IR War Cheat Sheet

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 1

***PROLIF GOOD***

Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach


PROLIF GOOD – WAR

Prolif decreases war. Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that

nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in HI. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors - Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) - and five nuclear actors - Gulf War (1990) - only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors - by extension, many general actors as well - experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a 'balance of terror' as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists' view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did

during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving super powers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the

number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis

situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of full scale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likeli hood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases.

Prolif solves major warWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Waltz Well, that is a different question. The United States and the Soviet Union developed peculiar ideas of nuclear deterrence:

namely that thousands of warheads are required for deterrence. That notion was always crazy. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis our estimates were that the Soviet Union had only about seventy true strategic systems.


http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 4We had thousands. Were we deterred? Yes we were. We did not strike at the nuclear warheads that the Soviet Union had in Cuba. The Air Force was asked if they could hit and destroy all the targets. And remember that they were close by,

and there were not that many of them. The Air Force answered: “We promise we can get 90 percent.” Not enough. We were deterred. Now, nuclear weapons do not deter everybody from doing everything. They do not deter forays. They do not deter, for example, Arab countries from starting wars over the disputed terroritories. But they did dissuade the Egyptians and Syrians from trying to divide Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They pulled back for fear that the threat of the destruction of the Israeli State would prompt the use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons deter threats to the vital interests of the state, and they have done so in every case that comes to mind.

New proliferators decrease the likelihood and damage of war—5 reasons-caution-deescalation due to fear of retaliation-deterrence by punishment-nuclear use causes immediate sobriety-no motive to seek victoryWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p36-37 AjonesDoes the spread of nuclear weapons threaten to make wars more intense at regional levels, where wars of high intensity have been possible for many years? If weaker countries are unable to defend at lesser levels of violence, might they destroy themselves through resorting to nuclear weapons? Lesser nuclear states live in fear of this possibility. But this is not different from the fear under which the United States and the Soviet Union lived for years. Small nuclear states may experience a keen sense of desperation because of vulnerability to conventional as well as to nuclear attack, but, again,

in desperate situations what all parties become most desperate to avoid is the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Still, however improbable the event, lesser states may one day fire some of their weapons. Are minor nuclear states more or less likely to do so than major ones? The answer to this question is vitally important because the existence of some states would be at stake even if the damage done were regionally confined. For a number of reasons, deterrent strategies promise less damage than war-fighting strategies. First, deterrent strategies induce caution all around and thus reduce the incidence of war. Second, wars fought in the face of strategic nuclear weapons must be carefully limited because a country having them may retaliate if its vital interests are threatened. Third, prospective punishment need only be proportionate to an adversary's expected gains in war after those gains are discounted for the many uncertainties of war. Fourth, should deterrence fail, a few judiciously delivered warheads are likely to produce sobriety in the leaders of all of the countries involved and thus bring rapid deescalation. Finally, warfighting strategies offer no clear place to stop short of victory for some and defeat for others. Deterrent strategies do, and that place is where one

country threatens another's vital interests. Deterrent strategies lower the probability that wars will begin. If wars start nevertheless, deterrent strategies lower the probability that they will be carried very far? Nuclear weapons lessen the intensity as well as thc frequency of war among their possessors. For fear of escalation, nuclear states do not want to fight long and hard over important interests-indeed, they do not want to fight at all. Minor nuclear states have even better reasons than major ones to accommodate one another and to avoid fighting. Worries about the intensity of war among nuclear states have to be viewed in this context and against a world in which conventional weapons have become ever costlier and more destructive. New proliferators dramatically reduce the risk of war Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p43-44 AjonesWhat will a world populated by a larger number ot nuclear states look like? I have drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less responsible and less capable of self control than the old ones have been. They feel fears that many felt when they imagined how

a nuclear China would behave. Such fears have proved unfounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising future. l have reached this unusual conclusion for four main reasons. First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the system. This will continue to be so. Second, given the massive numbers of American and Russian warheads, and given the impossibility of one

side destroying enough of the other side's missiles to make a retaliatory strike bearable, the balance of terror is indestructible. What can lesser states do to disrupt the nuclear equilibrium if even the mighty efforts of the United States and

the Soviet Union did not shake it? Third, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 5Angell argped that war could not occur because it would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some countries at the expense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell's dictum becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to

bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear

weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Fourth, new nuclear states will feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold for Small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welComed than feared.

Prolif prevents the escalation of wars Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p33-34 AjonesThe presence of nuclear weapons makes war less likely. One may nevertheless oppose the spread of nuclear weapons on the ground that they would make war, however unlikely, unbearably intense should it occur. Nuclear weapons have not been fired in anger in a world in which more than one country has them, We have enioyed half a century of nuclear peace, but we can never have a guarantee. We may be grateful for decades of nuclear peace and for the discouragement of

conventional war among those who have nuclear weapons. Yet the fear is widespread that if they ever go off, we may all be dead. People as varied as the scholar Richard Smoke, the arms controller Paul Wamke, and the former defense secretary Harold Brown have all believed that if any nu~ clear weapons go off, many will, Although this seems the least likely of all the unlikely possibilities, it is not impossible, What makes it so unlikely is that, if a few warheads are fired, all of the countries involved will want to get out of the mess they are in.

Even if low-scale violence does occur it won’t escalateSeng 98 (Jordan, Phd Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY for PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, P. 158-159, ZBurdette)Overall, limited war will not be as prevalent among Third World proliferators as many analysts fear. If it does occur, limited aims strategies are likely to be very restrained in terms of both military methods and

objectives. One might well see a prevalence of low grade violence aimed at Third World proliferators, but such violence is distinctive from true limited war, and it is not the sort of violence that is in danger of causing escalation and possible nuclear launch.

More nuclear states increase stability—the cold war became even more stable when europe joined the fray Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p14 AjonesFourth, while some worry about nuclear states coming in hostile pairs, others worry that they won't come in hostile pairs. The simplicity of relations that obtains when one party has to concentrate its worry on only one other, and the ease of

calculating forces and estimating the dangers they pose, may be lost. Early in the Cold War, the United States deterred the Soviet Union, and in due course, the Soviet Union deterred the United States. As soon as additional states joined the nuclear club, however, the question of who deterred whom could no longer be easily answered. The Soviet Union had to worry lest a move made in Europe might cause France and Britain to retaliate, thus possibly setting off American forces as well. Such worries at once complicated calculations and strengthened deterrence. Somebody might have retaliated, and that was all a would-be attacker needed to know. Nuclear weapons restore the clarity and simplicity lost as bipolar situations are replaced by multipolar ones.



ASAL & BEARDSLEY METHODOLOGY GOOD

Our studies are best --

1) EmpiricsAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)Much of the literature on the impact of nuclear weapons does not empirically test the arguments made (Geller, 2003: 37; Huth & Russett, 1988: 34). Here, we strive to move beyond speculation to observe the impact of nuclear proliferation on the level of violence used in crises. We examine the relationship

between the severity of the violence in crises in the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset and the number of

involved states with nuclear weapons, controlling for other factors that increase the likelihood of severe violence.1 We find that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence. Also, as the number of

nuclear actors involved in a crisis increases, the likelihood of war continues to drop. Drawing from Waltz (Sagan & Waltz, 2003) and the rational deterrence literature, we argue that states facing the possibility of a nuclear attack will be more willing to concede or back down from violent conflict.

2) DataAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)Data and Methods International Crisis Behavior Data To study the impact of nuclear weapons on international crisis behavior, we employ the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset (Brecher &

Wilkenfeld, 2000). The database includes 434 international crises from 1918 to 2001. Following Huth &

Russett (1990), the set of crises should be an appropriate set of cases because these are all instances in which some challenge or threat is made, and there is some possibility of deterrence success or failure. In this way, the mechanisms specific to immediate deterrence are tested, which Morgan (2003)

notes are generally understudied in the deterrence literature. An actor is defined as being in crisis when some value is threatened, there is a finite time to react to the threat, and there is an increase in the perception of military hostilities.

3) Accuracy and robust results. Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists' argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war

continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including nonnuclear capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot speak to other proliferation risks.



PROLIF GOOD – DETERRENCE

Nuclear weapons prevent and descalate war—deterrence, caution, lack of motivation, and miscalc Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p3 AjonesFirst, war can be fought in the face of deterrent threats, but the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the

loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back . Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible, but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for.

If states can score only small gains, because large ones risk retaliation, they have little incentive to fight. Second, states act with less care if the expected costs of war are low and with more care if they are high. In 1853 and 1854 Britain and France expected to win an easy victory if they went to war against Russia. Prestige abroad and political popularity at home would be gained, if not much else. The vagueness of their expectations was matched by the carelessness of their actions. ln blundering into the Crimean War, they acted hastily on scant information, pandered to their people's frenzy for war, showed more concem for an aly's whim than for the adversary's situation, failed to specify the changes in behavior that threats were supposed to bring, and inclined toward testing strength first and bargaining second in sharp contrast, the presence of nuclear weapons makes states exceedingly cautious. Think of Kennedy and Khrushchev in the Cuban missile crisis. Why fight if you can't win much and might lose everything? Third, the question demands an

affirmative answer all the more insistently since the deterrent deployment of nuclear weapons contributes more to a country's security than does conquest of territory. A country with a deterrent strategy does not need the

extent of territory required by a country relying on conventional defense. A deterrent strategy makes it unnecessary for a country to fight for the sake of increasing its security, and this removes a major cause of war. Fourth, deterrent effect depends both on capabilities and on the will to use them. The will of the attacked, striving to preserve its own territory, can be presumed to be stronger than the will of the attacker, striving to annex someone else's territory. Knowing this, the would-be attacker is further inhibited. Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also makes war less likely. From the late nineteenth century onward, the speed of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War Il,

technological advance has been even faster, but short of a ballistic missile defense breakthrough, this has not mattered. lt did not disturb the American-Soviet military equilibrium, because one side's missiles were not made obsolete by improvements in the other side's missiles. In 1906, the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and fire power of its guns, made older battleships obsolete, This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it, "Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types They may have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve. Many wars might have been avoided had their outcomes been foreseen. "To be sure," Georg Simmel wrote, "the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of the conflict/'Â° Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the differences between conventional and nuclear worlds are fundamental. ln the former, states are too often tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France tried very hard to avoid a general war. nom hoped for victory even though they believed the opposing coalitions to be quite evenly matched. In 1941, Japan, in attacking the United States, could hope for victory only if a series of events that were possible but unlikely took place, Japan hoped to grab resources sufficient for continuing its war against China and then to dig in to defend a limited perimeter. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain would have to deal with Germany, supposedly having defeated the Soviet Union and therefore supreme in Europe. Japan could then hope to fight a defensive war for a year or two until America, her purpose weakened, became willing to make a compromise peace in Asia.7 Countries more readily run the risks of war when defeat, if it comes, is distant and is expected to bring only limited damage. Given such expectations, leaders do not have to be crazy to sound the trumpet and urge their people to be bold and courageous in the pursuit of victory. The outcome of battles and the course of campaigns are hard to foresee because so many things affect them. Predicting the result of conventional wars has proved difficult. ~ 1 Uncertainty about outcomes does not work decisively against the fighting of wars in conventional worlds. Countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in defeat their suffering will be limited. Calculations about nuclear war are differently made. A nuclear world calls for a different kind of reasoning. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. Of course, it also

may not be, but that is not the kind of uncertainty that encourages anyone to use force. ln a conventional world, one is uncertain about winning Or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated, If force is used, and not kept within limits, catastrophe will result. That prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of opposing forces. The number of one's cities that can be severely damaged is equal to the number of strategic warheads an adversary can deliver. Variations of number mean little within wide ranges. The expected effect of the deterrent achieves an easy clarity because wide margins of error in estimates of the damage one may suffer do not matter. Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start worrying about how


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 8to avoid them. ln a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Nuclear weapons make military miscalculation difficult and politically pertinent prediction easy.

Prolif is vital to deterrence and global stabilization. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]In a robust deterrence framework, fear translates into stability. While stability is a hollow substitute for peace,

it at least protects lives. In a world without peace -- a world of endless grievances and violent people - deterrence is a valuable thing. And nuclear weapons are excellent vessels of deterrence because they are excellent vessels of fear. Nuclear weapons are a particularly good solution to a particularly bad state of human affairs.

Because this is a world without peace, and because our weapons are mostly a symptom of our violence rather than a source of it, powerful weapons systems are advisable for the sake of deterrence, and among such systems, nuclear weapons are sui generis. Particularly for weak minor states, nuclear weapons provide deterrence clout that their other relatively limited military capabilities could not sustain. But nuclear deterrence comes in better and worse forms defined by the robustness of the four elements of stabiliry that have occupied a good deal of this analysis: deterrent threat, crisis stability, control stability and arms race stability. In this volume, I have taken a proliferation situation thought by many to be insolubly unstable and shown it to be otherwise. I have

argued that these nuclear deterrence relationships in the foreseeable future will be of the sound variety. Of course, the unforeseeable future looms large. Indeed, it is not the present or medium term of emerging

minor proliferators that should cause concern, it is their vague and distant future, and not only theirs. As the recent history of the former Soviet empire shows, things change. As a guard against an uncertain future, it would be better if

nuclear proliferation did not occur in the present. In the long view, statistics are the best ally: the fewer the nuclear states the better. But as a policy approach to a compelling present in which a certain sort of proliferation is happening among minor states, one needs a realistic approach. Proliferation is happening and we need to know how to think about it. To this end, it is imperative to note that we should not measure minor proliferators' chances for stability against their potential for duplicating the superpowers' means and methods; not should we neglect the policies available for capitalizing on "˜limited means' balances that adhere in the structural contexts of minor states. Despite vague fears about the nuclear

future, we must be prepared to exploit the best parts of current nuclear scenarios. They are not going away,

and one would like to make the best of a less than ideal situation. The nuclear future does not have to be bad, and to help ensure that it is not we need to correctly understand the nuclear present.

Nuclear weapons prevent and deescalate war. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p3 AjonesStates coexist in a condition of anarchy. Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. Therefore, in weighing the chances for peace, the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains, Strategies bring ends and means together. How nuclear weapons affect the chances for peace is seen by examining the different implications of defense and deterrence. How can one state dissuade another state from attacking? ln either or in some combination of two ways. One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces that look forbiddingly strong. To build defenses so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil. I call this the defensive ideal. The other way to counter an intended attack is to build retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor. 'To deter" literally means to stop people from

doing something by frightening them. ln contrast to dissuasion by defense, dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it home, but

because the expected reaction of the opponent may result in one's own severe punishment. Defense and deterrence are often confused. One used to hear statements like this: "A strong defense in Europe will deter a Soviet attack." What was meant was that a strong defense would dissuade the Soviet Union from attacking. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. Purely deterrent forces provide no defense. The

message of the strategy is this: "Although we are defenseless, if you attack we may punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains." Secondstrike nuclear forces serve that kind of strategy . Purely defensive forces provide no deterrence. They offer no means of punishment, The message of the


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 9strategy is this: "Although we cannot strike back at you, you will find our defenses so difficult to overcome that you will dash yourself to pieces against them." 'Ihe Maginot Line was to serve that kind of strategy

Nuclear weapons are the best means of deterring conflict; the world before them was wrought with warForsyth et. al, 10 (James, B. Saltzman, Gary Schaub, “Remembrance of Things Past The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Forsyth: professor of strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Saltzman: chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Schaub: assistant professor of strategy at the Air War College, JPL)A key goal of any national security policy should be to enhance stability, where stability is defined as the absence of war or major crisis. Assuming the absence of a sudden change in the anarchic nature of the international

system, any such policy should rely upon deterring potential aggressors at its base. Nuclear weapons enhance “general deterrence,” a concept defined by Patrick Morgan. “General deterrence relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack” (emphasis in original).15 The goal of a general deterrent policy would be to ensure that incentives for aggression never outweigh the disincentives. In theory, nuclear weapons are better than conventional forces in terms of enhancing general deterrence. This is so because deterrence succeeds when the costs—or, more

appropriately, the risks of costs—exceed any probable gains that are to be had through armed aggression. War has been such a common international phenomenon throughout the centuries because some decision makers have concluded that the benefits of aggression would outweigh its costs.16 Such a conclusion can be reached all the more easily when it is believed that victory on the battlefield can be attained quickly and decisively, and there are many historical examples from which decision makers can choose in order to bolster their confidence—from Bismarck’s wars against Denmark, the Austrian Empire, and France to Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait and its eviction by UN coalition forces. Injecting the possible use of nuclear weapons by the defending state into the equation, however, can alter these calculations considerably. The possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal by a defender, as well as

the means to deliver these weapons to the battlefield or the aggressor’s homeland, makes the risks of aggression much greater and the potential costs much starker. This is because the possession of nuclear weapons tends to equalize the power of states, although not to the absolute degree that some would argue—attributes of national power such as geographic size, population, industrial capacity, GNP, and others still weigh heavily in any assessment of national power. Nonetheless, this equalizing tendency objectively manifests itself in two ways. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons can enhance the power of a smaller conventional force considerably. And in terms of absolute destructive power, only a finite amount of damage is necessary to destroy a modern state as a functioning entity.17 Provided that two states are capable of developing

the means to reliably deliver at least “enough” nuclear weapons to their adversary’s homeland to “assure” its

destruction, then, in a relative way, the two states can be considered equally powerful.

Prolif good -- creates stability through state survival and deters conventional and nuclear conflict through balancing.Monteiro 11 - Nuno P., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (June 13, 2011, “BALANCING ACT WHY UNIPOLARITY MAY BE DURABLE,” http://www.nunomonteiro.org/wp-content/uploads/Nuno-Monteiro-Balancing-Act-20110613.pdf)In a nuclear world, the primary end of states (survival) can be achieved through means (developing a

nuclear arsenal) that require no push for a shift in the systemic balance of power. In fact, the pursuit of an overall (i.e., nuclear and conventional) balance of power between nuclear states for the purposes of guaranteeing state survival is futile at best and dangerous at worst. Since two nuclear states are unlikely to go to war with each other and, in any case, such a war would threaten the survival of both regardless of the conventional balance of power between them, further conventional balancing efforts between them would be futile. They could also be dangerous because the acquisition of conventional forces capable of being used against another nuclear state could be perceived by the latter as indicative of aggressive intentions, triggering preemptive action. This line of reasoning highlights the theoretical contradiction

underlying mechanistic understandings of the formation of systemic balances of power. In Craig’s words, the balance-of-power logic “is based ultimately upon a great power’s readiness to wage major war.” 26 The logical steps

entailed in this assertion are: states care about their survival, therefore they must be able credibly to threaten potential predators with high costs in case of a major war, and the only way of doing so is to balance until they possess as much or more power than any such potentially predatory state. In a

nuclear world, however, no greatpower war is winnable. As Robert Jervis showed, survivable nuclear weapons make all-out great-power war unwinnable. 27 This means that major war in a nuclear world endangers a state’s existence, jeopardizing the initial premise -- a preeminent interest in state survival -- of the


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 10argument that led to balancing in the first place. Consequently, any threat of major war issued by a nuclear state against another nuclear state is itself a threat to the threatening state’s survival -- no less of a threat than

any threat a predatory state might pose to its existence. In sum, as Craig points out, nuclear technology makes the ultima ratio of international politics -- the ability to wage major war rather than allow an adversary to threaten a state’s

existence -- absurd. It is, as Bismarck would put it, suicide for fear of death. Furthermore, as Jervis has also argued, invulnerable nuclear arsenals make it very difficult to prevent any war between great powers from escalating into a total nuclear war. In my view, Jervis is right in eschewing the effects of the so-called “stability-instability paradox.” 28 As Jervis explains, the stability-instability paradox is less valid than usually argued because all-out war is the result of “a dynamic process in which both sides get more and more deeply involved, more and more expectant, more and more concerned not to be a slow second in case the war starts.” 29 For a nuclear war to remain limited, and therefore winnable, “one side must accept defeat while it still possesses the military capability to destroy its opponents easily.” 30 This violates proposition (1) -- the only that remains unaltered in my revised logic of balancing -- that states care first and foremost about their own survival. Nuclear weapons therefore give paramount practical import to the distinction Nexon established between theories of balancing and balance-of-power theories. For him, the extant literature often conflates the two, despite their lack of logical coherence. As Nexon sees it, and I concur, theories that explain the conditions that lead states to adopt a strategy of balancing and the ways in which they implement such a strategy (i.e., theories of balancing) are logically independent from theories that explain the formation of systemic balance of power (i.e., balance-of-power theories). 31 In his own words, “[e]ven theories that posit the ubiquity of balancing strategies need not imply that these strategies aggregate into systemic power balances.” 32 Such is the case with the theory laid out in this article. Balancing may be a common strategy of states and still the international system as a whole might be persistently out of balance. Nuclear weapons bring this disjunction into bold relief. Craig pointed in this direction in his Glimmer of a New Leviathan. His work attempts to update realist thinking for the nuclear age. Rather than proclaiming that nuclear weapons have made the nation-state obsolete 33 , Craig argues that, faced with the omnicidal potential of thermonuclear weapons, realists were led “to glimpse -- not to design, to glimpse -- a new, that is, unforeseen, political process whereby a condition of anarchy evolves into a new Leviathan: a world state that comes into being merely because of the prospect of a nuclear war of all against all.” 34 My view is that Niebuhr and Morgenthau, the realists who, to use Craig’s phrase, glimpsed this new leviathan, got it wrong. Nuclear weapons do indeed provide the “glimmer of a new leviathan,” but this leviathan does not come in the form of a world state. Rather, it comes in a transformation of the structure of the international system that attenuates the impact of anarchy in the affairs of great (and major) powers. Specifically, nuclear weapons guarantee that no state that values first and foremost its own survival will threaten the survival of a nuclear state. Rather than producing the

conditions of possibility for the emergence of a global state, nuclear weapons, then, attenuate the conditions that,

from the point of view of state survival, led to the prescription of a global state as the solution. Nuclear weapons are therefore an element of the structure of (international) politics that increase the odds of peace (at least among the nuclear states). They are, in this sense, the new leviathan: the (granted, partial)

solution to the problems created by international anarchy. 3 More problematic, though, is what Craig’s argument means for the structural balance-of power theory of Kenneth Waltz. Craig’s work illuminates the tension between Waltz’s 1979 and 1981 works. In the former, his Theory of International Politics, Waltz lays out how the ever present ultima ratio of international politics -- the specter of total war -- leads to the recurrence of balances of power. 36 Wars among great powers are unlikely, yet they are made possible by the anarchical system. In the latter, his argument in “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Why More May Be Better,” Waltz makes the case for how the spread of nuclear weapons, with their insurmountable defensive advantage, would have a pacifying effect on the international system. 37 Wars among great powers become all but impossible, despite the anarchical international system. Craig is cognizant of the devastating effect of this latter argument on Waltz’s earlier theory: The spread of nuclear weapons would create defensive, conservative, and secure states, assured of their long-term survival and mindful of the extreme risks associated with aggression and conquest. International politics could thereby approach the ‘defensive ideal’ : a condition in which anarchy is not eliminated but rather adapted to by defensive-minded states so thoroughly as to make offensive wars exceedingly irrational and hence extremely unlikely. 38 Interestingly for the issue at

hand, Waltz’s argument on the benefits of the spread of nuclear weapons can also serve as an adjudicator between the two factors Waltz pointed to as pillars of “bipolar stability” -- bipolarity and nuclear weapons. If one takes

his argument on nuclear weapons seriously, it appears that nuclear weapons, not bipolarity, were doing most of the work in the so-called “bipolar stability” era. 39 As Craig notes, in a world of secure nuclear states, “bipolarity, multipolarity -- any kind of balance of power -- would become much less important.” 4



EXTS – COLD WAR PROVES

Cold war proves nuclear deterrence is goodKoehl 9—Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security and Industry Program (Stuart, “Destabilization and Disarmament: Fewer nukes mean more risk”, SEP 24, 2009, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/993kkohs.asp, ZBurdette) Imagine, then, a world without any nuclear weapons whatsoever. Back in the days when Dr. Helen Caldicott was calling not just for a nuclear freeze, but for total nuclear disarmament, my friends and I sported buttons and T-shirts saying, "BAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS", in big, bold print; underneath, in smaller letters, they added, "Make The World Safe for Conventional War". It was sophomoric, sure (we were, after all, sophomores), but it raised a valid point. Without the inhibitions imposed by nuclear weapons, there was really nothing to constrain the propensity of some countries to settle disputes by warfare, and nothing to restrain the level at which wars were waged. That is, while the U.S. and USSR engaged in a deadly global conflict for forty years, during that time each was careful to avoid a direct confrontation with the other, fighting mainly through surrogates, and limiting both the geographic scope and levels of violence in these proxy wars. Given the superiority of the USSR in

conventional armaments, it is most likely that, absent the extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, there would have been a major conventional war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at some point in the Cold War. Only a massive

expansion of U.S. and NATO conventional forces to match Soviet conventional forces could have prevented it. In turn, the U.S. and its allies would have had to expend far more on defense, and much less on peaceful activities. Instead of spending 3 to 5 percent of GDP on military forces, they would have had to spend somewhere in the vicinity of 15 to 20 percent (at its peak, the Soviet Union was spending somewhere between 40 to 50 percent of its GDP on the defense sector), which in turn would probably have depressed the rate of economic expansion. Nuclear weapons are cheap, and conventional forces are very, very expensive in comparison.


http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/993kkohs.asp


INDIA/PAKISTAN PROVE

India and Pakistan prove prolif has a stabilizing effectWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Journal Let’s turn our attention to the nuclear situation in South Asia. While nuclear weapons may have arguably helped stabilize the contentious relationship between India and Pakistan–no war has been fought since the

introduction of nuclear weapons in the early 1970s–many observers worry that nuclear stability may not hold. What do you see as the prospects for stability? Waltz Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability such as the intractable

dispute over the Kashmir. Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet Union was deep enough

during the Cold War, and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan’s common border increase the risk? Probably not in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you’ve got a common border as long as it’s perfectly easy for the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? Geographic proximity may shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split–second timing. What’s the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you’re going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten minutes from now, or tomorrow? A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and it’s that fear of retaliation that deters.




AT DETERRENCE FAILURES

Uncertainty makes the cost of war too high Karl 96 (David, “International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter, 1996-1997, pp. 87-119, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539274, ZBurdette)Optimists have relaxed views of the preventive-war dangers entailed in situations in which a nuclear power confronts a nuclearizing rival. The practical difficulties of ensuring a disarming strike to preclude any possibility of nuclear retaliation make preventive actions a military gamble that states are very unlikely to take. As Waltz

explains, "prevention and pre-emption are difficult games because the costs are so high if the games are not perfectly played.... Ultimately, the inhibitions [against such attacks] lie in the impossibility of knowing for sure that a disarming strike will totally destroy an opposing force and in the immense destruction even a few warheads can wreak."25 To optimists, states will have to learn to live with a rival's emerging nuclear armory. Because strategic uncertainty is seen as having a powerful dissuasive effect, optimists usually view the very increase in the numbers of nuclear-armed states as an additional element of stability Dagobert Brito and Michael Intrili- gator, for instance, argue that uncertainty over the reaction of other nuclear powers will make all hesitant to strike individually26 As an example, they point to the restraint the superpowers exercised on each other in the 1960s, when first the United

States and then the Soviet Union contemplated military action against China's nascent nuclear weapon sites.

The net effect of the uncertain reaction of others is that "the probability of deliberate nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations."27 Similarly, Waltz reasons that even in cases of asymmetric proliferation within conflict dyads, nuclear weapons will prove "poor instruments for blackmail" because a "country that takes the nuclear offensive has to fear an appropriately punishing strike by someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a non-nuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other nuclear powers."28

Even low chance of retaliation is sufficient to deterAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)Rational deterrence advances the notion that actors are effectively able to deter other states from aggression if they can credibly posture themselves as resolute and strong states. States with nuclear weapons should be especially effective at deterrence if they can convince their adversary that there is some possibility nuclear weapons would be used. Nuclear states may resort to brinkmanship or costly signals to overcome the credibility problem (Schelling, 1960, 1962, 1966; Powell, 1988, 1989, 1990; Fearon, 1994). As long as there is some probability that a state would use a nuclear weapon against an opponent, the enormity of the costs of that event should be enough to deter opponents from escalating in a conflict even if the probability of that event is low.

Even if deterrence failure occurs, prolif guarantees it doesn’t escalate. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p33-34 AjonesDeterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one easily leaps to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. lf deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. lf the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come., 35"


http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539274

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 14More ev.Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p23AjonesDeterrent threats backed by second-strike nuclear forces raise the possible costs of an attack to such heights that war becomes unlikely. But deterrent threats may not be credible. In a world where two or more countries can make them, the prospect of mutual devastation may make it difficult, or irrational, to execute threats should the occasion for doing so arise. Would it not be senseless to risk suffering further destruction once a deterrent force had failed to deter? Believing that it would be, an adversary may attack counting on the attacked country's

unwillingness to risk initiating a devastating exchange by its own retaliation. Why retaliate once a threat to do so has failed? If one's policy is to rely on forces designed to deter, then an attack that is nevertheless made shows that one's reliance

was misplaced. The course of wisdom may be to pose a new question: What is the best policy once deterrence has failed? One gains nothing by destroying an enemy's cities. Instead, in retaliating, one may prompt the enemy to unleash more warheads. A ruthless aggressor may strike believing that the leaders of the attacked country are capable of

following such a "rational" line of thought. To carry the threat out may be "irrational."This old wony achieved new prominence as the strategic capabilities of the Soviet Union approached those of the United States in the middle 19705. The Soviet Union, some feared, mig]ht believe that the United States would be self-deterred.



AT ANY RISK OF PROLIF O/W

Study ONLY empirical outcomes. The ONLY relevant question is the net body count and nuclear prolif clearly reduces it. Single risk of accident isn’t enough.Sechser ‘9 (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics – UVA and PhD Pol.. Sci. – Stanford, in “Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations”, Ed. John A. Hird, Peter M. Haas and Beth McBratney, p. 171-172)Second, the appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons would result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. In other words, we must ask: will the gains outweigh the costs? Even if one of the terrible events feared by proliferation pessimists does occur at some point in the future (as indeed it may), this outcome will not necessarily imply that the costs of proliferation outweigh the benefits. If the spread of nuclear weapons also would prevent numerous conventional wars, then it may be entirely reasonable to conclude that the net overall benefit justifies a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. In deciding whether nuclear proliferation would be stabilizing or destabilizing for international politics, it is not enough to merely point out that risks exist—one must weigh those risks against potential rewards.



PROLIF GOOD – CONVENTIONAL WAR

Proliferation solves nuclear and conventional conflictAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)Other, more optimistic, scholars see benefits to nuclear proliferation or, perhaps not actively advocating the development of more nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon states, see that the presence of nuclear weapons has at least been stabilizing in the past. For example, some scholars are confident of the promise of the 'nuclear peace'.4 While those who oppose proliferation present a number of arguments, those who contend that nuclear weapons would reduce interstate wars are fairly consistent in focusing on one key argument: nuclear weapons make the risk of war unacceptable for states. As Waltz argues, the higher the stakes and the closer a country moves toward winning them, the more surely that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. States are not likely to run major risks for minor gains. War between nuclear states may escalate as the loser uses larger and larger warheads. Fearing that, states will want to draw back. Not escalation but deescalation becomes likely. War remains possible,

but victory in war is too dangerous to fight for. (Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6-7) 'Nuclear war simply makes the risks of war much higher and shrinks the chance that a country will go to war' (Snyder & Diesing, 1977: 450). Using similar

logic, Bueno de Supporters of proliferation do not see leaders of new nuclear states as being fundamentally different from those of the old nuclear states in terms of their levels of responsibility (Arquilla, 1997), nor do they see them facing unique challenges in managing and securing these weapons (Feaver, 1992/93: 162?163). The response to the argument that small powers, non-Western powers, and military powers

will behave less responsibly than the USA and other 'responsible' powers is that the evidence does not support the view that new nuclear powers are 'different' in the worst sense of the word (Lavoy, 1995; Hagerty, 1998; Arquilla, 1997;

Feldman, 1995; Karl, 1996/ 97). Van Creveld (1993: 124) sums up this viewpoint when he points out that where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate warfare has disappeared' . Dismissing the fear

that deterrence will not work if the arsenal is not big enough or under enough control, Chellaney (1995) contends that the Cold War is evidence that even minimum deterrence is sufficient. In support, Feaver (1992/93: 186) argues that even a modest nuclear arsenal should have some existential deterrent effect on regional enemies, precisely

because decapitation is so difficult'. There are those who argue that security is increased at a systemic level when the number of nuclear states increases because of the level of uncertainty created when more than one or two players are playing with a nuclear deck. When this happens, 'the probability of deliberate

nuclear attack falls to near zero with three, four, or more nuclear nations' (Brito &C Intriligator, 1983: 137).

Cimbala (1993:194) agrees, arguing that 'it is only necessary to threaten the plausible loss of social value commensurate with the potential gains of an attacker’.

Conventional war is really deadly.Arbatov et al ’89 (Alexei, Head, Nikolae Kishilov, Head of Section, and Oleg Amirov, Senior Researcher, Department on Problems of Disarmament – Institute of world Economic and International Relations, in “Conventional arms Control and East-West Security”, Ed. Robert Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, p. 76-78)A large-scale conventional war, even if it would not quickly boil over into a nuclear war, would have numerous unpredictable features that would make it quite dissimilar to World War II, the experience of which continues to be used even now as the point of departure for the strategic and operational planning of combat operations for NATO and WTO ground forces, air forces and naval forces. The fact that during the past 40 years incomparably greater changes have taken place in technology than those that took place in the earlier interwar periods of 1870-

1914 and 1918-1939 supports such a conclusion. Therefore, war in the modern era is even less similar to World War II than that war was to War World I, and the latter in turn to the Franco-Prussian war. It is exceptionally difficult, if it is possible at all, to predict its course. But there is every justification to say that the numerous contradictions and paradoxes of a hypothetical new war would in practice have the most unexpected consequences, consequences most likely incompatible with the concept of "protracted" conventional combat on the European continent or on a global scale. This concerns, for example, the fact that the sharply increased interdependence of different types of armed forces and troops, individual formations and units and various weapons systems is a distinguishing feature of the functioning of enormous and highly complex organizations, which is what modern armed forces are. A great spacial scope of operations (on the scale of entire TVDs), the rapidity and intensity of combat actions, and the multinational structure of opposing coalitions of states will characterize their actions. All of this poses unprecedently high demands for coordinating the actions of all elements of military potentials and for carefully planning operations, their priority, sequence of interaction and so on. At the same time, the character of modern warfare makes inevitable the constant and rapid change of the combat situation on the fronts, deep breakthroughs and envelopments, and the intermixing of one's own and others' formations, units and subunits. In view of the high maneuverability of troops even the traditional FEBA may no longer exist. In place of it zones of combat contact of a depth of dozens of kilometers will arise and rapidly change and shift. The unpredictability, mutability and intensity of probable combat actions would so overload the capabilities of a centralized command and control in the theater of war and the separate TVDs that they would most likely rapidly lead to total chaos. The intensity of the anticipated combat also renders inevitable exceptionally great losses in arms and equipment. At the same time, because of the rapid increase in the cost of weapons systems, the quantitative levels of armed forces and arms on the whole have a tendency to decrease. Fewer but much improved and more powerful arms have a much lesser chance than in World War II of being used repeatedly in several battles. Their longevity will entirely depend on how successfully they may outstrip the opponent and destroy his forces and capabilities earlier than they will be destroyed by him. Therefore, combat actions will in any event most likely have a short-term character, if not for both, then at least for one of the sides. And this is not to mention the enormous losses among the civilian population and the damage to the economic

infrastructure in the region of combat, which may now envelop the greatest and most densely populated portion of the European continent. Neither the population, economy nor ecology of Europe can withstand a large-scale conventional war for any


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 18amount of time—even in the improbable event that nuclear power stations, chemical enterprises and nuclear and chemical weapons depots are not destroyed. The limited capabilities of the "human factor" in conditions of modern battle are clearly demonstrated by the experience of the local wars of the 197os and the 198os. Thus, for maintaining the combat capability of troops at a "sufficiently high level" during the Falklands conflict (1982), the British command was forced to replace forward units every two days. Furthermore, the high sortie rate of Great Britain's air force and naval aviation in this period was guaranteed largely thanks to the use of special medicinal preparations. Naturally, it is impossible to compare and carry over the experience of individual local conflicts to potential large-scale combat operations on the European continent, where their character would be quite different both in terms of intensity and scope. This concerns the anticipated transient "fire contacts" with the rapid change of the tactical and operational situation, the threat of using nuclear weapons at any moment, the swift advance of enemy troops, the simultaneous envelopment of large territories with combat actions, the premeditated violation of lines of communication and C3I, and the conduct of combat operations at any time of the day (including at night) and under any weather conditions—all of which maximally increase the physical and psychological stress on a person, and cannot be compared with what took place in the years of World War II, in the Middle East in 1973 or in the Falkland Islands in 1982. It is also necessary to observe that the replacement of the leading units by their withdrawal to the rear for rest and replenishment, as was done in the past, becomes practically impossible in the conditions of large-scale combat operations. Where to withdraw the units for rest, and at what time, if just 3o-5o kilometers from the front there would be a

zone of combat operations just as intense as at the forward line? Any assessments of the losses of the sides participating in the conflict can only be highly abstract. Only one thing is clear—the human and material losses in the event of a "general conventional war" will be characterized, undoubtedly, by a scale many hundreds of times greater than that in analogous conflicts of the past, and, what is especially important, by a significantly higher "attrition rate" of people and equipment, of the share of irreplaceable losses.



EXTS – PROLIF SOLVES CONVENTIONAL WAR

40 to 1. Benefits outweigh the costs.de Mesquita and Riker ’82 (Bruce Bueno and William, Dept. Pol. Sci. – Rochester, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 302-303)One might object further. Conceding that the likelihood of miscalculation does diminish as proliferation occurs, one might still contend that the costs of such a miscalculation are so large that they cannot conceivably justify even the diminished risk of war. If the expected costs from nuclear wars arising out of miscalculation or irrational acts exceed the expected costs from wars that could be prevented by proliferation, then, indeed, proliferation is a very dangerous thing. There is, of course, no precise way to measure these expected costs, but we do have some basis for estimating them. Using expected utility calculations similar to the one suggested here, one of us (Bueno de Mesquita 1981b) found that 65 of approximately 70,000 opportunities to initiate war rationally were seized in the period 1816 to 1974, with hundreds of other opportunities being used to threaten war. In that same study it was also found that only 11 of nearly 500,000 opportunities to initiate war were seized in violation of the expectations arising from the expected utility framework. In other words, the ratio of seemingly rational and correct calculations to either irrational calculations or miscalculations that have led to war is over 40 to 1. This implies that through symmetry-producing nuclear proliferation, we may expect to prevent approximately 40 conventional or one-sided nuclear wars for every one miscalculated or irrational bilateral nuclear exchange. Using the 40 most recent wars as a crude indicator, this analysis implies that a single miscalculated or irrational nuclear exchange in the third world would have to kill several tens of millions of people before some proliferation would be unjustified by yielding a higher expected loss of life. It seems to us unlikely that one such miscalculated or irrational act among third world countries, each with a very few warheads, could produce this level of loss. Still, we do not rule it out, but rather note that it is exactly such estimates that must be made in calculating the trade-offs between gains and losses from nuclear proliferation. One might expect, for instance, that selection of candidates for proliferation might be based partially on the calculation of the marginal effect on expected costs in life and property from not standing in the way of the candidate in question. Thus, proliferation would be resisted where the expected marginal effect would be an increase in loss of life and property over nonproliferation, but would be encouraged where the marginal effect was otherwise.

Prolif solves conventional war and arms racing Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p31 AjonesLarge conventional forces neither add to nor subtract from the credibility of second-strike nuclear forces. Smaller nuclear states are likely to understand this more easily than the United States and the Soviet

Union did, if only because few of them can afford to combine deterrent with large war-fighting forces. Israel's military policy seems to fly in the face of deterrent logic. lts military budget has at times exceeded 20 percent of its GDP. ln fact lsrael's policy bears deterrent logic out. So long as Israel continues to hold the Golan Heights and parts of the West Bank, it has to be prepared to fight for them. Since they by no means belong unambiguously to Israel, deterrent threats do not cover them. Because of America's large subsidies, economic constraints have not driven Israel to the territorial settlement that would shrink its borders sufficiently to make a deterrent policy credible, Global and regional forces, however, now do so. To compete internationally, Israel has to reduce its military expenditures. If a state's borders encompass only its vital interests, their protection does not require spending large sums on conventional forces. The success of a deterrent strategy depends neither on the conventional capabilities of states nor on the extent of territory they hold. States can safely shrink their borders because defense in depth becomes irrelevant. The point can

be put the other way around: With deterrent forces, arms races in their ultimate form-the fighting of offensive wars designed to increase national security-become pointless.

Preventing proliferation guarantees devastating conventional wars in all global hotspots. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)These calculations include Israel, which would be left contending with several hundred million Arabs and Iranians absent a nuclear shield. A denuclearized Pakistan would confront more than a billion Indians. Japan and Taiwan-if it still exists as a separate polity-would face China without the nuclear umbrella the United States once extended. In other words, what started out as an almost scholastic question of nuclear numbers would

quickly turn into a very practical question of geopolitics. Within a couple of decades, the power map of the world Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 20would be completely redrawn, as oldfashioned metrics such as population size, territorial extent, and conventional military strength once again dominated strategic calculations, with dire consequences for the United States and the West as a whole. Of course, such factors would not matter if nuclear disarmament ushered in

perpetual peace. But such a heaven did not exist before nuclear weapons were deployed, so why should it exist once they are removed? The peace that disarmament advocates take for granted has been the product of the very arsenals they want to eliminate. The correlation between nuclear weapons and great-power peace is perfect- 65 years, the longest such period in world history. Conversely,

with the nuclear threat lifted , conventional war among the great powers might no longer look so terrifying. If the last rung on the escalation ladder is gone, stepping onto the first one might not lead straight to Armageddon.



CONVENTIONAL WAR BAD – GENERAL

Conventional war sucks. Tower 89 (John, Senator, Armed Services Committee Hearing, Federal News Service, 1-25)

SEN. TOWER: Well, of course we've been discussing this for a long time, that if ultimately the outcome is to make the world safe for conventional warfare we've gone back to square one. I submit that a man who died in the Alamo with a musket ball in his chest is just as dead as somebody that died in nuclear explosion. And, too, we have seen how devastating conventional war is. Anybody who has any memory of Europe -- I was in the

occupation of Japan in 1945, and I can tell you, if that's what conventional warfare can do with much less sophisticated conventional weapons than we have now, we don't want that either. War is a detestable way

for men and nations to resolve their differences. No war is good.

We control empirics -- millions die absent nuclear deterrence. Joseph and Reichart 98—Robert G. Joseph and John F. Relchart are director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, and members of the National War College faculty. Ambassador Joseph is a fonner principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Dr. Reichart is a former member of the State Department policy planning staff (“The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today”, Winter 1998, ZBurdette)

While it is impossible to prove what would have happened had nuclear weapons not existed during the Cold War, the reality of what did not happen-world War III-would seem to vindicate those who advocated a strong nuclear deterrent. In the first half of the twentieth century tens of millions of

combatants and civilians perished in war. In the second half of the century, millions more died in regional conflicts in which nuclear deterrence did not pertain. Yet, in Europe-arguably the most volatile Cold War battleground and potentially the deadliest because of the enormous concentration of armed forces there-war did not occur. The threat of escalation and nuclear annihilation made the prospect of war too horrific and reinforced caution in decision makers on both sides.



CONVENTIONAL WAR O/W NUCLEAR WAR

Conventional war is just as devastating as nuclear warMyers 86 (Grover, Major USAF, September 1986, “Aerospace Power: The Case for Indivisible Application”, http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/Myers_Aerospace.pdf, ZBurdette)

Those who argue that "conventional" war may be more likely if seen as divorced from potential nuclear consequences are represented by Mary Kaldor, who wrote: The terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons may lead us to condone conventional weapons as a lesser evil. This is something new. After World War I, there was widespread

revulsion against war in all its forms. Yet a modem conventional war with the weapons now available could in the words of a British lieutenant colonel "recreate the conditions of 1914-15" . . . the carnage would be fearful with modem weapons making the World War I casualty lists look brief by comparison.33 In

other words, a major nonnuclear war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could conceivably be as destructive and deadly (albeit probably longer) as many theater nuclear scenarios. The trigger of war may seem easier to pull, given that the potential level of destruction may not appear as great. But nearly total destruction is still possible. During World War 11, the firebomb raids on cities like Dresden and Tokyo killed far more people than the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Europe lost a generation (somewhere around 15 million men) in the trenches of World War I.

Conventional war escalates to nuclear war. Myers 86 (Grover, Major USAF, September 1986, “Aerospace Power: The Case for Indivisible Application”, http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/Myers_Aerospace.pdf, ZBurdette)

To make matters worse, the second concern centers on the fact that some analysts are raising serious concerns as to the viability of even the nuclear/nonnuclear distinctions. In the heat and fog of battle, commanders may have a difficult time determining what kind of weapons are being used against them, especially in tactical situations. The standard image of nuclear warfare- the razing of entire cities in a single multimegaton nuclear blast and the virtual elimination of entire societies in a matter of a few short hours-while a worst- case possibility, is a long way from the battlefield situations in which nuclear weapons will most likely see their first use. Large-yield nuclear weapons of the "city-busting7' class could certainly be used in such situations, but they have more important uses as the Armageddon-makers-the bludgeons of ultimate deterrence-and they also invite their use by the other side. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have developed small, lower- yield weapons with good accuracy that are specifically intended for tactical action but that presently are distinguishable from their nonnuclear counterparts. However, for the future, the same technologies that are producing such radical improvements in conventional weaponry will surely affect the nuclear arsenal in similar fashion. Nuclear-delivery systems will become more accurate as advanced inertial- and terminal-guidance systems are deployed, reducing the requirement for large-yield warheads. The desire to limit collateral damage, especially in Europe, will foster further accuracy refinements and yield reductions. At the same time, nonnuclear weapons are increasing in destructive potential. For example, Gen Robert Marsh described the potential of the new nonnuclear explosive metastable helium (MSH) as having "more than five times the stored energy capacity of TNT" and the capability to produce "thirty times the overpressure on a target of a TNT munition of similar weight at the same miss distance.” Another writer compared existing systems: "It has been estimated that an aircraft equipped with the type of cluster bomb used by Israel in Lebanon has the same immediate destructive effect as a Lance missile equipped with a one-kiloton [an explosive power equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT] nuclear warhead. ' '35 Thus, the combination of smaller, more accurate nuclear munitions and larger, more destructive nonnuclear weapons, both

designed to accomplish the same tasks, may eventually blur the distinctions between nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. The critical firebreak that is so important to deterrence theory may become very indistinct if not nonexistent. To be sure, there are differences between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons even at lower yields, most

notably radiation and fallout (although even these can be minimized); but a military commander, surrounded by the urgencies and confusion of battle, is not likely to wait for fallout reports before recommending what he may see as appropriate nuclear retaliation. Matters are made even worse by the fact that in modern warfare even a large-scale "conventional" (in name only) war may be seen as a possible option because of the emergence of such precise and potent nonnuclear weapons.

Conventional weapons are increasing in lethalityWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)It is conventional weapons that have proliferated. And conventional weapons are of ever–greater lethality, and, unlike nuclear weapons, are frequently used. We have had nuclear weapons since 1945, and never has a nuclear weapon been fired in anger in a world in which two or more countries had nuclear

capabilities. Now that is a good and unparalleled record. Can you think of any other weapon in the history of the world with such a record? In other words, nuclear deterrence has worked. It has worked both for big nuclear powers, like the United States and the Soviet Union, and for small nuclear countries.



http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/Myers_Aerospace.pdf

http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/Myers_Aerospace.pdf


CONVENTIONAL WAR BAD – TERRORISM

War causes terrorWaltz 2—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (:Beyond Bin Laden” , International Securtiy 26:3, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/walt_winter_01_02.pdf, ZBurdette)The danger that some failed states pose also reminds us that unresolved conflicts are always a potential danger. Protracted conflicts generate hatred and the desire for revenge, foster the emergence of groups whose main aim is to wage war, and empower leaders who depend on a climate of fear to justify their own rule. These conditions provide ideal breeding grounds for precisely the sort of people who willingly engage in mass terror. The terrorist network that the United States now seeks to eradicate is a product of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The September 11 attacks on the United States

might never have occurred had these violent struggles been resolved. Thus, helping to settle protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general; it can also make the United States safer. 17


http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/walt_winter_01_02.pdf


AT CONVENTIONAL WAR UNLIKELY

Conventional war is probable. Sound deterrent strategies should guide policy analysis.Horowitz and Shalmon ‘9 (Michael, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Pennsylvania, Dan, Senior Analyst – Lincoln Group and Graduate Student – Georgetown U., Orbis, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy”, 53:2, ScienceDirect)Some scholars question the notion that state-on-state warfare has become unlikely. Army Colonel Gian Gentile argues that the COIN community's analysis “more than anything else… stakes a claim on the future,” concluding that Iraq does not provide a “model” for America's future wars.15 U.S. Air Force (USAF) Major General Charles Dunlap has argued that land forces “will be of little strategic import in the next war.”16 Gentile disagrees with Dunlap but also with the COIN community, writing that “‘legacy’ large-scale battles… might, in fact, still be looming on the horizon.” Citing Iranian, North Korean and Chinese threats, he argues that planners “could (and should) imagine many types of conflict in the near-to-medium term, not

all or even most of them counterinsurgencies.” 17 Michael Mazarr assails the “naïve… assumption that the world has been rendered immune from the requirement for deterrence of major conventional war,” referencing possible threats from rogue states, Russia and the People's

Republic of China (PRC).18 Referencing similar threats, Dunlap attacks the COIN community for believing that “human nature will change, that peer competitors will not arise and that the rest of the world will not attempt to challenge U.S. air power.”19 Metz calls for defense thinkers to “jettison the concept of counterinsurgency,” which he describes as having “outlived its usefulness,” and rethink how they understand irregular threats, since “not all armed conflict is war.”20 This is similar to Mazarr's argument that the use of military force is not the most effective way of winning COIN operations. Whereas COIN advocates argue for minimizing the costs of irregular warfare commitments by dedicating units to enhancing the capabilities of friendly regimes—especially those facing Islamic radicalism—Posen and Metz oppose most capacity-building efforts because twenty first century insurgency is “not simply a variant of war” but is rather “part of systemic failure and pathology,” requiring comprehensive social re-engineering.21

Consequently, host nation governments and the United States have inherently conflicting interests. Mazarr makes an even broader argument,

claiming that given the character of twenty first century irregular warfare, militaries should de-emphasize COIN and focus on conventional warfighting.22 Reversing McMaster's argument, the essential traditionalist claim is that focusing on irregular war, for which violent tools are ill-suited,

will undermine the U.S. military's role in doing what it does best—preventing and winning full-scale interstate wars.

Multiple nations are gearing up for conventional war-fighting now. Absent adjustment the world will face risks of large-scale conflict.Sieff ‘9 (Martin, Defense Policy Editor, UPI, “Defense Focus: Land war threats -- Part 1”, 6-3, L/N)The two conventional land wars that were fought in the Northern Hemisphere over the past year were both small ones, almost tiny in geographical range and short in duration. But Russia's five-day war in Georgia in August 2008 and Israel's three-week incursion into Gaza in January 2009 taught the old, hard lesson that a country without adequate tanks, armor, combat aircraft and heavy artillery can't stand up to any country that has them. And for all the problems that Sunni Muslim insurgents in Iraq have given the U.S. Army and Marines over the past

six years, they weren't able to stop U.S.-led armed forces from conquering that country in less than three weeks in March-April 2003 and staying there ever since. Military occupations can certainly become costly and exhausting over the months and years without an adequate political solution, but as the Red Army in 1979 and the U.S. armed forces in late 2001 both showed in Afghanistan, the only thing that can stop a well-equipped military force from conquering a

country is a comparably armed military force on the other side. Since the collapse of communism it has been widely assumed by U.S. policymakers that gigantic, full-scale land wars on major continents involving

hundreds of thousands or even millions of troops have become inconceivable. In the 21st century, U.S.

policymakers, spearheaded by Donald Rumsfeld during his momentous six-year reign as secretary of defense, have been convinced that the advent of precision weapons, reconnaissance and communications means that the United States will remain militarily supreme around the world without needing hundreds of thousands, or even

millions, of ground troops to fight large-scale wars. Republicans, raised in the age of Tom Clancy novels, have lived in a world where this seemed to be true for the past quarter-century. Democrats don't buy into the vision of electronic super-weapons rendering huge masses of less well-equipped troops, cannon and armored vehicles obsolete as enthusiastically as Republicans do, but they still think that the age of massive land confrontations has passed. That is also the wisdom in every major nation of the European Union, and it's especially the case among European Commission policymakers in Brussels. The only trouble is that a lot of other major powers around the world do not believe it is true -- and are planning on very different assumptions. The Russian army is currently upgrading its equipment on a more

massive scale than at any time in at least the past 30 years. Until September 2008, it could afford to do that because of the soaring global price of oil and gas, and Russia was the world's largest exporter and revenue earner of those energy sources. However, even after global energy prices collapsed as the worldwide economic recession took hold last fall, the Russian government has remained resolutely committed to its ambitious military modernization plans. And

the Russian invasion of Georgia showed that the current rulers of the Kremlin certainly do not regard the use of their ground forces in conventional wars to further state aims as inconceivable.



AT PROLIF BAD – GENERAL

Their impact claims are based on a flawed analysisAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)The negative impact of proliferation on the security environment, however, may be seen in a very different light if the security and political interests of the USA do not drive the analysis. Indeed, several non-US perspectives reject non-proliferation arguments, as 'divid ing states into "responsible" ones who can set and change the rules of the game and those "irresponsible" nations who have to accept the rules leads to discriminatory ideas of non proliferation (Mashhadi, 1994: 107; see also Goheen, 1983).2 Or, as Singh

(1998) bluntly states, arguments for non-proliferation may be dismissed as ‘Nuclear Apartheid’.



AT ACCIDENTS

No accidents – incentives for safety measures. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 125]Of course, all else being equal, a nuclear state probably would like to have pretty good negative command and control. Nuclear accidents and misuse are generally bad things and one should like to avoid them. However, there are clear advantages to being perceived as having weak mechanisms of negative command and control. Ideally, a state will want to have good negative command and control but be perceived as having poor negative command and control. Limited nuclear proliferators in the Third

World will have a relatively easy time appearing to be out of control, like the terrorist bank robber in our

illustration. To be clear, even if Third World proliferators actually do not have poor mechanisms of negative command and control, the fact is that much suspicion and doubt exist with regard to Third World states' command and control capabilities, and thus they will have an easy time convincing opponents and observers that they are nervous that their switches are hair-triggered and that if they are pressed too hard their nuclear weapons might just "go off” unintentionally.

Centralized control in new proliferators solves. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]In short, while Third World states may not have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do not "get out of control” they have other advantages that make the challenge of' centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their lingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

The risk of accidents is low -- nukes are on balance better for stability. Joseph and Reichart 98—Robert G. Joseph and John F. Relchart are director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, and members of the National War College faculty. Ambassador Joseph is a fonner principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Dr. Reichart is a former member of the State Department policy planning staff (“The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today”, Winter 1998, ZBurdette)

Accidents, unauthorized use, and the “hair trigger.” It is a truism that there is and always has been some level of risk of accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. But, just as there is a risk of a major dam breaking or an accident at a nuclear power plant, the real issue is how to manage and mitigate these risks. Current programs that make our stockpile and that of the former Soviet Union more secure are essential. But reducing the numbers of warheads does not in itself guarantee a reduction in risk. In any event, the risk of accidents or unauthorized use, though real, must be judged low, and this risk must be measured against the

national security benefits gained from retaining nuclear weapons.



AT ANONYMOUS STRIKE/BLACKMAIL

No riskWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p15-16 AjonesSome have feared that a radical Arab state might fire a nuclear warhead anonymouslly at an Israeli city

in order to block a peace settlement. But the state firing the warhead could not be certain of remaining unidentified. Even if a country's leaders persuaded themselves that chances of retaliation were low, who would run the risk? Nor would blackmail be easy, despite one instance of seeming success. ln 1953, the Soviet Union and China may have been convinced by President Dwight D. EisBnhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that they would widen the Korean war and raise the level of violence by using nuclear weapons if a settlement were not reached. In Korea, we had gone so far that the threat to go farther was plausible. The blackmailer's threat is not a cheap way of working one's will. The threat is simply incredible unless a considerable investment has already been made. On January 12, 1954, Dulles gave a speech that seemed to threaten massive retaliation in response to bothersome actions by others, but the successful sicge of Dien Bien Phu by Ho Chi Minh's forces in the spring of that year showed the limitations of such threats. Capabilities foster policies that employ them. Using American nuclear weapons to force the lifting of the siege was

discussed in both the United States and France. But using nuclear weapons to serve distant and doubtful interests would have been a monstrous policy, too horrible, when contemplated, to carry through. Nuclear weapons deter adversaries from attacking one's vital, and not one’s minor, interests.



AT ARMS RACE

Only small arsenals -- solves stability -- three reasons.Seng 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.53]There are three main reasons that limited means nuclear deterrence is viable in the developing world. One target sets will be small for nuclear weapons states. In large part, this is because, nuclear states will face enemies with only very small numbers of population and industry centers. Developing state

proliferators will only need very small numbers of weapons to provide overwhelming punishment capability and second strike assured destruction capability. Ample strategic deterrent threat will be possible

without large arsenals and explicit declarations of capability, and crisis stability will be possible without advanced weapons survival technologies. Two, the nuclear arsenals of developing state proliferators will be very small numerically. The small size of developing state nuclear arsenals will be determined in part though not completely, by the small numbers of targets that developing states have to worry about hitting. Other reasons include the limited financial resources of developing states, the dangers of regional nuclear fallout from the detonation of large numbers of weapons, and the political rewards of small arsenals. The small size of arsenals will make it possible for developing states to achieve effective command and control without advanced communications and use-control technologies. Three, nuclear arsenals in the developing world are likely to be opaque. Contrary to the fears of many analysts, I will argue not only that opacity will not prove an

insurmountable barrier to effective nuclear deterrence, but that it will be helpful in several ways. For instance

conditions of opacity will further aid in keeping nuclear arsenals small in the developing world, which in tum

will help facilitate easy command and control of nuclear forces. More importantly, opacity will provide optimal conditions for tacit, informal arms negotiations between nuclear adversaries. Like the superpowers' formal arms

agreements, tacit agreements will aid in maintaining arms race stability. However. because developing state proliferators will need only very small numbers of weapons for assured destruction, and because there will be various pressures that will require developing states to keep their numbers of weapons very small, these arms negotiations are likely to be aimed at completely avoiding arms buildups rather than simply making arms races stable. There are three main reasons that limited means nuclear deterrence is viable in the developing world. One target sets will be small for nuclear

weapons states. In large part, this is because, nuclear states will face enemies with only very small numbers of population and industry centers. Developing state proliferators will only need very small numbers of weapons to provide overwhelming punishment capability and second strike assured destruction capability. Ample strategic deterrent threat will be possible without large arsenals and explicit declarations of capability, and crisis stability will be possible without advanced weapons survival technologies. Two, the nuclear arsenals of developing state proliferators will be very small numerically. The small size of developing state

nuclear arsenals will be determined in part though not completely, by the small numbers of targets that developing states have to worry about hitting. Other reasons include the limited financial resources of developing states, the dangers of regional nuclear fallout from the detonation of large numbers of weapons, and the political rewards of small arsenals. The small size of arsenals will make it possible for developing states to achieve effective command and control without advanced communications and use-

control technologies. Three, nuclear arsenals in the developing world are likely to be opaque. Contrary to the

fears of many analysts, I will argue not only that opacity will not prove an insurmountable barrier to effective nuclear deterrence,

but that it will be helpful in several ways. For instance conditions of opacity will further aid in keeping nuclear arsenals small in the developing world, which in tum will help facilitate easy command and control of nuclear forces.

More importantly, opacity will provide optimal conditions for tacit, informal arms negotiations between

nuclear adversaries. Like the superpowers' formal arms agreements, tacit agreements will aid in maintaining arms race stability. However. because developing state proliferators will need only very small numbers of weapons for assured destruction, and because there will be various pressures that will require developing states to keep their numbers of weapons very small, these arms negotiations are likely to be aimed at completely avoiding arms buildups rather than simply making arms races stable. Arms race stability will obtain because there will be no arms races.

No arms race -- arsenals mean MAD theory.Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.8]Between the states involved. Accordingly, arms race stability would be the condition in which arms races are not likely, and therefore war is less likely. Charles Glaser offers an alternative view of arms race stability using the concept he

calls "robustness” of forces. "Robustness" is a measure of the difficulty (a state) would encounter in trying to reduce (another state's) security. Robust forces provide capacities for deterrence that are so decisive,


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 31so overwhelming, or so irresistible that the state that has them need not worry that its adversary's arms buildups or innovations will allow the adversary to escape nuclear punishment should it aggress. Analysis of robustness asks, how easy would it be for one state to develop a means of' compromising the other's current deterrent capabilities? If would be very hard, then arms races or unilateral arms developments would probably not be destabilizing. lf it would be easy, then arms races or unilateral developments might outstrip methods of deterrence and create instability. Glaser reasons that fretting about the likelihood of arms races is relatively unimportant if changes in arsenals are not likely to alter the essential deterrent capacities of states involved.

Nuclear capabilities make arms races irrelevant Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p29-31 AjonesFirst, nuclear weapons alter the dynamics of arms races. ln a competition of two or more parties, it may be hard to say who is pushing and who is being pushed, Who is leading and who is following. lf one party seeks to increase its capabilities, it may seem that others must too. The dynamic may be built into the competition and may unfold despite a mutual wish to resist it. But need this be the case in a strategic competition among nuclear C0untries? lt need not be if the conditions of competition make deterrent logic dominant. Deterrent logic domi- nates if the conditions of competition make it nearly impossible for any of the competing parties to achieve a first-strike capability. Early in the nuclear age, the implications of deterrent strategy were clearly seen. "When dealing with the absolute weapon," as William T. R. Fox put it, "arguments based on relative advantage lose their point." United States has sometimes designed its forces according to that logic. Donald A. Quarles, when he was President Eisenhower's secretary of the Air Force, argued that "sufficiency of air power" is determined by "the force required to accomplish the mission assigned." Avoidance of total war then does not depend on the "relative strength of the two opposed forces." Instead, it depends on the "absolute power in the hands of each, and in the substantial invulnerability of this

power to interdiction/'31 To repeat: If no state can launch a disarming attack with high confidence, force comparisons are irrelevant . Strategic arms races are then pointless . Deterrent strategies offer this

great advantage: Within wide ranges neither side need respond to increases in the other side's military capabilities. Those who foresee nuclear arms racing among new nuclear states fail to make the distinction between warfighting and war-deterring capabilities. War-fighting forces, because they threaten the forces of others, have to be compared. Superior forces may bring victory to one country; inferior forces may bring defeat to another. Force requirements vary with strategies and not just with the characteristics of weapons. With war-fighting strategies, arms races become hard to avoid. Forces designed for deterrence need not be compared. As Harold Brown said when he was

secretary of Defense, purely deterrent forces "can be relatively modest, and their size can perhaps be made substantially, though not completely, insensitive to changes in the posture of an opponent/'32 With deterrent strategies, arms races make sense only if a first-strike capability is within reach. Because thwarting a first strike is easy, deterrent forces are quite cheap tobuild and maintain.

Deterrence disincentivizes arms racing Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p29-31 AjonesSecond, deterrent balances are inherently stable. This is another reason for new nuclear states to decrease, rather than increase, their military spending. As Secretary Brown saw, within wide limits one state can be insensitive to changes in another state's forces. French leaders thought this way. France, as President Valery Giscard d'Estaing said, "fixes its security at the level required to maintain, regardless of the way the strategic situation develops in the world, the credibility-in other words, the effectiveness-of its deterrent force. With deterrent forces securely established, no military requirement presses one side to try to surpass the other. Human error and folly may lead some parties involved in deterrent balances to spend more on armaments than is needed, but other parties need not increase their armaments in response, because

such excess spending does not threaten them. The logic of deterrence eliminates incentives for strategic-arms racing. This should be easier for lesser nuclear states to understand than it was for the United States and the Soviet Union. Because most of them are economically hard-pressed, they will not want to have more than enough. Allowing for their particular situations, the policies of nuclear states confirm these

statements. Britain and France are relatively rich countries, and they have tended to overspend. Their strategic forces were never~ theless modest enough when one considers that they thought that to deter the Soviet Union would be more difficult than to deter states with capabilities comparable to their own. China of course faced the same task. These three countries however, have shown no inclination to engage in nuclear arms races. India was content to have nuclear military capability that may or may not have produced warheads, and Israel long maintained her ambiguous status. New nuclear states are likely to conform to these pattems and aim for a modest sufficiency rather than vie with one another for a meaningless superiority.)

No arms race -- no changes in arsenals to worry about.Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 32Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.37]Again, arms race stability is the condition under which quantitative or qualitative improvements in nuclear arsenals do not compromise states' functioning deterrent capabilities. Significant improvements might include innovations in damage limitation capabilities that trigger crisis instability, or breakthroughs in defense technologies (e.g. missile defenses) that decrease levels of strategic deterrent threat. Arms race stability may obtain because there are no arms races (i.e., because there are no notable changes in arsenals to worry about) and/ or because deterrent capabilities are so robust-so devastating and irresistible--that changes in forces will not affect them significantly. Arms race stability is the 'guarantee' that methods of deterrence that serve well today will not be rendered obsolete tomorrow.

No arms race -- limited means.Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.47]For command and control stability, the superpowers needed advanced and complex systems because they had extremely

large and complex arsenals. The "˜limited means' proliferator will only need relatively rudimentary systems of command and control because its arsenals will be very small and simple. For arms race stability, the superpowers had highly robust forces and they employed enormous resources to keep their arms race stable. The nuclear forces of the ideal "˜limited means' proliferator need not be nearly so robust because it will not be arms racing.

Nope -- robustness, and agreements.Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Fortunately, though this last version of arms race stability might not apply well to Third World settings. the first

two forms apply quite well. Third World proliferators will be able to avoid competitive nuclear arms buildups for reasons associated with, one. the robustness of their force capabilities and, two. certain advantages they have in terms of negotiating arms agreements. That is, because it is unlikely that arms races will matter strategically. and because Third World proliferators will be in particularly good positions for negotiating pre-arms race security agreements, we are unlikely to see competitive arms buildups in the Third World beyond the small buildups required to achieve levels of limited nuclear proliferation.



AT ARSENAL INSECURITY – GENERAL

Small arsenals, self-interest, and ingenuity keep weapons secureWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Journal But does the lack of funding for security measures increase the possibility of a miscalculation or an unauthorized launch? Waltz I think large numbers of weapons would raise that concern. But I think

we can rely on their self–interest and their ingenuity to prevent accidents. Every country goes through a period where it has relatively crude weapons, although relatively crude weapons are not as crude as they used to be, and where they have small numbers and where there are some questions of

vulnerability. But we have managed to get through those periods. The only strikes we’ve had have been

at nuclear facilities before any warheads were produced, with no attacks where there were existing warheads and

for good reason: Deterrence works.




AT CIVIL WAR/UNSTABLE STATES

Lower risk of prolif in those states and no escalation. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p8 AjonesWhat can one say? Four things primarily. First, possession of nuclear weapons may slow arms races down, rather than speed them up, a possibility considered later. Second, for less-developed countries to build nuclear arsenals requires a long lead time. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of considerable cost that pay off only in the

long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter becomes the attention span of its leaders. 'lhey

have to deal with today's problems and hope for the best tomorrow. In Countries where political control is most difficult to mainiain, governments are least likely to initiate nuclear Weapons programs. ln such states, soldiers help to mainlaln leaders in power or try to overthrow them. For those Purposes nuclear weapons are not useful. Soldiers who have political clout, or want it, are not interested in nuclear Weapons. They are not scientists or technicians, They like to command troops and squadrons. Their vested interests are in the military's traditional trappings? Third, although highly unstable states are unlikely to initiate nuclear projects, such projects, begun in stable times, may continue through periods of political turmoil and succeed in producing nuclear weapons. A nuclear state may be unstable or may become so. But what is hard to comprehend is why, in an intemal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons. Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for maintaining or gaining control? I see little more reason to fear that one faction or another in a less-developed country will fire atomic weapons in a struggle for political power than that they will be used in a crisis of succession. One or another nuclear state will experience uncertainty of succession, fierce struggles for power, and instability of regime. Those who fear the worst have not shown how those events might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Strikingly, during the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, some group managed to keep control of China's nuclear weapons. Fourth, the possibility of one side in a civil war firing a nuclear warhead at its opponent's stronghold nevertheless remains. Such an act would produce a national tragedy, not an international one. This

question then arises: Once the weapon is fired, what happens next? The domestic use of nuclear weapons is, of all the uses imaginable, least likely to lead to escalation and to global tragedy.



AT CRISIS INSTABILITY

Prolif solves crisis stability – first strike capability.Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.47]For crisis stability, the superpowers needed advanced weapons survival technology because they needed to protect a large

number of weapons from an enemy with advanced counterforce capabilities. The ideal 'limited means' nuclear proliferator will face an adversary with only a few major population and industrial centers. The "limited means' proliferator will only need rudimentary weapons protection because it only needs to protect a handful of weapons from first strikes. Its adversary will know that its counterforce first strike must be virtually perfect to eliminate the chance that it will be completely destroyed by nuclear retaliation,-and because `perfect' is such a high standard, preemptive incentives will be small.

Prolif creates a perception of second strike capabilities that solves crisis instability.Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.8]The essence of crisis stability is second mike capability -- the capability to absorb a first strike and still retaliate with enough nuclear firepower to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. To be able to inflict unacceptable

levels of' damage on an adversary even after suffering a first strike, a state will need some method of protecting its

weapons or weapons technology from that strike. If a state’s weapons can be preserved - if its adversary cannot escape unacceptable levels of damage by striking first-then there will be no first strike incentive.

The threat of sufficient retaliation will keep adversaries from making the first destructive move; and if the first move is never taken, stable deterrence will not fail.

Even if prolif causes more crises, it forces leaders to back down before they escalate.Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)The causal mechanism in a proliferation optimist argument like that of Waltz (Sagan & Waltz, 2003), which expects war to be less likely as the number of nuclear actors

increases, is connected to a rationalist view of nuclear deterrence (see Zagare & Kilgour, 2000; Huth, 1999). Proliferation optimists implicitly contend that,

as the number of nuclear actors in the system increases, the proportion of disputes involving nuclear actors should increase as well.5 That is, all else being equal, the more of any type of actor you add to the playing field of international politics, the more likely that that type of actor will be involved in a crisis . If nuclear weapons increase the prospects of deterrence, then proliferation should result in more crises with restrained actors that are prone to back down instead of escalate.



AT FAULTY ARSENALS DESTABILIZE

Nope Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p20-21 AjonesThis question then arises: May dispersing forces for the sake of their survival make command and control hard to maintain? Americans think so because we think in tenns of large nuclear arsenals. Small nuclear powers neither have them nor need them. Lesser nuclear states may deploy, say, ten real weapons and ten dummies, while permitting other countries to infer that numbers are larger. An adversary need only believe that some warheads may survive its attack and be visited on it. That belief is not hard to create without making command and control unreliable. All nuclear countries live through a time when their forces are crudely designed. All countries have so far been able to control them. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and later among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, were at their bitterest just when their nuclear forces were in early stages of development and were unbalanced, crude, and presumably hard to control. Why should we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difticulties than the ones old nuclear states were able to cope with? Although some of the new nuclear states may be economically and technically backward, they will either have expert and highly trained scientists and engineers or they will not be able to produce nuclear weapons. Even if they buy or steal the weapons, they will have to hire technicians to maintain and control them. We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so. They will not want to risk retaliation because one or more of their warheads accidentally struck another country.

Even atrocious arsenals can deter Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p21-22 AjonesThe weak can deter one another. But can the weak deter the strong? Raising the question of China's ability to deter the Soviet Union in the old days highlights the issue. The population and industry of most

states concentrate in a relatively small number of centers. This was true of the Soviet Union. A major attack on the top ten cities of the Soviet Union would have mashed 25 percent of its industrial capacity and 25 percent of its urban

population. Geoffrey Kemp in 1974 concluded that China could probably have struck on that scale." And I

emphasize again, China needed only to appear to be able to do that. A low probability of carrying a highly destructive attack home is sufticient for deterrence. A force of an imprecisely specifiable minimum capacity is nevertheless needed. In a 1979 study, Justin Galen (pseud.) wondered whether the Chinese had a force capable of deterring the Soviet Union. He estimated that China had sixty to eighty medium-range and sixty to eighty intermediaterange missiles of doubtful reliability and accuracy and eighty obsolete bombers. He rightly pointed out that the missiles might miss their targets even it' fired at cities and that the bombers might not get through the Soviet Union's defenses. Moreover, the Soviet Union might have been able to preempt an attack, having almost certainly located virtually every Chinese missile, aircraft, weapons storage area and production facility But surely Soviet leaders put these things the other way around. To locate virtually all missiles and aircraft is not good enough. Despite inaccuracies a few Chinese missiles might have hit Russian cities, and some bombers might have got through. Not much is required to deter. What political-military objective is worth risking Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, and Tomsk, with no way of being sure that Moscow would not go as well?



AT IRRATIONALITY

Leaders aren’t irrational -- they’re focused on state survivalWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Journal What about those states whose leaders might not use rational calculations in considering the threat

of nuclear weapons, such as Saddam Hussein of Iraq, if he were to acquire nuclear weapons? Waltz We have this peculiar notion about the irrationality of rogue states. When he was Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin said these rogue leaders

might be undeterrable. Others contend that some states may undertake courses of action even if they know that catastrophe may result. But who would do that? Not Saddam Hussein. Not Kim Il Sung when he was ruler of North Korea. What is a key characteristic of all those rulers? They are survivors, as they struggle to live in a harsh environment–both internally, with the constant danger of assassination, and externally, as they’re surrounded by enemies. And they survive for decades until they are carried out in a box. Are they irrational? Their behavior is ugly and nasty to be sure, but irrational? How could they survive? If they were not deterrable, how would they ever have survived? They don’t run the kind of risks that would put their regime into question. Kim Il Sung wanted to pass his reign onto his

son, Kim Jong Il. They obviously love to rule, but they’ve got to have a country. They’re not going to risk the existence of their country. For example, Saddam Hussein was deterred during the Persian Gulf War. He did not arm the SCUD missiles with lethal warheads and shoot them at Israel. They were nuisance attacks. Why? Because he didn’t want us to pound him more heavily than he was being pounded. The allies, led

by the United States, could have substantially destroyed that country without ever using nuclear weapons, and he knew it. Sure he was deterred. So how can we say irrational or undeterrable? But we do say it.

All actors are at least rational enough, even non-state/terrorist groups. Forsyth et al., 2010 (James, B. Saltzman, Gary Schaub, “Remembrance of Things Past The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Forsyth: professor of strategy at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Saltzman: chief of the Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy Division, Schaub: assistant professor of strategy at the Air War College, JPL)

It is often argued that deterrence is inherently flawed because no human being is perfectly rational—indeed, they often act irrationally.10 But this is a red herring. As Robert Jervis has argued, “How rational do people have to be for deterrence theory to apply? Much less than total rationality is needed for the

main lines of the theory to be valid.”11 Indeed, given that adversaries of any note lead large organizations—states

—and had to pursue strategies to gain and retain power, it is difficult to argue that such persons are irrational or nonrational.12 They may not be perfect, but they are sensible and react to the incentives of their

strategic and domestic environments.13 This holds also for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or Hamas, who utilize suicide terrorism to achieve strategic objectives.14 It is on this basis that strategy and policy can be readily erected.

Prolif stabilizes radical regimes -- Libya proves. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p11 AjonesSecond, many fear that states that are radical at home will recklessly use their nuclear weapons in pursuit of

revolutionary ends abroad. States that are radical at home, however, may not be radical abroad. Few states have been radical in the conduct of their foreign policy, and fewer have remained so for long. Think of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. States coexist in a competitive arena. The pressures of competition cause them to behave in ways that make the threats they face manageable, in ways that

enable them to get along. States can remain radical in foreign policy only if they are overwhelmingly strong-as none of the new nuclear states will be_or if their acts fall short of damaging vital Interests of other nuclear

powers. States that acquire nu clear weapons will not be regarded with indifference. States that want to be freewheelers have to stay out of the nuclear business. A nuclear Libya, for example, would have to show caution, even in rhetoric, lest it suffer retaliation in response to someone else's anonymous attack on a third state. That state, ignorant of who attacked, might claim that its intelligence agents had identified Libya as the culprit and take the opportunity to silence it by striking a heavy conventional blow. Nuclear weapons induce caution in any state, especially in weak ones.




AT MIL CONTROL → FIRST USEDoesn’t happen. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p14-15 AjonesFifth, in some of the new nuclear states, civil control of the military may be shaky. Nuclear weapons may fall

into the hands of military officers more inclined than civilians are to put them to offensive use. This again is an old worry. I can see no reason to think that civil control of the military was secure in the Sovict Union, given thc occasional presence of military officers in the Politburo and some known and some surmised instances of military

intervention in civil affairs at critical times." in the People's Republic of China, military and civil branches of government are not separated but fused. Although one may prefer civil control, preventing a highly destructive war does not require it. What is required is that decisions be made that keep destruction within bounds,

whether decisions are made by civilians or soldiers. Soldiers may be more cautious than civilians. Generals and admirals do not like uncertainty, and they do not lack patriotism. They do not like to fight conventional wars under unfamiliar conditions. The offensive use or nuclear weapons multiplies uncertainties. Nobody knows

what a nuclear battlefield would look like, and nobody knows what will happen after the first city is hit. Uncertainty about the course that a nuclear war might follow, along with the certainty that destruction can be immense, strongly inhibits the first use of nuclear weapons.



AT MISCALC

Prolif solves miscalc. Waltz 95—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate”, p. 45, direct access to original source was not available, ZBurdette)Third, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation diffi cult because it is hard not to be aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century Norman Angeil argued that war could not occur because it would not pay. But conventional wars have brought political gains to some

countries at the ex pense of others. Among nuclear countries, possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell’s dictum becomes persuasive. When the ac tive use of force threatens to bring great losses, war becomes less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but

insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons reduced the chances of war between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One must expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them?

No miscalcSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Assuming that decapitation Fears prompt leaders in Third World nuclear states to decentralize launch capability, will they prompt leaders to make counter-launches automatic-to eliminate negative controls and increase the chance that false alarms in the field will lead to inappropriate nuclear use? In essence, we have already discussed this as well. Concealment strategies alleviate the need for hair-triggered launch procedures.

Decapitation Fears may prompt leaders to delegate launch capability, but the delegation of launch capability does not mean that peripheral personnel cannot take time during crises to confirm that central leaders have indeed been destroyed before proceeding to launch weapons without central authorization. That is, with respect to decapitation and delegation, the fear is that false indications of an attack on central leaders (say. an interruption ir1 communications with leaders in the capitol city) will cause peripheral operators to launch their weapons inappropriately. However, if peripheral operators do not have to worry that their weapons will be destroyed by a first strike, then they can take the time to confirm the reasons behind the alarm (say,

that communications have been interrupted by an earthquake, not a nuclear attack). Accordingly, launch procedures need not be automatic; procedures for centralized negative control need not be eliminated. Central

commanders can be left in "˜the loop.` Central leaders do not need to tell peripheral operators, "If you cannot contact us, fire

away." Rather. they can design procedures for central confirmation: "If you cannot contact us, keep trying. If' not by phone, then by radio. If we cannot be contacted, confirm our destruction by other means: contact with other military units. contact with other states, CNN!"



AT NUCLEAR HITLER

Won’t happen Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p28-29 AjonesIn a nuclear world, conservative would-be attackers will be prudent, but will would-be attackers be conservative? A new Hitler is not unimaginable. Would the presence of nuclear weapons have moderated Hitler's behavior? Hitler did not start World War ll in order to destroy the Third Reich. Indeed, he was dismayed by British and French declarations of war on Poland's behalf. After all, the western democracies had not come to the aid of a geographically defensible and militarily strong Czechoslovakia. Why then should they have declared war on behalf of an indefensible Poland and against a Germany made stronger by the incorporation of Czechoslovakia's armor? From the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 to the invasion of Poland in 1939, Hitler's calculations were realistically made. ln those years, Hitler would have been deterred from acting in ways that immediately threatened massive death and widespread destruction in Germany. And, even if Hitler had not been deterred, would his generals have obeyed his commands?

ln a nuclear world, to act in blatantly offensive ways is madness. Under the circumstances, how many generals would obey the commands of a madman? One man alone does not make war. To believe that nuclear deterrence would have worked against Germany in 1939 is easy. lt is also easy to believe that in 1945, given the ability to do so, Hitler and some few around him would have fired nuclear warheads at the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as their armies advanced, whatever the consequences for Germany. Two considerations work against this possibility: the first applies in any world; the second in a nuclear world. First, when defeat is seen to be inevitable, a ruler's authority may vanish. Early in 1945, Hitler apparently ordered the initiation of gas warfare, but his generals did not respond."

Second, no country will press another to the point of decisive defeat. In the desperation of defeat, desperate measures may be taken, and the last thing anyone wants to do is to make a nuclear nation desperate, The unconditional surrender of a nuclear nation cannot be demanded. Nuclear weapons affect the deterrer as well as the deterred.



AT OFFENSIVE USE – GENERAL

Nuclear use by small states would not escalate – the costs are too highWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p16-17 AjonesNuclear weapons do not make nuclear war likely, as history has shown. The point made when discussing the internal use of nuclear weapons bears repeating. No one can say that nuclear weapons will never be used. Their use is always possible. In asking what the spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world, we are asking about the effects to be expected if a larger number of relatively weak states get nuclear weapons. If such states use nuclear weapons, the world will not end. The use of nuclear weapons by lesser powers would hardly trigger them elsewhere.



AT OVERCONFIDENCE

The uncertainty of nuclear response means even an overconfident actor wouldn’t attackWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p24 AjonesTo ask why a country should carry out its deterrent threat if deterrence fails is to ask the wrong question. The question suggests that an aggressor may attack believing that the attacked country may not retaliate. This invokes the conventional logic that analysts find so hard to forsake. In a conventional world, a country can sensibly attack if it

believes that success is possible. In a nuclear world, a would-be attacker is deterred if it believes that the attacked may retaliate. Uncertainty of response, not certainty, is required for deterrence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing so much. In a nuclear world, we should look less at the retaliator's conceivable inhibitions and more at the challenger's obvious risks.



AT PREEMPTIVE STRIKES

The high probability of 1st strikes failing is sufficient to prevent themWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Proximity also does not mean vulnerability. Every country has enough space to move its weapons around; in order for me to believe that your force is vulnerable and consider a preemptive attack, I have to convince myself that I know exactly how many deliverable nuclear weapons you have. So if I think you have twelve weapons, I’ve got to know you don’t have a couple more. I’ve got to be sure that’s the

number. And if I persuade myself that you have twelve and no more, I have to know where they are, and I have to be sure that you do not move them by the time I decide to attack. It’s estimated by Herbert York, former director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, that a country making a relatively crude nuclear warhead would be able to make one weighing less than a ton–small enough to place in a van and move around. Journal Some military analysts would contend that India’s conventional superiority makes Pakistan’s nuclear capability vulnerable, largely because Pakistan relies on its air capability to deliver weapons, and in a conventional war, its air capability could be destroyed very quickly. Could that development, with the implications on Pakistan’s inability to withstand a preemptive attack, possibly disrupt nuclear stability? Waltz You’ve got to be sure that in an attack, whether with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons, you’re attacking weapons. Now, it’s hard–nuclear weapons are small–to be sure that you’re going to destroy those weapons quickly and completely. With conventional weapons you at least have the illusion of control; that is, you can defend, you can delay, and you can exact a toll from the enemy. The ultimate question is whether you are going to win or lose. If you are fighting with nuclear weapons the issue is survival, not necessarily physically, but as a political entity. Military commanders are well aware of how many things can go wrong: failed intelligence, undetected warheads in an unexpected location. If Pakistan has two dozen nuclear weapons spread around and at least four or five India does not know about, is India going to attack and risk four or five warheads blowing up Indian cities? While the attack might not destroy India, what could be at stake that would be worth that price? It’s a risk to their regime, it’s a risk to rulers, and it’s a risk to the military. You don’t get much enthusiasm out of the military for fighting wars it’s going to lose.

Empirical studies prove no preemption. Bzostek 5 (Rachel, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. “WHY NOT PREEMPT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES ”, August, http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-06302005-104805/unrestricted/Bzostek_dis.pdf, ZBurdette)Anticipatory Military Activities: Do States Preempt? While there are a plethora of different factors that could influence the likelihood of a state’s using anticipatory military activities, a few generalizations can be made. For one, it appears that uncertainty, which underlies most of the concepts discussed above, and is applicable to both the capabilities and the intentions of the adversary, tends to increase, at least hypothetically, the probability of a state using anticipatory military activities to deal with threats posed by an adversary. This is primarily due to the

fact that states tend to expect the worst from their adversary. Or, in other words, as the adage goes, it’s better to be safe than sorry. But, is this actually the case? If uncertainty is truly as rampant and detrimental as many scholars suggest, and if taking anticipatory military action is seen as an effective tool for dealing with this uncertainty, one would expect to see states frequently employing these activities. But, as Reiter notes, for the most part states do not take anticipatory action. It is important to note that the absence of such actions does not necessarily imply a corresponding lack of uncertainty. To be sure, there are numerous different elements at play, all of which must be taken into consideration. However, it is also true that just as the influence of many of the international security concepts can be underestimated, they can also be overestimated, leaving a situation of partial understanding. In this respect, Chapters 6 through 8 seek to rectify at least part of this problem by integrating and including concepts from a variety of different sources, specifically, through adding legal and normative elements into the analysis. Several scholars have empirically tested various hypotheses about preemptive and preventive war using concepts and theories derived from the international security literature. While there is diversity vis-à-vis the explanatory variables used in these studies, there appears to be consensus with respect to the conclusions: states rarely use anticipatory military activities. Before discussing these conclusions, it is important to look at the different explanations and hypotheses tested in these studies.

No offensive use. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p16 Ajones


http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-06302005-104805/unrestricted/Bzostek_dis.pdf



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 44Although nuclear weapons are poor instruments tor blackmail, would they not provide a cheap and decisive offensive force when used against a conventionally armed enemy? Some people once thought that South Korea, and earlier, the Shah's Iran, wanted nuclear weapons for offensive use. Yet one can neither say why South Korea would use nuclear weapons against fellow Koreans while trying to reunite them nor how it could have used nuclear weapons against the North, knowing that China and the Soviet Union might have retaliated. And what goals might a conventionally strong Iran have entertained that would have tempted it to risk using nuclear weapons? A country that launches a strike has to fear a punishing blow from someone. Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense even against a nonnuclear state raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other states.



AT PREVENTATIVE STRIKESNo preventative warsSeng 98 (Jordan, Phd Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY for PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, P. 158-159, ZBurdette)Analysts are right to focus on these special dangers of Third World scenarios, but they are wrong to focus on them exclusively. Pessimistic analysts often stress those things which would seem to enable and encourage adversaries to execute preventative strikes on nuclear assets without acknowledging factors that complicate and discourage such strikers. On balance, preventative strikes are likely to be prohibitively difficult and dangerous for Third World preventers. If they do occur, they are likely to be done in such a way that nuclear

detonations will not be involved, and so collateral damage will be relatively limited. There are three reasons for these conclusions. One, by nature, preventative strikes against nuclear weapons programs are simply difficult to execute effectively, strategic distances being what they may. While it may be possible to destroy certain physical facilities associated with weapons development, it is extremely difficult to wipe-out the know-how behind them. Proliferators tend to be a determined lot, and though it may be possible to slow

down their efforts to acquire the bomb, it is very hard to truly eliminate their nuclear weapons capacities. As a result, it is likely that preventive strikes will have to be repeated by adversaries and, for reasons we shall discuss, prevention is likely to be increasingly difficult with each successive round of preventative strikes. Two, preventive strikes against nuclear weapons programs are getting more difficult as time goes by. The recent diaspora of ex-Soviet nuclear scientists and the growing willingness of the Chinese to provide nuclear aid, and the general increase in nuclear trade and assistance has resulted in an “internationalization” of nuclear weapons knowledge. Even if preventers do manage to wipe-out a proliferator’s know-how with a preventative strike, the proliferator is increasingly able to purchase expertise on the international market. Also, proliferators and would-be proliferators increasingly are taking steps to ‘harden’ their nuclear assets against preventive strikes and they thereby

further complicate prevention. Three, in any given situation of nuclear weapons development, the later it is in the proliferator’s weapons development program the greater the chance that the proliferator will have achieved some minimal nuclear weapons capability with which it can retaliate against preventers. That is, the closet proliferator is to achieving explosive capability, the greater the risk that it will be able to launch some limited nuclear retaliation. Because with Third World states even ‘limited’ retaliation with a handful of weapons can cause national devastation, this risk is especially severe for preventers in the Third World. Moreover, certain characteristics of Third World settings make it very difficult for would-be preventers to determine just how close to achieving weapons capability proliferators truly are. In such situations, preventive strikes are like rolls of the dice. These difficulties in determining proliferators’ location on the weapons development timeline, like the general difficulties in executing preventive strikes against nuclear assets, are likely to increase with each successive preventive strike the adversary is forced to make.

Political constraints check preventive warBzostek 5 (Rachel, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. “WHY NOT PREEMPT? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF ANTICIPATORY MILITARY ACTIVITIES ”, August, http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-06302005-104805/unrestricted/Bzostek_dis.pdf, ZBurdette)Van Evera, “If this political penalty is small, a military first-strike advantage still provides a general first-strike advantage.” But, on the other hand, “a large political penalty can outweigh even a large military first-strike advantage, converting a military success into a general politicalmilitary failure.” 143 The relative strength of each of these contrasting elements may be impacted by the intricacies and particularities of each crisis situation. However, due to the legal and normative uncertainties of anticipatory actions, allies of the would be preemptor/preventor may decide to withhold their support. Misperception can compound the difficulties inherent in deciding if a state should engage in anticipatory military activities. Betts

notes that while launching a first-strike “may be the only way to avoid the consequences of being struck first in the near

future”, in the real world, “it is rarely possible to be sure that the enemy preparations for war are definite, or are aggressively motivated, rather than precautionary reactions to rising tension and fear.” 144 Others examine if the regime type of a state impacts its propensity to use anticipatory military activities. Schweller argues that there are a variety of different factors that reduce the likelihood that democracies will use anticipatory military activities, and that these factors can help explain why different states respond to the same situations in different manners, i.e., why some states preempt while others do not. There are numerous attributes of democratic states that Schweller proposes predisposes these states away from using anticipatory military activities. For instance, Schweller extrapolates Kant’s position that




Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 46“public opinion inhibits democratic state actors from initiating wars expected to be of great risk and cost” to

apply to “preventive war, which by its nature is risky, since it is “an unprovoked war now to avoid the risks of war under worse

circumstances later.” 145 Other characteristics of democratic states that influence the use or non-use of anticipatory military

activities include the civilian control over the military (which serves to mitigate the “military’s institutional preference

for offensive doctrine”), 146 the knowledge that the next election is just around the corner and that wars often come with a substantial political cost and therefore “democratic elites require something more than the

assumption of a potential future threat based on the projection of an irreversible decline in relative power,” 147 and finally, there are the normative and “moral” constraints imposed by the “moral values of that society.” 148 Schweller does not

argue that democracies never employ anticipatory military activities, but rather that they are severely constrained with respect to which crises and situations will be conducive to their use.

nopeWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p18-19 AjonesA number of causes combined may account for the reluctance of states to strike in order to prevent adversaries from developing nuclear forces. A preventive strike is most promising during the first stage of nuclear

development. A state could strike without fearing that the country it attacked would be able to retum a nuclear blow. But would one country strike so hard as to destroy another country's potential for future nuclear development? lf it did not, the country struck could resume its nuclear career. If the blow struck is less than devastating, one must be prepared either to repeat it or to occupy and control the country. To do either would be forbiddingly difficult. In striking Iraq, Israel showed that a preventive strike can be made, something

that was not in doubt. lsrael's act and its consequences, however, made clear that the likelihood of useful accomplishment is low. lsrael's action increased the determination of Arabs to produce nuclear weapons. lsrael's strike, far from foreclosing Iraq's nuclear career, gained Iraq support from some other Arab states to pursue it. Despite Prime Minister Menachem Begin's vow to strike as often as need be, the risks in doing so would have risen with each occasion. A preemptive strike launched against a country that may have a small number of warheads is even less promising than a preventive strike during the first stage. If the country attacked has even a rudimentary nuclear capability, one's own severe punishment becomes possible. Nuclear foroes are seldom delicate because no state wants delicate forces, and nuclear forces can easily be made sturdy. Nuclear warheads can be fairly small and light, and they are easy to hide and to move. Even the Model-T bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were small enough to fit into a World War Il bomber. Early in the nuclear age, people worried about atomic bombs being concealed in packing boxes and placed in the holds of ships to be exploded when a signal was given. Now, more than ever, people worry about terrorists stealing nuclear warheads because various states have so many of them. Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs.Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are thought to be capable of.



AT RIVALRIES

Even bitter rivals are deterred by nuclear use Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p11 AjonesFirst, new nuclear states may come in hostile pairs and share a common border. Where states are bitter enemies one may fear that they will be unable to resist using their nuclear weapons against each other. This is a worry about the future that the past does not disclose. The Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, were hostile enough; and the latter pair shared a long border. Nuclear weapons caused China and the Soviet Union to deal cautiously with each other. But bitterness among some potential nuclear states, so it is said, exceeds that felt by the old ones. Playing down the bitterness sometimes felt by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China requires a creative reading of history. Moreover, those who believe that bitterness causes wars assume a close association that is seldom found between bitterness among nations and their willingness to run high risks.



AT THEFT/TERRORISM

NOPE – bunches of warrantsSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Third, analysts worry that Third World leaders might lose possession of their nuclear weapons. Third World states are plagued with high levels of domestic instability. Governments might lose control of their weapons through nuclear coup de tas; that is. rebel Factions could seize the weapons as part of a power grab.5 Rebels may not understand the command and control systems in place, which could compromise the effectiveness of the systems. Alternately, analysts suggest that Third World weapons might be stolen by terrorist groups. Third World states may not have electronic usecontrol and tamper-control devices that would help prevent weapons use by thieves. Some analysts suggest that organizational or financial limitations could translate into poor security at weapons storage or launch sites.6 Third World proliferators will have two important advantages in terms of command and control that help alleviate the concems of analysts. One, because their arsenals will be so small, their launch bureaucracies and control organizations can be very small. Third World proliferators may well cultivate positive control by delegating launch capability to peripheral commanders, And / or the lack of electronic use-control devices may make it difficult for central commanders to physically

prevent peripheral commanders from launching weapons inappropriately. However. the limited numbers of weapons in Third World arsenals will mean that there need not be more than a handful of peripheral launch commanders. There may be more than one "˜finger on the button' in Third World nuclear states, but not many more. Peripheral commanders can be carefully screened and tightly supervised by central command. Moreover,

because the numbers of personnel involved in nuclear launches will be very small. Third World

proliferators will not suffer the dangers of large and complicated organizational routines and standard operating procedures that plagued the superpowers. The organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even ifa few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite and unambiguous decision to press that button. Finally, small arsenals are also easy to secure from thieves and terrorists. The requirements of securing small arsenals are not likely to overburden the resources of Third World states.

No terror / stolen – MAD theory but smaller scaleSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Fears concerning the nuclear coup d’etat can be mitigated through consideration of the strategic goals of domestic combatants and the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. First, while there may be some symbolic significance to a rebel group gaining possession of a government`s nuclear weapons, one wonders how such a development could translate into political currency. A rebel group that steals a few nuclear weapons is then threatening the very society whose loyalty it seeks to win with nuclear possession. There is a

certain amount of prestige associated with the possession of advanced weaponry, but such prestige would seem to be outweighed by the threatening nature of such weaponry. This brings up a second and more general point concerning the strategic usefulness of nuclear weapons in domestic disputes. As Waltz writes. "What is hard to comprehend is why, in an internal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for gaining or maintaining contro1?"'6 Waltz's point is most valid in situations in which combatants are vying for control over the same territory: the use of nuclear weapons in such a dispute would be tantamount to destroying the very thing which each side Finds valuable. To a

somewhat lesser degree, the same logic applies to situations involving separatist groups seeking to wrest a piece of territory away from a central government." are most often based on ethnic identities or traditional people groupings. An ethnic group whose territory has been subsumed into a central government is likely to

spread throughout the larger state to some degree. Separatist militaries may thus Find it hard to fire nuclear weapons that could destroy numbers of their "˜own people.` Of course, depending on boundaries and geography, nuclear fallout from an attack against the central state may well cause deaths within the breakaway territory itself On the other hand, if the distribution of ethnic populations and the boundaries of break-away territories do not prevent separatists from using nuclear weapons against the central state. then it is also probable that the central state will have no reason not to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the separatists. In other words. a mutual deterrence situation could quickly obtain. and nuclear use and spill-over conflagrations would seem unlikely. With regard to spill-over conflagrations themselves, analysts' suggestions that civil nuclear conflicts will spill-over into regional disputes are underspecified. By what chain of events might this occur? It is unlikely that an adversarial state would behave aggressively against a nuclear proliferator during a domestic upheaval because it is precisely at that point that the proliferator would be most desperate-most threatened by incursions,


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 49most unable to respond with purely conventional rebuffs, and most likely to lose negative control of its weapons. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that a state preoccupied with domestic upheaval would embark on nuclear escapades abroad. Perhaps it might be suggested that separatist groups would attack third parties to draw them into the fray-to get other states to apply pressure to the central state government to end the conflict to the separatists' liking. Perhaps, but such an action would seem like a huge gamble to take for the sake of a

little added political pressures against the central state. Any state or sub-state that uses nuclear weapons in an attack-especially an attack as unprovoked as one aimed at drawing a third party bystander into a civil dispute-risks nuclear retaliation either by the targeted state or some other state concerned with protecting the international community (for instance, a large, advanced nuclear power like the U.S. might consider an overwhelming counterforce strike against a state or group that had such disregard of life that it had attacked a third party bystander for political purposes). In any case. nuclear use against third parties is likely to result in the most intense forms of political, commercial and strategic isolation, and therefore is not the sort of policy a young, break-away government would normally favor.

Terrorists have no motivation for a nuclear attackWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Journal What about non–state actors? Can nuclear weapons deter terrorists? Waltz Well, first you need an address; you have to know whom you are retaliating against. Oddly enough, as the number of terrorist incidents–worldwide and in the United States–has decreased, our concern with terrorism has increased. Former CIA Director John Deutch said that in 1996 alone, the United States experienced the lowest number of terrorist incidents in the last twenty–five years. That is rather striking. Journal Will terrorists themselves seek to acquire nuclear weapons? Waltz Would they want them? I think that the answer is no. Terrorists have always been in the position where they could have done more damage than they have chosen to inflict. As Brian Jenkins, one of the great experts on terrorism, said a long time ago: “Terrorists want more people watching, not more people dead.” They are trying to make a point. They are fighting what looks to be a weak and hopeless cause, and they adopt these drastic measures because they do not have the strength to make their cases in an acceptable fashion.

FalseSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]

In short. nuclear weapons would not be very useful in domestic disputes for either symbolic or strategic purposes, and thus it is unlikely that domestic combatants will compromise negative control of weapons by fighting over them. With some straining, one can imagine situations in which nuclear weapons might be used in battles of national separation. but even then their use is not likely to result in intemational conflagration. One might add that unstable states are unlikely to achieve nuclear weapons capability in the first place. As Waltz suggests.

Small arsenals solve. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]First, limited nuclear proliferators will have very small nuclear arsenals. This in itself will greatly aid in the security of nuclear weapons. There will only be a handful of weapons to guard. It is unlikely that any state's organizational or financial resources will be stretched too thin by the security requirements of a few dozen nuclear weapons. Personnel for guarding such a small number of weapons can be hand-picked, and screened for loyalty and competence (just as all personnel for controlling nuclear

weapons in states with small arsenals can be hand-picked and highly trained). Also, deployment of those few weapons in Third World states is not likely to be far-flung or complicated. Third World proliferators do not have to worry about safeguarding weapons in foreign countries like the U.S. did. Neither do Third World states

have to worry about weapons on submarines, aircraft carriers or destroyers. In addition, Waltz has suggested that because Third World states will need long lead times to develop large arsenals, leaders will have lots of time to learn proper control and security on small arsenals that will not place much demand on their limited organizational and financial resources. [9 His argument is sound enough as far as it



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 50goes. However, as I made clear in chapter two, it is highly unlikely that Third World states will ever buildup arsenals beyond very small numbers of weapons. Limited nuclear proliferators in the Third World will enjoy the advantages of having to secure only small numbers of weapons; they will probably get better at it over time, and the growth of their arsenals-if there is growth-will not outstrip their resources.

Nope – if there was terrorism – there’d be more controlSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Second, if a state suffers from an unstable domestic scene, one would expect it to be more worried about weapons security, not less worried. It is unlikely that Third World nuclear stares will compromise their weapons security out of negligence. lf a government suffers from separatist agitation, for instance. given limited nuclear proliferators' ability to hand-pick control and security personnel, one would expect central governments to exclude operators of questionable_ loyalty from the "˜loo p.' Such exclusive patterns are seen in militaries in many unstable or potentially unstable states. Saddam Hussein reserves his best equipment and most sensitive tasks For his elite Red Guard troops. Most of the more

sensitive resources of the Yugoslavian army were kept in the hand of Serbians by the Serbdominated central government before the national break-up.



AT UNEQUAL PROLIFUnequal prolif means no retaliationSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 116]In situations of Third World proliferation. it may not always be the case that nuclear deterrence scenarios involve more than one nuclear power. In cases in which the nuclear deterrer has a nuclear monopoly, retaliatory capability will not be as large a problem. There may still be costs associated with using nuclear weapons, such as political costs or financial costs that come with condemnation by the world community, but such costs are not likely to affect retaliatory credibility provided that the need to use them is clear. That is, in the

moment of pending conflict or actual battle, aggressors would have to assume that security interests would overwhelm deterrers' worries about condemnation from the world community. Still, as argued in chapter

two, international sanctions are quite meaningful to economically vulnerable Third World states, which helps to explain the whole phenomena of opacity. Even for developing countries, however, sanctions must take a

back seat to security in the instance of conflict. For Third World proliferators that have a nuclear monopoly vis-a-vis

their primary adversary/ adversaries, retaliatory credibility will be less of a problem than it was for the superpowers. But there are other reasons to expect Third World proliferators to have an easier time with retaliatory credibility, even in situation in which they do not enjoy a nuclear monopoly.

2nd Strike capability allows deterrence to work even between misbalanced forces Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p24-25 AjonesOne may nevertheless wonder whether retaliatory threats remain credible if the strategic forces of the attacker are superior to those of the attacked. Will an un~ successful defender in a conventional war have the courage to unleash its deterrent force, using nuclear weapons lirst against a country having superior strategic forces? Once more this asks the wrong question. The would-be attacker will ask itself, not whose forces are numerically superior, but whether a grossly provoca-tive act might bring nuclear warheads down on itself. When vital interests are at stake, all of the parties involved are strongly constrained to be moderate because one's immoderate behavior makes the nuclear threats of others credible. With deterrent forces, the question is not whether one country has more than another but whether it has the capability of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on another, with "unacceptable" sensibly defined. Given second-strike capabilities, it is not the balance of forces but the possibility that they may be used that counts. The balance or imbalance of strategic forces affects neither the calculation of danger nor the question of whose will is the stronger. Second-strike forces have to be seen in absolute terms.



PROLIF GOOD – BW SHIFT

Solving nuclear prolif causes a shift to bio-weapons.Cordesman ’00 (Anthony, Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment – CSIS, Federal News Service, 3-28, L/N)New, critical technologies are escaping our control One of the problems I have noticed in US government efforts to analyze proliferation is that they focus on past and current threats. As result, our studies tend to give

primary weight to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology , medicine, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, however, are making it progressively easier to manufacture biological weapons with nuclear lethalities, to do so under breakout conditions, and do so with little

or no warning of the precise nature of the threat. The engines and guidance systems needed for cruise missiles are becoming industrial devices like GPS, sensor-triggered fuses, cluster munitions, drones, crop sprayers, cellular phones interaction with the steady growth in global commerce, shipping, and labor migration to make covert and proxy attacks steadily more effective. Ironically, controlling ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons alone tends to simply push proliferation into other weapons systems and modes of delivery.

Bioweapon use causes extinction.Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm.In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still

is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a so-called

nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as "On the Beach," was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the

combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may

pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined

with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori

known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is achieved.



EXTS – STOPPING PROLIF → BW

Preventing proliferation encourages biological weapon acquisition.Zilinskas 2000 –Clinical Microbiologist and Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program (Raymond A., “Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense,” p. 1-2, Google Books)It is an odd characteristic of biological weapons that military generals tend to view them with distaste, but civilian bioscientists often have lobbied for their development and deployment. There are, of course, understandable reasons for this oddity; generals find that these weapons do not fit neatly into tactical or strategic military doctrines of attack or defense, whereas researchers have observed that transforming microbes into weapons presents interesting scientific challenges whose solution governments have been willing to pay well for. Another oddity is that whenever biological weapons have been employed in battle, they have proven militarily ineffectual, yet bellicose national leaders persevere in seeking to

acquire them. There is also a facile explanation for this anomaly, namely, that although pathogens are all too willing to invade prospective hosts, human ingenuity so far has failed to devise reliable methods for effectively conveying a large number of pathogens to the population targeted for annihilation by disease. This repeated failure has not

deterred leaders; again and again they become allured by the potential destructive power of biological weapons. Perhaps trusting science too much, they direct government scientists to develop them, believing that this time a usable weapon of mass destruction will be achieved. Their belief so far has been thwarted, but is it possible that within the foreseeable future the potential of biological weapons will be realized and that the effect of a biological bomb, missile, or aerosolized cloud can be as readily predetermined as that of a bomb or missile carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead? There are many who believe that today's bioscientists and chemical engineers working in unison and wielding the techniques of molecule biology developed since the early 1970s could, if so commanded, develop militarily effective biological weapons within a fairly short time. If this

supposition is correct, our perception of biological weapons as being undependable, uncontrollable, and unreliable must change. The reason is simple: if these weapons are demonstrated to possess properties that make it possible for commanders to effect controlled, confined mass destruction on command, all governments would be forced to construct defenses against them and some undoubtedly would be tempted to arm their military with these weapons that would be both powerful and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Ironically, as tougher international controls are put into place to deter nations from seeking to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons, leaders may be even more drawn to biological arms as the most accessible form of weapon of mass destruction. Before beginning a consideration of the implications of molecular biology for biological warfare (BW) and defense, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of microbiology. It has passed through two eras, and we presently are in its third era. The first was the “pre-Pasteur” era; when the underlying science of fermentation was unknown, so microbiology was applied strictly on an empirical basis. Although undoubtedly any fine beers and wines, as well as breads and other fermented foods, were produced through the use of empirically developed fermentation techniques, no finely controlled production of chemicals was possible. During this era, BW was also empirically based. Common tactics included contaminating water sources with bloated animal carcasses and catapulting infected cadavers into citadels (Poupard and Miller, 1992).



NUCLEAR DETERRENCE GOOD – CBW ATTACKS

Presence of nuclear weapons prevents a CBW attack. Muthiah Alagappa, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University “Reinforcing National Security and Regional Stability The Implications if Nuclear Weapons and

Strategies,” The Long Shadow, 2009, p. 487

The primary function of nuclear weapons in the Asian security region is basic deterrence-that is, preventing large-scale conventional attack and deterring any form of nuclear attack against the homeland of a nuclear weapon state. China, Russia, India, and Pakistan all see nuclear weapons as essential to balance and deter stronger powers that threaten or might threaten their interests and to preserve policy autonomy in a context of American dominance and a rising China and India. The United States views nuclear weapons as necessary for contingencies involving China and to deter Russia if relations with that country deteriorate. It is unclear if the U.S. nuclear arsenal has a counterforce role against Russia and China and if it is developing BMD against both these countries. Even if the United States were successful in developing these capabilities, the political purposes for which it would use them is unclear. Some states see a role for nuclear weapons to deter chemical and biological attacks on their homelands as well. And some countries have attempted to deploy nuclear weapons in coercive diplomacy, war fighting, and strategic defense roles. In 1999, Pakistan engaged in coercive diplomacy by exploiting the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In response, India too engaged in coercive diplomacy and explored limited war under nuclear conditions. In its 2002 NPR (U.S. Department of Defense 2002), the United States indicated a shift in emphasis from deterrence to offensive and defensive strategies. The ensuing discussion of nuclear policies and strategies of relevant states and their behavior in conflict situations reveals the limitations of the offensive and defensive roles of nuclear weapons and highlights basic deterrence as the most important role for nuclear weapons



BIOWEAPONS O/W NUCLEAR WAR

Bioweapons outweigh nuclear war -- short circuits deterrence. Kellman 08 (Barry, Professor of Law, Director, International Weapons Control Center, International Human Rights Law Institute @ DePaul U., Futurist, May 2008, “Bioviolence: A Growing Threat,” http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/31535413/Bioviolence-A-Growing-Threat)According to the National Academies of Science, "The threat spectrum is broad and evolving – in some ways predictably, in other ways unexpectedly. In the future, genetic engineering and other technologies may lead to the development of pathogenic organisms with unique, unpredictable characteristics." For as far into the future as we can possibly see, every passing day it becomes slightly easier to commit a vio lent catastrophe than it was the day before. Indeed, the rapid pace of advancing science helps explain why policies to prevent such a catastrophe are so complicated. Bioviolence Jihad? Some experts argue that terrorists and fanatics are not interested in bioviolence and that the danger might therefore be overblown. Since there have been no catastrophic bioviolence attacks, these experts argue, terrorists lack the intention to make bioweapons. Hopefully,

they are correct. But an enormous amount of evidence suggests they are wrong. From the dawn of biology's ability to isolate pathogens, people have pursued hostile applications of biological agents. It is perilous to ignore this extensive history by presuming that today's villains are not fervent about weaponizing disease. Not a single state admits to having a bioweapons program, but U.S. intelligence officials assert that as many as 10 states might have active programs, including North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Moreover, many terrorist organizations have expressed interest in acquiring biological weapons. Whatever weight the taboo against inflicting disease might have for nation-states, it is obviously irrelevant to terrorists, criminals, and lunatics. Deterrence by threat of retaliation is essentially meaningless for groups with suicidal inclinations who are likely to intermingle with innocent civilians. Al-Qaeda and affiliated Islamic fundamentalist organizations have abling them to spread in regions where there is no natural immunity. The polio virus has been synthesized from scratch; its creators called it an "animate chemical." Soon, it may be resynthesized into a form that is contagious even among vaccinated populations. Recreation of long-eradicated livestock diseases could ravage herds severely lacking in genetic diversity, damage food supplies, and cause devastating economic losses. Perhaps the greatest biothreat is the manipulation of the flu and other highly contagious viruses, such as Ebola. Today, scientists can change parts of a virus's genetic material so that it can perform specific functions. The genomic sequence of the Spanish flu virus that killed upwards of 40 million people nearly a century ago has been widely published; any savvy scientist could reconstruct it. The avian flu is even more lethal, albeit not readily contagious via casual aerosol delivery. A malevolent bio- scientist might augment its contagiousness. The Ebola virus might be manipulated so that it kills more slowly, allowing it to be spread farther before its debilitating effects altogether consume its carrier. A bit further off is genetic manipulation of the measles virus--one of the great killers in human history--rendering useless the immunizations that most of us receive in early childhood. Soon, laboratory resynthesis of smallpox may be possible. Advanced drug delivery systems can be used to disseminate lethal agents to broad populations. Bio- regulators--small organic compounds that modify body systems-- could enhance targeted delivery technologies. Some experts are concerned that new weapons could be aimed at the immune, neurological, and neuroendocrine systems. Nanotechnology that lends itself to mechanisms for advanced disease detection and drug delivery--such as gold nanotubes that can administer drugs directly into a tumor--could also deliver weaponized agents deep into the body, substantially raising the weapon's effectiveness. Altogether, techniques that were on the frontiers of science only a decade or two ago are rapidly mutating A looming danger confronts the world--the threat of bioviolence. It is a danger that will only grow in the future, yet we are increasingly failing to confront it. With every passing day, committing a biocatastrophe becomes a bit easier, and this condition will perpetuate for as long as science progresses. Biological warfare is as old as conflict, of course, but in terms of the objectives of traditional warfare-- gaining territory or resources, compelling the surrender of an opposing army--biological weapons weren't very effective. If the objective is to inflict mass death and panic on a mixed population, however, emerging bioweapons offer remarkable potential. We would be irresponsible to presume that radical jihadists like al- Qaeda have ignored said potential.

Bio-weapons use outweighs and turns nuclear war. Alexander, 2007 (Timothy, Former Scottish Editor of Burke’s Peerage, B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies, October 22nd, “War On Iran = You Die from Biowar”, Op Ed News, http://www.opednews.com/articles/genera_lord_sti_071020_war_on_iran__3d_you_di.htm, ajones)We have been conditioned, by seeing films of mushroom clouds and images of nuclear destruction in Japan at the end of WWII, to have some understanding of the horrific effects of a nuclear war. We have NOT been conditioned to understand the

effects of Twenty-first Century advanced biological war. The kill numbers are very similar, just with biowar you don't get the "big bangs", the mushroom clouds, the nuclear bombers, the ICBMs, etc. Just sub-microscopic genetically engineered super killer viruses that we have absolutely no defense against, delivered in

secret, with a slow horrifying unstoppable migration through the global human population. All the fear of a

naturally mutated form of "bird flu" that might kill tens of millions is simply "child's play" compared to multiple designer military

viruses that are built to kill in the many hundreds of millions to billions of people globally. It costs approximately US$1 million to kill one person with nuclear weapons-of-mass destruction but only approximately US$1 to kill one person with biological weapons-of-mass destruction. Bioweapons are truly the "poor man's nukes". The Iranians are known to have a biological weapons program and they, and their allies, certainly have the means to deliver biowar agents into the Israeli and European and North American homelands. Bioweapons do not have to be dispersed via missiles or bombs, they are perfect for non-traditional normally non-military delivery systems. Being very small (there are, for example, typically approximately 40 million bacterial cells in


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 57every gram of soil and massively more viruses in the same gram), they lend themselves to an enormous variety of non-detectable methodologies for delivery and use in war, both regionally and globally. What is being missed here, with all the talk of Iran developing nuclear weapons or not (depending on one's viewpoint), is that Iran is already a state that possesses WMD. HELLO, ANY WAR WITH IRAN IS HIGHLY APT TO INVOLVE LARGE SCALE DEATHS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN WMD THREAT. Hello again, this means that YOU...the person reading this...is apt to die from biowar in event of a war with Iran! We are in a MAD....mutually assured destruction....pre-war state with Iran, just as we are with Russia and and to a lessor extent with China when it comes to nuclear weapons. A famous line from the movie "Wargames" (referring to engaging in nuclear war and the odds of "winning" such a war) is "the only winning move is not to play". Sad to say, this does not seem to have any bearing on the apocalyptic strategy of the neocon push for war with Iran. The nature of biowar is that it is a "gift that keeps on giving". Once released, advanced recombination DNA based viral bioweapons will continue to spread and kill and kill ....regardless if Iran (and its ally Syria) are but a sea of green radioactive glass devoid of all life. With advanced biowar agents, it is not the quantity that counts but the quality; humans themselves become the vectors and delivery systems of the bioweapons. It does not require large amounts of weapons running into the millions or billions of tons of high explosives; nor does it require ICBMs and cruise missiles and $100 million dollar warplanes to deliver the bioweapons. A very small group of human assets, prepositioned with small amounts of easily hidden biowar weapons (submicroscopic viruses), in the Middle East, Europe, Canada, and America can begin the process that will result in the deaths of hundreds of millions or even billions of human beings. When you get right down to it, does it matter if you die from some exotic bioengineered hemorrhagic fever or from radiation poisoning/nuclear blast .......dead is still dead. To begin to

understand the truly horrific nature of the biowar threat, one only has to look to history for some "mild" examples. The Black Death bubonic pandemic, believed caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, is estimated to have killed between a third and two-thirds of Europe's population after it spread to Europe in 1347 from South-western/Central Asia. Yersinia pestis, being a bacteria is massive when compared to a virus, and is easily treated with modern antibiotics. However, the Soviet Union's Biopreparat

organization turned Black Death from a medieval plague into a 20th Century bioweapon. The Yersinia pestis bacteria was

exposed to every then-known antibiotic, in a process that any advanced high school or early undergraduate college level

biology class student could undertake, and the resulting antibiotic resistant Y. pestis was bred and loaded into a small number of Soviet ICBMs aimed at America. The resistant Y. pestis had also been exposed to various levels of radiation to "radiation harden" the bacteria. The intent was to hit American survivors of a nuclear war with a new and untreatable form of Black Death that itself could survive the effects of nuclear fallout. As frighting as a totally antibiotic resistant Yersinia pestis bacteria is, it remains "child's play" compared to the more advanced recombination DNA technology used in most biowar programs. This typically involves the recombining of viral DNA into new virus, "designer virus". The Soviets, years ago, engineered a new virus that combined elements of Smallpox and Ebola. With the genetic engineering of viruses those doing the "designing" can engineer into the virus a wide number of different characteristics. For instance, an advanced hemorrhagic fever can be designed to be: airborne (capable of being transmitted via sneezing), with a very small amount of viral material required to infect a human host, with a incubation period of 14 days or longer, with most of the incubation period that is both highly contagious and at best looks like a mild version of the common cold, with the resulting hemorrhagic fever having a mortality of 90% or more. The same technology can be used to create a large number of different viruses which can all be released on a target population at the same time, vastly complicating detection and containment and treatment programs. In fact the normal research and development process used in genetic engineering results in a large number of different new viruses. Those nations not directly involved in a strike upon Iran, that is most of the rest of the world, will nevertheless face massive deaths within their nations...they will lose more of their citizens to the war, that we are about to unleash, than they lost in World War II and ALL THE OTHER WARS IN HISTORY COMBINED. Needless to say, this will have a profound effect on their actions towards those nations who have started the mess in the first place. The global military, political, economic, and medical chaos resulting from global biowar will make the use of nuclear weapons a likely outcome as America, the United Kingdom, France and other nations starting the war will be seen as out-of-control "mad dogs" who have unleashed World War III. The Book of Revelations speaks of one-third of the world dying, in the Final Battle, from plague ....biowar; and another one-third of the world dying from "wormwood"....which we now know to be nuclear war effects ...Chernobyl, which comes from the Ukrainian word "chornobyl", translates into wormwood (or its close relative mugwort). (Chernobyl is the site of a massive uncontrolled nuclear meltdown disaster in the Ukraine on the 26th of April 1986). We are in a period of extreme danger to us all. Even more dangerous than the Cuban Missile Crisis of the 60s. Yet far too many people are so uneducated as to the real dangers from advanced Twenty-first Century biowar that they are totally blind to the profound risk to their own lives.

Bioweapons cause extinction and outweigh nuclear war. Steinbruner, Senior Fellow & Chair of International Security at the Brookings Institution, 1997 (John, “Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses,” Foreign Policy, December 22)Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs

immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 58pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population



PROLIF GOOD – SATELLITES

Proliferation causes satellite surveillance expansion.Norris ‘7 (Pat, Space Strategy Manager – Logica UK, “Spies in the sky: surveillance satellites in war and peace”, p. 169-170, Google Print)Surveillance satellites that are specifically military in nature are operated by seven countries, namely Russia, the US, France, Japan, Germany, China, and Britain (although Britain's is only a technology

demonstrator satellite, not an operational system). The impetus for new countries to build these satellites has come from the fragmentation of the world's military threats since the end of the Cold War. Where before the main threat was a US-Soviet confrontation--either directly or via satellite states--military forces from the developed countries are now involved in actions around the globe. The proliferation of missile and nuclear technology has

also motivated countries to have an autonomous satellite-monitoring capability. Japan's decision to build a fleet of radar and visible imaging satellites stems from concerns about the missile tests undertaken by North Korea.

That’s key to the global environmentReibaldi, 1995 [Giuseppe, European Space Agency, Acta Astronautica, “Contribution ofSpace Activities to Peace”, 35:8, ScienceDirect]The 1970s have seen the rise of ecological movements, originating from the view of the fragile Earth, as photographed by the Apollo astronauts on the way to the Moon. The human species already consumes or destroys 40% of all energy produced by terrestrial photosynthesis, that is, 40% of the food potentially available to living things on land. Predictions for the future indicate that tropical

forests will continue to be destroyed, arable land will shrink because of the top soil pollution that cannot be repaired. The control of the environment is no longer the issue of a single state but its implication is international, so it requires close monitoring to avoid disputes in this matter, eventually generating situations of conflict. Governments realized that pollution had reached unsurpassed levels and after several years of futile discussions they agreed on several environmental treaties which limited the use of substances which proved to be dangerous to the environment (i.e. Montreal Accord which seeks to limit the global emission of CFCs to protect the ozone layer). The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was a significant step in this direction, since it was attended by Heads of State and Government. Delegates from rich and poor countries participating in the Rio Conference worked out agreements to protect bio- diversity, control carbon dioxide emission and slow deforestation. Those agreements require verification in order to be credible and binding for the countries which adhere to it. Earth observing satellites can bring awareness of any violation of environmental treaties as an independent source of information. For example, the European Space Agency’s Earth Remote

Sensing 1 (ERS-1) satellite can detect, by day and by night, river pollution and identify the potential responsible, or oil leakage generated by a transport ship which is washing its tanks in international waters. Furthermore, space technology can provide easier access to “soft technology” such as education and health care as well as “hard technology” such as telecommunication and discovery of natural resources and this will help developing countries in achieving a policy of sustainable development.

Extinction.Cairns, 2004[John, Department of Biology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. “Future of Life on Earth,” Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, www.int-res.com/esepbooks/EB2Pt2.pdf]One lesson from the five great global extinctions is that species and ecosystems come and go, but the evolutionary process continues. In short, life forms have a future on Earth, but humankind’s future depends on its stewardship of ecosystems that favor Homo sapiens. By practicing sustainability ethics, humankind can protect and preserve ecosystems that have services favorable to it. Earth has reached its present state through an

estimated 4550 million years and may last for 15000 million more years. The sixth mass extinction, now underway, is unique because humankind is a major contributor to the process. Excessive damage to the ecological life support system will markedly alter civilization, as it is presently known, and might even

result in human extinction. However, if humankind learns to live sustainably, the likelihood of leaving a habitable planet for posterity will dramatically increase. The 21st century represents a defining moment for humankind—will present generations become good ancestors for their descendants by living sustainably or will they leave a less habitable planet for posterity by continuing to live unsustainably?



PROLIF SLOW

Proliferation will be slow and will not cause instability or terrorism -- their impacts are fabricated as the result of political and economically motivated scaremongering.Steve Kidd, June 8 2010. Head of Strategy & Research at the World Nuclear Association, where he has worked since 1995 [when it was the Uranium Institute]. (“Nuclear proliferation risk - is it vastly overrated?” June 8, 2010 Nuclear Engineering International, Lexis, Ajones)A significant amount of media attention has recently attached itself to the nuclear security meeting convened by US president Barack Obama and the five-yearly review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which followed soon afterwards. The fear of so-called 'rogue nations' acquiring nuclear weapons, or terrorist organisations creating outrages by misuse of nuclear materials, clearly remains strong. Many column inches also continue to be devoted to various North Korean nuclear activities and to Iran's alleged intentions to pursue a weapons programme. There therefore remains a fear that this may cast a shadow over the nuclear renaissance, particularly as many people clearly believe that nuclear energy and bombs are merely two faces of the same coin. But it is surely not unreasonable to question whether these fears are being substantially inflated and possibly manipulated by various interest groups in order to suit their own purposes. There is, however, no doubt that nuclear materials could conceivably be diverted from a civil nuclear power programme into the production of nuclear weapons or alternatively, major fuel cycle processes (notably enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel) could be employed to produce weapons rather than fuel for civil reactors. Similarly, it is understandable that concerns over the security of civil nuclear facilities have multiplied since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. The possibility of aircraft crashing into such plants has naturally now been raised, as have possible terrorist incursions at plants either to acquire materials for weapons or to misuse the facility to create an explosion or a major radioactive release (see also 'Security since September 11th,' NEI March 2010, pp 14-9]. Rather like the risks of operating nuclear power plants themselves, these possibilities largely boil down to assessing very low probability events which may have big consequences. Human beings are notoriously bad at this and frequently reach what seem to be illogical conclusions. This is highlighted by a recent book by a US academic, John Mueller,

Atomic Obsession-Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (ISBN No 978-0195381368). Mueller argues very persuasively (but certainly also controversially) that the impact of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated both in terms of their likely destructive power (in the hands of any party other than

one of the five recognised nuclear weapons states) but also in their real impact on human history since 1945. He

emphasizes how slow proliferation of weapons has been in reality, partly because the difficulties of acquiring nuclear materials and developing weapons technology are much greater than commonly stated, but also because all but a few countries have no real interest in acquiring weapons, as they make little sense beyond supposedly increasing national prestige. Similarly, the task of the atomic terrorist is far from simple. If it were as easy as many people claim, why haven't there been any incidents, even when the controls on nuclear materials were far looser than today? And why do terrorist incidents (with the possible exception of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) usually involve low tech methods, such as people attaching bombs to themselves or taking over commercial airlines armed with box cutters and

then flying them into prominent buildings? There may not be, in reality, any substantive black market in nuclear materials, despite the stories we regularly hear of nuclear trafficking. The comparison sometimes made with narcotic

drugs is not reasonable; although drug seizures are known to be the tip of a very large iceberg, controls on the production, trade and transport of nuclear materials are much stiffer and potential buyers are very limited in

number. First, security considerations have been addressed by deploying additional armed personnel at facilities and by other measures to prevent incursions, while new nuclear plants are designed with the possibility of an aircraft impact much in mind. Although such events are clearly not impossible, the entire 50-year history of civil nuclear power contains nothing to suggest that the risks are other than very remote. Little can be done other than what has been accomplished already and the risks should certainly not be allowed to dominate the assessment of potential future actions. Indeed, critics of nuclear power are very

bad at keeping things in perspective and fail to apply similar degrees of scrutiny to other plans. For example, should football stadiums not be licensed for 80,000 fans, simply because a direct aircraft strike during a game could conceivably kill many thousands? Should the walls of the stadium have to be several metres thick? Proliferation of nuclear materials and technology and their integration into weapons are notably more substantive risks, particularly as they will likely involve sovereign states with their greater resources above those of a terrorist organisation. Critics of nuclear power emphasise that designing a nuclear bomb itself is not particularly difficult (even if, as Mueller emphasises, actually manufacturing and delivering a weapon certainly is). So much of the world anti-proliferation regime is based on controls on fissile materials; if the necessary plutonium or highly enriched uranium is not available either by diversion from civil uses or production in a local facility, a weapon is impossible. It is therefore necessary for nuclear power critics to focus on alleged weaknesses in the international nuclear safeguards regime or in the security of nuclear materials transport, plus the possible spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries who may have an interest beyond normal civil uses. While there is no room for complacency, the real risks are actually as remote as those


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 63associated with nuclear facility security and mean that attempts to stiffen safeguards even further will encounter reasonable objections. Nevertheless, over the past 35 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. Most countries have indeed renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possessing of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA, complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG). Safeguards require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. The aim is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments. All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards, while facility-specific safeguards apply in the five weapons states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel). Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iran has allegedly set up equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade (see also 'Figuring out Fordow,' NEI March 2010, pp20-2]. North Korea used research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lies in the fact that no obvious diversion of material has been involved. In both countries, the uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the countries themselves built the nuclear facilities concerned, without being declared or placed under safeguards arrangements. The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation has traditionally rested with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full NPT safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. This is the argument for moving to some kind of intrinsic proliferation resistance in the fuel cycle, where there are a number of ideas, previously floated many years ago, which keep on being revamped. One key principle is that the assurance of non-proliferation must be linked to assurance of supply and services in the nuclear fuel cycle to any country embracing nuclear power. Various proposals for fuel banks and multinational fuel cycle centres may aim to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel and services for bona fide uses, thereby removing the incentive for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Yet there is clearly a risk here of dividing the world into 'good guys' and 'bad guys,' in a politically discriminatory way. Already, some international fuel

cycle proposals have raised the ire of major developing countries like Brazil and South Africa. The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them , largely claiming to have

nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are castigated as being in the industry's pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if they impose additional costs on the industry. It is likely that more countries will foolishly choose to acquire nuclear weapons.

Prolif is inevitable, slow, and stabilizing—no offenseTepperman 9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Editor Foreign Affairs and Assistant Managing Editors Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb”, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html, ZBurdette)These efforts are all grounded in the same proposition: that, as Obama has said several times, nuclear weapons represent the "gravest threat" to U.S. security. This argument has a lot going for it. It's strongly intuitive, as anyone who's ever seen pictures of Hiroshima or Nagasaki knows. It's also popular; U.S. presidents have been making similar noises since the Eisenhower administration, and halting the spread of nukes (if not eliminating them altogether) is one of the few things Obama, Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, and Benjamin Netanyahu can all agree on. There's just one problem with the reasoning: it may well be wrong. A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states and transnational terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But that's a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy. Obama's idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But it's not even clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustn't be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke-free planet) that's both unrealistic and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just


http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 64stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of

political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to

start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with

the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it,

"Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?" Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling, it's led to what's known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in which all the world's major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitou s ly. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and there's very good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is fundamentally reassuring—because in each instance, very different leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the

Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on, "It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both

sides realized that, maybe for the first time." The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear-armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction didn't do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides have never fought another war, despite severe provocations (like Pakistani-based terrorist attacks on

India in 2001 and 2008). They have skirmished once. But during that flare-up, in Kashmir in 1999, both countries were careful to keep the fighting limited and to avoid threatening the other's vital interests. Sumit Ganguly, an Indiana University professor and coauthor of the forthcoming India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, has found that on both sides, officials' thinking was strikingly similar to that of the Russians and Americans in 1962. The prospect of war brought Delhi and Islamabad face to face with a nuclear holocaust, and leaders in each country did what they had to do to avoid it. Nuclear pessimists—and there are many—insist that even if this pattern has held in the past, it's crazy to rely on it in the future, for several reasons. The first is that today's

nuclear wannabes are so completely unhinged, you'd be mad to trust them with a bomb. Take the sybaritic Kim Jong Il, who's never missed a chance to demonstrate his battiness, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and promised the destruction of Israel, and who, according to some respected Middle East scholars, runs a messianic martyrdom cult that would welcome nuclear obliteration. These regimes are the ultimate rogues, the thinking goes—and there's no deterring rogues. But are Kim and Ahmadinejad really scarier and crazier than were Stalin and Mao? It might look that way from Seoul or Tel Aviv, but history says otherwise. Khrushchev, remember, threatened to "bury" the United States, and in 1957, Mao blithely declared that a nuclear war with America wouldn't be so bad

because even "if half of mankind died … the whole world would become socialist." Pyongyang and Tehran support terrorism—but so did Moscow and Beijing. And as for seeming suicidal, Michael Desch of the University of Notre Dame

points out that Stalin and Mao are the real record holders here: both were responsible for the deaths of some 20 million of their own citizens. Yet when push came to shove, their regimes balked at nuclear suicide, and so would today's international bogeymen. For all of Ahmadinejad's antics, his power is limited, and the clerical regime has always proved rational and pragmatic when its life is on the line. Revolutionary Iran has never started a war, has done deals with both Washington and Jerusalem, and sued for peace in its war with Iraq (which Saddam started) once it realized it couldn't win. North Korea, meanwhile, is a tiny, impoverished, family-run country with a history of being invaded; its overwhelming preoccupation is survival, and every time it becomes more belligerent it reverses


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 65itself a few months later (witness last week, when Pyongyang told Seoul and Washington it was ready to return to the

bargaining table). These countries may be brutally oppressive, but nothing in their behavior suggests they have a death wish. Still, even if Iran or North Korea are deterrable, nuclear pessimists fear they'll give or sell their deadly toys to terrorists, who aren't—for it's hard to bomb a group with no return address.

Yet look closely, and the risk of a WMD handoff starts to seem overblown. For one thing, assuming Iran is

able to actually build a nuke, Desch explains that "it doesn't make sense that they'd then give something they regard as central to their survival to groups like Hizbullah, over which they have limited control. As for Al Qaeda, they don't even share common interests. Why would the mullahs give Osama bin Laden the crown jewels?" To do so would be fatal, for Washington has made it very clear that it would regard any terrorist use of a WMD as an attack by the country that supplied it—and would respond accordingly. A much greater threat is that a nuclear North Korea or Pakistan could collapse and lose control of its weapons entirely. Yet here again history offers some comfort. China acquired its first nuke in 1964, just two years before it descended into the mad chaos of the Cultural Revolution, when virtually every Chinese institution was threatened—except for its nuclear infrastructure, which remained secure. "It was nearly a coup," says Desch, "yet with all the unrest, nobody ever thought that there might be an unauthorized nuclear use." The Soviets' weapons were also kept largely safe (with

U.S. help) during the breakup of their union in the early '90s. And in recent years Moscow has greatly upped its defense spending (by 20 to 30 percent a year), using some of the cash to modernize and protect its arsenal. As for Pakistan, it has taken numerous precautions to ensure that its own weapons are insulated from the country's chaos, installing complicated firing mechanisms to prevent a launch by lone radicals, for example, and instituting special training and screening for its nuclear personnel to ensure they're not infiltrated by extremists. Even if the Pakistani state did collapse entirely—the nightmare scenario—the chance of a Taliban bomb would still be remote. Desch argues that the idea that terrorists "could use these weapons radically underestimates the difficulty of actually operating a modern nuclear arsenal. These things need constant maintenance and they're very easy to disable. So the idea that these things could be stuffed into a gunnysack and smuggled across the Rio Grande is preposterous." The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace ." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran

does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior. Put this all together

and nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening. So why have so few people in Washington recognized this? Most of us suffer from what Desch calls a nuclear phobia, an irrational fear that's grounded in good evidence—nuclear weapons are terrifying—but that keeps us from making clear, coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them actually is. The logic of nuclear peace rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad—conventional war—won't happen. This may well be a rational bet to take, especially if that first risk is very small indeed. But it's a tough case to make to the public.

Still, it's worth keeping in mind as Obama coaxes the world toward nuclear disarmament—especially because he's destined to fail. The Russians and Chinese have shown little inclination to give up their nukes, for several reasons—chief among them that the U.S. is vastly more powerful in conventional terms, and these weapons are thus their main way of leveling the playing field. Moscow and Beijing would likely be unmoved by anything short of a unilateral U.S. disarmament, which no one in Washington contemplates. And even if Russia and China (and France, Britain, Israel, India, and Pakistan) could be coaxed to abandon their weapons, we'd still live with the fear that any of them could quickly and secretly rearm. Meanwhile, the U.S. campaign to slow Iran's weapons program and reverse North

Korea's is also unlikely to work. States want nukes if they feel their survival is in jeopardy. The Obama administration may have dropped talk of regime change, but it continues to threaten Pyongyang and Tehran. That ensures the standoff will continue, for so long as these states feel insecure, they'll never give up their nuclear dreams.


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 66Prolif will stay slow and won’t snowball. Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p43-44 AjonesSome have feared that weakening opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons will lead numerous states to obtain them because it may seem that "everyone is doing it. Why should we think that if we relax, numerous states

will begin to make nuclear weapons? Both the United States and thc Soviet Union were relaxed in the past, and those effects did not follow. The Soviet Union initially supported China's nuclear program. The United States helped both Britain and France to produce nuclear weapons. By 1968 the CIA had informed President ]ohnson of the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons, and in Iuly of 1970, Richard Helms, director of the CIA, gave this information to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These and later disclosures were not followed by censure of Israel or by reductions of economic assistance." And in September of 1980, the executive branch, against the will of the House of Representatives but with the approval of the Senate, continued to do nuclear business with India despite its explosion of a nuclear device and despite its unwillingness to sign the nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do. One can believe that American opposition to nuclear arming stays the deluge only by overlooking the complications of international life. Any state has to examine many conditions before deciding whether or not to develop nuclear weapons. Our opposition is only one factor and is not likely to be the decisive one. Many states feel fairly secure living with their neighbors. Why should they want nuclear weapons? Some countries, feeling threatened, have found security through their own strenuous efforts and through arrangements made with others. South Korea is an outstanding example. Many officials believe that South Korea would lose more in terms of American support if it acquired nuclear weapons than it would gain by having them.Further, on occasion we might slow the spread of nuclear weapons by not opposing the nuclear weapons programs of some countries. When we oppose Pak<istan's nuclear program, we are saying that we disapprove of countries developing nuclear weapons no matter what their neighbors do.8 The gradual spread of nuclear weapons has not opened the nuclear floodgates. Nations attend to their Security in ways they think best. The fact that so many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do says more about the hesitation of countries to enter the nuclear military business than about the effectiveness of American nonproliferation policy. We should suit our policy to individual cases, sometimes bringing pressure against a country moving toward nuclear-weapons capability and sometimes quietly acquiescing. No one policy is right in all cases. We should ask what the interests of other countries require before putting pressure on them. Some countries are likely to suffer more in cost and pain if they remain conventional states than if they become nuclear ones. The measured spread of nuclear weapons does not run against our interests and can increase the security of some states at a price they can afford to pay.

No epidemic – even if one state proliferates, it will not create a domino effect because every state has a different strategic calculusPotter and Mukhatzhanova 8 (William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova is Research Associate at the James Martin Center. “Nuclear Phobia”, International Herald Tribune, September 23, Infotrac)Egypt - the domino most often identified as likely to fall in the wake of an overt Iranian nuclear weapons program - is a case in point. As James Walsh demonstrates in his case study for our project, Egypt's motivations to acquire nuclear weapons were more intense in past decades than they are today or are likely to be in the near future, while disincentives are as severe if not more so than in the past. Why would Cairo decide to emulate an Iranian nuclear posture when it has so long tolerated a far more potent Israeli nuclear weapons capability? Why would it risk severe damage to its relations with the United States, not to mention the loss of huge amounts of economic and military aid, for the very uncertain benefits of an expensive weapons program? One should also be skeptical that Turkey, another prospective link in an Iran-instigated chain reaction, would abandon its quest for membership in the European Union and jeopardize its NATO security guarantees to emulate Iran. And what about Saudi Arabia, another Middle Eastern kingpin? What problem, internal or otherwise, would the kingdom solve with nuclear weapons? To suggest that the proverbial proliferation sky is not yet falling is not to dismiss the risk of weapons spread. Indeed, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, or military action against Iran, could well shift the balance of incentives and disincentives in the proliferation calculus for a number of states. If history is any guide, however, these factors will be country-specific, and even if one nation should decide to disavow its nonproliferation commitments, there is little reason to expect an epidemic.

Proliferation is slow and non-threatening – states won’t abandon nuclear restraintPotter and Mukhatzhanova 8 (William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 67the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova is Research Associate at the James Martin Center. “Nuclear Phobia”, International Herald Tribune, September 23, Infotrac)A review of declassified U.S. national intelligence estimates (NIEs), as well as scholarly prognoses, shows that nuclear alarmism has been a feature of U.S. threat assessments throughout most of the nuclear age. The catalysts for projections of rapid proliferation and the characteristics of "threshold states" have changed over time, but past forecasts have routinely overestimated the pace of proliferation. The most famous dire prognosis was President John F. Kennedy's 1963 nightmare of a future world of 15, 20 or 25 nuclear powers. Although there has been little movement in that direction, the assumption persists that the birth of a new nuclear-armed state will beget many others. Waves of proliferation were widely anticipated following India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion in 1974; the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998; and, most recently, North Korea's defection from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While these events produced no obvious diffusion effect, policy makers have identified the Middle East as the site of the next proliferation epidemic. Do the facts on the ground support this prognosis? Our multiyear study of the dynamics of nuclear proliferation for a dozen "usual suspects" suggests otherwise. It indicates that the further spread of nuclear weapons is neither imminent nor likely to involve a "chain reaction." Although surprising in terms of its challenge to

conventional wisdom about a proliferation pandemic, our conclusion is consistent with the historically slow pace of proliferation and the exceptional circumstances that must pertain for states to abandon nuclear restraint. It also highlights the important role played by individual leaders and domestic political coalitions for whom pursuit of nuclear weapons poses major political, economic and security costs.

Prolif slow and inevitable Waltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p1 AjonesWhat will the spread of nuclear weapons do to the world? l say "spread" rather than "proliferation" because so far nuclear weapons have proliferated only vertically as the major nuclear powers have added to their arsenals. Horizontally, they have spread slowly across countries, and the pace is not likely to change much. Short term candidates for the nuclear club are not numerous, and they are not likely to rush into the nuclear

business. One reason is that the United States works with some effect to keep countries from doing that. Nuclear weapons will nevertheless spread, with a new member occasionally joining the club. Membership grew to twelve in the first Hfty years of the nuclear age, and that number includes three countries who suddenly found themselves in the nuclear military business as successor states to the Soviet Union. A 50 percent growth of membership in the next decade would be surprising. Since rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling, the slowness of the spread of nuclear weap ons is fortunate. Someday the world will be populated by fifteen or eighteen nuclear-weapon states (hereafter referred to as nuclear states). What the further spread of nuclear weapons will do to the world is therefore a compelling question.



SMALL ARSENALS

New proliferators will build small arsenals – uniquely stable. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.203-206]However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be

small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly

delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number

of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train

operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far

easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control

organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the

superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and

unambiguous decision to press that button.

Won’t build large arsenals – solves conflict. Seng 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.2]


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 69Because of the unique strategic and political contexts of minor proliferators, they will be able to generate stable nuclear deterrence without numerically huge arsenals, weapons survival technologies, advanced

and highly complex systems of command and control, and massive arms race resources that the superpowers employed in their nuclear relationship. This is not to say, as highly optimistic scholars would have us believe, that nuclear proliferators need not worry at all about issues such as crisis stability, command and control, and arms race stability, but rather

that they will be able to achieve these things in a different way than the superpowers' did. Kenneth

Waltz, the most optimistic of proliferation analysts, has argued that if a state is even suspected of having nuclear weapons then it will have achieved robust deterrent capability. The prospect of losing even one city to nuclear attack will be enough to deter the most determined aggressor, he reasons, and

therefore states will not need large nuclear arsenals or secure second strike technology. Further, he argues

that because proliferators will realize they only need a few nuclear weapons for deterrence, they will not build large and complex forces that overwhelm their capacities for effective command and control.

Small arsenals checkWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)

Journal Will new proliferants be destabilizing? Waltz The new proliferants are mainly, but not entirely, weak states. Pakistan and India are good examples of new nuclear powers that are going to have only a small number of

nuclear warheads. The United States has at least seven thousand strategic nuclear warheads. If you have thousands of nuclear warheads* then you need elaborate bureaucracies to control the arsenal. But if you have ten nuclear warheads or fifty, you are going to cherish those nuclear warheads. You obviously feel that you need them, and therefore you have every reason to be very careful. The accidents and near–accidents that have taken place with nuclear warheads have been, as far as I know, accidents on the part of the major nuclear powers and not the small ones. Journal So, you do believe that these new proliferants of

the future can be deterred? Waltz Well, that is a different question. The United States and the Soviet Union developed peculiar

ideas of nuclear deterrence: namely that thousands of warheads are required for deterrence. That notion was always crazy. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis our estimates were that the Soviet Union had only about seventy true strategic systems. We had thousands. Were we deterred? Yes we were. We did not strike at the nuclear warheads that the Soviet Union had in Cuba. The Air Force was asked if they could hit and destroy all the targets. And

remember that they were close by, and there were not that many of them. The Air Force answered: “We

promise we can get 90 percent.” Not enough. We were deterred. Now, nuclear weapons do not deter everybody from doing everything. They do not deter forays. They do not deter, for example, Arab countries from starting wars over the disputed terroritories. But they did dissuade the Egyptians and Syrians from trying to divide Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They pulled back for fear that the threat of the destruction of the Israeli State would prompt the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons deter threats to the vital interests of the state, and they have done so in every case that comes to mind.

Small arsenals = effective command and control Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.56-57]Effective command and control need not involve all the advanced technology of the superpowers either. The superpowers employed large. complex, redundant and highly sophisticated technology and organizations. Arsenals were so large, fat-Hung and varied that centralized civilian control was impossible, and thus complicated systems of checks and fail safes developed to manage a highly declarative command structure. But what if a nuclear arsenal were not so large, far-flung and varied? What if it consisted of only a handful of weapons; say fifteen or even twenty? First. the statistical likelihood of nuclear accidents would be smaller in such a scenario. Second, the technology and organizational sophistication needed to control such an arsenal would be minimal. Communication requirements would be simpler because there would not be so many launch sites with which to stay in contact. If states do not have bombs on submarines or patrolling bombers and in foreign countries, fail safes are much easier to construct. The chance for human errors could be lessened because personnel could be hand-picked and tightly supervised. Launch authority could be vested in relatively few people, and command structures need not be so delegate. Perhaps most importantly, commanding and controlling tiny arsenals need not involve heavy reliance on complex organizations and the use of cumbersome standard operating procedures. All of this also would make it easier to guard weapons from thieves and renegades.

Prolif is small arsenals – 4 reasonsEconomic constraints



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 70Fallout fearPolitical rewardOpacity

Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Nuclear proliferation among developing states will involve both small target sets and small arsenals. Population and industry are highly concentrated in developing states, offering a very limited number of targets to hit. Large numbers of weapons would not be needed to inflict McNamaran levels of nuclear

destruction. Large numbers of nuclear weapons are proscribed for other reasons as well. Fears about the spread of deadly nuclear fallout will keep states from launching more than a handful of weapons on regional

adversaries. Economic constraints will help limit the numerical size of developing state arsenals.

Political rewards of nuclear weapons development will accrue to developing state proliferators even if they do not have

large numbers of weapons. The requirements of keeping arsenals opaque also will enforce tight numerical restrictions. We can expect arsenals among developing stares to be opaque for reasons concerning the costs of international anti-proliferation sanctions and the benefits opacity provides in domestic and international politics. There is a strong global regime proscribing the spread of nuclear weapons. States that break the global nonproliferation norm risk various international sanctions directed by this regime. By obscuring

proliferatory transgressions, opacity makes it more difficult for regime leaders to identify weapons development, and when regime leaders do suspect weapons development opacity makes it hard to prove. The uncertainty makes it hard for leaders of the regime to institute sanctions, whether individually or in concert with other states.

This cover of uncertainty is especially important for developing states. They are particularly vulnerable to sanctions due to their dependence on Western military and economic aid and their need for trade with large, developed markets.

While Cold War geostrategic politics once protected some proliferating states from the threat of international sanctions, the end of the Cold War removed that shelter. The U.S. and its allies now have greater freedom to apply aid and trade pressure; correspondingly, opacity becomes more valuable as a strategy of avoidance.

Opaque proliferation has important political benefits for both the proliferating state and concerned outsiders. Opacity helps preserve the integrity of the global nonproliferation norm despite limited proliferation. It also could help political leaders in both the proliferating state and its enemy states avoid politically charged agitation from hardliners that could derail stable political and strategic arrangements. In sum. there are good reasons to expect proliferation in the developing world to be small and opaque, and thus there are good reasons to expect to see limited mean nuclear deterrence. In chapter one, I discussed at length the four basic requirements of stable nuclear deterrence, including strategic deterrent threat, crisis stability. effective command and control, and arms race stability. These are the pillars on which all stable nuclear deterrence, including alternate form nuclear deterrence. is built. The next four chapters deal with each of these requirements respectively, demonstrating in detail how limited nuclear proliferation can translate into stable deterrence in the developing world.



EXTS – YES BUILD SMALL ARSENALS Five reasons they’ll build small arsenals. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.56-57]

Kenneth Waltz argues that leaders in all new nuclear states will build only small arsenals. His claim rests primarily on the assumption that all new nuclear states will believe they only need to threaten adversaries with the destruction of one or two cities to ensure stable deterrence, and that they subsequently will be reluctant to dedicate massive resources to building large nuclear arsenals.' My claim is less broad, and it concerns only stares in the developing world. I argue that conditions in the developing world are such that whether leaders think they need to be able to destroy only one city or believe they should have the capability to achieve complete societal destruction of an adversary, they very likely will judge that only very small nuclear arsenals are needed for the job. Moreover, because conditions are such that arsenal buildups will exact high economic, political and security costs on developing states, it is very unlikely they will build more weapons than they believe they need. What follows is an examination of the specific conditions on which these claims are based. There are five main reasons to expect small arsenals among nuclear states in the developing world. They include 1) the limited number of targets developing states will have to worry about, 2) fears concerning 'regional suicide' through nuclear fallout, 3) economic constraints related to nuclear production and military budgets, 4) the specific manner in which developing states reap political rewards and prestige from nuclear weapons development, and 5) the requirements of keeping nuclear arsenals opaque. These factors can carry a cumulative weight in developing state proliferators, which is to say that their cumulative effect may serve to constrain arsenal buildup when the individual effect of any one of them may not be sufficient. They also reinforce each other in important ways, meaning that if policymakers recognize the existence of one or some of the conditions they are likely to recognize most or all of them, and thus their cumulative weight is likely CO be felt. Not all the factors discussed here will apply to all proliferators and potential proliferators in the developing world; however, it is not necessary that they do. It is simply necessary that enough of the factors apply, or that one of them applies strongly enough, to generate the essential constraining effects. This is very likely to be the case in all developing world situations.

Only small arsenals – fallout fear. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.71-72]Among geographically close adversaries, fears concerning nuclear fallout definitely would eliminate the nuclear barrage tactics mentioned above. Barrage tactics would involve blanketing large sections of an enemy's territory with nuclear bombs. This bombing method might be used to generate greater levels of collateral destruction (especially in areas where population and industry are not concentrated) or as a counteroffensive measure in instances in which the exact location of an enemy's weapons are not known. I3 Either way, barrage tactics are likely to be a self-destructive. The large numbers of weapons employed in a nuclear barrage would generate extremely high levels of fallout. High levels of fallout are olso me concern if one is separated from the target state by a big ocean, but they are of great concern in one's enemy is right across the border. In any case, all nuclear explosions generate fallout; only its scope is uncertain, and a shift in wind could mean the difference between strategic victory and great loss of life within one's homeland. Fallout fears may not be enough to deter all nuclear attacks, but they would be a significant limiter on the scale of those attacks. Accordingly, the value of having large arsenals with many weapons is diminished.

Opacity requirements will keep new arsenals small. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.56-57]Limited nuclear proliferation in developing states involves both small arsenals and conditions of opacity. These characteristics function together to help provide the basis for limited means nuclear deterrence. They are also

interrelated. The requirements of opacity generate pressure on emerging nuclear states to keep arsenals numerically small. Numerically small arsenals help facilitate opacity. Large arsenals are simply harder to hide. Opaque weapons must be stored secretly or somehow obscured in the field, and the more of them there are, the more difficult this will be. Also, the larger the arsenal, the harder it is for opaque nuclear states to maintain tight control of information about its existence and extent. Large arsenals will require greater numbers of people to maintain and supervise them, much moreso if weapons are actually deployed in the field. The larger the circle of officials and personnel 'in the know,' the more difficult it will be to contain information leaks and/or observations from outsiders. It is difficult to say at what point a developing state's arsenal would become too big to remain opaque; but it is safe to


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 72say that the bigger it is, the harder it is to obscure its existence. States that want to keep the existence of their weapons in question will want to keep numbers of weapons as small as possible. Of course, whether or not the requirements of keeping nuclear developments opaque constrain nuclear buildup will depend on how highly the emerging nuclear state values opacity. For several reasons, though, opacity is very useful. And so we turn to the next section and the next important question: why do developing states employ policies of opaque proliferation?

No incentive for large arsenals. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.66-67]In sum, developing state proliferators simply will not need anything beyond very small numbers of nuclear weapons. Urban concentrations in the developing world mean that large percentages of developing state populations can be devastated by targeting just a handful of cities with nuclear weapons; and the limited resources available for relief and rebuilding in developing states mean that each bomb dropped on

those cities will do relatively more damage than bombs dropped on developed states. The diffusion of population outside key cities in many developing states means that the marginal value of dropping bombs beyond the number required for destroying key cities would be small, and the value of building up arsenals diminishes

accordingly. Finally, due to likely asymmetries of interest, developing states will only need to threaten developed states with relatively limited damage in order to deter them effectively.

No adversaries = no large buildupSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 67]

Developing states are not world powers. Their spheres of military concern are small and regionally bounded. The adversaries with which developing states are concerned will be their regional neighbors. Enemies

will be right next door. or at least very close. This observation is important for two main reasons. First, it is rare that developing states face numerous enemy states. Their limited spheres of concern generally will restrict the potential number of conflictual relationships they might have. Only so many carp can Ht into a

backyard pond. The fewer the adversaries a developing state has, the fewer number of targets it will have to worry about hitting. Whereas the former Soviet Union worried about targets in the United States, Britain. France, Germany. China and possibly Israel, Pakistan worries only about India. Some developing states have a couple major adversaries, and Israel has to worry about several . but as a general rule one can expect the geographically limited military concerns of developing states to act as a limiter on arsenal develoomentf



AT ARSENALS TOO SMALL FOR DETERRENCE

Even small arsenals are sufficient for deterrence. Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)For some states, proliferation has such important strategic value that they will make any effort to go nuclear, as in the case of Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s (Kokoski, 1995). The justification for proliferation in countries like India, Iraq, and Pakistan is often security (Sagan, 1996/97). Mearsheimer (1990: 20) argues, 'states that possess nuclear deterrents can stand up to one another, even if their nuclear arsenals vary greatly in size'. Gallois (1961) was one of the first to make this

argument for the value of proliferation for smaller states based on the deterrent value that even a small number of nuclear weapons can provide. During the Cold War, and despite superpower nuclear umbrellas, this logic was persuasive for the French as well as for the British and the Chinese (Goldstein, 2000: 360).

New proliferators will have strong deterrence credibility in spite of limited arsenalsSeng 98 (Jordan, Phd Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY for PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, P. 158-159, ZBurdette)This chapter has two main parts. In the first, I will discuss important elements of deterrent threat as they relate to limited nuclear proliferators in the Third World. Requirements of damage capability – having enough nuclear firepower to deter a would-be aggressor – I take as largely unproblematic in this chapter because I have discussed the issues at length in earlier chapters. I focus my attention on issues of existential credibility (making one’s adversary think one has enough nuclear firepower) and retaliatory credibility (making one’s adversary think that the firepower will be used with push comes to shove). I argue that establishing adequate retaliatory credibility will be relatively simple for limited nuclear proliferators because they will not need to worry about complicated issues of extended deterrence and because they are likely to benefit from a relatively large threat that leaves something to chance. Accordingly, Third World

proliferators are likely to have ample deterrent threat when it comes to deterring large scale, total wars. In the last part of the chapter, I evaluate limited nuclear proliferator’s deterrent threat capabilities in terms of deterring

limited aims wars as well. I find that limited nuclear proliferators generally will have strong deterrent threat capabilities in limited war scenarios, and they will have some specific advantages that the superpowers did not enjoy.

Even small arsenals can effectively deterWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p20-21 AjonesLesser nuclear states can pursue deterrent strategies effectively. Deterrcnce requires the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on another country. "Unacceptable damage" to the Soviet Union was variously defined by Robert McNamara as requiring the ability to destroy a fifth to a fourth of its population and a half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity. American estimates of what is required for deterrence were absurdly high. To deter, a country need not appear to be able to destroy a fourth or a half of another country, although in some cases that might be easily done, Would Libya try to destroy Israel's nuclear weapons at the risk of two bombs surviving to fall on Tripoli and Bengazi? And what would be left of lsrael if Tel Aviv and llaifa were destroyed? "4



***PROLIF BAD***



PROLIF BAD (BELOW)

Prolif guarantees great power intervention – escalates to nuclear war. Below, 2008 (Tim, Wing Commander – RAF and MA Defense Studies – Kings College London, “OPTIONS FOR US NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: EXEMPLARY LEADERSHIP OR EXTRAORDINARY LUNACY?,” A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, June) Proliferation. Roger Molander, of RAND Corporation, asserts that “in the near future, a large number of countries are each going to develop a small number of nuclear weapons.”5 The Union of Concerned Scientists considers this to be the greatest long term danger confronting both US and international security today.5 Proliferation increases risk in a number of ways. First, the more states that hold nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that one will have an insufficiently mature or robust nuclear doctrine to manage its capability responsibly. Tom Sauer suggests that developing states that do not have democratic political systems present a particularly high risk because in dictatorial regimes, the military are frequently in control, and as Sagan has observed, the military appear to be more inclined to initiate preventative attacks against adversaries than civilians.52 Second, the more widely proliferated nuclear weapons become, the more theoretical opportunities may be presented for theft of nuclear material. Third, proliferation increases the risk of nuclear intervention by an established nuclear power, including the five NWSs. Stephen

Younger envisages several scenarios in which currently established nuclear powers might “feel a need” to intervene with nuclear weapons in present regional conflicts, especially if WMD are being employed or threatened. Moreover,

since proliferation is frequently associated with reaction to nuclear development either within a bordering

nation or regional counterpart, further proliferation is in turn likely to generate a quasi-exponential expansion of similar regional scenarios.53 Ambassador Lehman envisages a scenario in which proliferation may induce a chain reaction of related regional arms races that could result in unintended and unexpected consequenc e s far removed from the objectives of the proliferating nations, and in the United States’ specific case, a risk that the nation could get sucked into a conventional regional conflict which is subsequently escalated into nuclear warfare by its allies or their opponents.54



PROLIF BAD (KISSINGER)

Prolif causes extinction -- deterrence fails and can’t replicate Cold War stability -- accidents, miscalc, terrorism, preemption. Kissinger et al 11—Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr.

Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (“Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation: The doctrine of mutual assured destruction is obsolete in the post‐Cold War era”, Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2011, http://www.nti.org/c_press/Deterrence_in_the_Age_of_Nuclear_Proliferation.pdf, ZBurdette)

As long as there has been war, there have been efforts to deter actions a nation considers threatening. Until fairly recently, this meant building a military establishment capable of intimidating the adversary, defeating him or making his victory more costly than the projected gains. This, with conventional weapons, took time. Deterrence and war strategy were identical. The advent of the nuclear weapon introduced entirely new factors. It was possible, for the first time, to inflict at the beginning of a war the maximum casualties. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction represented this reality. Deterrence based on nuclear weapons,

therefore, has three elements: It is importantly psychological, depending on calculations for which there is no historical experience. It is therefore precarious. It is devastating. An unrestrained nuclear exchange between superpowers could destroy civilized life as we know it in days. Mutual assured destruction raises enormous inhibitions against employing the weapons. Since the first use of nuclear weapons against Japan, neither of the superpowers, nor any other country, has used nuclear weapons in a war. A gap opened between the psychological element of deterrence and the risks most leaders were willing to incur. U.S. defense leaders made serious efforts to give the president more flexible options for nuclear use short of global annihilation. They never solved the problem, and it was always recognized that Washington and Moscow both held the keys to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic escalations. As a result, nuclear deterrence was useful in preventing only the most catastrophic scenarios that would have threatened our survival. But even with the deployment of thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Soviet moves into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were not deterred. Nor were the numerous crises involving Berlin, including the building of the Wall in 1961, or major wars in Korea and Vietnam, or the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In the case of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons did not prevent collapse or regime change. Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know ‐ how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used . It is not possible to replicate the high ‐ risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability. From 1945 to 1991, America and the Soviet Union were diligent, professional,

but also lucky that nuclear weapons were never used. Does the world want to continue to bet its survival on continued good fortune with a growing number of nuclear nations and adversaries globally? Can we devise and successfully implement with other nations, including other nuclear powers, careful, cooperative concepts to safely dismount the nuclear tiger while strengthening the capacity to assure our security and that of allies and other countries considered essential to our national security? Recently, the four of us met at the Hoover Institution with a group of policy experts to discuss the possibilities for establishing a safer and more comprehensive form of deterrence and prevention in a world where the roles and risks of nuclear weapons are reduced and ultimately eliminated. Our broad conclusion is that nations should move forward together with a series of conceptual and practical steps toward deterrence that do not rely primarily on nuclear weapons or nuclear threats to maintain international peace and security. The first step is to recognize that there is a daunting new spectrum of global security threats. These threats include chemical, biological and radiological weapons, catastrophic terrorism and cyber warfare, as well as natural disasters resulting from climate change or other environmental problems, and health-related crises. For the United States and many other nations, existential threats relating to the very survival of the state have diminished, largely because of the end of the Cold War and the increasing realization that our common interests greatly exceed our differences. However, an accident or mistake involving nuclear weapons, or nuclear terrorism fueled by the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear know-how, is still a very real risk. An effective strategy to deal with these dangers must be developed. The second step is the realization that continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the principal element for deterrence is encouraging, or at least excusing, the spread of these weapons, and will inevitably erode the essential cooperation necessary to avoid proliferation, protect nuclear materials and deal effectively with new threats. Third, the U.S. and Russia have no basis for maintaining a structure of deterrence involving nuclear weapons deployed in ways that increase the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate nuclear exchange based on a false warning. Reducing the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles with verification to the levels set by the New Start Treaty is an important step in reducing nuclear risks. Deeper nuclear reductions and changes in nuclear force posture involving the two nations should remain a priority. Further steps must include short‐range tactical nuclear weapons. Fourth, as long as nuclear weapons exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter a nuclear attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence. There is an inherent limit to U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions if other nuclear weapon states build up their inventories or if new nuclear powers emerge. It is clear, however, that the U.S. and Russia—having led the nuclear buildup for decades— must continue to lead the build‐down. The U.S. and its NATO allies, together with Russia, must begin moving away from threatening force postures and deployments including the retention of thousands of short‐range battlefield nuclear weapons. All conventional deployments should be reviewed from the aspect of provocation. This will make America, Russia and Europe more secure. It will also set an example for the world. Fifth, we recognize that for some nations, nuclear weapons may continue to appear relevant to

their immediate security. There are certain undeniable dynamics in play—for example, the emergence of a nuclear ‐ armed


http://www.nti.org/c_press/Deterrence_in_the_Age_of_Nuclear_Proliferation.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 79neighbor, or the perception of inferiority in conventional forces—that if not addressed could lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and an increased risk they will be used. Thus, while the four

of us believe that reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective, some nations will hesitate to draw or act on the same conclusion unless regional confrontations and conflicts are addressed. We must therefore redouble our efforts to resolve these issues.



PROLIF BAD (KRIEGER)

Proliferation risks extinction. benefits don’t justify jacking with the future of humanity. Krieger, 2009 (David, Pres. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Councilor – World Future Council, “Still Loving the Bomb After All These Years”, 9-4, https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger) Jonathan Tepperman’s article in the September 7, 2009 issue of Newsweek, “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb,” provides a novel but frivolous argument that nuclear weapons “may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous….” Rather, in Tepperman’s world, “The bomb may actually make us safer.” Tepperman shares this world with Kenneth Waltz, a University of California professor emeritus of political science, who Tepperman describes as “the leading ‘nuclear optimist.’” Waltz expresses his optimism in this way: “We’ve now had 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It’s striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states.” Actually, there were a number of proxy wars between nuclear weapons states, such as those in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and some near disasters, the most notable being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Waltz’s logic is akin to observing a man falling from a high rise building, and noting that he had already fallen for 64 floors without anything bad happening to him, and concluding that so far it looked so good that others should try it. Dangerous logic! Tepperman builds upon Waltz’s logic, and concludes “that all states are rational ,” even though their leaders may have a lot of bad qualities, including being “stupid, petty, venal, even evil….” He asks us to trust that rationality will always prevail when there is a risk of nuclear retaliation, because these weapons make “the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable.” Actually, he is asking us to do more than trust in the rationality of leaders; he is asking us to gamble the future on this proposition. “The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction is so compelling,” Tepperman argues, “it’s led

to what’s known as the nuclear peace….” But if this is a peace worthy of the name, which it isn’t, it certainly is not one on which to risk the future of civilization. One irrational leader with control over a nuclear arsenal could start a nuclear conflagration, resulting in a global Hiroshima. Tepperman celebrates “the iron

logic of deterrence,” but deterrence is a theory that is far from rooted in “iron logic.” It is a theory based upon threats that must be effectively communicated and believed. Leaders of Country A with nuclear weapons must communicate to other countries (B, C, etc.) the conditions under which A will retaliate with nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other countries must understand and believe the threat from Country A will, in fact, be carried out. The longer that nuclear weapons are not used, the more other countries may come to believe that they can challenge Country A with impunity from nuclear retaliation. The more that Country A bullies other countries, the greater the incentive for these countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

Deterrence is unstable and therefore precarious . Most of the countries in the world reject the argument, made most prominently by Kenneth Waltz, that the spread of nuclear weapons makes the world safer. These countries joined together in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but they never agreed to maintain indefinitely a system of nuclear apartheid in which some states possess nuclear weapons and others are prohibited from doing so. The principal bargain of the NPT requires the five NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, and the International Court of Justice interpreted this to mean complete nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Tepperman seems to be arguing that seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad policy, and that nuclear weapons, because of their threat, make efforts at non-proliferation unnecessary and even unwise. If some additional states, including Iran, developed nuclear arsenals, he concludes that wouldn’t be so bad “given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.” Those who oppose Tepperman’s favorable disposition toward the bomb, he refers to as “nuclear pessimists.” These would be the people, and I would certainly be one of them, who see nuclear weapons as presenting an urgent danger to our security, our species and our future . Tepperman finds that when viewed from his “nuclear optimist” perspective, “nuclear weapons start to seem a lot less frightening.” “Nuclear peace,” he tells us, “rests on a scary bargain: you accept a small chance that something extremely bad will happen in exchange for a much bigger chance that something very bad – conventional war – won’t happen.” But the “extremely bad” thing he asks us to accept is the end of the human species. Yes, that would be serious. He also doesn’t make the case that in a world without nuclear weapons, the prospects of conventional war would increase dramatically. After all, it is only an unproven supposition that nuclear weapons have prevented wars, or would do so in the future. We have certainly come far too close to the precipice of catastrophic nuclear war. As an ultimate celebration of the faulty logic of deterrence, Tepperman calls for providing any nuclear weapons state with a “survivable second strike option.” Thus, he not only favors nuclear weapons, but finds the security of these weapons to trump human security. Presumably he would have President Obama providing new and secure nuclear weapons to North Korea, Pakistan and any other nuclear weapons states that come along so that they will feel secure enough not to use their weapons in a first-strike attack. Do we really want to bet the human future that Kim Jong-Il and his successors are more rational than Mr. Tepperman


http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248

https://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2009/09/04_krieger_newsweek_response.php?krieger


PROLIF BAD (SOKOLSKI) A proliferated world would risk escalatory regional nuclear wars. Sokolski, 2009 [Henry, Ex. Dir. Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and served on the US congressional commission on the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism, Policy Review, “FEATURES: Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd”, June/July, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html]There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22

Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable . Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for

sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in

Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.


http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/46390537.html


PROLIF BAD (ROBERTS)

In the new world order proliferation will be rapid and destabilizing – even Waltz assumes proliferation is slow Roberts ’99 (Brad, Member of Research Staff – Institute for Defense Analyses & editorial Board of Nonproliferation Review, Nonproliferation Review, “VIEWPOINT: PROLIFERATION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE 1990S: LOOKING FOR THE RIGHT LESSONS”, Volume 6, Fall, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf) This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two standard answers to the question of what’s at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weapons of mass destruction —all of them,

though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions—and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war employing mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and custom- ary. The stability argument relates to the unintended consequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars . Although it is an old truism that proliferation is destabilizing, it is not always true—not where the acquisition of strategic leverage is essential to preservation of a balance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditions of a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. In- stead, the risks associated with the competitive acquisition of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweigh the perceived benefits to states that have considered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Bra- zil, for example, like Sweden and Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink even if living there is within their reach. But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility . The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and

risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely

test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions.


http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf


PROLIF BAD (ROBOCK)

Prolif dramatically increases the risk of nuclear war -- causes nuclear winter. Robock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)Nuclear winter is the term for a theory describing the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black, sooty smoke from cities and industrial facilities, would be heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper stratosphere, and spread globally, lasting for years. The resulting cool, dark, dry conditions at Earth's surface would prevent crop growth for at least one growing season, resulting in mass starvation over most of the world. In addition,

there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing enhanced ultraviolet radiation. More people could die in the noncombatant countries than in those where the bombs were dropped, because of these indirect

effects. Nuclear proliferation is now expanding the threat. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could produce so much smoke that it would produce global environmental change unprecedented in recorded human history. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has fallen from 70,000 at its peak in the

1980s to less than 10,000 currently deployed, a nuclear war between the United States and Russia could still produce nuclear winter. This theory cannot be tested in the real world. However, analogs can inform us about parts of the theory, and there are many that give support to the theory. They include the seasonal cycle, the diurnal cycle, forest, fires, volcanic eruptions, and dust storms on Mars. The only way to be sure to prevent the climatic effects of nuclear war is to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The US must take every measure possible to prevent further proliferation -- the alternative is the end of the world.Robock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)The suicidal nature of the use of nuclear weapons is one of the most important policy implications. If country A used enough weapons only against military targets to prevent country B from retaliating, in what is called a ‘first strike’, the climatic consequences could be such that everyone in country A could die. Nuclear weapons, therefore, become an instrument of suicide and not an instrument of defense.10,38 Soon after the nuclear winter theory was

established, Carl Sagan gave a briefing on the subject to Senators, Congressmen, and staff on Capitol Hill. He described how the smoke from burning cities and industrial areas after a nuclear war would be so thick as to block out so much sunlight that the Earth's surface would become so cold and dark for so long that agriculture would be impossible and most of the people in the world would starve to death. After the presentation, one of them called him aside and said, ‘Look, if you believe that the mere threat of the end of the world is enough to change thinking in Washington and Moscow, you haven't spent much time in those cities!’ (Ref 10, p. 6). Albert Einstein said, after nuclear weapons were invented, ‘Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe’.39 Yet it does seem that nuclear winter has provided a context to reexamine all the existing policy assumptions about nuclear war. People are gradually changing the way they think. And it happened only because scientists have tried to warn the world of the dangers of current policies.



PROLIF BAD (WAR – GENERAL)

Statistical evidence shows nuclear weapons increase the probability of war and escalation.Geller ‘90 (Daniel, Former Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Mississippi, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, 34:2, June, p. 306-307)This analysits has focused on escalation patterns in serious interstate disputes among nations with both identical and different levels of weapons technology. Initiator and target conflict action was examined in terms of four dispute categories based on distinctions in military technology. The findings indicated that dispute escalation probabilities are affected by weapons technology -the distribution of nuclear capabilities does impact the patterns of escalation in serious international disputes. It

was demonstrated that disputes between nuclear powers are more likely to escalate (short of war) than are nonnuclear disputes; and in conflicts between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the possession of nuclear weapons has no

evident inhibitory effect on the escalation propensities of the nonnuclear opponent. Moreover, a Markov analysis indicated that disputes between nuclear powers are more likely to evolve in a tit-for-tat (reciprocating) manner than are nonnuclear conflicts. An initiator's threat and display of force or use of force is most likely to elicit target behavior at the same hostility level. The probabilities of a nuclear state taking no military confrontation action in response to any form of provocation from another nuclear power are relatively small when measured against other reaction probabilities or in comparison to nonmilitary target behavior in nonnuclear disputes. Conversely, in mixed confrontations, nonnuclear dispute initiators and targets act much more aggressively than do their nuclear rivals. These findings, and particularly the ones pertaining to escalation patterns between nuclear states, support the competitive risk-taking theses of Kahn (1965), Schelling (1966), Osgood and Tucker (1967), and Snyder and Diesing (1977). They indicate an actual raising of the provocation threshold and an expansion in the use of coercive tactics-threats, military displays, and force short of war - for achieving political objectives in nuclear disputes. Regarding conflict action in mixed disputes, the greater aggressiveness of nonnuclear

participants against that of their nuclear rivals can be explained by: (1) a disbelief that the opponent will use nuclear force (either because of its lack of military significance, or because of political and ethical inhibitions), or (2) a greater intensity of nonnuclear state interests in a local conflict compared to that of the nuclear state. The principal

policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute

behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists. At best, the evidence (to date) suggests that secure, second-strike nuclear forces are sufficient to prevent a direct nuclear attack by an opponent on one's own territory (Howard, 1984; Jervis, 1984, 1988; Russett, 1989). Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force. In confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, war is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear power probable. If force is to be brought to bear in either of these dispute types, usable conventional military power is likely to prove critical.

Statistical evidence shows nuclear weapons deter neither conflict nor escalationGeller ‘90 (Daniel, Former Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Mississippi, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, 34:2, June, p. 303)The first-order analysis indicates that in nuclear disputes an initiator's threat and display of force or use of force is most likely

to provoke a target response at the same hostility level. Moreover, the probabilities of no military confrontation action

as a response by the target to either of the initiator conflict behaviors are slight. Conversely, in nonnuclear disputes, a threat or display by the initiator has the greatest probability of meeting with no military confrontation

action from the target. On the basis of this analysis, it can be seen that disputes between nuclear nations are more likely to evolve in a tit-for-tat (reciprocating) manner than are nonnuclear conflicts. The probabilities of a nuclear state taking no military confrontation action in response to provocation from another nuclear power are relatively small when measured against other reaction probabilities or in comparison to nonmilitary target behavior in nonnuclear disputes. This evidence is further confirmation of Hypothesis 1 and the thesis of competitive risk taking in nuclear disputes. The escalation patterns in the remaining two conflict classes are almost the obverse of those discussed above. In mixed disputes between nuclear and nonnuclear states, nuclear targets have a greater probability of not responding to provocation than nonnuclear targets; nuclear targets are also much less likely to use force in response to either form of provocation than are nonnuclear targets. In short, nonnuclear dispute initiators and targets behave more aggressively than nuclear states in mixed disputes. This evidence provides additional support for Hypothesis 2 and weakens the argument for the salience of nuclear weapons in confrontations with nonnuclear states.

Proliferation leads to catastrophic scenarios and threats exist now – India, Pakisan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq proveGartzke and Kroenig 9 (Eric, Department of Political Science @ University of California San Diego, Matthew, Department of Government @ Georgetown University, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation”, March 2009, Journal of Conflict Resolution)Nuclear weapons have occupied a central role in international politics ever since their introduction onto the world stage in 1945. The use of nuclear weapons by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is widely

believed to have compelled Japanese surrender and brought World War II to a close. The vast nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamental to the bipolar, strategic relationship that structured international politics for more than fifty years during the Cold War. And while many analysts had hoped that the collapse


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 85of the Soviet Union would lead to a reduction in the influence of nuclear weapons in international affairs, it was not to be so. The threat of nuclear proliferation resurfaced as India, Pakistan, and more recently, North Korea have conducted nuclear tests. Other regional powers, including Iran, Iraq, and Libya, are pursuing or have pursued nuclear capabilities. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that if terrorists, intent on carrying out mass-casualty attacks, acquired nuclear weapons, the results could be catastrophic. The ease with which states or terrorists could potentially acquire sensitive nuclear materials was exemplified by the black market nuclear proliferation ring operated by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Indeed, in his 2007 annual report to Congress on the projected threats to the national

security of the United States of America, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell concluded that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.1

Proliferation causes regional destabilization – escalates to nuclear conflictCimbala 99 - - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare,” vol. 25, issue 4, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Accidental%2FInadvertent+Nuclear+War+and+Information+Warfare&rft.jtitle=Armed+Forces+%26+Society&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=1999-10-01&rft.pub=Sage+Publications&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=653&rft.epage=675&rft_id=info:doi/10.1177%2F0095327X9902500407&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=10_1177_0095327X9902500407 /mr)A third reason for the continued importance of nuclear deterrence is the spread of nuclear weapons among "opaque" proliferators and the potential for additional non-nuclear states to acquire these and other weapons of mass destruction. The opaque proliferators, whom virtually everyone now includes in the category of nuclear

competent actors, are India, Israel, and Pakistan. Experts disagree about the sizes of their weapons inventories or deployment capabilities on short notice; more significant, even their military and scientific experts have stopped denying the all but certain nuclear-acquired status of these three countries. In addition to these opaque proliferators, other candidate non-nuclear states thought to be pursuing nuclear capability include Libya, Iran, Iraq, and (until 1994)

North Korea. The potential for regional destabilization once any of these currently nonnuclear states acquires nuclear weapons is enhanced, given their apparent interest in other weapons of mass destruction and in delivery systems for nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons. 10

New proliferators are inherently unstable – escalation.Richard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Regime stability in both these proliferating and existing nuclear states constitutes a major international security issue. Command and control issues (meaning nuclear arsenals’ vulnerability to accidental and unauthorized

use) cause special concerns. If the assumptions of rational framework theory don’t hold, it “raises doubts about whether any state can build a large nuclear arsenal that is completely secure from accident” (Sagan

and Waltz, 2003, pg. 73). Emerging nuclear states often lack the financial resources needed to produce safe weapons designs. The international community’s non-proliferation posture also strongly inhibits the ability to conduct full-scale

nuclear weapons tests, preventing the development of effective and safe designs. Combined with the domestic instability present in many proliferating states, this lack of testing makes accidental detonations

become extremely plausible. Domestic stability is critical, as “political unrest can increase the risk of nuclear weapons accidents by encouraging unsafe transportation, or testing operations”(Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). During China’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Nie Rongzhen launched a test missile eight hundred kilometers across China, armed with a live nuclear warhead, to display the successes of its nuclear program (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). Nie’s decision

shows that newly proliferating states may determine their actual behavior by the illogical objectives of military organizations within those states. The parochial interests of these military organizations may not coincide with national interest, and so lead to accidental uses of nuclear weapons. This further degrades deterrence measures despite rational state interests to the contrary. Strict military control over nuclear arsenals also creates both domestic and international security hazards, as military


http://www.hamilton.edu/documents/levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf

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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 86officials and weapons operators in limited combat theaters have different interests than civilian politicians charged with implementing policy. Steve Sagan describes the mentality of military officials in terms of their own interests: Even when a professional military service acts in relatively rational ways to maximize its interests---protecting its power, size, autonomy, or organizational essence---such actions do not necessarily reflect the organizational interests of the

military as a whole, much less the national interests of the state (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 52). Military leaders minimize diplomatic considerations in any given conflict, focusing instead on their ultimate objective, victory. Soldiers train to win; they ignore secondary considerations and repercussions. During China’s proliferation in the 1960’s, senior U.S. military officials advocated a preemptive destruction of its developing arsenals, arguing that “the attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 192). Military officials view proliferation and possession of nuclear weapons by other states as detrimental to U.S. national security and relative power.

Nuclear proliferation will end life as we know it – four thousand million will die instantly in the event of nuclear warSchultz et al 7 (Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary ofstate from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, January 4,

Wall Street Journal, http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/A_WORLD_FREE.pdf)Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution." Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly

on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this

madness." Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization ." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision , which had also been expressed by previous American presidents. Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.

Proliferation is the greatest threat – nuclear war would kill hundreds of thousands, crush the economy, and destroy stabilityAllison 10 (Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professorof Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, “Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats”, Foreign Affairs, volume 89, issue 1, pages 74-85, http://www.policyschool.neu.edu/education/graduate/spring2010/documents/AllisonNuclearDisorderForeignAffairsJan2010.pdf)Obama has put the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda. He has called it "a threat that rises above all others in urgency" and warned that if the international community fails to act, "we will invite nuclear arms races in every region and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine. "Consider the consequences, he continued, of an attack with even a single nuclear bomb: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life ." Obama's

mission is to bend the trend lines currently pointing toward catastrophe. Most of the actions required to achieve this mission must be taken not by Washington but by governments around the world, which will act on the basis of

their own assessments of their interests. But in an effort to encourage them to act and demonstrate U. S. leadership, Obama has


http://www.policyschool.neu.edu/education/graduate/spring2010/documents/AllisonNuclearDisorderForeignAffairsJan2010.pdf

http://www.policyschool.neu.edu/education/graduate/spring2010/documents/AllisonNuclearDisorderForeignAffairsJan2010.pdf

http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/A_WORLD_FREE.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 87pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States' national security strategy, negotiate a follow-on arms control agreement with Russia to decrease U. S. and Russian nuclear armaments, ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, endeavor to ban the production of fissile material worldwide, and provide additional authority and resources to the IAEA. In the hope of rolling back North Korea's arsenal and stopping Iran short of building a nuclear bomb, he has opened negotiations with both countries, signaling a willingness

to live with these regimes, however ugly, if they forgo nuclear weapons.



RISK OF PROLIF O/W

Even if the risk is relatively low the consequences are too high to risk.Allison ‘7 (Graham, Douglas Dillon Prof. Gov. and Dir. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – Harvard U. JFK School of Government, National Interest, “Symposium: Apocalypse When?” November/December, L/N)Mueller is entitled to his opinion that the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism is "exaggerated" and "overwrought." But analysts of various political persuasions, in and out of government, are virtually unanimous in their judgment to

the contrary. As the national-security community learned during the Cold War, risk = likelihood x consequences. Thus,

even when the likelihood of nuclear Armageddon was small, the consequences were so catastrophic that prudent policymakers felt a categorical imperative to do everything that feasibly could be done to prevent that war. Today, a single nuclear bomb exploding in just one city would change our world. Given such consequences,

differences between a 1 percent and a 20 percent likelihood of such an attack are relatively insignificant when considering how we should respond to the threat. Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called "the only true genius I had ever met", told Congress in March that he estimated a "20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion--not just a contaminated, dirty bomb--a nuclear explosion] with American cities and European cities included." My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent--identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, Nuclear Terrorism, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world's most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is "inevitable." He stated, "I don't see any way that it won't happen."

Err massively against proliferation – the catastrophic nature of our impacts demand 100% certainty before you would vote against usBusch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 313)While abstract theorizing can be found on both sides of the debate, it is especially common among the optimists. Rather than asking how NWSs actually do act, optimists have begun with theories of how states should act—that is, in accordance with supposedly “realist" rational-actor models-—and predicted the actions of states on that basis. One need only recall Waltz’s confident statement, “We do not have to wonder whether they [NWSs] will take good care of their weapons. They have every incentive to do so.”“° On

the contrary, the proper approach to theory would begin with wonder about whether states do, in fact, always act with such

rational incentives in mind. As the present study has demonstrated, there is little empirical support for such an optimistic position where nuclear proliferation is concerned. While realist theories may be useful for explaining certain types of state actions,

they are inappropriate models for predicting specific policies and actions that NWSs will take. Having oversimplified the causes and motivations of state action, the optimists make highly inappropriate policy recommendations regarding nuclear proliferation. Indeed, those recommendations go beyond what

the optimists’ own theories could possibly support. In a context other than the proliferation debate, Waltz argues that his theories cannot predict specific

policies or particular actions by individual states; instead, he maintains, they can predict only general trends."‘ But, as Jeffrey Knopf has pointed out,

when one is advocating a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, predicting general trends is not enough: one must be certain that one’s theories are correct all of the time ."* It is likely that a certain awareness of the special dangers attending nuclear weapons policy leads Waltz to misapply his own realist theory and predict that NWSs will act rationally without exception. But that awareness must be replaced by fully conscious practical reasoning. Empirically grounded theories, combined with the prudence of the policymaker, would lead to policy recommendations that are more sound.



PROLIF BAD – ACCIDENTS

Proliferation creates significant accidental and unauthorized nuclear risks -- India and Pakistan prove they won’t take sufficient protective measures. Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 289)As these accounts suggest, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use could be very high in emerging NWSs, particularly during nuclear crises or periods of domestic instability. The prospects for proliferation are

therefore especially disturbing because emerging NWSs will tend to be more unstable than the established NWSs have been.3° For example, all three of the emerg-ing nuclear powers examined in this study—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—have had significant risks of domestic instability . Although Saddam Hussein proved able to crush any opposition, he did experience a number of coup attempts (the most serious in 1992), as well as repeated riots and uprisings (in 1991, 1995, 1996, and 2000) during his time in power.31 And once an external invasion took place, all central authority evaporated quite rapidly.32 The risks of regime-threatening upheavals are much greater, however, in North Korea and Iran than in Ba'athist Iraq. As we have seen, neither of these countries has great prospects for political stability in the near- to mid-term.33 In the event of severe upheavals or regime collapse, they could experience a rapid deterioration of their central controls over their nuclear weapons and related materials. Nor is it clear that simple command structures in emerging NWSs will significantly reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use, as Seng and Karl contend. Indeed, as several analysts have argued, the rudimentary command-and-control structures in India and Pakistan increase the likelihood of accidental or unauthorized use , particularly during crises. The Indian military currently has little experience in handling nuclear weapons. If India's nuclear weapons were given to the military during a crisis, they would be as inexperienced in preventing their use as they would be in using them.34 Moreover,

because Pakistan currently lacks an enunciated nuclear doctrine, reliable decision-making or communications systems, or explicit targeting information, there is an increased likelihood that Pakistan's own troops might undertake strikes on their own.35 These are risks that any emerging NWS would likely experience as they worked to develop nuclear weapons, formulate use-doctrines, and establish command-and-control systems. But since many of the countries most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future would have to consider the chances of preventive strikes as quite high, they might choose to deploy (or be forced to deploy) their nuclear weapons before they have all these issues sufficiently worked out. In these instances, the simple command structures would not necessarily prevent accidental or unauthorized use, and in fact could increase these risks.

Prolif causes states with hair trigger responses – it’s key to their survival – guarantees accidental nuclear warCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)The performance of forces in our illustrative and hypothetical case is also influenced by the command and control systems that connect political and military leaders with force operators, and with one another. Although

command and control variables have not been built into the model, the implications for command decision making, and for the problem of control during crisis management, are clear enough. The forces most dependent on land based ballistic missiles show the most discrepancy between hair-trigger and slow-trigger responses. On the other hand, states with balanced forces such as Russia, or with major reliance upon

sea based as opposed to land based missiles (Japan), are comparatively less reliant on jumpy warning and fast firing. If hair trigger responses are necessary for survivability, then policy makers and commanders will have few minutes in which to make life and death decisions for entire societies . And missiles of theater or shorter range offer even fewer minutes of decision time than ICBMs, whose intercontinental reach requires 20 minutes or so from silo to silo. Faced with this analysis, states might decide to supplement vulnerable and potentially provocative land based ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Cruise missiles can be based in various environments; on land, at sea and in the air. They can be moved on relatively short notice and can attack from various azimuths with high accuracy.


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 91Other states cannot have failed to notice the U.S. use of cruise missiles to great effect during the Gulf War of 1991 and in punitive strike campaigns throughout the 1990s, as well as during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Cruise missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads: the choice obviously depends on the target and mission, and the decision whether to arm the missile with nuclear or non-nuclear munitions affects its operational range. But it is certainly conceivable that various states in our mix will turn to ALCMs (air launched cruise missiles), SLCMs (sea launched), and ground launched (GLCMs) as weapons of choice for high priority conventional, or nuclear, missions: the absence of air defenses of any consequence, in many states, invites their opponents to explore this option if they can.

Prolif causes an arms race – accidental nuclear warCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)The five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: 1 some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; 2 states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and 3 faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption. To this point, we have discussed the problem of an Asian nuclear arms race as an abstract, albeit sufficiently alarming, problem. In the sections of the article to follow, we want to pin down the concept by detailed interrogation of one hypothetical scenario: an eight-sided nuclear polygon of force structures and, therefore, of probable operational performances in deterrence, in crisis management and, if necessary, in war. Before being scenario specific, however, we need to resolve, or at least address, matters of “philosophy of analysis” or analytic points of departure, pertinent to this study.






PROLIF BAD – CRISIS INSTABILITY

Prolif causes crisis instability in post-Cold War era Cimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation,” vol. 27, issue 5, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Russian-U.S.+Nuclear+Force+Reductions+and+Nuclear+Proliferation&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2008-10-21&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=431&rft.epage=450&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F01495930802185460&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_01495930802185460 /mr)Taken together, Figures 3 and 4 offer bracing news. States in a multipolar, nuclear international system, even under optimal conditions of constrained force sizes, and assuming debellicized political conditions, are caught in a series of tradeoffs between the requirements of deterrence (old style ) and the imperatives of crisis stability (new style ) . Crisis stability “new style” means crisis stability that is viable within a post-Cold War world of uncertain political alignments, and within a world order that is stalked by precarious norms against proliferation. Trying to practice the old medicine in a new world order will be futile. States cannot improve the quality of deterrence simply by building larger forces, because both large and small forces will have to handle the possible trade-offs between deterrence and crisis stability. As well, states’ forces will have to manage the nuanced relationship between generated and prompt-launch stability under uncertainty exacerbated by eight (or more) players.


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CRISIS INSTABILITY T/DETERRENCE

Crisis instability kills deterrenceSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p.7]Crisis stability will obtain between adversaries if neither has an incentive to be the first to attack. An incentives to strike first will exist if states have what is called damage limitation capability That is, if by attacking first a state can destroy its adversary's ability to inflict nuclear damage-if it can destroy its adversary’s weapons on the ground' before they can be used-then that state has a first strike incentive. By destroying its adversary`s weapons a state protects itself from being damaged by those weapon and probably enhances its chance for victory in a conflict. If adversaries' weapons are vulnerable to first strikes, then the one who shoots first is better off; therein lies the problem. If first strike incentives exists, states may race to be the first to launch during a crisis, causing crises to be ‘hair-triggered' and efforts at crisis resolution to be cursory. In a situation of crisis instability, states may hurtle past avenues of peaceful conflict resolution in order to be the first to strike. In short, deterrence may prove unstable if states' capability to inflict



PROLIF BAD – DETERRENCE FAILURES

Regional deterrence failures are likely. They’ll escalate to draw in the US.Pfaltzgraff and Schoff ‘9 (Robert, Prof. Int’l. Sec. Studies – Fletcher School at Tufts, and James, Associate Dir. Asia-Pacific Studies – Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, “Updating U.S. Deterrence Concepts and Operational Planning”, IFPA White Paper, February, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf) Moreover, as suggested above, as more nations seek or attain nuclear status , we may very well be entering an era in which nuclear “non-use” is ending. This means that the risk of deterrence failures is growing, and with it questions about the ability of the United States to control the escalation chain in a crisis situation. During the Cold War, escalation dominance was presumed to lie with the United States, or at least that it could be managed in the U.S.-Soviet context because the stakes of escalation were such that both states were putatively deterred from nuclear weapons use (against the other). Today, however, the same may not be true with respect to North Korea and Iran, let

alone in the context of a Taiwan contingency, or with respect to India and Pakistan in a crisis over Kashmir.

Deterrence failures in the regional context may result from an accident, a deliberate calculation, or the intervention of a third party (e.g., Israel or Taiwan) in a crisis contingency. However, regardless of their origins, the consequences might very well be an escalatory exchange that ultimately draws the United States into a regional nuclear conflict.

Deterrence failure is likely. Incomplete intelligence and irrationality in a regional crisis. Cimbala, 2007 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld]There is no “magic number” of nuclear-armed states that guarantees a first use of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. States will not become irrational on account of the possession of nuclear weapons: indeed, there is some

experience during and after the Cold War to suggest that states might become more careful, rather than less. Many variables intrude here: including the intensity of regional rivalries; ethno-national and religious feelings; and , most immediately pertinent to our concerns, the pros and cons for deterrence and crisis stability of the forces themselves. Nevertheless, the propensity of heads of state for committing military follies should never be underestimated:

especially by students of history and political science. The “rationalities” of states are not of the black box variety. States’ world views and decision making processes are the product of internal as much as external forces. A U.S. model of deterrence rationality may fail drastically in the imminent circumstances of a regional crisis. The strategic reach of Russian or American nuclear forces against lesser nuclear powers should not be overestimated. Iranians with scores to settle against Israel, Chinese intent upon annexation of Taiwan, or North Koreans seeking to intimidate Japan and South Korea, may not believe U.S. threats of preemption or retaliation. Russia’s policy of providing air defense missiles to Iran, increasing the difficulty of Israeli or American preemptive air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ironically invites the erosion of Russia’s own deterrence perimeter once the Iranians are nuclear capable.Downloaded by [University of Michigan] at 12:36 20 July 2011

Nuclear Proliferation, Deterrence in Asia 63 U.S. intelligence cannot be guaranteed to provide timely and accurate warning of nuclear attack by regional revisionist actors against neighbors: or others. U.S. intelligence has not infrequently been the victim of strategic or operational-tactical military surprise by non-Western opponents: from Pearl Harbor to 9–11. Timely and accurate intelligence is even less likely on the intentions or capabilities of non-state actors, compared to states. Intelligence on the best of days can give likelihoods and maybes for

policy makers to mull over. One of the major risks of nuclear weapons spread in Asia is the possibility that states with first strike vulnerable nuclear forces will “use them or lose them” on the basis of faulty indications and warning.

More nuclear weapons increases risks of instability – causes deterrence failureCimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation,” vol. 27, issue 5, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Russian-U.S.+Nuclear+Force+Reductions+and+Nuclear+Proliferation&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2008-10-21&rft.issn=0149-




http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Updating_US_Deterrence_Concepts.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 955933&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=431&rft.epage=450&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F01495930802185460&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_01495930802185460 /mr)The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) anticipated that the acknowledged nuclear powers would work to reduce the size of their own nuclear weapons arsenals, with the eventual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from their respective inventories. For many reasons, things have not turned out that way. Yet the

relationship between nonproliferation and “vertical” disarmament of existing nuclear weapons will not go away. If the current nuclear stakeholders prefer to grow, instead of reduce, their inventories of weapons and launchers, nonnuclear states have additional incentives to join the nuclear club. More nuclear weapons states not only increase the risks of crisis instability and deterrence failure , but at a certain tipping point, the entire nonproliferation regime may collapse .

Traditional deterrence theory is not applicable to the present -- non-state actors and new nuclear statesSchultz et al., 2007 (Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary ofstate from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, January 4,

Wall Street Journal, http://disarmament.nrpa.no/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/A_WORLD_FREE.pdf)Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. North Korea's recent nuclear test and Iran's refusal to stop its program to enrich uranium -

potentially to weapons grade -- highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. In today's war waged on world order by terrorists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate means of mass devastation. And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American "mutually assured destruction" with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?

New proliferators will make deterrence less stable: historical animosity, short-range and civil-military relationships. Cimbala, 2007 [Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld]Nuclear proliferation in Asia, as opposed to Europe, does change the political background for proliferation. The Cold War Americans and Soviets deployed nuclear forces and engaged in other political-military competition

on account of disagreements about ideology. In Asia, states have other, and potentially more volatile, things to disagree about, including: contiguous territory with disputed ownership; grievances left over from past wars; issues of identity and communal membership; and feelings of wounded national pride or

emerging empowerment. In addition to the political differences between nuclear weapons in Cold War Europe and post-

Cold War Asia, there are important military differences. Two stand out. First, actual and possible future nuclear states in Asia are within catastrophic reach of short or medium range as well as long range delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Geography matters. “Tactical” weapons can have “strategic” effects. Second, the variable character of regimes in Asia results in a complicated mosaic of civilmilitary


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 96relationships. Assured positive control of the armed forces by civilians and negative control against accidental-inadvertent war, as operative in the United States and in other democratic states, cannot be assumed. Or even if assumed as valid, controls are obscure in detail to foreign intelligence services or other outsiders.

Deterrence is unstable. Failure is likely even with minimal deterrence. Arbatov, 2006 (Alexei, PhD History and Dir. Center for International Security, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations and Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Politics and Law, “Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation The Dialectics of “Doomsday Weapons””, 44:5, September-October, 35-60) The enormous ambivalence of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world can be explained by one factor: in contrast to prevailing views, deterrence has only rarely and for short periods of time been understood in the narrow sense,

as a strategy for preventing nuclear war. Much more frequently, deterrence has been interpreted in the expanded

strategic sense, usually implying that a country has to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That is another contradiction implicit in nuclear deterrence: it implies the readiness to unleash nuclear war. Fortunately, for the past half-century, this apocalyptic paradox has remained theoretical, but it threatens to become practical in the future because of nuclear proliferation and an increase in multilateral nuclear relations among countries. The idea of nuclear deterrence has become so much a part of international military and political relationships that it is perceived everywhere as quite rational, even inevitable. We agree that nuclear deterrence is, of course, less irrational than nuclear war, especially war between nuclear powers. If, however, we approach the problem not from a purely military and strategic standpoint but from a sociopolitical one, we cast serious doubt on the rationality of

deterrence. Even “minimum deterrence,” the most defensive (because it rejects the idea of a first strike) and

stabilizing version of this strategy, is rather paradoxical. After all, it proposes to kill tens of millions of another nation’s civilians in retaliation for an adversary’s nuclear strike. The act of retaliation is irrational, first, because the massacre of some other country’s population will not restore one’s own dead citizens to life or restore one’s own destroyed material values. Moreover, unlike the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan in World War II, a nuclear strike does not affect the enemy’s ability to continue the war, which depends entirely on what remains in the enemy’s nuclear arsenal and on the functioning of its command-and-control system. Second, in the pre-

nuclear age a country could not begin and wage war without the support of at least part of its population. A nuclear war,

however, can be unleashed without the consent of the people, merely by delivering the High Command’s order to those on duty in the controlrooms for the missile launchers (the latest command-and-control systems can even bypass these individuals by sending the signal directly to the launchers). Although the main target of a retaliatory nuclear strike, the public has no direct responsibility for its supreme leaders’ decision to initiate hostilities. This is especially true of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, where the public not only does not elect its leaders but may have no particular value in their eyes. The leadership of the People’s Republic of China, for instance, demonstrated such an attitude when, in the 1950s–60s, it preached total war as a path to “final victory” over imperialism. In the late 1970s, suspecting the Soviet leaders of similar attitudes, U.S.

President Jimmy Carter approved what he referred to as a “countervailing strategy” in his Presidential Directive (PD)

59 [Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy—Ed.]. It ordered delivery of strikes against targets that presumably the Soviet leaders “valued” above all else—their own lives, meaning the destruction of protected underground bunkers and antinuclear shelters and other shelters for the party–state leadership.1 Understandably, this policy caused extreme pain in the USSR, where people dubbed it “the decapitating-strike strategy” and regarded it as a new, outrageously aggressive manifestation of U.S. strategy favoring a pre-emptive strike against the USSR. Other attempts to rationalize nuclear deterrence, as a rule, also had the opposite effect. For example, attempts to strengthen the capacity of strategic nuclear forces to deliver retaliatory strikes against an enemy’s reserve strategic forces—those that may not participate in a first strike—are invariably perceived as increasing the chances for a preemptive strike rather than for retaliation. This reaction is not entirely without foundation: missile launch silos, submarine and bomber bases, and regions of ground-based ICBM deployment are the same targets that a first strike must take out to avoid retaliation or to reduce its damage. The usual response to such strategic experiments, in addition to increasing the viability of one’s own strategic nuclear forces, was raising the priority of the concept and the technological systems that would be used in a retaliatory strike and plans for the more massive use of weapons. On the whole, if one side tried to give deterrence more credibility by making it more usable (through selective targeting and

limited- impact schemes, plans to restrict the number of warheads, various combinations of small-scale nuclear strikes, etc.), the other side usually saw it as greater aggressiveness in nuclear strategy—an orientation toward a pre-emptive strike and plans for victory in a nuclear war. The greatest paradox of nuclear deterrence is that the potential outcome that best represents the unthinkable nature of nuclear war (massive strikes,

maximum destructive consequences, rapid and unconditional retaliation) would be the worst option if at some point deterrence did not work and nuclear weapons were used in real life. At the same time, attempts to incorporate more “rational” options into nuclear forces and operative planning lower the “nuclear threshold” and inevitably weaken the concept of deterrence. One more, perhaps the most important, indication of the paradoxical nature of deterrence is that no other type of weapon so greatly requires effective control by the political leadership—taking into account the catastrophic consequences of using such weapons, especially by mistake. At the same time, it is without a doubt more difficult, if not impossible, to ensure real political control over the use of nuclear arms than over any other type of weapon. The


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 97travel time of ballistic missiles is so short (from ten to thirty minutes) that political leaders, even if they reached

the command- and-control center in advance, would not have enough time to make a thorough assessment of the situation and a deep and well-considered decision on whether to use nuclear weapons, on which human survival depends. The leadership must, in essence, either act on autopilot— following the algorithm of a solution developed by experts in peacetime, long before the crisis arose and without making allowances for all the diversity of political reality—or do nothing at all, taking the chance that no retaliatory strike will take place. This makes it extremely likely that someone will unleash nuclear war through miscalculation or a technical error.

Rational deterrence theory is flawedCimbala 4 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear proliferation and international systems,” vol. 20, issue 4, , 12/01/2004, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+proliferation+and+international+systems&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2004-12-01&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=321&rft.epage=336&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F1475179042000305787&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_1475179042000305787 /mr)This model of nuclear deterrence rationality is not to be despised or dismissed casually. It offers important clues as to the development of nuclear force structures and to the posturing of nuclear delivery systems and command-control in times of crisis. For example, weapons and command-control systems that are vulnerable to first strikes invite attack and are therefore assumed to be destabilizing. Survivable weapons and command systems, to the contrary, contribute to arms race and to crisis stability. But, despite the fact that RDT leads to useful inferences about force structure and operational habits that are contributory to stability , it falls short of providing sufficient insight into human and organizational behavior that might be more important in crisis management . In addition, RDT is not necessarily what it seems, even in its own terms and based on its own interior logic. The first

point, that RDT falls short of accounting for the causal relationships in large organizations and small groups that make the decisions for peace or war, has been emphasized by Scott D. Sagan in studies of American and other nuclear crisis management. Sagan is especially informative on the proclivities of military organizations, including their organizational mind-sets and standard operating procedures, that could complicate crisis management and contribute to an outbreak of inadvertent nuclear NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS • 331 war or escalation. According to Sagan, among the possibly crisis-dysfunctional proclivities of military organizations is their preference for pre-emption or for preventive war: getting in the first blow, should war appear to be inevitable.^^ This understandable propensity for seizing the initiative in the twilight between peace and war makes sense under many conditions of conventional warfare. But in a crisis between two nuclear armed states, the organizational proclivity for first strikes becomes more of a liability than an asset: preparations for a pre-emptive strike or preventive war might be noticed by the adversary and trigger its own pre-emption. Organizational proclivities or standard operating procedures that drive states toward a reciprocal fear of surprise attack thus conflict with the political objective of nuclear crisis management. Thus the case has been made for the limitations of RDT in taking into account variables inside the black box of decision-making and organizational behavior. Even critics of RDT on this point concede, by implication, that once outside the black box, RDT still makes sense and its logic remains, by and large, compelling. This concession may be premature . RDT is built on a truncated view of rationality . It is a rationality of means, but not of ends. End-rationality would also ask about the implications for society, culture and polity, including humane values, of the various courses of action being plugged into RDT and systems theory. Does the willingness to engage in a nuclear war in order to "save" a society or validate a policy ever make

sense? Perhaps it does, in a very scenariodependent manner. Deterrence theorists contend that socially unacceptable threats of nuclear retaliation are morally good because they "work" well enough, and they cite the Cold War as evidence in favor of their brief. Neither the US nor the Soviet Union fired a nuclear weapon against the other's military forces or state territory despite 40-plus years of global rivalry and a number of serious political crises. Trafficking in nuclear fear may be a dirty business, but it works wonders because even politicians and generals overdosed on

nationalism or testosterone carmot pretend that nuclear war is truly "winnable" or define "victory" at an acceptable cost. The Cold War is, however, mixed evidence for the value of nuclear deterrence as a guaranteed pact for peace. The absence of large-scale war between the Soviet Union and the United States and their allied coalitions was over-determined: by politics, technology, memories of World War II, and the ability of both "superpowers" to get most of their objectives without war. Despite all these inhibiting factors, serious confrontations that could have led to an outbreak of war, including nuclear war, marked the Cold War: the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was only the most publicized and obvious. The peaceful end ofthe Cold War was an historical anomaly to which nuclear weapons and deterrence made a contribution, but only a partial one. The Cold War endgame was driven primarily by factors internal to the Soviet Union, especially


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 98by Gorbachev's oxymoronic skill in dismantling the old Soviet power structures and his equally breathtaking inability to replace the old order with anything durable and legitimate. Gorbachev's desire to hold the Soviet Union together, in competition with Boris Yeltsin's eagerness to lead the march out from imder the Soviet umbrella, created a state of uncertainty within Russia that gave breathing space for diplomatic, as opposed to military, endgames in Germany. It was a sub-system dominant endgame with a systemic overlay, not the reverse. 332 • STEPHEN J. CIMBALA The entire Cold War endgame rested on the willingness of both Soviet and Western alliances to agree the peaceful reunification of Germany. As late as 1989, this still appeared as a political impossibility, resisted by hard liners in Russia and in Western Europe. Against the odds it happened, on account of the determination of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Gorbachev. Systems logic would have dictated a more cautious approach as less threatening to stability, within the Soviet power structures and between the Germanys. The ebullient personalities of the two heads of state and their willingness to be risk-acceptant under extraordinarily fiuid political conditions made legitimate the re-polarization of the continent of Europe. Nuclear weapons and deterrence did play a supporting role here: military adventurism by hard-liners East and West in these troubled but fruitful political times was harder to advocate or to undertake on account of the enormous American and Soviet nuclear arsenals hanging in the background. Considering the peaceful end to the Cold War, therefore, requires that we give the devil his due. RIST and RDT were not irrelevant to an explanation and prediction of policy outcomes during the Cold War, or in the complicated interactions among states that brought the Cold War to a conclusion without war. System structure and polarity did matter: the "long peace" between 1945 and 1991 cannot be explained without paying careful attention to the sizes of the larger billiard balls, the shape of the table, and the movements back and forth across the table as the balls passed or collided with one another. But the initial velocity and direction for each ball was provided by an "actor" not a system, and some balls had enough force or unpredictability to restructure the game, at least temporarily. A bipolar system remained in place from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Soviet Union, but this bipolarity was highly conditional: for most of the Cold War it was only a bipolarity of military power for mass destruction. Cold War experience, inter alia, shows how RIST and RDT offer valuable, but highly contingent, explanatory and predictive insights pertinent to world politics and foreign policy decision-making. RIST and RDT models share with other rational choice theories the attributes of parsimony and an explicitly defined connection between causal and dependent variables. But as explanations and predictions of behavior related to peace and war, they are containers only as good as the historical understanding that is poured into them. Consider, for example, the July crisis of 1914. From a systems theory perspective, it made little sense for the great powers to align themselves on two opposed sides of tightly cohesive and antagonistic blocs, as opposed to maintaining the fiexibility of a five- or six-sided balance of power system. It made even less sense for the leading states of these hostile alliances, especially Germany, France and Russia, to rely upon prompt mobilization and first-strike offensives as a deterrent, when in fact they mainly served as provocation and as proximate causes for escalation. The "system" of great power relationships that created a tolerable and mutually beneficial stability, first forged by Bismarck in the 1880s, was deliberately put at risk by hotheaded poseurs and fogy grandees who put myths of grandeur and hegemony ahead of practical reason. The July crisis of 1914 also offers cautionary tales about the validity of rational deterrence theory. Leaders in July and August 1914 should have been deterred for the NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS • 333 reasons that the leading "deterrence theorist" of prewar fame, Ivan Bloch, argued in his prescient studies. Bloch foresaw that the military technology of the day favored defensive strategies and protracted war, which would exhaust the treasuries and manpower of the combatants. Therefore, leaders of the great powers having been so informed, they would forbear of arms. But leaders were undeterred by the prospect of a longer and more destructive war despite the evidence of costs exceeding benefits. Instead of confronting the evidence, they invented their own version of a future in which rapid mobilization and prompt offensives would guarantee a short, decisive war . Further to wishful thinking, the political leaderships of the great powers in 1914 were all persuaded that, in the event, they would emerge as victors in a short war.^* Additional compromise with rational decision-making was caused by the intelligence assessments with which the powers were provided. The intelligence appreciation of each other's intentions and capabilities in the months preceding outbreak of war were, in the main, marked by misperceptions of enemy intentions, military capabilities, national resolve and security dilemmas as seen by the "other" side.^' It is not a new discovery that history can confound optimistic predictions or rationimal models of choice. But July and August 1914 are revolutionary, not evolutionary, challenges to RIST and RDT Neither RIST nor RDT models would have predicted the preference of leaders to march to the tune of Mozart's "Requiem" in lieu of attempting to play the great game for a decade or two longer. Nor can one deduce the collapse of peace into war in July and August 1914 from gross patterns in trade and technology. In modern terms, the final decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century were times of "complex interdependence" amid growing commercial interchange and scientific optimism among Europeans and throughout the EuroAtlantic region. Hostility was not the result of inter-cultural disconnectedness or economic autarchy. Contrary to the expectations of Marx (a systems theorist par excellence), the edifice of pre-1914 Europe was not brought down by the objective forces of technology and intolerable social dysfunction. Instead, Europe dissolved itself by choice, and the choices were made in its chancelleries by politicians and generals who viewed their obligations to the "system" in the same way that developers view shorelines, or sharks view bait. In their own way, the heads of state, foreign ministers and military boffins of 1914 were as nihilistic as nineteenth-century Russia's anarchists, and equally as determined to demonstrate that individuals with sufficient power and obtuseness can drive any system into a cul de sac. In August 1914 the system was set on "stun" and rational deterrence theory was fed a pacifier in favor of military autism. One can offer various microdots against the arguments here: not all the powers were equally dependent on mobilization as tantamount to war; Britain attempted to maintain fiexibility of alignment amid the obstinacy of other powers until Germany invaded Belgium; Austria-Hungary was a spent Wurlitzer whose willingness to front for German ambitions was misperceived by both alliances as a military asset; and, finally, that widespread feelings of inevitable war among elites and masses in all the great powers created a besotted climate of anger and fear that propelled leaders into hasty decisions. When these and other disclaimers have been acknowledged and the wisdom of hindsight has been conceded, the rubble of August 1914 offers little or no consolation


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 99334 • STEPHEN J. CIMBALA for the proponents of RIST and RDT Equally defiant of rational choice theory was the willingness of the powers to continue the war, long afrer the predictions of short war and decisive victory had been falsified, to the utter destruction of four empires and the economic devastation of all major combatants save the late-arriving United States. The adherence of warlords to dysfunctional plans guaranteeing only military stalemate and exhaustion, in the face of reversals in the field and discontent on the home front, also defied explanation by any theory other than policy inertia and blinkered vision. Project, if you will, an imaginary future with a collection of autocratic regimes in Asia or the Middle East as obtuse to collective security as were the European powers of 1914. Each state is armed with nuclear forces of variable survivability and its military is highly persuaded of the advantages of nuclear first strike. Mass publics are infiamed with nationalism and/or boosted in their enthusiasm for war by religious or ethnic hatred. The potential disputants array themselves into two or more hostile groups based on cultural or other fault lines and eventually persuade themselves of the inevitability of war. If this dismal but possible future is to be avoided, it is a necessary but insufficient dissuader for the pertinent heads of state to be acquainted with systems logic or RDT. They must, in addition, comprehend the potential of human gullibility and fallibility to overturn the system, destroy the commons and turn rationality into political and military sewage. CONCLUSION

None of the requirements for rational deterrence will apply.Beker ‘8 (Yonatan, Foreign Policy Fellow – Senator Norm Coleman and Grad Student – Edmund A. Walsh school of Foreig Service – Georgetown U., Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, “Nuclear Proliferation and Iran:‘Thoughts about the Bomb’”, http://israelcfr.com/documents/issue6_iran.pdf) Sagan proceeds to critique the three operational requirements sustaining the rational deterrence framework: avoiding a preventive war initiated by a nuclear state against a non-nuclear state pursuing a weapon; both sides attaining second- strike survivability; and a nuclear arsenal not prone to accidental or unauthorized use. Waltz points to the possibility of an effective preventive strike taking place against an early-stage nuclear program, but adds that such an attack would not take place against a state with an advanced program. Sagan ascribes to preventive strikes a higher probability for the following reasons: the focus on warfare makes military officers skeptical of non-military alternatives, believing in “better-now- than-never” logic; these officers possess biases in favor of offensive measures and decisive operations, over debilitating diplomatic consideration. Whenever the US and the USSR contemplated preventive strikes against nuclear programs, these strikes were invariably proposed by defense officials and rejected by their civilian superiors. Preventive strikes were employed only twice: against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and against the Syrian–Korean

plutonium reactor in September 2007. These precedents—seemingly successful in reversing nuclear programs— indicate a similar action may be taken against Iran as well.12 As to the second requirement for rational deterrence, Sagan

reminds us that rather than settling—as Waltz predicts—on a limited second-strike capability, comprised of a small amount of invulnerable nuclear devices, the US and USSR amassed enormous arsenals capable of sending our planet back to the Stone Age.13 Sagan explains this contradiction by the continuous pressure applied by military and scientific organizations on decision makers to continue expanding the arsenal. The final requirement for rational deterrence is that nuclear arsenals should not be prone to accidental or unauthorized use. This requirement falters, however, when one considers the lower priority placed on costly safety procedures, as opposed to more parochial objectives such as increasing production levels. New nuclear states could lack the organizational and financial resources needed to guarantee safety, and the secretive nature of these programs exacerbates such concerns, as was the case with Chernobyl. An additional risk arises when a survival-fearing leadership delegates launch authority to lower levels in

the defense hierarchy, as was thought to be the case in Iraq in 1991.

The bulk of empirical evidence disproves deterrence theoryGeller ‘90 (Daniel, Former Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Mississippi, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, 34:2, June, p. 297)The evidence regarding the efficacy of nuclear power as a deterrent is mixed, at best, with the weight of the findings counter to expectations of classical deterrence theory! On the positive side, Intriligator and Brito (1981), Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982), and Betts (1987: chap. 4) present formal models, empirical evidence, and tentative case study conclusions that nuclear weapons do have deterrent impact. Organski and Kugler (1980:176), however, report that in six of their seven relevant cases

that involved confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear powers, the nuclear state lost. They conclude that

the theory of nuclear deterrence is unsupported by their results. In a related piece, Kugler (1984) cites evidence that the

possession of nuclear weapons does not confer an advantage in crises with nonnuclear states, and that

classical deterrence theory is flawed. Russett (1989), Huth (1988), and Huth and Russett (1984, 1988) report that extended deterrence success is not systematically associated with either the possession of nuclear weapons or an advantage in the overall strategic military balance; rather, existing and usable conventional forces in, or

deployable to, the conflict area appear to be a more important factor. Finally, Blechman and Kaplan (1978)

produce findings that the strategic nuclear balance has little salience in crisis outcomes; again, the local balance of conventional military power appears to be determinative.



Deterrence is a flawed theory because its unprovable until it fails -- the risk of nuclear war is too high. Beebe and Kaldor 10 (Shannon, Adjunct Professor, George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, and Mary, British academic, currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance, “The Ultimate Weapon is no Weapon”, 2010, Perseus Book Group, Print)Absolute state sovereignty, war mentality, territorial inviolability, and aspects of superpower rivalry are remnants of this industrial and imperial age. But hard power is hard to shift. The twentieth-century wars established huge embedded institutions in our societies, both in the West and among the newly emerging great powers like Russia, China, and India. Dictators oppose interference. The left fears imperialism. Organizations don’t like change. Statesmen, soldiers, and civil servants naturally think the way they have always one things is the right way to do things. Moreover, the identity of the state is often bound up with a militarized notion of security. Thus, the War on Terror was a popular policy because it reflected popular assumptions about the nature of American power, however out of date. In the same way, it is helpful for Iran, China, and Russia to have a Western enemy. But these are old battles and old wars, and there’s no virtue in fighting them again. Traditional military power no longer works as a way of dealing with potential spoilers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea; indeed, perceiving them as military threats may have the opposite effect of what is intended – legitimizing the buildup of armaments as well as domestic repression. Instead, such states need to be embedded in an interconnected global framework aimed at protecting the human

security of all citizens. Traditional ways of thinking about security need to be reformulated. Sovereignty is no longer absolute; today, states are members of an international system that operates on behalf of the human community and in which all human lives are considered equal. Energy security is a global, not a national

problem. Deterrence, which is an unprovable strategy until it fails, needs to be recast as prevention since a nuclear war is the worst imaginable cataclysm. Above all, war itself needs to be reframed as a human catastrophe, along with natural disasters, famines, and pandemics. Human security is about prevention and avoidance of human catastrophes, rather than protecting us against their aftereffects.

Nuclear deterrence will only solve under near perfect information – in most likely situations it can’t solve conflict and only increases the risk Kraig ’99 (Michael, Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Buffalo, Journal of Peace Research, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment”, 36:2, p. 164-165) When the simplicity of complete information games puts a dent in the armor of pro-proliferation arguments, then one has to wonder how strong those prescriptions really are. Waltz and others believe in the bounties produced by a stable and secure 'balance of power', and since nuclear weapons are presumably the great equalizers, their spread to further states is

seen as a viable alternative for ensuring systemic peace. But questions about balance of power aside, the preceding analysis has shown that nuclear forces are not agents of equalization. Even with sym- metrical nuclear capabilities, stability is still intimately tied to the relationships between credibility, conventional strength, and the dynamics of escalation. The only way that defense is guaranteed for a state with incapable conventional forces is an asymmetric spread of nuclear weapons in its favor, at least according to the assumptions about rules of play and preferences utilized in the model. But this introduces a one-way advantage for the proliferating nation, so that order and stability continue to be elusive. The best of all worlds would be if proliferation favored states that were truly supportive of the status quo, but it is an open question whether such nations really exist especially in the eyes of their main opponents. For example, Israel's situation may be touted as a resounding success, but this is true only as long as Syria and Egypt do not manufacture their own bombs, and only if unilateral advantage for Israelis viewed as a positive outcome. According to the logic of the model, a counter-proliferation with credible Arab nuclear threats could soon change the current non-war outcome (advantage for Israel in areas such as the Golan Heights) to conventional conflict. The possibility of a stable status quo is similarly ambiguous for Taiwan-China, North-South Korea, and Pakistan-India. In each of these rivalries, the presence of incapability at the conventional level for one or both players could produce all-out conventional warfare, or the existence of one-sided escalation dominance could lead to nuclear blackmail. For example, Taiwan might still be defeated in a conventional war under the 'nuclear umbrella' if both it and China have credible nuclear threats, or China's sizeable and well-developed arsenal might simply undermine the credibility of Taiwan's second-stage threats (assuming that the implicit US nuclear threat against China is neutralized through diplomacy or other developments). Similarly, the steady erosion of North Korean conventional forces and the ambiguous nature of US nuclear threats against the North on behalf of its ally are both factors that militate against simple predictions of status quo stability. Thus nuclear weapons, like most miracle cures, are rarely beneficial. They are more likely harmless (doing little to cure the symptoms of conflict) and possibly dangerous (doing much to

make the symptoms worse). Contrary to Waltz, fear of annihilation does not necessarily mean that states


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 101will be 'exceedingly cautious'. Therefore, the best advice for the prospective consumers of the latest miracle cure is the same as it has always been: let the buyer beware.

Deterrence isn’t automatic. Cimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Jervis qualifies as an agnostic because he accepts mutual deterrence through assured retaliation as a basic frame of reference for nuclear stability, but recognizes that deterrence is neither automatic nor risk avoidant. In that recognition he is not

alone among those nuclear strategists who favor assured retaliation to counterforce damage limiting strategies.(39) But one of Jervis's special contributions, his insight into the two-sided character of escalation, results from his

agnostic appreciation of the role of nuclear weapons. Escalation is neither impossible nor certain.(40) If escalation were impossible, then war could be waged safely below the nuclear threshold. If escalation were certain, then no one would start a conventional war involving one or more nuclear powers. The indeterminacy of escalation is what makes it work; the same indeterminacy makes it dangerous.(41) It "works" because leaders who engage in a process of competitive risk taking knowingly enter a sequence of events over which they may ultimately lose control.(42) Like nuclear agnostics, some proponents of nuclear irrelevancy count on an important role for fear of escalation in dampening crises and in avoiding wars, but not necessarily, and not preferably, nuclear escalation.(43)


http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139




AT COLD WAR PROVES DETERRENCE SOLVES

Cold war model doesn’t apply to new wave proliferation.Alagappa ‘8 (Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 19)Finally, an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states raises the issue of stability. Some argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is destabilizing, whileothers argue that it can have stabilizing effects (Knopf 2002; Sagan and WaltzI995). Based largely on deductive reasoning and extrapolating behavior from the Cold War or discarding that experience altogether, the stability-instability debate is unlikely to be resolved. Nevertheless, it draws attention to the possible implica-tions of the spread of nuclear weapons to more states. Although proliferation and stability were also concerns during the Cold War, the present situation is deemed to be different because of the close proximity of the new nuclear weapon states and the intractable conflicts between them (India—Pakistan and Israel-Iran), the totalitarian or theocratic nature and/or fragility of regimes (North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan), their irrational and “roguish” behavior (North Korea,

Iran, andPakistan), and because of safety concerns (Buchan et al. 2003: 22-23). The United States and the Soviet Union did not share a politically significant boundary, and their heartlands were separated by thousands of miles, allowing space and time for response in crisis situations. Although China and Russia, and China and India, border each other, their heartlands are also relatively far apart. In other dyads (India-Pakistan, Israel-Iran, North Korea-_]apan, and North Korea-China), however, Asian nuclear powers are neighbors or very close to each other with very short missile flight times between major cities. In nearly every case, political boundaries are sensitive and disputed, or there is a high degree of mistrust and conflict. Some of these states are also fragile, with the potential for regime

collapse and change. All these considerations have implications for force posture, force security, and crisis stability. The spread of nuclear weapons to more states,along with the multiplicity of threats, also necessitate thinking about nuclearstrategy, and especially deterrence, as a complex multisided enterprise rather thanin the more familiar bilateral mode.

Disputes today are subject to military resolution. Not like the Cold War.Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)Waltz's argument is overly influenced by the experience of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. He implicitly takes that experience and intellectually overlays it on geopolitics after the Wold War. Those elements that lent stability to the cold war bipolar distribution of power are lacking or missing in contemporary regional competitions for power, contrary to the premise held in Waltz's argument of the stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons spread.

As a broad observation, the Soviet Union and the United States did not have clashes of national interest of a magnitude sufficient to warrant a full-scale war between the superpowers. As George Kennan remarked of the Cold War, there were 'no political issues between the Soviet Union and the United States which could conceivably be susceptible of solution by war, even if the state of weaponry had not made any major military conflict between the two powers ~nthinkabl e ' .~' That is certainly not the case in the contemporary security environment in the Middle East and South Asia.

Cold War has nothing to do with current security dilemmas.Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)A unique set of circumstances contributed to the stability that characterized the Cold War rivalry between

the Soviet Union and the United States, but regional rivalries in contemporary and future international relations are unlikely to be as stable. As Eliot Cohen wisely judges: It would be a terrible mistake to think that the elaborate and arid logic

of nuclear deterrence that operated between the superpowers will continue to hold elsewhere. The U.S.-Soviet confrontation took place between a stable, pacific, and contented democracy and a highly rational, cautious dictatorship that found nothing inherently shameful a about retreating in the face of superior force. It was, in many ways, an ideal opposition, and one highly unlikely to be repeated.30 Despite a rivalry beset by

folly and crises, Soviet and American statesmen were able to keep the superpower relationship within bounds short of war. These

fortuitous circumstances, however, are not directly analogous to contemporary security dilemmas in the Middle East and South Asia.


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 103Nuclear agnosticism accurately explains the world post-Cold war – proliferation is riskier nowCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)At the moment, three alternate perspectives guide studies of the relationship between nuclear weapons and international stability. Choosing among these approaches is not merely an intellectual exercise. The choice has serious implications for policy. By offering post hoc explanations of the role played by nuclear weapons in the Cold War,

adherents of each perspective draw inferences about the future role of nuclear weapons and, in particular, about the risks of nuclear proliferation. The realist perspective contends that the spread of nuclear weapons is fully compatible with international stability. Others, myself included, argue that the realist perspective trivializes the risks of nuclear weapons spread by extending a fortuitously correct analysis of th e Cold War experience into the post-Cold War world.(l) The perspective of nuclear irrelevancy is an alternative to realism which

holds (speaking broadly) that the prospects of nuclear war are so horrible as to render war obsolete. This

perspective is seductively appealing to those skeptical of the realist analysis. But it does not really explain Cold War experience very well, and it sweeps tough deterrence problems under the rug of taxonomic obsolescence. A third perspective, nuclear agnosticism, better explains both the role that nuclear weapons actually played in the Cold War and why nuclear proliferation is riskier after the Cold War than before.

Deterrence theory failed in the Cold War and will continue to fail – incites warBeebe and Kaldor 10 (Shannon, Adjunct Professor, George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, and Mary, British academic, currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance, “The Ultimate Weapon is no Weapon”, 2010, Perseus Book Group, Print)The main argument for continuing to possess nuclear weapons is deterrence. That, after all, was the basis of the case for accumulating large numbers of nuclear weapons during the Cold War; they were supposed to deter an attack, whether conventional or unconventional, by the Soviet Union against the democracies of the West. But did they? It is often argued that deterrence kept the peace during the Cold War. Quite apart from the fact that there were many wars during this period outside of Western Europe and North America, the problem with this argument is that it can only be disproved, not proved. Had the Soviet Union attacked the West, then we would know that deterrence does not work. But we do not know whether the Soviet Union would have attacked the West had the West not possessed nuclear weapons. What we do know is that the arms race kept alive the idea of war – it was not peace but “imaginary war” that was experienced in Europe during the Cold War. Indeed, the arcane arguments about strategic, sub-strategic,

and tactical weapons were all about how nuclear weapons might be used in the scenarios dreamed up by military planners. The term arms control has to be understood in the context of deterrence. It was about keeping alive the idea of war while minimizing the risks of such a war becoming real. Hence, arms control was directed against so-called defensive weapons and against sub-strategic or tactical weapons that were thought to be “usable,” while preserving the capacity for “mutually assured destruction.” Since the end of the Cold War, we have plenty of proof that deterrence does not work. The American possession of nuclear weapons did not deter the 9/11 bombers – they inflicted mass destruction even if they did not use what are formally defined as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) – nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons. Likewise, British nuclear weapons did not deter the use of polonium, which could be described as a radiological weapon (i.e., a WMD) according to the formal definition, to poison the Russian dissident Alexander Litvinov repeatedly in a Sushi Bar. A cartoon in the British magazine Private Eye showed Prime Minister Blair saying to Putin, “We need new nuclear weapons,” and Putin replying, “Try Sushi.”

Cold War is the exception, not the ruleCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+







Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 104%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Exceptionality of Cold War Realist arguments for the possibility of a stable nuclear multipolar world are based on the Cold War experiences of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The supposition is that, just as the U.S. and the Soviet political and military leaderships worked out, over time, rules of the road for crisis management and the avoidance of inadvertent war or escalation, so too would aspiring nuclear powers among the current non-nuclear states. However, there are reasons to doubt whether the U.S. and Soviet experiences can be repeated after the Cold War. First, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship between 1945 and 1990 was also supported by bipolarity and by an approximate equality, although an asymmetrical one, in overall U.S. and Soviet military power. Neither bipolarity nor,

obviously, U.S.-Russian global military equity is available to support stable relations in the post-Cold war world: in fact, both are irrelevant so long as Russia evolves in a democratic, capitalist direction and prefers cooperative U.S: Russian foreign relations. A second reason why the U.S. and Soviet Cold War experiences

are unlikely to be repeated by future proliferators is that the relationship between political legitimacy and military control was solid in Moscow and in Washington, but uncertain for many nuclear powers outside of Europe.(7) The issue here is not whether democracies are less warlike than dictatorships are. The question is whether the regime can impose either assertive or delegative military control over its armed forces, and, if it does, the consequences for its crisis management and normal nuclear operations. Assertive control implies a great deal of civilian intervention in military operations and management; delegative control, more willingness to let the military have their own way on operational and organizational issues. Assertive control ensures against "never" types of failure in a nuclear command and control system, at the expense of "always" failures (responding promptly to authorized commands). Delegative control has the reverse emphasis.(8) A third reason why the U.S: Soviet experience may not be normative for newer nuclear powers is that there were no pieces of territory or other vital interests for which one of the sides was committed to go to war rather than to suffer defeat or stalemate. The two sides were generally satisfied by bloc consolidation and by internal power balancing instead of external adventurism and zero sum competition for territory or resources. The preceding observation does

not imply that Cold War crises, such as those that occurred over Berlin and Cuba, were not dangerous. They were dangerous, but the danger was mitigated by the awareness that neither state had to sacrifice a vital piece of its own territory or its own national values (allies were another matter) in order to avoid war. What was at stake in the most dangerous U.S.-Soviet Cold War confrontations was "extended" deterrence, or the credibility of nuclear protection extended to allies, and not defense of the homeland per se.

Even in the context of the Cold war, nuclear weapons dragged on the conflictCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Although arguing for paradigm pluralism, Gaddis leans more toward the perspective of nuclear realists than he does toward those who would contend that nuclear weapons were irrelevant during the Cold War. According to Gaddis, nuclear weapons have influenced post-World War 11 international relations in at least four ways. First, nuclear weapons helped to support an already existing reluctance of the great powers to wage war against one another. Second, states that possessed nuclear weapons became more risk averse. Third, nuclear weapons did not create bipolarity after World War 11, but they did prolong its life, and so, too, helped to

prolong stability. Fourth, nuclear weapons helped to perpetuate the Cold War by saving the U.S., the Soviet Union, and their allies military expenditures on conventional forces, expenditures which if necessary might have forced rethinking of Cold War assumptions sooner.(35) All four of these arguments go against the grain of nuclear irrelevancy, but only the first three are necessarily supportive of the case for nuclear stability. The fourth acknowledges that political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union remained adversarial longer than necessary, in part due to ingrained habits of military hangover. Nuclear weapons helped to freeze a political glacis that became its own worst enemy until a new Soviet leader in 1985 began to take dramatic steps to melt the ice. To the nuclear positivists' contention that nuclear weapons made war less likely because war became more dangerous, Gaddis' fourth argument for nuclear relevancy points to the downside of that contention. The

very weapons of mass destruction that some would contend were instruments of deterrence or peace were also causes of U.S. and Soviet leaders' fears of devastating surprise attack. The capabilities of these weapons were so unprecedented that the very fact of their being targeted at your state made a relationship hostile in military-operational terms even when it had passed into a stage of nonhostility in policy.








AT INDO-PAK PROVES DETERRENCE

Indo-Pak crises prove deterrence failure is possible and nukes don't prevent escalation.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)The analysis in this article contributes to scholarship on nuclear proliferation and has policy implications as well. Its first scholarly contribution is to answer calls for a detailed investigation into the political and military behavior of new nuclear powers. Commenting on this issue, David Karl notes, “The task now before scholars is to go beyond rote arguments over whether proliferation is good or bad and undertake empirical investigations into the actual behavior of new nuclear powers.” 113 Proceeding with such an investigation, this article shows that, first, non-nuclear factors, such as U.S. diplomacy, averted military escalation and ended the 1999 and 2001–02 crises. Thus, contrary to the optimists’ position, nuclear deterrence was not the main factor that ended these crises. Second, a credible case can be made that significant military escalation was quite likely if these crisis-ending factors were absent. In short, the detailed empirical investigation in this article lessens confidence in the deterrence optimists’ emphatic position that, as Waltz puts it, “The obvious conclusion to draw from Kargil [and the 2001–02 crisis] is that the presence of nuclear weapons prevented escalation from major skirmish to full-scale war.” 114 The Optimists and Escalation The above point about nuclear deterrence not averting military escalation has additional scholarly implications—it engages the optimists’ position on escalation in three ways. First, as noted previously, one group of optimists affirms that in a crisis between nuclear rivals, “not escalation but de-escalation becomes likely.” 115 Contrary to this position, this article convincingly shows that escalation, rather than de-escalation, was likely if Washington had not intervened in South Asia’s crises. Second, another group of optimists accepts that some escalation could occur in a crisis but still argues that escalation would be very limited. Those optimists suggest any escalation would involve much less than, say, a few tens of thousands of troops that make up one strike corps. They reason, “Why would any Indian or Pakistani leader order a strike corps across the international border in the face of possible nuclear retaliation?” 116 Yet this article shows that escalation in South Asia’s crises could have involved far more than one strike corps. In June 2002, India was prepared for military operations involving all of

its three strike corps (on the order of over one hundred thousand troops), and this represents a case of very significant rather than just limited escalation. Thus, this article challenges the optimists’ position that nuclear deterrence would limit escalation in a crisis. Third, while optimists accept the possibility of limited escalation, they do not fully examine the pressures and provocations in regional security environments that contribute to escalation. Those factors—related to domestic political pressures, the provocative nature of an attack on national leaders, and the seriousness of the issue

of terrorism—can cause military escalation to far exceed the limited escalation optimists suggest. First, domestic pressures for military escalation may arise when one side is taking high casualties and because of political compulsions for governments to not appear weak, especially near a time of elections. Domestic pressures stemming from high casualties were very prominent in the Kargil crisis. They caused India’s political leaders to repeatedly warn about expanding the conflict despite nuclear deterrent signals from Pakistan. Second, particularly provocative acts such as attacks on national leaders can induce a very strong militarily response. India’s security elites interpreted the

December 2001 militant attack on Parliament as an attempt to wipe out the political leadership. They considered this to be a very serious provocation that warranted a strong military response, and they were not deterred from military escalation in this situation. Third, the issue of terrorism can be viewed by national governments as a serious provocation that warrants a strong and “decisive” military response; this is an issue optimists have not considered. In the words of Prime Minister Vajpayee, India was prepared for a “decisive battle” against terrorism. 117 Further, Pakistan’s nuclear forces were not deterring India’s leaders from such a battle. India’s leaders repeatedly mentioned that they would risk a nuclear strike from Pakistan to stop what they regarded as nearly two decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. 118 In addition, the post-September 11 war on terrorism, and the more permissive international environment for cross-border military action against terrorism, makes national leaders more willing to militarily escalate in the face of terrorist-related crises. Recognizing that the United States undertook a military campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan, India’s political establishment made the case that they too had the right to pursue a military campaign against Pakistan. To summarize, this article more fully engages the optimists’ position on escalation in three ways. First, it refutes the arguments of some optimists that de-escalation rather than escalation is likely in a crisis. Second, it shows that escalation could have been very significant rather than just limited as the optimists suggest. Third, it specifies particular factors in regional security environments that can lead to significant escalation. These pressures and provocations for significant military escalation can contribute to the break down of nuclear deterrence

South Asia proves nothing. Escalation was deterred by US intervention, not nuclear weapons.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)In examining the consequences of nuclear proliferation, scholars and practitioners have extensively debated the question of whether nuclear deterrence prevents war among regional nuclear rivals. Proliferation optimists argue that nuclear deterrence prevents war while pessimists challenge these arguments. 1 South Asia has become an important test bed for assessing these contending claims—India and Pakistan are among the world’s newest nuclear powers, and they were involved in two military crises after their 1998 nuclear tests. In 1999, the two sides fought a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir that caused over one thousand fatalities. In 2001–02, they mobilized a million troops


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 107on their borders and were prepared for a wider conflagration. Eventually, these two military crises did not escalate into larger conflicts, and optimists argue that nuclear deterrence kept the peace in South Asia. Based on this, optimists note that the South Asian case provides one of the strongest pieces of evidence to support deterrence theory. For example, Kenneth Waltz notes, “South Asia is said to be the acid test for deterrence optimists. So far, nuclear deterrence has passed all of the many tests it has faced [in the region].”

Indo-Pak crises prove deterrence failure. Escalation was assured without US intervention in spite of nuclear deterrence.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)Despite nuclear deterrent signals, if the crisis had not eased in both midJanuary and early to mid-June, there is much evidence that India was likely to have militarily escalated. Pakistan had signaled its nuclear deterrent repeatedly during the crisis. President Musharraf later observed, “I personally conveyed messages to Prime Minister Vajpayee through every international leader who came to Pakistan, that if Indian troops moved a single step across the international border or Line of Control, they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan.” 88 In early June, Musharraf sent three emissaries to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, carrying letters with similar messages. One of these emissaries, former army chief General Jehangir Karamat, claimed in Europe that Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons and also spelled out some “red lines” that would trigger nuclear use—an economic or sea blockade, a military threat in the plains, intervention in Pakistani politics, or blockage of Indus River waters by India. 89 Earlier, in December, General Khalid Kidwai, director of the Strategic Plan Division of the Pakistani Army, informed visiting Italian researchers of similar red lines. 90 Finally, the movement of Pakistani missiles in December-January and in May-June, and, more specifically, Pakistan’s three missile tests on 25–28 May, signaled that Pakistan had a capable nuclear deterrent against any Indian military strike. 91 The Indian Army’s own assessment was that Pakistan issued a nuclear signal “during Parakram at least twice—once each by President General Musharraf and foreign minister Abdul Sattar.” 92 Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities did not deter India’s political leaders from being willing to authorize the use of force against Pakistan—they mainly held back from a military attack while nonmilitary options were exhausted. As noted previously, these officials and India’s security elites had been actively exploring the concept of limited war since the Kargil conflict, and in a postSeptember 11 environment, they were also making the case that, like the United States in Afghanistan, New Delhi had the right to cross international borders to fight terrorism. 93 Neither was India’s military deterred from an attack against Pakistan. India’s military came close to attacking Pakistan on two occasions. The first occurred in January when the Indian Army was prepared for two operations in the Kashmir sector. One involved launching air strikes with precision-guided munitions on militant camps across the border and raids across the Line of Control to occupy infiltration points; India’s government had approved this operation and only delayed it (the military was ready to begin this operation on 7 January) while it explored nonmilitary options. 94 A second plan was to occupy areas of operational significance in Pakistan-held Kashmir, such as the Bugina Bulge, the Lipa Valley, or the Hazipir Pass; this operation would require some ten thousand troops, and the Indian government held back on authorizing it. 95 The Indian Army also deployed a few hundred thousand troops along the Kashmir line and the international border. Confronted with even a limited Indian attack in Kashmir, Pakistan’s military was very likely to have retaliated and clashed with these Indian forces. It had instructed its soldiers to respond immediately after the first Indian attack and also issued orders for at least one counter-attack. 96 Pakistan’s army was well positioned for such operations as it had deployed its forces more quickly than India could fully field its strike corps. 97 Second, in May and June, the Indian Army was prepared to launch a larger military campaign not restricted to the Kashmir sector. India’s military plan was to seize Pakistani territory, to draw Pakistani forces into combat and attrite them, and to trade Pakistani territory for concessions in ensuing negotiations. 98 It was prepared for such a campaign for several months. Thus, since January, the Indian Army had moved three mountain divisions from eastern India to the Jammu corridor and had also moved 1 Corps to Rajasthan. The Indian Army then had all three of its offensive strike corps—1, 2, and 21 Corps—in the Rajasthan area. To counter these, Pakistan would have had to use its Army Reserve South and to move its Army Reserve North southward. India’s military was confident that the ensuing attrition

battle would end in India’s favor. 99 In short, while India’s leaders were cautious about a military attack, the evidence indicates they were not being deterred from major military action. Confirming these points, India’s national security advisor said, “I don’t think anybody relished the idea of war .... But there was the inevitability that if we don’t do this, Pakistan will get away with something horrendous.” 100 Further confirming these points, Prime Minister Vajpayee unambiguously noted that if Pakistan had not agreed to end infiltration, and if Richard Armitage had not conveyed that guarantee to India (in June), then war would

not have been averted. 101 More central to this article’s argument, Pakistan’s nuclear forces were not deterring India from its planned

military action. Prime Minister Vajpayee emphasized that India was ready to risk a nuclear strike from Pakistan

to stop what India regarded as nearly two decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. 102 Indeed, three times in late December and early January, India’s political and military leaders declared that India could absorb a nuclear strike and retaliate against Pakistan. 103 Further, interviews with India’s senior-most political leaders indicate that nuclear weapons were not stopping plans for war. Such interviews reveal, for example, that for one full day in January, India’s political leaders intensely discussed and came close to a decision to initiate war, and at key moments in both December-January and May-June, they consulted extensively on war plans with the military Chiefs of Staff committee. In all these deliberations, there was no indication that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were halting India’s war plans. 104 If India had launched offensive operations against Pakistan, the resulting conflagration would have been significant. While it is not possible to accurately predict the extent of such a conflagration, a rough order of magnitude assessment is possible. Both the Indian and Pakistani militaries had mobilized a few hundred thousand troops on their border. India’s first military operations in the Kargil crisis or in January 2002 may have been confined to the Kashmir sector. Thereafter, depending on Pakistan’s response, India could have expanded operations to other sectors, and these operations would, even initially, have involved tens of thousands of troops. (Simulated military exercises of such offensives involved some 25,000–40,000 Indian troops advancing 50–80 kilometers into Pakistan). 105 In June 2002, India planned an even larger offensive, involving all three of its strike corps and over a hundred thousand troops. In such a situation, within a few weeks of combat, some twenty-eight Indian divisions would be clashing with twenty-one Pakistani Army divisions on Pakistani territory. 106 All this indicates that any IndiaPakistan military confrontation would have been substantial.



AT INDO-PAK PROVES DETERRENCE (KARGIL)

US intervention, not nuclear weapons prevented Kargil escalation.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)The Kargil crisis eventually ended not because India’s military was deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear forces and so refrained from expanding hostilities.

Instead, the crisis ended because of U.S. diplomatic efforts on 4 July, which gave Pakistan a face-saving way to withdraw its troops from across the Line of Control. American bureaucrats and diplomats viewed the Kargil conflict with concern from the moment it began in May; they feared that if India responded strongly to the intrusion by militarily escalating, then a conventionally weaker Pakistan would quickly use its nuclear forces. Accordingly, they formulated a diplomatic strategy that stressed the sanctity of the Line of Control and that called upon Pakistan to withdraw before India initiated a major war. 29 On 4 and 15 June, President Clinton called Prime Minister Sharif to urge Pakistan to pull out of Kargil. Clinton also called Prime Minister Vajpayee to seek Indian restraint. American diplomacy intensified after 17 June when President Clinton received a letter from Prime Minister Vajpayee that explained how media images of Indian soldiers in body bags were raising public pressure on Vajpayee’s government to attack Pakistan. Clinton then sent two emissaries to Pakistan—General Anthony Zinni, head of the U.S. Army’s Central Command, and Gibson Lanpher, deputy assistant secretary of state. 30 Zinni and Lanpher met with Pakistan’s army chief Pervez Musharraf on 24 June and then with

Prime Minister Sharif and Musharraf on 25 June. American diplomatic efforts at this time did not end the Kargil crisis, but they opened a critical line of mediation for both parties, a line which was used in July to end the crisis. Prime Minister Sharif called President Clinton on 2–3 July and met him on 4 July, seeking ways to end the crisis.

Absent US intervention, Kargil escalation was probable.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)If Washington had not given Pakistan a way to withdraw its forces in July, two outcomes were possible. One outcome could have involved India reversing the intrusion in a few weeks. Indian sources reported that India’s military recovered some 75 percent of the area of intrusion, including the important Tiger Hill enclave on 4–7 July, and India could have quickly evicted the remaining intruders thereafter. 34 Further, in hindsight, Pakistan’s position on the ground appeared weaker than the military establishment assumed. Thus, one outcome could have resulted in the Kargil crisis ending after India evicted the intruders. In this case, a non-nuclear factor—Indian military gains on the ground—would have been responsible for ending the crisis, which therefore still tempers the optimists’ case. Further, even if we accept this outcome, a thorough test of deterrence optimism would have to consider the question of how India would have responded if it had not been able to reverse the intrusion quickly and without incurring high casualties. A second possible outcome involved a situation where India would have continued to take high casualties and may not have been able to quickly reverse the intrusion. In early and mid-July, Pakistan’s military could have continued to fight in Kargil for two reasons: it still held key posts in Indian territory, and it was unwilling to unconditionally withdraw from these positions. On the first point, in its own assessment, Pakistan’s military still held more than half the area of the original intrusion at the time of the withdrawal decision. 35 Illustrating Pakistan’s strength on the ground in mid- and late July (after the temporary cease-fire from 12 to 16 July), Pakistani forces still held and skirmished with Indian troops over several strategic positions. These included Point 5353 in the Dras sector, which was the highest feature in the area and enabled Pakistani forces to direct artillery fire on the Srinagar-Leh highway; Bunker Ridge and Ring Contour in the Dras sector; Point 4925 and Zulu Spur in the Mashkoh sector; and Area Saddle in the Batalik sector. 36 Indian and Pakistani troops also clashed at Points 5220, 5590, and 5720 in the Turtok sector until early August. 37 Second, in the absence of the U.S. exit strategy in July, Pakistan’s military was not willing to withdraw from territory it still held, especially not without some U.S. role in ending hostilities or Indian concessions. Illustrating this, during meetings with General Zinni on 24–25 June, General Musharraf did not agree to a unilateral withdrawal and instead linked a Pakistani withdrawal to reciprocal steps by India or to U.S. involvement in Kashmir. 38 Owen Bennett-Jones accurately describes the military’s unwillingness to end hostilities. “Sharif wanted a way out but it was far from clear how he could extricate himself .... The Pakistanis’ strength on the ground helps explain why so many in the military establishment resented the order to pull back.” 39 In short Pakistan’s military could have held on to positions under its control. During and after the mid-July cease-fire, it was still laying mines, counterattacking Indian troops in a few instances, and even reinforcing some positions on a small scale; troop reinforcements from the Rawalpindi corps started reaching the mountains toward the end of June and had hostilities continued in July, they would have helped consolidate Pakistani positions. Pakistan’s military

would thereby have continued to inflict casualties on Indian forces seeking to retake these positions. If the conflict thus dragged on in July, there was a strong possibility that India would have widened its parameters despite nuclear signals from Pakistan. These signals included the display of Ghauri missiles. As Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh observed, “We did see certain degree of movement near Jhelum where the missiles, the Pakistan missiles are, and we saw them moving towards redeployment.” 40 Another signal involved deterrent threats by Pakistani leaders. 41 On these nuclear signals, Pakistani officials maintained that the movements of missiles were only a precautionary operational maneuver and that local-level commanders were following standard

operating procedures of protecting missiles in a situation where opposing conventional forces were mobilizing. 42 U.S. officials have noted that missile movements were not defensive: U.S. analysts had examined and discounted the defensive aspects. 43 Regardless of whether Pakistan’s missile

movements were a dispersal or a deployment, at least some policy makers in Washington and New Delhi interpreted them as a nuclear warning. Thus, Indian defense minister George Fernandes asserted that Pakistan issued nuclear threats in late June and early July, and Washington’s own assessment was that on 3 July, there was “disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment.” 44 Despite Pakistan’s nuclear signals,

India’s military was making preparations for a wider war. First, the Indian Navy had concentrated its forces in the Arabian Sea and was ready to blockade Pakistan’s ports—during the crisis, India’s navy gradually increased the pressure on Pakistan in eight stages. 45 Second, and more significantly, the Indian Army undertook a major military build up, deploying artillery and tank units and strike and reserve formations along the Western border with Pakistan. The army leadership visited every corps headquarters on the western front to discuss and lock in operational plans; the army redeployed its strike and reserve formations; it stocked forward logistics bases in accordance with military plans; and, beyond the deployment of these main army units, an amphibious force (108th Infantry Brigade) was moved to the western sector. In response, Pakistan’s director general of military operations expressed concern about this Indian deployment of troops and armor on the western sector.

Kargil disproves deterrence optimism. India would have escalated without US intervention.Mistry ‘9 (Dinshaw, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. and Dir. Asian Studies – U. Cincinnati, Security Studies, “Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia”, 18:1, InformaWorld)It should be clarified that Indian political leaders were cautious about crossing the Line of Control and international border. Any such attack would have involved a request by the army chief to the political leadership and Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) as well as an explicit decision by the political leadership to violate the border. 50 Yet India’s military came close to making such a request in mid-June (when India had not recaptured much territory), and a cross-border attack would also have been possible in July had the crisis not eased. In July, one main non-military alternative to resolving the crisis (bilateral India-Pakistan diplomacy) had faltered, and if U.S. diplomacy had also faltered, Indian military escalation was quite possible. By then, as

noted above, India’s army had made extensive military preparations for cross-border action, and its leaders were

prepared to authorize major operations into Pakistan if they encountered high casualties and a worsening tactical

situation. Thus, the tactical military situation on the ground, rather than Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, was


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 109the main determinant shaping India’s ultimate decisions on expanding military hostilities in July. In summary, non-nuclear factors related to American diplomacy were primarily responsible for ending the Kargil crisis in July 1999. Had these factors not been present and had other conflict resolution mechanisms such as India-Pakistan diplomacy remained unsuccessful, hostilities would have continued. If such hostilities resulted in heavy Indian casualties, India was likely to have expanded military operations despite nuclear signals from Pakistan. India’s initial military operations were planned in the Kashmir sector across the Line of Control; India’s political elites and interlocutors repeatedly informed international leaders about this possibility. Thereafter, depending on Pakistan’s response, and the tactical situation on the ground, operations could have expanded to other sectors along the international border—India’s military had mobilized and was prepared for large-scale military operations in these sectors. These points temper the optimists’ case that nuclear deterrence was the main factor that ended, and

would have prevented escalation of, the Kargil conflict



AT NUKES ONLY FOR DETERRENCE

New powers will see nuclear weapons as useful for offensive warfighting, not deterrence.Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)How major regional powers view nuclear weapons is a critical question. Do statesmen in the Middle East and South Asia value nuclear weapons principally for their deterrent qualities? Or do they believe that nuclear weapons could serve strategic and tactical purposes in war? During the cold war, American strategic thought on nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by Bernard Brodie, who argued that nuclear weapons were only good for deterring wars, not for fighting them.38 Do contemporary regional powers find logic similar to Brodie's equally convincing in contemporary circumstances? Is it possible that Brodie does not translate or resonate in non-Western cultures? As Peter Feaver has pointed out, the strategic culture of nation-states is a critical factor because it is produced by 'the long shadow of military and political history which generates attitudes about the usefulness of military force (and particularly nuclear weapons) as an instrument of state policy'." He warns that, 'The ambiguity of the strategic culture factor is ample reason for being cautious about making dogmatic claims for its precise influence in proliferating countries.'40 Other nation-states might take away a 'lesson of history' from the American

use of nuclear weapons against Japan in World War I1 that nuclear weapons can be strategically used to win wars. In fact, in the early stages of developing American nuclear doctrine, the United States was inclined to view nuclear weapons as merely another weapon, much as we view artillery, aircraft or tanks. Betts reveals that for

20 years after World War I1 American 'presidents had an almost facile inclination to introduce vague nuclear threats in military confrontations despite the apparent vulnerability of the United States to Soviet retaliation'. ' President Eisenhower, for example, threatened to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War and in the disputes between China and Taiwan." These situations illustrate the point that nation-states may view nuclear weapons as effective tools for imposing their wills upon those of adversaries.



EXTS – DETERRENCE FAILS (NON-STATE ACTORS)

Terrorists and rogue states are not deterred by nuclear arsenals Beebe and Kaldor 10 (Shannon, Adjunct Professor, George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, and Mary, British academic, currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance, “The Ultimate Weapon is no Weapon”, 2010, Perseus Book Group, Print)Actually, President George W. Bush used a similar argument. In the National Security Strategy of 2002, it was argued that deterrence does not work against rogue states and terrorists. Suicide bombers and mad leaders do not fear retaliation; indeed, they might welcome retaliation since they do not care about human life and it would prove that they are involved in a war against the West. This explains Bush’s

emphasis on counter-force to deal with proliferation – hence the threats against Iran. But if leaders like Ahmadinejad are not rational, even a threat could be dangerous. And if deterrence only works against states that are rational, why do we need nuclear weapons at all? Surely no rational state would threaten to use them. We need another approach.

Deterrence theory is not applicable to modern circumstances because of irrational actors or weak security – Pakistan provesPant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)The last few years have been particularly difficult for the global non-proliferation and arms control regime. From Iran to North Korea, from the nuclear black market of A.Q. Khan to Brazil, new challenges are emerging virtually every other day that threaten to undermine the global arms control architecture. Forced by India’s open challenge to the global arms control and disarmament framework in May 1998, major powers in the international system have been re-evaluating their orientation towards global arms control and non-proliferation. The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 were the first open challenge to the system, especially by a “responsible,” opposed to a “rogue,” member of the international community. Some might argue that surreptitious Chinese weapons proliferation and clandestine nuclear programs undercut the arms control regime long before the Indian nuclear tests. Nonetheless, India’s nuclear tests significantly altered the contours of the existing security architecture already under stress in the post Cold War era. India’s open defiance marked the real beginning of the end of the non-proliferation regime as the world had known it until then, forcing the international community to look at nuclear proliferation through a different lens. For a long time, the West has viewed nuclear weapons in South Asia with dread because of the possibility that conventional warfare between India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear war. Indian and Pakistani officials, on the other hand, have continued to argue that, just as the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction resulted in “hot peace” between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, nuclear weapons in South Asia will also have a stabilizing impact. Since September 11, 2001, however, the nature of the problem for the region and the world at large has changed, insofar as the threat now appears to be Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being used by radical Islamists if they can manage to wrest control of it. There is little hope that the rational actor model on which classical nuclear deterrence theory is based would apply as much to Islamist terrorist groups as it would to the Pakistani government. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there were suggestions that the US had

explicitly sought guarantees from the Musharraf government that its nuclear arsenal was safe. The present turmoil in Pakistan continues to raise concerns about the safety, security, and command of its nuclear stockpile. Though Pakistan’s government is always quick to dismiss reports that its nuclear weapons are in danger of falling into the wrong hands as “inspired” and stresses that Pakistan provides the highest level of institutionalized protection to its strategic assets, the credibility of such claims remains open to question.

Non-state actors operate outside of traditional deterrence theory Pant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)The underlying reality in South Asia is that despite a number of crises post-1998, nuclear deterrence remains robust insofar as state-tostate ties are concerned. The real problem now is that of the non-state actors who may try to sabotage this stability. The jihadi groups that have been nurtured by the Pakistani State to

further its agenda in Kashmir and elsewhere have now turned against their sponsors. This new problem complicates the


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 112old nuclear deterrence model in the South Asian context. And, it is this issue that should be the focus of future studies of the consequences of nuclearization in South Asia



PROLIF BAD – IRRATIONALITY

Rationality is a uniquely poor assumption for nuclear war planning.Mozley, 1998 [Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 15]Kenneth N. Waltz, who over a decade ago published The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, has been very

influential. In that paper he concluded that general proliferation would create a more stable situation among nations. His only qualification of this argument is the suggestion that the proliferation be gradual. His paper is comprehensive in its discussion of the dangers of proliferation. However, through his best-case analysis of these dangers, he reached the conclusion that more proliferation was better. Watlz’s paper ignores the limitations of a generalization based on the single example of the Cold War. He is not bothered by the knowledge that each situation of conflict is different. He assumes that all national decisions are made rationally and that nations actually carry out the wishes of their leaders. He does not allow for errors, incompetence, or

insubordination. In the situation in which a national leader does not want to start a conventional war, and

finds that some of his directives are being ignored by the national bureaucracy, he will generally have time, measured in

weeks, to correct any national actions he did not intend. If he is trying to correct actions that lead to nuclear war, he may have only a few minutes.



PROLIF BAD – MISCALC

Proliferation risks miscalculation.Mozley ’98 (Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 12) A lack of technical proficiency in less-developed nations can result in unstable bombs. Normally, a nuclear weaon is made to produce a nuclear explosion by the detonation of conventional explosives,

which in turn compresses a shell or sphere of uranium or plutonium to a much higher density, of supercritical value. This conventional explosion must be brought about with very accurate timing. A nation unable to master this technology can compensate by using more fissile material, which makes the weapon more nearly critical before detonation. Such a weapon will of necessity be more easily set off by a detonation of its conventional explosive, which could occur if it were dropped and would certainly happen if a plan carrying a weapon were to crash. A New York Times Magazine article reported on the findings of U.S. inspectors when they examined the design of the nuclear bomb the Iraqis had developed: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb – it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off- even while sitting on the workbench. “It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one inspector says, adding: “I wouldn’t want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk.”



PROLIF BAD – PRE-DELEGATION

Risk of preemption means pre-delegation making nuclear escalation more likely. Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)To guard against nuclear 'decapitation' nation-states might delegate release authority for the use of nuclear weapons to lower echelons of command. The delegation of release authority would ensure that field commanders had the means to retaliate against an adversary that had succeeded in eliminating the country's leadership in the capital or to ensure that fielded forces could resort to nuclear weapons to defend against offensive ground operation^.^^ Indeed, such a scenario has an historical precedent. Gaddis points out that during the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev had authorized the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba to use tactical nuclear weapons if an American military attack was underway and he could not reach Moscow to confirm permission to use them.50 More recently, Saddam Hussein claimed to a delegation of US senators, visiting Iraq months before Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, that he had predelegated launch authority for chemical weapons to military commanders in the event of an Israeli nuclear strike on Baghdad.s' Presumably Saddam would have be willing to predelegate authority for nuclear weapons retaliation had he had that capability at the time. Indian civilians - in control of India's nuclear weapons - have prepared sealed instructions to be opened by military commanders in the event that Pakistani or Chinese nuclear strikes have destroyed the civilian command authority in New Delhi.52 A field commander faced with the prospect of defeat might have fewer reservations about resorting to nuclear weapons than a statesman far removed from the battlefield.



PROLIF BAD – PREEMPTION

Prolif encourages “use or lose” mentality – risks preemption and war Cimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “Connecting the Dots: Nuclear Arms Control and Proliferation After Bush and Putin,” vol. 21, issue 2, pg. 259-278, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Connecting+the+Dots%3A+Nuclear+Arms+Control+and+Proliferation+After+Bush+and+Putin&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2008-04-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=259&rft.epage=278&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040802067094&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_13518040802067094 /mr)The outcomes of these scenarios are not necessarily surprising, but they are informative. Relative to the United States and Russia, other nuclear powers have force structures with less diverse, and almost certainly less survivable, launch platforms. One reason for this is that, at least until now, only a few states have had the capacity to deploy and operate ballistic missile or cruise missile submarines. The operation of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) requires not only a fleet with appropriate weapons systems and sophisticated command-control, but also numbers of highly trained crew and a certain tradition of elitist nuclear navalism. A more prudent choice for newer or smaller nuclear powers in search of more survivability might be to deploy cruise missile firing submarines – but on the

basis of Russian experience with the sinking of the Kursk in 2000, this is no small challenge either. The weapons of choice for smaller and newer nuclear states will almost certainly be land based ballistic missiles and tactical or operational-tactical aircraft. Short and medium range ballistic missiles have spread to many countries, including some that would like to join the nuclear club. North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons, has been a continuing source of ballistic missile proliferation. Land based ballistic missiles have simple command-control compared to nuclear submarines, and they have a higher probability of penetrating any enemy defenses compared to attack aircraft. The disadvantages of ballistic missiles are two: they cannot be recalled after launch (unlike

aircraft), and they are first strike vulnerable, encouraging a “use them or lose them” mentality in a crisis. One of the ironies of spreading short, medium or even intermediate range ballistic missiles around the

planet is that the shorter the range of the missile, the less may be the warning of attack to the defender. Knowing this, defenders anticipating attack may prefer to jump the gun for one of two reasons: a decision for preemption, based on the assumption that an attack is already in progress or has been decided upon and is imminent; or, a decision for preventive war, on the assumption that war “now” is better than war “later” which is unavoidable. The Bush administration has to some extent elided the difference between preemption and prevention in its declaratory policy for anticipatory attacks against terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 15 15See Karl P. Mueller, et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), for an assessment of past and present U.S. experience. View all notes The discussion here makes a different point. The difference between the defender's perceived risk of a preemptive attack, compared to a preventive strike, may become gradually less clear, in proportion to the time between missile launch and arrival at the intended target. In the same way that I might muddle the distinction between a “mild” and a more serious heart attack if I were frightened

out of my wits by either, a target state with some first strike vulnerable forces might not wait for the actual onset of a crisis to parse the distinction between preemption and prevention. Short form: give enough short range and medium range ballistic missiles to enough angry people with WMD, and you have a recipe for mass destruction on the installment plan.

Future proliferators will use nukes, not deter. Preemption is likely.Cimbala ‘7 (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld) Deterrence (or compellence) theories depend for their effectiveness on an understanding of war or crisis as a bargaining process, in which utilities are defined commensurably as between the belligerents. The existing and future probable proliferators in the Middle East and Asia may see nuclear weapons as absolutes or

gold standards of modern military power. They may also believe that preemptive (or preventive) war is preferable to riding out an attack that appears to be imminent (or inevitable). Smaller nuclear arsenals may

tempt nuclear first strikes or first uses as the cutting edge of a first strike. From a systems perspective, deterrence in a multipolar nuclear world is not necessarily more likely to break down than in a bipolar one: but the

term “necessarily” is used advisedly. More nuclear-armed states with dyadic or other conflicts may create a Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach

http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Connecting+the+Dots%3A+Nuclear+Arms+Control+and+Proliferation+After+Bush+and+Putin&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2008-04-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=259&rft.epage=278&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040802067094&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_13518040802067094



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 117tipping point, beyond which deterrent fatigue gives way to competition in preemptive strategies. Such a process occurred on the eve of World War I, escalating the assassination of an archduke into a war of unprecedented destruction.

Prolif causes preemption – lowers threshold of deterrence, encourages first strike fears, and causes positive feedbacks that escalatesCimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Missile Defenses in a “Deuces Wild” Context: Proliferation, Terror and Deterrent Disorder,” vol. 25, issue 1, 1/1/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Missile+Defenses+in+a+%22Deuces+Wild%22+Context%3A+Proliferation%2C+Terror+and+Deterrent+Disorder&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2006-02-01&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=FCST&rft.externalDocID=1182855721 /mr)The implications of ballistic mi.ssile defenses fornuclear weapons spread, and for the related possibility of nuclear terrorism, depend upon: (1) advances in missile defense technolojzy relative to offenses: (2) the

political goals and intentions of ''.status quo" and revisionist actors, within and across regions; and (3) the transferability of nuclear technology and know-how across state lines into the hands of extreme revisionist states or terrorists. Scholars and expert policy analysts have, since the end of the Cold War, disagreed about the viability of the nonproliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proiiferation Treaty (NPT). Defenders of the NPT regime credit it with the past accomplishment of having slowed the nuclear arms race during and even after the Cold War. Critics suggest that the NPT regime, however well it perfoimed in the past, is unsuited to the demands of the twenty-first century. Skeptics point to the greater risks of nuclear weapons spread among states, especially in Asia, and the interest of rogue or revisionist states and terrorists in acquiring WMD, including nuclear weapons.'Shocks to the

NPT system have heen administered by the declared nuclear statuses of India, Pakistan, and North Korea, bringing the number of acknowledged nuclear powers to eight (Israel does not acknowledge its assumed nuclear

weapons capability). Iran has declared its intent to complete a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes, but the U.S., its European allies and the IAEA suspect that Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons to support an assertive regional political strategy. Although few have noticed, Japan's stocks of weapons-grade plutonium combined with its scientific and technological expertise make it a "virtual nuclear power" on standby, capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within months of a decision to do so.' ^ Eailure to reverse North Korean nuclear proliferation creates additional incentives for Japan to go nuclear. A

nuclear-armed Japan, in tum, raises anxieties among China, Russia and both Koreas. If the NPT system is in disrepute or disarray, then the competent management of further proliferation may include the option of defenses against ballistic missiles of theater or longer ranges. States" options faced with the possibility of nuclear blackmail include: (I) conventional or nuclear preemption against the blackmailer's offensive weapons; (2) acquiescence to the blackmailer's demands; (3) reliance on a strategy of "deterrence by denial" that would deny the blackmailer his objectives by deploying effective BMD; (4) reliance on a strategy of deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable second strike retaliation; or (5) some combination of one or more of the above, depending upon the political situation and state of the art in military capabilities. The various options have costs and benefits. The Bush administration has endorsed preemption as an option against terrorists and rogue states, especially those that might be armed with WMD. But if the option of preemption becomes a rule and not an exceptional mode of conduct, it lowers the threshold of deterrence, encourages first strike fears, and pushes states toward the adoption of nuclear prompt launch. Option number two, acquiescence to the demands of a nuclear blackmailer, may be forced upon a state in a crisis, but once it happens, the victim has every incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability. A strategy of "deterrence by denial" (option three) would return classical strategy to the second nuclear age, offensive and defensive technologies—and military options supported by those systems would compete at the margin for operational and strategic ascendancy. The fourth option, classical Cold War deterrence redux. based on the threat of mutual societal

vulnerability, does not require defenses but may find that defenses are "friendly" supports to deterrence in a post-Cold War international system pregnant with aspiring new nuclear states. The

uncertainty of the NPT regime, and the evident march of the revisionists toward nuclear competency, will require states to move away from sole reliance upon option four (mutual vulnerability) to a retaliatory capability combined with defenses (option three). How capable these defenses need to be depends upon the opposed threats with which they must cope. No state among the current or prospective nuclear powers requires nuclear arsenals and the variety of delivery vehicles available to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union during the High Cold War. Minimum deterrent forces that are survivable and capable of inflicting historically unprecedented damage on any attacker's society will suffice to give pause to sensible leaders. Defenses that supported second-strike postures


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 118by limiting damage and protecting retaliatory forces could make minimum deterrent forces more viable, and preemption less appealing.

Prolif causes preemptionCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)Because the consequences of even a small nuclear war would be socially and ethically unacceptable, the decision path for getting there resists modeling by the standards of rational policy making. One

study calls our attention to the problem that preemption is often mischaracterized by students of conflict: The fear of preemption is a natural one for military planners and political leaders, but the concept of preemption is often poorly understood. Preemption is not an offensive strategy but a defensive one. It is an attack motivated by the expectation that the opponent has already launched an attack or is about to. The object of preemption is to beat the enemy to the punch. It is because preemption is a defensive strategy and not an offensive one that it is so dangerous; one side or both could strike out of fear and despite the apparent consequences. 8 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Conflict Termination and Intrawar Deterrence,” Ch. 5 in Cimbala and Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict, pp. 131–164, citation pp. 135–136, italics added. View all notes Nuclear proliferation may increase the abstract possibility of a nuclear crisis and of a mistaken decision for preemption. But there is no deterministic relationship between more weapons and a greater likelihood of bad decisions. 9 For arguments on both sides of the issue whether nuclear weapons spread will increase the probability of nuclear war, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Academics can always offer competing arguments, but few (if any) current or former U.S. government officials with experience in nuclear force planning or arms control have argued that “more is better” with regard to nuclear proliferation. View all notes The present discussion leaves us somewhere between linear and nonlinear models of nuclear proliferation, leaning toward the latter. As untidy as this decision might be, from a strictly scientific point of view, it fits the spongy reality of world politics and the uncertainty of forecasting social unknowns. In the next section, we develop a specific scenario for multiple Asian nuclear actors and test out some propositions about their arsenals.

Fears of attack and subjectivity of nuclear forces guarantees preemptionCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)We noted previously that decisions for war or nuclear blackmail will probably be driven by political variables more than military ones. Nevertheless, even in the case of nuclear forces which are intended more for coercion than for actual use, it can matter a great deal how they are deployed, and operated, short of war. The deployments and operational modes for nuclear forces may seem as if they are “hard” or “objective” facts, and to some extent they are: whether weapons are to be land or sea based, how many warheads or re-entry vehicles are carried by a particular missile, and so forth. On the other hand, nuclear force deployments and operational characteristics also have subjective properties. Weapons, launchers, and command-control protocols “communicate” intentions with respect to the probable or possible behaviors of states and their leaders: intentions that might not be correctly interpreted or understood by other states. During a crisis in which one or more states contemplate the possibility of nuclear attack, countries will not only listen to one another's diplomatic statements: they will also watch what the other fellow is doing, including his military capabilities and maneuvers, for clues about his future behavior.

Proliferation causes preemptionCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?


http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281







Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 119ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)In addition to the plausible interest of terrorists in nuclear weapons, there is also the disconcerting evidence of nuclear entrepreneurship resulting in proliferation. The A.Q. Khan network of Pakistani and other government officials, middlemen, scientists and nondescripts trafficked for several decades in nuclear technology and know-how. The Khan network, described as a Wal-Mart of nuclear proliferation, apparently reached out and touched North Korea, Libya, and Iran, among others. 1 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt, Times Books, 2004), pp. 61–63. View all notes States seeking a nuclear start‐up can save enormous time and money by turning to experts in and out of government for help, and the knowledge of how to fabricate nuclear weapons is no longer as esoteric as it was in the early days the atomic age. In response to 9, 11 and to the possible failure of nuclear containment in Asia and the Middle East, the Bush administration has sought to reinforce traditional nonproliferation with an interest in preemptive attack strategies and missile defenses. U.S. superiority in long range, precision weapons makes preemption technically feasible, provided the appropriate targets have been identified. U.S. policy

guidance apparently also allows for the possible use of nuclear weapons in preemptive attack against hostile states close to acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. 2 Lawrence Korb, with Peter Ogden, The Road to Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, December 2004), p. 5. View all notes Missile defenses are further behind the curve, compared to deep strike, but the first U.S. national missile defense (NMD) deployments took place in 2004, under the Bush administration commitment to deploy defenses based on several technologies against rogue state or terrorist attacks. Preemption strategies and defenses are controversial in their own right. For present purposes, however, they are simply talismans of U.S. government awareness and acknowledgment that containment and deterrence can no longer complete the anti-proliferation tool kit.

Prolif causes preemption and war – empirics and nature of states proveCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)The five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap

of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: 1

some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; 2 states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and 3 faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption. To this point, we have discussed the problem of an Asian nuclear arms race as an abstract, albeit sufficiently alarming, problem. In the sections of the article to follow, we want to pin down the concept by detailed interrogation of one hypothetical scenario: an eight-sided nuclear polygon of force structures and, therefore, of probable operational performances in deterrence, in crisis management and, if necessary, in war. Before being scenario specific, however, we need to resolve, or at least address, matters of “philosophy of analysis” or analytic points of departure, pertinent to this study.

Proliferation causes preemption – escalates to war – human nature provesCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala









Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 120%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)Arms races offer challenges to modelers not quite as bad as war—but almost. When the arms racing takes place with regard to weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, the omnipresence of Donald Rumsfeld's “known unknowns” intrudes. If the spread of WMD is linear, then traditional measures of containment, such as treaty regimes and trade embargoes, may work. If nuclear proliferation becomes nonlinear, with positive feedback, then more active anti-proliferation steps may need to be taken: including preemption, defenses, and nuclear counterterrorism. A chaotic process of nuclear weapons spread would resist modeling altogether. 5 The distinction between nonlinearity and chaos is explained in Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002), Ch. 4. View all notes There exists a mathematics of chaos theory, but it would fall short of the complexity of human behavior related to decisions about state policy and nuclear decision making, especially those not yet taken. The question of modeling strategy is complicated by the significance of behavioral factors, including leaders' cognitive processes, personalities, and decision making proclivities. For example, in discussing the problem of nuclear preemption, Paul K. Davis summarized a number of “dangerous ideas” that might arise inappropriately and find acceptance in crisis. 6 Paul K. Davis, “Behavioral Factors in Terminating Superpower War,” Ch. 6 in Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 165–182. View all notes The dangerous ideas might even be true, to a point: they would simply be dysfunctional to the de-escalation of a nuclear crisis and to the avoidance of a mistaken decision for preemption. Davis' list of dangerous ideas in this context, includes leaders' assumptions about the opponent and about circumstances: We must preempt because he is about to launch a first strike: —he is crazy; —his doctrine will require him to do so under these circumstances; —he has double crossed us; he's not really standing down, but preparing for attack. We must preempt, because the other side is out of control. —the other side is not doing what its leaders promised; its military is probably taking control, the military may not be cohesive, and it appears that the military is preparing a strike. We will have to attack: —a third country is about to launch a strike, and the lid will then be off, even if our adversary understands what is happening; The cost of going second rather than first is very high: —we might be able to decapitate the other side's regime or command-control system, causing him to quit, retaliate ineffectively or collapse in paralysis; —we might be able to disarm the other side sufficiently as to ensure our own survival; —we might be able to change the balance of forces so drastically that the other side would be coerced into surrender or ceasing its aggression and negotiating an acceptable outcome; —our decapitation is possible, and would be catastrophic; —the military cost of going second rather than first is high, even if we are assuredly able to retaliate; —by a first strike, we might actually survive an attack if it were less than fully effective. Our only chance to survive is by conducting a first strike and hoping it is more effective than our confidence level indicates. 7 Ibid., pp.

170–171. I have deleted some items and revised some wording from the original. View all notes Because the consequences of even a small nuclear war would be socially and ethically unacceptable, the decision path for getting there resists modeling by the standards of rational policy making. One study calls our attention to the problem that preemption is often mischaracterized by students of conflict: The fear of preemption is a natural one for military planners and political leaders, but the concept of preemption is often poorly understood. Preemption is not an offensive strategy but a defensive one. It is an attack motivated by the expectation that the opponent has already launched an attack or is about to. The object of preemption is to beat the enemy to the punch. It is because preemption is a defensive strategy and not an offensive one that it is so dangerous; one side or both could strike out of fear and despite the apparent consequences. 8 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Conflict Termination and Intrawar Deterrence,” Ch. 5 in Cimbala and Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict, pp. 131–164, citation pp. 135–136, italics added. View all notes

Nuclear proliferation may increase the abstract possibility of a nuclear crisis and of a mistaken decision for preemption. But there is no deterministic relationship between more weapons and a greater likelihood of bad decisions. 9 For arguments on both sides of the issue whether nuclear weapons spread will increase the probability of nuclear war, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Academics can always offer competing arguments, but few (if any) current or former U.S. government officials with experience in nuclear force planning or arms control have argued that “more is better” with regard to nuclear proliferation. View all notes The present discussion leaves us somewhere between linear and nonlinear models of nuclear proliferation, leaning toward the latter. As untidy as this decision might be, from a strictly scientific point of view, it fits the spongy reality of world politics and the uncertainty of forecasting social unknowns. In the next section, we develop a specific scenario for multiple Asian nuclear actors and test out some propositions about their arsenals.

Proliferation lead to preemptive strikesRichard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Rather than accept a decline of relative military and political power, states may feasibly consider a preventative war to prohibit the proliferation of rival states. Sagan suggests that the course of preventative war will “more likely be chosen when military leaders, who minimize diplomatic





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 121considerations…have a significant degree of influence over the final decision” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61). Military officials have an extremely narrow view of war and the ramifications of actions taken during war. In his address to the

National Security Council in 1954 regarding the U.S.S.R.’s growing nuclear program, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could guarantee a successful outcome in a nuclear war if preemptive strategies were adopted (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61). Several members of the JCS adopted the preventative war mentality during the early stages of the Cold War, and believed that nuclear superiority could in fact be used in conflict (Dingham,

1989, pg. 63). While the U.S. has never engaged in a preventative war, Sagan argues that the likelihood of preventative wars occurring “will increase in the future since strict centralized civilian control over military organizations is problematic in some new and potential proliferant states” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61).

Regardless of proliferation policies, proliferating states create security issues for the United States and the world. As the process of proliferation spreads, so does the threat of preventative war, and thus the probability of nuclear conflict.

Iran and North Korea prove. Isenberg 8 (David, analyst in national and international security affairs. He is also a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, and a US Navy veteran, “The Return of Limited Nuclear War?” May 2, The CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9375)The authors take exception to the view that deterrence is still a valid strategy, as it was against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They argue that deterring the use of nuclear weapons by threatening retaliation could be "highly problematic in many plausible conflict situations involving nuclear-armed regional adversaries for the simple reason that adversary leaders may not believe that they will personally be any worse off for having used nuclear weapons than if they were to forgo their use." The authors write that for different

reasons — Kim Jong Il out of a sense that he has little to lose and Iran's leadership out of nationalist ambition fueled by religious-revolutionary zeal.Both countries may be willing to accept a great deal of risk once conflict breaks out. The monograph points out North Korean and Iranian leaders have compelling reasons to consider using nuclear weapons. It notes: The prospect of the United States forcibly overthrowing them is not an abstract proposition. Both of the U.S. national security strategy documents released by George W. Bush declared that the ultimate goal of the United States is "ending tyranny." And both North Korea and Iran are cited as examples of the types of regimes about which the United States harbors grave concerns. And, given that the leaders of such "regional adversary states" recognize that their military forces are locked into a position of marked inferiority against U.S. conventional forces they cannot prevent large-scale U.S. forces from deploying to their regions or mounting an attack. The report states if diplomacy fails, over the next 10 years, they could field between a dozen and three dozen fission weapons. In fact, they might even be tempted to use them early on in any conflict. This would be a scenario the United States has never before confronted. The monograph states that in certain circumstances

U.S. leaders can not be confident of deterring regional adversaries from using their limited arsenals, even if the United States maintains its nuclear superiority.

The act of proliferation invites first strikes even if deterrence applies -- prolif good authors concede.Asal and Beardsley ‘9 (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Nuclear Weapons as Shields*”, 26:3, Sage) While we do not attempt to resolve the debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists, there are two notable implications to that debate. First, nuclear weapons do confer observable benefits to the possessors by making them less likely to be targets of violent aggression. This helps further explain why states bear considerable costs to achieve

them. Note however, that nuclear weapons do not make states completely immune to hostile acts of aggression, as evident in the Israeli–Arab and India–Pakistan cases. Future studies might better assess crisis behavior that is “off the equilibrium path” from the logic presented here to understand under which situations states bear considerable risks by using violent aggression against a nuclear state.The second implication is that proliferation does not necessarily translate into either greater stability or net utility gains in the international system. We demonstrate that proliferation is undesirable for both other non-nuclear states and members already in the nuclear club. Both types of states will lament the loss in ability to use heavy handed coercive diplomacy. Moreover, the attempt at proliferation itself appears to be destabilizing to the international system as the nuclear program states tend to be the target and source of much hostility. We found that program states have some heightened


http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9375

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 122tenden- cies toward aggression, despite the incentives to lie low during the development stage. This is puzzling and a potentially fertile topic of future study.



PROLIF BAD – PREVENTATIVE STRIKES

Prolif increases preventive attemptsSobek et al ‘9 (David, Prof. Pol. Sci. – LSU, David Sobek, Prof. Int’l Studies and Pol. Sci. – VMI, and Semuel Robinson, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. – Lsu, Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362138_index.html)At the exploration stage, conventional force usage does not make much sense when an opponent’s primary objective is destructive preemption; most notably, there are likely very few or no “hard targets” to strike at this stage. If, however, conventional force is employed as a general bargaining tool whose utility is not confined to mere destruction, then the precision of destructive efforts is not the only conventional targeting concern for opponents. Instead,

given that the mere act of exploring 6 Similar views have been expressed by Geller (1990) and Miller (1993). acquisition feasibility credibly signals a potential proliferator’s intention to solidify its own future bargaining position, forceful efforts by opposing states to try to resolve the issue before acquisition are likely more attractive than if no proliferation efforts had been undertaken. These considerations lead us to our first

general hypothesis. Hypothesis 1a: States that are exploring nuclear weapons are more at risk of being targeted in a conventional militarized dispute than non-proliferating states.

Prolif changes the bargaining terms. It increases the risk of prevention.Sobek et al ‘9 (David, Prof. Pol. Sci. – LSU, David Sobek, Prof. Int’l Studies and Pol. Sci. – VMI, and Semuel Robinson, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. – Lsu, Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362138_index.html)Contextualized in this way, proliferation efforts serve as a warning to opposing states that the terms of bargaining over the disputed issue(s) will change in an unfavorable way at some future point. Specifically, if and when the proliferator achieves nuclear possession, opposing states’ capacities to uphold or change the status quo within acceptable levels of cost are likely to evaporate. It would thus seem that the physical destruction of nascent nuclear programs is not the only incentive for opponents to engage in conventional conflict with a proliferator; physical force can also be a useful means by which to achieve a favorable outcome to the disputed issue underlying the proliferators’ efforts before nuclear acquisition drastically shifts the balance of power between the two sides.

Prolif increases the risk of war. Adversaries will seek to resolve disputes before acquisition is complete. Sobek et al ‘9 (David, Prof. Pol. Sci. – LSU, David Sobek, Prof. Int’l Studies and Pol. Sci. – VMI, and Semuel Robinson, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. – Lsu, Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362138_index.html)In this paper, we use this set of interacting incentives as a point of departure in delineating a theory of the relationship between the nuclear proliferation process and the frequency with which proliferators are targeted in conventional militarized conflicts. Though much previous scholarship has been devoted to this question, we believe that extant views have focused too narrowly on one subset of that relationship: the preemptive employment of conventional capabilities by status quo powers in order to physically disable or destroy proliferators’ nascent nuclear programs. In developing a broader treatment of the strategic interaction between states, we posit that the various stages of deterrent nuclear proliferation are best conceived of as sequential steps in a bargaining process over preexisting disputes that were instrumental in spurring proliferators to consider nuclear options. As such, we contend that the primary rationale for status quo states’ conventional targeting of proliferators should derive not from the desire to physically disrupt nuclear development (which is, at best, a difficult task), but from the desire to reach favorable conclusions to underlying disputes before the deployment of nuclear weapons drastically complicates the issue. The effect of nuclear proliferation on conventional targeting is empirically tested by looking at states in four different stages of the proliferation process: no program, exploration, pursuit, and acquisition (Singh and Way, 2004). In general, the results of our analyses show that as states move from no program to exploration and then to pursuit, the odds that that they become the target of a militarized interstate dispute (or MID; Jones, Bremer, and Singer,1996) increase rather steadily. Once actual acquisition is achieved, however, the risk of being targeted decreases. These results are most


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 124robust when looking at disputes over territory (which arguably represent conflicts over the most salient interest of states) and territorial disputes that lead to at least one fatality.



PROLIF BAD – PREEMPTION/PREVENTATIVE STRIKES

Prolif causes preventive and preemptive strikes -- empirical proof. Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld) Waltz's analysis seeks to answer the question, why have nuclear-armed nation-states not fought a major war? Perhaps the best way to critique his analysis is to pose the opposite question, why or under what circumstances might nuclear-armed nation-states fight a major war? This line of questioning opens a wide vista of potential scenarios, all within the realm of

possibility in the Middle East and South Asia. Nuclear weapons infrastructure and inventories might present attractive targets for preventive or pre-emptive strikes. The Middle East has experienced several historical examples of preventative and pre-emptive strikes. The Israelis in 1981, for example, preventively attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osiraq, a key facility for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. The strike was an effective measure to stem Baghdad's development of nuclear weapons, particularly in light of the post-1991 Gulf War revelations about the scope of Iraq's ambitions. According to respected Israeli security expert Ze'ev Schiff, Israel under Prime Minister Menachem Begin established and publicly proclaimed 'the determination to destroy the nuclear stockpile of any Arab country at war with Israel if there are grounds to believe that the country is manufacturing nuclear weapons'.43 The fact that Israel was willing to develop a policy of preventive war suggests that other countries might also see grounds for such a policy within their own strategic circumstances. As Scott Sagan recalls, in 1969 Moscow contemplated launching a preventive strike on Chinese nuclear facilities; the Minister of Defense reportedly favored a preventive strike 'despite the existence of a small Chinese nuclear arsenal at that time', but the Politburo did not approve of the attack.* The United States' war against Iraq in 1991 had overtones of being a preventive war in that US policy-makers in the run up to the ground campaign were concerned about Iraq's potential to develop nuclear weapons; it provided an auxiliary justification, in addition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, for going to war against Baghdad. A vulnerable command, control, communication, computer and intelligence (C4I) system might induce an adversary to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, perhaps in a long simmering crisis, to 'decapitate' an adversary's leadership. Major C41 nodes invariably lie in the capitals of nation-states, which would be vulnerable to nuclear weapons. Nuclear nation-states today in the Middle East and South Asia probably have less robust C41 systems than the United States and the Soviet Union had during the Cold War.4sRedundant Soviet command and control systems, however, did not stop some Western observers from speculating about the prospects for holding the Soviet leadership at risk in a nuclear conflict." Similar arguments in the heated political circumstances of major regional rivalries today, particularly in the midst of a political-military crisis, might find a more receptive audience for such a strategy than they did in the United States during the Cold War. A nation-state might calculate that a first strike would catch the C41 infrastructure of an adversary unawares to maximize the destruction and minimize the adversary's ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the C41 systems of nation-states might remain vulnerable despite a heightened crisis and warnings of war. In a survey of twentieth century conflict Betts has found that: All major sudden attacks occurred in situations of prolonged tension, during which the victim state's leaders recognized that war might be on the horizon. Surprise succeeded despite ample political warning and, paradoxically, in some cases because of it. Conscious of the possibility of war and faced with evidence of developing enemy readiness to strike, leaders nevertheless often do not authorize effective counterpreparations."'



PROLIF BAD – FIRST STRIKES IMPACT

Tech diffusion causes first strikes.Roberts ’96 (Brad, Ed. Washington Quarterly and Research Fellow – CSIS, “Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War”, p. 226) The diffusion of the ability to produce weapons of mass destruction may be having a number of implications for stability. It can increase the incentive to strike preemptively against weapons production sites in the time of near war, thus making war more likely. Crisis instability is further aggravated by

the short lead time necessary to move from nascent capability to militarily effective weapons in the chemical and biological domains, meaning that states will live closer than ever before to the the brink of major competition in these areas.

These states will be left uninhabitable. Nissani ’92 (Moti, Prof. Bio. Sci. – Wayne State U., “, Lives in the Balance: the Cold War and American Politics, 1945-1991”, Chapter 2: CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR, http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html) On each of the projections above we need to superimpose the possible destruction of civilian nuclear power plants and installations. Such destruction will accomplish several strategic objectives. Since conventional and nuclear electricity-producing plants are vital to industrial economies, their targeting will reduce an adversary's chances of economic recovery. Owing to the close linkage between the civilian and military nuclear

industries, bombing of civilian facilities would weaken an adversary's chances of regaining war-related nuclear capabilities. Such bombing would further reduce a nation's chances of recovery by contaminating and rendering uninhabitable huge tracts of land for decades. It follows that many nuclear power plants and installations are likely to be vaporized by surface bursts during an all-out war. We can begin to take in the horrors of such wholesale destruction by recalling that a peacetime accident in a single nuclear power plant could be catastrophic. An accident in a single reprocessing facility, a breeder reactor, or a near-ground radioactive disposal site could have even more ominous implications. Thus, one accident involving a radioactive waste disposal site in the Ural Mountains reportedly caused the death of thousands and required evacuation of an area of some 600 square miles. The names of 32 towns and villages in this region have disappeared from Russian maps. The region is deserted and sealed off-to inhabitants, most visitors, and a river. Radioactive materials produced in nuclear power plants decay more slowly than the by-products of nuclear bombs, so the devastation of nuclear power plants would considerably increase the area which would remain unsafe for human habitation after the war. For breeder reactors, reprocessing facilities, and near-ground radioactive waste-disposal sites, the picture is even grimmer: certain portions of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the eastern half of the continental U.S., the states of Washington and California, and considerable portions of Western Europe, could be contaminated for decades. Even centuries later, it might be advisable to check radioactivity levels before buying land in these regions.


http://www.is.wayne.edu/mnissani/pagepub/CH2.html


AT NO PREEMPTION – DETERRENCE

Deterrence can’t check preemption – fears cause irrational decisionmakingCimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Joint Force Quarterly: JFQ, “Nuclear First Use: Prudence or Peril?,” issue 51, 10/1/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+First+Use%3A+Prudence+or+Peril%3F&rft.jtitle=Joint+Force+Quarterly+%3A+JFQ&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2008-10-01&rft.pub=National+Defense+University&rft.issn=1070-0692&rft.issue=51&rft.spage=27&rft.externalDBID=JFQY&rft.externalDocID=1559946111 /mr)The distinction between preemptive preventive attacks lies in the attribution of motive (by the defender against the attacker), in the reliability of the intelligence (relative to the plans of the attacker), and in the time available for making decisions (whether an attack is in progress or being considered in good time). If a defender has actionable intelligence that an attack has already been set in motion or is imminent, then preemption is a means of avoiding the worst effects of being surprised. Of course, people can quibble about what “actionable intelligence” means, but for the present discussion it means that there is verifiable information from human or technical (or both) sources that an attack is in progress or is about to be launched. For example, the U.S. nuclear attack warning system during the Cold War required confirmation by “dual phenomenology” (satellites and ground stations) before authoritative interpretation of an attack in progress was validated. In addition to the reliability of the defender’s intelligence about the attacker’s capabilities and plans, the matter of time is also important in the justification for preemption. Preemptive attacks occur under the assumption that the option of forestalling the attack by diplomacy or deterrence no longer exists. The attacker has taken an irrevocable political decision for war. The defender’s options are either to await the first blow or, alternatively, to act first to minimize damage or to preemptively destroy the enemy’s strike capabilities if possible. The time pressure for making these judgments creates a compression factor that can destabilize rational or even sensible decisionmaking . Even when nuclear weapons are not involved, crisis management often brings out the worst in decisionmaking pathologies by individuals and organizations. For instance, the months of July and August 1914 present a rich tableau of leaders who made mistaken assumptions about other states’ intentions, capabilities, arts of war, and politico-military staying power. Some heads of state and foreign ministers were unfamiliar with their own country’s war plans and their implications for crisis management. In lieu of intelligence, stereotypical thinking about national character and military dispositions was available to take up the slack (“the Frenchman cannot be a very effective fighter; his voice is too high”). Added to this was the uncertainty about alliance cohesion on the part of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente: each state or empire had its own priorities, in policy and in strategy, and these priorities could not be synchronized under the time pressure between Sarajevo and the guns of August. In a crisis involving two nuclear armed states with the capability for second strike retaliation, time pressure becomes nerve shattering. The evidence from studies of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 shows that American and Soviet leaders operated under high stress and strained group decisionmaking throughout the 13 days that were required for the crisis to run its course. U.S. officials at one point wondered whether Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had actually been the victim of a coup and replaced by a hard-line Politburo coalition more determined for war. And the “known unknowns,” as Donald Rumsfeld might have said, are, in retrospect, equally discouraging for optimists about nuclear crisis management. One of these “known unknowns” was whether the Soviets had deployed any nuclear capable delivery systems in Cuba in addition to the medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile launchers that provoked the crisis. U.S. officials at the time assumed not, but later historians determined otherwise. Nuclear capable surface-to-surface short-range missiles were deployed with Soviet ground forces in Cuba, unknown to U.S. intelligence at the time. And Soviet ground force commanders, in the event of a U.S. military invasion, were presumably authorized to use nuclear capable missiles in self-defense. The result of this “known unknown” could have been World War III, as a U.S. nuclear retaliation against Soviet nuclear first use in, or near, Cuba led to further escalation.



AT NO PREEMPTION – INTEL

Intelligence over-confidence means they'll chance preemptive strikes. Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)Major regional powers might one day be overly confident in the quality of their intelligence. It is

entirely possible that a nuclear-armed state might obtain raw intelligence or form intelligence analyses that confidently identify the locations of an adversary's nuclear weapons inventories and delivery

systems. In the heat of an escalating crisis, leaders might seize on such intelligence as justification for a bold military action, calculating that great risk is required in warfare to achieve strategic success. They might judge that the prospect of destroying an adversary's nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles on the ground - coupled with the fear that the window of opportunity would be rapidly closing and that a delay

might increase their own vulnerability to attack - would necessitate a pre-emptive attack. Nuclear weapons inventories may in fact be vulnerable to pre-emptive action. Pakistan, for example, in November 2001 in the midst of the American military campaign against the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda network in neighboring Afghanistan was sufficiently anxious about the vulnerability of its nuclear weapons that President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country's nuclear arsenal.'Wajor regional powers today - with smaller geographic areas, limited nuclear inventories and fewer military infrastructures such as airbases for delivery systems - are more vulnerable to preventive and pre-emptive strikes than the United States and the Soviet Union were during the Cold War.



AT NO PREEMPTION – RATIONALITY

Nuclear arsenals won't deter intervention. Goldstein ‘3 (Lyle, Associate Prof. Strat. Studies and Vice-Chair Eurasia Studies Group – US Naval War College, Political Science Quarterly, “Do nascent WMD arsenals deter? The Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969”, 118:1, Spring, Proquest)This article has aimed at a clearer understanding of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 in the hopes of contributing to the theoretical debate about the impact of WMD proliferation on international affairs. While archives remain closed precluding definitive conclusions at this point and for the foreseeable future, I have attempted to employ second-best sources: the testimony of both Russian and Chinese scholars and policy makers. After suggesting that Soviet leaders appear to have seriously considered a preventive strike against China's nuclear facilities, this article has investigated five hypotheses for explaining why the Soviets ultimately opted against such an attack. The testimony presented here challenges the conventional explanation for Soviet restraint.122 While the proliferation optimist explanation of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 cannot be ruled out entirely, available evidence suggests that scholars should be cautious about accepting the optimist interpretation that nuclear weapons restrained the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969. Recall that in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, scholars and policy makers on both sides tended to reify the role of nuclear weapons, hoping that nuclear balance could undergird cold war stability. In this case, however, both Russian and Chinese specialists deny that nuclear weapons played a stabilizing role in the crisis. Rather, the leading authorities in both countries-Russia's Lev

Deluisin and Victor Gobarev, in addition to China's Li Danhui and Yang Kuisong-say that China's nascent nuclear arsenal was vulnerable and destabilizing. As with China's minimal nuclear deterrent, the role of the United States also

appears to have been exaggerated. The United States had neither the capability nor the will to directly participate in such a conflict. The evidence for a norms-based explanation is slender, but it remains plausible. In a situation where nuclear weapons appeared to offer the most efficient solution for destroying China's nuclear infrastructure, the suggestion that Soviet plans for a conventional attack reached the advanced planning stages may have significant theoretical meaning. One could hypothesize, based on this case, that proliferation may indeed spur conflict, but it is likely to follow

the pattern of the Israeli attack on Osirak in 1981, that is to say, preventive attacks will likely be conventional because of norms that restrict nuclear first use. Regarding the impact of the conventional balance, the evidence

remains indeterminate. However, there is sufficient evidence for Chinese strength to question the hypothesis that Soviet conventional superiority obviated the necessity for considering preventive war. China's unique resilience to attack, established by its large, hardy rural population and extensive experience with prolonged guerrilla warfare, is the singularly most persuasive explanation. Thus, we recall how General Bolyatko asserts, "[War with China] would have been disastrous . . . the factor of numbers . . . [the prospect of] partisan war . . . that was important."123 Gaiduk offers, "What good would it have done to strike China with its vast population and territory? . . . The Chinese did not even fear it."124 Moreover, Kapitsa's, Elizavetin's, and Li Jinjie's descriptions of the Kosygin-Zhou negotiations suggest that China's most decisive card to play during the crisis was not China's nascent nuclear arsenal, but rather the threat to "fight to the end." Despite presenting some tentative support for the strength of nonuse norms, the overall conclusion of this study is rather alarming. During the crisis of 1969, China does appear to have passed through an extremely volatile valley of vulnerability. For China, it was the second crossing of this dangerous valley: serious tensions with the United States developed over the Chinese nuclear weapons program during the early and mid-1960s.125 Nor is China the only state to have made such a crossing.126 This reevaluation of the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969 has been undertaken in the hopes of reaching a deeper understanding of potential conflict dynamics between asymmetric WMD powers. Consistent with the hypotheses of the proliferation pessimists, the evidence presented here suggests that states possessing small arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, but which lack China's peculiar strengths, have cause to fear. From a purely structural standpoint (capabilities), the Soviet relationship with the "rogue" China of the 1960s is analogous to America's relationship with rogue proliferators today. Both

sets of relationships are characterized by radical WMD asymmetries. But today's rogue proliferators are considerably weaker than China was in 1969, and the United States is also much stronger than was the Soviet Union in 1969. Thus, in present circumstances, the asymmetries are even more radical. The pattern of U.S. confrontation with rogue WMD proliferators during the 1990s appears to be the result of instability that is inherent to the structural condition of radical WMD asymmetry. With reference to rogue proliferators, the present administration has argued that the "United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather."127 However, the underlying structural conditions of this new environment were aptly described in the early 1990s by a senior Defense Department official of the Clinton administration: "The United States now needs to take a fresh look at the feasibility and desirability of both the preventive war and preemption options against new nuclear weapon states. Their nuclear programs or arsenals will certainly be smaller than those of the former Soviet Union. . . . They may be more vulnerable to attack."128 Observers watching simultaneous proliferation crises unfold in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean Peninsula have perhaps been too hasty in suggesting that Pyongyang's alleged


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 130nascent nuclear capability explains the Administration's softer approach to that problem. A variety of factors restrain current U.S. action against North Korea, but surely the best explanation is tactical: no country would choose to fight two wars at the same time. When the Persian Gulf is quiet, Pyongyang's day of reckoning may well have come. The President's "axis of evil" doctrine illustrates that the U.S. is willing to bear substantial risks in order to neutralize the threat posed by rogue proliferators.*



AT NO PREVENTATIVE WAR

Historically rare nature of preventive war is irrelevant. It is likely in the future against nuclear prolif. Wirtz ‘7 (James, Dean – School of International Graduate Studies and Prof. Dept. National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College Review, “Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Analysis”, 60:2, Proquest)Goldstein addresses this debate with a survey of the most significant international confrontations involving nuclear and nonnuclear non·nu·cle·ar adj. 1. Not causing, involving, or operated by nuclear energy. 2. Not possessing nuclear weapons. states, exploring the incentives, perceptions, and judgments of nuclear-armed leaders as they contemplate the prospects and pitfalls of launching preventive war to disarm emerging nuclear powers. His comparative case studies span the entire nuclear age: from the U.S. reaction to the emergence of a Soviet nuclear weapons program, American and Soviet responses to the Chinese nuclear program, and the Israeli strike against Iraq's Osiraq reactor, to both U.S. counter-proliferation wars against Iraq. His case studies reveal that although the leaders in dominant states often contemplate preventive war, a host of issues conspires to prevent them from launching strikes to destroy emerging nuclear forces and infrastructures. Goldstein's finding that preventive counterproliferation strikes are rare is offset by several observations that are not at all reassuring. Counterproliferation attacks have been contemplated from the start of the

nuclear age, but actual attacks are a relatively recent phenomenon. Goldstein's analysis suggests that the revolutions in conventional precision guidance and global reconnaissance capabilities have tipped the balance in favor of preventive war, although risks still remain. U.S. officers and officials, for instance, were deeply concerned about the prospect that Saddam Hussein might retaliate with chemical or biological weapons when it became clear that the regime in Baghdad itself was the target of coalition

operations in 2003; nevertheless, members of the administration were ultimately undeterred by what they considered to be a credible threat. Goldstein concludes with an even more disturbing observation: that world politics might be entering a period of pronounced instability as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems accelerates. More opportunities will soon present themselves to stop ambitious nascent nuclear states in their tracks.

Multiple examples show preventative war is much more likely than your authors acknowledge Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 106)Second, although preventive wars are hard to do and perhaps unlikely, they are not as remote as a possibility as neooptimists claim. On the other hand, as neooptimists remind us, there are some important dogs that have not barked. India did not launch a preventive war to prevent the final development of Pakistani nuclear capability, nor has the United States launched a war against North Korea. Both cases would have met the pessimist criteria of a likely case for preventive war. On the other hand, there are examples of attacks that approximate a preventive war. Israel engaged in something resembling a preventive strike against Iraq; the United States exploited Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to wage a preventive war against Hussein’s arsenal. Moreover, the more we learn about nuclear history, the more evidence we find that states took the planning for preventive war seriously. The jury is still out on a number of cases that also might meet the criteria for most-likely; what. For instance, would China’s reaction be to credible evidence that Taiwan or Japan were developing nuclear weapons?

Even if preventative war won’t happen states assume it will and build accident prone-arsenals Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 108-109)Fourth, even if an enemy splendid first strike is a remote possibility, it can still have perverse effects on the command and control decisions of minor proliferators. Pessimists worry about preventive war for two reasons: (1) states might wage preventive war; (2) in an effort to counter the preventive war problem states may take command and control short-cuts that prove destabilizing. The fact that an outside analyst concludes that the arsenal is survivable does not dispose of the possibility that senior leaders will feel compelled to take steps to hedge against the danger. Moreover, some of those steps may be almost as bad as the risks of preventive war in the first place, such as placing the arsenal on higher states of alert and pre-delegating use authority to lower-echelon commanders.



AT DIPLOMACY CHECKS

Diplomacy doesn’t check war – countries will look to military actions before cooperationCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)We noted previously that decisions for war or nuclear blackmail will probably be driven by political variables more than military ones. Nevertheless, even in the case of nuclear forces which are intended more for coercion than for actual use, it can matter a great deal how they are deployed, and operated, short of war. The deployments and operational modes for nuclear forces may seem as if they are “hard” or “objective” facts, and to some extent they are: whether weapons are to be land or sea based, how many warheads or re-entry vehicles are carried by a particular missile, and so forth. On the other hand, nuclear force deployments and operational characteristics also have subjective properties. Weapons, launchers, and command-control protocols “communicate” intentions with respect to the probable or possible behaviors of states and their leaders: intentions that might not be correctly interpreted or understood by other states. During a crisis in which one or more states contemplate the possibility of nuclear attack, countries will not only listen to one another's diplomatic statements: they will also watch what the other fellow is doing, including his military capabilities and maneuvers, for clues about his future behavior.






AT INTEL CHECKS

New powers lack the intel that made cold war deterrence stable. Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)Second, the reconnaissance revolution is gradually moving from major to medium powers with the commercialization of the satellite industry, but regional capabilities probably fall short of those of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. As Jeffrey Richelson describes the industry, France has produced a: commercial satellite, which has been used to acquire photographs of a variety of military installations, and these photos have been published. In addition, France, along with Italy and Spain, is developing the HELIOS military reconnaissance satellite. Israel has placed an experimental satellite in orbit and is clearly on its way to deploying a reconnaissance satellite. India will probably be next.'" Despite the increasing availability of satellite imagery, major regional nation-state rivals are unlikely to soon have robust intelligence collection and analysis capabilities comparable to those that lent stability to the Cold War Soviet-American rivalry.

Bad c and c makes prolif a war risk. Schepp ‘8 (David, 332 Air Expeditionary Wing Historian, Air Power History, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, 55:1, Spring, Proquest)The book opens with an assessment of the "optimist" and "pessimist" interpretations of nuclear proliferation. Essentially, the optimist perspective iterates that nuclear proliferation can be a positive force for international stability, predicated on the idea that states with nuclear arms will be more reluctant to engage in conventional conflicts for fear of escalation. The pessimist perspective asserts a contrary position predicated on a lack of credible evidence supporting the optimist standpoint. Busch offers examples--primarily that of India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers--who have engaged in several conventional engagements, undermining the optimist interpretation. Busch asserts, through case studies of the overt nuclear powers (e.g. the U.S., Russia, China, India, and Pakistan; omitting the UK and France for their assumed similarity to the U.S., and Israel, based on the ultra-secretive nature of their nuclear weapons program), that the optimist interpretation of nuclear proliferation is fundamentally fallacious. One of the cornerstones of this argument is that the U.S., assumed to be the most stable of the nuclear powers, has faced a number of near-crises throughout its period of nuclear weapons possession. The author also examines nuclear proliferation in the "newly proliferating states" of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He also offers some theories on the assumed development of nuclear weapons programs in those states. The author strings together his arguments cogently and effectively. Based on the idea that even the U.S. has had problems with command and control, he maintains that less stable polities would have even more troubles. This becomes most obvious in his case study of Russia's travails with the other former Soviet republics and their legacy

of nuclear weapons. Additionally, Busch maintains that a newly proliferating state may be the most unstable for the purposes of nuclear command and control and materiel security .



AT NUCLEAR IRRELEVANCY

Nuclear irrelevancy doesn’t accurately depict the world Cimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Nuclear Irrelevancy A second school of thought argues that nuclear weapons were really unnecessary for Cold War stability. One can formulate this argument in harder or softer terms. The harder version is that nuclear weapons were irrelevant subjectively as well as objectively: not only did they have no real impact on the likelihood of major war, but, in addition, leaders had little regard for the role of nuclear weapons in preserving stable deterrence. The softer form of the argument would contend that leaders did pay attention to nuclear weapons and spend a great deal of time with nuclear planning, but that all of this was potlatch, not really necessary for a basically stable relationship between the U.S. and NATO, on one side, and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, on the other. Representative of the softer form of the argument, and of the less polemical, is John Mueller's Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War.(25) Mueller's book really asserts two very different theses. The first is that large-scale, interstate wars had already become obsolete by the turn of the twentieth century. Leaders, having failed to recognize this, plunged foolishly into World War I and paid an unexpectedly drastic price. After World War 1, most European political and military leaders, intellectuals, and publics recognized the dysfunctional character of major war. The world was on a linear path toward the absence of great coalition wars, lining up numbers of major powers on each side. This path toward peaceful progress was interrupted by the unexpected dedication of the German and Japanese regimes in the 1930s to achieving their objectives by conquest. After World War II, in a very new international system, the major powers resumed their linear progression toward the obsolescence of war. Like dueling and slavery, war was simply becoming an idea whose time had run out. The growing obsolescence of major interstate war is related to Mueller's second argument: that nuclear weapons had little to do with Cold War stability. If the first argument by Mueller is largely true, then the second argument can rest in part on a substructure provided by the first: obsolescence of war supports nuclear irrelevancy. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and their major allies had had enough of fighting as a result of World War II. The possibility of a World War III fought, even without nuclear weapons, would have been sufficiently discouraging. Mueller contends that U.S. industrial and economic superiority would have guaranteed victory in a global war waged without nuclear weapons: America could have mobilized for victory and overwhelmed any adversary with military production after World War II, as it did between 1941 and 1945. U.S. mobilization potential and economic capacity were the great deterrent against Soviet adventurism, according to Mueller, not nuclear weapons. Mueller's case for nuclear irrelevancy during the Cold War is supported by Robert S. McNamara, former U.S. Secretary of Defense. McNamara is something of a pardox. As Secretary of Defense he played an essential part in developing U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure, which remained influential to the very end of the Cold War.(26) In February 1963 McNamara testified before a Congressional committee that Khrushchev was forced to back down: Khrushchev "knew without any question whatsoever that he faced the full military power of the United tates, including its nuclear weapons," that U.S. officials had faced "the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev Knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons."(27) McNamara's reflections out of office, on the other hand, run decidedly against the political or military significance of nuclear weapons. Writing in the 1980s, McNamara argued that nuclear weapons "serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless--except only to deter one's opponent from using them."(28) Reconsidering the U.S. experience in the Cuban missile crisis in 1987, McNamara reaffirmed that "all those fancy nuclear weapons are militarily useless. You can't use them (Original emphasis)."(29) Note that this position is different from the position taken by some nuclear positivists and agnostics, that nuclear superiority is military or politically useless. McNamara would doubtless agree about the futility of nuclear superiority, but his position goes beyond that. Mueller is correct to argue that the Soviet Union and its allies would have been disadvantaged in any global conventional war, compared to the U.S. and its allies. U.S. economic and industrial strength, especially in the first two decades following the end of the World War II, must have seemed very imposing to Soviet leaders. In addition, to the extent that they took their Marxism seriously, Soviet leaders would have believed that military superiority flows from ecomomic poteneial. Therefore, any war against the capitalist west would make long odds for Moscow.(30) However, it does not follow that, if the requirements for deterring the Soviet Union from deliberate attack on NATO could have been met without nuclear weapons, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the prevention of war in Europe obtained. More than deterrence of the Soviet Union from any deliberate aggression that it might have contemplated was involved in maintaining Cold War European stability. The Soviet Union also had to be persuaded that NATO was "deterred." The very statement that NATO required deterring struck Western military experts as oxymoronic during the Cold War years: it was self-evident to them that the U.S. and NATO would never launch an unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union. But it was not self-evident to Moscow: what seemed like an unprovoked or unjustified attack to the Soviet leadership might differ from what was defined as an unprovoked attack in Washington, Bonn, or Brussels. Given the large nuclear and conventional weapons arsenals and numbers of troops deployed in Europe by adverse military blocs poised for war, the major risk was





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 137not deliberate but inadvertent war.(31) Incidents growing out of border clashes or other apparently minor skirmishes between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces might have escalated into major confrontations between the Cold War superpowers. Recall that nuclear deterrence theorists touted their logic of manipulation of an unknown, but significant, risk of war as a principal component of deterrence. Testimony to this theory as put into practice by NATO was NATO's forward deployment of U.S. and other short

range, or tactical, nuclear forces throughout the European theater of operations. These weapons would either be overrun by enemy forces very early or commanders would demand early release from NATO authorities, raising the likelihood of nuclear first use into a near certainty. Tactical nuclear weapons were capable of igniting a series of actionreaction sequences over which the combatants would rapidly lose centralized political and military control. Many wars, not one, would be going on at once: a NATO military command and control system cut into pieces of uneven size and complexity would be reacting to a Soviet system similarly disaggregated and confused. Stopping this kind of war would not necessarily be impossible, but it would be about as difficult an undertaking as theorists of war termination had ever imagined. There was very little likelihood that, had war broken out in Europe at any time between the latter 1950s and the mid-1980s, NATO could have used most of its short range nuclear forces in a controlled and purposive way.(32) The preceding paragraph strengthens Mueller's argument to the extent that it supports the political absurdity of nuclear war fighting doctrines. However, it reminds us that deliberate war was probably not the major risk to stability in post-World War II Europe. The war machines created by the two alliances turned into military museums overstuffed with useless furniture, including superfluous arms and vulnerable command and control systems. These war machines were designed for threatening one another, but in the event of actual war they could not have kept the level of violence proportionate to any meaningful political objective. Even throwing away nuclear weapons would have left NATO and the Warsaw Pact with military pterodactyls: forces larger than necessary for any politically acceptable mission, but forces with sufficient size and putative capability to create serious fears on both sides that the other side might launch a surprise attack. Bernard Brodie's claim about nuclear weapons in 1946, that from the time of their invention, the strategy involving them would mainly be dedicated to the avoidance of major war, was prescient. It also had an ironical destination in Cold War U.S. and Soviet armed forces and military doctrines. The skillful nonuse of military forces turned deterrence into an all encompassing substitute for military preparedness, for usable war fighting skills, and, especially in the U.S. case, for foreign policy in general. Deterrence became the tapeworm which swallowed the host. Forces and doctrines justified in the name of deterrence of Moscow were often perceived by the Soviets as strategic compellents. Instead of viewing U.S. forces and doctrines as defensively motivated policies of the status quo, Soviet leaders from the 1960s through the 1980s interpreted U.S. force modernizations and policy pronouncements as American efforts to force Moscow into military and political retreat.(33)



AT SAFETY MEASURES

Small countries will build large arsenals and lack stable C and C Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 287-288)Both David Karl and Jordan Seng argue that the nuclear weapons in developing countries will be relatively easy to control, even without sophisticated use-control devices, because their arsenals will be small

and their command systems simple. But there are serious problems with this argument. First, as we have seen,

there is little evidence to suggest that emerging NWSs will remained satisfied with small arsenals and simple command structures. Instead, most evidence suggests that they will tend to develop larger, more complex systems, which increase organizational difficulties and will be much harder to control. As the Russian case demonstrates, complex systems can deteriorate during economic crises due to a lack of resources for maintenance and repairs. Moreover, even if some emerging NWSs do keep their arsenals small and simple, their controls could still be severely weakened during domestic upheavals. The most serious weaknesses in Russia’s controls were caused less by the size of its nuclear arsenal or the complexity of its command structure than by the type of nuclear controls that it inherited from the Soviet Union. To be sure, the scope of Russia’s problems has been exacerbated by size and complexity, but because Russia’s nuclear

controls relied heavily on guards, gates, and guns, Russia still would have had difficulties maintaining its nuclear controls even if its nuclear system had been much smaller. Emerging NWSs probably will have problems similar to Russia’s during political upheavals because they are likely to rely on the “3 G’s” for their

nuclear command-and-control systems. Indeed, we have seen that the arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan are potentially vulnerable to accidental or unauthorized use, even though they are comparatively smaller.

New proliferants won’t see any need for safety measures – proves our pessimism arguments Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 298)As we have seen, both optimists and pessimists do, or should, acknowledge at it is in the interests of every NWS to maintain safety and security for their nuclear weapons and fissile materials. And yet, the cases in this study suggest that NWSs, or certain groups within NWSs, simply may not see the necessity for rigorous safety and security measures. In

particular, emerging WSs will tend to marginalize such measures in their single-minded pursuit their weapons programs." This is the most fundamental weakness in the optimists' arguments, since they assume that states will always clearly understand—and pursue—their interests." For example, we have

seen extensive evidence that India and Pakistan ye underdeveloped safety and safeguards cultures.69 Both countries have been willing to risk accidents and potential catastrophes in numerous areas their nuclear programs, and neither state has been willing to correct these problems. The marginalizing of safety and security is not unique to India d Pakistan. For example, even after Russian facilities encountered severe , difficulties with fissile material security and the United States assisted them the MPC&A upgrades, many facilities still do not choose to follow the procedures or use the technologies necessary for fissile material security. We ye seen similar problems in China. Although Chinese officials have admitted that their fissile material controls are based on the Russian model, they ye demonstrated little interest in improving their fissile material controls cause, they argue, China is currently stable. But since China has had severe domestic upheavals in the past and could have more in the future, this situation appears unjustified. Because it is highly unlikely that emerging NWSs would see their self-interests any more clearly than have the current NWSs, have reason to side with the pessimist position.7°



AT SMALL ARSENALS

Double bind – either small states can’t build survivable deterrents creating instability or they will build large unstable arsenals for second strike creating C and C problems Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 282-283)The evidence concerning the likelihood of NWSs developing survivable forces is somewhat mixed. On the other hand, it is very difficult to build survivable forces. The United States and the Soviet Union exerted tremendous efforts to develop systems that would be capable of surviving a first strike. These systems included resilient command and communications systems, extensive forced, deployed in rapid response configurations that allowed for launch-on-warning; sophisticated early-warning systems; and hardened shelters for political leaders. Still, some analysts have questioned whether their nuclear forces and command structures were, in fact, survivable. China’s nuclear forces have also been vulnerable to a first strike, since for many years they relied on a deterrence based on an outdated ICM force of roughly eighteen missiles capable of striking the United States.

Because it would require several hours of preparation with the missiles exposed before their weapons could be launched, China’s forces would be highly vulnerable to a nuclear first strike by NWSs with advanced surveillance systems, such as those possessed by the United States. India and Pakistan also rely on small forces and rudimentary command and communication structures that could be destroyed by a first strike. In addition, analysts have argued that a conventional or nuclear strike by India could destroy the launch strips at Pakistani air force bases, thereby eliminating or significantly weakening Pakistan’s current retaliatory capability. Because it is very difficult to create survivable forces, there are risks that nuclear powers night engage in a nuclear first strike and that vulnerable nuclear powers will face a “use them or lose them” scenario. On the other hand, pressures to build survivable forces are likely to cause NWSs to develop larger and more advanced arsenals, dispersed weapon deployments, and more complicated command structures. Of the established NWSs, the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France all developed these capabilities fairly early. And China appears to be developing similar capabilities. Although China initially stored its missiles unfueled and without the warheads mated, concerns about survivability they are causing China to move to a mobile system, in which the missiles will be stored fully fueled, possibly with mated warheads. Moreover, both India and Pakistan appear to be moving in a similar direction. Whether or not India adopts a system similar to the one called for in its 1999 draft nuclear doctrine, it is moving toward weaponization and deployment of mobile missile systems that could allow for a rapid-response capability. Pakistan, as well, appears to be moving toward mobile systems, and might very well adopt a rapid-response capability, a launch-on-warning policy, and a

predelegation of launch authority. Thus, virtually every nuclear power so far has yielded-or is yielding-to pressures to build larger, more robust, more complex nuclear systems, and it is reasonable to expect that other emerging NWSs will behave similarly. Larger and more complex systems might be more

survivable (though they still might be vulnerable to a nuclear first strike), but they also significantly increase command-and-control difficulties, as we will see in the next section.

Actual dynamics of conflict prove there will be a rapid arsenal buildup and according loss of command and control. Glenn ‘4 (David, Chronicle of Higher Education, “A Bomb in Every Backyard”, 9-3, 51:2, Proquest)As he became acquainted with the optimist-pessimist debate, Mr. Busch says, he realized that "neither side -- and, for what it's worth, especially the optimists -- has devoted enough effort to testing their theories empirically." He arranged to spend the 1998- 99 academic year as a graduate research assistant at the Los Alamos lab, studying early records of the U.S. nuclear program and observing current operations. In the following years, he compiled similar information from Russia, China, and the new nuclear states in South Asia. (His project excluded Britain and France, on the grounds that their systems are very similar to those of the United States, and Israel, because its nuclear program, which has never been formally acknowledged, is so cloaked in secrecy that little is known about it.) "I've tried to develop the most comprehensive study of the safety and management of nuclear-weapons operations," he says. "There have been quite a few studies of command-and-control systems" -- that is, systems for operating the weapons during war -- "but relatively little attention has been given to the related question of the control of fissile material or the 'loose nukes' problem." One of the optimists' central predictions is that new nuclear states will tend to develop only small arsenals, and that they will be content to maintain their weapons

unassembled. Pessimists, on the other hand, worry that new nuclear powers will want fairly large, "survivable" arsenals that will not be vulnerable to being wiped out by a surprise first strike from an adversary. Columbia's Mr. Waltz, whose 1981 paper "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better" was a founding

document of proliferation optimism, says that that is a foolish worry. "What American writers generally misunderstand is how easy it is to create an arsenal that is perceived by adversaries as being survivable," he says. If Country X is known to have even as few as five or six weapons in dispersed locations, Mr. Waltz argues, its adversaries will probably not entertain any dreams of wiping out that arsenal in a surprise first strike. For how could they be absolutely certain that all five or six bombs would be destroyed? Even if just one or two of Country X's bombs survived, it would be able to exact a terrible revenge. "Already," Mr. Waltz says, "we in the U.S. don't know exactly how many weapons North Korea might have, so they're already able to deter us." In a 1993


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 140paper, the pessimist Peter D. Feaver, now a professor of political science at Duke University, replied to such arguments by saying that even if countries were never quite sure how many nukes their adversaries had, that did not mean that they would feel secure about their own weapons. "The question can be turned on its head," he wrote. "Will a proliferator ever truly feel that its arsenal is invulnerable?" Mr.

Busch's book supports Mr. Feaver's position. China and Pakistan do worry about the survivability of their forces, he says, and that fear may in turn impel them to build larger and more complex arsenals. (Pakistan fears that even if India does not know exactly where its bombs are, it might be able to launch a crippling first strike by strafing Pakistan's air strips.) "As countries build larger arsenals," Mr. Busch says, "they encounter what we refer to as the always/never dilemma." That is, a nuclear power always wants to be able to use its weapons in a time of crisis, but it never wants the weapons to be used inadvertently or without a clear command from the central government. There are trade-offs between those two goals. As a country builds a larger, more dispersed, survivable arsenal (fulfilling the "always" goal), its command-and-control systems become more complex, and there is more danger that weapons will be lost or seized by rogue officers. India's official nuclear doctrine, for example, calls for weapons eventually to be maintained in an assembled "rapid response" state, which might increase the risk of an accident.

Empirical evidence shows new weapon states won’t develop command and control systems but will build large assembled arsenals Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 283)These case studies very clearly illustrate Peter Feaver’s arguments about the always/never dilemma. In the early stages of their nuclear programs, the United States, the Soviet Union, china, India, and Pakistan relied on the unassembled weapons. But the pressures to build survivable forces have led, or are currently leading,

these states to move toward assembled weapons and dispersed deployments. These systems require advanced weapons designs and safety devices to avoid accidental detonations and sophisticated command-and-control systems to prevent accidental and unauthorized use. Although it is possible that proliferating countries could find alternative ways to compensate for some of these risks, the cases in this study suggest reasons to doubt, at least, that emerging NWSs will consistently develop advanced safety and command-and-control systems.

The fact that superpowers did build big arsenals proves states don’t adopt rational safe nuclear policies Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 99) BOTH SENG AND Karl lean heavily on the putative virtues of a small and simple arsenal.16 They concede that command and control problems attend large and complex arsenals, but claim this is precisely why we need not worry about minor proliferators. The small size and simple procedures associated with

the arsenals of minor proliferators effectively neutralize most of the historical analogies proffered by nuclear pessimists. Every example of dangerous nuclear behavior by one of the superpowers can be explained away as the obvious, perhaps unavoidable consequence of trying to maintain a large and unwieldy nuclear force posture. From the point of view of rhetoric, this is a shrewd tactical withdrawal on the part of nuclear optimists; it concedes a large and mounting pile of evidence that neither superpower behaved as chastely as rational deterrence theory would expect, but neatly dismisses all of these implications as irrelevant.17 Such a concession, however, undermines a core assumption of nuclear optimism (neoand

paleo-), namely that when states are faced with nuclear options they will pick ones that lead to more-safe rather than less-safe behavior (on which more later).

Israel proves new powers will build larger than necessary arsenals Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 100)Small and simple arsenals are, ceteris paribus, easier to protect against unauthorized use and are less prone to the kind of "normal accidents" problems afflicting large, tightly connected systems.18 Whether the states have small and simple arsenals, however, and whether they will always remain so, is debatable. For instance, the Israeli arsenal may in fact be much larger than one hundred weapons as claimed by Seng, if the information from Vanunu can be believed.19 Even at one hundred, the Israeli arsenal would be considerably larger than Israel needs if the rest of the neooptimists' argument about the ease of hiding weapons and the impossibility of preventive war is correct;


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 141viewed this way, the arsenal appears relatively large, raising doubt as to whether Israeli leaders are as sanguine about the virtues of extremely small arsenals as are the neooptimists.

New proliferants won’t trust minimum deterrence even if it works – they will shoot for large arsenals Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 105-106)Thus, the neooptimists' case reduces to the same argument paleooptimists advanced. The spread of nuclear proliferation is stabilking, they claim, because even the most backward minor proliferator will have an arsenal capable of providing some minimal existential deterrence—and states, recognizing this, will never try to provoke the minor proliferator. Since the proliferator will never be provoked, the proliferator will never feel compelled to worry about the reliability of his nuclear arsenal and will never adopt unsafe practices designed to boost its deterrent value. I remain unpersuaded by this logic for five reasons. First, no state I know of has ever relied on existential or minimum deterrence for very long. Certainly, none of the first generation nuclear powers ever acted as if they believed

in true minimum deterrence. Even France and China spent the money to buy a fairly robust missile capability. If neooptimists code these countries—each with at least four hundred weapons aboard a wide mix of

delivery systems kept at fairly high levels of readiness— as the minimum deterrent models for minor proliferators, then neooptimists have to admit of all the organizational and complexity concerns pessimists have raised.34 The acid test will be in South Asia and that test is in its infancy (on which more in the conclusion). The fact is that states have shown a proclivity for worst-case strategizing and this leads them to distrust existential deterrence schemes.

Smaller arsenals may be simpler but will also be unreliable and more accident prone Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 100-101)Neooptimists thus see a virtue where pessimists have seen a vice. Financial constraints, neooptimists argue, will keep arsenals small and simple. The factors that constrain the size of the arsenal, however, such as financial pressures and the effects of the nonproliferation regime, also affect other features of the arsenal directly related to desirable nuclear behaviors. The constraints may tend to keep arsenals small but they also tend to keep the arsenals untested, unproven, and probably unsafe. Smallness and simplicity are not intrinsically preferable (except for the fact that fewer numbers of warheads would translate into a statistically lower probability of accidents, provided that the small size has not encouraged risk-prone deployment patterns and ceteris paribus). Smallness and simplicity may make safe behaviors more affordable and assertive control more tractable, ceteris paribus,

but they do not in and of themselves constitute safe behavior. It is one thing to say that minor proliferators will find it easier to maintain smaller arsenals than they would larger arsenals. It is another thing to say that they will, in fact, maintain small arsenals adequately. The Iraqi "arsenal" was so small that it was nothing more than a laboratory design, but we know from postwar inspectors that it would have been prone to accidental use if it had been built—perhaps precisely because Iraq was forced to design its weapon in secret and with scant resources.23

Smaller arsenals will have insufficient training to avoid command instability in a crisis – even if they are simpler the increase in other dangers more than offsets this Feaver ’97 (Peter, Ass. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Duke, Security Studies, “Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”, 6:4, p. 102-103)Are small and simple arsenals really more responsive in a crisis? Neooptimists dismiss some of the most damning near-nuclear accidents from die cold war era as merely a consequence of die rigid and complex standard operating procedures associated with the large superpower arsenals. Seng claims, with rather

unjustified enthusiasm, that smaller arsenals should be able to "spin on a dime."27 He overstates his case. Given a certain level of operational skill, it is easier to improvise with a smaller than a larger arsenal. Will minor proliferators, however, have die kind of military that is proficient enough to improvise at all? Some will and some will not. Doctrinal skill varies widely across different militaries and even within different subelements of the same military.28 Of course, the nuclear operators may be die better trained elements of die minor proliferator, but not under conditions of opacity. Improvisation and operational flexibility are not simply a matter of size; they must be trained into military units. This argument points to a limitation of small-N comparative static analyses. Holding everything constant and then varying the size of the arsenal yields an expectation that command and control problems will ease. If you take the exact same country with the exact same deployment and skill profile, it will find controlling a smaller arsenal easier than controlling a larger arsenal. Counterfactual reasoning supports this logic, but since there are so few cases of nuclear proliferation to study we cannot be very confident of the magnitude of the effect.29 Since the purpose of neooptimism is to assuage us on the safeness of minor proliferators, it is not sufficient to know whether a certain kind of proliferation is relatively safer than another. We must also know how much safer—that is, whether it is safe enough


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 142to compensate for other problems. One must also examine whether the factor that is driving the smallness will also result in changes in other relevant parameters, for instance the alert level of the arsenal or the reliability of the weapon's design. One must also have some sense of the magnitude of effect and of other necessary conditions; the smaller size may only afford a meaningful improvement in nuclear command and control during a crisis if it is coupled with a competent military. Weighing all the factors in the U.S. case, for instance, it is not at all certain that nuclear operations were safer in the late-1950s than in the late-1960s; the arsenal was smaller in the earlier period, but the advantages of size were offset by a variety of unsafe operational practices including airborne alerts, a relatively wide scope of predelegated authority, an absence of use-control devices, and a general ignorance among top-level civilian leaders about operational realities. In sum, neooptimists have helpfully fleshed out the

ways in which small size facilitates command and control. In so doing, however, they may be overstating both the virtues of smallness and simplicity and the likelihood that minor proliferators will adopt the specific kinds of small and simple arsenals necessary for the rosy scenario.



AT PROLIF SLOW (GENERAL)

Proliferation creates a dangerous domino effect – uncontainable Pant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)S. Paul Kapur examines the stability/instability paradox in the South Asian context and takes aim at the widely held scholarly consensus that it is the paradox that explains continuing conflict in a nuclear South Asia. Whereas the stability/instability paradox is expected to impede escalation of conflict between two nuclear powers, in the South Asian case, the nuclear shield has actually made Pakistan’s leadership more adventurous as they believe that fear of nuclear escalation would prevent India from using its conventional superiority against Pakistan and lead the international community to intervene before conflict could escalate. South Asian violence, according to Kapur, “has resulted from a strategic environment in which nuclear escalation is a serious possibility in the event that a limited Indo-Pakistani confrontation spirals into a full scale conventional conflict.”

States are ideologically inclined to develop nuclear capabilities because it’s a status symbol – it’s not controllablePant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)The third chapter is about the impact of discourse on state behavior wherein the author focuses on a broader issue of why states develop nuclear programs, as opposed to examining the reasons behind nuclear weapons acquisition. Itty Abraham suggests that the focus of most scholarship on nuclear weapons proliferation is in determining when and why states decide to pursue a nuclear weapons program which he terms as “the discourse of control.” In

such a context, non-proliferation policy paradoxically becomes a reason for states to become nuclear powers. Nuclear power for India became a symbol of Indian independence. Indian leaders had always viewed their nation as a major global power, and nuclear power was a symbol of India’s technological sophistication. Abraham argues that “India’s atomic energy program represented the zenith of Indian developmentalism, technologically and symbolically,” and therefore the question of giving up the nuclear project did not even arise, as it would be “equivalent to giving up the project of a sovereign Indian state.”

Neorealism dictates that states will continue to proliferate indefinitely if they have the technical capabilitiesPotter and Mukhatzhanova 8 (William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova is Research Associate at the James Martin Center. “Divining Nuclear Intentions”, Summer, International Security, Volume 33, Issue 1)Much of the thinking about nuclear proliferation has been informed by realist perspectives, which assume that states are unitary actors that seek nuclear weapons because their security—precarious in

an anarchic world—demands it. From a classical realist perspective, the quest for nuclear weapons is a rational form of self-help designed to maximize power.22 Neorealism embraces the same basic assumptions as classical realism, but it is more attentive to the impact of structural differences in the international system on the occurrence of war and peace.23 Applied to the proliferation arena, neorealism offers an elegant and simple explanation for why and when nations would go nuclear. In its view, regime type, domestic politics, and personalities are of no consequence, and all that really matters is an understanding of the balancing dynamic in which one state's pursuit of nuclear weapons begets another.24 Employing this logic, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera, and Benjamin Frankel, among others, thought it likely that the decline of bipolarity after the end of the Cold War would generate a new spate of proliferators, including countries such as Germany, Japan, and Ukraine.25 Taken to its logical conclusion, unadulterated neorealism predicts a lengthy nuclear proliferation chain that extends to as many states as have access to technical know-how and material to build nuclear weapons.



AT PROLIF SLOW (NO TIPPING POINT)

We are at the nuclear tipping point – consensus of expertsPotter and Mukhatzhanova 8 (William C. Potter is Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova is Research Associate at the James Martin Center. “Nuclear Phobia”, International Herald Tribune, September 23, Infotrac)Judging by the comments of most political figures, scholars and media pundits, regardless of political orientation, the future of nuclear proliferation is bleak. This time, the sky is surely falling. At the very least, the world is at a "tipping point" in the direction of a nuclear armed crowd with far more countries actively pursuing and acquiring nuclear weapons. On this point, Hillary Clinton, Benjamin Netanyahu, Ban Ki-moon and John McCain all agree. This proliferation pessimism often finds expression in metaphors about nuclear dominoes, chains,

cascades and waves. In most cases the gloomy scenario anticipates a reactive process in which Iran's "going nuclear" leads to decisions by other states in the region and possibly elsewhere to follow suit in quick succession.



AT RATIONALITY CHECKS

Rationality of states is irrelevant – even the tiny possibility of miscalculation or misunderstandings would plunge the world into the dark ages Robock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)The Cold War is over, but many of the nuclear weapons produced during that period remain. The US and Russia are very slowly reducing the numbers of weapons, but each still maintains an arsenal far larger than necessary to produce nuclear winter. No current leader of the US or Russia would use nuclear weapons, but their existence alone makes the possibility of nuclear winter in the future possible if a crazy person or computer error or misunderstanding caused their use. The only solution is to reduce the number of weapons to a level that will still provide a deterrent, but will not create a nuclear winter should they ever be used. Reducing these numbers to a level below which they could produce a global climatic catastrophe, as Sagan was fond of saying, is a matter of elementary planetary hygiene. This number is around a few hundred, the same number of weapons that Britain, France, and China have had in each of their arsenals for decades, and a number they have deemed more than sufficient to maintain a credible defense of their countries. This is also the number Admiral Stansfield Turner,42 former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), argued for on other grounds, in 1997. The United States dropped two atomic bombs on innocent people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 in the first nuclear war; since then, in spite of the massive buildup of these weapons, they have never been used in war again. Nuclear winter theory now shows not only that the superpowers still threaten the existence of the rest of the world, but also that the newly emergent nuclear powers now threaten the former superpowers, perhaps not with extinction, but with serious consequences including drought and famine. Eliminating the nuclear weapons will eliminate the possibility of this climatic catastrophe. If they exist, they can be used .17,43 Rapid reduction of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals will set an example for the rest of the world that nuclear weapons cannot be used and are not needed.



AT REALISM

Realism fails in the context of nuclear proliferationa. BiasCimbala 4 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear proliferation and international systems,” vol. 20, issue 4, , 12/01/2004, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+proliferation+and+international+systems&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2004-12-01&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=321&rft.epage=336&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F1475179042000305787&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_1475179042000305787 /mr)The first problem for some important RIST theorists is that, in crossing from the world of abstraction to the

universe of actual policy-making, their assumptions introduce hidden biases . Assumptions that do no damage in

the world of models (where all assumptions are equal, as all angels in heaven have wings) can be pathologically misguided when they leak into policy-derived explanations or predictions. For example, Kenneth Waltz explicitly compares the behaviors of states in an international system to the behavior of firms in a market. As the market forces firms into a common mode of rational decision-making in order to survive, so, too, does the international system, according to Waltz, dictate similar constraints upon the behavior of states. The analogy, however, is wrong. The international system does not dominate its leading

state actors: leading states define the parameters of the system. The international system, unlike the theoretical free market,

is sub-system dominant. The "system" or composite of interactions among units is the cross product of the separate behaviors of the units.* International politics is a game of oligopoly, in which the few rule the many. Because this is so, there cannot be any "system" to which the leading oligopolists, unlike the remainder of the states, are subject against their wishes. The system is driven by the 324 • STEPHEN J. CIMBALA preferred ends and means of its leading members on issues that are perceived as vital interests to those states or as important, although not necessary vital.' Realists, especially structural realists who emphasize the

number of powers and their polarities as determinants of peace and war, assume that some "system" of interactions exists independently of the states that make it up. This is a useful heuristic for theorists, but a very mistaken view of the way in which policy is actually made in international affairs. Because realists insist upon reification of the system independently of the principal actors within the system, they miss the sub-systemic dominance built into the international order. Napoleon Bonaparte and Adolph Hitler, for example, saw the international order not as a system that would constrain their objectives and ambitions, but as a series of swinging doors, each awaiting a fateful, aggressive push. If the international "system" were as determinant as systems theorists insist, Iraq would neither have defied the UN Security Council in 1991, nor would Saddam Hussein have dug in his heels in Baghdad in 2002 in the face of George W. Bush's undisguised determination to bring down his government and dispatch him to the nether regions. Hussein's intransigence following his invasion of Kuwait in 1991 stared down a united coalition of the world's greatest military powers, including a united NATO and most of the Arab world, and forced a UN-authorized military operation to restore the status quo ante in Kuwait. A much weaker Hussein, after more than a decade of economic strangulation, no-fly zones and attempted diplomatic isolation, nonetheless managed to divide diplomatically the UN Security Council and NATO in 2003, forcing the United States to relent or invade with a minimum "coalition of the willing". Systems theorists might object that they cannot be expected to make point predictions about individual decisions at a particular time. But Hussein's defiance of international opinion and threats of force, as well as his willingness to go to war against enemies with overwhelming power, occurred over more than a decade of activity in international relations. During this time Hussein was the closest thing imaginable to an internationally convicted felon. Yet he stood tall in the face of systemic seismic shifts, including American military unipolarity. Attempts by RIST theorists to circumvent some explanatory problems create others. As Robert Jervis has noted, one can divide international systems theorists according to whether the "system" is treated as an independent variable, as a dependent variable, or as both.'* Waltz contends that the most important causes of international behavior reside in the structure of the international system, i.e., in the number of powers and in their positions relative to one another.' Jervis notes that Waltz's structure omits some important variables and processes that are neither at the system nor actor level: for example, technology and the degree and kind of international interdependence.

b. It confuses formal and efficient causes – RIST is only applicable to conventional deterrenceCimbala 4 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear proliferation and international systems,” vol. 20, issue 4, , 12/01/2004, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+proliferation+and+international+systems&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2004-12-01&rft.issn=1475-







Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 1481798&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=321&rft.epage=336&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F1475179042000305787&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_1475179042000305787 /mr) A second problem in RIST theories is the confusion or conflation of formal and efficient causes.

System polarity is virtually identical with system structure in many RIST arguments. But this near-identity of polarity and structure is flawed. Polarity is more the result of past state and non-state actor behaviors than it is the cause of future behaviors. Cold War bipolarity was the result of World War II, of nuclear weapons, and NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS • 325 of the fact that leaders perceived correctly the futility of starting World War III in Europe. Leaders' perceptions of the balance of power are an intervening variable between polarity and outcomes such as stability, including peace or war. In other words, leaders' perceptions, including their risk aversion or risk acceptance, are the efficient causes for

international bebavior: "systems" and polarity are formal causes. The difference between efficient and formal causes is important for theories that purport to be empirically testable. Formal causes are proved by an abstract process that follows a deductive chain of reasoning. Efficient causes are demonstrated by observation of temporal sequences and bebavioral effects. International systems theorists who emphasize the importance of structure have been more successful at proving formal than efficient causes. There is merit in doing so, and Waltz and others who have argued from this perspective deserve credit for their rigor and for the insights derived from their perspective.' The danger for international systems theorists lies in transferring inferences from the realm of deductive logic to the world of policy explanation and prediction. For example. Waltz argues both that,

because there were only two Cold War superpowers, each had to balance against the other at virtually any point; and disputes among their allies could not drag the US and Soviets into war because they could satisfy their deterrence requirements through internal balancing, rather than alliance aggregation.'"

The first argument is at least partly inconsistent with the second, and neither is confirmed by Cold War evidence. The US and Soviets sometimes conceded important disputes to one another in order to avoid the possibility of inadvertent war or escalation, as in the US refusal to expand the ground war in Vietnam on account of expected Soviet and Chinese reactions. And allies sometimes did drag the superpowers into crisis and under credible threat of war, as the Israelis and Egyptians did in 1973. Despite these logical problems in RIST, it remains influential as time passes for two reasons. First, international relations and security studies are as subject as are other fields to bandwagoning effects. Prominent ideas gather new adherents in leading graduate schools, and the products of those graduate schools carry the ideas far and wide into the profession, like St Paul's missionary journeys in Asia Minor. Second, RIST does have one major virtue. Unlike the majority of social science theories applied to international politics and foreign policy, it is self-consciously aware of the importance of military history and of strategy. John Mearsheimer's The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, previously cited, is exemplary of RIST theorists' ability to mine history for pertinent lessons about policy. These "positives" about RIST might balance its negatives in a world made up of only non-nuclear powers (before World War II) or of only two nuclear superpowers (the Cold War). But an emerging landscape of "n" nuclear-armed state and non-state actors changes the context within which prior arguments worked. RIST works (conditionally) in a world of conventional deterrence, where great powers can still fight major wars at an acceptable cost. Nuclear weapons change this calculation . One might save RIST in a world of nuclear plenty by arguing that nuclear deterrence replaces conventional war fighting as the major stabilizing dynamic. But this argument cannot fast-forward from a bipolar nuclear world into a multi-polar system for reasons that RIST theorists themselves have acknowledged: multi-polar systems, especially those that are unbalanced, are more war prone than are bipolar systems."

c. structural weaknessesCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)The Realist Perspective: Strengths and Weaknesses The realist perspective is frequently associated with and defined by three basic postulates about international relations.(2) First, states wish to preserve their autonomy. To do so, they often seek to balance contending powers in international rivalries to prevent any single state or coalition from attaining a hegemonic position. Second, power is measurable or, at least, comparable in units of consensual understanding. Thus, if one state holds more military power than another, both will understand that this gives the more powerful state an advantage in situations of conflict or potential conflict. For realists, this is a strong argument for connecting nuclear weapons with peace. Nuclear weapons make power immediately commensurable: few doubt that even a small number of nuclear explosions can cause unacceptable damage.(3) Third, states seek to advance their interests, but at a risk and cost that are manageable.(4) This postulate implies a different logic for deterrent nuclear forces than for conventional defense forces. Deterrent forces depend upon the expected probability of unacceptable retaliation for the attacker. Conventional forces depend upon the probability that the







Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 149defender may prevail, at an acceptable cost, in battle against would-be attackers.(5) When we assume that states carefully weigh their risks before attacking and that the logic of nuclear deterrence supersedes the logic of conventional defense, the result is a glacial standoff in which nuclear weapons remain poised in their silos ready to be used in a moment that everybody hopes will never come. Taken

together, these postulates support arguments that the post-Cold War world may be compatible with a hitherto unknown, and unacceptable, degree of nuclear weapons spread.(6) The arguments seem persuasive to those who believe that these fundamental tenets of realism best explain outcomes in international relations. Nevertheless,

when we carefully examine their application to the problem of nuclear deterrence stability, the resulting realist model encounters significant theoretical limitations. Three questionable

premises receive attention here: that a general theory of deterrence can be built on exceptional cases; that one can transfer parsimonious explanations from economic theory to international politics with equal explanatory power; and, that theories of general deterrence can adequately explain the behavior of states in immediate deterrence situations.

d. Economics prove Waltz’s analogy doesn’t applyCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Economic Analogies The second major set of theoretical problems with nuclear realism lies in the adaptation of arguments from microeconomic theory to theories of interstate relations. Waltz explicitly compares the

behaviors of states in an international system to the behavior of firms in a market. As the market forces firms into a common mode of rational decision making in order to survive, so, too, does the international system, according to Waltz, dictate similar constraints upon the behavior of states.(9) The analogy, however, is wrong. The international system does not dominate its leading state actors: leading states define the parameters of the system. The international system, unlike the theoretical free market, is subsystem dominant. International politics is a game of oligopoly, in which the few rule the many. Because this is so, there cannot be any "system" to which the leading oligopolists, unlike the remainder of the states, are subject. The system is determined by the preferred ends and means of its leading members. Structural realists assume that some system of interactions exists independently of the states which make it up. This is a useful heuristic for theorists, but a very mistaken view of the way in which policy is actually made in international affairs. Because realists insist upon reification of the system independently of the principal actors within the system, they miss the subsystemic dominance built into the international order.(l0) An important test of whether meaningful theory can proceed on the basis of the realist, or realpolitik, premise of system separateness, or whether domestic political forces must also be taken into account by theorists, is to test realist and domestic/constrained hypotheses against historical evidence. According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, the realist perspective as formalized in their models is not supported by the past two centuries' experience of interstate behavior.(l1) The authors deduce an "acquiescence impossibility" theorem which shows that, in a logically developed game structure based on realist assumptions, it is impossible for one state to acquiesce to the demands of another "regardless of the beliefs held by the rivals, regardless of the initial demand made by one of the states, and regardless of initial endowments of capabilities, coalitional support, propensities to take risks, or anything else."(12) None of the deductions derived from the realist or neorealist versions of their international interactions game, according to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, were supported in the empirical data set that included 707 dyadic interactions.(13) One might argue, in defense of realists on this point, that the assumption of system determinism is a useful falsehood. It allows for parsimony of expression through focus on

the essential attributes of an international system. But the assumption of "apartness" of the system and its essential state or nonstate actors is only useful, and methodologically defensible, if it leads to insights that are both accurate and not otherwise attainable. Neither exceptional accuracy nor exceptional attainability of insight has been demonstrated by realists for the assumption of system and actor "apartness." This is probably one reason why traditional realists, as opposed to modern structural and other

neorealists, do not exclude what Waltz, in another study, refers to as first and second image variables.(14)

Realism fails to explain the high degree of international cooperation that takes place despite a legally anarchic international order because of the biased manner in which realism deals with imperfect information. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman: In the realist world, imperfect information can only encourage violence. Incorrect beliefs about the intentions of rivals can only steer disputes away from negotiation (or the status quo) and toward the blackmail inherent in a capitulation or the tragedy inherent in a war. Incorrect beliefs, secrecy, misperception, misjudgment, and miscalculation are routine features of human intercourse. In that sense, a realist world could be a dangerous world indeed.(15) In fact, the explanations and predictions made





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 150possible by realism are successfully carried out only within a closed and very constrained universe. Even within that universe, structural realism (emphasizing the causal primacy of system polarity) works better with conventional weapons than it does with a multitude of nuclear forces. Conventional wars can be fought to rectify an imbalance of power, to challenge the hegemonial rule of imperial states, or to bring about other changes in the international political environment with which states must act. Conventional war and system change can go together.(16) Nuclear weapons, and in particular

nuclear weapons spread, makes the relationship between war and systems change much more pathological. War as an instrument for the attainment of policy objectives becomes more irrational with nuclear, compared to conventional, weapons. Realists actually count on this fear, of a pathological relationship

between war and change, to preserve peace. Nuclear weapons will freeze the situation in favor of the defenders of the status quo, and against those potential aggressors who would disturb the peace.

e. There’s a distinction between general and immediate deterrence – Cuban missile crisis disproves realist theoryCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)General Versus Immediate Deterrence This brings us to the third general set of problems with realist theories and nuclear weapons spread. The structure of the international system is not related to general deterrence in the same way as it is related to immediate deterrence. According to Patrick M. Morgan, the need for general deterrence is inherent in the normal day-to-day relations of states, based on the distribution of power and states' assumptions about one another's intentions.(17) General deterrence is the latent possibility that any state may opt for war within an anarchic or nonhierarchical international order.(18) Immediate deterrence is a situation in which one side has actually made specific threats against another, the second side perceives itself threatened, and a significant likelihood of war exists in the minds of leaders in at least one of the two states. For example, the onset of a crisis often signifies a failure of general deterrence, but as yet immediate deterrence has not failed because states have not yet abandoned diplomacy and crisis management for battle. It makes sense to assume that there might be a strong correlation between success or failure in general deterrence and system attributes such as distributions of actor capabilities and objectives. However, the relationship between international systems and failures of immediate deterrence is much more indirect. State and substate variables, including the attributes of individuals, groups and bureaucratic organizations, are among the filters through which any system forces must pass before those forces are manifest in state decisions and policies. The distinction between general and immediate deterrence helps to explain why perfectly logical deductions from deterrence theory based on rationality postulates often fly in the face of states' actual behavior.(19) The significance of the distinction between general and immediate

deterrence is illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis. The decision by Khrushchev to put Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles into Cuba was intended, among other objectives, to diminish the publicly acknowledged (by U.S. government officials) gap between U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Khrushchev's decision, made in the spring of 1962 after

consulting very few key advisors, represented a failure of general deterrence. The Soviet leadership had decided to risk the emplacement of its nuclear weapons outside Soviet territory and in the Western Hemisphere for the first time. However, it was not yet a failure of immediate deterrence, which was not involved in Khrushchev's clandestine deployment program because the deployments were deliberately kept secret. Had Khrushchev carried through his original plans, he would have completed the missile deployments and then announced their existence.(20) In that eventuality, the mere existence of Khrushchev's missiles on Cuban soil, however threatening it seemed to U.S. policy makers, would not have created a situation of immediate deterrence. Only the completion of deployments followed by a coercive threat could move the situation from a failure of general deterrence to one of immediate deterrence (for example, after having completed Cuban missile deployments, the Soviet Union now demanding that the U.S and its allies depart West Berlin immediately). The preceding supposition is of the "what if" or counterfactual kind; we may never know the full story of Khrushchev's motives for the missile deployments.(21) The actual shift from a general to an immediate deterrence situation took place on 22 October when President Kennedy ordered the Soviet missiles removed from Cuba, announced that the U.S. was imposing a quarantine on Soviet shipments to Cuba, and stated that a nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any target in the Western Hemisphere would call forth a full U.S. retaliatory response against the Soviet Union. Realist perspectives help to explain the background to general deterrence failure in this instance, but they do little to clarify why the U.S. and Soviet political leaderships chose as they did. If the international power positions of states yield unambiguous deductions about their crisis management strategies, Khrushchev should never have dared to put missiles into Cuba. And the U.S., once the missiles had been discovered, need not have hesitated to invade





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 151Cuba or to launch an air strike to destroy the missile sites, colocated air defense sites, and other nuclear-capable weapons platforms deployed in Cuba by Moscow.(22) Realists would argue, against the preceding statement, that nuclear weapons made the Soviets and the Americans cautious during the Cuban missile crisis. The danger created

by nuclear weapons helped to end the crisis without war, following the logic and against my earlier argument. However, realist arguments will not work in this context. Nuclear weapons did not make the crisis easier to manage, but harder. They added to the risk of escalation, to be sure, and leaders were well aware of those risks. The U.S. deliberately and--some would say--successfully manipulated the risk of escalation and war in order to force

Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles. But the argument, that nuclear coercion was the path to Cuban crisis settlement, will not work because nuclear weapons, and the Soviet sense of inferiority in the nuclear arms race, were major causes for the Cuban crisis.(23) If it is argued that nuclear weapons helped to resolve the crisis, that is true only as a historical tautology: By having caused it or helped to cause it and making it more dangerous, they could also play a part in ending it.(24) The Cuban crisis example shows the limitations of realism in explaining even the most set piece, one-against-one confrontation between two relatively mature command and control systems during the Cold War. Realism leaves the mold in place and removes the jello. The essence of Cuban crisis bargaining was about Khrushchev's overestimation of his own risk-taking propensity. His military reach had exceeded his

political grasp. When discovery of the missiles blew his cover, he retreated, not only because of U.S. power and determination, but also because he and Kennedy recognized that they had maneuvered themselves very close to an outbreak of inadvertent war, and possible escalation to nuclear war. The tendency of realism to reification of systems may have its methodological uses when systems are posited to do harmless or politically benign things. When systems are charged with the responsibility for maintaining peace and security, then one cannot exclude from the assessment of system stability the decision-making proclivities of states, nor the fears and perceptions of their leaders. Realist assumptions can help to explain or to predict failures of general deterrence, as in the case of arms races that get out of control. But what states will choose to do about these systemic processes (actually a series of state decisions, although we grant realists the benefit of the doubt) remains an open door, a window of The matter raised here is not simply a problem of the level of analysis, but one of philosophy of analysis. One cannot choose preferred levels of analysis without making some assumption about which level or levels best provide explanations and predictions for those outcomes and processes that matter most. Nuclear positivists who depend upon realism can make interesting statements about the central tendencies of state behaviors within a particular international order. But meaningful theory must also include statements about ranges or variation among values taken on by causal and dependent variables. It is both true and misleading to say, for example, that we had no nuclear wars during the Cold War era: therefore, states in general are risk averse once they have acquired nuclear weapons. The point about

states in general remains not proved, and it says nothing at all about what a particular state might do in a specific crisis. Unlike business firms and their problems, with nuclear weapons and nuclear wars involved, we want to know the deviant cases and know them intimately: they may drive the entire system in new directions.

f. In the context of proliferation, RIST and RDT theories failCimbala 4 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear proliferation and international systems,” vol. 20, issue 4, , 12/01/2004, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+proliferation+and+international+systems&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2004-12-01&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=321&rft.epage=336&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F1475179042000305787&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_1475179042000305787 /mr)RIST and RDTs offer some important insights about international politics, and they have a justifiable center of gravity based on recognition of the importance of military history and strategy. But theorists and policy-makers need to be careful in borrowing from RIST and RDTs. RIST offers explanatory and predictive hj^jotheses that fit some worlds better than others. A world of many nuclear-armed states has the potential to drive RIST theorists, not to say deterrence models, into the wood chippers of history. Two variables will help to determine whether RIST and RDT will remain compelling in a world of nuclear plenty: first, whether the distribution of power among nuclear armed actors is relatively balanced or unbalanced; and, then, whether the aims of nuclear states are status quo or revisionist in their attitude toward the existing distribution of international power and other values. RIST and RDT have a lot to say about the first set of variables but understate the importance of the second set. The relative military potential of state actors matters a great deal for the future of deterrence; so, too, do the aspirations and motivations of the future nuclear heads of state. History shows that systems matter, like parents do, but their rules are not always followed by intrepid adolescents with an impatient grasp for power and glory.






AT WALTZ

Waltz’s theory is flawedCimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “Connecting the Dots: Nuclear Arms Control and Proliferation After Bush and Putin,” vol. 21, issue 2, pg. 259-278, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Connecting+the+Dots%3A+Nuclear+Arms+Control+and+Proliferation+After+Bush+and+Putin&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2008-04-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=259&rft.epage=278&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040802067094&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_13518040802067094 /mr)U.S. and Russian post-SORT and post-START forces operating under a 1,000 warhead limit can also be linked to a multilateral model of constrained nuclear proliferation. As shown above, it is at least statistically possible, although politically open ended, to construct a manageable and deterrent-stable multipolar nuclear power system. The long term stability of such a system depends on political intentions as much, or more, than the distribution of military capabilities. Kenneth Waltz was more shocking than

revolutionary in his arguments for “more is better” with respect to nuclear weapons spread. His thinking

stands squarely in the tradition of political realism and nuclear deterrence strategy. 18 18Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). This study predates the spike in interest in nuclear terrorism after 9–11. For that topic, see Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable

Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt and Co.—Times Books, 2004). View all notes The problem with this logic is that it takes only a single nuclear armed state, reasoning “outside the box” of Western realism and deterrence theory, to disrupt the system. 19

Waltz’s rational deterrence theory failsRichard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Despite nuclear proliferation’s controversial nature, states continue to develop the technologies requisite for constructing nuclear weapons. What motivates men to create “the most terrifying weapons ever created by human kind…unique in their destructive power and in their lack of direct military utility”(Cirincione, 2007, pg. 47)? Why then do states pursue the controversial and costly path of proliferation? To states, nuclear weapons comprise a symbolic asset of strength and “as a prerequisite for great power status” (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 47). On a simplistic level, nuclear weapons make states feel more powerful, respected and influential in world politics. When it is in their best interest, states develop nuclear capabilities to ensure their own sovereignty and to potentially deter other states from attacking. According to realist thinkers, nuclear weapons provide the “ultimate security guarantor” in an anarchic international system (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 51). Proliferation optimists and rational deterrence theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz, argue proliferation stabilizes international security and promotes peace. Rational deterrence theory states that nations refrain from nuclear conflict because of the extraordinarily high cost. Arguably the most powerful military technology ever developed by man, nuclear weapons have only twice been deployed in actual conflict, due to the devastation they incur. Nuclear weapons increase the potential damage of any given military conflict due to their immense destructive capabilities. Summarizing rational deterrence framework, Waltz asserts “states are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg 32). According to the rational deterrence framework, political actors refrain from both

conventional and nuclear conflict because of the unacceptably high costs. Ultimately an assumption, rational deterrence theory lacks any empirically tested evidence. Nuclear proliferation exponentially increases the possibility of non-proliferation regime collapse and nuclear conflict, reducing all states’ relative power. Nuclear peace theory seems plausible, but like any mathematical model it may only marginally apply to world politics and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, due to the fact that “international security is not reducible to the theory of mathematical games” (Bracken, 2002, pg. 403). Rather, the spread of nuclear weapons exponentially decreases the stability of regional and global politics by intensifying regional rivalries and political tensions, both of which may potentially catalyze a nuclear catastrophe. Frustrated with a lack of results through conventional conflict, desperate states may look to nuclear arsenals as a source of absolute resolution for any given conflict. The use of nuclear weapons, even in

a limited theater, could plausibly trigger chain reactions rippling across the globe. With their interests and sovereignty threatened, other nuclear states will eventually use their own weapons in an effort to ensure national security. President Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation in 1963: I ask you to stop and

think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries…there would be






Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 154no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security…there would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 103). Proliferation decreases the relative security of all states not only through

the possibility of direct conflict, but also by threatening foreign and domestic interests. As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its power to insure its security and influence international politics in a way that reflects its own interests and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). In addition to creating a direct security threat, further proliferation jeopardizes the United States’ ability to project its primacy and promote its interests internationally.



PROLIF → BMD

Prolif causes BMD buildupCimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Missile Defenses in a “Deuces Wild” Context: Proliferation, Terror and Deterrent Disorder,” vol. 25, issue 1, 1/1/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Missile+Defenses+in+a+%22Deuces+Wild%22+Context%3A+Proliferation%2C+Terror+and+Deterrent+Disorder&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2006-02-01&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=FCST&rft.externalDocID=1182855721 /mr)Third, proliferation has all but pushed the NPT regime into receivership, and nuclear weapons spread in Asia has the potential to collapse into a tsunami of conflict spital. In this environment, the interest of regional states in theater or national missile defenses may grow: either in BMD provided by offshore protectors (America, Russia) or in home-grown varieties for the wealthier and larger states. Purpose-built missile defenses may help some states to avoid nuclear blackmail by powers inside or outside of their immediate region. However, missiie defenses without retaliatory forces will not deter a serious competitor or antagonist.



PROLIF BAD – ENVIRONMENT

Prolif causes massive environmental destruction.Christ and Zheutlin ‘1 (Michael, Ex. Dir. And Peter, Associate Prog. Dir. – International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Tikkun, “Stop Playing the Nuclear Game.” 16:3, May/June, Ebsco)Even if nuclear weapons are never used in war, by accident, miscalculation, or in a terrorist attack, the legacy of radioactive and toxic contamination from the testing, production, and maintenance of nuclear arsenals over the last half-century presents intractable and costly long-term problems . Workers who were exposed to radiation and chemical hazards as they toiled in nuclear weapons plants and those living downwind of such sites continue to suffer disproportionate rates of work-related death and disease. Some nuclear weapons production sites, such as the Hanford Reservation in Washington state and

Chelyabinsk in Russia, still pose potentially catastrophic health and environmental risks. Cleaning up contaminated soil and water and quarantining sites that cannot be cleaned--sites the government has called "national sacrifice zones"--will cost untold billions of dollars over hundreds--and perhaps

thousands--of years. Holding onto existing nuclear arsenals, along with the proliferation of new ones, only compounds these enormous health, safety, and environmental problems.



PROLIF BAD – HEG

Prolif destroys heg and diplomacy --

a. Proliferation affects each state differently. The largest determinant of whether proliferation is good or bad is an individual state’s power projection capabilities – this understanding of proliferation is comparatively better for policymakers. Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)This power-based theory provides a better account of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation than alternative explanations based on political relationships or nuclear possession. Whether nuclear weapons spread to friends or foes influences the nature and the degree of the proliferation threat, but I will show that a state’s political relationship with the new nuclear-weapon state is less important than a state’s power-projection capability in determining whether nuclear proliferation will advantage or disadvantage a state’s security. Further, I demonstrate that the threat that a state faces as nuclear weapons spread does not depend on whether the state itself possesses nuclear weapons. By moving beyond optimism and pessimism to consider the differential effects of nuclear proliferation at the unit level, this article makes a number of contributions to our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation. First, understanding the effects of nuclear proliferation on states, the units that compose the international system, is important in its own right. Second, the debate about the consequences of nuclear proliferation at the systemic level could be informed through a better understanding of the unit-level effects of nuclear proliferation, because unit-level effects may aggregate to influence systemic outcomes. Third, this article demonstrates that nuclear proliferation has differential effects. Sagan argues that the spread of nuclear weapons is bad, Waltz argues that it is good, and this article sets out the argument that it depends: the spread of nuclear weapons is bad for power-projecting states and can be good for non-power-projecting states. This novel approach promises to reinvigorate the scholarly study of the consequences of nuclear proliferation by establishing a research agenda on the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Further studies could identify and examine the factors, other than power projection, that shape the degree to which states will be threatened by the spread of nuclear weapons. Fourth, explaining the differential effects of nuclear proliferation is the first step in developing a theory to explain variation in state responses to nuclear proliferation in other states. Empirically, we see that states respond very differently to the prospect of nuclear proliferation in other states. At one extreme, states are willing to use military force to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. At the other extreme, states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to help additional states acquire nuclear weapons. Without a better understanding of the conditions under which nuclear proliferation will positively or negatively influence the security environments of different types of states, we cannot begin to explain why states support or oppose the spread of nuclear weapons in particular cases. If the argument of this article is correct, a state’s ability to project power over a particular state should be an important factor that determines whether, and the degree to which, a state will oppose nuclear proliferation to that state. Finally, the unit-level focus of this research is well-suited to meet the demands of nuclear nonproliferation policymakers. Government officials do not make policy with the primary aim of contributing to the stability of the international system; rather, they pursue policies that will promote the interests of their own state.6 This article explains the nature of the threat that nuclear proliferation poses to different types of states, helping intelligence analysts and policymakers better understand the effects of nuclear proliferation on their own security environment and how other key states may respond to important nuclear proliferation issues.


http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 159b. Proliferation hurts power-projecting states like the US while strengthening our enemies – proliferation hurts hegemony by decreasing our ability to leverage coercive diplomacy Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)To contribute to our understanding of the consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons, this article proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the effects of nuclear proliferation at the unit level. I argue that nuclear proliferation threatens some states more than others and that the threat posed by nuclear proliferation depends on a state’s ability to project military power. States that have the ability to project military power over a particular target state, states that I call “power-projecting states,” incur many costs and accrue few benefits when that target state acquires nuclear weapons.5 I claim that these states are threatened by nuclear proliferation largely because the spread of nuclear weapons constrains their conventional military freedom of action. Of course, there are other potential negative consequences of nuclear proliferation, including the low-

probability, high-consequence threat of nuclear war. I argue, however, that leaders in power-projecting states are primarily concerned that nuclear proliferation will: deter them from using military intervention to secure their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability that could engulf them in conflict, weaken the integrity of their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their spheres of influence. On the other hand, states that lack the ability to project military power over a target state, states that I call “non-power-projecting states,” incur fewer strategic costs and have the potential to accrue strategic benefits when that target state acquires nuclear weapons. Because they lack the advantages afforded by a viable military option, the spread of nuclear weapons does not further undermine their strategic position. Their relative weakness precludes them from: using military intervention to secure their interests, using military coercion as a tool of diplomacy, intervening in regional crises, extending security guarantees as a means to cement their alliance structures, needing to monitor new nuclear states, or needing to worry about further nuclear proliferation beyond their limited spheres of influence. Non-power-projecting states may incur other costs as nuclear weapons spread, but the strategic costs of nuclear proliferation enumerated above are concentrated on power-projecting states. For these reasons, non-power-projecting states are, on average, less threatened by nuclear proliferation. Moreover, the spread of nuclear weapons can, in certain

circumstances, actually improve the strategic environment of non-powerprojecting states, even if they lack nuclear weapons themselves, because the spread of nuclear weapons constrains other, more powerful states. Indeed, I will show that non-power-projecting states can even promote the spread of nuclear weapons as a way to impose strategic costs on more powerful states, shifting the international balance of power in their favor.




EXTS – PROLIF KILLS HEG

Proliferation erodes hegemonyRichard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)On August 29, 1949, The Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear fission bomb, signaling the end of U.S. hegemony in the international arena. On September 11th, 2001, the world’s single most powerful nation watched in awe as the very symbols of its

prosperity fell to rubble in the streets of New York City. The United States undisputedly “has a greater share of world power than any other country in history” (Brooks and Wolforth, 2008, pg. 2). Yet even a global hegemon is ultimately fallible and vulnerable to rash acts of violence as it conducts itself in a rational manner and assumes the same from other states. Conventional strategic thought and military action no longer prevail in an era of increased globalization. Developing states and irrational actors play increasingly influential roles in the international arena. Beginning with the U.S.S.R. in 1949, nuclear proliferation has exponentially increased states’ relative military capabilities as well as global levels of political instability. Through ideas such as nuclear peace theory, liberal political scholars developed several models

under which nuclear weapons not only maintain but increase global tranquility. These philosophies assume rationality on the part of political actors in an increasingly irrational world plagued by terrorism, despotic totalitarianism, geo-political instability and failed international institutionalism. Realistically,

“proliferation of nuclear [weapons]…constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (UN

Security Council, 2006, pg. 1). Nuclear security threats arise in four forms: the threat of existing arsenals, the emergence of new nuclear states, the collapse of international non-proliferation regimes and the rise of nuclear terrorism. Due to their asymmetric destabilizing and equalizing effects, nuclear weapons erode the unipolarity of the international system by balancing political actors’ relative military power and security. In the face of this inevitable nuclear proliferation and its effects on relative power, the United States must accept a position of declining hegemony. Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony 45

Constrains conventional military freedomMatthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)The spread of nuclear weapons threatens power-projecting states primarily because it constrains their conventional military power. These states understand that the spread of nuclear weapons to states against which they have the option to use conventional military force will erode a source of strategic advantage. These strategic costs are not as catastrophic as nuclear war, but they are costs that power-projecting states can

count on incurring with near certainty as nuclear weapons spread. Power-projecting states also consider other high-impact, low-probability consequences of nuclear proliferation, such as nuclear war, accidental nuclear detonation, or, in recent years, nuclear terrorism, but evidence from their own internal, strategic assessments reveals that statesmen in power-projecting states fear nuclear proliferation because they understand that it will constrain their conventional military freedom of action.

b. Deter’s military interventionMatthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for




Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 161Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)Policymakers in power-projecting states fear that nuclear weapons could deter them from using conventional military force to pursue their interests. This belief is consistent with much of the nuclear deterrence

literature that claims that nuclear weapons deter foreign invasion.10 Power-projecting states can use force in an attempt to reduce the military capabilities, change the policies, or even overthrow the governments, of threatening nonnuclear weapons states. When facing a nuclear power, however,

direct military intervention becomes a much less attractive option. Power-projecting states are deterred from using their conventional military power against threatening, nuclear-weapon states, constraining their military freedom of action. Indeed, the benefit of nuclear deterrence is often thought to be the primary reason why states acquire nuclear weapons.11 Of course, nuclear deterrence may not always work. Nuclear-armed states, like Israel, have been attacked and theories of the stability/instability paradox claim that strategic nuclear deterrence could make the world safe for low-level conflicts.12 Still, nuclear weapons are widely regarded by policymakers and academics as having powerful deterrent effects. Even theorists of the stability/instability paradox admit that nuclear weapons impose constraints on the use of conventional military power because, while nuclear weapons

may encourage low-level conflict, states could still be deterred from engaging in high-level conventional conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level.13 The deterrent effects of nuclear proliferation on a state’s conventional military power have long been recognized and feared by the leaders of power-projecting states. For example, a 1961 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff report concluded, “a nuclear China would only weaken Washington’s influence in the region and its capabilities to intervene on behalf of its allies there.”14 Similarly, a 1963 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assessed that if China acquired nuclear weapons,

“the U.S. would be more reluctant to intervene on the Asian mainland.”15 This view was shared by President John F. Kennedy

who “feared that even a minimal Chinese nuclear force could prevent U.S. military intervention” in China. Kennedy further noted that just a few missiles in Cuba “had a deterrent effect on us.”16 Partly for this reason, Kennedy thought that China’s imminent nuclear ascendance to the nuclear club was “likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.”17 U.S.-based analysts have continued to fear the effect of nuclear deterrence on the U.S.’s conventional military might since Kennedy’s time. A 1986 Top Secret CIA assessment, North

Korea: Potential for Nuclear Weapons Development, stated that a nuclear North Korea, “would have the effect of deterring a U.S. response to a North Korean attack.”18 Indeed, many analysts suspect that one of the reasons that the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003 and not North Korea, another state designated by President Bush as a member of the “axis of evil,” was because the United States was deterred by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.19 As the United States considers the very real possibility that Iran may soon acquire nuclear weapons, U.S. military planners are undoubtedly concluding that one of the primary strategic consequences of an Iranian bomb is that United States will be deterred from using military force against a nuclear-armed Iran. The recognition that nuclear

weapons deter military intervention is common among other power-projecting states. Egyptian officials were adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in neighboring Israel in the 1960s because they believed it would constrain Egypt’s conventional military freedom of action. Avner Cohen explains that the Egyptian military assessed, “A soon to- be-built Israeli nuclear weapon would put the Egyptian military in an inferior position, negating Egypt’s conventional superiority.”20 Presently, strategic thinkers in Turkey oppose nuclear proliferation in neighboring Iran because they believe that an Iranian bomb could threaten the conventional military balance between Turkey and Iran. Mustafa Kibaroglu writes that at present a rough, “parity exists between (Iran and Turkey) in geographical location, demographic structure, and military capability,” but “should Iran develop nuclear weapons capability, the balance may tip dramatically in favor of Iran.”21 Similarly, Indian officials opposed nuclear proliferation in Pakistan because they feared that a Pakistani nuclear arsenal would deter an Indian conventional military invasion of Pakistan, undermining Indian security.22 Indian security strategy in relation to Pakistan had long rested on a conventional military superiority that allowed India the ability to threaten the territorial integrity of Pakistan without the fear of a credible retaliatory threat. But, in the 1980s, Indian officials, including General K. Sundarji, chief of staff of the Indian Army, feared Pakistan’s nuclear program primarily because they believed that a nuclear arsenal in Pakistan would deter an Indian conventional attack, undermining India’s military advantage.23 Outside analysts have argued that Sundarji was justified in this fear and that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has had precisely this effect. Ashley Tellis writes that the primary effect of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has been to “significantly circumscribe India’s political



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 162and military freedom of action…In effect, Pakistan— the traditionally weaker adversary—has now neutralized India’s conventional and strategic advantages.” 24

c. reduces effectiveness of coercive diplomacy Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)For power-projecting states, nuclear proliferation reduces the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Nuclear

proliferation not only deters power-projecting states from using military force against adversaries, it undermines the credibility of their threats to use military force. Students of coercive diplomacy maintain that the effectiveness of deterrence and compellence policies hinges on the credibility of their associated threats.25

Adversaries are unlikely to be influenced by a threat that they believe will never be carried out. As the

spread of nuclear weapons makes it difficult for power-projecting states to use military force, it also reduces their adversaries’ estimations of the probability that they will follow through on threats to use force. The presence of nuclear weapons places a limit on how hard leaders in power-projecting states believe they can push in a crisis and, accordingly, power-projecting states limit their aims and means in conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries. Power-projecting states may be forced to consider the redeployment of military forces and bases beyond the range of the new nuclear-weapon state’s arsenal to minimize their military vulnerability in potential, military crises. Power-projecting states may also be more likely to capitulate in political conflicts of interest against nuclear-armed powers. Indeed, recent quantitative analyses have demonstrated that states are less likely to prevail in international disputes against nuclear-armed states.26 Another scholarly study demonstrates that nuclear weapons enhance the diplomatic bargaining power of their possessors.27 As a power-projecting state backs down in confrontations with a new nuclear-armed state, the influence of the new nuclear-weapon state in the geographical region is enhanced at the expense of the powerprojecting state. At the extreme, policymakers in power-projecting states worry that nuclear proliferation will allow the new nuclear-weapon state to “dominate” their geographical region. The fear that nuclear weapons alone will allow a state to dominate a geographical region are

probably exaggerated, but nuclear weapons do appear to shift the bargaining space in favor, and increase the strategic influence, of their possessor. Statesmen in power-projecting states recognize that nuclear proliferation could lead to a reduction in their bargaining power and regional influence. A 1963 U.S. NIE

assessed that a nuclear-armed China “would feel very much stronger and this mood would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts…the tone of Chinese policy would probably become more assertive.”28 In their newfound assertiveness, U.S. analysts feared that a nuclear-armed China would be less willing to concede to U.S. demands and were sure “to exploit nuclear weapons for this end.”29 President Kennedy was convinced that China was “bound to get nuclear weapons, in time, and that from that moment on they will dominate South East Asia.”30 Considering the effect of nuclear proliferation more broadly, the Gilpatric Committee, a special committee set up by President Lyndon B. Johnson to analyze the implications of nuclear proliferation for U.S. foreign policy, assessed that nuclear proliferation could “eventually lead to the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces from regions populated with new nuclear powers.” The nuclear arming of China would lead to a reduction of U.S. influence in East Asia which could then “fall under Chicom (Communist China) hegemony.”31 While some of the worst-case scenarios envisioned by U.S. officials did not come to pass, they were correct to believe that the United States would be eager to avoid militarized disputes against a nuclear-armed China. Scholars have noted, for example, that the United States became much less willing to challenge China’s core security interests after Beijing acquired the atomic bomb.32 Similarly, in recent years, U.S. officials and U.S.-based analysts have assessed that nuclear proliferation would lead to constraints on U.S. influence and allow hostile states to gain greater sway in vital strategic regions. Barry Posen has argued that if Saddam Hussein had possessed nuclear weapons during the First Gulf War, the United States could have still gone to war against Iraq, but that the United States would have been forced to limit its war aims and means against a nuclear-armed Iraq.33 The administration of President George W. Bush also feared that nuclear proliferation in Iraq could lead to a shift in bargaining power. In the run up to the Second Gulf War, President Bush warned that if Saddam Hussein acquired nuclear weapons, he “would be in a position to dominate the Middle East.”34 Today, U.S. officials maintain that a nuclear armed-Iran would reduce U.S. leverage, giving Iran greater influence over Middle Eastern politics. Peter Brookes, a U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in George W. Bush’s administration, predicted that a nuclear-armed Tehran would become “the predominant state in the Middle East, replacing the



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 163U.S. as the region's power broker and lording over its Sunni Arab neighbors.”35 Other power-projecting states also assess that nuclear proliferation will reduce their diplomatic advantages and increase the influence of the new nuclear-weapon state. The Soviet Union feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel would reduce Moscow’s strategic influence in the Middle East.36 Egypt was adamantly opposed to nuclear proliferation in neighboring Israel in the 1960s because, according to Avner Cohen, Egyptian officials believed that an Israeli bomb would have the effect of “reducing the influence of the Egyptian armed forces.”37 Presently, Turkey opposes nuclear proliferation in neighboring Iran because they believe that an Iranian bomb would enhance Tehran’s coercive bargaining power and regional influence.38

d. Trigger regional instabilityMatthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)Nuclear proliferation can embolden new nuclear states, triggering regional instability that could potentially threaten the interests of powerprojecting states and even entrap them in regional disputes. New nuclear-weapon states may be more aggressive and this newfound assertiveness can result in

regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclearweapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.39 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.40 The threat that regional instability poses to power-projecting states is different from the concern about international instability expressed by the proliferation pessimists. Pessimists assume that international instability is bad in and of itself – and they may be right. But, powerprojecting states have a different concern. They worry that nuclear proliferation will set off regional instability and that, because they have the ability to project power over

the new nuclear weapon state, they will be compelled to intervene in a costly conflict. Power-projecting states could feel the need to act as a mediator between nuclear-armed disputants, provide conventional military

assistance to one of the parties in the dispute, or because they have the ability to put boots on the ground in the new nuclear state, potentially be drawn into the fighting themselves. As such, power-projecting states worry about the effect of nuclear proliferation on regional stability. U.S. officials feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel could embolden Israel against its Arab enemies, or entice Arab states to launch a preventive military strike on Israel’s nuclear arsenal. In a 1963 NIE on Israel’s nascent nuclear program, the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence community was that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons, “Israel’s policy toward its neighbors would become more rather than less tough…it would seek to exploit the psychological advantage of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs.”41 President Kennedy concurred. In a letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Kennedy wrote that Israel should abandon its nuclear program because Israel’s “development of such (nuclear) weapons would dangerously threaten the stability of the area.”42 Similarly, in the case of China’s nuclear program, U.S. officials believed that a nuclear-armed China would “be more willing to take risks in military probing operations because of an overoptimistic assessment of its psychological advantage.”43 In recent years, U.S. officials have continued to fear the effect of

nuclear proliferation on regional stability. In a 1986 Top Secret CIA Assessment, U.S. intelligence analysts predicted that

a nuclear North Korea would have “a free hand to conduct paramilitary operations without provoking a response.”44 Similarly, a U.S. expert recently testified before Congress, “A nuclear arsenal in the hands of Iran’s current theocratic regime will be a source of both regional and global instability.”45 U.S. officials assessed that regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could compel them to intervene directly in regional conflicts. In the early 1960s, U.S. officials speculated that Israel could potentially leverage its nuclear arsenal to compel the United States to intervene on its behalf in Middle Eastern crises.46 Similarly, in 1965, Henry Rowen, an official in the Department of Defense, assessed that if India acquired nuclear weapons, it could lead to a conflict in South Asia “with a fair chance of spreading and involving the United States.”47 Today, U.S. defense strategists plan for the possibility that the United States may be



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 164compelled to intervene in regional conflicts involving a nuclear-armed Iran or North Korea and their neighbors. The empirical record has justified fears that nuclear proliferation could entangle powerprojecting states in nuclear disputes. The United States has intervened in conflicts that it might have avoided had nuclear weapons been absent. For example, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was reluctant to aid Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War until Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir threatened that, without U.S. assistance, she would be forced to use nuclear weapons against the Arab armies.48 In response, Kissinger reversed his decision and provided emergency aid to the Israeli Defense Forces.49 Similarly, in 1999 and 2002, the United States became caught in diplomatic initiatives to prevent nuclear war in crises between the nuclear-armed countries of India and Pakistan.50 Indeed, the expectation that powerful states will intervene in conflicts involving a nuclear-armed state is so firmly ingrained in the strategic thinking of national leaders that small nuclear powers actually incorporate it into their strategic doctrines. South Africa’s nuclear doctrine envisioned, in the event of an imminent security threat, the detonation of a nuclear weapon, not against the threatening party, but over the Atlantic Ocean in an attempt to jolt the United States into intervening on South Africa’s behalf.51 Similarly, the surprise Pakistani raid on Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999 was motivated partly by the expectation that Pakistan would be able to retain any territory it was able to seize quickly, because Pakistani officials calculated that the United States would never allow an extended conflict in nuclear South Asia.52 Regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation could also entrap power-projecting states in a great power war. Other power-projecting states, facing a mirror-image situation, may feel compelled to intervene in a crisis to

secure their own interests, entangling multiple great powers in a regional conflict. In a 1963 NIE, U.S. intelligence analysts assessed that “the impact of (nuclear proliferation in the Middle East) will be the possibility that hostilities arising out of existing or future controversies could escalate into a confrontation involving the major powers.”53 President Johnson believed that a nuclear Israel meant increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East and perhaps superpower war.54 If historical experience provides a guide, U.S. strategists today are concerned by the possibility that China may feel compelled to intervene in any conflict involving a nuclear-armed North Korea, making the Korean Peninsula another dangerous flash-point in the uncertain Sino-American strategic relationship. Power-projecting states, other than the United States, are also threatened by the possibility that nuclear proliferation will generate regional instability that could potentially require their intervention. Soviet intelligence estimated that a South African bomb, “would lead to a sharp escalation of instability and tension in southern Africa.”55 The Soviet Union also assessed that nuclear proliferation in Israel could trigger regional instability that could lead to a broader war. For example, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the Soviet embassies in Egypt and Israel, “The establishment of nuclear weapons production in Israel will make the situation…even more unstable, and is liable to trigger a serious conflict that can spill over the borders of the region.”56 South Korean officials also believe that they could become entangled in regional instability set off by nuclear proliferation in neighboring North Korea. In the mid-1990s, Seoul prepared military forces for participation in a possible second Korean War as North Korea’s nuclear program advanced.57 Today in Turkey, strategic thinkers argue that nuclear proliferation in Iran could be a “spark (that) may be enough to ‘explode’ the entire region in almost every meaning of the word.”58

e. Undermines alliance structures.Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)During the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear threat was sometimes thought to be one of the adhesives holding the NATO alliance together. The full range of effects of nuclear proliferation on alliances, however, is more complicated. Nuclear proliferation

also undermines the alliance structures of power-projecting states because the spread of nuclear weapons reduces the value of the security guarantees that power-projecting states extend to their allies. Power-projecting states use the promise of military protection as a way to cement their alliance structures and to cultivate patron-client relationships. The client states are asymmetrically dependent on a relationship that ensures their survival, allowing power-projecting states influence over their clients’ foreign policies. Power-projecting states can dangle, and threaten to retract, the security guarantee carrot to prevent client states from acting contrary to their interests. As nuclear weapons spread, however, alliances held together by promises of military protection are undermined in two ways. First,



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 165client states may doubt the credibility of their patron’s commitments to provide a military defense against

nuclear-armed states, leading them to weaken ties with their patron.59 Second, nuclear proliferation could encourage client states to acquire nuclear weapons themselves, giving them greater security independence and

making them less dependable allies. The spread of nuclear weapons can undermine the alliance structures of

power-projecting states by making allies question whether their powerful patron will be willing to come to their defense when they are threatened by a nuclear power. As Charles de Gaulle famously asked about the U.S. commitment to defend France from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, would Washington be willing to trade New York for Paris? Thomas Schelling outlined the potential steps that powerful states could take to increase the credibility of extended deterrent threats, but the fact that complicated mechanisms such as “trip wires” are required in situations of extended deterrence reinforce the fact that promises to defend a state against a nonnuclear-weapon state are inherently more credible.60 Accordingly, leaders in power-projecting states often worry that nuclear proliferation will undermine the credibility of their commitments, weakening the integrity of their alliance structures. John McCloy, a top advisor to the Johnson administration argued that as nuclear weapons spread, the United States would be forced to offer security guarantees to more and more states. McCloy worried, “The character of our determination will be diluted if we have 20 such commitments and our fundamental image of capability to defend the free world might be impaired.”61 With U.S. credibility in question, weaker allies may decide that the best way to ensure their own security would be to abandon a close security relationship with the United States. The Gilpatric Committee speculated that if China acquired nuclear weapons, “a heightened sense of China’s power could create a bandwagon effect, with greater political pressures on states in the region to accommodate Beijing and loosen ties with Washington.”62 Though the Gilpatric Committee may have overestimated this effect (U.S. alliances in Asia did not appear to weaken visibly after China acquired the bomb) the concern was not unjustified. Today, analysts point out that the development of a nuclear weapons arsenal in North Korea may already be driving a wedge between Washington and Seoul over defense policy in East Asia.63 Moreover, nuclear proliferation could threaten alliance cohesion by encouraging weaker allies to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. One U.S. official pointed out, “European doubts about the credibility of our willingness to risk our destruction by using nuclear weapons” could “create the need for European independent capabilities.”64 If the client states themselves acquire nuclear weapons, their need for an external security guarantee is reduced, giving them greater security independence and making them less compliant to their patron’s demands.65 According to many scholars, the acquisition of the force de frappe was instrumental in permitting the French Fifth Republic under President Charles de Gualle to pursue a foreign policy path independent from Washington.66 Analysts in power-projecting states fear that the spread of nuclear weapons will shift the terms of dependence, undermining their ability to influence friendly states. For example, in a March 1963 intelligence memorandum, Sherman Kent argued that if Israel were to acquire nuclear weapons it would be detrimental to Washington’s interests because Israel “would use all its means at its command to persuade the U.S. to acquiescence in and even to support” Israeli interests.67 Indeed, since its acquisition of the bomb in 1967, there is no doubt that U.S. support for Israel has drastically increased. There are several reasons for the United States’ greater willingness to accommodate Israeli demands, including the strength of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, but there is no question that Israel’s nuclear arsenal has also increased Israel’s bargaining leverage with Washington in critical moments, including, as was explicated above, in the 1973 Yom

Kippur War.68 Similarly, in recent years, U.S. officials have worried about how the development of nuclear programs in Taiwan and South Korea, among others could reduce U.S. influence over allies.69 The Soviet Union’s threat assessments mirrored Washington’s concerns about nuclear proliferation undermining alliance structures. The Soviet Union cut off nuclear assistance to China in 1960 partly because it feared that a nuclear-armed China would be a less reliable ally.70 Moscow’s fears were confirmed as China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964 is considered to be one of the contributing factors that led to the Sino-Soviet split.71 The Soviet Union also assessed that nuclear proliferation in Israel would jeopardize Moscow’s Middle Eastern alliances. According to Isaballa Ginor and Gideon Remez, the Soviet Union assessed that they could use their military might “to limit Israeli action against their Arab clients, thus reinforcing these clients’ dependence on the USSR – as long as Israel had no counter-deterrent. Preventing Israel from” acquiring nuclear weapons “thus became a central objective of Soviet Middle East policy.”72

F. dissipates strategic attentionMatthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 166First, nuclear proliferation dissipates the strategic attention of power-projecting states. As nuclear weapons spread, power-projecting states are compelled to reapportion a costly share of strategic attention to new and potential nuclear weapons states. The collection and analysis of foreign intelligence, the practice of diplomacy, the provision of economic aid, the application of economic sanctions, defense spending, and military contingency planning focused on stopping and managing the spread of nuclear weapons, are resources that are not contributing to other national goals. With each and every case of actual and potential nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence, the strategic attention of power-projecting states must be spread more thinly, and the amount of resources devoted to each potential threat reduced.73 This is not to say that the strategic attention devoted to nuclear proliferation is not deserved; it is. Nuclear proliferation poses a significant threat to power-projecting states. This is contrasted with the strategic position of non-power-projecting states that, as we will see below, are able to avoid expending considerable national resources on the problem of nuclear proliferation because, for them, nuclear proliferation poses less of a threat. In historical instances of nuclear proliferation, the United States has engaged in intensive diplomacy to discourage nuclear development, drawn up military plans for possible strikes on nuclear installations, developed new military contingency plans to combat a nuclear-armed opponent, severed economic relations with a potential nuclear proliferator in an effort to apply pressure and dissuade proliferation, and redeployed intelligence assets in order to better understand the details of a country’s nuclear program. The United States, for example, devotes considerable resources to the problem of nuclear proliferation on the intelligence front alone. According to David Holloway: The United States has put an enormous effort into gathering information about the nuclear projects of other countries. After World War II it equipped aircraft with special filters to pick up radioactive debris from nuclear tests for isotopic analysis. It created a network of stations around the world to register the seismic effects of nuclear explosions. Most important, in 1960 it began to launch reconnaissance satellites that could take detailed photographs of nuclear sites in the Soviet Union and China.74 U.S. officials have recognized the ability of nuclear proliferation to occupy their strategic attention. According to Francis Gavin, the Gilpatric Committee noted that in the 1960s “the U.S. Government was devoting tremendous energy to preventing other nations from acquiring (nuclear weapons).”75 Similarly, over the eight-year administration of President George W. Bush, suspected and actual nuclear weapons programs in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, and the black-market nuclear exports of Pakistan, have occupied an enormous amount of U.S. strategic attention. Nuclear proliferation has also sapped the strategic attention of other power-projecting states. The Soviet Union redeployed intelligence assets to focus on nuclear proliferation in many countries including Israel and South Africa. It was a Soviet satellite, for example, that first detected the preparation of a nuclear test site in South Africa.76 Moscow also drew up plans for military strikes against other states’ nuclear facilities. The Soviet Union developed plans and issued orders to military commanders to strike Israel’s nuclear facilities at Dimona if certain contingencies were met in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.77 Egypt also planned for a preventive strike on Israel’s nuclear facilities.78 Further, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser engaged in a

vigorous diplomatic campaign to put international pressure on Israel’s nuclear program.79 As Pakistan marched toward the nuclear club, India redeployed intelligence assets to scrutinize Pakistan’s nuclear program.80 In

recent years, South Korea has expended diplomatic capitol and dispensed large dollops of economic aid in an effort to dissuade North Korea from its nuclear course.81

h. Sets off further proliferationMatthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)The other secondary cost that power-projecting states incur is that of further nuclear proliferation. Because power-projecting states are so threatened by nuclear proliferation, they frequently worry that nuclear proliferation to one state will cause further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence, compounding the strategic costs detailed above. When a state acquires nuclear weapons, other states may seek to develop their own nuclear arsenal in response, setting off a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation. The nuclear domino effect is probably more muted than many analysts claim and certain policy steps, including the extension of a nuclear umbrella from a superpower, can help to mitigate the security concerns of regional states. Nevertheless, nuclear dominoes do fall. Indeed, scholarly research has shown that states with a nuclear-armed rival are more likely to develop nuclear weapons themselves.82 Further proliferation is probably the most widely-cited, negative strategic consequence of nuclear proliferation recognized by analysts and policymakers in power-projecting states. For example, in 1964, U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball predicted that a Chinese



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 167nuclear test would set off a wave of nuclear proliferation in Asia. He assessed that there was a “fifty-fifty” chance that India would follow China down the nuclear path. According to Ball, Pakistan would likely respond to India’s nuclear status by seeking its own nuclear arsenal. Ball further cited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan as states that could eventually develop nuclear weapons as a counter to the Chinese arsenal.83 U.S. State Department official George McGhee also noted in 1961 that if India were to develop nuclear weapons, it could unleash “a chain reaction of similar decisions by other countries, such as Pakistan, Israel, and the United Arab Republic.”84 U.S. officials also feared that Israel’s nuclear program would lead to further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. In a letter to David Ben-Gurion, President Kennedy argued that if Israel acquired nuclear weapons it would only encourage the Arab states to begin their own nuclear weapons programs.85 Of course, not all of the states that U.S. officials cited as potential nuclear proliferators have acquired nuclear weapons – at least not yet. Still, the fears were prescient. The Chinese bomb was a contributing cause to the development of nuclear weapons in India and, in turn, Pakistan.86 China’s nuclear arsenal was also a factor that encouraged the beginning of nuclear programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Similarly, Israel’s nuclear capability sparked a nuclear program in Egypt and may have been a factor that encouraged Iran’s nuclear development. In recent years, U.S. officials have stressed that nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea could encourage a cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and East Asia. For example, nonproliferation officials in

the administration of President William Jefferson Clinton argued that nuclear proliferation in North Korea could lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia and the potential for future nuclear weapons arsenals in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.87 Similarly, in 2004, John Edwards, the Democratic Party’s Vice Presidential Nominee stated, “A nuclear Iran is unacceptable for so many reasons, including the possibility that it creates a gateway and the need for other countries in the region to develop nuclear capability – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, potentially others.”88 Policymakers and analysts in power-projecting states further fear that proliferation breeds proliferation by enhancing the supply of, not just the demand for, nuclear materials and technology. As the number of nuclear-weapon states increases, so too does the number of states that are able to provide sensitive nuclear material and technology to nonnuclear-weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons. Scholars have recently examined the causes and consequences of nuclear transfers, and the relationship between sensitive nuclear transfers and nuclear proliferation has long been suspected by officials working in nonproliferation policy.89 During World War II, Selby Skinner of the U.S. Strategic Services Unit warned, “French scientists have the formula and techniques concerning atomic explosives, and that they are now willing to sell this information…to

one of the smaller nations.”90 In the early 1990s, U.S. officials worried that South Africa could transfer enriched uranium to other

nations.91 More recently, following North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, George W. Bush announced, “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such

action.”92 Similarly, Peter Brookes, assessed that it is possible that, “Iran, as a nuclear weapons state, will involve itself in the dreaded ‘secondary proliferation,’ passing its nuclear know-how on to others.”93 The fear on the part of power-projecting states that proliferation will beget proliferation is not limited to the United States. Moscow feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel would lead Moscow’s Arab allies to seek nuclear weapons.94 Presently, strategic thinkers in Turkey oppose nuclear proliferation in neighboring Iran because they believe that an Iranian bomb could contribute to further nuclear proliferation in their own region. Expressing the view from Turkey, Kibaroglu writes, “If Iran becomes a suspected or a de facto nuclear weapons state, it is feared that its neighbors such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, (and) Syria…may consider their nuclear options.”95

Conversely, new proliferation makes our enemies stronger by allowing them to constrain our freedom of action: all our internal links are reverse causal Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)For non-power-projecting states, the story is different. States that lack the ability to project power against a potential target state incur fewer costs and can, in certain circumstances, accrue benefits when that target state acquires nuclear weapons. I will begin by showing that nonpower- projecting states incur fewer strategic costs as nuclear weapons spread. Next, I will demonstrate that non-power-projecting states can actually benefit from nuclear proliferation because the spread of nuclear weapons imposes strategic costs on other, more powerful states. The spread of nuclear weapons is less threatening to non-power-projecting states than it is to power-projecting states. Non-power-projecting states lack the strategic advantages provided by conventional military power whether nuclear weapons are



Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 168present or not, so nuclear proliferation does not further erode their strategic position. Logically, the problems that power- projecting states closely associate with the spread of nuclear weapons do not impinge upon nonpower- projecting states in the same way. Non-power-projecting states do not worry that nuclear proliferation will deter them from using military intervention to secure their interests; they are too weak to intervene militarily whether nuclear weapons are present or not. They are not threatened by the prospect that the spread of nuclear weapons will reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy because they lack the conventional military power that could have allowed them to use threats of military force to their advantage in the first place. Non-power-projecting states do not fear that nuclear proliferation will trigger regional instability that could engulf them in conflict. Since they lack the ability to operate their military forces in and around the new nuclear-weapon state, it is less likely that they could become entangled in a conflict involving the new nuclearweapon state. Non-power-projecting states need not worry that nuclear proliferation will weaken the integrity of their alliance commitments. They are too weak to promise conventional military protection as a way to cement their alliances. Since the above strategic burdens are not borne by non-power-projecting states, they need not worry that nuclear proliferation will dissipate their strategic attention. They do not need to focus their strategic attention on nuclear proliferation because for them, these cases of potential nuclear proliferation are less important strategically. Finally, non-power-projecting states are less worried that nuclear proliferation will set off further nuclear proliferation. Since they lack the ability to project power over a potential nuclear-weapon state, if that state’s nuclearization sends its neighbors down the nuclear path, it is likely that the non-power-projecting state will not be able to project power over, and will not be threatened by nuclear proliferation to, the neighbors either. This is not to say that nuclear proliferation poses no threat whatsoever to non-powerprojecting states. Non-power-projecting states may still be concerned that nuclear proliferation could lead them to become the victims of a nuclear attack or nuclear coercion from a nucleararmed state. They may also assess that nuclear proliferation could deter allies from coming to their defense if they are attacked by a nuclear-armed state. These leaders may also be concerned that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to a general nuclear war among major powers. Especially in more recent years, non-power-projecting states may fear that they could become the victims of nuclear terrorism. The existence of these other potential costs of nuclear proliferation, however, does not undermine the argument that nuclear proliferation disproportionately threatens power-projecting states. Many of these potential threats are low-probability events making it unlikely that any state will bear these costs. After all, humanity has never experienced a nuclear exchange, or a nuclear terrorist attack. While, in contrast, many of the constraining effects of nuclear proliferation occur with near certainty as nuclear weapons spread. Further, it is likely that many of these costs are also concentrated disproportionately on power-projecting states. After all, states that have the ability to project power against a new nuclear-weapon state would be more likely to come into conflict with that state. This means that power-projecting states would be more likely to be the designated target of the new nuclear state’s nuclear attacks or attempts at nuclear coercion, and that they would be more likely to need allies to aid them in a fight against a nuclear-armed state. Similarly, states with the ability to project power beyond their own borders may also be at greater risk of suffering a nuclear terrorist attack. In sum, in contrast to power-projecting states, leaders in non-power-projecting states do not fear that nuclear proliferation will constrain their conventional military advantage. For this reason, the spread of nuclear weapons, on

average, threatens non-power-projecting states less than it threatens power-projecting states. A summary of these differential effects of nuclear proliferation is provided in Table 1. This relationship between the lack of a power-projection capability and the absence of a nuclear proliferation threat is supported by evidence that suggests that states are less threatened by nuclear proliferation to states against which they lack the ability to project conventional military power. For the most part, this evidence comes in the form of an absence of concern about the constraining effects of nuclear proliferation by strategic thinkers in non-power38 projecting states. The concern that nuclear proliferation could constrain conventional military power rarely appears in the internal strategic assessments of non-power-projecting states. This point will be supported by empirical evidence below. Moreover,

statesmen in non-power-projecting states sometimes go further and make positive statements proclaiming that they are not threatened by nuclear proliferation. For example, when asked how the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea (a country against which Pakistan could not conceivably project

military power) would affect Pakistan’s own security, Jehangir Karamat, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, admitted, “North Korean nuclear capability does not threaten us directly.”96 Not only are non-power-

projecting states less threatened as nuclear weapons spread, in certain situations, nuclear proliferation can actually improve the strategic environment of nonpower- projecting states. Of course, non-power-projecting states can benefit from possessing nuclear weapons themselves, but the argument here is that the spread of nuclear weapons to other states in the international system can benefit non-power-projecting states. Nuclear proliferation constrains the military freedom of action of power-projecting states. As nuclear weapons spread, these power-projecting states are less able to use conventional military power in a manner that potentially threatens the interest of non-power-projecting states. To the degree that the strategic costs of nuclear proliferation are concentrated on more powerful states, non-power-projecting states can exploit the payoff structure to their advantage. Statesmen in non-power-projecting states have even promoted the spread of nuclear weapons with the intention of imposing strategic costs on power-projecting states. To illustrate this argument, I will briefly examine three instances of non-power-projecting states promoting the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear- weapon states: France to Israel (1959-1965); China to Pakistan (1981-1986); and Pakistan to Iran, Libya, and North Korea (1987-2002). France lacked the ability to project power against Israel in the late 1950s and early 1960s. France’s nearest military bases were located in Djibouti and Algeria, rendering a ground invasion of Israel impossible.97 Putting French troops into a Middle Eastern theatre against a hostile opponent would have required an amphibious invasion, but the French lacked nearby air bases, the French navy had been almost completely destroyed in World War II and had yet to be reconstituted, and France never developed the specialized capabilities required for an amphibious


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 169invasion.98 When French forces did partake in other military actions in roughly the same geographical region in this time period, it was only able to do so under special circumstances. French forces were only able to participate in the Suez War of 1956, for example, because they relied heavily on British basing, air and navel power, and specialized, amphibious invasion capabilities.99 France was able to fight the war in Algeria because French Algeria was a department of France, giving France local basing and substantial time to build up a French military presence without organized resistance.100 Because France lacked the military capabilities that would have allowed it to project power against Israel, officials in Paris did not believe that nuclear proliferation in Israel would threaten France’s strategic position. From 1958 to 1965, French officials carefully considered the likely ramifications of a nuclear-armed Israel on French interests, but they never expressed concern that nuclear proliferation in Israel would threaten France’s conventional military freedom of action. The primary concerns that appear over and over again in the strategic assessments of power-projecting states simply did not occur to French officials. Available evidence indicates that French officials never once expressed concern that nuclear proliferation in Israel could: deter French military intervention in the Middle East, reduce France’s strategic influence in the region, generate regional instability that could entangle French forces, prevent France from promising military protection to French allies in the region, dissipate France’s strategic attention, or spur further nuclear proliferation. In fact, French officials recognized only a single, negative repercussion from nuclear proliferation in Israel: displeasure from the international community. French President Charles de Gaulle is reported to have worried in 1960, “If France was the only country to help Israel, while neither the United States, Britain, or the Soviet Union has helped anyone else [get the bomb], she would put herself in an impossible international situation.”101 While France considered the diplomatic costs of an Israeli bomb, French officials did not consider the possibility that nuclear weapons in Israel would directly constrain French military freedom of action. France’s inability to project power in the region precluded any such assessment. Not only were French officials not threatened by nuclear proliferation in Israel; they also saw a potential upside to the spread of nuclear weapons in this case. French officials believed that by helping Israel acquire nuclear weapons they could constrain another state better able to project power over Israel: Egypt. In the mid-1950s, France was engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign in French Algeria against the rebels of the National Liberation Front (FLN). Nasser was the key external supporter of the FLN, providing funds and military equipment to help the FLN wage the insurgency against France. French officials, eager to sever Nasser’s ties to Algeria, believed that a nuclear-armed Israel would divert Nasser’s strategic attention away from Algeria and toward his nuclear-armed neighbor. From 1958 to 1965, France aided Israel’s nuclear program, building the Dimona reactor and an underground plutonium reprocessing facility, transferring nuclear weapon designs, and allowing Israeli officials to view French nuclear tests.102 Describing his motivations in later years, French Defense Minister Bourgès-Maunoury explained, “I gave [the Israelis] the atom…so that Israel could face its enemies in the Middle East.”103 According to Shimon Peres, the Israeli official responsible for acquiring nuclear assistance from France, France was willing to help Israel primarily because “Some [French] leaders, notably those responsible for defence matters, held that clipping Nasser’s wings would limit his ambitions and impact on the Algerian front.”104 The understanding that nuclear proliferation could benefit France by constraining powerprojecting states was also occasionally reflected in French rhetoric. During the Cold War, French President Charles de Gaulle made statements, advocating the international spread of nuclear weapons as a way to redistribute power in international politics and reduce the international influence of the superpowers.105 Historically, other non-power-projecting states have adopted policies that promote nuclear proliferation with the expectation that the spread of nuclear weapons would improve their own security because it would constrain more powerful states. China,

to this day, a country that lacks the ability to project conventional military power much beyond its own borders, has in the past held a rhetorical policy in favor of nuclear proliferation.106 Beginning in the 1960s, Chinese foreign policymakers explicitly advocated nuclear proliferation because they saw the spread of nuclear weapons “as limiting U.S. and Soviet power.”107 China also provided sensitive nuclear assistance with the intent of helping another state acquire nuclear weapons. A close analysis of Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan in the 1980s reveals that Beijing was likely motivated to provide sensitive nuclear assistance in this case by the desire to constrain other power-projecting states. Given its lack of amphibious invasion capabilities and a shared border along a particularly treacherous stretch of the Himalayan Mountains, China could not conceivably fight a full-scale, conventional, military, ground war in Pakistan.108 But China was able to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to Pakistan to constrain two other states, India and the Soviet Union, that were able to operate their conventional military forces against Pakistan. It is likely that the primary motivation behind China’s assistance to Pakistan was to constrain India and divert New Dehli’s strategic attention away from Beijing.109 China was also threatened by growing Soviet influence in South Asia, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and may have hoped that a nuclear-armed Pakistan would contain the Soviet Union’s presence in the region. In sum, according to Gordon Corera, China engaged in these sensitive nuclear transfers because, for strategic reasons, Beijing “was keen to see more nuclear powers in the world.”110 In more recent years, other non-power-projecting states have encouraged nuclear proliferation to constrain more powerful states. From 1987 to 2002, Pakistan, with assistance from nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, distributed sensitive nuclear materials and technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. With the exception of Iran, Pakistan lacked the ability to project power against any of these states, meaning that nuclear proliferation in these countries would not constrain Pakistan’s own military might. The above quote from Ambassador Karamat illustrates the fact that Pakistan’s elite may not have seen nuclear proliferation to these countries as a direct threat. Moreover, some of the key players involved in Pakistan’s sensitive nuclear exports thought that nuclear proliferation could improve Pakistan’s security by constraining U.S. military power. General Mirza Azlam Beg, was Pakistan’s vice chief of the army staff from 1987 to 1988, and the chief of the army staff from 1988 to 1991. As the head of the military, he was a powerful figure in Pakistani politics. In this role, Beg was a key player promoting Pakistan’s nuclear exports.111 Beg believed that the global spread of nuclear weapons could lead to a multipolar world that would better suit Pakistan’s interest than a bipolar or unipolar world dominated by the United States.112 In particular, Beg was concerned about growing U.S. influence in the Middle East and South Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Beg


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 170hoped that a band of nuclear-armed states hostile to Washington, supported by Pakistan and China could form an alliance of “strategic defiance” against the United States.113 A.Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist often considered the key actor behind Pakistan’s nuclear transfers, agreed with these sentiments. Khan proudly proclaimed, referring to the United States, “I disturbed all their strategic plans, the balance of power and blackmailing potential in this part of the world.”114 Corera concurs, concluding that one of the primary motivations for Pakistan’s sensitive nuclear exports was the belief among select members of the Pakistani elite that it was in “Pakistan’s national interest for more countries to have bombs, thereby…reducing the power of the United States.”115 There are signs that the promotion of nuclear proliferation by non-power-projecting states to constrain more powerful states could continue in the future. Indeed, the understanding that nuclear proliferation constrains powerful states is endemic among

strategists in non-power- projecting states. India, at present, lacks the means to project conventional military power much beyond its own borders and while India has not yet been compelled by its structural position to advocate nuclear proliferation, there are signs that the weight of this strategic logic is being felt in foreign-policy making circles in New Delhi.116 Bharat Karnad, a Professor of National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research in India, argues that New Dehli should provide sensitive nuclear assistance to Vietnam and Taiwan to impose strategic costs on China. In a recent book, Karnad writes, “India should, likewise, create precisely the kind of dilemmas for China that Beijing has created for it with respect to a nuclear weapons and missile-equipped Pakistan by arming Vietnam with strategic weapons” and by “cooperating with Taiwan in the nuclear and missile fields.”117 While Karnad’s views may not be representative of India’s foreign policy establishment, they are further evidence that a pro-nuclear proliferation doctrine remains attractive for strategic thinkers in non-power-projecting states.



PROLIF BAD – HEGEMONIC TRANSITION

Prolif makes major power transitions more dangerous and increases the likelihood of catalytic conflicts escalating. Muller ‘8 (Harald, Dir. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and Prof. IR – Frankfurt U., Washington Quarterly, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, 31:2) The United States is not doing badly for an advanced economy with 3 to 4 percent growth, but the two Asian giants are making headway with growth rates close to or higher than 10 percent. Of course, there are stumbling blocs on their road to development, such as fragmentation and a backward infrastructure in India and vast regional disparities and an anachronistic political system in China. Yet, the United States has its own stumbling block: an enormous budget deficit as a consequence of imperial overstretch that shows no signs of abating. Any or all of the three could stumble or could continue the present economic trend. Assuming continuation, China will be at the United States’ economic level within one generation, and India will be one-half of a generation later. A power transition creates dangerous times.9 Most challenges to a hegemon in world history, whether successful or not, have precipitated war or a series of wars. Today’s interdependence will surely serve to make great powers cautious about armed conflict, but it cannot completely guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Bones of contention exist, notably between the United States and China: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the competition for Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy resources. Although there exists a naive belief that great-power war has been eliminated as a possibility in world politics, exaggerated complacency could become extremely dangerous. Interdependence itself and advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons included, would mean that a violent contest among the big powers would be an unmitigated catastrophe. The relationships among those powers must be carefully managed if a clash is to be avoided, and nuclear weapons reductions are an essential contribution to this management. U.S. strategist Richard Betts coined the “three Ps” in 1976 to cover the most prominent motivations for nuclear proliferation: paranoids, pygmies, and pariahs.10 States with exaggerated concerns about existential threats to their security try to procure the ultimate assurance of their survival. Small states long for an existential deterrent against potentially more powerful

enemies. For badly isolated states, nuclear weapons might not just be the only way to persist in a wicked

world but might also provide a means to overcome the loathed isolation. In all three models, the process that leads to nuclear weapons is not independent of the international security environment. This environment is in turn largely shaped by the great powers, who happen to be the five “official” nuclear-weapon states. Their record in creating a viable environment for smaller actors to remain nonnuclear is unconvincing. China has been bullying Taiwan and continues to do so. Threatening gestures toward Japan enhances Tokyo’s nervousness, already aroused because of North Korea’s nuclearization. Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea could have had serious repercussions among resource-rich countries of Southeast Asia; fortunately, Chi- na has turned to milder manners recently. In contrast, Russia plays hardball with its near abroad and unwisely flexes its political muscle on the presently favorable energy market. The United States always keeps “all options on the table” and pleases itself with declaring “axes of evil” at will without considering the possible repercussions in the target states. U.S. presidential candidates appear to be in a kind of competition over which Muslim country should be the primary target for an air attack, with Iran, Pakistan, and even Saudi Arabia having been nominated as candidates by armchair strategists.11 The U.S. inclination to pressure, sanction, threaten, and occasionally attack enemies of its choice, a threat which invariably has a nuclear undertone, contributes to the anxious- ness of the paranoids, pygmies, and pariahs to acquire some sort of deterrent, if not nuclear then at least biological or chemical weapons. The smaller nuclear-weapon states have a less negative record in practice. Yet, in terms of doctrine, the United Kingdom has quietly followed the U.S. lead to expand the contingencies for employing nuclear weapons to chemical and biological environments,12 and then-president Jacques Chirac of France declared access to strategically important resources to be a vital interest covered by the nuclear umbrella.13 Oil-producing states should be forgiven if they are not amused about this hardly veiled threat. The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It rests on a bargain between nuclear-weapon states and non–nuclear-weapon states. The latter agree to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons but are guaranteed the right to develop civilian nuclear energy without constraints as long as they are parties to the treaty in good standing. All parties are obliged to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation to give this right substance, and the nuclear-weapon states are committed to making serious moves toward nuclear disarmament. Until 2000, the non–nuclear-weapon states, particularly those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, were not uncritical of the nuclear-weapon states’ record, but they were satisfied that the process of disarmament was underway. The 2000 NPT Review Conference brought the hard-fought compromise of the “13 steps” on nuclear disarmament, a series of moderate, incremental measures that would lead to some progress without questioning the nuclear-weapon status of the five in the foreseeable future.14 Nevertheless, in 2005 the nuclear-weapon states, led by the United States and to a certain degree by France, refused to recognize to what they had agreed in 2000, having apparently come to the conclusion that the concessions were too far-reaching. Among non–nuclear-weapon states, there is now the strong impression that the NPT’s Article VI, the disarmament obligation, is dead in the eyes of the nuclear haves. With the bargain shattered, the iron law of armament would apply: the most

powerful weapon of an era is inevitably either had by none or by all. The present state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, combined with the fundamental insecurity of all states with whom the nuclear-weapon states have unfriendly relations,

seems to be a dangerous precondition for rampant proliferation. A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Re- gional conflicts could escalate to the nuclear level. The optimistic expectation of a universal law according to which nuclear deterrence prevents all wars15 rests on scant historical

evidence and is dangerously naive. Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 172greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear

during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place. Moreover, the more states that possess nuclear weapons and related facilities, the more points of access are available to terrorists.



PROLIF BAD – TERRORISM

More nuclear weapons causes terrorism – it’s a real threatCimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Missile Defenses in a “Deuces Wild” Context: Proliferation, Terror and Deterrent Disorder,” vol. 25, issue 1, 1/1/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Missile+Defenses+in+a+%22Deuces+Wild%22+Context%3A+Proliferation%2C+Terror+and+Deterrent+Disorder&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2006-02-01&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=FCST&rft.externalDocID=1182855721 /mr)Are fears of nuclear terrorism exaggerated? According to Graham Allison, tbree observations make a compelling case

for the imminetice of the threat." First, thousands ofnuciear weapons and tens of thousands of potential weapons (highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium)are located in places where security against theft or diversion is insufficient. Second, the only "high hurdle" preventing terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon is access to fissionable material. Terrorists might easily obtain fissile material from rogue states. The possibility that the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq might transfer nuclear technology and weapons to terrorists was one of the principal justifications for the U.S. war to depose the Iraqi dictator in 2003. Hussein's weapons of mass destruction failed to appear in postwar inspections, but the threat of rogues-to-radicals technology and weapons transfer remains a realistic concern. North Korea and Pakistan are now acknowledged nuclear weapons states. North Korea is a politically isolated Stalinist regime run by a dictator of uncertain personal qualities and political intentions. North Korea has previously transferred nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan, among others. Pakistan's current government has supported the U.S. in its war against al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. But the Musharraf regime has been under siege from terrorists and other domestic political opponents. Its survival is uncertain, and if it were to fall, political power in Islamabad might pass into the hands of anti American leaders. Pakistan's intelligence services and military are suspected of being penetrated by persons sympathetic to al Qaeda. Additional concerns about Pakistan's management of its nuclear complex resulted from revelations about off-the-shelf activities of tbe scientist who was the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. A. Q. Khan headed a transnational network that supplied a "Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation" for profit, including designs and components for centrifuges, blueprints for warheads, and tons of uranium hexafluoride gas.^ North Korea's exchange of its ballistic missile technology for Pakistani centrifuge designs may have been expedited by the same network ."* North Korea and Pakistan represent only two potential fronts in the effort to prevent nuclear weapons or materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. A third problem is Iran. Iran has declared its intention to develop a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. The U.S. and its European allies suspect that Iran plans to use its completed fuel cycle to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA has danced with Iran on the issue ofnuciear inspections; some Iranian facilities have been acknowledged and inspected, but other suspected facilities have not. Iran's political leadership is increasingly hostile toward the United States and Israel.^ Iran has strong ties to some of the more active anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorist groups in Palestine and elsewhere, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Another state of concern with regard to the possible leakage of fissile material to terrorists is Russia. In Russia the problem from the U.S. standpoint is not political intentions: the Putin administration had declared its shared Interest in fighting terrorism, .seen as a strategic threat to Russia. But Russia's capability to protect its own vast storehouse ofnuciear weapons and weapons-grade material has been doubted by Western experts.*' Russia's post-Soviet nuclear weapons complex suffered from frostbite and neuralgia combined: interruptions of state funding for personnel and other expenses; inadequate accounting systems for weapons and fissile materials; former Soviet nomenklatura going "private" with state assets under their control, and in cahoots with criminals; and loss of scientific and weapons engineering Missile Defenses in a "Deuces Wild" Context 3 expertise as formerly prestigious and highly paid experts were reduced to bartering for their services/ A third reason for the U.S. and its allies to be concerned about the proximate tbreat of nuclear terrorism is the apparent ease with which a nuclear device might be smuggled onto American territory. Nuclear material sufficient for a bomb migbt be smaller than a football and easily concealed within a cargo container or airline baggage. Of some seven

million cargo containers reaching American ports eacb year, fewer than five percent may be inspected.^ Depending on the type of weapon assembly and the yield required, terrorists could sneak into U.S. or allied territory a device sufficient to kill tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent civilians, apart from any damage done to military or govemment targets. For this purpose, terrorists might purchase an already assembled nuclear weapon or obtain fissile material and assemble it themselves. Instructions for making nuclear weapons, as in the case of other weapons of mass de.struction, can be obtained from "open sources" including the intemet.



EXTS – PROLIF → TERRORISM

Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism; preventing it solvesRichard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Increasing radicalism and militant insurgency makes securing and ensuring the stability of existing nuclear arsenals absolutely imperative. Terrorism poses the single largest threat to U.S. hegemony. Believing acts of mass destruction can create the global conflict they seek, modern terrorist groups fuel fear in a global audience. Scholars

Charles Ferguson and William Potter note the following in their 2004 study The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism: Today’s terrorism is often fueled by extremist religious ideologies that rationalize destruction, vengeance, and punishment as both necessary ends in themselves and as tools to achieve a better world (Ferguson and Potter, 2004, pg. 190). Several Islamist terrorist groups currently seek to obtain nuclear arms as a means to achieve their political and social

objectives; existing stockpiles with deteriorating safeguards present a prime source for these groups’ proliferation. Should one such group eventually obtain a nuclear weapon, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to take any sort of action to prevent a nuclear attack. Terrorists possess neither physical assets to protect nor a home address, and are thus

extremely difficult to deter. Securing both developing and existing stockpiles needs to become a security imperative if the U.S. wishes to avert nuclear catastrophe. Terrorist organizations need not seize a nuclear weapon, however. Weapon-grade plutonium would suffice for the construction of a nuclear device (Ferguson and Potter, 1989, pg.

190). A terrorist organization need only steal or purchase either twenty-five kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or HEU, or eight kilograms of plutonium, to construct a gun assembly type bomb, similar to the one dropped on Hiroshima in World War II. Though only eight states currently possess nuclear arms (North Korea is excluded as its weapons total is uncertain), fifty states have access to highly enriched weapon-grade uranium, or HEU. As of 2003, conservative estimates place the global stock of weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium at 3,730 metric tons, with a bomb equivalent of 304,800 (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 190). Allison claims that the science for bomb construction is in the public domain, meaning an organized and well-funded group could feasibly construct a bomb within five years of obtaining fissile material (Allison, 2004, pg. 12). Ultimately, a dedicated and devoted organization will inevitably obtain a nuclear weapon and be able to use it “without fear of retaliation” (Trachtenberg, 2002, pg. 146). Allison states the following in his book regarding the

likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack: Given the number of actors with serious intent, the accessibility of weapons or nuclear materials from which elementary weapons could be constructed, and the almost limitless ways in which terrorists could smuggle a weapon through American borders…a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not (Allison, 2004, pg. 15). Should a militant group gain control of a nuclear weapon, either through construction or seizure, deterring its use would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. A nuclear terrorist attack on U.S. soil will be inevitable if the current non-

proliferation policies are maintained. Counteraction and Reformation of Policy The threat of nuclear terrorism is currently on the rise; however, preemptive measures can be taken to prevent such a catastrophe. As the

sole international hegemon, the U.S. needs to rethink its role as an advocate and enforcer of non-proliferation. A bipolar power structure no longer exists in world politics; the U.S. sits alone atop global hierarchy. The United States needs to take an active role in non-proliferation and change the way it conducts international political discourse in the second nuclear age. “Today, the nuclear threat posed by other nuclear-armed states is being eclipsed by a new threat, that of nuclear instruments in the hands of non-state, terrorist organizations” (Ferguson and Potter, 2004, pg. 318). Terrorism comprises the greatest threat to U.S. primacy; Washington needs to adapt its policies in a manner that allows it to maintain and resolve diplomatic relations with irrational political actors. It would be impossible for the U.S. to monitor all nuclear arsenals and prevent proliferation on a state-by-state case. Regulating fissile materials

at the source would be the simplest and most inexpensive means to prohibit nuclear terrorism. Obtaining fissile materials, or an actual weapon, poses the greatest problem for terrorist groups seeking to gain possession of a nuclear weapon. Restricting the flow and spread of fissile materials means terrorists can neither purchase nor steal a nuclear weapon. In addition, Graham Allison asserts that in order to fully prevent nuclear terrorism and regulate the flow of fissile materials, the United States must adopt a policy of “three no’s”; no loose nuclear weapons, no nascent nuclear weapons and no new nuclear weapons states. The international community must agree to secure existing arsenals to a sufficient standard to prevent theft. Secondly, states cannot be allowed to construct enrichment facilities capable of creating HEU. Third, other states cannot develop nuclear weapons.




Proliferation risks nuclear terrorismCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 mr)Events since the end of the Cold War have challenged U.S. reliance on the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and other measures of nuclear arms control as the principal bulwark against nuclear weapons spread. Briefly put, the NPT has been extended legally beyond the international circumstances that gave weight to its ambitions. The bipolar international system of the Cold War allowed the Americans and Soviets to keep their respective blocs and allies within a security umbrella that discouraged states from acquiring their own WMD. In a very different and evolving international system since the end of the Cold War, available technology has combined with new ambitions and opportunities to bring nuclear capabilities within reach of more states. At the same time, U.S. and allied intelligence have been challenged to follow the flows of money, of weapons-grade material, of scientific expertise, and of shadow networks creating new linkages between rising demand for WMD and eager suppliers. The difficulties in containing the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems among states are only compounded by the possibility that materials or technology could find its way into the hands of terrorists, to deadly effect. Reportedly, al-Qaeda has tried to obtain weapons grade material (enriched uranium and plutonium) and assistance in assembling both true nuclear weapons and radiological bombs (conventional explosives that

scatter radioactive debris). Nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves as weapons of “mass destruction”: thus, a miniature nuclear weapon exploded in an urban area could cause much more death and destruction than either biological or chemical weapons similarly located.

Proliferation will increase terrorist theft of nuclear materials which escalates to an arms race. Mozley ’98 (Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 220) The theft and subsequent sale of nuclear material expands the dangers associated with nuclear proliferation. It allows shortcutting the elaborate and expensive procedures necessary to produce fissile material. Present procedures have made it very difficult for an underdeveloped nation to build nuclear weapons, and have made it impossible for terrorist groups, even those as highly organized s the Japanese Aum Shrinrikyo, to build one. The availability of weapon-grade uranium, however, would make it possible for a medium-sized group to build a Hiroshima type of weapon. All that would be needed is about 100 lbs. of highly enriched uranium, some neutron-reflecting material, a gun barrel measuring a few inches in diameter, and some high explosive. Some understanding of metals, of nuclear physics, and of the action of explosives would complete the list. The calculations for designing the Hiroshima bomb were so straightforward that it was not thought necessary to test a prototype in 1945. Past efforts, which have concentrated on preventing nations from developing or

purchasing the technology to build nuclear weapons, have been remarkably effective. But the availability of stolen nuclear material from the former Soviet Union may now be allowing terrorist groups and maverick nations to circumvent all of the controls and to buy nuclear materials for a small fraction of what they would

otherwise cost. The great success of the previous effort was that nations generally have been made to feel they will be more secure without nuclear weapons than with. Almost all of the developed nations are able to build their own

weapons, some needing only a few month’s time. Most have relied on the shield provided by the deterrent nuclear strength of one of the nuclear powers. But the deterrent shield (i.e., the threat of retaliation) is lost when the enemy is a terrorist group. If terrorist groups, or countries such as Libya, Iraq, or North Korea, are known to have nuclear weapons, an obvious reaction might be a rush by all nations to arm themselves.

Prolif risks a nuclear terrorist attack.Graham and Talent 8—Bob Graham, a former U.S. senator from Florida, is chairman of the congressionally established Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism and the board of oversight of the Graham Center for Public Service at the University of Florida and the University of Miami. Jim Talent a former U.S. senator from Missouri, is vice chairman of the WMD Commission and Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation (September 15, 2008, “Nuclear





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 176proliferation endangers world stability”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/09/Nuclear-proliferation-endangers-world-stability, ZBurdette)During the first presidential debate in 2004, President Bush and Sen. John Kerry agreed -- as stated by the president -- that "the single, largest threat to American national security today is nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist network." Yet despite that consensus, the subject of weapons of mass destruction proliferation has quickly disappeared from the national agenda. Few comments or questions on this issue have been posed to the

presidential candidates, even though preventing WMD proliferation should be on the short list of priorities for a McCain or Obama White House. And it rarely appears on polls of the most urgent concerns of citizens. So, in 2008, after seven years in which there have been no successful terrorist attacks inside the country, why not relax? Here are the reasons: Terrorists have continued to demonstrate the intent to acquire a WMD capability. As Director of National Intelligence Admiral Michael McConnell said in his Sept. 10, 2007, testimony to the Senate Homeland Security

and Governmental Affairs Committee, "al Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability." The potential human toll of an attack utilizing weapons of mass destruction is appalling. On a normal workday, half a million people crowd the area within a half-mile radius of Times Square. A noon detonation of a nuclear device in Midtown Manhattan would kill them all. Another attack -- particularly with WMD --

would have a devastating impact on the American and the world economies. As former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan warned, a nuclear terrorist attack would push "tens of millions of people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing world." The environment for the use of nuclear and biological weapons has changed. Although Russia is doing a better job of securing its stockpiles and therefore is less of a threat, North Korea and Iran have taken its place. North Korea has gone from two bombs worth of plutonium to an estimated ten. Iran has gone from zero centrifuges spinning to more than 3,000. In what some have termed a "nuclear renaissance," many nations are now seeking commercial nuclear power capacity that will add to the inventory of nations and scientists who could extend their interest to nuclear weapons. With the nuclear surprises we've experienced in Iran, Syria and North Korea, it is clear that current nonproliferation regimes and mechanisms can no longer be certain to prevent more nuclear proliferation or the theft of bomb-usable materials. Biologists are creating synthetic DNA chains of diseases which have been considered extinct, such as the 1918 influenza virus that killed over 40 million people. The potential of using these laboratory-developed strains against an unaware and noninoculated population is ominous. There is the necessity of engaging the American people. Unlike the Cold War, which was a superpower vs. superpower confrontation, the current asymmetric threat that would be dramatically escalated if the terrorists had access to nuclear or biological weapons. The incorrect claims regarding Saddam Hussein's WMD and his collusion with al Qaeda have contributed to public skepticism. Nonetheless, there was and is a real danger that al Qaeda will get a nuclear bomb and attack an American city.

Prolif guarantees non-state actor acquisition -- extinction.Business Recorder ‘9 (“NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR DEFIANCE”, 5-27, L/N)And it is getting deadlier in its fourth-generation mode. It is deadlier also because, thanks to technological upgrade, it is

no more a state-exclusive weapon; there are atom bombs in suitcases and dirty nuclear devices for the non-state actors. These are the hazards that would always come with nuclear proliferation, legal or illegal. The way out of this dilemma is total, unconditional non-proliferation. By merely bringing down the

tally from 36,000 to 26,000 warheads one cannot secure the world against a nuclear holocaust. All of this is cosmetic: even 26 nuclear warheads can render this planet uninhabitable. It is not our intent to justify the second test by North

Korea.


http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/09/Nuclear-proliferation-endangers-world-stability

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2008/09/Nuclear-proliferation-endangers-world-stability


AT PROLIF SOLVES WAR (GENERAL)

Prolif creates numerous chances for conflict. Letting prolif happen causes far more destructive wars. Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld) The preceding analysis makes plain the weak analytic reeds on which nuclear proliferation optimists base their case. They

mistakenly extrapolate the conditions in the Cold War superpower rivalry to those of contemporary major regional rivalries. Today's regional conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia differ markedly from the

US-Soviet standoff, most notably in that they involve border disputes that were not part of the superpower conflict in which spheres of influence were clearly delineated. Moreover, contemporary regional conflicts are pitted with nationalism and the drive for prestige, power and interest and actors may prefer the risk of war to the perceived

injustices of the 'peaceful' status quo. Waltz and like-minded thinkers assume that nation-states will rationally calculate costs, benefits and risks as would a detached third party. In reality, however, political actors may view their circumstances much differently than outside observers. The scenarios described here with their historical analogies are illustrative of the complexities of statecraft and war that fundamentally undermine the notion that nuclear weapons - in any and all circumstances - will prevent the outbreak of war between nuclear-armed belligerents. In their quest for theoretical parsimony, the optimists overly simplify the realities of international politics. They fail to heed Morgenthau's warning that 'The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impos~ible.'C~o~nsequently, the arguments by proliferation optimists are inadequate for deriving policy prescriptions for dealing with the concrete dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons proliferation. A laissez-faire policy toward nuclear weapons proliferation will not in itself render war obsolete as an instrument of statecraft. Instead, such a policy would likely increase the odds of more destructive wars between nation-states in the Middle East and South Asia.

Current nuclear state is stable, but further prolif causes crisis instability and collapse of deterrence. Cimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Russian-U.S. Nuclear Force Reductions and Nuclear Proliferation,” vol. 27, issue 5, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Russian-U.S.+Nuclear+Force+Reductions+and+Nuclear+Proliferation&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2008-10-21&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=27&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=431&rft.epage=450&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F01495930802185460&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_01495930802185460 /mr)Conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows. First, a deterrence-stable and crisis-stable nuclear world can be imagined, and even arranged, if sensible diplomacy can be combined with realistic expectations about military plans

and technologies. It’s a win-win for the existing nuclear weapons states to make their interactions more predictable and less threat based. It’s also a win-win for them to keep other states from joining the nuclear club. The case for optimism about nuclear weapons spread has been made elsewhere by theorists, but few diplomats or military planners tasked with managing the problem of proliferation have been favorably impressed.26

Proliferation won’t deter war -- bad command and control, rapid response risks inadvertent war and proliferation would be rapid. Busch ‘4 (Nathan, Visiting Ass. Prof. Public & Int’l Affairs – Center for Int’l. Trade & Security – UGA, “ No End in Sight: The continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 301-302) *NWS= Nuclear Weapons StateThis study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical hat the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their nuclear weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWSs have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will end to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 179emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism.

Even if prolif results in some stability, theater missiles means there’s less time for rational decision-making – guarantees preemption and accidental nuclear warCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)Even under the “optimistic” assumption of eight-sided nuclear parity in force size force characteristics and operational assumptions make a considerable difference for crisis and arms race stability. Most states in Asia will depend on land based missiles and/or bomber delivered weapons as the bulwark of their deterrents. Few will be capable of operating fleets of ballistic missile submarines as does the United States. Thus, ICBM or IRBM/MRBM dependent countries in Asia will rely on alerted forces and prompt launch to guarantee survivability. Hair triggers may be more the rule than the exception. In addition, many of the land based missiles available to Asian powers for use as “strategic” launchers will be of medium or intermediate range, theater, as opposed to intercontinental, missiles. These theater range missiles will have shorter flight times

than true ICBMs, allowing less time for the defender's launch detection, decision making and response . Errors in launch detection, in the estimation of enemy intentions, and in choice of response are more likely with shorter, compared to longer, range missiles. The high dependency of Asian forces on land based missiles will be compounded by command and control systems that may be accident prone or politically ambiguous. In democratic states, political control over the military is guaranteed by checks and balances and by constitutional fiat. In authoritarian polities, the military may operate as a political tool of the ruling clique or it may be an autonomous political force, subject to intrigue and coup plotting. The possibility of political overthrow or military usurpation during a nuclear crisis would not be ruled out in systems lacking constitutional or other political safeguards.

The danger is not only that of Bonapartism on the part of disgruntled officers. It is also the danger of panic in the face of nuclear threats and an institutional military bias for getting in the first blow to maximize the possibility of military victory and avoid defeat.

Nuclear weapons don’t guarantee stability – empirics proveCimbala 96 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Proliferation and peace: An agnostic view,” vol. 22, issue 1, , 1996, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Proliferation+and+peace%3A+An+agnostic+view&rft.jtitle=ARMED+FORCES+%26+SOCIETY&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+SJ&rft.date=1996-02-01&rft.pub=TRANSACTION+PERIOD+CONSORTIUM&rft.issn=0095-327X&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=211&rft.epage=211&rft.externalDBID=GARM&rft.externalDocID=9302139 /mr)Other contributions from nuclear agnostics provide grounds for skepticism about a positive association between nuclear weapons spread and international stability, based on case studies of nuclear crisis management and force operations or on the operations of nuclear command and control systems generally. Studies of nuclear crisis management by Richard K. Betts, Alexander L. George, Richard Ned

Lebow, and Scott D. Sagan, among others, have called into question many of the assumptions about decision making on which rational deterrence theory is based.(44) These studies were supported by extensive analyses of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear command and control systems, including detailed information about their operational biases and military-doctrinal proclivities, by Bruce Blair, Desmond Ball,

Paul Bracken, and others.45 These "crisis management/ force operations" and "command and control" literatures jointly call into question the assumption that rational deterrence theory leads to optimism about nuclear proliferation. Peter D. Feaver has explained that nuclear command and control organizations must optimize between the "always" requirement, for responsiveness to authorized commands in order to avoid vulnerability, and the "never" requirement, to prevent accidental or








Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 180unauthorized nuclear use.(46) He notes that one cannot infer the behavior of nuclear command systems without taking into account those environments or domains which might influence nuclear use decisions. These environments are the strategic weapons systems and force structures; the strategic environments in which a state's policy is located; and, most significant in the present context, the strategic culture of a state, including its patterns of civilmilitary relations and whether that pattern emphasizes "delegative" or "assertive" control by civilians over military operations.(47) The work of Blair, Sagan, Feaver, and others who are attempting to develop testable hypotheses about nuclear organizational behavior is important for another reason. Testable propositions about leaders' decision making and command system performances will help to settle some past disputes about how behaviorally correct deterrence theory really is.(48) Deterrence has always been promoted as a species of rational decision theory: it depends upon arguments about cost-benefit ratios and calculations of expected gains and losses.(49) For many of its

critics, however, U.S. versions of nuclear deterrence theory suffered from vacuous arguments and insufficient validation in comparative case studies.(50) Much of the deterrence literature, like a great deal of the Marxist literature, served as a scholastic rallying point for polemicist argument instead of a source of disinterested scientific research or policy studies.

Their turns assume a Cold War environment – they aren’t applicable anymoreCimbala 5 - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear weapons in the Twenty-first century: From simplicity to complexity,” vol. 21, issue 3, 10/1/ 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+weapons+in+the+Twenty-first+century%3A+From+simplicity+to+complexity&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-09-30&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=267&rft.epage=281&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F0743017052000344947&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_0743017052000344947 /mr)The role of nuclear weapons in twenty-first-century confiict is uncertain. Nuclear weapons acted as a

basically stabilizing force for most of the Cold War. Once the US and the Soviet Union both deployed highly survivable

nuclear retaliatory forces, the logic of mutual deterrence superseded policy based on nuclear brinkmanship. Although political rivalry between Moscow and Washington remained a fact until the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, deterrence based on mutual vulnerability remained the paradigm that dominated US thinking and planning for nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, war. Some have asserted that, in the twenty-first-century international political

environment, nuclear deterrence based on mutual vulnerability has been superseded by events and technology. The absence of a US-Russian political rivalry, the development of new threats to US security, and the potential for new technology for missile defenses together raise the possibility of a new security road map. Missile defenses, if reliable against plausible and constrained threats,

could complicate or overturn the balance of terror based on mutual vulnerability - or so technology optimists hope, and pessimists fear.


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AT PROLIF SOLVES CONVENTIONAL WAR

nuclear war isn't close to deterring conventional wars. And this holds escalatory potential.Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)Nuclear-armed adversaries might calculate that honor, fear and interest necessitate war and that its conduct could

be limited and not result in nuclear weapons exchanges. For instance, a nation-state might calculate that it could initiate conventional military operations for limited objectives - such as territory - that would not threaten vital interests such as the regime survivability of the opponent, reducing the risk of nuclear retaliation. The historical

record shows that non-nuclear states are willing to attack or go to war against nuclear powers. As Sagan points out, 'History suggests that while many states facing nuclear adversaries may well be cautious, some states have nevertheless launched attacks in the face of such ~ncertainty."~ Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973 and Argentina invaded the United Kingdom's Falkland Islands in 1982. Israel's reputed nuclear weapons capability did not deter the Iraqis from firing Scud missiles at Tel Aviv in the 1991 Gulf War. More recently, many Indians see the 1999 Kargil crisis with Pakistan as evidence that the Pakistanis believed their nuclear deterrent would allow them to take the contested territory in Kashmir without risking Indian retaliation." If these states were willing to fight against nuclear powers without a nuclear retaliatory capacity, it is reasonable to assume that they would do the same with a nuclear weapons inventory at the ready. Barry Posen has speculated that the United States, had it been faced with a nuclear-armed Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War, might not have been deterred from retaking Kuwait. Posen argues that the United States might have launched the military campaign while 'convincing Saddam Hussein that the United States will retaliate in particularly horrible ways if he employs nuclear weapons'.56 Such resolve may have deterred Saddam from unleashing chemical or biological weapons against US force during that Gulf War. President Bush, who was concerned that Iraq might resort to weapons of mass destruction to thwart the coalition military operations against Iraq, issued a veiled ultimatum to Saddam before the onset of the ground war. In a 5 January 1991 letter to Saddam, Bush warned that 'unconscionable acts' like 'the use of chemical or biological weapons' would 'demand the strongest possible response'.57 Alternatively, Saddam may not have resorted to chemical or biological attacks against American forces in the 1991 Gulf War because they never approached Baghdad to threaten his hold on power. An aggressor nuclear state might calculate that it could achieve political objectives with conventional military operations - the destruction of opposing conventional forces and the occupation of an adversary's capital, for example - before an adversary could resort to nuclear weapons in its defense. While some might dismiss such a scenario as far-fetched, one must recall that the German military, for all of its reputed prowess at military planning, had assumed in the pre-World War I Schlieffen Plan that France could be defeated with dispatch before it turned its attention to defeating Russian forces to the

east. It is a fair assumption that the Germany of old will not be the last repository of military hubris and the possession of nuclear weapons today might even encourage such folly. The victim of a conventional attack - even if intended by the aggressor to achieve limited objectives - would be under enormous psychological and emotional strain. Under such circumstances, the attacked state might judge that the aggressor intends to bring about its total defeat, forcing the victim to unleash nuclear retaliatory strikes to stave off conventional military defeat. Such a scenario was close to becoming a reality in the 1973 Middle East war. Time magazine reported that Israel had readied its nuclear weapons in response to substantial battlefield losses to Arab armies.'' More recently, during the 1987 crisis between India and Pakistan that involved extensive military maneuvers in India's territory close to Pakistan's border, the man responsible for Pakistan's uranium-enrichment program warned, 'we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened'.59

War is still likely. Subordinates, first strike and lack of survivability.Mozley ’98 (Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 6-7)There is a popular belief, based on the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during

the Cold War, that the possession of nuclear weapons makes nations so careful in their dealings with one

another that war of any sort between them can be avoided. Some international-relations theorists even propose increased nuclear proliferation as a method for reducing the risk of conventional war. They assume that all governments are rationally controlled and therefore would not order a nuclear first strike against an enemy or engage in conventional military confrontations that might escalate to nuclear conflict. These proposals ignore many practical realities. Even if all leaders were rational, it does not necessarily follow that their governments and nations would act rationally, nor is it certain that no situation could exist in which it would be rational to launch nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed enemy. Few national leaders have subordinates who carry out their orders in perfect detail; delegated authority must be exerted through people who may disagree and who make mistakes. The technology used may break down. The result in either case can be actions that are unrelated to the wishes of the person or agency in nominal control, actions that are compounded of the habits and


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 182desires of the leaders and those of the people who must put the actions into effect. Even more dangerous is the possibility of war started accidentally or through misunderstanding. Controlling nuclear weapons is a particularly demanding problem. Obviously, no rational leader would start a nuclear war with a hostile nation if that nation could retaliate with its own devastating nuclear attack. He would not even start a war with conventional weapons if it might easily escalate into a nuclear conflict. There can, however, be no reliance on a nation's not taking an opportunity to conquer an opponent by a sudden nuclear attack that would remove any chance of retaliation. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maneuvered in order to be able to retaliate for a nuclear attack, leading to the position that came to be known as mutually assured destruction (MAD), in which each nation could survive a nuclear attack with enough nuclear weapons intact to exact devastating destruction on the attacker. There is evidence, however, that the position of MAD was very hazardous during the years of the Soviet-U.S. confrontation. In his book The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War,

Bruce G. Blair describes a situation that occurred shortly before the end of the Cold War, in which the military commands of both the United States and the Soviet Union were not sure whether their command and control systems would survive a first strike.' In this situation, their nuclear-armed missiles, however well protected, would not have been able to respond effectively. The United States attempted to strengthen its command and control by delegating the ability to launch nuclear weapons to commanders well below the presidential level. The Soviets, on the other hand, tried to protect the central command by elaborate defenses, such as establishing control bunkers 1,000 feet below Moscow (the conservative military had doubts about command safety even at this depth). For those controlling the ICBMs on both sides, this development led to policies of launch on warning. These policies were not publicized, and both sides emphasized the need of making the ICBMs themselves able to survive a nuclear attack.

Empirically nuclear proliferation increases the risk of conventional war – high costs encourage conflictKapur ‘7 (S. Paul, Associate Prof. Strategic Research Department – Naval War College, “Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia”, p. 171)My study's findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation's effects on international security. As noted, proliferation optimists argue that by threatening to raise the cost of war astronomically, nuclear weapons reduce the likelihood of conflict. My findings, however, indicate that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the study shows that the danger of nuclear weapons can in certain

circumstances have the opposite effect. By potentially raising the costs of violence, nuclear weapons can make conflict more likely, encouraging a weak, revisionist state both to take territory while insulated from all-out conventional retaliation and to attempt to force third-party diplomatic intervention in ensuing crises. The high cost of nuclear war is precisely what promises to make such a strategy successful; nuclear danger deters adversaries and also attracts outside attention. If nuclear weapons were not so destructive, a weak, revisionist state would get neither of these benefits and would be less likely to engage in aggressive behavior. Thus, the high cost of nuclear war may not lead to lower level stability and can actually increase the likelihood of conflict.

Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars. Sobek et al ‘9 (David, Prof. Pol. Sci. – LSU, David Sobek, Prof. Int’l Studies and Pol. Sci. – VMI, and Semuel Robinson, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. – Lsu, Prepared for presentation at the 2009 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago. 2009-05-22, “Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001”, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p362138_index.html)At the active pursuit stage , one can assume that previous efforts to dissuade proliferators have been unsuccessful and that acquisition is much more likely to become a reality. In light of the heightened sense of urgency that would accompany this

state of affairs, there are compelling reasons to believe that the probability of conventional force usage is relatively great. First, as noted in the destructive preemption literature, we are more likely to observe efforts to militarily target existing capabilities, as “hard targets” begin to take shape during the acquisition stage. Moreover, in line with our bargaining process expectations, it is probable that opponents will redouble their

conventional military efforts to reach a favorable settlement to the issue before acquisition. Put differently, active pursuit serves as a strong signal that the “expiration date” on the current bargaining environment is nigh . Overall, since the active pursuit of weapons decreases an opponent’s estimates of the risks and costs of preemptive destruction and increases the urgency with which it seeks to obtain the bargaining benefits of any conventional military action, we predict that targeting is more likely to be observed against nuclear “pursuers ” than both non-proliferators and nuclear “explorers.” Hypothesis

1b: States that are actively pursuing nuclear weapons are more at risk of being targeted in a conventional militarized dispute than exploring and non-proliferating states.


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 183Doesn’t solve lower level conflicts.Reiter 6—political science prof at Emory (Dan, “PREVENTIVE WAR AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY”, April,http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446306&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf, ZBurdette) Notably, deterrence does not prevent all aggression. Nuclear theorists have described the “stability-instability paradox,” in which nuclear weapons provide stability and peace at highly intense levels of violence

(the use of NBC weapons), but less stability at lower levels of violence because the use of nuclear weapons is not credible against lesser threats. 63 During the Cold War, the American nuclear deterrent did not prevent lower levels of Communist aggression, including intervention in the Third World (e.g., the Cuban intervention in Angola) and within the Communist bloc itself (e.g., the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia). Furthermore, there are a few instances of nuclear-armed states being attacked with conventional weapons, including the 1969 SinoSoviet border dispute, the 1982 Falklands invasion by Argentina, and Iraq’s 1991 Scud missile attacks on Israel. However, the NSS is not concerned with conventional attacks; American conventional forces are sufficient in quality and quantity to address virtually any conceivable conventional threat, and such threats do not have the catastrophic potential attending NBC use. Our strategy is concerned rather with NBC attacks, and within this area deterrence is extremely effective.


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446306&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf


AT ASAL & BEARDSLEY

Proliferation only reduces the risk of war by 37%, but risks absolute destructionAsal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)We should also note that this was a 'hard' test for the pro-proliferation argument - we are not asking if nuclear dyads are less likely to go to war. Our analysis indicates that the presence of nuclear-weapons states as crisis actors, regardless of which side they are on, decreases the likely level of violence. This fits with the theoretical arguments of proliferation optimists and rational-deterrence theorists. Despite the support for the optimists, the evidence is not as overwhelming as one might wish, given the costs involved if there is a mistake in the calculations of leaders armed with nuclear weapons during a crisis. A 37% change in the probability of full-scale war is a large amount, but as Waltz

(Sagan & Waltz, 2003: 6) points out, the costs of a mistake can be nothing short of 'destruction'. Is a change of 37% in probability worth taking the risk that proliferation may reach a ruler who is truly irrational? In either case, the findings suggest avenues for future research using the ICB dataset to explore various impacts that nuclear weapons have on crisis behavior.



AT ALLIED PROLIF GOOD/STABLE

Proliferation is bad even when it spreads to allies.Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)One could argue that the effects of nuclear proliferation depend on whether nuclear weapons spread to friends or enemies. 118 Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued in favor of a double

standard for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy because he claims that the United States is more threatened by nuclear-armed

foes than it is by nuclear-armed friends.119 While it is true that the nature and the degree of the threat posed by nuclear proliferation varies depending on who possess them, the friend/enemy distinction overlooks the fact that nuclear proliferation to friends still causes many problems for power-projecting states and that non-power-projecting states are not necessarily concerned when nuclear weapons spread to nonallies. As Great

Britain’s Lord Palmerston famously remarked, nations have no permanent friends, they only have permanent interests. Nuclear proliferation does not provide an exception to this rule. For power-projecting-states, nuclear proliferation to both friends and enemies entails substantial strategic costs, though the type of cost is different in each case. States will not worry much that nuclear proliferation to an ally will deter a military invasion, since it is highly unlikely that states would want to invade an allied state. This does not mean, however, that nuclear proliferation to a friendly state is cost free. Power-projecting states incur many other strategic costs when allies acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation leading to regional instability that could potentially compel a costly intervention can occur whether the new nuclear state is an ally or an enemy. In fact, as we saw above, the fear of regional instability in the Middle East was a principal reason why the United States and the Soviet Union both opposed nuclear proliferation to Israel in the 1960s.120 Further, nuclear proliferation to an allied state can encourage rivals to seek their own nuclear deterrent, contributing to further nuclear proliferation. As we saw above, officials in Washington feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel would lead Arab states to develop their own nuclear programs. Moreover, the concern often expressed by power-projecting states that nuclear proliferation will undermine alliance relationships is primarily a fear about the spread of nuclear weapons to allied states. Indeed, the United States has almost always opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons to allied states.121 The United States is not alone in this regard. Moscow also prohibited its allies from acquiring nuclear weapons and had great success: no member of the Warsaw Pact ever acquired the bomb.122 Further, friendship is not a necessary prerequisite for promoting nuclear proliferation. Recent scholarship has examined the factors that lead states to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology.123 This study reveals that in no case has a state ever provided sensitive nuclear assistance to a state with which it shared a formal alliance.124 As argued above, states provide sensitive nuclear assistance more according to whom they are constraining and less according to whom they are helping.




ASIAN PROLIF BAD – ARMS RACES

Asian prolif causes arms races – escalates to nuclear warfareCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia during the first two decades of the twenty-first century has the potential to disrupt existing security arrangements within and outside of the region, to provide a catalytic agent for an outbreak of conventional or nuclear warfare, and to consign to the ash heap of history optimistic projections about the triumph of economic globalism and political postmodernism in the twenty-first century. The spread of nuclear weapons in the first two decades of the twenty-first century may have effects similar to the spread of military plans for rapid mobilization and prompt offensives among great powers a century ago. European political leaders in July and August, 1914, plunged from crisis into war without fully comprehending how prior decisions about force deployment, and plans for preemption in the initial period of war, would help to trigger the very conflict they hoped to deter. In a similar fashion, nuclear proliferation after the Cold War may escape the constraints that kept nuclear ownership limited and nuclear adventurism under control between 1945 and 1991. In the new world order, nuclear weapons threaten to tilt the balance between the satisfied and dissatisfied states, or between defensively and offensively minded powers, until deterrence collapses into itself.

Among regions or military theaters of operation of interest to the United States, Asia presents the most dangerous imminent possibility of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) colliding with serious political grievances and inadequate supports against deterrence failure. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia and in the Middle East with military reach into Asia (or vice versa) could involve the United States and other great powers in actual war or in a continuing minuet of crises short of war. In addition, prevention or rollback of nuclear proliferation in Asia may no longer be possible. Containment and deterrence, supported by arms limitations, might be the only feasible options, regardless of their downside risks. In the discussion below, we project to the year 2020 or shortly thereafter, entering the third decade of the twenty-first century. Eight candidate Asian nuclear powers are provided with hypothetical forces, making possible comparisons among states' forces on a variety of dimensions related to arms race and nuclear crisis stability. The political context of an Asian nuclear arms race is obviously different from the environment that surrounded United States – Soviet competition throughout the Cold War. Therefore, variations in the performances of national forces may be more significant for crisis and arms race stability in an eight-sided arms competition, compared to the two way street of the Cold War.






ASIAN PROLIF BAD – PREEMPTION

Asian prolif specifically causes preemption – nuclear warCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Nuclear Prolifeartion in Asia and Missile Defense,” vol. 24, issue 4, 10/1/ 2005, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ba28c7bd-0ee6-4c79-ad0b-b188b88681eb%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=1232F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is arguably the most dangerous trend in international security policy. There are several reasons for policy makers and international relations scholars to be concerned about this development.

First, Asia is the source of a number of historical and/or contemporary political rivalries: India and Pakistan; China and India; Russia and China; Russia and Japan; North and South Korea; Japan and the two Koreas; Japan and China. A number of these states already possess nuclear arsenals and plan to increase them in size and diversity. A second reason for the significance of nuclear proliferation in Asia is that the United States has vital security and economic interests in the region—and some of them are in conflict with one another, at least at the margin. The U.S. has security and defense commitments to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. It has strong and growing trade and other economic relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Bush administration has also moved to improve U.S. economic and security relationships with India. Bush and Indian officials reached agreement in July, 2005 (pending Congressional approval) for the United States to supply India with civilian nuclear technology and conventional military equipment. Pentagon officials estimated that India might, under the new arrangements, purchase as much as $5 billion worth of conventional weapons.1 Warmer security relations and greater arms sales between the U.S. and India had implications for China and for Pakistan. Chinese observers might reasonably conclude that the U.S. rapprochement with India was intended as a counterweight against the PRC’s own military ambitions. In July, 2005 a Pentagon assessment of China’s military capability and potential contended that the PRC was increasing its nuclear arsenal and specifically noted that Chinese missiles are capable of striking India, Russia and “virtually all of the United States.”2For its part, Beijing objected to the U.S. assessment as inflammatory. The defense agreement with India also reverberated in Islamabad. Pakistan remained a key ally in the U.S. war on terror and, notwithstanding recent thaws in their relationship, a potential military opponent of India. And, as the U.S. sought to balance its relationships among India, China and Pakistan, it had to consider as well the implications for proliferation of its proposed agreement with India. Members of the 44-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group would have to be persuaded that aid to India’s civilian nuclear industry would not be transmutable into support for its weapons program. According to the U.S.-Indian agreement of July 20, 2005, India committed itself to forego additional nuclear tests, to open its civilian nuclear reactors to international inspectors, and to withhold nuclear technology or materials from possible proliferators.3 On the other hand, the open door for U.S. aid to India’s civilian nuclear industry, despite India’s unwillingness to sign the NPT, raises issues of equity in U.S. policy of nuclear containment. As one editorial commented: “Help in building civilian nuclear reactors is a carrot for countries that agree not to build nuclear weapons. If India can build such weapons and then munch the carrot anyway, why should others not aim to do likewise?”4 Part of the answer may be that geopolitics and national interests, in New Delhi and inWashington, took precedence over the norms of nonproliferation. The case of technology and arms transfers to India is but one example of the intricacy of U.S. policy objectives, including nonproliferation, in the region. A third reason for concern about the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is that the Cold War assumptions about U.S.-Soviet behavior, related to nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are not really transferable to the Asian context. Stabilizing forces that existed between 1946 and 1989 with

regard to the development and deployment of American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons do not exist in early twenty-first century Asia. A first difference is that the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms competition was two sided. Each had only to watch the other in order to make plausible threat assessments. The eventually enormous sizes of the American and Soviet nuclear weapons establishments virtually guaranteed an historically unprecedented, and socially unacceptable, outcome if deterrence failed. But the analytical problem of focusing intelligence collection and analysis on “the threat” from Washington or Moscow was politically simplified compared to the present, and plausible future, condition of regional nuclear multipolarity in and near Asia. Nuclear Proliferation in Asia

315 A second difference, relative to stabilizing forces present during the Cold War but not necessarily now, is that the American and Soviet military establishments were under firm political control. The possibility of an American Seven Days in May or Dr. Strangelove scenario, in which the political control over military forces was usurped by serving officers, was obviated by constitutional and other checks and balances. For different reasons, the Soviet system also provided for firm party control of military selection and training, especially in the higher ranks. Neither state was at risk, even during crises that might have involved the use of nuclear weapons, of military overthrow or of “Red Commanders” cutting party leaders out of the wartime chain of command. Conversely, there is little reason to be complacent about the spread of nuclear weapons among states in Asia where our knowledge of their political and military-procedural control systems is limited at best. What are the use controls, enablement codes, or “fail-safe” procedures in North Korea, in Pakistan, or in a possibly future nuclear-capable South Korea and Japan? Whose fingers will actually be on the nuclear trigger during a crisis, and what happens if civilian and





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 189military leaders devolve into competing factions? States in Asia other than Russia and China do not have decades of experience in the management of nuclear forces, including the alerting and standing down of nuclear-capable land based missiles, aircraft and sea-based forces—and their supporting command, control and communications systems. A third difference between the ColdWar and the present and future situation in Asia is related to the size, diversity and vulnerability of delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the two situations. The U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in land-based, sea-based, and air-launched basing modes. The numbers and diversity of these platforms made a credible first strike unthinkable for either side, especially after the achievement of military-strategic parity in broad categories of launchers and weapons. On account of the high survivability of U.S. and Soviet mature ColdWar forces, strategies of preemption were unpromising, and therefore unappealing to policy makers and commanders. In contrast, the present and foreseeable forces of Asian nuclear powers will be smaller and less survivable compared to the post-parity American and Soviet forces. Instead of more than ten thousand warheads capable of being delivered over intercontinental ranges, current and future Asian powers will probably deploy hundreds instead of thousands of warheads. In addition, the

survivability of these weapons under plausible conditions of attack, together with the responsiveness and endurance of their command-and-control systems, will also be in doubt, compared to the American and Soviet Cold War forces. Smaller forces with less survivability, other things being equal, invite first-strike strategies and planning based on preemption or “launch on warning” compared to second-strike retaliation. Finally, a fourth aspect of forces deployed by present and future Asian military powers, compared to American and Soviet

Cold War forces, is their contiguity to their assigned targets and to the forces of their regional opponents.

The “strategic” (meaning, of intercontinental range and directed against the most vital targets) nuclear weapons of regional actors in Asia may include ballistic missiles and aircraft of theater or shorter ranges.

Medium or even short-range ballistic missiles and “tactical” aircraft, or offshore naval vessels of similar range, may be able to deliver fast attacks with potentially “strategic” effects against military or value targets. These less-than-intercontinental-range delivery systems will shorten times for warning and response on the part of the defender, compared to systems of longer range. Short flight times and requirements for rapid decision by the defender encourage hair-trigger responses , including prompt launch or even preemption. The importance of this factor of contiguity between WMD-equipped forces and their targets was apparent during the 1991 U.S. and allied coalition war against Iraq. Many air 316 S. J. Cimbala sorties had to be assigned to detection and attempted destruction of the Iraqi SCUD missiles launched against Israel. The U.S. also deployed Patriot antimissile defenses to Israel in order to provide some partial protection against missile attacks and to encourage Tel Aviv not to enter the war against Iraq. Israeli leaders feared with good reason that Saddam Hussein might fire SCUDs with biological or chemical warheads into their cities. Perhaps Hussein chose not to, on account of U.S. warnings that his use of WMD would open the door to retaliation in kind, not excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons. Whatever his reasoning, the episode showed how easy it would be for aggressors with only short-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear or otherWMDto pose a strategic threat to nearby states and their societies. In the analysis that follows, we will posit force structures that provide limited numbers of truly long-range weapons systems (i.e., intermediate- or intercontinental-range missiles and bomber delivered weapons of comparable distances). Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in addition to those long-range weapons included in our hypothetical, projected forces, other delivery systems of shorter range could also be used as nuclear-capable launchers. Therefore, our illustrative forces probably err on the conservative side, in terms of their total capabilities for complicating the problems of the defender relative to that of the attacker. The next section explains our methodology and follows through with the pertinent analysis.

Asian proliferation causes preemptionCimbala 5 - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear weapons in the Twenty-first century: From simplicity to complexity,” vol. 21, issue 3, 10/1/ 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+weapons+in+the+Twenty-first+century%3A+From+simplicity+to+complexity&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-09-30&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=267&rft.epage=281&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F0743017052000344947&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_0743017052000344947 /mr)The possibility of further proliferation in Asia, in response to the acknowledged or obvious nuclear statuses of India,

Pakistan and North Korea, could not be ignored.^ Nuclear weapons could appeal to South Korea or, even, to

Japan. In addition, the Middle Eastern and south Asian politico-military template was complicated by the imminence of an Iranian nuclear capability, unless Tehran was persuaded to reverse course by American and

European pressure. Israel might try to pre-empt an Iranian decision to go nuclear, although its official policy in

the spring of 2005 was to support US and European coercive diplomacy to that effect. Nuclear weapons could make north and south Asia (to include parts of the Middle East from which nuclear capable missiles could reach into Asia) a geo-strategically crowded neighborhood: Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, and the US could all have vital interests and nuclear forces to support those interests. The Bush administration National Security Strategy emphasizes that the threat from rogue states or terrorists in possession of weapons





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 190of mass destruction requires rethinking of Cold War assumptions about deterrence. The direction that post-Cold War revisionism should take is far from obvious, however. The concept of assured retaliation by survivable retaliatory forces as one component of stable deterrence, as opposed to the entire basis of military-strategic relationships among major powers, is likely to endure into the twenty-first century. Populations will remain hostage to the effects of mass destruction weapons, including those delivered by terrorists. Protection of populations through active and passive defenses may improve, compared to Cold War standards. But population protection can never be absolute, and small numbers of nuclear weapons can inflict large amounts of societal destruction. In addition,

nuclear weapons can be used to attack targets other than value targets such as cities. Pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against military forces are also possible. During the Cold War, scenarios focused on massive US-Soviet force exchanges involving thousands of weapons. Each side feared that the other would execute a disarming first strike against its retaliatory forces. Much of this danger was exaggerated, but it drove analysis at the margin. And, although we are well past the Cold War, US and Russian nuclear forces are still sized against one another's capabilities, regardless of political intentions, as the "gold standard" against which other nuclear powers are compared. The Moscow Treaty of 2002 signed by Presidents Bush and Putin calls for reductions in the numbers of deployed

warheads on each side's strategic launchers to 270 • STEPHEN J, CIMBALA between 2,200 and 1,700 by 2012.^ Although parity in numbers of weapons is important to the two sides, each is trusted, according to the protocols of the Moscow Treaty, to implement its own reductions according to its own state priorities. This permissive approach to verification reflects the non-hostile political relations between the US and Russia after the Cold War. In addition to the canonical scenario of a massive US-Russian nuclear exchange, it is equally or more likely that nuclear weapons in the future will be used for coercive diplomacy or in actual attacks as part of regional "access denial" strategies. In this respect, the

object of a North Korean or Iranian nuclear capability, for example, would be to preclude the intervention in a local conflict of US or allied hostile forces. In Iraq, with nuclear weapons already available on SCUD launchers, this would have posed a very different problem for US planners of Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. The same holds true for the US war to impose regime change on Iraq in 2003.



ASIAN PROLIF BAD – TERRORISM

Asian proliferation risks instability and nuclear terrorism. Richard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Nuclear weapons’ equalizing effect makes them increasingly appealing as an asymmetrical means to counter the United States’ conventional military superiority. North Korea currently pursues a controversial nuclear program to combat power disparities with the United States and other major powers in the Far East, such as China and Japan. North Korea’s proliferation is perhaps the most threatening of all, in terms of U.S. interests, for several reasons. A nuclear North Korea poses a major threat as a supplier of nuclear technology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea already grosses an average of $580 million annually from missile sales to northern Africa and the Middle East, making it the single largest exporter worldwide

(CIA, 2003, pg. 56). Should Pyongyang obtain nuclear weapons, it would become a major exporter of nuclear technologies. The emergence of new nuclear states in both northeast Asia and the Middle East, as a

product of North Korean exports, would drastically exacerbate regional instability, seriously inhibiting U.S. influence and reducing the non-proliferation regime’s efficiency. Unstable regimes in these newly proliferated states establish a major threat not only to the U.S., but to global security. These regimes become prime sources for radical militant and terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons. Most alarmingly, if North Korea goes nuclear, other states in the region may question their own security and decide to follow suit. Dick Cheney stated the following regarding North Korea’s proliferation on Meet the Press on March 16, 2003: A nuclear-armed North Korea…will probably set off an arms race in that part of the world, and others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider whether they want to readdress the nuclear question (Cheney, 2003). Despite

Cheney’s questionable record on political forecasts, he rightly acknowledges that North Korea’s proliferation may force other countries to pursue their own nuclear programs. Japan’s civilian stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium could plausibly be converted to hundreds of nuclear warheads in a matter of months or even

weeks (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 105). If Japan were to go nuclear, South Korea would likely follow due to a security imperative, despite U.S. countermeasures. The resulting proliferation of northeast Asia erodes U.S. interests and assets; U.S. businesses currently conduct more than $500 billion in transactions in the region and have invested

another $150 billion (US Department of Defense, 2001, pg.7). Proliferation of northeast Asian states jeopardizes U.S. economic affairs and reduces the United States’ ability to use its leverage as an international hegemon, due to the relative bargaining power those states gain through the possession of nuclear weapons.

Asian prolif causes terrorism. Cimbala 5 - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear weapons in the Twenty-first century: From simplicity to complexity,” vol. 21, issue 3, 10/1/ 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Nuclear+weapons+in+the+Twenty-first+century%3A+From+simplicity+to+complexity&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-09-30&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=267&rft.epage=281&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F0743017052000344947&rft.externalDBID=DFSA&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_0743017052000344947 /mr)In a similar fashion, the objective of states in possession of WMD is not only, or mainly, the actual carrying out of missile strikes or air attacks that might provoke retaliation against their own territory. Instead,

new nuclear powers can more successfully exploit the fear of possible attacks against US expeditionary forces, allies or American territory in order to induce a more cautious diplomatic and military approach to conflict resolution. North Korea over the decade from 1994 to 2004

provides a case in point. North Korea used its latent and then manifest nuclear capabilities to squeeze the US and other major powers for economic assistance and diplomatic concessions. The US was not worried about losing a war against North Korea, if it came to that. The risk posed by even a small North Korean nuclear force was based on

its potential to coerce regional rivals, including South Korea and Japan, allied to the US.' In addition. North Korea might Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach





Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 192become a nuclear Wal-Mart for terrorists. Consideration of "access denial" strategies supported by WMD or of the possible use by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction has led the Bush administration to emphasize pre-emption as an option in its military-strategic planning. The prospect of NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY • 271 a Taliban or al-Qaeda with nuclear weapons suggests that traditional strategies of retaliation after attack may fall short of the degree of persuasion required for successful deterrence. More broadly, the Bush administration has called for rethinking the entire concept ofthe nuclear-strategic "triad" of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bomber-delivered weapons that were the basis of its Cold War nuclear force structure. The Bush Nuclear Posture Review called for a "new triad" composed of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive forces, active and passive defenses, and improved infrastructure, for reconstitution of forces in a crisis, for maintaining forces at necessary levels of readiness, and for providing necessary research, development and testing to ensure against future surprises.*



AT PROLIF GOOD (ASIA SPECIFIC)

Their prolif good turns assume a Soviet and American influence – they don’t apply to AsiaCimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Nuclear Prolifeartion in Asia and Missile Defense,” vol. 24, issue 4, 10/1/ 2005, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ba28c7bd-0ee6-4c79-ad0b-b188b88681eb%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=1232F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)This author disputes the argument that “more is better” when it comes to nuclear weapons spread. But he acknowledges that the “more is better” school has some arguments that require serious discussion.

On the evidence, nuclear weapons do make leaders more cautious about getting into wars and about

employing weapons of mass destruction against their enemies, once having been engaged in war. But during the Cold War and even during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the international system was constrained by the existence of American and (declining) Soviet international influence and their overbearing nuclear arsenals. A future nuclear arms race in Asia will take place in a very different political, and military, context.



IRAN PROLIF BAD

Iranian prolif undermines deterrence – guarantees crisisCimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Strategic Reassurance in a Proliferation-Permissive World: American and Russian Options,” vol. 22, issue 3, 9/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Strategic+Reassurance+in+a+Proliferation-Permissive+orld%3A+American+and+Russian+Options&rft.jtitle=Defense+%26+Security+Analysis&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen+J&rft.date=2006-09-01&rft.issn=1475-1798&rft.volume=22&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=221&rft.epage=239&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F14751790600933830&rft.externalDBID=n%2Fa&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_14751790600933830 /mr)The spread of nuclear weapons into parts ofthe Middle East with strategic reach into Asia complicates further the issues of deterrence and crisis stability. The case of Iran, under diplomatic pressure

from the US and the European Union to reverse its course toward the development of nuclear weapons, has all the earmarks of a potential crisis.* Israel is a de facto nuclear weapons state, and an Iranian nuclear deterrent once deployed will factor into the diplomatic and military calculations of leaders in Riyadh, Cairo, Amman

and Damascus. In addition, an Iranian nuclear deterrent poses problems for US military commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. First, Iran may use its nuclear weapons for diplomatic coercion against US and allied supporters of the governments in Kabul and in Baghdad. Second, more than a trivial number of deployed nuclear weapons gives Iran an "access denial" strategy of its own against military intervention from outside the region.


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MIDDLE EAST PROLIF BAD – GENERAL

Middle East prolif causes destabilizing arms races, escalation, and nuclear terrorism. IHT ‘6 (Noah Feldman, “Nuclear holocaust: A risk too big even for martyrs?” 10-27, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/bombforweb.php)Adding the nuclear ingredient to this volatile mix will certainly produce an arms race. If Iran is going to get the bomb, its neighbors will have no choice but to keep up. North Korea, now protected by

its own bomb, has threatened proliferation - and in the Middle East it would find a number of willing buyers. Small principalities with huge U.S. Air Force bases, like Qatar, might choose to rely on an American protective umbrella.

But Saudi Arabia, which has always seen Iran as a threatening competitor, will not be willing to place its nuclear security entirely in American hands. Once the Saudis are in the hunt, Egypt will need nuclear weapons to keep it from becoming irrelevant to the regional power balance - and sure enough, last month Gamal Mubarak, President Mubarak's son and Egypt's heir apparent, very publicly announced that Egypt should pursue a nuclear program. Given the increasing instability of the Middle East, nuclear proliferation there is more worrisome than almost anywhere else on earth. As nuclear technology spreads, terrorists will enjoy increasing odds of getting their hands on nuclear weapons. States - including North Korea - might sell bombs or give them to favored proxy allies, the way Iran gave Hezbollah medium-range rockets that Hezbollah used this summer during its war with Israel. Bombing through an intermediary has its advantages:

deniability is, after all, the name of the game for a government trying to avoid nuclear retaliation. Proliferation could also happen in other ways. Imagine a succession crisis in which the Saudi government fragments and control over nuclear weapons, should the Saudis have acquired them, falls into the hands of Saudi elites who are sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, or at least to his ideas. Or Al Qaeda itself could purchase ready-made bombs, a feat technically much less difficult than designing nuclear weapons from scratch. So far, there are few nuclear powers from whom such bombs can be directly bought: as of today, only

nine nations in the world belong to the nuclear club. But as more countries get the bomb, tracing the seller will become harder and harder, and the incentive to make a sale will increase.


http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/bombforweb.php


MIDDLE EAST PROLIF BAD – HEG

Middle East proliferation eviscerates US hegemony Richard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)Nuclear proliferation decreases the United States’ military strength relative to other nations as they

develop nuclear arsenals, creating a paradox of “weak state power”(Ae-Park, 2001, pg. 451). Essentially, nuclear weapons place states on a level playing field, producing an equalizing effect. Relatively weaker nations “favor nuclearization as a way of leveling the playing field” (Trachtenberg, 2002, pg. 152). In regions

vital to U.S. political affairs, proliferation escalates political tensions, potentially decreasing U.S. influence. In the Middle East, increased friction among Arabic states with unstable U.S. relations would severely inhibit the United States’ access to the region’s oil resources. The U.S. Department of Defense stated

the following sentiment to this effect in its 2001 report “Proliferation: Threat and Response”: U.S. goals in the Middle East and Africa include securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace…building and maintaining security

arrangements that assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its petroleum reserves…In this volatile region, the proliferation of [nuclear] weapons and the means of delivering them poses a significant challenge to the ability of the United States to achieve these goals (Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 2001, pg. 33). Post World War II, the U.S. maintains a military presence in the Middle East to ensure access to petroleum reserves. Proliferation constitutes a pressing threat to regional stability as Gulf states compete to control critical oil supplies in order to further their political and military objectives. The spread of nuclear weapons would escalate conflict tensions and increase the will to confront the United States and threaten its regional interests. States, such as Iran, recognize they cannot conventionally match U.S. military power and thus seek alternative means to combat the U.S., in an effort to offset their own relative weakness (US Department of Defense, 2001, pg.1).




MISSILE PROLIF BAD – ESCALATION

Proliferation causes escalationMistry 03 – Associate professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati (UC). He specializes in international relations, security studies, technology and politics, and Asian security. He has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center; the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. (Dinshaw, “Containing Missile Proliferation,” p. 12) Missile activity has destabilizing political consequences in both wartime and peacetime . Missile strikes that terrorize a target population and increase pressures on political leaders to retaliate can considerably escalate conflicts . In the Gulf War, Iraq’s missile strikes against Israel could have had a very serious political impact. The Coalition might have fractured as Arab states left if it Israel had retaliated against Iraq.

Further, ballistic missiles escalated tensions in the prewar phase (because of Iraq’s declared policy of threatening

Israel), widened the war’s parameters once the fighting began, and diverted significant air power and special force

resources away from other military tasks.

Proliferation causes interstate regional conflict Mistry 03 – Associate professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati (UC). He specializes in international relations, security studies, technology and politics, and Asian security. He has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center; the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. (Dinshaw, “Containing Missile Proliferation,” p. 12) Missile proliferation can also increase the likelihood of interstate conflict in the long term. International conflict studies suggest that neighboring states are more likely to fight wars with each other, and that

proximity correlates positively with conflict. Ballistic missiles can quickly strike distant states and thereby bring distant states “closer” to each other, which (especially if deterrence stability cannot be attained) could increase

interstate tensions and the likelihood of regional conflict. Moreover, missile deployments can be provocative in a region where nuclear weapons are vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Missiles then undermine the stability of deterrence.



MISSILE PROLIF BAD – NPT

Missile prolif destabilizes the world and collapses non-prolif efforts. Mistry 03 – Associate professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati (UC). He specializes in international relations, security studies, technology and politics, and Asian security. He has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center; the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; and the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. (Dinshaw, “Containing Missile Proliferation,” p. 9) On strategic grounds, missile proliferation undermines the nuclear, biological, and chemical nonproliferation regimes. Ballistic missiles enable states (and nonstate actors and terrorist groups) to quickly deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to distant regions, thereby exacerbating the WMD threat and weakening the nonproliferation regime. Conversely, halting missile proliferation mitigates the WMD threat, strengthens the nonproliferation regime, and enhances international security.



***RANDOM PROLIF-RELATED***



NPT GOOD – TERRORISM

The NPT is key to nonproliferation- solves extinction and terrorism Muller, 8- prof of IR (Spring, Harold, The Washington Quarterly, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World,” www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_muller.pdf, mat) The Brittle State of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It rests on a bargain between nuclear-weapon states and non–nuclear-weapon states. The latter agree to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons but are guaranteed the right to develop civilian nuclear energy without constraints as long as they are parties to the treaty in good standing. All parties are obliged to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation to give this right substance, and the nuclear-weapon states are committed to making serious moves toward nuclear disarmament. Until 2000, the non–nuclear-weapon states, particularly those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, were not uncritical of the nuclear-weapon states’ record, but they were satisfied that the process of disarmament was underway. The 2000 NPT Review Conference brought the hard-fought compromise of the “13 steps” on nuclear disarmament, a series of moderate, incremental measures that would lead to some progress without questioning the nuclear-weapon status of the five in the foreseeable future. 14 Nevertheless, in 2005 the nuclear-weapon states, led by the United States and to a certain degree by France, refused to recognize to what they had agreed in 2000, having apparently come to the conclusion that the concessions were too far-reaching. Among non–nuclear-weapon states, there is now the strong impression that the NPT’s Article VI, the disarmament obligation, is dead in the eyes of the nuclear haves. With the bargain shattered, the iron law of armament would apply: the most powerful weapon of an era is inevitably either had by none or by all. The present state of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, combined with the fundamental insecurity of all states with whom the nuclear-weapon states have unfriendly relations, seems to be a dangerous precondition for rampant proliferation. A world populated by many nuclear-weapon states poses grave dangers. Regional conflicts could escalate to the nuclear level. The optimistic expectation of a universal law

according to which nuclear deterrence prevents all wars 15 rests on scant historical evidence and is dangerously naive. Nuclear uses in one part of the world could trigger “catalytic war” between greater powers, drawing them into smaller regional conflicts, particularly if tensions are high. This was always a fear

during the Cold War, and it motivated nonproliferation policy in the first place. Moreover, the more states that possess nuclear weapons and related facilities, the more points of access are available to terrorists.

The NPT stops nuclear terrorismDhanapala 2—Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations (The NPT, Nuclear Disarmament, And Terrorism, http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2002/2002Apr09_NewYork.pdf, chm)By maintaining all the official records of these deliberations, by offering our advice and counsel to States parties, by helping to encourage public participation while promoting public education, and by offering a common global forum for debate and deliberation -- the United Nations is making its our own contributions in the global effort to reduce

nuclear threats. Yet the primary responsibility for action still remains in the hands of the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon states, and this is likely to remain the case until a global nuclear disarmament regime can develop a stronger legal and institutional infrastructure --

including, that is, a nuclear weapons convention and some machinery to ensure that it is implemented. The "thirteen steps" agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference

were a very constructive step forward in addressing this problem -- by establishing some specific benchmarks for assessing

progress in nuclear disarmament. Clearly full implementation of each of these steps would advance substantially global efforts against nuclear terrorism -- by making nuclear materials harder to acquire, by further de-legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons per se by any country or anybody, and by demonstrating to concerned citizens around the

world that close multilateral cooperation in disarmament and non-proliferation can produce peace and security dividends -- not to mention cost savings -- that cannot be purchased by greater reliance upon arms alone or the threat or use of force. This is, in essence, what a good treaty review process is supposed to do: to build confidence, to alleviate perceptions of security threats, and to underscore the positive gains from forging and implementing multilateral commitments. Getting at Those Elusive "Deeper Roots" I just returned last week from a trip to China, where I opened an international conference on "A Disarmament Agenda for the 21st Century," jointly organized

by the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. A common theme of many participants at this conference was that we need to get to the "deeper roots" of conflicts that generate the pressure to acquire deadly arms. This is most apparent in the case of the problem of curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as the demand for such weaponry is driven by complex political, social,

and at times economic motivations. Yet the problems of disarmament, non-proliferation, and WMD terrorism also require an intensive

examination of root causes. Disarmament is most sustainable when it is embraced by states as being demonstrably in their national security interests. Similarly, the world community cannot hope to succeed in reducing global proliferation and terrorist threats without addressing the deeper causes that lead states or subnational groups to seek weapons of mass destruction -- or that motivate the nuclear have's to work so hard to retain their nuclear options. file:///G|/S%20drive/ddaweb-2004/speech/09apr2002.htm (4 of 5) [08/26/2008 12:56:19 AM] The NPT, Nuclear Disarmament, and Terrorism One caution is in order, however, in this never-ending pursuit of the ultimate first causes of chronic global problems like the continued existence of nuclear weapons and their risk of proliferation. The problem is

that the very existence of these weapons surely forms one of the deepest tap roots of the problem -- for stockpiles beget stockpiles. Nuclear weapons, in short, are not simply reflections of underlying conflicts that, once solved, would cause such weapons to disappear. Among the current P-5 states -- the NPT's nuclear-weapon states -- there is currently a very low likelihood of general war; yet the nuclear arsenals persist, and persist in all cases based on claims of security threats from the nuclear weapons of other countries. When all the many roots of nuclear armament and proliferation are finally unearthed and sorted out for systematic analysis -- the bomb itself remains. Conclusion I have now come full circle back to by original point of departure: a note of recognition for the absolutely indispensable role played by non-governmental groups in promoting sensible responses to the nuclear dangers amongst us all. They keep governments focused on earnest efforts to achieve solemn disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. They help to sort through and identify the deeper roots of the problem. And they provide a foundation upon which to build support for multilateral cooperation, and to sustain and deepen that cooperation over time. Acting alone, the nation state cannot solve these problems without cooperation from the people and among all countries in common international arenas, at the subregional, regional, and global levels. Our instruments to address this challenge, in short, have not evolved as rapidly as the threat has evolved -- we are confronting 21st century global problems with institutional tools of times past, perhaps even centuries past. While I am sure this conference will not conclusively resolve this paradox, I am more confident that its organizers and participants will come away with a deeper appreciation of the work ahead. The challenge of coming to grips with the many military, political, economic, and environmental threats that nuclear weapons pose to humanity will require a level of international cooperation on a scale far beyond what we have witnessed so far. I have identified only a few new approaches that are under consideration, largely within the United Nations. Furture progress will require a new synergy of effort, involving an increasingly diverse coalition of groups and interests across the globe, a coalition linked by a common goal of freeing the world from the most dangerous weapon human ingenuity has produced.


http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/HR/docs/2002/2002Apr09_NewYork.pdf

http://www.twq.com/08spring/docs/08spring_muller.pdf


NPT GOOD – PROLIF

The NPT solve prolif- symbolic steps reduce the likelihood of warKrepon and Black, 11 - BA from Franklin and Marshall College (July/August, Michael and Samuel, Nuclear Nonproliferation, “Good News and Bad News on the NPT,” mat)The past is so much with us that it can sometimes obscure the present. This is certainly true with respect to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), whose quinquennial review is scheduled to begin on May 3. During past reviews, the health and well-being of the NPT regime has been measured primarily by the actions of the five states recognized by the treaty as possessing nuclear weapons. Under Article 6 of the treaty, all five—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are obligated to act in good faith to facilitate the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the “P-5” also have special responsibilities to address proliferation dangers that, as reaffirmed by the council on September 24, 2009, constitute “a threat to international peace and security.”[1] During the Cold War, the P-5 produced, in the aggregate, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, tested these weapons more than 2,000 times, and threatened to use them during harrowing crises or in warfare. Most of this wretched excess was the doing of the Soviet Union and the United States. Given this history, past review conferences understandably produced action plans that focused primarily on what the first five proliferators needed to do to strengthen the regime. Continued pressure on the P-5 is certainly warranted because they still possess more than 20,000 nuclear weapons.[2] Nevertheless, well-rehearsed speeches blaming the P-5 for the ills of the global

nonproliferation regime obscure recent trends and impressive gains. Looking back, the NPT has made extraordinary strides. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, with just 43 member states. Among the original absentees were China and France. Initial safeguards at nuclear facilities were rudimentary. The original International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance on the structure and contents of safeguards agreements contained three paragraphs on implementation, all of which focused heavily on minimizing the burden placed on safeguarded facilities. For example, this guidance stated that the IAEA should “avoid hampering” the development of nuclear expertise and international cooperation including “international exchange of nuclear material.”[3] By comparison, the IAEA’s 1997 Model Additional Protocol is far more specific, uses stronger language (“shall” instead of “should”), and authorizes far more encompassing inspections, setting a new standard for responsible nuclear stewardship.[4] Over time, the NPT’s membership has grown to almost as many states as belong to the United Nations. In 2008 the IAEA carried out 2,797 inspections, design

information verifications, and complementary access visits in 163 countries, which required 14,121.5 calendar-days in the field.[5] Despite the power and

influence nuclear weapons are presumed to possess, the NPT has established nonproliferation as a global norm. States pursuing nuclear weapons programs after the NPT entered into force have been cast as outliers. The IAEA Board of Governors has found two states, Iran and North Korea, to be in noncompliance with their safeguards agreements.[6] Others, including South Korea and Syria, have conducted activities that, when exposed, have been viewed by the IAEA as matters of serious concern, prompting the agency to request clarifications or dispatch inspection teams. Although a number of non-nuclear-weapon states have strengthened their commitment to the NPT over the past two decades, the most impressive gains during this period have been made by four of the P-5. These gains can be measured by six key indicators of nuclear weapons’ utility: actual battlefield use, threats of battlefield use, overall stockpile size, warheads deployed, nuclear weapons

tests, and fissile material production for weapons. Based on these six indicators, compliance with the NPT’s core obligations by four of the P-5 has become stronger, and the value they have placed on nuclear weapons has plummeted since the Cold War ended. Despite these gains, which are described below, the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference is in doubt, as is, more importantly, the health and well-being of the NPT regime. Threats to the well-being of the regime now lie increasingly in the actions of outlier states, the politicization of deliberations by the IAEA board, and the reluctance of key non-nuclear-weapon states to step up to their obligations as guardians of the treaty. The profound nature of the positive trends described below has been underappreciated for three primary reasons. First, the residual P-5 capabilities remain large, reflecting the excessive size of their arsenals in past decades. Second, old ways of thinking linger in P-5 nuclear enclaves, where attempts to buck these trends capture headlines, even when they are ineffectual. For example, Bush administration efforts to add new warhead designs to the U.S. nuclear stockpile garnered global attention but died quickly on Capitol Hill. Third, nuclear posture reviews, treaty ratification, and entry-into-force provisions are designed or controlled by those who seek to brake, rather than accelerate, enduring trends. By rightly focusing on how much remains to be done to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles and to end nuclear testing permanently, supporters of the NPT wrongly fail to appreciate how much the stock price of nuclear weapons has fallen for major powers over the past two decades. Waning Utility Consider the particulars, starting with the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. When the nuclear age began, no one was so bold or so foolish as to predict that the “winning weapon” would remain sheathed for more than six decades.[7] Others have analyzed at length the reasons for this unexpected and enormously important tradition of restraint.[8] What matters most, for the purposes of this article, is the inescapable conclusion that a weapon not used on battlefields loses its military utility. Every year that passes without the use of nuclear weapons in crisis or warfare makes it more difficult for a political leader to authorize subsequent use, while making the user more of an international pariah. A second criterion is the political utility of nuclear weapons. Even if unused on a battlefield, nuclear weapons could still have political utility in that they could influence behavior in crises and in war. During the Cold War, the United States often directed nuclear threats against China during the Korean War and in crises over Formosa/Taiwan. The Soviet Union and the United States also ramped up their readiness to use nuclear weapons during Cold War crises to influence decision-making. U.S. maneuvers were most evident when nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and strategic bombers were forward deployed during a crisis. On some occasions, instructions to increase readiness for use of nuclear weapons were broadcast in ways that could easily be intercepted. Now, U.S. aircraft carriers do not carry nuclear weapons on board, and Washington typically moves theater missile defense capabilities rather than B-52s into harm’s way when tensions increase in troubled regions. Nevertheless, veiled nuclear threats by the P-5 have not ceased entirely. Russian leaders have not so subtly implied that the Czech Republic and Poland could become targets for nuclear detonations if they choose to host U.S. theater missile defense components. In addition, the United States has clarified on a few occasions, including the run-up to both wars against Saddam Hussein, that the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces, friends, and allies would be met with a devastating response. Rare, public threats by British and U.S. leaders in recent decades have been directed only at countries that are not in good standing with the IAEA and are presumed to have weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.[9] The pattern of nuclear-tinged threats over the past two decades has changed markedly from the Cold War. The most harrowing crises since the Cold War ended have involved outliers to the NPT. India and Pakistan have experienced four crises since 1990 in which veiled or blunt nuclear threats have been exchanged, and North Korea periodically engages in nuclear bluster when it wishes to raise temperatures on the Korean peninsula. Verbal threats in periods of heightened tension in South and East Asia have been complemented by the flight testing or movement of nuclear-capable missiles. The record is clear: states that seek political utility from nuclear weapons during periods of heightened tension now reside primarily outside the NPT. Declining Numbers A third measure of nuclear weapons utility is stockpile size. According to data compiled by Stan Norris and Hans Kristensen, global nuclear stockpiles reached their peak in 1986 at more than 65,000 warheads.[10] Moscow and Washington have reduced their stockpiles by approximately 50,000 warheads below their Cold War peaks.[11] The stockpiles of France and the United Kingdom have been in decline since 1981 and 1992, respectively.[12] The British and French stockpiles are now respectively 43 percent and 32 percent smaller than they were in these peak years.[13] Of the P-5 nuclear arsenals, only China’s is believed to be growing, albeit modestly.[14] Another important barometer is the number of nuclear weapons deployed. Since the Cold War ended, Moscow and Washington have reportedly removed from operational status more than 19,000 nuclear weapons.[15] The number of nuclear weapons deployed by France has been reduced by at least 125.[16] The United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal by approximately 200 deployed nuclear weapons.[17] Of the P-5, only Beijing is increasing the number of warheads it deploys.[18] Every test of a nuclear weapon is a declaration of utility. In 1962 alone, there were an astonishing 178 nuclear weapons tests. From 1965 to 1974, there was an average of 62 tests per year. In the following decade, the average was 54 tests per year. From

1985 through 1994, the average number of tests dropped to 18 per year. Since 1996, the P-5 have not conducted a single declaration of

utility in the form of a nuclear weapons test.[19] A final yardstick is fissile material production for weapons. Four of the P-5—again, with the exception of China—have officially declared a moratorium on fissile material production. Beijing may be refraining from new fissile material production for weapons, but it has yet to publicly confirm

this.[20] In summation, by all six key indicators, the utility of nuclear weapons has declined dramatically for four of the P-5 over the

past two decades. Stockpiles and numbers of deployed nuclear weapons are declining significantly. The potential for military conflicts between major powers has diminished greatly, along with accompanying threats to use nuclear weapons. Probably none of the P-5 is now producing fissile material for weapons. None of the five has tested nuclear weapons for 15 years, an extraordinary and previously inconceivable stretch of time. Finally and most importantly, no country has resorted to battlefield use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. Significant Gains This track record deserves respect rather than denigration. To be sure, Cold War stockpiles and nuclear testing were excessive by any measure. Yet, the extent of reductions in Russian and U.S. stockpile sizes and nuclear force structures reflect significant shifts in perceived utility, not merely the shrinkage of wretched excess. The structure of international relations has changed since the Cold War ended. Berlin, Cuba, and Taiwan no longer evoke nuclear flashpoints. Major powers now lose standing by brandishing nuclear weapons against each other or against non-nuclear-weapon states. Major powers that seek to gain influence now do so by means of economic and energy-related indicators, not by nuclear weapons. When Moscow seeks to pressure its neighbors, it

gains more leverage by threatening to cut off natural gas supplies than by threatening nuclear strikes. The NPT is both a beneficiary and a cause of these positive trends. The extent of causality can admittedly be debated, except in one crucial respect: The treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995 was clearly linked to the subsequent completion of negotiations and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This pledge was partially delivered in 1996 but has yet to be honored fully. Nonetheless, the positive linkage between the NPT and nuclear testing is clear: If there were no connection between nuclear testing and the indefinite extension of the NPT, the P-5 would surely have tested old or new weapons repeatedly during the past 15 years. Nuclear trend lines for four


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 206of the P-5 have been decidedly positive over the past four review conferences. Supporters of the NPT, who have pushed long and hard for these trend lines, can be justifiably proud of their work, even though they habitually see the glass as half-empty. Temporary reversals of these enduring trends could occur at any time, which would compound P-5 responsibility for the NPT’s uncertain state. Their most important duty as treaty guardians and as veto-wielding members of the Security Council is to deal purposefully with compliance concerns. In their dealings with Iran and North Korea, however, Beijing and Moscow sometimes have higher priorities than to uphold NPT compliance. Russian and U.S. nuclear stockpiles remain extremely large, and although further reductions are in store, Moscow has demonstrated limited enthusiasm for widening their scope to include tactical nuclear weapons. The Bush administration did serious harm to NPT norms by championing a civil nuclear deal with India without compensatory steps to shore up the treaty. Meanwhile, Beijing still acts as a free rider to the NPT regime, rather than taking on responsibilities commensurate with its growing power. China’s intentions and force structure remain opaque, while its modernization programs are proceeding at a faster pace than those of other states with nuclear weapons. Beijing, like Washington, has still not ratified the CTBT. Other complaints could no doubt be added to this list, but there is undeniable, impressive evidence that, on balance, the contributions of four of the P-5 to the NPT regime have grown significantly in recent decades. In contrast, outliers to the NPT are relying more heavily on nuclear weapons. Three of the four NPT outliers—India, North Korea, and Pakistan—are the only states to have tested nuclear devices since 1996 and are enlarging their fissile material and weapons stockpiles. Israel, the fourth non-NPT state, has not done nearly enough to support the NPT by means of parallel steps that reinforce the treaty’s objectives and purposes. The NPT regime’s weaknesses are growing for other reasons as well. The IAEA board has not acted consistently and coherently to uphold treaty obligations. Many states resist “second-generation” norms of responsible nuclear stewardship, particularly those associated with strengthened safeguards, materials protection, and accountancy. Key non-nuclear-weapon states that are needed to serve as guardians of the NPT have been missing in action in Vienna and New York. Egypt threatens to hold the NPT hostage to its regional interests. Above all, the nuclear program of Iran, a noncompliant party to the treaty, casts a long shadow over the NPT regime. These positive and negative trend lines will intersect with uncertain effect at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Four of the five major powers have contributed most of the significant gains for the NPT regime over the past two decades, but all five still have a long way to go in fulfilling their treaty obligations. Although the P-5’s trend lines are mostly positive, the same cannot be said for the IAEA, for states outside the treaty, or for those undermining it from inside. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/LookingBack

The NPT soles escalating arms races- the impact is extinctionMueller, 1 – Professor of IR (Harald, Prof International Relations at Univ. Frankfurt “The Future of Arms Control”, Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate)

Globally, non-proliferation or prohibition agreements, particularly those relating to weapons of mass destruction

(WMD), are a precondition for banning existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety and, in

extremis, even the survival of the human race. Arms control can create sufficient security and stability to motivate countries to commit themselves to cooperation in other sectors where it is mutually profitable and indeed

indispensable for solving problems for society and the economy in the age of globalisation. Such agreements also

impact heavily on regional balances and help, if successful, to prevent the greatest dangers of escalation of existing

regional conflicts. Successful arms control agreements build shared security interests among erstwhile rivals and enemies. Hence, they even help to de-escalate the general level of regional conflict. This brings us to the second major significance of the triad of arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law. Taken together, these present an important and powerful alternative to a security policy based entirely on self-help and its extension, defensive alliances. While defence capabilities present, in the final instance, the essential backbone of any security system, arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law form a first line of security that consists of internationally agreed rules. The security dilemma which leads to costly and risky arms races and, in extreme circumstances, even to war, can be considerably lessened if there are generally accepted

rules for upper limits of troops, military equipment, for the shape of military doctrines and the form of exercises, which give states

the confidence that their neighbours do not harbour aggressive intentions. These rules delineate clear distinctions

between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and thus help to distinguish between the rule-abiding membership of such a security regime and the (hopefully very few) rule-breakers against which the capabilities of

the lawful majority can then be directed.

The NPT prevents proliferation -- specifically is checking wildfire Asian prolifDunn 9— former Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and served as Ambassador to the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf)Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage point for outside influence and action to prevent proliferation? NPT adherence clearly provides a point of leverage, although the nature of that leverage* and its likely

effectiveness*could vary depending on the country. In Iran’s case, its adherence to the NPT has been most useful as a rallying point for outside efforts to pressure Iranian leaders to think anew about their goals. UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) all reaffirmed the council’s support for the NPT, while Resolutions 1747 and 1803 both emphasized ‘‘the need for all States Parties to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations.’’ Moreover, some key European countries’ support for actions to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment activities has been linked to a belief*accurate or not*that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would put at risk the overall NPT structure.19 Amid continuing tensions between the George W. Bush administration and other countries, Iran’s NPT obligations provided a ready basis to argue that the issue was not simply one of the United States versus Iran. To use a hypothetical example, let us imagine that due to some combination of the most recent North Korean volte-face on giving up its nuclear weapons, tensions with China, and uncertainty about the U.S. security link, pressures grow in Japan to pursue nuclear weapons. In this case, outside powers could use Japan’s NPT adherence as a THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 149 leverage point to urge the Japanese leadership to think carefully about whether to take that step. Japan’s NPT adherence*and the need for it to go through procedures to withdraw from the NPT*would also help buy time for new initiatives to deal with future Japanese security concerns. Still another example of the leverage provided by NPT membership concerns possible action to be taken after a country has violated its obligations and broken out of the NPT. Iran may yet be a future case in

point. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, the international community will need to take many actions to contain the

regional and global spillovers.20 Those actions could well include measures to make Iran pay a price for violating the NPT*to signal resolve to Iran, to its threatened neighbors, and to the wider NPT community. The fact that Iran would have violated its legal obligations under the NPT would provide a stronger foundation for any such international punitive actions. Metric: Did widespread NPT adherence help reverse the perception that runaway proliferation was


http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/LookingBack

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 207unavoidable? In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This fear of runaway proliferation gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of the belief that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons material in the hands of many countries.21 Such warnings of runaway proliferation, however, could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many countries might have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind. Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear security of its European non-nuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation regime. The NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968*including critical countries in Europe and

Asia*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the prospect of an international system of nuclear safeguards*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*to prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying prophecy. Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering 150 LEWIS A. DUNN fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations. Article II Net Assessment. The direct impact of Article II in preventing proliferation is mixed. Negotiation of the NPT with its ‘‘no manufacture, no acquisition’’ obligation forced a number of countries to decide whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Faced with that decision, important countries chose to renounce nuclear weapons. In deciding, states were motivated by a mix of considerations, and the NPT helped crystallize their decisions. By contrast, some prominent NPT parties have stayed in the NPT while pursuing nuclear weapons: North Korea, Iraq, and Libya*and quite possibly Iran. The indirect impact of Article II may be more compelling. The ‘‘no acquisition, no manufacture’’ obligation provides a nonproliferation leverage point for rallying outsiders, for engaging in dialogue with countries rethinking their nonproliferation commitment, and for taking action after NPT breakout. Successful negotiation of the NPT and Article II contributed significantly to reversing earlier fears of runaway worldwide proliferation. Today, adherence to Article II still provides a potentially valuable means to counter renewed fears of such a world*assuming there is compliance with NPT obligations. Steps to Strengthen Article II via the 2010 NPT RevCon. The lack of an agreed understanding of no ‘‘manufacture’’*of what actions would violate Article II obligations* remains an oft-noted weakness of the NPT. First among the five NPT NWS, and then perhaps more widely, it may be time to seek an agreed understanding. Continued efforts to use the review process to create a consensus on what broad actions violate the ‘‘no manufacture’’ obligation could be pursued in parallel. Both sets of actions would make it harder for an NPT party to pursue nuclear weapons while claiming to meet its NPT obligations. Close consultations among the great powers on how to make Iran pay a high price for NPT breakout would be another step. As argued above, how the international community responds to an Iranian bomb*should one emerge*would have a significant impact on the prospects for containing proliferation in the Middle East, negating the gains to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons, and limiting the wider erosion of the NPT regime.

Brink of rapid prolif – NPT key.Stares ‘7 (Paul, VP for Conflict Analysis and Prevention – US Institute of Peace, NY Times, “To Ban the Bomb, Sign the Peace”, 1-30, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/opinion/30stares.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print) OF all the crises facing the new United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, the fraying nuclear nonproliferation system is arguably the most consequential. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has warned of 30 “virtual new weapons states” on the horizon.

Obviously, the more countries that possess the bomb, the higher the risk of a nuclear accident, the theft of a weapon, sales of technology and hardware, and a serious miscalculation leading to nuclear war.

Nonprolif prevents extinction.Hassan ‘7 (Hassan Hamid, States News Service, “IRRESPONSIBLE WEAPONS TRANSFERS, SOARING DEATH TOLL FROM SMALL ARMS, LIGHT WEAPONS UNDERSCORE 'PRESSING NEED' FOR ARMS TRADE TREATY, DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE TOLD”, 10-23, L/N) HASSAN HAMID HASSAN ( Sudan) said that weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery represented an imminent danger to the survival of humanity, and to the integrity and credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He had in mind the illicit network in nuclear technology and the great risk of access to such weapons by terrorist groups and non-State actors. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) had been a very important step forward in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means. However, if the implementation of that important text was to succeed, international, regional and subregional institutions must play their role in assisting developing countries in their implementation efforts. The non-


http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/opinion/30stares.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/opinion/30stares.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 208proliferation of nuclear weapons should move towards a global disarmament process and discourage the new arms race.



AT US ACTIONS → PROLIF

Prolif is based on regional concerns -- not motivated by US action. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)The main focus of all proliferators since China, in short, has been regional. As the Duelfer report, based on the

debriefing of captured Iraqi officials following the Iraq war by the Iraq Survey Group, revealed, Saddam had not armed against Israel, let alone against any of the official nuclear powers: "Saddam's rationale for the possession of

[weapons of mass destruction] derived from a need for survival and domination ... particularly

regarding Iran." The idea that nonnuclear powers arm because the existing nuclear powers do not disarm is contradicted by the actual history of the superpower arms competition. If there is any correlation between the behavior of the haves and that of the have-nots, it is in the reverse direction. By a rough count, including both deployed and undeployed warheads, the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has dropped from a peak of well over 30,000 warheads in

the mid-1960s to about 10,000 today. Russia's arsenal has climbed down even faster, from about 45,000 in 1990 to

about 14,000 today. If the "good example" theory were correct, such massive cuts-about 70 percent of

the total number of warheads- should have started turning Iran and North Korea into nuclear pacifists, which they have not. Libya did have a change of heart at the end of 2003. It was not because of great-power disarmament but rather the reverse: fear of a United States emboldened by easy victory against Saddam. The same apprehension led Iran to suspend weaponization in 2003, according to the United States' fabled 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. Iran's nuclear weapons program then appears to have resumed as the Bush administration began to slide the military option off the table, while also constraining Israel's options by denying it the United States' biggest bunker busters, and then accelerated as the Obama administration practically cleared the table while failing to corral Russia and China into serious sanctions. The lesson is

a familiar one: hard power-or, more accurately, hard power combined with a reputation for the will to use it-is a more efficient deproliferator than disarmament. Great-power virtue makes for good words, but truly effective

proselytizing, as missionaries know, requires the fear of God. Because nuclear weapons serve many purposes, they are

often simply too useful to forego. They are good for blackmail (North Korea), they intimidate the enemy next door (India and Pakistan), they deliver the ultimate life insurance (Israel), they devalue conventional superiority (every case), and they support hegemonic ambitions, whether regional or global. Regardless of whether the haves disarm, therefore, such weapons will still be in demand. Unless the United States manages to extend deterrence as credibly to Egypt and Saudi Arabia as it did to Japan and West Germany, those countries may well counter an Iranian bomb with ones of their own. And why not? After all, which nuclear power was ever invaded by a mighty outsider? Given nuclear logic and history, it is hard to be sanguine about a plan to convert the wayward by way of example. But what about a regime with teeth, such as that proposed by Global Zero- with obligatory monitoring, including unannounced on-site inspections? Let us assume an agency that could identify nuclear facilities, although neither India nor Pakistan had problems concealing theirs. Who would enforce the regime, and how, once the great powers had let go of their mightiest weapons?



GLOBAL DISARM ATTEMPTS BAD

Removal process would lead to nuclear miscalculation -- empirical examples prove. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)But surely, it must be possible to safely bring down the number of weapons, given how even today's arsenals still constitute massive global overkill? At first glance, gradualism does seem sensible. But behind the process of disarmament lurks the ugly face of dread. As a state's stocks of nuclear weapons dwindle, its vulnerability to an enemy's disabling first strike rises- along with its fear that such a strike might actually occur. It is easier to destroy ten missiles than one thousand. Small arsenals, in Schelling's words, put a "premium on haste," which undermines crisis stability . The structural incentive to go first , he notes,

"is undoubtedly the greatest piece of mischief that can be introduced into military forces, and the greatest source of danger that peace will explode into all out war." By contrast, large and diverse forces reduce the rewards of haste. Hence, there is safety-mutual safety-in numbers . What about incremental disarmament- a variant of gradualism that the Global Zero co-coordinator Bruce Blair and his colleagues recently described in these pages ("Smaller and Safer," September/October 2010)-which includes confidence-building measures such as lowering the alert status of nuclear forces, removing target coordinates from guidance systems, and separating warheads from launchers? Inserting such circuit breakers, the argument runs, would introduce a salutary delay between crisis and launch, giving negotiations a chance to resolve the crisis short of war. Making military mobilizations cumbersome, however, is hardly a guarantee of crisis stability . The intersection of greatpower rivalries with complex and staged mobilization schedules helped trigger World War I rather than prevent it. Hig hreadiness forces would have kept the "guns of August" from going off. And Israel's lack of military readiness prior to the Yom Kippur War created an opening for an Egyptian attack rather than

incentives for a mutual stand-down. Measures that buy time for a crisis to play out slowly can sharpen the dilemma between lashing out and hanging back. Nervousness can blanket calm; when tensions are

high, states will be tempted to raise the alert status of their nuclear forces by reassembling launchers and warheads and retargeting their missiles. Such moves by country A might sober up country B, signaling how high the stakes are for A. But these moves might also increase B's sense of vulnerability, prompting an even higher level of readiness on its end. If the upward spiral continues, either state or both of them might conclude that war has already begun, leaving no choice but preemption or humiliating concession.

Even if its successful, it causes categorically greater instability and escalation than the SQ. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)But assume, for the sake of argument, that all the practical obstacles to the implementation of Global Zero were whisked away-that one could bring all the relevant states on board, construct a disarmament regime with teeth, identify all nuclear facilities, monitor them carefully, and police all violations effectively. Would Global Zero serve its intended purpose?

Would a world free of nuclear weapons actually be happier and safer? No -for a reason so simple that one

hesitates to belabor it. Even if states were willing to destroy their nuclear weapons, they could not destroy the knowledge, technology, and materials that lie behind them. It was in a global-zero world, after all, that nuclear weapons were invented by the United States, starting in 1939, when it was still a

nonbelligerent. The implications are not heartening. Were Global Zero to achieve its goals, former nuclear powers would inevitably keep mobilization bases at a high state of readiness to guard against a nuclear

breakout by others, since the acquisition of only a few bombs would offer a deadly advantage to whichever

state rearmed first. The result would be a world, as Schelling has observed, in which the United States, Russia,

Israel, China and half a dozen or a dozen other coun tries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to

preempt other nations' nuclear facilities. ... Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate ; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world .



AT NPT SOLVES PROLIF

No wildfire prolif- the NPT isn’t keyHymans, 5 – prof of IR (11/15/2005, Jacques E., Foreign Policy, “Think Again: Nuclear Proliferation,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/11/14/think_again_nuclear_proliferation, mat)

The Number of Countries with Nuclear Weapons Is About to Grow Dramatically We've heard all that before. In 1964, five states possessed nuclear weapons. The previous year, President John F. Kennedy had predicted that number would expand to between 15 and 25 nuclear weapons states within a decade. Ten years later, the top U.S. arms controller, Fred Ikl, foresaw as many as 35 nuclear states in the world by 1990. But, even though nuclear technology did diffuse widely, the nuclear weapons club had only expanded by two new members

by 1980. And during the 1980s, membership in the club did not grow at all. At the end of the Cold War, experts again braced themselves for rampant proliferation. Even optimistic scenarios anticipated that key global players such as Germany would seek nuclear weaponry.

The predictions again proved to be wrong. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, more states have actually given up their nuclear weapons arsenals than have created new ones. True, no one can be certain that those who come bearing dark predictions today wont turn

out to be correct after all. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. But if the proliferation prophets were managing your money, youd have fired them by now. The Nonproliferation Regime Deters New Nuclear Weapons States Hardly. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does good work, and the agency and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, deserve their Nobel Peace Prize. But to say that a flood of new nuclear weapons states has been blocked by the international nonproliferation regime is like saying that Bill Gates is rich because he saved a bundle by switching to GEICO. Has the nonproliferation regime been helpful? Yes. But it has not been a determinative factor in preventing proliferation. After all, the regime is flimsy. It suffers from ambiguous and erratically enforced rules, myriad technical loopholes, and chronic underfunding. The case of pre-1991 Iraq showed how easily a determined state can hide the true extent of its nuclear program from the IAEA. Monitoring and inspection procedures have tightened up a great deal since then, but even a closely watched Iran managed to develop an extensive secret nuclear program over an 18-year period, until the truth started leaking out in 2002. In addition, the regime has been weakened by the ambiguous message it sends to states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does not create a level playing field between states, as most international treaties try to do. Rather, it separates states into two categoriesthe nuclear weapons states versus the othersand most of the onus for compliance falls on the latter group. The nuclear weapons states have only halfheartedly pursued nuclear disarmament, as the NPT says they must, and they have increasingly refused to meet their other major treaty obligation of disseminating civilian nuclear technology. Meanwhile, the Bush administration has recently made it clear that it intends to treat NPT holdout India as a legal nuclear weapons state. So its difficult to say that the nonproliferation regime today offers nonnuclear weapons states much of a reward for staying that wayif, indeed, it ever did. Then theres the overriding fact that, even when

the chips are down, most states have little desire to acquire nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime is billed as having been wildly successful because few states have gotten the bomb, but this logic ignores the fact that a vast majority of the worlds countries quite simply have no interest in doing what the NPT prohibits. States Want the Bomb Because It Is a Great Deterrent Its not that simple. Its true that most states who get the bomb want it mainly for the deterrent effect they think it provides. But many states, even among the handful that face high external levels of threat, dont automatically accept that having the absolute weapon will make them safer. Consider the case of India. In 1964, two years after India had fought and lost a bloody border war with China, the Chinese went nuclear. At the time, India had the technical wherewithal to try to follow suit. It did not. Rather than playing with the fire of mutually assured destruction, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri focused on bolstering the countrys conventional military forces to secure Indias borders. Shastri didnt believe in the theory of nuclear deterrence. But even most of those leaders who do believe in deterrence theory are not rushing out to get a couple of nuclear missiles. Building a small nuclear arsenal to face a much larger one does little more than invite a preventive attack. It is only once a state develops a secure second-strike capabilitythe ability to absorb the enemys first blow and then respond in kindthat it can begin to feel safe. For instance, in the wake of Chinas 1964 nuclear test, petrified Australian leaders also seriously contemplated exercising their nuclear option. What held them back was the belief that Australia couldnt build that crucial second-strike capability. States Want the Bomb for International Status Thats not the whole equation. Nonnuclear states are certainly keenly aware that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are also the five legal nuclear weapons states under the NPT. But the desire for status or prestige on its own is rarely enough to motivate a decision to go nuclear. Take, for instance, the case of Argentina in the 1970s and early 1980s. From its grandiose staging of the 1978 World Cup to its 1982 invasion of the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands, the Argentine military juntas appetite for nationalist self-expression appeared to have no bounds. The junta also embarked upon an enormous, economically questionable expansion of Argentinas nuclear technology base, seeking to have at least six operating nuclear power reactors and achieving mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. But, contrary to what many experts think even today, it did not embark on a nuclear weapons program, and indeed no influential voices within the state even wanted to do so. In fact, when the growth in its nuclear program threatened to entrap it in a nuclear arms race with Brazil, Argentina swallowed some pride and sought a diplomatic rapprochement with its neighbor. Argentinas military rulers understood that introducing the prospect of mutual annihilation into a region characterized by limited conflicts of interest would bein one admirals wordsa strategic absurdity. Its a point of view also shared by many of the worlds nonnuclear states today. Rogue States Are More Eager to Go Nuclear Than Are Others Nonsense. Much recent press attention has focused on the nuclear activities of the unpleasant regimes of North Korea and Iran. It previously focused on Iraq and Libya. Those countries nuclear programs clearly do (or did) give cause for alarm. But they are hardly the only ones that have played fast and loose with the rules of the nonproliferation regime. For instance, last year, even democratic South Korea informed the IAEA that as late as 2000 it had been secretly producing weapons-grade uranium, in violation of commitments not to do so. Indeed, if we use history as our guide, we might want to worry as much about the South Koreas as we do about the Libyas. For in fact, few of the members of the nuclear weapons club actually fit the rogue state designation. Apart from the original five, we find India, a democracy with international credentials so strong, it even has a chance for permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council. And then we find Israel and Pakistan, states that may not be universally admired but certainly have long enjoyed a close embrace from the United States. And it might be added that all three of these nuclear gatecrashers were headed by democratically elected leaders when they made their crucial decisions to cross the nuclear threshold. In short, few states may want the bomb, but no regime type provides a sure vaccination against nuclear weapons ambitions. Countries That Master the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Want to Produce Weapons Dont jump to conclusions. The desire to produce or amass plutonium or enriched uranium is a red flag, but its not a smoking gun that proves nuclear weapons ambitions. In fact, it can be driven by all sorts of motives apart from a desire for nuclear weapons. Resource-poor states such as Japan view the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle as a necessary correlate to their goal of energy independence. Japans choice is arguably driven by economic motives, but there are other motives unrelated to the bomb. For instance, Argentina started its secret uranium enrichment program in 1978, when the United States cut off enriched uranium exports to states that had not accepted the NPT. Without enriched uranium, Argentina would be unable to fuel its self-designed research reactorsa particular point of pride for a country with little in the way of high-technology industry. It also wanted to be able to fuel a pair of German-made TR 1700 diesel attack submarines, which it was considering transforming into nuclear subs. Thus, even though the work was conducted in total secrecy, Argentine scientists built their enrichment plant to make reactor-grade, not bomb-grade enriched uranium. Today, the world is closely watching Irans progress on enrichment. The Iranians may very well want enriched uranium as a pathway to the bomb, but it would be unwise to dismiss as mere propaganda the other motivations that they cite. Policymakers Need Better Data on States Nuclear Capabilities Not only. Overstating Iraqs nuclear progress has certainly given U.S. intelligence a black eye, but former weapons inspector David Kay is also right to note that the real challenge for intelligence is going to be giving to our political leaderships not just judgment about capabilities, but judgments about real intentions. And that is tough. Thats true. But still, the intelligence community could develop much better judgment than its showing now. It could begin by simply considering nascent nuclear programs innocent until proven guilty. For ultimately, most states either dont want or dont think they can muster a credible nuclear deterrent. Recognizing that the world is not full of nuclear illuminati would allow the international community to relax a bit, avoid offending large swaths of states, and concentrate resources on the few dangerous governments that really do want a bomb. Still, how does one determine where the real threats are? The late Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan made an incisive suggestion after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests caught the intelligence community napping: Learn to read. After all, Moynihan pointed out, Indias Bharatiya Janata Party, newly elected at the time, had publicly advocated going nuclear for a decade. Moynihan was basically right, and not just about India. People who want nuclear weapons tend to want them badly. They therefore find it hard to resist telegraphing their intentions. Of course, bluntly telling the world you want nuclear weapons is not for everyone. Thats why its essential for the intelligence community not only to learn to read, but to learn to read between the lines. A good deal of analysis can be done long-distance, using open sources. But diplomats, spies, or politicians can also glean critical information by meeting key players face to face. Unfortunately, American experts and envoys have often squandered such opportunities, showing a decided tendency to lecture rather than listen. They could do worse than to follow the lead of Henry Kissinger, who, as secretary of state, responded with restraint to Indias peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974and was reciprocated by an Indian state that ended up waiting another quarter-century before deciding to build an actual nuclear arsenal. Judging state demand for nuclear weapons is tough, but we can do better than were doing today. And we have no other choice but to try.

NPT doesn’t solve prolif- empirics


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/11/14/think_again_nuclear_proliferation

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 214Dunn, 9- PhD in political science from the University of Chicago (July, Lewis A., Nonproliferation Review, “The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future,” http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf, mat)

Metric: Has adherence to the NPT*and to Article II*significantly constrained pursuit of nuclear weapons by

NPT parties? Past experience indicates that if a country’s leadership decides to pursue nuclear weapons, the Article II ‘‘no manufacture and no acquisition’’ obligations will not be a significant constraint. Article II was violated by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, as well as by North Korea under both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Indeed, in the internal Iraqi deliberations about how to resume Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons after the Israeli 1981 attack on the Osirak reactor, Saddam Hussein was reportedly advised by Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, his top nuclear scientist, not to withdraw from the NPT but to remain an NPT member to better hide Iraq’s intentions. 13 For its part, Libya sought to purchase a virtual turnkey nuclear weapons program from the A.Q. Khan network, even while remaining an NPT party.

Arms control can’t solve irrational actors -- only deterrence checks that. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)So is there nothing that can be done to improve the current situation, no way for the size of existing arsenals to be reduced? Of

course there is. The key, however, is to focus not on the weapons themselves but on crisis stability . Traditional arms control-not at all the same thing as disarmament of the Global Zero variety- has emphasized just such concerns, and helped usher in a world where the nuclear weapons of the great powers, once a

terrifying presence at center stage of international politics, have safely receded into the wings. Such advances are real and valuable in and of themselves. Unfortunately, they have not and will not resolve all problems of the nuclear age. The proliferation of nuclear weapons to states such as North Korea and Iran or to nonstate actors such as al Qaeda follow a logic that has little to do with great-power arms control. If such states cannot be disarmed, they must be deterred . But how can nuclear weapons be deterred unless with nuclear weapons? Here is where the idealism of Global Zero becomes not

merely irrelevant but possibly tragic, obstructing the sensible policies required to maintain a credible

modern deterrent.


http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf


AT CBMS SOLVE

Confidence-building measures fail -- increases the risk of preemption and conflict. Joffe and Davis, 11 (Josef, James, Jan/Feb 2011, “Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 Iss. 1, Joffe: Editor of Die Zeit, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Davis: Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen, JPL)Blair and his colleagues argue that such a vicious cycle need not arise. "A lower level of launch readiness" flanked by "much deeper cuts," they write, would make for "uncertainty and incomplete knowledge" and so render policymakers risk averse in a

crisis. Uncertainty might well instill caution. But it could just as well breed the opposite. Which nation has ever started a war on the basis of certainty about its own and its enemy's capabilities, actual

and potential? Would Germany and Japan have taken on the Soviet Union and the United States if they had known in 1941 what these unready giants would throw back at them from 1942 to 1945? What stops the would-be aggressor is the certainty of unacceptable damage, even if it follows a sudden first strike.

Preemption, the worst enemy of stability, might actually be easier in a world filled with confidence-building measures, as Schelling has pointed out. Today's retaliatory forces are hardened or hidden under

the sea. Now think of a world replete with circuit breakers-with missiles in one place, warheads in another. Instead of having to take out hardened silos or elusive submarines, a state could resort to simpler means of preemption, attacking or sabotaging the logistical chain between its enemy's launchers and its warheads or the storage sites where its weapons are kept. One of the oldest paradoxes of the nuclear age is that loaded

and ready weapons induce caution while also carrying risks. Forty years of arms control have managed to preserve the caution while reducing the risks through innumerable fail-safe devices. Trading the residual risks for a return to vicious cycles of suspicion, fear, and possible preemption does not seem like a good bargain .



OPACITY BAD – STABILITY

Proliferation won’t be stable under opacity. Roberts ’96 (Brad, Ed. Washington Quarterly and Research Fellow – CSIS, “Weapons Proliferation and World Order: After the Cold War”, p. 208-209) In interstate relations in which nuclear weapons are an open and accepted fact, perceptions of the opponent are likely to be relatively clear, which will contribute to stability in times of crisis. But in relations dominated by opaque patterns of nuclearization, perceptions will be less clear, which may well

aggravate instability in times of crisis . The very opacity of the proliferation process complicates the task of clearly understanding stakes, risks, and consequences. The salience of the risks associated with uncertainties in opaque circumstances will depend significantly on the propensity of leaders to run those risks; as discussed in chapter 3, risk-taking is a marked propensity among regimes that find the status quo untenable. In the case of Israel, for example, opacity operates not so much to create doubts about the

existence of an Israeli nuclear option but about the stage in a military crisis when it might be threatened or used, with a result that leaders of opposing states might miscalculate that threshold. In the case of

South Asia, opacity leaves doubts about the degree to which either Pakistan or India might have secure retaliatory capabilities, and thus it may contribute to a decision to strike first in time of near war in order to avoid a devastating first strike.



OPACITY GOOD – STABILITY

Opaque prolif solves stabilitySeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Factors relating to behavior in the international community help to both keep arsenals small and to keep them opaque. As discussed, Third World states are limited by their resources when it comes to weapons development and buildup. They cannot buildup numbers of weapons quickly, which increases the chances that they will not buildup large numbers of weapons at all. Thus, policies that force developing states to rely on their own resources while developing nuclear weapons capability--or otherwise serve to

lengthen the timeline of nuclear development-are valuable policies. Current restrictions on international trafficking in weapons-useable material should be maintained or strengthened. International inspection regimes that aim to prevent the diversion of weapons fuel from commercial reactors can be a good way to restrict and slow growth in weapons Fuel stockpiles even frame diversion does actually occur.

Opacity creates stable nuclear prolif -- no hardlinersSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 97]Second, by obscuring the existence of nuclear weapons, opacity also robs hardliners within adversarial states of a potential causes belli. If one's enemy starts building nuclear bombs, it could generate a sense of threat within one's state. Hardliners within an enemy state could seize on the development of nuclear weapons

within a proliferating state, seeking to parlay the sense of threat into political power and reactionary, aggressive policies. Opacity robs hardliners of obvious evidence of nuclear weapons construction,

thereby weakening their hand. Further, a policy of opacity may indicate that the proliferating state is exercising restraint. helping to limit the threat generated by nuclear development _ That is, while it may be known that the opaque state could construct nuclear weapons and target the enemy state, opacity suggests that it might not necessarily be so, or that the opaque state is at least willing to curb its nuclear weapons development in some fashion. Leaders in the enemy state may be reassured by such behavior. Also, they may not want to tempt the proliferator to lose that restraint. and if those in control are moderate. they may welcome the proliferator`s opacity as a means of taming hardliners



OPACITY GOOD – THEFT/TERRORISM

Opacity prevents nuclear theft. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]Finally, the opacity of weapons development in the Third World will aid in preventing nuclear weapons theft. Opaque weapons are hidden weapons. By keeping weapons hidden from the international community proliferators will also be keeping them hidden from terrorists who might hope to steal them. Also, states that follow an opaque pattern of proliferation are sure to concern themselves with the security of weapons from the very beginning of development. Even if leaders are not

worried about weapons theft, per se, they will be worried about their sec ret getting out, and thus weapons will have to be carefully guarded.



AT OPACITY NOT SOLVE DETERRENCE

Opaque prolif still solves deterrenceWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette)Journal You contend that Saddam Hussein did not launch lethal missiles at Israel during the Gulf War because he was deterred by the nuclear threat. This raises the question of how Israel’s undeclared nuclear status affects nuclear stability. Does opacity diminish the effectiveness of deterrence? Waltz I take Israel as being a nuclear state, and I do not think anybody doubts that Israel has nuclear weapons. But as a tacit nuclear state, it doesn’t admit that it has nuclear weapons. By keeping its nuclear status opaque or tacit, it relieves some of the pressure on potential adversaries. It prevents Israel from goading Arab states by always talking about its nuclear

weapons, which would make it more embarrassing for surrounding Arab states not to have them, and encourage them to

try a little harder to acquire the capability. So it tends to dampen it, but it doesn’t fool anybody.




***RANDOM UNRELATED***



YES – GLOBAL NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

Threat is high now – states are modernizing their arsenals and research is advancing rapidlyMonroe 9 (Robert, retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, “A Perfect Storm over Nuclear Weapons”, September 1, Air and Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/monroe.html)Finally, in addition to remaining aware of the above specific threats, we must also fully prepare for the unknowable nature of the future. With startling speed, friends can become enemies; hostile forces can take over supportive nuclear-weapon states; major US vulnerabilities may occur unexpectedly; advanced weapons can present us

with totally new threats; adversaries may form unanticipated alliances, greatly raising threat levels; and so on. In sum, nuclear weapons exist, and they aren't going away--ever. There are tens of thousands of them in the world today. More states have them than ever before. Over half the world's population lives in states that possess nuclear weapons. Every such state in the world--with the sole exception of the United States--is modernizing its arsenal. Rogue states and terrorist organizations worldwide seek them unceasingly. On the research-and-

development front, "fourth-generation" nuclear weapons loom just around the corner. Most importantly, basic nuclear-weapons technology--well known and available everywhere on the earth--will continually advance and never disappear. Consequently, small groups with modest technical qualifications can produce nuclear weapons that work well. Given the great number of different threats from these weapons, the probability of our actually confronting some of them is quite high. Any such attack carries huge consequences-- world changing . Thus, we urgently need a new, relevant US strategy of nuclear deterrence--and it must hedge on the side of strength.


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/monroe.html


YES – CHINA BUILDUP

China is a challenger -- building up nuclear stockpiles.Monroe 9 (Robert, retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, “A Perfect Storm over Nuclear Weapons”, September 1, Air and Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/monroe.html)China poses a different type of nuclear threat. Chinese leaders recognize that they have now become a global, rather than regional, economic power. To advance to true superpower status, China must become a global military power as well. Thus, it has embarked upon a huge strategic-modernization program, ranging from space warfare and cyberwar capabilities to aircraft carriers and--most notably--nuclear weapons. The latter include greater numbers of advanced, high-yield strategic missiles with increased range to reach US targets, as well as nuclear antiship missiles. An early Chinese objective calls for gaining full access to the Pacific through control of Taiwan, doing so peaceably if possible but through force if necessary. Since the United States has aligned itself to oppose such an action militarily, China intends to make any US action so extremely costly that we will opt for international pressure rather than armed combat.




YES – RUSSIA BUILDUP

Russia is developing its capabilities now -- multiple warrants.Monroe 9 (Robert, retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, “A Perfect Storm over Nuclear Weapons”, September 1, Air and Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/monroe.html)Nuclear-weapon threats to the United States and its allies have steadily increased over the past 20 years, but because they're so different from the global thermonuclear threat of the Cold War, they have gone virtually unnoticed.

Russia tops the list. First, it is still the only nation capable of destroying the United States. Second,

Russia must increase its nuclear-weapons capability, as this is the only reason for its being considered a superpower. Third, over the past decade, the Russians have changed their military strategy to one based on

the early use of nuclear weapons in all military conflicts, large or small. Fourth, they have preserved thousands of Cold War-era tactical nuclear weapons--a force unmatched by any Western power. Fifth, they have a robust, active industrial base for producing nuclear weapons. Sixth, for two decades, they have focused on researching, developing, testing, designing, and producing advanced, highly usable nuclear weapons: very low yield, radiation intensive, and relatively "clean" but still immensely destructive. Seventh, they plan to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in several ways, including the launching of cruise missiles from submarines. The US-Russian nuclear arms-control treaty now being negotiated to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) covers none of these tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, Russia is modernizing its strategic nuclear forces.




YES – ROGUE STATE/TERRORIST THREAT

Rogue states are a huge threat – even if they won’t attack, they will sell nuclear arsenals to terroristsMonroe 9 (Robert, retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and former director of the Defense Nuclear Agency, “A Perfect Storm over Nuclear Weapons”, September 1, Air and Space Power Journal, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/fal09/monroe.html)Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and it is modernizing them. Its political situation is so unstable that those 100-odd weapons could soon fall into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists, for many of whom

America is the principal target. North Korea and Iran are rogue states, well on their way to becoming nuclear-weapon powers, and, to date, the world has chosen not to stop them. The North Koreans have already conducted two nuclear-weapon tests, and if they successfully begin production of capable weapons, they would probably sell them to any state or organization able to pay. Iran may have a year or two to go

before production, but once that occurs, it could very well transfer weapons to terrorist organizations (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda) for proxy attacks on the West.




YES – NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Nuclear terrorisms high probability. Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.) is Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, focuses on nuclear nonproliferation, missile defense, military policy, nuclear terrorism, and related national security issues. 2011 (“A Joint Study on Nuclear Proliferation,” The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Accessed online at http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/a_joint_study_on_nuclear_terrorism/, Accessed on 7/29/11)On June 6, 2011, the Belfer Center at Harvard University released the results of a year-long study entitled “The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism”. The study is significant because, between them, the U.S. and Russia possess about 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons and weapons grade nuclear materials that terrorists could use to make crude but highly destructive nuclear explosive devices. Shortly after the report was

released, President Obama announced the continuation of the National Emergency, initially declared in 2000, regarding the large volume of weapons-usable fissile materials in Russia in multiple locations, subject to diversion or theft. The joint study warns of a persistent danger that terrorists could obtain or produce nuclear explosive devices and employ them with catastrophic consequences, and that the threat is increasing due to globalization and the proliferation of technical knowledge. “If current approaches toward eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and resolve,” the study report warns, “the question will become not if but when, and on what scale, the first act of nuclear terrorism occurs.” The study states that making a nuclear

bomb is potentially within the capabilities of a “technically sophisticated terrorist group.” But the UN Terrorism Prevention Office warned as early as 2001 that there were some 130 terrorist groups capable of developing a home-made nuclear bomb if they could obtain highly enriched uranium or plutonium. The “catastrophic” result of a nuclear attack would not be limited to the resultant loss of life and massive destruction, the study notes, but it also would produce international psychological trauma and widespread political and economic chaos. Both presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have recognized that the greatest threat to U.S. and international security is a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. This prompts the question as to why, especially after 9/11 and the explicit threats posed by terrorist organizations, “current approaches” are inadequate, as the report concludes. The study identifies two principal reasons: secrecy on the part of nation states that want to protect their sovereignty and, the most significant barrier, a widespread attitude of complacency. Issues of sovereignty and security have limited the participation of several states including China, Pakistan and India, as well as North Korea and Iran, and probably at least to some extent also the United States. There’s no doubt, however, that complacency has been a major factor in the lack of urgency in dealing with the issue of nuclear terrorism by many nations, including the United States. It’s too easy to consider what has not yet occurred, such as a terrorist nuclear attack, to be unlikely or even far-

fetched. President Obama broke the previous mold of half-hearted efforts to prevent terrorists from obtaining fissionable materials that they could use to fashion nuclear explosive devices. He announced in his comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation speech in Prague in 2009 that he would lead an effort to secure these materials world-wide in four years. He followed up this pledge a year later by holding a Nuclear Security Summit with some 47 other countries, which resulted in a work plan and commitments by participating nations to specific actions in the furtherance of that goal. Unfortunately,

however, the United States Congress does not share the President’s sense of urgency.

Terrorists can acquire nuclear materials.Jen Talley, staff writer for Avvo, 3/23/11 (“Could Terrorists Easily Buy a Nuclear Bomb?” Accessed online at http://nakedlaw.avvo.com/2011/03/could-terrorists-easily-buy-a-nuclear-bomb/, Accessed on 7/29/11)A more likely possibility, according to these same experts, is that a terrorist group could acquire raw materials to produce their own nuclear device. It’s unlikely terrorists would have the materials and expertise needed

to covertly make their own HEU and plutonium, which leaves the possibility of theft and illegal purchase. Unfortunately HEU and plutonium are not always as secured as one might expect, and there is no global inventory of these materials. Most sites have state-of-the-art security, but some HEU storage facilities, particularly in places such as India, Pakistan, and former Soviet states, don’t have much more than a security guard and a chain-link fence. The WikiLeaks cables revealed one site in Yemen where weapons-grade radioactive material was sitting in a building

with a broken security camera and no guard. The International Atomic Energy Agency has documented 15 confirmed cases of HEU or plutonium theft, in addition to other unconfirmed reports. In most of these cases,


http://www-ns.iaea.org/

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/12/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-security-fears

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8615484.stm

http://nakedlaw.avvo.com/2011/03/could-terrorists-easily-buy-a-nuclear-bomb/

http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/a_joint_study_on_nuclear_terrorism/

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 229thieves were attempting to sell the material to the highest bidder. Al-Qaeda has been actively seeking nuclear material, according to some reports, for nearly 20 years. Fortunately there is no evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.

Terrorists can get the bomb – Pakistan, North Korea, or the Black Market BBC News 4/12/10 (“Could terrorists get hold of a nuclear bomb?” BBC News, Accessed online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8615484.stm, Accessed on 7/29/11)Three months later, a commission set up by the US Congress warned that without decisive action it was "more likely than not" that a terrorist attack involving WMD would occur by the end of 2013. Pakistan

In Rolf Mowatt-Larssen's view, there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world".

The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding. Once a new plutonium reactor comes on line in the near future "smaller, more lethal plutonium bombs will be produced in greater numbers", he says.

The possibility of a Taliban takeover is, he admits, a "worst-case scenario". But the Taliban and al-Qaeda are not the only shadows on the Pakistani landscape. There is also the Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group, which is accused of carrying out the Mumbai attack in November 2008, and like the Pakistani officer corps, recruits

mostly in the Punjab. "As one senior Pakistani general once told me," wrote Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution last week,

"the relationship between the army and the Lashkar-e-Taiba is a family affair". He went on: "Pakistan has

taken serious measures to protect the crown jewels of its national security, but it lives in a perilous time. If there is a nightmare

nuclear security scenario in Pakistan today it is probably an inside-the-family-job that ends up in a nuclear armageddon in India."

The point is echoed by Ian Kearns of the British American Security Information Council (Basic), who writes of the danger that states could use terrorist groups to attack adversaries "by proxy", engineering nuclear security breakdowns to facilitate terrorist access to weapons or materials. BBC correspondents say there is every indication that the Pakistani military is in total control of the country's nuclear facilities. North Korea The reason North Korea keeps Rolf Mowatt-Larssen awake at night is connected

with the mysterious site at al-Kibar in Syria, destroyed by Israeli missiles in 2007. It's his view that North Korea was helping Syria build a reactor there and that the outside world only found out because of a "windfall of intelligence". "Taking into account the sobering reality that Kim Jong-il came close to providing Syria with the building blocks for nuclear weapons... how confident can the international community be that there is not a long-running 'AQ Kim' network in North Korea that is analogous to the AQ Khan rogue state nuclear supplier network in Pakistan?" he asks. The episode showed, in his view, that it is hard enough for the intelligence community to spot state-related clandestine nuclear activity, let alone clandestine nuclear trafficking of non-state actors, which would have a much smaller footprint. North Korea's "erratic and irresponsible behaviour" makes it a leading potential source for terrorists seeking to acquire nuclear-related technologies and materials, he says. Al-Qaeda Though he now works in

academia, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen led US efforts to determine whether al-Qaeda possessed a nuclear bomb, in the wake of 9/11. He

doesn't believe it does. But "the group's long-held intent and persistent efforts to acquire nuclear and biological weapons represent a unique means of potentially fulfilling their wildest hopes and aspirations," he writes. Al-Qaeda's experience on the nuclear black market has taught its planners that its best chance lies in constructing an "improvised nuclear device (IND)," he says. For this they would need either a quantity of plutonium or 25kg-50kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), the size of one or two grapefruits. HEU is held in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries. "Security measures for many of these stocks are excellent, but security for others is appalling," according to a report published in 2008 by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The IAEA registered 15 confirmed cases of unauthorised possession of plutonium or HEU between 1993 and 2008, a few of which involved kilogram-sized quantities. In most cases the quantity was far lower but in some cases the sellers indicated there was more. (If there was, it

hasn't been traced.) There is no global inventory of either material, so no-one can be sure how much has gone missing over the years. Neither are there agreed international standards for security and accounting of these materials. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 merely calls for "appropriate and effective" measures,

without defining this in detail. "It is a stark and worrying fact, therefore, that nuclear materials and weapons


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8615484.stm

http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-13/us/nuclear.terrorists_1_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-material-al-qaeda?_s=PM:US

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 230around the world are not as secure as they should be," writes Ian Kearns, in his Basic report. The main goal of the

Washington summit is to make progress on this issue.

Nuclear terrorism is feasible -- crushes the global economy Matthew Bunn, an Associate Professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and Col-Gen. E.P. Maslin director of ANO “Aspect-Conversion” specializing in the upgrade of physical protection systems at Russian nuclear hazardous facilities within the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and Global Partnership, 3/11/10 (“All Stocks of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials Worldwide Must be Protected Against Global Terrorist Threats,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, Accessed online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/all-stocks-of-weapons-usable-material-eng.pdf, Accessed on 7/29/11)Several unfortunate facts shape the risk the world faces. First, some terrorists are actively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, and the plutonium or HEU needed to make them. Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction a "religious duty", and al-Qaeda operatives have attempted to buy nuclear material and recruit nuclear expertise. Two senior

Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists associated with Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) network, for example, personally met with bin

Laden and Zawahiri to discuss nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, which launched the nerve

gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, also sought nuclear weapons. There is clear evidence that Chechen terrorists have pursued

radiological "dirty bombs," and at least suggestive indications of their interest in actual nuclear bombs as well -- and there are deep

links between some Chechen terrorist factions and al Qaeda. With at least two terrorist groups having pursued nuclear weapons in the last two decades, the world should not expect that they will be the last. Second, repeated assessments by the U.S. government and other governments have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear explosive -- capable of destroying the heart of a major city -- if they got enough plutonium or HEU. A "gun-type" bomb made from HEU, in particular, is basically a matter of slamming two pieces of HEU together at high speed. One study by the now-defunct congressional

Office of Technology Assessment summarized the technical reality: "A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device... Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required." Indeed, even before the revelations from Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence

concluded that "fabrication of at least a 'crude' nuclear device was within al-Qa'ida's capabilities, if it could obtain fissile material."

The hardest part of making a nuclear bomb is producing the needed plutonium or HEU -- a task that took up more than 90% of the

effort in the U.S. Manhattan Project. Making their own nuclear material is almost certainly beyond terrorist nuclear capabilities --

so if the stocks controlled by states can be appropriately secured and kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be prevented. It is important to understand that making a crude, unsafe, unreliable bomb of uncertain yield that might be carried in the back of a large van is a dramatically simpler task than designing and building a safe, secure, reliable, and efficient weapon deliverable by a ballistic missile, which a

state might want to incorporate into its arsenal. Terrorists are highly unlikely to ever be able to make a sophisticated and efficient

weapon, a task that requires a substantial nuclear weapons enterprise -- but they may well be able to make a crude one. Their task would be easier if they managed to recruit knowledgeable help, which they have been actively attempting to do. Third, there is a real risk that terrorists could get the plutonium or HEU needed to make a nuclear bomb. Important weaknesses in nuclear security arrangements still exist in many countries, creating weaknesses that outsider or insider thieves might exploit. HEU-fueled research reactors, for example, sometimes located on university campuses, often have only the most minimal security measures in place. One recent review of research reactors that had received U.S.-sponsored security upgrades identified research reactors that were wholly dependent on off-site response forces to respond to a theft attempt, but had never exercised the capabilities of those forces; a reactor that conducted no search of vehicles leaving the site for potential nuclear contraband; a reactor for which the national regulatory agency had not established any nuclear security requirements; and a reactor where no background checks were performed before allowing access to nuclear material. In countries such as Pakistan, even substantial nuclear security systems are challenged by immense adversary threats, both from nuclear insiders - some with a demonstrated sympathy for Islamic extremists - and from outside attacks that might include scores or hundreds of armed attackers. In the end, all countries where these materials exist - including the

United States and Russia - must regularly reassess whether the security they have in place is sufficient to meet the evolving threat. As a result of such security weaknesses, there have been 18 incidents of theft or loss of HEU or separated plutonium confirmed to the IAEA by the states concerned. Most recently, in February 2006, Russian citizen Oleg


http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/all-stocks-of-weapons-usable-material-eng.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 231Khinsagov was arrested in Georgia (along with three Georgian accomplices) with 79.5 grams of 89% enriched HEU, claiming that he had kilograms more available for sale. What we do not know, of course, is how many thefts may have occurred that were never detected; it is a sobering fact that nearly all of the stolen HEU and plutonium that has been seized over the years had never been missed before it was seized. There have also been alarming intrusions. In 2007, for example, at the Pelindaba nuclear facility in South Africa, where hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade HEU are located, two teams of armed men attacked from opposite sides of the site: one of the teams got through a 10,000-volt security fence, disabled intrusion detectors

without detection, proceeded to the emergency control center (where they shot one of the workers on duty), and spent 45 minutes inside the guarded perimeter without ever being engaged by site security forces. Fourth, it would be extremely difficult to stop terrorists from smuggling nuclear material or a crude nuclear weapon to its target. A nuclear bomb might be delivered, intact or in ready-to-assemble pieces, by boat or aircraft or truck. The length of national borders, the diversity of means of transport, the vast scale of legitimate traffic across borders, and the ease of shielding the radiation from plutonium or especially from HEU all operate in favor of the terrorists. Building the overall system of legal infrastructure, intelligence, law enforcement, border and customs forces, and radiation detectors needed to find and recover stolen nuclear weapons or materials, or to interdict these as they cross national borders, is an extraordinarily difficult challenge. Fifth, even a single terrorist nuclear bomb would be a catastrophe that would change history. The heart of a major city could be reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin, leaving tens or hundreds of thousands of people dead. Terrorists -- either those who committed the

attack or others -- would probably claim they had more bombs already hidden in other cities (whether they did nor not), and the fear that this might be true could lead to panicked evacuations, creating widespread havoc and economic disruption. Some countries may feel that nuclear terrorism is really only a concern

for the countries most likely to be the targets, such as the United States. In reality, however, such an event would cause devastating economic aftershocks throughout the world -- global effects that in 2005 then-UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan warned would push "tens of millions of people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing world."



YES – NUCLEAR WINTER

Nuclear winter theory is true – their experts rely on limited, outdated expertsRobock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)The resulting cold, dark, and dry conditions at the surface would prevent agriculture for years. Mass starvations in Africa, but without any outside help, now seemed more appropriate models for the world after nuclear war than Hiroshima or Nagasaki. More people could die in India or China from a nuclear war, even if no bombs were dropped there, than would die in the United States and Russia combined. That work was limited by existing climate models and computers, but the fundamental physics of the situation, that blocking out sunlight cools the surface, was unquestioned. The biggest unknown was how much smoke would be produced and how long it would remain in the atmosphere. Based on some early experiments with a general circulation model that was limited

in vertical extent and length of runs,12 some (e.g., Ref 13) suggested that nuclear winter theory was disproved. But recent work with modern climate models and computers has shown that nuclear winter theory was correct, and that, in fact, the effects would last for many years, much longer than previously thought.14 The number of nuclear weapons in the world has decreased to 1/3 of the peak number of more than 70,000 in the 1980s, and current treaties call for the global arsenal to be less than 10% of that number by 2012. Yet, if used, even this arsenal could plunge the planet into nuclear winter. Furthermore, nuclear proliferation now presents the problem that a nuclear war between new nuclear states, say India and Pakistan, using much less than 1% of the current global arsenal, could produce so much smoke that, while it would not produce winter conditions in the summer, it could produce global environmental change unprecedented in recorded human history.15

A nuclear attack would burn cities to the ground and kill millionsRobock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. About one-third of the energy of a nuclear explosion is in the form of light or heat. Like a giant match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. The assumption made in many nuclear winter scenarios is that anything receiving more than 10 calories per square centimeter per minute (about 7000 W/m2—20 times the average amount of energy received at the top of Earth's atmosphere from the Sun) will burst into flames, and this was demonstrated in actual tests in Nevada before the atmospheric nuclear test ban. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and other developing countries, providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. Following the flash of light comes the blast wave (like thunder following lightning) which will break apart many structures and blow out the flames, but crumpled structures burn more easily and fires would be reignited by burning embers and electrical sparks. Imagine how easily a house would burn with open gas lines or a filling station with gas pumps knocked over. In fact, there are many flammable sources of fuel for fires in cities, including buildings and their contents, trees, and even asphalt. Modern materials, such as plastics, not only burn with a sooty smoke, but also produce high levels of toxic

chemicals. The direct effects of the nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and extensive pollution would kill millions of people, but only those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. Massive amounts of dark smoke from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10–15 km above Earth's surface in the tropics and 6–8 km above the surface in higher latitudes, and then absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the smoke would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out. The climatic effects of the use of nuclear weapons depend on the amount of smoke they would generate, and this depends on the targets. Nuclear targeting plans call for not only cities to be targeted, but also industrial facilities such as oil refineries and wells. Forests around military targets would also provide fuel. All these targets together would produce clouds of black sooty smoke, which rise into the atmosphere.

Nuclear winter would destroy food supplies and have devastating health effects on the few survivorsRobock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 233The most important consequence of nuclear winter for humans is the disruption of food supplies.8 This comes from environmental disruptions that reduce or completely wipe out agricultural production and the disruption of the distribution mechanisms. However, there has been no new work on this subject since the 1980s. This is an area where new research, using scenarios of climate change from recent simulations,14,15 would provide more specific information on impacts, so the following conclusions are rather general. Not only would it be virtually impossible to grow food for 4–5 years after a 150-Mt nuclear holocaust, but it would also be impossible to obtain food from other countries. In addition to the disruption of food, there would be many other stresses for any surviving people. These would include the lack of medical supplies and personnel, high levels of pollution and radioactivity, psychological stress, rampant diseases and epidemics, and enhanced UV-B.

Nuclear winter would destroy agriculture – Asia, Africa, and South America would last 1-2 months before dying of starvationRobock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)There are many ways that agriculture is vulnerable to nuclear winter. The cold and the dark alone are sufficient to kill many crops. Superimposed on the average cooling would be large variations. During the summer of 1816 in New England, there were killing frosts in each summer month.30 Only 1 day with the temperatures below freezing is enough to kill rice crops. Colder temperatures mean shorter growing seasons, and also slower maturation of crops; the combination results in much lower yields. Most of the grains that are grown in midlatitudes, such as corn, are actually of tropical origin, and will only grow in summer-like conditions. For example, a study done in Canada shows that with summer temperatures only 3°C below normal, spring wheat production would halt.8 Insufficient precipitation would also make agriculture difficult. The tremendous productivity of the grain belt of the US and Canada feeds not only those countries but also many in the rest of the world where normal climate variability often results in reduced harvests. This productivity is the result of modern farming techniques that allow a tiny percentage of the population to produce more than enough for the rest. To do this, tremendous energy subsidies are needed. Farmers depend on fuel for their machinery, fertilizer, and pesticides, none of which would be available or distributed in the aftermath of a war. Furthermore, insects have a higher tolerance for radiation and the stresses that would follow than do their predators, such as birds. Whatever might grow would be eaten by pests, already a significant problem in today's production. Also, the seeds that are in use were designed to yield high productivity assuming the current climate and inputs of chemicals and energy as discussed above. These seeds would not grow well in a radically altered growing environment. Our dependence on technology is such that if every human in the US went out to the fields to try to raise crops with manual labor, and if they knew what they were doing, and if they had enough food to eat, and if they were healthy, they still could not produce what is produced today. Thus, most of the world's people are threatened with starvation following a full-scale nuclear war. The number that would survive depends on how much food is in storage and how much could be produced locally. Earlier studies of

various countries around the world conclude that even with extremely optimistic assumptions of perfect distribution systems within countries,8 that each person who will survive becomes a vegetarian and eats the minimum needed for survival, and the others waste none of the food, that nations in Asia, Africa and South America could only last 1–2 months. In many nations, people would be reduced to a hunter/gatherer existence with nothing to hunt and precious little to gather.

Survivors will be subject to countless health problems and oceans will be unusable from the decimation of phytoplanktonRobock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)The effects on health would add to the misery. Immune deficiencies can be produced by any of the following: burns and trauma, radioactivity, malnutrition, psychological stress, and UV-B radiation. All

of these would be present for the survivors in the target nations. Pollution from dioxins, PCBs, asbestos, and other chemicals

will make the air unhealthy to breath. Severe psychological stress will prevent the survivors from making the efforts to continue to exist. One might think that the ocean shore would be a good place to survive because

the temperatures would not fall as much, and there would be plenty of food to catch. Although the ocean would not cool very fast, the darkness would decimate the phytoplankton, which are at the base of the oceanic food chain. That, combined with toxic and radioactive pollution, would severely limit the food sources in the oceans. Furthermore, the large temperature contrasts between the oceans and the land would produce strong storms that would make fishing difficult at best.



OIL SHOCKS IMPACT

Oil shocks devastate the economy, collapse global trade and guarantee escalation. Cook et al 10 – Malcolm, East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010, MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, Andrew Shearer, “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures,” http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futures_-_final_version.pdf)Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, is dependent on energy originating in the world’s most turbulent region, the Middle East. Indeed, the combination of instability and war in the Middle East (and the

possibility of more ahead), together with Asia’s increasing dependence on that volatile region, has reaffirmed the salience of energy as an issue with potentially deep implications for Asia’s future security order. Today, the level of oil production in the Middle East is relatively flat and the discovery and development of new fields is progressing unevenly. With renewable sources of energy many years away from

becoming a viable replacement for hydrocarbon-based fuels, concerns about the scarcity of energy resources have the potential to engender both competition and cooperation among the major powers of Asia. In

regional terms, Asia is already the world’s largest consumer of energy, with between 70-80 per cent of imported oil coming directly from the Middle East. Approximately half of China’s oil supply originates in the Middle

East. India, despite importing considerably less by volume, relies on this region for over 60 per cent of its total oil imports. At almost 85 and 90 percent repectively, Japan and South Korea (with their heavily industrial economies) depend on the

Middle East to an even greater extent. While the United States relies on imports from the Middle East to a far lesser extent, it nevertheless continues to underpin security in both regions – Asia and the Middle East –

and across the sea lanes that connect them. What would the implications be for Asia of an acute crisis in the Middle East, resulting in prolonged disruptions to the steady supply of oil? 10 Of course much would depend on the specific nature of the crisis – the way it started, its chief protagonists, duration, and the means by which it was resolved. 108 Nevertheless, it is possible

to draw a few general, if speculative, conclusions. Perhaps the most immediate and pronounced effect of a major disruption in the flow of oil would be serious economic upheaval throughout the region, manifest in a collapse in production and trade and either the gradual or rapid reversal of regional economic integration . Massive inflation – not only in the price of oil, but all goods which need to be shipped – could quickly result in slowing GDP growth, higher unemployment, poverty, diminished investment and lower asset values. Social unrest and international

political stability would be likely to ensue. For China in particular, this would pose a severe challenge, compromising both the strength of its regional position and at the same time undermining the basis of its leadership’s claim to internal legitimacy. If, as the previous chapter suggested, the response to this might be to fan the flames of Chinese nationalism by adopting a more assertive regional posture – a way of compensating for its economic underperformance – the prospects for an Asian concert would be greatly diminished as new tensions either reinforce the status quo – US primacy – or usher in a more contested balance of power. On the other hand, there are strong forces for cooperation when it comes to energy. Despite its military modernisation and efforts to diversify supply, China’s energy supplies from the Middle East and North Africa are vulnerable to interdiction. Japan also outsources its energy security to the United States. As a consequence of their continued dependence on the United States to provide access to oil markets and freedom of passage across vital sea lanes, all the major powers of Asia – China, Japan, even India – have strong incentives to promote a cooperative approach to energy security and to maintain stable, working relationships. Furthermore, any breakdown in the global supply of oil will mean a concomitant rise in the cost of oil for all importing countries. A self-defeating ‘energy security dilemma’ could

arise as each country tries to secure its energy resources, thereby intensifying competition in world energy markets, and in turn increasing the salience of national energy security strategies. 109 As a region, Asia’s general interest promises to be best served by enhancing cooperation and coordination to preserve open access to global oil markets. Indeed, nascent counter-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden 110 reflect the possibilities inherent in a more cooperative approach to energy security. Another possible outcome to a prolonged oil shortage, especially in the wake of such a crisis, would be a general attempt among the powers of Asia to bolster their political and military influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, to position themselves more favourably should similar circumstances arise in future. Japan and South Korea have been pursuing major

investment in Middle Eastern oilfields and operations to produce natural gas for many years now. China meanwhile has already cultivated what it describes as a ‘strategic oil partnership’ with Saudi Arabia; it is a major arms supplier in the region and its close ties with Iran have already begun to impede Sino-US relations, as

Washington struggles to gain or sustain Beijing’s support for more extensive sanctions against Iran in relation to its ongoing nuclear program (itself a potential catalyst for just such a crisis). India is also a major importer of Saudi oil.


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 236To be sure, China is not yet capable of becoming a major strategic challenger in the Middle East, lacking as it does the necessary force-projection assets. For the foreseeable future, therefore, it is likely to rely on its partnerships to dilute the singularity of US primacy in that critical region. Nevertheless, as its power and influence expand, China might seek out a much more prominent role in the Middle East – a development that the United States is not only likely to resist in the Middle East, but potentially in Asia and other parts of the world as well. Once again, this

would most likely hasten the emergence of a balance of power. Finally, the most serious risk of a serious oil crisis is that it might unleash an intense security competition in Asia itself. This scenario has an unfortunate historical

basis. It was concern for the security of its energy supplies, especially in the wake of Washington’s oil embargo (1941), which in part motivated Japan to occupy oilfields in maritime Southeast Asia in World War II. To what extent does the rise of China, with its rapidly expanding power and growing dependence on foreign energy

supplies, portend the renewal of intense competition over energy in the coming decades? Perhaps the most serious risk is that China’s efforts to secure and consolidate its oil supply will arouse the insecurity of other regional powers. 111 China has expansive claims in the South and East China Seas, through which a great proportion of Japan’s energy is transported. Furthermore, as China’s energy dependence intensifies, as the price of energy increases with continued demand, and as new uncertainties emerge regarding freedom of access, the capacity to at least deny the use of sea lanes that connect the Persian Gulf to the Pacific will become a more urgent strategic priority for a number of regional navies.



Prolif and NPT File

--- Prolif ---....................................................................................................................................... 1***Prolif Good***............................................................................................................................ 1Impact – Democracy....................................................................................................................... 1Impact – Deterrence....................................................................................................................... 1Impact – Prevents Bioweapons.......................................................................................................5***Prolif Bad***.............................................................................................................................. 7Impact – Arms Race........................................................................................................................ 8Impact – Miscalc............................................................................................................................. 9Impact – Terrorism....................................................................................................................... 10Heg Solves Prolif.......................................................................................................................... 12Prolif O/W Nuclear War................................................................................................................13***No Prolif***.............................................................................................................................. 15No Loose Nukes............................................................................................................................ 16No Prolif....................................................................................................................................... 17--- NPT ---...................................................................................................................................... 20***NPT Good***............................................................................................................................ 22AT: NPT Failing............................................................................................................................ 23Compliance K2 NPT...................................................................................................................... 26US Key.......................................................................................................................................... 27***NPT Bad***.............................................................................................................................. 29Fails.............................................................................................................................................. 30Increases Prolif............................................................................................................................. 33No Impact..................................................................................................................................... 36



--- Prolif ---



***Prolif Good***



Impact – Democracy

Prolif key to democracy and regime change.Hitchens, ’11[Christopher Hitchens; “Stop nuclear proliferation: Support democracy;” published in Slate Magazine, 5/31/2011; Lexis Nexis] JayIt's very unpleasant to be given lectures on good behaviour by the profiteers of nuclear proliferation, but if you can hold still and swallow your vomit, there are lessons to be learned from the exposure to it. On April 27, The New York Times ran a long interview with Aisha el-Gaddafi, daughter of the "King of Kings" and rabid demagogue. Having served as a member of Saddam Hussein's legal defence team -an experience that seems to have taught her little -she had just had the experience of being referred to the International Criminal Court. In between various claims about the traitorous nature of the rebellious Libyans, she managed to insert

an interesting retrospective claim about the past: She complained of the "betrayal" of Arabs whose causes her father had supported and the Western allies to whom he had turned over his weapons of mass destruction. "Is this the reward that we get?" she asked. "This would lead every country that has weapons of mass destruction to keep them or make more so they will not meet the same fate as Libya." Then last weekend, in an article written for Newsweek that did not even touch upon his role in selling nuclear

weaponry to third countries, Pakistan's notorious A.Q. Khan made a similar point, if point it is: "Don't overlook the fact that no nuclear-capable country has been subjected to aggression or occupied, or had its borders redrawn. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently. If we had had nuclear capability before 1971, we would not have lost half of our country -present-day Bangladesh -after disgraceful defeat." Both of the shady characters I have just quoted are, of course, engaged in special pleading. (The shudder-inducing Khan even calmly invites us to think of how Pakistan could have improved upon its conventional-weapons genocide against the Bangladeshis and threatened to level Indian cities into the bargain.) But in various

forms, this argument has gotten itself repeated in more respectable forums as well. The vastly

overrated Mohamed ElBaradei, in his new book The Age of Deception, attributes almost all rogue-state nuclear delinquency to the arrogance of the United States. The Libyan stockpile, for example -the entire

existence of which he managed to miss during his tenure at the International Atomic Energy Agency -was "really" acquired in response to the April 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli. He speaks of a meeting with Gaddafi in which the latter "spoke earnestly of his desire to develop Libya." George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a brilliant review of ElBaradei's book, also cites his blissful naïveté about Iran and North Korea. Learning that senior Iranian mullahs planned to go after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad if he came to any agreement with Washington, he commented: "I sighed. Tehran had been spending way too much time following D.C. politics, I thought." The regime of Kim Jong-il, meanwhile, is "isolated, impoverished, feeling deeply threatened by the United States but nonetheless defiant." Defiant enough, certainly, to test one of its missiles by firing it without warning across the mainland of nonnuclear Japan, there to "splash down" in the Pacific. Is it seriously

argued that this whole loosely connected nexus would conduct itself more rationally if the United States adopted a more lenient strategy and showed more awareness of the needs and dreads that prompt dictators to go nuclear? We know one thing for sure. No state has ever surrendered its program without having to face the gritty question of regime change. It can do this either voluntarily, or it can do so under compulsion. The two great first instances are Brazil and South Africa, two very influential countries that had gone a long way on the nuclear road in the final Cold War years, only to decide that the nukes were an obstacle to their integration into the warmer and closer global family. (A "swords into ploughshares" sculpture, fashioned from parts of an abandoned nuclear weapon, was presented to the offices of the IAEA in Vienna in 1994.) Nobody ever threatened either Brazil or South Africa with outside force. Rather, denuclearization was a part of the agreed democratic transformation of both former dictatorships. Turning from carrot to stick, the insane refusal of Saddam Hussein to come into compliance with the UN resolutions meant that his country was forcibly and comprehensively "inspected." This in turn led Libya to approach British prime minister Tony Blair and president George W. Bush for a handover (of large stockpiles of materiel, not so much of finished or usable weaponry). Inspection of this trove led to the realization that a good deal of it could only have come from America's Pakistani "ally." As a result, the A.Q. Khan network -which had also had dealings with North Korea and probably Syria, and also escaped the attention of and the IAEA -was identified and partially shut down. In counterproliferation terms, this process ought to be credited as something of a success. The same goes for Israel's recent obliteration of a secret Syrian site -since belatedly confirmed by the IAEA as a nuclear facility -without even a squeal of protest from an embarrassed Syrian President Bashir Assad. In studying the remaining cases, it's impossible not to notice the continuing connection between the weapons programs and the character of the regime. North Korea's nukes are the perfect symbol of its own stunted, starved, isolated character and of its continued willingness to risk an apocalyptic outcome on the peninsula. The Iranian program is clearly designed to forward the mullahs' policy of regional military blackmail (and probably also to gratify some of their less rational impulses of Messianism and anti-Semitism). But North Korea is already in a position to destroy much of South Korea with conventional weapons alone, and Tehran can, and does, easily threaten smaller Gulf states with its existing military forces. Pakistan can continue to menace India with its own arsenal, but it is vulnerable to an annihilating second strike from New Delhi that would obliterate it as a state. Thus, the course of future confrontation and potential blackmail has already been determined, but by the dictatorships themselves. It is wrong for Aisha Gaddafi and A.Q. Khan to imply that the threats come from the other direction, or that nuclear arsenals can or will underwrite the security of such dictatorships indefinitely. (That logic, after all, would license a pre-emptive strike on Tehran's nuclear facilities.)

The possession of illegally acquired nuclear weapons remains a huge threat and burden to neighbouring states and to international law, but history shows that it is also nearly


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 243insupportable for the offending state and has a long-run tendency to shorten the lifespan of its despots. It's a good thing that, so far, disarmament and democratization have shown themselves to be natural allies.



Impact – Deterrence

Nuclear proliferation ensures deterrence – risk calculus assumes annihilationWaltz ’81 (Kenneth, Adelphi Papers, Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm) RA

Certainty about the relative strength of adversaries also improves the prospects for peace. From the late nineteenth century onwards the speed of technological innovation increased the difficulty of estimating relative strengths and predicting the course of campaigns. Since World War II, technology has advanced even faster, but short of an antiballistic

missile (ABM) breakthrough, this does not matter very much. It does not disturb the American-Russian equilibrium because one side's missiles are not made obsolete by improvements in the other side's missiles. In 1906 the British Dreadnought, with the greater range and fire power of its guns, made older battleships obsolete. This does not happen to missiles. As Bernard Brodie put it: 'Weapons that do not have to fight their like do not become useless because of the advent of newer and superior types”. They do have to survive their like, but that is a much simpler problem to solve (see discussion below). Many wars might have been avoided had their outcomes been foreseen. 'To be sure,' Georg Simmel once said, ‘the most effective presupposition for preventing struggle, the exact knowledge of the comparative strength of the two parties, is very often only to be obtained by the actual fighting out of

the conflict'. Miscalculation causes wars. One side expects victory at an affordable price, while the other side hopes to avoid defeat. Here the differences between conventional-multipolar and nuclear-bipolar worlds are fundamental. In the former, states are too often tempted to act on advantages that are wishfully discerned and narrowly calculated. In 1914, neither Germany nor France tried very hard to avoid a general war. Both hoped for victory even though they believed their forces to be quite evenly matched. In 1941, Japan, in attacking the United States, could hope for victory only if a series of events that were possible but not highly probable took place. Japan would grab resources sufficient for continuing the conquest of China and then dig in to defend a limited perimeter. Meanwhile, the United States and Britain would have to deal with Germany, which, having defeated the Soviet Union, would be supreme in Europe. Japan could then hope to fight a defensive war for a year or two

until America, her purpose weakened, became willing to make a compromise peace in Asia. Countries more readily run the risks of war when defeat, if it comes, is distant and is expected to bring only limited damage. Given such expectations, leaders do not have to be insane to sound the trumpet and urge their people to be bold and courageous in the pursuit of victory. The outcome of battles and the course of campaigns are hard to foresee because so many things affect them, including the shifting allegiance and determination of alliance members. Predicting the result of conventional wars has proved difficult. Uncertainty about outcomes does not work decisively against the fighting of wars in conventional worlds.

Countries armed with conventional weapons go to war knowing that even in defeat their suffering will be limited. Calculations about nuclear war are differently made. Nuclear worlds call for and encourage a different kind of reasoning. If countries armed with nuclear weapons go to war, they do so knowing that their suffering may be unlimited. Of course, it also may not be. But that is not the kind of uncertainty that encourages anyone to use force. In a

conventional world, one is uncertain about winning or losing. In a nuclear world, one is uncertain about surviving or being annihilated. If force is used and not kept within limits, catastrophe will result. That prediction is easy to make because it does not require close estimates of opposing forces. The number of one's cities that can be severely damaged is at least equal to the number of strategic warheads an adversary can deliver. Variations of number mean little within wide ranges. The expected effect of the deterrent achieves an easy clarity because wide margins of error in estimates of probable damage do not matter. Do we expect to lose one city or two, two

cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start worrying about how to avoid them. In a conventional world, deterrent threats are ineffective because the damage threatened is distant, limited, and problematic. Nuclear weapons make military miscalcu lations difficult and politically pertinent pre diction easy.

Deterring rogue states is impossible – prolif allows allies to arm themselves for defense.Carpenter, ‘4 – vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute[Ted Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute, and Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas; “Not All Forms of Nuclear Proliferation Are Equally Bad;” published 11/21/2004; http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=2886#] Jay

The conventional wisdom is that all instances of nuclear weapons proliferation threaten the stability of the international system and the security interests of the United States. Indeed, that is the underlying logic of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, adopted by the bulk of the international community in the late 1960s, which is the centerpiece of the existing nonproliferation system. Members of the arms control community have over the decades spent an enormous amount of time and energy agonizing over the possibility that stable, democratic status quo powers such as Germany, Japan, Sweden and South Korea might decide to abandon the treaty and develop nuclear weapons. Indeed, they have devoted at least as much attention to that problem as they have to the prospect that unstable or aggressive states might build nuclear arsenals. The recent flap over the small scale (and probably unauthorized) nuclear experiments in South Korea is merely the latest


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 245example of such misplaced priorities. The hostility toward all forms of proliferation is not confined to dovish arms control types but extends across the political spectrum. As the North Korean nuclear crisis evolved in 2002 and 2003, some of the most hawkish members of the U.S. foreign policy community became terrified at the prospect that America's democratic allies in East Asia might build their own nuclear deterrents to offset Pyongyang's moves. Neoconservative luminaries Robert Kagan and William Kristol regarded such proliferation with horror: "The possibility that Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan, might respond to North Korea's actions by producing their own nuclear weapons, thus spurring an East

Asian nuclear arms race . . . is something that should send chills up the spine of any sensible American strategist." That attitude misconstrues the problem. A threat to the peace may exist if an aggressive and erratic regime gets nukes and then is able to intimidate or blackmail its non-nuclear neighbors. Nuclear arsenals in the hands of stable, democratic, status quo powers do not threaten the peace of the region. Kagan and Kristol -- and other Americans who share their hostility toward such countries having nuclear weapons --

implicitly accept a moral equivalence between a potential aggressor and its potential victims. America's current nonproliferation policy is the international equivalent of domestic gun control laws, and exhibits the same faulty logic. Gun control laws have had little effect on preventing criminal elements from acquiring weapons. Instead, they disarm honest citizens and make them more vulnerable to armed predators. The nonproliferation system is having a similar perverse effect. Such unsavory

states as Iran and North Korea are well along on the path to becoming nuclear powers while their more peaceful neighbors are hamstrung by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from countering those moves. The focus of Washington's nonproliferation policy should substitute discrimination and selectivity for uniformity of

treatment. U.S. policymakers must rid themselves of the notion that all forms of proliferation are equally bad. The United States should concentrate on making it difficult for aggressive or unstable regimes to acquire the technology and fissile material needed to develop nuclear weapons. Policymakers must adopt a realistic attitude about the limitations of even that more tightly focused nonproliferation policy. At best, U.S. actions will only delay, not prevent, such states from joining the nuclear weapons club. But delay can provide important benefits. A delay of only a few years may significantly reduce the likelihood that an aggressive power with a new nuclear weapons capability will have a regional nuclear monopoly and be able to blackmail non-nuclear neighbors. In some cases, the knowledge that the achievement of a regional nuclear monopoly is impossible may discourage a would-be expansionist power from

even making the effort. At the very least, it could cause such a power to configure its new arsenal purely for deterrence rather than for aggressive purposes. Washington's nonproliferation efforts should focus on delaying rogue states in their quest for nuclear weapons, not beating up on peaceful states who might want to become nuclear powers for their own protection. The other key objective of a new U.S. proliferation policy should be to prevent unfriendly nuclear states from transferring their weapons or nuclear know-how to terrorist adversaries of the United States. Those objectives are daunting enough without continuing the vain and counterproductive effort to prevent all forms of proliferation.

Mutual suspicion inevitable – proliferation is the only method to deter other nationsWaltz ’81 (Kenneth, Adelphi Papers, Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better,” http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm) RA

States coexist in a condition of anarchy. Self-help is the principle of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way in which states must help themselves is by providing for their own security. Therefore, in weighing the chances for peace, the first questions to ask are questions about the ends for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. The chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without actively using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains. Strategies bring ends and means together. How nuclear weapons affect the chances for peace is seen by considering the possible strategies of

states. Force may be used for offence, for defence, for deterrence, and for coercion. Consider offence first. Germany and France before World War 1 provide a classic case of two adversaries each neglecting its defence and both planning to launch major attacks at the outset of war. France favoured offence over defence, because only by fighting an offensive war could Alsace-Lorraine be reclaimed. This illustrates one purpose of the offence: namely, conquest. Germany favoured offence over defence. believing offence to be the best defence, or even the only defence possible. Hemmed in by two adversaries. she could avoid fighting a two-front war only by concentrating her forces in the West and defeating France before Russia could mobilize and move effectively into battle. This is what the Schlieffen plan called for. The Plan illustrates another purpose of the offence: namely, security. Even if security had been Germany's only goal, an offensive strategy seemed to be the way to obtain it. The offence may have either or both of two aims: conquest and security. An offence may be conducted in either or in some combination of two ways: preventively or pre-emptively. If two countries are unequal in strength and the weaker is gaining, the stronger may be tempted to strike before its advantage is lost. Following this logic, a country with nuclear weapons may be tempted to destroy the nascent force of a hostile country. This would be preventive war, a war launched against a weak country before it can become disturbingly strong. The logic of pre-emption is different. Leaving aside the balance of forces, one country may strike another country's offensive forces to blunt an attack that it presumes is about to be made. If each of two countries can eliminate or drastically reduce the other's offensive forces in one surprise blow, tlien both of them are encouraged to mount sudden attacks, if only for fear that if one

does not, the other will. Mutual vulnerability of forces leads to mutual fear of surprise attack by giving


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 246each power a strong incentive to strike first. French and German plans for war against each other emphasized prevention over preemption - to strike before enemies can become fully ready to fight, but not to strike at their forces in order to destroy them before they can be used to strike back. Whether pre-emptive or preventive, an offensive first strike is a hard one. as

military logic suggests and history confirms Whoever strikes first does so to gain a decisive advantage. A pre-emptive strike is designed to eliminate or decisively reduce the opponent's ability to retaliate. A preventive strike is designed to defeat an adversary before he can develop and deploy his full potential might. Attacks. I should add, are not planned according to military logic alone. Political logic may lead a country another country to attack even in the absence of an expectation

of military victory, as Egypt did in October of 1973. How can one state dissuade another state from attacking? In either or in some combination of two ways. One way to counter an intended attack is to build fortifications and to muster forces

that look forbiddingly strong. To build defences so patently strong that no one will try to destroy or overcome them would make international life perfectly tranquil. I call this the defensive ideal. The other way to inhibit a country's intended aggressive moves is to scare that country out of making them by threatening to visit unacceptable punishment upon it. 'To deter' literally means to stop someone from doing something by frightening him. In contrast to dissuasion by defence, dissuasion by deterrence operates by frightening a state out of attacking, not because of the difficulty of launching an attack and carrying it

home, but because the expected reaction of the attacked will result in one's own severe punishment. Defence and deterrence are often confused. One frequently hears statements like this: 'A strong defence in Europe will deter a

Russian attack'. What is meant is that a strong defence will dissuade Russia from attacking. Deterrence is achieved not through the ability to defend but through the ability to punish. Purely deterrent forces provide no defence. The message of a deterrent strategy is this: 'Although we are defenceless, if you attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains'. Second-strike nuclear forces serve that kind of strategy. Purely defensive forces provide no deterrence. They offer no means of punishment. The message of a defensive strategy is this: 'Although we cannot strike back, you will find our defences so difficult to overcome that you will dash yourself to pieces against them'. The Maginot Line was to serve that kind of strategy.



Impact – Prevents Bioweapons

Containing nuke prolif leads to bioweapons.Cordesman, 2k – Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment and Co-Director of the Middle East program, CSIS[Dr. Andrew Cordesman, Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment and Co-Director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; “Hearing Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;” published 3/28/2000; http://www.iranwatch.org/government/US/Congress/Hearings/sfrc-032800/us-sfrc-cordesman-032800.htm] JayNew, critical technologies are escaping our control. One of the problems I have noticed in US government efforts to analyze

proliferation is that they focus on past and current threats. As result, our studies tend to give primary weight to ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Advances in genetic engineering, biotechnology, medicine, pharmaceuticals, and food processing, however, are making it progressively easier to manufacture biological weapons with nuclear lethalities, to do so under breakout conditions, and do so with little or no warning of the precise nature of the threat. The engines and guidance systems needed for cruise missiles are becoming industrial devices like GPS, sensor-triggered fuses, cluster munitions, drones, crop sprayers, cellular phones interaction with the steady growth in global commerce, shipping, and labor migration to

make covert and proxy attacks steadily more effective. Ironically, controlling ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons alone tends to simply push proliferation into other weapons systems and modes of delivery. Proliferation breeds counterproliferation. I have watched some of the recent US

government efforts to warn our allies in the region about proliferation with some bemusement. Many are counterproductive. Our senior officials rush into the region and issue dramatic warnings about the threat by waving bags of sugar, speaking loudly and in generalizations, showing a few satellite photos, and rushing out. The end result is so unconvincing that each visit produces a new set of conspiracy theories about why we exaggerate the threat. Our military are far more convincing in briefing the seriousness of the threat- when they are allowed to be. At the same time their guidance is to talk about theater missile defenses we do not have and cannot sell, and where we have no clear delivery schedule.


http://www.iranwatch.org/government/US/Congress/Hearings/sfrc-032800/us-sfrc-cordesman-032800.htm


***Prolif Bad***



Impact – Arms Race

Prolif sparks arms race –> extinction.Clinton, ’10 – Secretary of State[Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State; “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies From Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation;” delivered 4/9/2010; http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm] JaySecretary Clinton delivers remarks entitled “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies from Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation” at the University of Louisville as part of the McConnell Center's Spring Lecture Series. Secretary Clinton

said: "I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer. "There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this

danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the United

States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today. "And the United States benefits when the world is stable: our troops can spend more time at home, our companies can make better long-term investments, our allies are free to work with us to address

long-term challenges like poverty and disease. But nuclear proliferation, including the nuclear programs being pursued by North Korea and Iran, are in exact opposition to those goals. Proliferation endangers our forces, our allies, and our broader global interests. And to the extent it pushes other countries to develop nuclear weapons in response, it can threaten the entire international order."


http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm


Impact – Miscalc

Prolif risks immediate miscalc and escalation.ICNND, ‘9 – International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament[Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers;” published 2009; http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf] Jay

3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nucleararmed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use –

involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable

leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes

with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety

and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving

interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.


http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf


Impact – Terrorism

Prolif lets terrorists gain nuke materials – risks extinction.ICNND, ‘9 – International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament[Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers;” published 2009; http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf] Jay

4.1 There is a significant and continuing fear internationally of nuclear terrorism – shared by the public

and decision-makers alike. The UN Secretary-General has labelled nuclear terrorism “one of the most serious threats of our time”. U.S. President Obama has been equally blunt: “There is no graver danger to global security than the threat of nuclear terrorism, and no more immediate task for the international community than to address

that threat.” 4.2 That fear is justified. There are terrorist actors in existence – as the whole world has known since Al Qaeda’s orchestration of 9/11 – who would, if they could, cause massive and indiscriminate havoc in almost any one of the

world’s major cities. And there is every reason to fear that they can match that intent with capability. There is quite a high risk that they could produce a “dirty bomb”, combining conventional explosives with radioactive material, to devastating psychological effect. The risk is very much smaller that they could produce a far more physically destructive nuclear explosion, given the scale of the technical and logistical problems that would have to be overcome. But it is not negligible. And the

possibility of cyber attacks on nuclear command and control centres is growing ever more significant. 4.3 Possible terrorist actors might either be acting independently of state backing, or have state sponsors. Since 1995, there have been several cases that confirm the danger that either group of actors can have access to – and no scruples about using – devices or substances with the potential for mass killings. The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the unsolved anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 were the first two. Another was the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 with Polonium210, which reminded the world that individuals can obtain a key material for detonating nuclear weapons and smuggle it undetected through the airports of countries on high alert against terrorist threats. 4.4 In the case of a nuclear weapon, it would require a large, well organized and well funded group to build, let alone buy, such a weapon, maintain security at all stages, and successfully transport it to the intended site for detonation. It is now known that Al Qaeda some years ago attempted to obtain enriched uranium, and that senior members of the group had at least one meeting with two Pakistani nuclear experts. The apparently dispersed and diffuse nature of its current organization and funding, after being under siege for most of the last decade, make the central organization, such as it is, a less likely candidate now than in the past for such a role. But it has offshoots and imitators in

many countries. The danger posed by any such group would 4.5 be much enhanced by state backing, whether for nuclear materials or know-how, or simply for the necessary funding. The number of states likely to give deliberate support of this kind would be very small. Even regimes with a long history of, if not irrationality, at least playing by different rules to everyone else, would be unlikely to lend such assistance without first making an assessment of the likely consequences should they be identified – including the possibility of nuclear retaliation (the chances of which would be

significantly higher if those states were already nuclear-armed themselves). A more substantial concern is that states with weak or fragile institutions, multiple internal power centres, and imperfect arrangements for securing weapons and dangerous materials, might end up providing such support even in the absence of any explicit government intent or direction to do so. 4.6 It should be borne in mind that the face of terrorism in ten to fifteen years may well be quite different from today’s. The politics of war and peace, and of security, may well shift from religion-based terrorism to eco-terrorism. In this scenario, there may be an even greater prospect that scientific and technical personnel from the richest countries will aid eco-terrorist use of nuclear weapons or materials.

Greatest threat to extinction.Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative[Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay

Leaders in the White House, the Congress and in the community of nations have repeatedly acknowledged the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack. They have used inspiring words and made solemn commitments to counter the danger. But our collective deeds have not matched our words – we need to re-invigorate our actions at

home and abroad. If a 10-kiloton nuclear device goes off in any major city anywhere in the world, it could kill hundreds of thousands in a single stroke. The loss of life would not be the only impact, however. The world economy would suffer a substantial blow – damaging the weakest economies the most. Today’s levels of spending and global investment would plunge and might not recover for a generation , or more. The balance between security and liberty worldwide would move strongly against liberty. The effects would be far greater if there were not just one nuclear weapon, but the threat of a second or a third. This is a danger not just to life, but to our way of life. There is more talk today about the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack because we are finally coming to accept that the


http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf

http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 253probability is much higher than we had thought. When Thomas Kean, the chairman of the U.S. 9/11 Commission1, was asked if he thought there was a real possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city in his lifetime, the former New Jersey

governor replied: “We talked to nobody who had studied this issue who didn’t think it was a real possibility.” When you combine that “real possibility” with the destructive effects of a nuclear weapon, you have our greatest threat . With so much at stake, every one of us has reason to ask: “Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?” The emphatic answer is “No, we are not.” What must be done to address the global nuclear danger? Here are four priority steps: • Reduce the worldwide supply of nuclear weapons by preventing the emergence of new weapons states and by taking concrete, verifiable actions to reduce the inventories of already-existing nuclear powers. • Limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology by putting in place a system of reliable fuel assurances to support peaceful uses of nuclear power. • Secure all nuclear weapons material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium to the highest standards by promoting best practices and giving technical assistance to any and all states with nuclear capacity. • Gain agreement on and implement a multi-state effort to address the root causes of the discontent underlying the virulent form of radical Islam that seeks these weapons for the purpose of inflicting mass death. The U.S. and the international community – through a series of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral means – are doing some part of all of these things. Each step is recognized as important, but no step is

seen as urgent. We have not acted and are not acting with the seriousness of purpose the threat demands.



Heg Solves Prolif

Heg key to solve prolif.Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative[Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay

So how might this sense of urgency and seriousness of purpose be fostered? In a word: leadership. In the past, great nations grew great and remained great without relying heavily on cooperation with other nations. They believed they could guarantee their own security. That era, however – like it or not

– is gone. The great leaders of our globally interconnected and interdependent age will be those who convince not only their own citizens, but all citizens, that if we are going to enjoy peace and prosperity in the 21st century, then all nations must cooperate in fighting and defeating the dangers that threaten us all. That’s a simple formula, but devilishly complicated in execution. Nuclear materials are distributed around the globe in many countries. Terrorists trying to acquire nuclear materials will not necessarily go where there is the most material; they will go where the material is most vulnerable. That means that the global-security chain is only as strong as its weakest link. It also means that – to a degree never seen before in history – rich and powerful nations will need the cooperation of small and poorer nations to safeguard their security. Our safety absolutely

depends on it. If the United States cannot defend itself on its own, then it must rouse the world to action, but there, precisely, is the rub. It will be hard for the United States to lead the world to action at a time when it has earned a reputation around the world for spurning international cooperation and for endlessly trumpeting the idea of “American

exceptionalism.” The United States must work diligently to regain its credibility as a country that can act in the cause of common security and for the common good – if it is to have the authority to call the world to more urgent action in defense of nuclear terror.




Prolif O/W Nuclear War

Prolif outweighs nuclear war – greater destruction and higher probability.Clinton, ’10 – Secretary of State[Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State; “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies From Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation;” delivered 4/9/2010; http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm] JayNow, this is a lot of activity. But it’s fair to ask whether it matters to people in New York or in Los Angeles or Louisville or, frankly, anywhere else beyond Washington, D.C. Discussions of nuclear issues are often conducted in a language of acronyms – NPR, NPT, SALT, SORT, START. At the White House two weeks ago, a reporter asked me why everyone’s eyes glaze over when we talk about arms control. Now, I’m sure that won’t happen in this audience today. Because it is easy to conclude that this is a subject that doesn’t have much impact on our daily lives or that this issue is a relic of the Cold War. I’m old enough to remember, even though I wasn’t around in 1933 – (laughter) – I am old enough to remember when I was in elementary school having those duck-and-cover drills. You remember those, Mitch. I bet there are a lot of heads – there’s a lot of heads nodding out there. I mean, why in the world our teachers and our parents thought we should take cover under our desks in the case of – (laughter) – of a nuclear attack is beyond me. But every month, we practices. And we’d get up and we’d get under our desks and we’d put our hands over our heads

and we’d crouch up. We lived with the Cold War. We lived with the threat of nuclear weapons. And it seems so long ago now, but it was so real in our daily lives. It wasn’t something left to presidents and senators and

secretaries of state, it was something you talked about around the dinner table. And it made the threat of nuclear war something that nobody could escape. So today, it seems like a good time ago. And it would be easy to think, well, that’s a relic of the past. But that is not the case. The nature of the threat has changed. We no longer live in constant fear of a global nuclear war where we’re in a standoff against the Russians with all of

our nuclear arsenal on the ready, on a haired-trigger alert. But, as President Obama has said, the risk of a nuclear attack has actually increased. And the potential consequences of mishandling this challenge are deadly. So, I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer. There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this

danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the

United States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today.


http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm


***No Prolif***



No Loose Nukes

No loose nukes.Muller and Steinbach, ’10 – *chair of polisci at Ohio State AND **Israeli nuke expert[John Muller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University; John Steinbach, Israeli nuclear weapon expert; “Was Obama Nuke Summit Necessary or Just ‘Nuclear Alarmism’? And What About Israel’s Arsenal?” published 4/14/2010; http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or] Jay

AMY GOODMAN: But Professor Mueller, why is it so hard for groups to get so-called “loose” nukes? JOHN

MUELLER: Well, mainly because they don’t exist. No one has really been able to find anything that’s a loose nuke. If you did actually buy or sell — buy or steal a nuclear weapon, what you’d find is that it’s got a lot of locks on it, and there’s very few people who know how to unlock it. In the case of Pakistan, for example, they keep their weapons in pieces, so you’d have to steal or buy one half, find

— go to another secure location and buy or steal the other half, somehow know how to put tab A into slot B, and set it off. The number of people — as I say, the number of people who know how to set them off is very small. The people who designed them are not — do not know how to set them off. And the people who maintain them do not know how to set them off. So just getting the bombs — and they also have locks on them which will, if tampered with, will cause a conventional explosion, which will cause the weapon itself to self-

destruct, effectively, in a conventional explosion. So the danger is extraordinarily small, it seems to me.


http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or


No Prolif

No interest in weapons, and difficult to obtain.Kidd, ’10 – deputy director general of the World Nuclear Association [Steve Kidd, deputy director general of the World Nuclear Association, and former Director of Strategy & Research at WNA; “Nuclear proliferation risk--is it vastly overrated? The recent well-publicised outpourings of anxiety about the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism overlook the fact that nuclear weapons are usually a matter for states, rather than individuals;” published in Nuclear Engineering Internaional, 55.671, June 2010] JayA significant amount of media attention has recently attached itself to the nuclear security meeting convened by US president Barack Obama and the five-yearly review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which followed soon afterwards. The fear of so-called 'rogue nations' acquiring nuclear weapons, or terrorist organisations creating outrages by misuse of nuclear materials, clearly remains strong. Many column inches also continue to be devoted to various North Korean nuclear activities and to Iran's alleged intentions to pursue a weapons programme. There therefore remains a fear that this may cast a shadow over the nuclear renaissance, particularly as many people clearly believe that nuclear energy and bombs are merely two faces of the same coin. But it is surely not unreasonable to question whether these fears are being substantially inflated and possibly manipulated by various interest groups in order to suit their own purposes. There is, however, no doubt that nuclear materials could conceivably be diverted from a civil nuclear power programme into the production of nuclear weapons or alternatively, major fuel cycle processes (notably enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel) could be employed to produce weapons

rather than fuel for civil reactors. Similarly, it is understandable that concerns over the security of civil nuclear facilities have multiplied since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. The possibility of aircraft crashing into such plants has naturally now been raised, as have possible terrorist incursions at plants either to acquire materials for weapons or to misuse the facility to create an explosion or a major radioactive release [see also 'Security since September 11th,'

NEI March 2010, pp 14-9]. Rather like the risks of operating nuclear power plants themselves, these possibilities largely boil down to assessing very low probability events which may have big consequences. Human beings are notoriously bad at this and frequently reach what seem to be illogical conclusions. This is highlighted by a recent book by a US academic, John Mueller, Atomic Obsession-Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda [ISBN #978-0195381368]. Mueller argues very persuasively (but certainly also controversially) that the impact of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated both in terms of their likely destructive power (in the hands of any party other than one

of the five recognised nuclear weapons states) but also in their real impact on human history since 1945. He emphasizes how slow proliferation of weapons has been in reality, partly because the difficulties of acquiring nuclear materials and developing weapons technology are much greater than commonly stated, but also because all but a few countries have no real interest in acquiring weapons, as they make little sense

beyond supposedly increasing national prestige. Similarly, the task of the atomic terrorist is far from simple. If it were as easy as many people claim, why haven't there been any incidents, even when the controls on nuclear materials were far looser than today? And why do terrorist incidents (with the possible

exception of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) usually involve low tech methods, such as people attaching bombs to themselves or taking over commercial airlines armed with box cutters and then flying them into prominent buildings? There may not be, in reality, any substantive black market in nuclear materials, despite the stories we regularly hear of nuclear trafficking. The comparison sometimes made with narcotic drugs is not reasonable; although drug seizures are known to be the tip of a very large iceberg, controls on the production, trade and transport of nuclear materials are much stiffer and potential buyers are very limited in number.

Terrorists can’t obtain WMD’s – too expensive and no interest.Muller and Steinbach, ’10 – *chair of polisci at Ohio State AND **Israeli nuke expert[John Muller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University; John Steinbach, Israeli nuclear weapon expert; “Was Obama Nuke Summit Necessary or Just ‘Nuclear Alarmism’? And What About Israel’s Arsenal?” published 4/14/2010; http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or] Jay

SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: And John Mueller, you also say that terrorists exhibit only a limited desire to obtain these nuclear weapons, which goes contrary to what most intelligence reports are telling us. Why do you say

that? JOHN MUELLER: Well, I looked at those intelligence reports, and, of course, Obama said the same thing. The indication of interest is extraordinarily small. There is some interest. They sort of think about it. They have thought about it from time to time. But, for example, in Afghanistan, when there were some hotheads among al-Qaeda who wanted to develop weapons of mass destruction, mostly like chemical weapons, which actually aren’t weapons of mass destruction, bin Laden basically approved it but didn’t put any money into it. When they were — when they left Afghanistan after the invasion in 2001, we got a computer which

indicated that their entire budget for weapons of mass destruction, mainly primitive work on chemical weapons,

was about $2,000. And since that time, they certainly haven’t been in better position. There’s no indication they Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach

http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or

Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 260have anything resembling a competent technology team that could put anything together, maybe not even chemical weapons, much less nuclear ones.



--- NPT ---



***NPT Good***



AT: NPT Failing

NPT not failing – proliferation only signals deterrence not instabilityFields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA

Of course, there have been arguments about the tensions in the regime. Many NNWS continue to feel slighted by the perception that the NWS have abandoned serious, sustained commitment to disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. However, with respect to the regime’s foundational norms on the negative implications of nonproliferation for security and

non-transfer, these disputes have never escalated beyond the third phase of norm change, where old norms are disregarded and new ones emerge. The complete disarmament of the NWS remains a distant and

challenging goal; yet, successive NPT Review Conferences have sought to strengthen the treaty by enhancing measures to discourage, detect, and punish noncompliance.43 The strength of the nonproliferation norm diminishes as the security dilemma becomes acute * that is, when states view nuclear weapons as desirable for their deterrent effect in the absence of security guarantees. However, security needs must be balanced with maintaining good standing in the international community.

States may feel constrained by and vulnerable because of the nonproliferation norm, but the majority still accept its overall intent and purpose. Without recognizing how the security environment affects the

nonproliferation (non-acquisition) norm, it is easy to arrive at the erroneous assessment that the regime is faltering. We should be cognizant of how norms evolve within this regime, how systemic as well as ideational factors play a role. While arguments about contradictions and gaps in the normative framework are bound to happen, given systemic changes, these do not necessarily suggest a regime crisis, particularly in light of continued efforts to strengthen the institutions meant to encompass the original norm.

NPT Regime strong – response to noncompliance provesFields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RAThose who assess the nonproliferation regime as in crisis generally refer to strength as the measure of compliance with rules and

expectations of the regime.49 By nature, nuclear noncompliance has severe consequences. One new nuclear state that reaches weapon status by subverting the regime has serious consequences for international security because it alters the balance of power. But even if one accepts that cases of

noncompliance are grievous occurrences simply by virtue of their ramifications, one should still be buoyed by the reality that such cases have been infrequent and that the regime generally adapts and members act to strengthen it. As Jim Walsh points out, regimes adapt to adverse and unforeseen circumstances, as the nonproliferation regime did with full-scope safeguards following India’s nuclear test in 1974 and with the Additional Protocol following revelations about Iraqi nuclear pursuits in the 1990s.50 (See Table 3, ‘‘Major Disagreements, Noncompliance, and Violations of Regime Obligations,’’ for a list of prominent cases of noncompliance and failure to meet regime obligations.) While problematic for international security, none of these cases viewed individually or collectively is

an exemplar of the existential weakness of the regime. States frequently cited as noncompliant have their own security needs, and in an anarchic global environment one expects them to attempt to meet those needs.51 This is to say that because other variables influence state behavior within a regime, one cannot always conclude that the regime is therefore on the verge of collapse.52 Thus, the measure of regime strength in this case should not be whether a state pursues nuclear weapons, but rather how it acts when it does so and how the membership of the regime responds. It would be a sign of fundamental weakness if these noncompliant states behaved without regard to consequences or if other countries concerned about the security

implications had attempted to deal with noncompliance outside the institutions of the regime. While instances of regime noncompliance have critical security implications and as such are signs of weakness in the regime, they are not the sole basis for our assessment of the overall strength of the regime. With

respect to the disputes enumerated in Table 3, there is a gap between theoretical expectations given states’ security needs in the international system and the relatively small number of actual cases of noncompliance; the majority of noncompliant states have attempted to hide their activities; and responses to * in many cases solutions for * noncompliance have generally occurred within the


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 267framework of the regime. Each of these realities represents a point of strength of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As such, our assessment of the regime’s strength is more optimistic than those judging solely on a binary view of noncompliance.

NPT regime effective – affects non-signatory statesFields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RAQuestions of who is inside and who is outside of a regime*and with what consequences*are questions of scope, and this is only one

dimension along which to assess regime health. Returning to one of the foundational points of our argument, we argue that it is important to avoid viewing the NPT and the nonproliferation regime as one and the same. The NPT is an institutional component of the regime.74 Starting with this broader definition of regime allows one to observe the ways in which institutional outsiders might respect certain tenets of the regime, even while operating outside of its institutional architecture. For example, despite not being a signatory to the NPT, Israel does not share nuclear weapons technology with NNWS.75 While India’s record in terms of procurement and its own facilities is spottier, it has been mostly restrained in terms of exporting nuclear weapons technology.76 In addition, despite standing outside of the NPT framework, India has allowed IAEA safeguards on six of its nuclear facilities since 1971, and in 2008, India concluded an agreement with the IAEA to safeguard an additional eight reactors.77 Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan network present a clear negative development on the sharing of nuclear weapons technology, but this must be balanced with the fact that Pakistan has nine different safeguard agreements currently in force with the IAEA.78 Finally,

regime adherents are also cognizant of those states that are not NPT signatories and take measures to limit proliferation from them.79 Thus, the mere existence of outsiders does not represent an existential threat to the regime. The actions of both outsider states and of NPT signatories in dealing with outsiders demonstrate some of the strengths of the regime’s normative foundations and allocational mode. While the actions of outsiders can present particular challenges to the regime’s institutions, their overall effect on the nonproliferation regime is mixed and provides at least some grounds for optimism.

Non-compliance does not signal crisis but rather realities the NPT regime was built to handleFields & Enia ‘9 - *Research Associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, **Professor in the Department of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College(Jeffery & Jason, THE HEALTH OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME, The Nonproliferation Review, Volume 16, Issue 2 July 2009 , pages 173 – 196) RA

The implications for international security as a result of outright defection from the NPT and abandoning nonproliferation norms by a state could be severe. This reality does not make the nonproliferation regime less subject to the dynamics that constitute a regime than in any other. Analysts often have trouble with

this. Fear of the potential consequences (another nuclear weapon state) leads some to automatically diagnose regime weakness or imminent collapse. Yet the dimensions essential for assessing

the health and for understanding the inner workings of any regime show that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is not unique in being subject to the parochial interests of its adherents. Self-interested members who flout norms imposed by the stronger members are to be expected. This does not constitute a crisis, but merely reflects how regimes work. The multidimensional aspects outlined in this paper are underappreciated and useful in assessing the health of the regime. The nonproliferation regime presents an interesting set of circumstances because key actors who have not accepted the norms may have the ability to affect actors inside the regime*a unique dynamic. At the same time, the perception (real or exaggerated) of a lack of substantial movement toward disarmament by the NWS

perpetuates the notion that a one-sided bias underpins the NPT bargain. These realities may be troubling, but they do not necessarily constitute crisis. Instead, they demonstrate how security concerns permeate aspects of the regime. Those who aim to evaluate regime health should consider this before automatically deciding that the nonproliferation regime is in crisis.

NPT should not be abandoned – sparked nonproliferation and can effectively continue the norm


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 268Leaver ‘5 - Senior Lecturer, School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University.(Richard, The failing NPT: the case for institutional reform, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:4,417 – 424) RAEven as the NPT hovers around the brink of its own collapse, two of its paradoxes are more apparent than ever. First, its Article 6 cause of nuclear disarmament has been given enhanced relevance by the modern strategic nightmare that features terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. For if nuclear devices of any kind do eventually end up in the hands of terrorists, we can already be

certain that they will have been sourced from some or another agency of some or another state. The second paradox is that a well-functioning NPT already delivers large doses of nuclear disarmament. By entering into verifiable commitments not to acquire practical knowledge about nuclear explosions, the NPT’s non-nuclear signatories have effectively endorsed the main substantive provisions of a nuclear prohibition regime. And since the treaty now has 184 such signatories instead of the mere 40 that attended

its birth, the argument that nuclear disarmament is too remote and too idealistic ignores the extent to which it has already been achieved for the vast majority of states. The gap that remains is

occupied by the really difficult cases of the nuclear weapon states. But there is no reason why the drip-drip-drip of

gradual proliferation should be used to abandon the NPT when it could be turned, ju-jitsu like,

against those difficult cases so as to reinvigorate their own commitments to Article 6. That, I believe, is a reformist project which is truly worthy of our time and energy.

NPT effectively discourages proliferation – latent nuclear states proveRublee 8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa (Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience) RA

However, I would argue that before the United States (or any other country) gives up on the NPT and associated nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should take full account of not only the regime’s failures, but also its successes. Indeed, the success of the NPT is in many ways more surprising than its recent failures: for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up. Numerous reports in the 1960s warned that the number of new nuclear states could reach as high as 20 in a few decades (The Bomb 1965:53). Instead, the count

by 2008 is only four: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.2 The fact that so many states abstained from nuclear weapons tells us to look closely at the nuclear nonproliferation regime. What role has it played

in encouraging nuclear forbearance? With the risk of nuclear theft or accidents increasing with each new nuclear weapons state, the international community needs all the help it can get in discouraging nuclear proliferation. This is especially important given the growing numbers of ‘‘latent nuclear states,’’ those with the ‘‘necessary industrial infrastructure and scientific expertise to build nuclear

weapons on a crash basis if they chose to do so’’ (Sagan 1996:56). In 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that over 40 countries were ‘‘nuclear latent states’’. Given the high stakes, we need to better understand how and in what ways the NPT has actually helped discouraged nuclear proliferation. In doing so, we can also understand the mechanisms through which international regimes work to influence policymakers.

The NPT bolsters a norm of nonproliferationRublee 8 - Professor of Government and World Affairs @ University of Tampa (Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review, 22 Aug 2008, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 420-450WileyInterScience) RA

In short, understanding that nuclear forbearance is actually the result of three separate attitudes—and that undermining the NPT could undermine commitment to nuclear nonproliferation with two of the three attitudes—leads to the

conclusion that undermining the NPT could lead to a wave of nuclear proliferation among states we assumed would never think about the nuclear option again. In other words, the value of the NPT cannot be evaluated without assessing the extent to which it has helped to prevent proliferation. How specifically does the NPT do this? I posit that it has created an international social environment that influences elite decision-making through a number of specific and distinct mechanisms. Without the NPT, those mechanisms fall apart. It is to this social environment and the ‘‘influence’’ mechanisms fostered by it that the papers turns to next.

Despite NPT shortcomings, abandonment risks conflict


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 269Ayson ‘5 - Senior Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University(Robert, Selective non-proliferation or universal regimes?, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:4,431–437) RA

If the future seems rather grim for the NPT, it may therefore be nothing compared to the mess which could accompany the breaking of the six decade-old taboo on nuclear use. The world does need a shot in the arm if it is to commit itself to strengthening or replacing the existing regime. But the medicine required may be too

strong or hazardous for the patient (the international system). Perhaps then it is better to accept that the disease

(the spread of nuclear weapons) is unlikely to be dealt with successfully any time soon, but to regard it as a chronic rather than a fatal condition. Muddling through may therefore be a better approach than grand designs. To adapt the old saying, even if it is partially broken, one might hesitate before trying completely to fix (or replace) it.



Compliance K2 NPT

Compliance key to global perception of NPT effectivenessDunn 9 - Senior VP, Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant director of the U.S. Arms Controland Disarmament Agency(Lewis, THE NPT Assessing the Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009)

Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22 In this context, however, widespread

adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations.



US Key

US key to solve the NPT.Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative[Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay

To do this, the United States must abandon its policy of disdain for international treaty regimes and institutions, and work instead to strengthen them. Underlying this effort must be a restored U.S. commitment to work through the United Nations and the structure of international regimes for counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, arms reduction and control, and the instruments for promoting global economic wellbeing that the United States helped create but has recently failed to adequately support. Where international organizations and regimes have been weakened by our lack of support or by their own internal flaws, these weaknesses must be eliminated, and both political and financial support restored. Working through international institutions is critical to restoring faith in the United States as a global

partner. That restored faith will allow more effective leadership. Central to gaining international cooperation from non-nuclear weapons states on nuclear proliferation matters would be a clear and unambiguous commitment by the U.S. and other weapons states to act purposefully to meet their responsibilities under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This point was made in an opinion piece written in January in the Wall Street Journal by former U.S. Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn. In their essay, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” they argue that we are on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era, with more nuclear-armed states and a real risk of nuclear terrorism. In such a world, the four warn that continued reliance on nuclear deterrence for maintaining international security “is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective,” and that none of the nonproliferation steps being taken now “are adequate to the danger.” The veteran statesmen argue that the United States and other nations must both embrace the vision of a world free

from the threat of nuclear weapons and pursue a balanced program of practical measures toward achieving that goal: “Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.” As former Secretary General Kofi Annan noted as he left office, the world risks becoming mired in a sterile stand-off between those who care most about disarmament and those who care

most about proliferation. Continued paralysis is a danger to us all. On our current path, in Annan’s words, the “world is sleepwalking toward nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.” The United States has an opportunity to break this stalemate and re-establish its essential leadership in non-proliferation in a single, dramatic stroke. Selecting the forum of the United Nations annual meeting of the General Assembly attended

by all world leaders, the United States should expressly and explicitly renew its NPT vows. The President should state the U.S. intention to engage all nuclear weapons states in a joint enterprise to work toward a safer world free from the threat of nuclear weapons and toward the establishment of a more secure global political context that would make that goal possible. The President should acknowledge that the requisite security context for achieving that goal does not exist today – and admit that we are headed in the wrong direction and must change course. The President could emphasize this commitment by announcing a number of steps that would reduce the

nuclear danger and underscore America’s bona fides.




***NPT Bad***



Fails

Structural flaws.Claussen, ‘8 – Fellow at the Folke Bernadotte Academy for Peace Studies[Bjørn Ragnar Claussen, MA from Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø; “The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy;” published Autumn 2008; http://www.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle/10037/2062/thesis.pdf?sequence=1] Jay

Moreover, if states withdraw from the NPT, their number would arguably add to the “pressure from outside.” Although many states consider the right to withdraw from a treaty as a norm of international law, the abrupt termination of a multilateral arms control treaty such as the NPT may directly affect the security of many or all parties.134 As noted

in the previous chapter section (2.4.2), the NPT has structural flaws, which means that a state can move to the brink of nuclear weapons capacity, thereby giving it the option to develop nuclear weapons quickly if it should decide to withdraw, without violating the treaty. Although its formal nuclear status is still unclear, the utilisation of the withdrawal provision of Article X by the DPRK illustrates this point. This has led several scholars

to argue that in order to ensure the survival of the NPT, no state should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty.135 The case of the DPRK also illustrates that different types of pressure can form clusters. The DPRK constitutes both “pressure from within,” by having acquired nuclear weapons despite its obligation as a NNWS not to do so, and arguably “pressure from outside,” by utilising the withdrawal provision of the NPT.

Perception of discrimination.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay

Many countries regard the NPT as deeply unfair, because it effectively solidifies an inequality in international relations that accords some states the (albeit questionable) status and security conferred by nuclear weapons

while denying it to others.1 Although the NPT commits nuclear weapons states to eradicating their nuclear arsenals, after over a quarter of a century they have made only partial moves towards fulfilling this undertaking.2 Some commentators have argued that the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 further underlined this breach of trust by depriving non-nuclear weapons states of the opportunities provided by periodic renewal (rather than just review) conferences to press the nuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament or to pressure Israel

over its covert nuclear weapons program (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 42). With little prospect of securing the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapons states, the continuation of the NPT has become farcical.3 Commenting on the 2000 NPT Review Conference, two observers noted that ‘agreement on the Final Document had been possible only because many of the provisions were capable of varying interpretations, and thus unlikely to be implemented in full’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 43). They also noted that evidence of backsliding on commitments, particularly by the US, was ‘greeted by most delegations with resignation and quiet cynicism, rather than forthright and persistent criticism’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 45). The unwillingness of states to expend diplomatic capital in taking on the US over its commitments indicates that

fewer and fewer states continue to regard the integrity of the NPT as a foreign policy priority. The unfairness of the NPT risks generating cynicism among states about their obligations under the treaty, and therefore impacts directly on its effectiveness. Friedrich Kratochwil (1989) has argued convincingly that states do not follow rules out of a sense of unreflective obligation or blind habit, but on the basis of explicitly developed justifications derived from socially shared conceptions of rationality and justice. Because the NPT effectively enshrines an unequal distribution of the security and status conferred by

nuclear weapons, it contravenes the principles of natural justice. This in turn detracts from its legitimacy and ultimately from its effectiveness. As Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes have argued, ‘a system in which only the weak can be made to comply with their undertakings will not achieve the legitimacy needed for reliable enforcement of treaty obligations’ (1998: 3).

Furthermore, by effectively making the prohibition of the spread of nuclear weapons a higher priority than the eradication of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states, the NPT regime implies that some states, and not others, can be trusted with nuclear weapons. The implicit judgement the regime

makes about competence and trustworthiness only further aggravates the status inequality issues that plague the

NPT. By arguing that the NPT enshrines a system of ‘nuclear apartheid’, Indian leaders and diplomats rehearsed many of these issues in their defence of India's nuclear tests in 1998. The effectiveness of this line of argument, plus the fact that interests deemed more important than non-proliferation soon brought an end to most states’ sanctions against India and

Pakistan, have done a great deal of damage to the moral authority of the NPT.


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Loopholes.Claussen, ‘8 – Fellow at the Folke Bernadotte Academy for Peace Studies[Bjørn Ragnar Claussen, MA from Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromsø; “The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy;” published Autumn 2008; http://www.ub.uit.no/munin/bitstream/handle/10037/2062/thesis.pdf?sequence=1] Jay

“Pressure from within” refers to NNWSs parties to the NPT which deliberately violate their treaty obligation to forsake nuclear weapons. States parties which have yet not concluded safeguards agreements

also belong to this type of pressure.111 “Pressure from within” stems in part from a paradox embedded in the NPT: Under the NPT, the NNWSs agreed to give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons, but not their pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to Article IV, it is the inalienable right of all states parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, Article IV guarantees NNWSs the right to full access to nuclear power technology, on condition that they submit their nuclear activities to international

inspections. According to Jonathan Schell, this bargain was a “Trojan horse” written into the text of the NPT.112

Nuclear technology is a dual-use technology with both civilian and military applications. Education, experience, materials and technology involved in making nuclear weapons can be drawn in large part by peaceful applications of nuclear energy.113 The NPT clearly prohibits NNWSs from using nuclear technology to make nuclear weapons, but once they have it, they have taken a major step towards the development of nuclear weapons.114 For NNWSs which desire nuclear weapons, Article IV thus assures that they are be able to acquire most of the wherewithal to fulfil their ambitions without violating the

NPT.115 Hence, the number of states capable of building nuclear weapons has paradoxically increased due to the NPT. According to David Santoro, this paradox can prove to be the Achilles heel of the NPT.116 NNWSs which work within the NPT, but deliberately manipulate or violate the provisions of the treaty, such as Iran is suspected to do, may cause states parties, both NWSs and NNWSs, to loose confidence in the credibility of the NPT, and opt for other means to prevent proliferation.117

Unenforceability.Council on Foreign Relations, ‘5[The Council on Foreign Relations, written by Esther Pan; “Nonproliferation: Proliferation Threats;” published 4/27/2005; http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/nonproliferation-proliferation-threats/p7834?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dbackgrounder%26page%3D30] Jay

Does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty need an overhaul? Many experts say it does. They concede that the, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which went into effect in 1970, has helped limit the number of nuclear-

armed countries. But they say the NPT has structural flaws that undermine its effectiveness against states determined to acquire nuclear weapons or terrorist groups bent on using them. Critics of the treaty and supporters alike will get a chance to air their views at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) NPT review conference in New York, May 2-27. There, the 189 signatories to the NPT--and observers, including India and Pakistan--will meet to

discuss treaty reforms. Which articles do critics object to in the NPT? The main criticisms from member countries deal with the following articles: Article 4, which gives all parties to the treaty the "inalienable right" to the "research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." This was

intended to allow all countries to share the benefits of nuclear power. But critics say Article 4 grants countries too much leeway to convert a lawful nuclear program into an illegal weapons program. The problem, says Jon Wolfstahl, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is that some countries now interpret Article 4 to mean they can legally build a civilian nuclear program and gain the knowledge they need to make nuclear weapons, then renounce the treaty to construct them. Article 2, which states that all non-nuclear weapons states that sign the NPT agree not to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, they agree "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." The United States claims that Iran has already violated this article by acquiring nuclear technology from other countries, including Pakistan, and will push for it to be interpreted more strictly.

Article 6, which states that all parties to the NPT will pursue negotiations and other measures in good faith to stop the nuclear-arms race and seek nuclear disarmament "at an early date." Because the treaty does not specify a date, however, the goal of nuclear disarmament has not been reached nearly 40 years after the treaty's creation. Experts say many non-nuclear countries around the world accuse the nuclear-weapons states of dragging their feet on complete disarmament. Non-nuclear countries may lobby to add a fixed deadline,

perhaps 10 or 15 years from now, by which disarmament must be completed. Article 10, which gives each member state the right to withdraw from the treaty with only 90 days notice if its "supreme interests" are jeopardized.

What's the treaty's biggest flaw? That there is limited power to enforce it , experts say. Most international inspections mandated by the NPT are voluntary, and countries largely control


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Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 276inspectors' movements. There are no penalties for breaking the terms of the NPT--as North Korea did when it developed an illicit nuclear-weapons program--except being reported to the U.N. Security Council. Thus far, the Security Council has taken no punitive action against North Korea. "The nonproliferation regime is like a pyramid scheme," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "It works as long as everyone believes in it. As soon as they stop doing that, it collapses."

Outdated.Garvey, ‘8 – Law Professor at University of San Francisco[Jack Garvey; “A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;” published February 2008 in the Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12 No. 3, 1-19] Jay

The success attributed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in truth depended on a now vanished logic of national power and interest. It was the cold war that stabilised the consensual regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For most of the life of the treaty, it was principally the leverage of Soviet–US confrontation that persuaded governments to favour adherence to the treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime. The states that did develop nuclear weapons outside the treaty regime, Israel, India, Pakistan and

for a time South Africa, were responding to the exceptional and distinctive dynamics of regionally defined national interest. But it was the mutually assured destruction of the United States and Soviet Union that discouraged nuclear weapons development by other states. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the principal nuclear weapons trauma of the period, was both in its origin and resolution, a Soviet–US encounter. The crisis was ‘Cuban’ in name and venue, but its outcome was decided as a matter of the US and Soviet strategic policy, the other states of the world mere witnesses to a nuclear

confrontation that would have determined all their fates. The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, no longer secured by the leverage of US–Soviet bipolarity, has buckled under the pressures of evolving political dynamics, dynamics that generate new and higher levels of risk. In a world of new instabilities, where nuclear technology, both hard and soft, is more and more accessible, 5 the treaty is failing to achieve containment. That new reality is named by the new rhetoric of risk; ‘nuclear terrorism’, ‘failed states’, ‘rogue states’, ‘nuclear traffickers’ and ‘non-state actors’. There are new countermeasures, such as the ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’6 of the Bush administration. There are new agreements, as with North Korea7 and India.8 Yet, there is no comprehensive rethinking and recreation of the non-proliferation regime.9 Recent calls for addressing these new threats simply reiterate the importance of working within established legal and institutional frameworks.10


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Increases Prolif

NPT increases prolif and blinds states to nuke development.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay

Due to persisting demand-side factors and crumbling supply-side controls, the nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will probably be unable to prevent a likely proliferation rate of one or two additional nuclear weapons states per decade into the foreseeable future. Beyond being ineffective, I

argue that the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous. The NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. However, abandoning the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The failure of the 2005 Review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reach agreement on even a ‘single matter of substance’ only confirms that global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction have reached a dangerous precipice (Nason

2005; Cubby 2005). As two observers of the 2003 PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) meeting commented, ‘the NPT review process is under such severe strain that it has been sedated: interaction over difficult issues has been put on hold’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 48). Yet an overwhelming majority of states and commentators advocate persisting with the NPT regime, despite its numerous shortcomings. They do so in the fearful but misguided belief that it represents

our ‘last chance’ (Epstein 1976) to ensure a world that is safe from the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The danger in this obsessive focus on the NPT, while failing to acknowledge and confront its fundamental weaknesses, is that states will lose sight of the ultimate objective—preventing the threat or use of nuclear weapons—and thereby gradually lose their capacity to ensure this objective. My intention here is to provoke debate about the utility of keeping the NPT on life support, as opposed to replacing it with a regime that acknowledges contemporary realities, while developing a more effective compact against the use or threat of nuclear weapons.

Makes states view nukes as a no-risk option.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] Jay

The drivers of proliferation among several of Asia's emerging great powers combine both mounting demand-side incentives and crumbling supply-side controls. Neither of these can adequately be addressed by the NPT in its current state. The major demand-side incentives are greater strategic uncertainty among regional powers and a rising thirst for international prestige. At the global level, the actions and statements of the United States, which currently combines a belief in its unassailable power with a post-11 September 2001 conviction of its unrivalled vulnerability, have increased the strategic uncertainties of many states. The current US preoccupation with terrorism and non-proliferation and recent high-visibility demonstrations of US air power have enhanced the credibility of Washington's threats of coercion against ‘rogue states’. As the United States’ inhibitions against the use of force have fallen, the attractiveness of nuclear weapons—the ultimate insurance policy—have risen. In Asia, a newly intense pattern of competition and collusion among the current and emerging great powers has further increased the attractiveness of nuclear weapons. China, Japan, India, Russia and Iran have reacted to a range of recent changes—rising prosperity, regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq, patterns of alignment and basing during the ‘war on terror’, uncertainties over energy security—to create a shifting pattern of alignments and tensions that are yet to settle into a stable and predictable template. In the meantime, this new great power manoeuvring has begun to link up previously separate security dyads and complexes, as combinations of powers jostle for position in Northeast, Southeast, Central, South and Western Asia. This is a fluid and potentially dangerous power dynamic, as Asia's powers are yet to settle among themselves issues of status, spheres of influence, regional norms of behaviour, patterns of alignment and enmity and tacit conditions governing the use of force. Meanwhile, the threat perceptions of many middle and smaller powers have been raised. As regional rivalries drive various containment and counter-containment strategies (see Paul 2003), and increased strategic uncertainty raises states’ security concerns, the demand-side pressures for nuclear weapons will continue to mount. The other major demand-side driver of proliferation is the growing thirst for status among Asia's emerging great powers. Rising prosperity and growing nationalism has fed a renewed interest in gaining symbols of international prestige and influence. The campaign of states such as Japan, India, Indonesia and Brazil for permanent seats on the UN Security Council is one manifestation of the new hunger for prestige. Membership of the ‘nuclear club’ has long been recognised as another tacit symbol of great power status. Possession of nuclear weapons is one indicator of membership in the great power ‘club’. The ability to design and manufacture nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles is thought to signal high levels of technological competence, a particularly

important status symbol for developing countries (Navais 1990: 9–13). The NPT's inability either to prevent the spread of nuclear components, materials and technology, or to secure the nuclear disarmament


Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 278of the nuclear weapons states (as discussed below), only adds to these demand-side pressures. In

developing nuclear weapons, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and probably Iran have demonstrated that neither the NPT nor any other international regime provides them with an adequate security guarantee against either nuclear or conventional coercion. To the contrary, by confining the possession of nuclear weapons

to some states and not others, the NPT has raised the attractiveness of nuclear weapons for those states not covered by the nuclear weapons states’ guarantees of extended deterrence. These demand-side

pressures suggest that the incentives of a small number of states to acquire nuclear weapons will endure over time. Each new nuclear weapons state will give rise to proliferation incentives among a limited number of neighbours and rivals, thereby maintaining a fairly consistent level of proliferation pressure over time. As I discuss below, because the vast majority of states choose to eschew nuclear weapons, because their sense of insecurity is insufficient to justify the costs of possessing nuclear weapons, the risks of a major nuclear ‘break out’ are low. It is the conditions of proliferation, rather than its occurrence, that a new regime should try to regulate. While the demand-side pressures for proliferation will continue, the supply-side restrictions have crumbled and are unlikely to be rebuilt. In the words of one technical expert, ‘one by one, the barriers to proliferation are gradually falling, and for those states that anticipate continuing security challenges, there may be a strong temptation during the first decades of this century to proliferate’ (Erickson 2001: 46). On the one hand, the economic and technological barriers to acquiring nuclear components and technology are falling. Most potential nuclear weapons states are becoming wealthier at the same time as the costs of building a nuclear weapons program are falling. Globalisation has led to the broad dispersal of sophisticated project management skills, while the international education market and the fact that the basic knowledge required to make nuclear weapons is now nearly 50 years old means that the technological

competence required for a viable nuclear program is no longer a rare commodity (Zimmerman 1994). On the other hand, the effectiveness of export controls has eroded. The post-Cold War priority of economic growth and integration led to the abolition of most blanket restrictions on dual-use technology exports and a reduction of the range of dual-use military technology subject to export controls (Saunders 2001: 127–8). States such as Russia and China have engaged in a form of diplomatic rent seeking by continuing to export nuclear technology and dual-use materials to potential proliferators—sometimes at the cost of substantial financial losses and threats of US sanctions (Diaconu and Maloney 2003)—in order to gain diplomatic

influence and weaken US leverage over key regional states. If this combination of demand-side and supply-side conditions leads to several states’ moves towards proliferation in the years ahead, the NPT will be singularly unable to prevent it, or to stabilise the process of proliferation.

NPT forces states to prolif to compete.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] JayMy central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of one or two

additional nuclear weapons states per decade, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue that the NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would help put

transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors. The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT's flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more

insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear—not chemical or biological—weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq's, Pakistan's, North Korea's and Libya's progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India's highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world's half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral

authority of the NPT regime, perhaps terminally. Even worse than being ineffective, the NPT is dangerous, because it increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT—the positives and the negatives—and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.



Decreases barriers to nuke production.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] JaySome of the causes of the NPT's declining effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation have been rehearsed above. However

the main cause of its ineffectiveness is structural: as Frank Barnaby observes, ‘The problem is that military and

peaceful nuclear programs are, for the most part, virtually identical’ (1993: 126). This directly erodes the viability of the deal that lies at the heart of the NPT: that non-nuclear weapons states agree not to try to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for assistance with peaceful nuclear programs, should they want them. The NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are thus simultaneously engaged in promoting and controlling two types of nuclear technology that are virtually indistinguishable until a point very close to the threshold of

assembling the components of a nuclear weapon. For many states that have contemplated the nuclear option, adherence to the NPT thus actually makes it easier to obtain cutting edge nuclear technology and dual-use components that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program (Dunn

1991: 23). As Barnaby argues, ‘Under [Article X of] the NPT, a country can legally manufacture the components of a nuclear weapon, notify the IAEA and the UN Security Council that it is withdrawing from the Treaty, and then assemble its nuclear weapons’(1993: 124). Although the IAEA's inspections role has been strengthened during the course of the 1990s, there is little prospect that its powers will be increased to such a level that it will be able to counter the highly sophisticated deception programs mounted by most covert proliferators. The only remedy to this dilemma has been to question the need of states such as Iran for peaceful nuclear power and to doubt the veracity of their statements that they do not intend to acquire nuclear weapons. This only further opens the regime up to charges of selectivity, unfairness and politicisation (Jones 1998).






No Impact

No impact to NPT collapse – econ, domestic politics, US heg, and international norms contain prolif.Wesley, ‘5 – Executive Director, PhD in IR[Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, professor at the University of Hong Kong, and PhD from the University of St Andrews; “It's time to scrap the NPT;” published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 59, Issue 3; 2005] JayIn considering whether states should scrap the NPT, two prominent questions need to be answered: what are the dangers associated with ending the NPT? And what would a new regime that confronts contemporary proliferation realities, while more

effectively ensuring the prevention of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, look like? The major concern of those who oppose scrapping the NPT is that it would result in a ‘proliferation break-out’. This suggests that without the constraints of the NPT, the number of nuclear weapons states would rise from the current nine acknowledged and non-

acknowledged holders of nuclear weapons to dozens. However, this assumes that the NPT has been the main reason for the limited spread of nuclear weapons over the past 60 years, an unlikely proposition for a

regime whose shortcomings have been acknowledged since its inception. A more likely explanation for the relative lack of

proliferation is that most states have experienced insufficient demand-side pressures to overcome the costs of acquiring nuclear arsenals. For most states, this is a condition that will persist past the ending of the NPT. Even though states have grown wealthier and proliferation costs have fallen, it is important to recognise that developing a nuclear arsenal is not cost-free. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs are expensive, meaning that most states will need to divert substantial resources from their conventional armed forces or other policy programs during the weapons development phase.6 Costs can also be incurred through the international opprobrium that will likely attend proliferation, from diplomatic boycotts to cancellation of aid funding to sanctions by states such as Japan. And a nuclear program brings risks, both the danger of catastrophic environmental and social damage from accidents, as well as arising from the strategic uncertainties generated among

neighbouring states (Erickson 2001: 43). Potential proliferators must also confront the power of the nuclear taboo—which long pre-dates the NPT—and shoulder the burden of justifying to domestic and international public opinion why they need the bomb. These factors will persist past the demise of the NPT, and in the absence of a sudden decline in the security of a large number of states, fears of a proliferation break-out

are unfounded. Another concern is that by making it easier for some states to acquire nuclear weapons, scrapping the NPT will result in several states being willing to take greater risks in advancing their strategic interests. This would work either by emboldening aggressive states by reassuring them that they are able to deter retaliatory action or through a version of extended deterrence, in keeping outside powers out of regional

conflicts (Dunn 1991: 26). Such misgivings, however, ignore past evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons on their possessors’ behaviour, and misunderstand the nature of nuclear weapons. In effect, they assume that nuclear weapons imbue their holders with ‘super-strategic’ properties. It has long been widely acknowledged that nuclear weapons have no rational offensive value; by threatening a prospective opponent with catastrophic destruction, their only logical use is to deter others’ attacks (Schelling 1963). In using nuclear threats offensively or as an explicit adjunct to a conventional attack, a state would incur unacceptable risks ‘because no state can expect to execute the threat without

danger to [itself]’ (Waltz 1981: 13). As Saunders observes, ‘There is little empirical evidence to support claims that developing countries that acquire WMD and delivery systems will behave less cautiously than other nuclear weapons states’ (2001: 133). And there is little reason for nuclear-armed regional powers to believe with any certainty that extended deterrence will work to keep the US out of a regional conflict. Since experiencing the frustration of being unable to use its nuclear arsenal to prevail in limited conflicts in

Korea and Vietnam, the US has developed a truly awesome conventional military capability that provides it with the capacity to prevail decisively in limited wars. In Iraq, it has also demonstrated its willingness to intervene and defeat an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction with the relative confidence that if such an opponent were to use WMD against its forces or its allies, the US would retaliate with overwhelming force. William Perry, then US Secretary of Defence, said in 1996 that if the US was attacked by chemical weapons, ‘We could have a devastating response without the use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility’ (quoted in Feiveson and Hogendoorn 2003: 90). A third concern is that by making it easier to acquire nuclear weapons, the end of the NPT will give certain disgruntled states the confidence to defy global and regional norms of behaviour. However, this concern assumes that such states only comply with such norms due to a persisting sense of insecurity that possession of nuclear weapons would remove. As Chayes and Chayes have convincingly argued, states follow norms and agreements in international relations not out of the fear of coercion but due to a general ‘propensity to comply’ with agreements they have made or joined (1998). Even disgruntled states exhibit great concern for their international reputation, especially in an era of globalisation, where general reputation and confidence in a government is necessary to secure the requirements for economic development. Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi's extraordinary about-face in compensating the victims of Libyan-backed terrorist attacks and abandoning well-developed plans to develop a nuclear arsenal have

only underlined the importance of reputation and co-operativeness in the age of globalisation. A fourth concern is that scrapping the NPT will make it easier for extremist regimes to gain the ultimate guarantee that








Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 281others will not intervene to topple them. There are certainly merits to this anxiety: it would be very difficult to justify and mount an intervention to topple a regime that possessed nuclear weapons. This in turn would take off the table the ultimate

sanction against a genocidal government. But there are reasons to question the international dangers posed by nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’. By enormously increasing the stakes involved in military adventures, possession of nuclear weapons is likely to strengthen the hand of moderates in any regime. And by ruling out the option of forceful intervention, a nuclear arsenal will probably, on balance, reduce the paranoid perceptions of a regime labelled a rogue state. In many ways, the case of Pakistan provides some evidence of these tendencies. As Gaurav Kampani observes, Pakistan fits the label of a rogue state better than most others: a state sponsor of terrorism with an active nuclear weapons program; a military dictatorship faced with an economy in terminal decline and a shrinking strategic space; and a set of societal, government and military institutions increasingly populated by extremist Islam (Kampani 2002: 107). Yet Pakistan has proved remarkably susceptible to international pressure to moderate its internal and foreign policies.7 A fifth concern is that conflicts between regional powers will become more likely as the demise of the NPT results in more states with nuclear weapons. An increase in regional conflict in Asia may well be coming, mainly as a result of the newly intense patterns of competition among that continent's new great powers. But possession of nuclear weapons will more likely have a positive (containing, de-escalating) effect on such conflicts, rather than a negative (escalating, broadening) effect. The most dangerous strategy one can choose in a war is to make a nuclear-armed state feel desperate; as a result, conflicts involving nuclear-armed states are more likely to be carefully limited and confined to stakes that are calculated to be well below the nuclear threshold of all parties (Waltz 1981: 20). Moreover, history shows that nuclear weapons have only been used or threatened to de-escalate or bring an end to conventional conflicts: the experience or prospect of catastrophic damage has tended to be a powerful motive forcing belligerents to modify their objectives. Further, the costs of nuclear war would be proportionately greater for new as opposed to the older nuclear states: the smallness of the territory and high rates of urbanisation of most aspiring nuclear states would ensure that a nuclear exchange would devastate a greater percentage of their populations and industry than projected exchanges between the superpowers were estimated to imperil during the height of the Cold War. The case of India and Pakistan offers some cautious hope that in some cases, after an unstable and dangerous period, acquisition of nuclear weapons will cause

opponents to begin to address the root causes of their antagonism and delimit spheres of interest. A final concern is that by allowing nuclear weapons to spread to more states, the end of the NPT raises the chances that nuclear or radiological materials will pass into the hands of terrorist groups. Once again, we

need to be cautious about such doomsday scenarios. Despite intense scrutiny, there is no evidence that even the most determined state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria and Iran, have passed chemical or biological weapons to their terrorist clients. Having refused to pass on lower-stakes chemical and biological

weapons, there is little reason to fear that they would hand over nuclear or radiological materials. Also, international advances in tracing the responsibility for terrorist attacks will have badly eroded such regimes’ confidence that they could allow a client group to carry out a nuclear or radiological attack and escape major retaliation. Such concerns have over time seen such regimes exercise tighter control over the groups they support, and to use such groups more as a deterrent than an offensive foreign policy option.8 Further, if regimes such as Iran and Syria had decided to rely on terrorist groups to deliver their WMD threats against their targets, they would not have spent millions acquiring ballistic missile technology. Thus there seems to be little reason to believe that ending the NPT will increase the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists. Indeed as I have argued above, the NPT's side effects of opaque and transnational proliferation represent a much more dangerous set of conditions for diagonal proliferation.

NPT collapse leads to stronger UN prolif prevention – solves better.Garvey, ‘8 – Law Professor at University of San Francisco[Jack Garvey; “A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;” published February 2008 in the Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 12 No. 3, 1-19] JayWe are at an intersection in the evolution of international law, where the road not taken, can condemn the journey to dissolution

and chaos. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not holding. However, it remains serviceable within a new architecture. Shifting to this architecture can occur without sacrificing what has been accomplished under the regime of the treaty. It is certainly no small accomplishment that over 180 countries are now party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that they cooperate in the important work of the IAEA, though in extreme

variance of degree. The new architecture is simply designed, and designed simply, to overcome the negative dynamics of the treaty, while generating effectiveness. The Chapter VII resolution here proposed would impact the grand bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty only by making mandatory the implementation of the

commitment to non-proliferation, and applying it to all the states, including non-parties to the treaty. The transition to a mandatory regime can be accomplished without undermining the present treaty commitments, such as they may be, to nuclear disarmament and assistance in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Nor is there any reason that the shift should impair the nuclear safeguards agreements presently in force. The Security Council's declaration that nuclear weapons proliferation is a

threat to the peace, triggering Chapter VII consideration, will establish the basic foundation for transition to a mandatory non-proliferation regime, while conserving the progress that has been accomplished.






Prolif Good/Bad Michigan 2011HKPZ Lab 282Any further consideration, modification or implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would be designed to conform to

this foundation. Ultimately, the mandatory structure might replace the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with agreements more congruent with the new architecture. The nuclear dilemma presents us with as stark and significant a challenge as has confronted humankind since cast out of the biblical garden. However, there is now a legacy of knowledge and experience that instructs the future. Existing structures of international law provide the opportunity for a new architecture to bind the nuclear devil anew, perhaps with permanence. There is no choice but to succeed.


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