strike

Iran militarily. Now, no one who supports the military option believes it's going to be apanacea.

[11:03] It's going to be a dangerous operation for whoever undertakes it and it's not going

to be an end to the Iranian nuclear program. I don't think we are fooled about that at all.

[11:14] On the other hand, a delay may be better than what comes next, which is an

Iranian nuclear capability, intimidation of the region, possible use of the weapon,

possible proliferation. None of us are technical experts, but I think that the details onIran's progress are very telling. They give us a sense that this is a debate that's likely to

come to an end reasonably soon. It's not going to go on for years.

[11:39] As of the last IAEA Report, Iran had 5,500 kilograms of enriched uranium. Theyhad 1,500 enriched to 20 percent. What's the President thinking about these things?

Congressman Wexler has a really good idea about the President's thinking on theseissues.

Congressman Robert Wexler: [11:57] Thank you. I'm a Floridian. Like too manyFloridians possibly, I've been at Disney World way too many times. One of the exhibits is

the Hall of Presidents. At least the way it used to be, the thing you could buy there was a

book. It had, in the book, two pages for each president. One page would be a big picture,a portrait and the other, in essence, would be the synopsis of the President's term in


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office. [12:23] Let's envision President Obama's page in the Hall of Presidents Disney

World exhibit. I would suspect that about two-thirds of the page is going to deal withdomestic policy. Either he's going to be FDR, if the economy goes right, or he'll be

Hoover if it doesn't. It'll probably say he was the first African-American president and

then, after that, it'll say he was the guy that ordered the action that caused the bringing of

justice to Osama bin Laden.

[12:51] Iraq most likely won't be on his page much. That'll be on President Bush's page.

Even Afghanistan won't be on President Obama's page. It'll be mostly on President Bush's

page. But what will be on the remainder of President Obama's page, I would argue and Iwould expect is on his watch Iran became a nuclear weapon holder or not.

[13:13] The bottom line, on President Obama's policy, I think it's worth it to just read a

quick quote that he said while he was visiting Israel recently. "We do not have a policy of

containment, when it comes to a nuclear Iran. Our policy is to prevent Iran frombecoming a nuclear weapon holder. We'd prefer to resolve this diplomatically and there's

still time to do so. All options are on the table. We will do what is necessary to prevent

Iran the next world's nuclear power."

[13:46] What are the means to prevent this? Of course, sanctions...We'll go into that no

doubt. That have been relatively successful in terms of exacting economic pain. But it's a

big question mark unfortunately so far in terms of if it has caused a change in Iranian

policy.

[14:03] What is at stake? Enormous security challenges, of course. Our own. Our allies.

Particularly Israel's. Also economics. Let us not forget that a good percentage of the

world's oil goes through the Strait of Hormuz, which, if Iran became a nuclear weaponholder, would hold the world's economics hostage and the complete, in essence, tearing

out of the nonproliferation treaty -- if Iran were to become successful in obtaining anuclear weapon.

[14:33] US credibility, not just the President's. I'll stop with this. But, should Iran become

a nuclear power after the President of the United States has adopted a concrete, clear

policy of prevention, the American credibility, not just in Israel, not just in the Gulf, but

worldwide, will be dramatically impaired in such a way that I would argue willprofoundly affect our interests, not just in terms of security, but our interests all across

the world, in every vein.

Susan: [15:07] Congressman Wexler, thank you very much. That was excellent. I cansee your training on the Hill led you to observe the timeline and we don't have anyone to

yield time to you. Thank you very much for that opening.

Congressman Wexler: [laughs] [15:17]

Susan: [15:18] Ambassador Dobbins, that's a good point to pick up. Would the military

option even be effective in stopping Iran? If that's the goal that everyone here agrees on,

stopping Iran from obtaining the capability for nuclear weapons, why should we believethen the military option would actually yield that result? Isn't it possible that it would


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simply lead to a broader war or to putting back the timetable a year or two? Can a nuclear

determined power be stopped?

Ambassador James Dobbins: [15:47] I think, for anyone here to decide which side of

this debate they come down on, they have to weigh the risks for the negotiations against

the risk of war. The risk of an American attack on Iran is not that it would close the

Straits of Hormuz, rocket Israel, unleash Hamas and Hezbollah, attack U.S. bases in theregion and launch a worldwide terror campaign. Those are things we can deal with.

[16:14] The risk of launching a war with Iran is that it would respond cautiously, that it

would play the aggrieved party, that it would seek international sympathy, that it wouldunravel the large global coalition that's currently restraining its nuclear possibilities, that

it would dismantle the sanctions regime, that it would withdraw from the NPT, that it

would send the inspectors home and that it would accelerate its nuclear program at

unknown sites, which we couldn't find and, therefore, couldn't destroy.

[16:47] Those are things we can't prevent. Now, I think you have to ask yourself, when

you try to consider what the consequences of a nuclear Iran are, what Iran's neighbors are

afraid of. They're not afraid of Iranian aggression. They are afraid of Iranian subversion.

[17:04] Nobody thinks that Iran is going to invade and occupy any of its neighbors. It

doesn't have the capability of doing so. It wouldn't have the capability of doing so even if

it had nuclear weapons. But it does have the capability of appealing to dissident

populations throughout that region, to Shia, to Palestinians, and to others.

[17:22] Its appeal to those populations would be intensified if it was the victim of an

unprovoked attack. In fact, I think you can make a good case that Iran's ability to project

influence in that region would be greater as the victim of an unprovoked American attackthan an Iran with nuclear weapons.

Susan: [17:41] Ambassador Pickering.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering: [17:42] Jim has sketched out very importantly the

problems of the use of force. I'd like to talk to you a little bit about negotiation. The

background for negotiations is the following. The U.S. intelligence community agrees

that there may have been an earlier Iran program, but there is none now in terms of adecision to make nuclear weapons. [18:01] Even more importantly, General Clapper

recently testified that he believes it was a very good chance he would know if that were

going to happen. Those are important. I also ask you to cast your eye over the American

public. Are we ready yet for another third ground war in the Middle East?

[18:18] The negotiating scenarios are very interesting. My own sense is that I believewe're probably closer to a solution through negotiation than we have been before, and I'll

tell you why. I think that the effectiveness of sanctions, and indeed the pressure that hasbeen put on Iran has led to two very interesting developments.

[18:40] One has been that rather than having negotiations take place once a year for one

day, we have seen over the last year, and continuing this year, a rather steady andsignificant series of negotiating activities.


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[18:56] The reports from those have been a combination of some enthusiasm and some

misery. They're not yet clearly, as a sense of a negotiation, moving to some kind of effortthat we could call essentially the end of the beginning. But we certainly have seen the

beginning of the beginning in negotiations.

[19:18] Substantively, I think it's important to note that rather than gosh, yet another

proposal, there is a series of proposals from the P5-plus-1, mainly focused around dealingwith 20 percent enriched material. Very important.

[19:32] Danny said there were 1,500 kilos. The Israeli red line happens to be 225 kilos.

The Iranians have scrupulously avoided making enough material in a form that could bere-enriched across that deadline, so I don't know where Danny got her information.

Danielle: [19:48] The IAEA.

Ambassador Pickering: [19:49] The what?

Danielle: [19:50] The IAEA.

Ambassador Pickering: [19:52] The IAEA is reporting less than 200 kilos, so you havea different IAEA than I have. In any event, we know in fact that...

Danielle: [19:59] Yes, I think I have the right one.

Ambassador Pickering: [20:00] We know in fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu has

called that a red line, and apparently the Iranians have heard that. I think it is significant

that the remaining outstanding, most significant difference is over the degree to which the

Iranians, and the US and its friends and allies, can get together on the issue of sanctionsrelief. [20:23] This is not an easy issue to deal with. There are some proposals on the

table. Jim suggested this morning in a group that, in fact, brought out the introduction ofthis particular book. I'll hold it right side up so you can see it. It is, in a sense, an

important primer for any of you interested in negotiations.

[20:44] Jim's suggestion was that in any sanctions effort, we should go the UN's Security

Council and get a temporary suspension of sanctions as our hold card against any Iranian

malfeasance in negotiations. This would mean that it would take our veto to continue thesanctions beyond a suspension period, and it's very important.

[21:07] How can all of this end? Well, very clearly on the table, there are four principles

that are important. One, the Iranians constrain their program to a purely civil, and indeed

peaceful, nuclear program. Secondly, the IAEA has inspection mechanisms of its owndevising to ensure, in fact, that we have the greatest possibility of knowing of any

violations.

[21:32] Thirdly, we gradually release sanctions as they gradually comply with therestraints they have to accept on their program. Fourthly, we agree that they can continue

enrichment within the bounds of a peaceful program and within the limits of a peaceful

program. To me, that makes sense. To me, that points the way for the future. To me, it is

an important point to exhaust negotiations before jumping into war.


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[21:59] Interestingly enough, from everything I've heard here, all four of us seem to agree

with that principle.

Susan: [22:04] All right. The Ambassador's team also ends on time, so thank you very

much for that. We're going to go to rebuttals, three minutes. I'd like to go back to Pletka

and Wexler with this question. Ambassador Pickering had just said are you ready for a

third ground war in the Middle East, and is that going to be the consequence of themilitary option that you're advocating?

Congressman Wexler: [22:26] I voted at the time to give President Bush the authority

to go to war in Iraq. That was the most difficult vote of my political career, and one thatwas politically, no doubt, the worst vote that I made. In many respects, I regret that vote.

[22:44] I do not think that anyone, nor would I suggest that anyone would, lightly

consider the extraordinary consequences of yet a third military action. However, the

question must presuppose all of the things that didn't happen before then, meaning that allthe things that Ambassadors Dobbins and Pickering talked about, didn't work. That's the

key.

[23:13] If all of the things they have proposed didn't work, and we were ultimately leftwith the question of do we prevent or do we contain, I argue we prevent. We have no

option. If prevention requires military action, then I actually believe because of the way

President Obama has quite modestly, in many respects, approached this, the American

people, the vast majority, would be supportive.

Danielle: [23:43] I think part of the question, of course, goes to whether any of us are

military tacticians. I guess I can only speak for myself in saying I'm probably not one.

[23:54] I don't know whether what would be required to strike the Iranian nuclear sites isin fact a ground war, given that none of us have suggested that the aim of any military

option is in fact to invade, occupy the country of Iran and let's say depose the regime. Idon't think that ground troops would be necessary, but perhaps I'm confused about what

the imperative is here.

[24:17] I think part of the challenge that we're facing up to, and I do want to come back

to you on the numbers because I think they're important, but let's set that aside for a

moment. The challenge that we're facing up to here is that we're on a timeline that is notone of our own choosing. If the aim of sanctions is indeed as one of our worthy

opponents suggested to have more negotiations, then those sanctions are really pretty

darn awesome, because we're having a lot of negotiations.

[24:48] The aim of sanctions is not to get to negotiations. It's to persuade the Iranians of

the wisdom of giving up their nuclear program, and by the way, giving up what may well

be, according to Yukiya Amano, the Director of the IAEA, elements that are secret to us.

In other words, progress that has been made about which we're not aware.

[25:11] That is the challenge. It's not about should we keep talking. We can keep talking.

That's always a good idea. The point is at a certain moment, Iran is going to have a

nuclear capability. At that moment, the question before the President of the United States


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will be to act or not to act. He has said very clearly he believes he should act. We happen

to agree.

Susan: [25:34] Congressman Wexler framed this as an issue of whether you're really

willing to embrace containment, ultimately. [25:42] You say that the goal is to stop Iran

from obtaining the ability to have a nuclear weapon. But really, doesn't your argument

suggest Ambassadors that rather than prevention ultimately containment is somethingthat you're willing to live with if the alternative is war in the Middle East again?

Ambassador Dobbins: [26:01] Well, I'd say first of all that the design of this debate is

about whether we should now be giving negotiations a further chance or not. On the issueof containment or prevention, the U.S. government agrees that they cannot prevent Iran

from getting a nuclear weapon. They can only delay it. [26:21] It really is a question of

do you deter Iran, or do you delay their development of a nuclear weapon? Thereby

making it A, more likely that they ultimately get it, ensuring that they get it underconditions of extreme hostility and creating the other consequences which I've laid out.

Tom, you want to add?

Ambassador Pickering: [26:47] Containment is a code word for accepting an Iraniannuclear weapon and using deterrents to try to prevent them from exploiting it. I don't

agree with that. My colleagues don't agree with that. [27:00] Secondly, it is very clear to

everybody who has looked at the military piece, and again, I recommend the predecessor

volume to this that looks at the cost and benefits of the use of military force. The best thatone can estimate, and a number of generals including a former CENTCOM commander

signed this document, is that you can get through aerial bombardment on a continued

basis, maybe four years relief.

[27:29] Everybody who looked at it believed that you have to invade and control Iran to

stop its nuclear program with the use of military force, which is why we have said themilitary option only works if in fact you enter another ground war in the Middle East. I

think it's important to keep that in mind.

[27:49] Finally, I agree with Jim. I thought we came here to debate whether we should

drop negotiations now and use military force. Iran has nuclear capabilities, no question.

Those capabilities are being developed. They concern me.

[28:02] The President has said when he believes they have gone to the decision to make a

nuclear weapon, he will employ everything on the table to stop them. I don't disagree

with that. I think that we all join in seeing the importance of stopping an Iranian nuclearweapon, but I don't believe, and I haven't heard Prime Minister Netanyahu say recently

that he believes that we don't have time to continue with the negotiating process.

Susan: [28:32] Thank you. We're now done with the opening statement and therebuttals, and so I'm going to jump in with some questions to keep us going right on that

theme. In fact, I'd like to start right with your question, Ambassador Pickering, which is

should we continue to invest in negotiations, or have we run out of time? If so, how will

we know? [28:54] Going right back to this Groundhog Day nature of this, we've had UNresolution after UN resolution. We've had tightening sanctions over and over again.


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We've had years, literally years, worth of P5-plus-1 negotiations over and over again.

Nonetheless, every year, it's reported that Iran has continued to press forward with thisnuclear program in some ways.

[29:18] It begs the question at this point, how will we know? What is it that makes one

team here see that there's more potential in negotiations and another team here say no? I'd

like to ask, first of all, Congressman Wexler and Danny, what you think about how doyou know that time is up?

Danielle: [29:40] I think that, first of all, we've gotten into what you call this Groundhog

Day discussion about negotiations, which is an entirely sterile debate. There is absolutelynothing wrong with negotiations. I think that we can continue talking to the Iranians for

as long as we like. [30:00] The challenge before us, as I said, is not whether or not we

should continue to negotiate. The challenge before is, "Are we something? Is it doing

anything to get to the end result that we seek?" After all, the purpose of these "cripplingsanctions" is for us to get the Iranians to give something up, not for us to simply get the

Iranians to the table to play out the clock until they have a better hand.

[30:29] I think that's the thing that we agree upon. Again, should we continue talking? Ihave no objection to talking. We can talk all we want, but we do need to achieve

something. That's why the President has said on numerous occasions, "This is not an

endless process. The window is not always going to be open. There is a wide recognition

that Iran will reach this point."

[30:52] Now I do have to disagree with our colleagues about the clarity that there will be.

General Clapper has suggested that he will know. He will know exactly the same way we

knew about 9/11 or we knew about the Iranian program or we knew about the Syrianprogram or we knew about the North Korean program. Our track record isn't exactly

perfect. I'm sorry. I hogged too much time. Congressman?

Susan: [31:15] That's OK. You get to respond as well.

Congressman Wexler: [31:18] I think it's important to ask the question, and I, too,

support extended negotiations. No one, no serious person in Washington, would suggest

employing a military option without exhausting over and over and over again every otheralternative. [31:37] Does anybody seriously believe that if President Obama had taken the

military option off the table, that we'd be negotiating with the Iranians? Of course we

wouldn't. Following that line of logic, it concerns me, this notion that the military option

or that the credible element of a military option is just a side show to the negotiations.They're not.

[32:08] I would argue that, unfortunately, a credible military option is one of, if not the

most, important element of a serious set of negotiations that reach the conclusions thatAmbassadors Pickering and Dobbins provide.

[32:27] I think it's extremely important to also recognize there's one more point. If I took

away one thing from all of the dozens of briefings that I received in Congress about Iran,was that as unified as the Iranian leadership may have been and still is with respect to the


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pursuit of a nuclear weapon, the one thing the clerical leadership values more than their

nuclear program is their power.

[32:56] I would argue that, while it's one strategy to attempt to alleviate a nuclear weapon

program, it's also another strategy to challenge the power of those that currently rule Iran.

I would argue that, at the end of the negotiations, should they fail, it's probably time to

combine the policy of President Bush and President Obama and make it an "all hands ondeck" policy.

[33:28] Take the best of the regime change policy and marry it to the best of the

negotiation policy with the military option still at hand. Maybe that's our last card.

Susan: [33:41] Team Ambassadors, I've got to ask you this question. Ambassador

Pickering, I'll go right to you. What is to stop us from having this process go on

absolutely forever? How is it that we can't string this on forever? When are you willing tosay that diplomacy has not succeeded? [33:58] We have a rule in my house that if you've

been saying you're going to clean the attic for a year and you haven't done it, you're not

doing it. We've been doing this for a lot longer than a year. How long is too long?

Ambassador Pickering: [34:10] Susan, if you're not making progress, you know it. We

are. It's not millennial, but it is there, and it's real. I made those points. Secondly, Danielle

Pletka doesn't know what she wants. She wants something to drop from the tree like a

ripe fruit as a result of the sanctions squeezed, but she's never to find it. [34:30] Certainly,having Iran give up entirely its full nuclear program is not on as a sanctions deal. What is

on, I think, is a deal which can constrain them. I might ask Congressman Wexler to take

his mind back to the Iraqi decision.

[34:48] What you just recommended is Iraqi decision son of with respect to Iran. You

need to think through what that means. Are we going to occupy Iran to achieve ourobjectives through the use of military force? And don't forget, we are not wonderful

occupiers. We are not good at changing regimes.

[35:10] We ought to learn a little bit from the last two episodes in which we worked that

particular problem so badly, combat operations were very successful. After that, the

whole thing went to hell in a hand basket. Think about it.

Susan: [35:26] We can see who drew the bad cop straw in this team here. [laughter]

Susan: [35:32] I'm going to let you both respond. Danielle?

Ambassador Pickering: [35:35] I've got to give Jim a chance here.

Danielle: [35:37] Do you want to, Jim? Go ahead.

Ambassador Dobbins: [35:38] I just say that we're all operating without full knowledgeof what's going on in these negotiations. My impression is that there is broad agreement

about the end game in which the Iranians constrain their enrichment program but don't

give it up all together, limit the amount of nuclear material that they have, and open up a

much wider inspection regime including sites that they haven't. [36:09] The issue is


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largely one about sequencing, how quickly you lift sanctions for what kind of Iranian

concessions with the Iranians wanting the sanctions lifted when they say they'll do thesethings, and our side saying, "No, you can have the sanctions lifted when you've actually

done all these things."

[36:28] I think we've gotten beyond broad principles to a real negotiation. Because none

of us actually know, the sides have been rather circumspect and that may be a good sign,people tend to become more circumspect when they actually have secrets to protect, but

my impression is we may be closer than we think.

[36:55] Nevertheless, there are going to be controversial decisions that the Americanpresident would need to make, concessions that will be severely criticized and moves that

will require understanding and support on the part of the Congress that may not be

entirely popular.

Susan: [37:12] All right. We're going to get a response around, and then we can go back

another time.

Danielle: [37:18] I just wanted to take a moment to admire Ambassador Dobbinsbeautiful character. His optimism is inspiring to me. [laughter]

Ambassador Dobbins: [37:27] Thank you, Danielle.

Danielle: [37:28] It really is. It reminds me a little bit about the conversation about thepeace process. We all know what the nature of the agreement is going to be, but yet, darn

it, those two folks, they just can't seem to get it together. Perhaps we'll be as successful in

our negotiations with Iran. Let me turn to the question of the ripe fruit that Ambassador

Pickering alluded to.

Ambassador Pickering: [37:50] It was Karl Marx, I'm sorry, Danny. [laughs]

Danielle: [37:53] That's OK, I expected no less from you. [laughter]

Danielle: [37:59] I don't think any of us fool ourselves into thinking that the Iranians are

going to have a road to Damascus like conversion and decide this is a really dreadful

idea. What were we thinking? Because, after all, I think that what they're thinking isperfectly rational. [38:19] The truth is that, if they look at the region and they see what's

happened, they can say to themselves, "Look at Libya. Kaddafi gave up his nuclear

capability or his nuclear plans, and where is he now? Oh yeah, he's dead. Look at North

Korea. They're still hopping along very nicely. It looks like the United States is thinking

twice."

[38:39] I think that's a perfectly rational calculation. They may also be looking at

Pakistan and thinking to themselves, "They'll accept it when they have to." I think thatthe Iranians are, contrary to the suggestions of some, very rational actors.

[38:52] The question is really, yes, what are they willing to give up? Here I think, again,

our opponents' faith in humanity is so much more deep than mine. Their faith in the

Iranians, the notion that Iran could have a limited enrichment program, a program, by the


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way, that is intended to be limited by their agreements under the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty and their safeguards agreements but has not been limited, aprogram about which there have been repeated revelations of violations of those

agreements, but nonetheless that we could again trust them perhaps just with a few more

observers.

[39:31] After all, then they won't want to keep secrets from us, because what they'relooking for, after all, isn't really regional domination. It isn't that trump card. What they're

really looking for is just that feeling of security that they have.

[39:47] Really? Is that what they're looking for? Perhaps, again, I think we just havedifferent reads of the Iranian character. Congressman Wexler, you had something to

answer as well on...

Susan: [39:58] Son of Iraq, I believe.

Congressman Wexler: [39:59] Yes. Ambassador Pickering asked, I think, both a valid

and important and, for me, haunting question. That is, "Have we learned any lessons fromIraq? Does my position or others doom us to repeat some of those mistakes?" That's a fairquestion. [40:19] I would argue that in actuality the policy that President Obama has put

in place from his first Inaugural Address, actually before that, from his debates from then

Senator Clinton and Senator McCain, he adopted an entirely different approach, whether

you think it's right or wrong, versus the approach that President Bush took with respect toIraq.

[40:49] In fact, I can't imagine almost a more diametrically opposed approach than the

manner in which both President Obama and the United States have maneuvered andstated our policy relative to Iraq, too. So I do not think, respectfully, that the analogy

ultimately works.

[41:10] After all, it's not even the United States that is directly negotiating with Iran.We're doing it with our European allies. We're doing it with Russia. We're doing it, in

theory, with China. These aren't a set of sanctions that are unilateral by the United States.

If they were, they would be hardly effective.

[41:29] They are a set of sanctions that have been adopted and approved by countlessnumbers of our allies. The Treasury Department, the State Department, have with great

pain gone through with even those that are not our allies to work with us in applying

pressures.

[41:49] If all of these things do not work, and that's the big if, if they all do not work,then President Obama is in a far different set of circumstances than, unfortunately, we

were in when President Bush went to war in Iraq.

[42:08] Then, ultimately, in Iraq, we were found out to be wrong with respect to weapons

of mass destruction. I suspect that if, God forbid, a military option was required and

whatever it was we alleged in Iran, I would hope and suspect that this time we would be

more accurate.


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p.14

Susan: [42:33] Ambassador Dobbins, I've got to ask you, Danielle Pletko says that you

have a touching and even naive faith in the Iranian character and their ability to negotiatewith us in good faith. Is that the case?

Ambassador Dobbins: [42:48] I'd say a couple of things. I'd say first of all, there's no

doubt that the reason we instinctively believe that the Iranians are going for a bomb is

because it's exactly what we would do if we were in their position. [43:01] No Americanpolicymaker would choose any option other than gaining nuclear weapons if he were

surrounded by the United States, Pakistan, Russia, India, and Israel. There's a natural

instinct. Of course, they're going for a bomb.

[43:19] I think there are a number of other factors, though, that constrain that decision

and make it fairly costly for them to cross that threshold. They've been careful not to

cross that threshold, although they keep inching up to it.

[43:31] They could have had a bomb sooner than this if they had really wanted one badly

enough and were prepared to pay the consequences. I don't think it's necessarily the threat

to attack them, although that may be a factor.

[43:42] They negotiated with us for five or six years before we threatened to attack them.

I think the sanctions regime and the degree of opprobrium they get if they cross this

threshold is one of the things that are holding them back.

[43:54] In terms of whether you can negotiate with the Iranians, I negotiated with the

Iranians over Afghanistan in 2001-2002. They were quite helpful in that regard, and they

negotiated quite seriously and without great difficulty.

The government there has changed, and Ahmadinejad was elected a year later and hasbeen a much more difficult [inaudible 44: [44:10] 18] . Therefore, I've had less hope for

similar relationship under his leadership. They're having another election in a couple of

months. Iranian elections aren't free and fair, but they are completely unpredictable, andthey do have consequences.

[44:37] Iranian policies have changed significantly under different leaders. We've missed

opportunities with other leaders when they made openings. I'm hoping that if those

opportunities occur, and I think they might, that we'll seize them this time.

Ambassador Pickering: [44:54] Might I add just two things, Susan? During that period

that is before 2008, Iran accepted for two years to stop enrichment entirely. Iran at the

same time agreed to accept the additional protocol to the IAEA which is a voluntary

extensive, more extensive inspection system which allows the IAEA to say what sites it'sto visit with the acceptance of the government in advance. [45:22] I don't think that the

whole question of negotiation is an exercise in disutility. I think it's extremely important.

I think that progress is slow, that part of the problem is that on the Iranian side the pointthat Congressman Wexler made, let's go for regime change, is certainly not helpful in

bringing about an agreement on a particular set of issues constraining their nuclear

program.


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p.15

[45:51] We will only know until we make the major effort to try. Jim and I have pointed

out that the bridge to cross is a serious one and not an ephemeral or, indeed, not anunimportant one. But it is, nevertheless, a bridge that I believe is possible to cross. There

are ways to cross it, as I explained, that continue to keep our powder to dry, so to speak,

and keep us in the driver's seat.

[46:22] That's the kind of approach we need. I couldn't agree more with CongressmanWexler who says that we should exhaust all of the opportunities, certainly within the time

allowed us. That time is obviously not working on our side, but I think we have time

now.

[46:39] I think the debate is not whether ultimately should we use military force, which is

what the other side is trying to turn it into. The debate I was invited to come here to make

was, "Should we use military force now and forget all of this silliness that the diplomats

are involved in, in negotiation?"

[46:59] I can tell you, in fact, that it is that kind of attitude and that sort of approach, the

substitution of military force for diplomacy on a premature basis, that got us into deeptrouble for the last 10 years in the Middle East.

Susan: [47:14] I'd like to let you respond. Then I want to probe a little bit more into this

question of the military option that you're advocating. Up until now, Congressman

Wexler, you have made the argument that having the viable military option is importantas a tool in the diplomacy. [47:32] But I haven't heard a lot from either of you about why

it is that you believe that, should negotiations fail, this is a viable option or that it is an

effective one. Please, respond to Ambassador Pickering as well.

Congressman Wexler: [47:48] First, I just want to be clear. I don't know exactly what

explanation you received, but I personally completely support all of these efforts. Theyare legitimate. They are credible. It's exactly what the United States must do in order to

prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon holder. [48:12] What I thought was a partof the debate, and certainly must be because it's the essential question ultimately and,

more importantly, when the President of the United States announces his policy of

prevention, he's a smart man.

[48:29] He understands that by choosing prevention versus containment, he is saying that

if at some point in time prevention is no longer possible by negotiation, then I must use

other means. Those means might include military means. That, to me, is quite

self-evident.

[48:52] I would go back, if I could, using Ambassador Pickering's, I think, very worthytactic of saying, "What have we learned from various experiences?" I would ask, it seems

to me that maybe the only time in which Iran has, in fact, altered its behavior was in2003.

[49:13] If I understand the history correctly, the primary action that occurred in 2003 was

the fact that there were 200,000 plus American troops in Iraq, and Iran correctly orincorrectly calculated that they might be next.


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p.16

[49:30] Now I'm not suggesting we put 200,000 plus American troops for this purpose,

but what lesson should we draw from that? That a credible military threat is not relevantto the success of negotiations or that a military threat is just one factor? I don't think so.

[49:49] The lesson that I draw is, rightfully or wrongfully so, a credible military threat

may, in fact, be the most significant element that we have to achieve your negotiated

success.

Ambassador Pickering: [50:06] You may be right. I don't think it's a knowable

proposition. Our experience is that coercive diplomacy, that is threatening somebody in

order to secure their behavioral change, usually doesn't work, that it makes them moredifficult to do what they're doing. [50:26] In 1999, or going back even earlier in 1991, we

told Saddam if he didn't get out of Kuwait, we would throw him out. He didn't get out.

We had to throw him out. In 1999, we told Milosevic if he didn't get out of Kosovo, we'd

bomb him out. He didn't get out and we had to bomb him out.

[50:51] In 2001, we told the Taliban that if they didn't hand over bin Laden, we'd invade

and overthrow their government. They didn't give us bin Laden. We invaded andoverthrew their government.

[51:02] In 2003, we again told Saddam that if he couldn't convince us he didn't have

WMD, we'd invade and overthrow his government. He didn't come clean that he didn't

have WMD. He continued to pretend he did and we invaded and overthrew hisgovernment. In every single occasion, the threat didn't work.

Congressman Wexler: [51:20] Respectfully, though, Libya is a different example.

Susan: [51:22] I'd like to get Danielle in.

Ambassador Pickering: [51:24] Libya's another good example, if you want anotherone.

Danielle: [51:26] I'm not quite sure what you would have preferred that we did with...

Ambassador Dobbins: [51:32] I'm on a limited argument, whether the threat is likely to

bring about the desired impact. I'm saying I don't know, but our experience is that threatstend to get people's back up and usually the threat of war doesn't lead to peace, it leads to

war.

Ambassador Pickering: [51:49] Can I make just one small point here?

Susan: [51:51] No, no, no. Danielle.

Ambassador Pickering: [51:56] I thought it was our side's turn for the six minutes.

Danielle: [52:01] Let me just address this.

Ambassador Pickering: [52:03] So we don't get equal time.


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p.17

Danielle: [52:04] No, you...

Susan: [52:05] You get more than equal time. We're not on the six minutes anymore.

Ambassador Pickering: [52:10] Somebody should tell us that we're off the six minutes.

Susan: [52:13] Go ahead.

Ambassador Pickering: [52:14] All I wanted to make was a small point. I agree with

Jim on threats. On the other hand, as an American diplomat, I would never want to

negotiate without a first class military force in this country or without the world's best

economy. I believe that in some ways that makes a considerable difference in our abilityto negotiate successfully.

Danielle: [52:38] I note the success of our negotiations with North Korea or perhaps not.

The success of our negotiations with Iran, so far. [52:50] I would point out thatsometimes there aren't really good answers but the notion, this construct, this straw man

that you've created that somehow had we negotiated with Milosevic, let's say, without theprospect...

Ambassador Pickering: [53:04] That's not my suggestion.

Danielle: [53:05] Again, it sort of is because we're in the real world. There is an option.

It either happens or it doesn't happen. Do you want to sit down and negotiate with him?At what point should we have stopped negotiating with him, because that's the place

we're in.

Ambassador Pickering: [53:23] I'm just arguing that in some cases neither negotiatingor threatening work. There are cases where neither works.

Danielle: [53:29] I think that what Ambassador Pickering said is actually apropos. We

go a little further, and I think that's maybe one of the distinctions between us. It's not the

question of having that military. It's the credible threat of using that military that givesyour negotiations a little bit of urgency. That is the question before us.

Ambassador Pickering: [53:50] has written...I wrote down the quote before I came

because I thought it was important what he said. "A war with Iran would be madness andcatastrophic for U.S. interests." I think that's a pretty clear statement that a war with Iran

would be madness. [54:07] We don't believe that, and I think, again, the important thing

here to underscore is that no one is excited about a military option with Iran. I'm sure,

least of all, the Iranians, but frankly even...I think I can speak for you, Robert, here. Idon't think we're very excited about this idea, either.

[54:25] First of all, you're exactly right. If we end up in a situation where, God forbid, we

end up having troops on the ground, we're not very good at that. But there's anotherelement here that doesn't get discussed. That is that a military strike, if it buys us the four

years that you estimate. I'll give you two. If it buys us the two years we estimate.


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p.18

[54:45] If we have a decent strategy to cope afterwards with an aftermath and to figure

out what should be done and to help to mitigate any option for the Iranians to move backto a nuclear weapons program, we will be in a better place than if the Iranians, in fact, are

the point of possession of nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Pickering: [55:10] Triumphs of hope over reality don't produce a sound

strategy.

Danielle: [55:14] I'm sorry, I couldn't hear.

Ambassador Pickering: [55:15] Triumphs of hope over reality don't produce a soundstrategy.

Danielle: [55:20] Bingo, that's the problem with the negotiations.

Ambassador Pickering: [55:20] That's what you're arguing.

Susan: [55:23] Just to return to our format so that everybody is clear, Ambassador

Pickering. We're going to give...I'm going to give a question to all of you that goes back

to this question about the military options and then we're going to turn to our audience fortheir questions.

Ambassador Pickering: [55:35] I thought we were having a debate, but that's OK. I'm

happy to oblige.

Susan: [55:37] We're going to have two minutes each, absolutely. [55:40] What I'd like

to know is your view of the military option and why it is that you're sure that it would be

such a disaster. Does that mean that you don't believe that there is the need for a crediblemilitary threat as part of these negotiations?

Ambassador Pickering: [55:57] I don't say that I don't believe that a credible military

threat is not useful. I explained how and why I believe that. I think Jim has explained

how active military threats, at times, have not produced the result that we would like, andI agree with that. [56:15] Secondly, I agree that we ought to exhaust diplomacy. That's up

to the line where the General Clapper piece begins to fit in, where his confidence, which I

was amazed by but I'm happy to accept, that he would know, in fact, if this was going toa nuclear weapon is very important to have on the table. It's something to consider.

[56:37] It's not something that I would likely doubt, because I respect the man, and I

think he's a careful and a conservative person. Jim and I have both described what we see

as the down sides of military activity. They are simple.

[56:52] One is we can achieve a small gain, but we don't know what we'll do after that

except either more bombing or land occupation to stop the nuclear program in Iran if it

turns to a weapon. Certainly, we are not yet ready to decide that some level of capabilityis the trigger for moving ahead.

[57:15] I think we need to be careful about that. I think that the President's view on that,

which has been expressed a number of times, which Congressman Wexler has expressed,


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p.19

is the right view. I wish I could tell you that we had some silver bullet, easy answer, to a

very difficult problem. I don't think we do.

[57:36] I think it's very hard. You've heard it from both sides, and I agree with that. But I

do think, and I go back to the point, that I think we agree along here that the exhaustion

of other remedies is extremely important before we turn to the military.

Susan: [57:55] Ambassador Dobbins, do you want to add anything to that?

Ambassador Dobbins: [58:05] I think that pretty much says it. I think we're all agreed

that we should exhaust diplomacy. I think Danielle, at least, believes it's exhausted.

Danielle: [58:14] Tired at least.

Ambassador Dobbins: [58:15] We're arguing that it's not. What you do when

diplomacy is exhausted is, in a sense, another debate. I think Congressman Wexler talkedabout the page in the Disneyland Book of Presidents, President Obama.

Congressman Wexler: [58:34] Disneyworld.

Ambassador Dobbins: [58:35] Disneyworld, sorry. [laughter]

Susan: [58:38] They're very different.

Ambassador Dobbins: [58:38] I'm an older guy. I visited Disneyland. Maybe if wewent the military route and set that program back, what that page might say is that he

pushed the Iranian nuclear capability into President Hillary Clinton's term. [laughter]

Ambassador Dobbins: [59:02] One of the questions is, "Is there a realistic preventionoption as opposed to a delay option? If it's a delay option, what are the risks and costs

that you entail with such a delay?" I think in my opening presentation I suggested that.

[59:18] In terms of where I think we'll be a year from now, I debated Danielle on this

almost five years ago, and I think you can schedule it right. Danielle and I, CongressmanWexler and Tom, can come back next spring and debate as to whether diplomacy still has

a chance.

Susan: [59:33] I like, the annual McCain Institute Groundhog Day Iran Debate.[laughter]

Ambassador Dobbins: [59:38] It's not a bad outcome.

Danielle: [59:39] It will still be a year, don't worry. There's always another year.

Susan: [59:42] Team Pletko and Wexler, I do want to return to this question of the

military option. You've made your case for why it's an element, you believe, of coercive

diplomacy that's necessary. But putting that aside, if it's an option that needs to beexercised, why do you believe that it would be effective?


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p.20

Danielle: [59:59] I don't think that either of us believes that it's a silver bullet. I think

you'd find a lot of consensus. There's no one who can make a persuasive case, and youdon't hear it in Israel, for example, where you first heard talk about military action, that

any military action would be a silver bullet. Clearly, the United States has much greater

capability on the military side than Israel would. [60:25] That being said, I think that

there is broad agreement that it could cause a serious delay in the Iranian nuclearprogram. At a certain moment, you are forced into a little bit of what we've been talking

about here today and what Ambassador Dobbins and Ambassador Pickering have been

writing about, which is a bit of a cost benefit analysis.

[60:46] I guess that there are those that believe that the cost of an Iranian nuclear

weapons capability are lower than the costs of a military strike. I don't think that's our

assessment. I don't want to speak for the Congressman.

[61:04] I think there's a further point here, and that is that we can't talk about this in avacuum, this notion that we all have tended to refer to in shorthand that somebody is

going to "do it." Who is going to do it? Are we going to do it, or are the Israelis going to

do it?

This "doing it" is a great corruption of what needs to happen, which is that you do need to

have a strategy for day two or week two. You do need to have an idea that, if we're going

to delay the Iranian nuclear program by striking at their key sites, at [inaudible 61:

[61:20] 40] and elsewhere, that we know what we want to do the next day.

[61:45] I think our military capacity isn't one that's in any doubt probably in the room.

The question is what are we going to do with that time that's afforded to us? We do need

to have a policy in place. I am hopeful that the President, as he says his policy isprevention, is thinking about those very things today. I sure as hell hope he is. What do

you think?

Congressman Wexler: [62:07] I think it's a given that no responsible personunderestimates the great consequences of any military action, let alone the potential for

this one. I'm not a military planner, and I wouldn't begin to be so presumptuous as to

suggest how the Pentagon either has or should go about planning for such a contingency.

[62:31] However, President Obama did not reach a position of prevention cavalierly. Heclearly laid the options. No doubt Ambassador Pickering understood every one of the

downsides that you listed. He also understood the other part of this equation, which is

"What are the downsides of Iran becoming a nuclear weapon holder?"

[63:04] The President clearly came down on the side of the downsides of Iran becoming a

nuclear weapon holder outweigh the downsides of a military action should it be required

as a last resort. Unfortunately, I think that is the ultimate part of the equation.

[63:26] The President could not reasonably have reached a prevention policy without

having the confidence that the Pentagon would be able to implement such a policy, and

that is not to underestimate the difficulty of doing so and the consequences of doing so.


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p.21

[63:48] I would offer maybe just one term here, though. I have so much respect for

Ambassador Pickering that I will always question myself if I hear him saying what I'msaying is way off. You suggest that by reinstituting an element of regime change, that that

would be completely counterproductive and would undermine the effectiveness of

negotiations.

[64:23] I accept that if the President were to go out now and do it, but if at the end of thisnegotiation process or at the 11th hour plus some and we still haven't succeeded, if we

can agree that the one thing the Iranian leadership cares about more than the nuclear

weapon program is their own power, if they were to perceive that the President of theUnited States with all its power was, once again, embracing the possibility of regime

change, would it not yet be another bit of leverage that might possibly avoid the military

confrontation that all of us would seek to avoid?

[65:09] Why, when dealing with a regime such as Iran, the world's leading sponsor ofterror, would we want, necessarily, to forsake what may be ultimately our biggest point

of leverage?

Ambassador Pickering: [65:23] Because you and I know we don't do regime changevery well and regime change in Iran requires occupation. Regime change in Iran will

come from Iranians. It will not come from outsiders. I think we have to live with that

tough reality. [65:46] As attractive as it may seem, again, another triumph of hope over

reality is not what I would call the right driver for the hard thinking that has to go onhere. If an action that you take is going to make it difficult or harder to reach agreement

on a nuclear program, then you ought to be very cautious about taking that action. You

ought to be cautious about making the threats.

[66:16] Jim gave you four examples where military threats had to lead to military use.

Military use lead, in some of those cases, to useful change and in some of those cases, todeeper and more difficult problems. It is not a kind of slot machine issue in which we put

the quarter in and pull the lever and out comes our preferred alternative.

Congressman Wexler: [66:40] Why keep the military option on the table at all?

Ambassador Pickering: [66:43] I'm not taking the military option off, and I told youthat because I told you I agreed that as an American diplomat, I would not want to enter

into negotiations with a situation in which I did not have the strongest of all possible

backing.

Susan: [67:01] Gentleman, a great spot to break for one second and bring in you, the

audience, the very patient audience. I can see we've eaten all the popcorn, so it's time tohave at the debaters.

Ambassador Pickering: [laughs] [67:10]

Susan: [67:12] Just to refresh on the rules. I'm going to ask you to state your name, who

you're with, and to really make it a question for our debaters. Each team will get two


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p.22

minutes to respond so that we can hopefully get to as many questions as possible. Sir?

You, you're the first guy.

Mike Connell: [67:29] I have a question...

Danielle: [67:31] Wait for the mike.

Susan: [67:34] Sorry, we're doing the live streaming, so we want to make sure they can

hear you.

Mike: [67:37] Mike Connell, Center for Naval Analyses. I have a question. Both sides of

the debate seem to downplay the issue of containment. They have sort of implied that itwouldn't work. I know we're not here to debate containment and Iran in a post nuclear

phase, but I'd the commenters to speak more about containment. [67:55] Why wouldn't

containment work? What are the downsides of containment? North Korea went nuclear,and the world didn't fall apart. Both sides have said that Iran is fairly rational actor. I'd

like to hear more about that issue.

Susan: [68:08] Thank you very much. I see Ambassador Pickering eager to start us off.

We have two minutes, again, for each team.

Ambassador Pickering: [68:13] The problem of containment is the problem with

premature capitulation to proliferation. It adds to the incentive of other people in the

region to move in that direction. The fundamental basis for our nonproliferation policy isthe more people who have it, the greater the chances are for mistaken, accidental and

mis-judgmental use. [68:39] I follow that logic and I respect those statistics. I think it's

very important to do that. It is clearly evident that when the Iranian issue became hot,

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others, including Jordan, all began new peaceful nuclearenergy power programs. So keep your eye on the ball.

Ambassador Dobbins: [69:07] Could I add just one point? I think we're really using the

wrong terminology. Containment has been the American policy toward Iran since 1979.It will be the American policy toward Iran as long as Iran tries to subvert and destabilize

its neighbors. Containment would be the American policy toward Iran whether it has

nuclear weapons or not. The issue is deterrence versus preemption.

Ambassador Pickering: [69:35] Exactly.

Ambassador Dobbins: [69:37] That's a better way of expressing this dilemma. Now,

can Iran be deterred? The answer is it can almost certainly be deterred from using its

nuclear weapons, particularly against other, stronger nuclear states. But if it possessedthose weapons, it might embolden it to use other instruments which would bedevil

particularly Israel and to some degree us. [70:01] And further expand its influence in the

region and along with the proliferation risk, that's really what is of concern. To Israel, toits neighbors and to the U.S. government.

Ambassador Pickering: [70:15] Yeah. Just to point out I said earlier that containment

had become a special term of art, which meant deterring Iran after it gets a nuclear


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weapon. I think the President is right in saying he's not in favor of that policy. I don't

agree with it. I don't agree with containment as the way to go.

Danielle: [70:36] We are going to have a...

Ambassador Pickering: [70:37] But I have to say I agree with Jim in every sense of the

word, that we're going to keep up the pressure on Iran in terms of its intervention in otherpeople's affairs.

Danielle: [70:47] Mike, you asked about containment. I wrote something on this with

my colleague Tom Donnelly about a year and a half ago. The sine qua non ofcontainment is, as I think our colleagues have said very ably, a credible deterrent. The

credible use of force in the event of the action that you've sought to deter, that you seek to

contain. What exactly is credible in what we would be doing? [71:19] We would have

gone through a process in which we for years on end said that it was unacceptable forIran to have a nuclear weapon. Suddenly they would have one and we would have done

nothing. Of course, we have gone through years on end of looking at Iran through its

proxies and directly kill American soldiers. Kill American soldiers in Saudi Arabia,support terrorist groups.

[71:41] Attack American citizens, murder American citizens. Capture and hold hostage

American citizens. Without actually ever doing anything credible that would contain the

regime.

[71:55] How would we in fact be a credible force for containment all of a sudden? It's not

a realistic option in terms of our own power projection and our own willingness. I think

that's a big part of the challenge.

Congressman Wexler: [72:11] I think there are in essence two parts to the gentleman's

question. There's the generalized debate of, however you define it, containment versus

prevention. I think both ambassadors answered that question very well. I think there's thesecond part of your question, which you didn't say, which is after adopting a policy of

prevention, what are the risks of the prevention failing and moving to a policy of

containment? [72:42] I would argue having adopted very publicly, concretely, clearly, for

everyone to see over and over and over again the policy that we have adopted. To then insome manner take a step back, we would destroy the credibility of the United States in

ways that we couldn't even begin to count. From strategic security issues. Danny

mentioned the two state solution or at least the negotiations between the Israelis and the

Palestinians.

[73:16] Kiss a Palestinian state goodbye. It will never happen. I realize this is waybeyond this debate, but you want to contain Iran?

[73:26] Everyone in the region then goes and pursues, both our friends and ouropponents, their own self interests with a degree of certainty and not looking back one

minute to see what the United States thinks, cares about or may do. Because everyone

will know we do nothing. I, for one, would never want this country to be in that position.


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Danielle: [73:50] Can I explore the Pickering prerogative for one sec? I just want to take

issue with one thing that Jim Dobbins said because I think that it's important it not sit outthere. I don't know why you're so persuaded that Iran would not be a first user of nuclear

weapons. I think that there's no reason for us to be so certain of it. [74:10] We can doubt,

but doubting isn't very reassuring when it comes to a country like Iran with nuclear

weapons.

Susan: [74:17] We're running out of time, so I'm going to try to squeeze in two questions

if we can be brief in our questions. So this young gentleman here.

Connor Gottard: [74:29] Thank you. The discussion this evening has been about amilitary option or...

Susan: [74:34] Can you tell us who you are and where you're from?

Connor: [74:35] Yes. My name is Connor Gottard. I'm a student at Northeastern

University. The discussion has been about a military option or high-level diplomacy. I'd

like to ask you about a third option, which would be supporting a democratic uprising inIran. This option was articulated this morning in a "Wall Street Journal" op-ed. [74:53] Ithink this is a very important moment as Iran has elections coming up in June. In the

2009 elections, we saw that there is a genuine thirst for democracy in the country. What

should the U.S. be doing to support democracy in Iran? Are our current tools there such

as our virtual embassy or the Voice of America effective enough?

[75:16] If we get a truly democratic Iran that is truly representative of the Iranian people,

will that be an ally of the United States? Thank you.

Susan: [75:24] Thank you very much.

Danielle: [75:26] If I may, that would be so awesome. Yet, first of all our commitmentto democracy is one that I question after watching what's going on in Syria. I question a

lot of things after watching what's going on in Syria. But I think what we've proven oversome years now is that we don't have a great commitment to supporting a democratic

uprising in Iran. We don't have great capacity to support a democratic commitment.

Perhaps that rests on the commitment. I'm not sure. [76:03] Of course, that would be the

answer, but that is regime change, of course. That is getting rid of not just the people, butthe system of the Islamic Republic. The problem for us is having gone so many years, the

Iranian government has in place a system of repression which is extraordinarily

sophisticated, extraordinarily brutal and one that it would be very tough to contend with,even if we were to put our back into this effort, which we haven't.

Ambassador Dobbins: [76:40] I think it would be great if the Iranian regime were to

change in fundamental ways and if democracy was to take hold in the country. I'm not

sure it would solve our nuclear problem. The nuclear program started under the Shah.[76:58] We came close to an interim agreement with the Iranians two years ago. It was

scuttled by opposition from the green movement, who complained that they were making

big concessions to the Americans.


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[77:11] Polling shows that the nuclear program, conceived of as a civil program, because

that's how the Iranian regime explains it to its own population, has strong support acrossthe spectrum in Iran. We would have a government that would be less threatening,

wouldn't be supporting terrorism, wouldn't be threatening to wipe Israel off the map.

[77:33] Would be trying to integrate in the international community and those would all

be good things and maybe we'd be a little less concerned about their nuclear program ifthey weren't otherwise threatening.

[77:43] Maybe we could persuade them to abandon it. I'm not suggesting we wouldn't try.

I'm just saying it's not necessarily a panacea. I agree with Danielle that we have very littlecapacity to influence whether this occurs in Iran. I think it will occur in some way at

some point in the next generation almost certainly. But when and how, I think, is not

going to be decided in Washington.

Susan: [78:08] Did you want to add something, ambassador?

Ambassador Pickering: [78:09] Just to add one more brief point. I said a while ago thatregime change in Iran will come from Iran. I agree with Danielle that the system ofrepression is enormous. But we saw in the period after June 12, 2009 when there were

great hopes, that both Mousavi, Qalibaf who led that movement said to us, "Please don't

help. It's not going to mean a difference for us that is positive." [78:41] I think it's

something that we have to keep in mind on this particular issue. I said earlier, we don't doregime change very well. I think that we have to be cautious about how and in what way

we deal with it. But the lead ought to come from that direction.

[78:57] If you want an example of where things went differently, it was in the periodwhen Serbia changed hands. But then it was very much the Serbs themselves, but with

people from the region. Who knew in fact, because they had involved themselves inchanging the communist domination, how to do this and made that happen.

[79:24] I don't see that kind of effort possible or available. I would like to keep my eye

open for it, but I think again it's more in the area of pious hope at the moment than it is

any reality.

Ambassador Dobbins: [79:38] The Serbs did get a little help from us.

Congressman Wexler: [79:41] I would respectfully differ just a bit. No doubt regime

change must be homegrown. No doubt American opportunities are limited. But surely

America has a role to play and again, back to your first sort of theory or question,

Ambassador Pickering. What lessons have we learned? [80:10] If we could turn the clockback to the most recent Iranian election, I might be persuaded by your argument that we

don't have many cards to play. If we were to inject ourselves, we are likely to undermine

the very result we wish to seek. We did that and it didn't work. I'm not saying that from acritical point of view, but we now have that example.

[80:36] I would hope that at a minimum as we approach the next Iranian election, none of

us know precisely what will happen. That if another opportunity were to present itself,


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that we would learn from that illustration and come to the conclusion that by simply

standing relatively silent, the likelihood of effecting a result that I think we would allhope, is highly unlikely. And that we would employ a different strategy next time that

might equal a different result.

Ambassador Dobbins: [81:09] Again, if you don't believe that it will come from inside

and has to be supported from inside, if the insiders want our help and can use it, that's anentirely different position.

Danielle: [81:23] But the insiders felt betrayed. I don't agree with you about what

happened in 2009. I think the people of Iran felt a great sense of betrayal, that the UnitedStates was unwilling to stand with them against a brutal and repressive regime.

Ambassador Pickering: [81:38] I think we've got all kinds of examples to learn from.

Congressman Wexler: [81:42] We are all dreaming that if everything was simply

splendid and we helped them out it would all change.

Ambassador Pickering: [81:49] Nobody's suggested that.

Congressman Wexler: [81:49] The two leaders of the movement made it very clear that

they couldn't use our help.

Danielle: [81:54] The same guys who criticized the regime for capitulating to us on thenuclear program, maybe they just weren't the right leaders.

Ambassador Dobbins: [82:02] Maybe so, but we're going to, then, start making leaders

out of people?

Danielle: [82:09] I think we actually believe in people.

Ambassador Dobbins: [82:12] I believe in people, too, but I believe in the fact that we

don't make leaders very well.

Susan: [82:19] One thing I can say, for sure...Sorry, please go ahead.

Congressman Wexler: [82:22] My only quick point is at this point we have an exampleof what happened in the last Iranian election.

Ambassador Pickering: [82:27] Let's try something different.

Congressman Wexler: [82:28] We have Egypt as an example of a different Americanrole. We have Bahrain as an example of a different American role. We've got Libya,

we've got Tunisia. We've got now a half a dozen examples. [82:41] I would hope that...

Ambassador Dobbins: [82:41] All of them moving splendidly except, perhaps, Yemenwhere we're OK.

Congressman Wexler: [82:45] Yeah. I would hope we could extract some lessons from

those.


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Susan: [82:50] I guess that we'll be having our panelists continue debating outside on

Pennsylvania Avenue for anyone who misses the show. [82:57] I'm afraid to say that I'mtold we're out of time. We are going to go right to our final round, which is really to go

back to each of our debaters tonight and to ask them one final question, which is to say,

"We didn't manage to come to any kind of consensus here about what is that date when

we're going to run out of time?"

[83:17] That clearly is the biggest X-factor, if you will. But let's just say we've reached

that date, whatever day it is, whatever time it is and we are now sure in some sure way

that I'm not sure how we'll be sure, but we're sure that Iran is finally on the cusp of anuclear weapons capacity.

[83:35] What should we do? What is your policy recommendation? We'll give everyone a

final chance to go around.

Danielle: [83:41] Can I start it, perhaps?

Susan: [83:43] Ambassadors, it's yours to...

Ambassador Pickering: [83:45] You mean we didn't get to go first before but now weget to go first with a really crappy question?

Susan: [83:48] I think that's a fair point. [laughter]

Susan: [83:53] I'm just following the moderator's [inaudible 83:55] .

Ambassador Pickering: [83:54] That's OK. I'm happy to go first.

Danielle: [83:56] I'll go first.

Ambassador Pickering: [83:57] I know how we stand in this free debate thing. [84:00] I

will tell you. Anybody who tells you that he will advise the President now, uncertain

about the circumstances and what the possibilities are, that the President should moveimmediately to war has got to have his head examined.

[84:19] My view is the President has said he's keeping everything on the table. I totally

support that. I will support under the circumstances and at the time, what I believe thepresident should do, but if I don't know the circumstances and the time, how much time

we will have left, what the type of evidence is on the decision, and how and in what way

we judge our military effectiveness, and whether it's better to achieve a two- to four-year

delay or continue with some other pressure tactic, I don't know.

[84:51] But my view is nothing should come off the table. I think that the President has

that onerous and difficult problem of looking at it under the circumstances.

Susan: [85:01] One thing I can say is we should send Ambassador Pickering to negotiate

with the Iranians because he's made a very important point here and in the interest of

fairness, it is not right that you should start with the second word and end with the second


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word so we're going to alternate. [85:14] Someone from Team Pletka or Wexler can go

next.

Congressman Wexler: [85:17] I concur with Ambassador Pickering. I would say it

requires one more statement in that the President, of course, has said that all options are

on the table, but he's also said -- this was his exact language -- "We will do what is

necessary to prevent Iran from getting the world's worst weapons." [85:39] That's thepolicy in a nutshell. If I could, without interrupting, Senator McCain has joined us. I

think something we all agree upon and probably why we're all here is that it's a

tremendous honor for us to be associated with anything under Senator McCain's banner. Imay not have always been on Senator McCain's team, but I always respected and admired

him, regardless.

Susan: [86:09] Thanks very much, Senator. [applause]

Senator John McCain: [86:17] Thank you, Susan. You've done a good job with another

rather unruly group here. I thank my friends from many years, all four of you. [86:32]

The debates that we've been having, I think, have been incredibly informative. But, also, Ihope we can share this with the American people because when I go back home, peopleask me, "What are we going to do about Iran?" Americans want to know.

[86:49] The benefit of the knowledge and experience amongst the four of you is even

older than me. I want to thank you for participating. It's a great honor to have people atthe level of knowledge and experience and expertise that you have to join here in this

debate.

[87:13] I know that those who not only are present but also view it through various mediaoutlets are better informed. That's what it's supposed to be all about.

[87:25] I thank you all for being here. And Susan, thank you for the great job you did.

Thank you.

[applause]

Kurt: [87:35] That's going to conclude our debate for this evening. I want to thank our

debaters again. I want to thank Susan and thank you Senator McCain for coming here. Hewasn't able to hear the entire debate, in part, because there were votes in the Senate this

evening which I think, if you all now check your "Washington Post" or Twitter feeds

you're going to see were quite interesting votes that took place. [87:57] I want to thank all

of you and remind you that our next debate will be June 19th on the subject of the

defense budget cuts. Are we giving our enemies a gift?

[88:06] Do stay in touch with the McCain Institute by our website. Get on our email list.

We will be continuing this series in the fall.

[88:13] I also want to put in a plug. This evening, there will be on "National Geographic"

a special called, "Locked Up Abroad," that features some of the history of Senator

McCain's service to our nation.


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[88:25] I want to thank all of you again for coming, thank our debaters. Thank you.

[applause]

[88:28]

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Iran: Are We Out Of Options?

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