Ir s 12 Sustitutos Halon

8/13/2019 Ir s 12 Sustitutos Halon

1/21

PDVSA N TITULO

REV. FECHA DESCRIPCION PAG. REV. APROB. APROB.

APROB. FECHAAPROB.FECHA

VOLUMEN 1

1994

IRS12 GUIDE FOR ALTERNATIVES TO HALON AS FIRE

EXTINGUISHING AGENT

APPROVED

Anibal Rosas Salvador ArrietaMAR.99 MAR.99

OCT.95

MAR.99 L.T.

L.T.

1

0

GENERAL REVISION 20

21

O. A.

A. N.

H. M.

J. R.

MANUAL DE INGENIERIA DE RIESGOS

ESPECIALISTAS


2/21

REVISION FECHA


GUIDE FOR ALTERNATIVES TO HALONAS FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENT MAR.991

PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 1

Men Principal Indice manual Indice norma

Indice

1 INTRODUCTION 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 OBJECTIVE 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3 SCOPE 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 REFERENCES 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 DEFINITIONS 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.1 Active Protection 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.2 Chemical Means of Extinguishment 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.3 Class A Fires 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.4 Class B Fires 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.5 Class C Fires 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.6 Halocarbon Agent 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.7 Inert Gas Agent 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.8 Inherent Safety 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.9 Lethal Concentration 50% (Lc50) 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5.10 Lowest Observable Adverse Effect Level (Loael) 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.11 No Observed Adverse Effect Level (Noael) 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.12 Normally Occupied Area 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.13 Physical Means of Extinguishment 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6 HALON SUBSTITUTION GUIDELINES 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6.1 Risk Analysis 6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6.2 Considerations for Halon Replacement 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 HALON REPLACEMENT OPTIONS 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.1 Gaseous Substitute Agents 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.2 Fire Alarm and Detection System Options 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.3 Power Shut Tripping or Deenergizing of Equipment 19. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8 FINAL DISPOSAL OF HALON 20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
http://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp


3/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 2

MenPrincipal Indice manual Indice norma

1 INTRODUCTION

PDVSA adopted as a basic philosophy the elimination of the use of halon in newinstallations. Aditionally, in existing facilities, adequate replacement fireprotection system shall be evaluated. Where this is not practical, all necessaryefforts should be made to minimize atmospheric discharges of halon.

2 OBJECTIVEThis guide establishes the criteria that shall be applied to select halon alternativefire protection system in new and existing installations.

3 SCOPE

This guide covers the halon substitute agents, nonhalon based replacementsystem and its final disposal.

4 REFERENCES1. Sheinson R.S., Eaton Hg., Black B., Brown R., Burchel H., Maranghides A.,

Mitchel C., Salmon G., Smith WD.; Halon 1301 Replacement Total FloodingFire Testing, Intermediate Scale. Halon Options Technical WorkingConference, May 35, 1994, Albuquerque.

2. Moore TA., Dierdorf DS., Skaggs SR.; Intermediate Scale (645 ft3) FireSuppression Evaluation of NFPA 2001 Agents. 1993 Halon Alternatives

Technical Working Conference, May 1113, 1993, Albuquerque.

3. Skaggs SR., More TA.; Toxicology of Halogenated Halon Substitutes. FireSafety without Halon?, September 79, 1994, Zurich.

4. The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum; Inert GasFire Extinguishing Agents, p. 8, Report No. 6.60/259, June 1997, London.

5. The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum; Inherent FireSafety Design Principles, p. 21, Report No. 6.48/231, December 1995,London.

6. Kletz, T.A., An Engineerss View of Human Error, published by the Institution

of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, U.K. 1985

7. The Oil Industry International Exploration & Production Forum; Guidelineson the Use of Water Mist Fire Extinguishment Systems in E&P IndustryApplications, p. 1113, Report No. 6.49/235, March 1996, London.

8. Grosshandler W. L., Gann R. G, and Pitts W. M., National Institute ofStandards and Technology. April 1994. NIST SP 861 p.1.

9. Revised Taylor G. M.; Halogenated Agents and Systems. Section 6/ chapter18 p. 281. National Fire Protection Association.
http://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp


4/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 3


10. Butler J.H., Elkins J. W., Hall B. D., Cummings S. O., and Mintzka S. A.,

Adecrease in the Growth Rates of Atmospheric Halon Concentrations. Vol359, p. 403. Nature. October 1992.

11. Atmospheric Chlorine: CFCs and Alternative Fluorocarbons.Http://www.afeas.org/atm_cl.html. EPA report, March 1998.

5 DEFINITIONS

5.1 Active Protection

Active design solutions require devices to monitor a process variable and functionto mitigate a hazard. Active solutions are sometimes referred to as engineeringcontrols. Examples are the use of a pressure safety valve or rupture disk to

prevent vessel overpressure or an interlock of a high level sensing device to avessel inlet valve and pump motor to prevent liquid overfill of the vessel.

5.2 Chemical Means of Extinguishment

Chemical agents extinguish fires by interfering with the chemical reactions of fire.Extinguishment is achieved faster than by physical means.

5.3 Class A Fires

Fires in ordinary combustible materials such as wood, cloth, paper, tapes,diskettes, rubber, and many plastics. These typically produce deep seated fires.

5.4 Class B FiresFires in flammable liquids, solvents, glycols, methanol, oils, greases, tars,oilbase paints, lacquers, and flammable gases

5.5 Class C Fires

Fires that involve energized electrical equipment where the electricalnonconductivity of the extinguishing media is of importance. Examples are firesresulting from overheated cable insulation or fire in an energized transformer orswitchgear.

5.6 Halocarbon Agent

A clean agent that contains as primary components one or more of the elementsfluorine, chlorine, bromine, or iodine. Examples are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), andfluoroiodocarbons (FICs).

5.7 Inert Gas Agent

A clean agent that contains as primary components one or more of the gasesargon, nitrogen, helium or neon, or a blend of these, which may also containcarbon dioxide as a secondary components.


5/21


6/21

Fig 1. HALON SUBTITUTION EVALUATION

HalonReplacement

EvaluationComplete

ConsiderNonHalonbased

No

Yes

EvaluationComplete

FireProtectionRequired

NonHalon

System

Performance

Okay

(Risk Analysis)

Fire ProtectionNeed Assessment

NonHalonbasedReplacement System

Subtitute Agents

Install Gaseous

System

Install

NonHalon

Yes

No

7.1

6.0

6.1

6.2

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 5



7/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 6


6.1 Risk Analysis

The risk analysis stipulated in Figure 1 shall address both the likelihood and theconsequence of the fire hazard. The fire likelihood should take into accounthistorical incident data when available. Sources or such information can bePDVSA experience or PDVSAs insurance underwriters. When such informationis not readily available, the approach should use failure analysis concepts. Faulttree analysis is an effective technique for assessing the likely frequency of fires.A suggestive fault tree is provided in Figure 2. By assigning failure rates to thevarious events, the top event frequency can be estimated.

The consequence analysis of the potential fire shall consider the following factors:

1. Primary asset damage and financial loss potential

2. Time to repair damage and business interruption potential

3. Personnel safety and injury potential

4. Impairment of plant safety systems due to damage sustained

5. Loss of critical business data

The risk level associated with the estimated frequency and consequences shallbe assessed using approved PDVSA IRS02.

Depending on the results of the risk assessment, refer to Figure 1 and continuethe stipulated logic sequence.

Fig 2. FAULT TREE
http://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santphttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://ir-s-02.pdf/http://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp/mir/indice_mir.htmhttp://www.intevep.pdv.com/santp


8/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 7


6.2 Considerations for Halon Replacement

6.2.1 Inherently Safer Design New Installations

The adoption of design criteria to reduce the probability of occurrence for fires andfor specifying materials, equipment or systems that limit fire propagation,constitute preventive actions which are more important than the decision to installan extinguishing system to reduce consequences. Therefore, the justification fora fire extinguishing system can be questioned when other design resources havenot been considered to prevent the occurrence and development of an event.

Examples of other design resources that can be considered are:

Enclosures or divisions to confine / separate the risk

Control of flammable materials and potential ignition sources Activation of power switches or process shutdown that stop the succession

/ extension of an event

Providing materials of difficult combustion, fire resistant or that prevent flamepropagation

Inherently safer designs eliminate or mitigate the hazard by using materials andprocess conditions that are less hazardous. The most important principles ofinherent safety principles are summarized below (Ref. 6):

Intensification. Using small quantities of hazardous substances or eliminating

them if possible. Substitution. Replacing a material with a less hazardous substance

Attenuation. Using less hazardous conditions or a less hazardous form of amaterial. Selecting a process with a lower risk potential

Limitation of Effects. Designing facilities that minimize the impact of a releaseof a hazardous material or energy

Simplification. Designing facilities that make operating errors less likely.Reducing number of leak sources (flanges, valves, instrument connections,etc.), and minimizing the ignition sources.

Tolerance. Make equipment robust and that are forgiving of errors that are

made, processes that go to bad quality, not to an uncontrolled reaction orcondition. Design with sufficient material corrosion properties and toughnessfactors.

Examples of these principles can help reduce the need for fixed extinguishingsystems are given in the following sections.

a. Intensification

The process designer shall seek practical opportunities to reduce inventories ofhazardous materials:


9/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 8


Minimize the need for all intermediate hazardous material storage.

Minimize quantities of storage by assuring timely and reliable supplyThe amount of hazardous material that can be transported or contained in a pipecan be sizable, specially in larger plants, thus a point should be made to minimizethese inventories:

Pipe size should not exceed the sized required for meeting the processrequirements. The exception being if the pipe size is less than 2, becausesmall piping is more vulnerable to failure.

Routing shall be as direct as possible to avoid unnecessary lengths of pipe butensuring that pipe is routed to minimize potential for external impact, exposureto corrosive environments, etc.

Limit number of pipe fittings to those strictly required in order to reduce potentialleak points.

b. Substitution

When possible, the designer should explore less hazardous materials for theprocess. For example,

Use of lower risk equipment such as non hydrogen evolving batteries

Use of non combustible materials for enclosures and the equipment and fluidshoused within the enclosure (cast resin transformers in place of oilfilledtransformers)

c. Attenuation

This measure reduces risk by using the least severe values in process parametersthat are allowed in the process or a less hazardous form of the material.

Reduce to the minimum the potential pressure differential between differentparts of the same equipment (such as a heat exchanger).

d. Limitation of Effects

Appropriate selection of the location where the equipment will be placed and theseparation between the equipment and vulnerable areas is an effective way tolimit the effects of an accidental release.

The site or location of the storage tanks shall consider ways to minimize knockoneffects on nearby facilities and offsite effects to the public in the event of release.

To avoid offsite effects, the toxic and flammable materials shall be stored as faras possible from the site fence.

Buffer zones between hazardous materials storage and offsite should becalculated and respected whenever possible.

appropriate distance must be maintained between the hazardous materialunloading, storage and process areas.


10/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 9


Reduce number of junction boxes and other items that can cause ignition

Limit number of internal combustion machines to those strictly essential andlocate them out of classified areas diverting the exhaust to an area where itcannot be an ignition source.

Avoid installation of hot fluid piping close to flammable fluid piping.

Locate daily service fuel tanks outside machinery enclosures.

Locate offices, control rooms, emergency electrical generator, fire fightingpumping systems upwind of hydrocarbon process or storage areas.

Locate open fire equipment such as process heaters upwind of hydrocarbonprocess or storage areas.

Locate flare and vent systems downwind of hydrocarbon process or storage

areas. Install power electrical cables and instrument cable in different cable trays.

Limit the enclosure volume of the areas where accumulation of hydrocarbonsis possible.

Minimize the areas where corrosive products are present.

Buffer zones and minimum distance between equipment to avoid knockoneffects shall be estimated using atmospheric dispersion and consequenceanalysis simulations of credible worstcase release scenarios as described in thePDVSA document IRS02.

Adequate emergency access shall be considered in the design stage as a way to

limit the consequences of emergencies:

Easy access to isolation and depressurization of equipment.

Easy access and escape during emergencies.

Possibility of manual activation of fixed fire fighting valves.

Possibility of access to depressurization valves of failed equipment.

Possibility of close proximity to failed equipment to allow use of manual fireextinguishing equipment.

Possibility of access in the opposite direction to smoke diffusion.

Possibility of easy escape and evacuation of personnel not involved in

emergency response.e. Simplification /Tolerance

The designer should simplify the system to avoiding possibilities for human error.

Use of dedicated piping is almost always preferred to multiuse piping.

Group areas which require similar maintenance frequency

Group areas which require similar fire protection

Reduce the equipment for which replacement parts/materials are expensive orhard to obtain


11/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 10


Easy access during operation

Easy and safe access for collection of samples

Easy access to hot spots in electrical installation

Immediate identification of release point

6.2.2 Fixed Systems

a. New

The decision to install a new fire protection systems shall be based on the resultsof an extensive risk analysis (see 6.1) to determine, firstly, if a protection systemis needed, and secondly, to study any alternatives to halon. Such alternatives shallinclude consideration of inherently safer design options as discussed in. When theneed for a halon replacement extinguishment system is confirmed, it is necessaryto take into account the following recommendations:

1. Control rooms and computer processing rooms:

Very early fire detection systems with alarm and a cut off of power system.

Automatic CO2extinguishing systems under the false floor.

Preaction sprinkler systems, wetpipe fire sprinkler in the room, or in theabsence of such systems, portable CO2or water monitors.

2. Motor control rooms, telecommunication rooms, switch gear room, andgeneral electrical and electronic equipment:

Very early fire detection system with alarm and cut off of power system and

automatic discharge of CO2. In this case, provisions shall be taken for thecase of personnel present in the moment of the discharge. A preset alarmwith retarding action is recommended to be used in the evacuation of thearea or building before the system enter in uses.

3. Other infrequent applications such as floating roof tanks, turbines, vents,etc.:

Apply the PDVSA Standards of the Risk Engineering Manual in eachparticular case. Following these Standards, halon will be substituted byfoam in the case of tanks and by CO2in the case of turbines and vents.

4. Explosion prevention and suppression:

In PDVSA installations halon is not used for this particular application.However, it is normal practice to install gas detection systems with alarm at20% of LFL (Lower Flammable Limit) and selective shutdown of equipmentand/or plant at 40% of LFL, as it is specified in the PDVSA standards of theRisk Engineering Manual.

b. Existing System Replacement

The review of options for replacement of an existing halonbased extinguishmentsystem shall be based on the result of an extensive risk analisis (see 6.1). If a fire


12/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 11


protection is required, an evaluation of approved halon substitutes shall be done

(see Section 7.1) Software programs are available from agent suppliers foranalysis of existing halonbased systems, which assess performance withsubstitute agents. If substitution is not a viable option for technical reasons, thennonhalon based replacement options recommended in Section 6.2.2.a shall befollowed. For guidance in the selection of an acceptable replacement system, thefollowing replacement system advantages and disadvantages should beconsidered.

1. Wet type sprinkler systems utilizing, recessed, quick response heads andif necessary, a CO2system protecting the subfloor

Advantages

These water based systems are very economical and easy to install, easyto maintain, quick response heads will offer faster response (up to 3 timesas fast) than standard heads and the recessed feature will eliminate thepotential for mechanical damage, environmental friendliness of water, noagent storage space required, except for that of CO2.

Disadvantages

Potential water damage to sensitive energized equipment, need for firepump and water tank.

2. Wet type sprinkler systems utilizing automatic, OnOff heads and ifnecessary, a CO2system for protecting the subfloor.

Advantages

Water based systems are very economical, easy to maintain, OnOff headswill minimize the possibility of water damage by limiting the volume of waterdischarge, environmental friendliness of water, no agent storage spacerequired, except for that of CO2.

Disadvantages

Potential water damage to sensitive energized equipment, need for a firepump and water tank. Potential for mechanical damage to the OnOff headsdue to the incapability to conceal or recess these types of heads (theseheads typically extend 4 6 inches from the ceiling level), higher costs

associated with OnOff heads (approximately 5 times more costly thanstandard and/or quick response heads)

3. Preaction, doubleinterlocking sprinkler system and if necessary, a CO2system protecting the subfloor.

Advantages

Water based systems are very economical, easy to maintain, preaction,doubleinterlocking feature will reduce presence of false alarms byincorporating additional initiating features prior to alarm/activation,


13/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 12


environmental friendliness of water, no agent storage space required,

except for that of CO2.

Disadvantages

Potential water damage to sensitive energized equipment, increase in costvs. standard, wet system, need for a fire pump and water tank.

c. Maintenance of Existing System

Independently of the actions to be proposed, the following actions shall be carriedout for any extinguishing system based on halon 1301 while it is maintained inoperation.

1. The livedischarge test of halon are completely prohibited.

2. Adopt the Door Fan Test for the protected environment instead ofdischarging the halon system to test its efficacy. The Door Fan Test allowsdetermination of whether the system will achieve and maintain the minimumspecific concentration for fire extinguishing and is currently the bestalternative available to find leaks in a closed area and evaluate its integrity.

3. Evaluate the reliability of the fixed systems, carrying out pressure test of thepiping systems that confirm the absence of obstructions and that simulatethe maximum flow through them.

4. Ensure the distribution and discharge of the extinguishing agent, such thatit is uniformly distributed in the protected environment. This must be doneusing computerized programs provided by the system design manufacturer.

5. Review the fire detection systems that trigger the halon system to determineits actuation speed. In cases of low detection speeds, consider the redesignof the detection system to install one faster and more efficient, in order toallow a manual intervention before the halon system is discharged.

6. Establish strict controls to prevent accidental discharges of the extinguishingagent. If this occur, do not proceed to recharge the system.

Revise the type of activation of the system and evaluate the characteristicsof the protected asset, in order to determine the need for automatic

activation. In so far possible, manual activation shall be adopted overautomatic activation to prevent false discharges

6.2.3 Portable Extinguishers

In case of existing halon portable fire extinguishers they will be replaced asindicated below:

a. Electrical equipment. Replace with CO2

b. Computer Equipment. Replace with CO2


14/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 13


c. Control Rooms. Replace with CO2

d. In any other circumstance, consider the use of water extinguishers, drychemical powder and/or foam.

7 HALON REPLACEMENT OPTIONSThese are some recommendations for halon substitute agents including chemicalagents, inert gases and powders. These recommendations reflect currentindustry practices and preferred halon alternative solutions.

7.1 Gaseous Substitute Agents

This alternative involves several agent options available in todays market, eachvarying in cost, effectiveness and chemical makeup. By types, the alternativesare divided into chemical agents, inert gases and powders. The chemical agentsinclude FM200and CO2. The most recognizable inert gas is Inergen (amixture of argon, nitrogen and carbon dioxide). Aerosols fall into the powdercategory. These types of products are the least developed and have not receivedan Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM) listing or approval.Substitute agents that are identified as HCFCs such as Halotronand NAFSIIIshould not be considered as viable options due to their phaseout deadline of2020.

To assist in limiting the numerous gaseous agent options to those approved and

deemed safe and efficient, the following should be consulted:

UL

FM

NFPA 2001Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems

U.S EPA Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) List

Both UL and FM will identify those agents and systems approved or listed for use,NFPA 2001 establishes requirements for design, maintenance and installation,and the SNAP list approves agents based on environmental effects and safety.

7.1.1 Approved Substitute Agents

The following description and analysis includes those substitute agents that havereceived recognition, listings and/or approvals from UL, FM, SNAP and NFPA2001:

a. FM200is the trade name for HFC227ea. The agent is a halocarbon and isa complex chemical mixture of hydrogen, carbon, and fluorine. Its full name isheptaflouropropane. As is true with most halocarbons, it extinguishes primarilyby interfering with the production of free radicals, necessary for sustaining a fire,


15/21


16/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 15


successful. Testing by the Modular Protection Corporation1indicates that for low

energy levels consistent with those found in electrical equipment theextinguishing concentration must be increased to 8%. This 8% value is theminimum test concentration, which did not result in reignition. A safety factor,20% is typical, would increase concentrations to 9.6%, exceeding the NOAEL.

Ideally, all agents needed at a facility could be stored in a single bulk storage area.However, the poor flow characteristics of FM200prohibit pipe runs of over 150feet as well as elevation changes associated with multiple stories. Therefore,FM200must be stored in close proximity to the areas they protect.

1. Advantages

Agent cost FM200and recycled Halon 1301 is basically the same but requires

approximately 1.67 times the storage space of Halon 1301, extensive health andsafety test information available, possibility of using existing Halon 1301 systempiping hardware (if low pressure system exists)

2. Disadvantages

Design concentration (7%) close to NOAEL (9%), required agent storageproximity to protected areas due to agent flow restraints

b. CEA410 is a perflourobutane consisting of carbon and fluorine. The agent isalso known as FC3110 and is produced by 3M. The agent is on the SNAP list,is UL listed and FMRC approved, and meets the requirements of NFPA 2001.

The agents design concentration is between 6% and 9.2%, weighs approximatelytwice as much as Halon 1301 and requires 1.67 times Halon 1301 by volume. Thiswill result in an increase in agent storage space. The agent shows flowcharacteristics similar to Halon 1301 and could feasibly use the same piping usedin Halon 1301 systems.

The agent is approved for use in occupied areas. In fact, it is considered safe inconcentrations up to 24%. However, CEA410 is not as environmentallyacceptable as many of the other agents on the SNAP list due to a high GWP (5,500based on a period of 100 years) and atmospheric lifetime of 2,500 years. As aresult, an evaluation must be made to address the need to use CEA410 over

greener alternatives. This evaluation must be available for review whenrequested by regulating agencies. The environmental impact of this agent mayresult in future restrictions on its use.

CEA410 is a Perfluorocarbon (PFC) and produces toxic compounds similar toFM200during decomposition. CEA410 has an added advantage in reducingthe production of these toxic compounds by increasing the design concentrationwithout exceeding the NOAEL. Increased design concentration has been shown

1 The Modular Protection Corporation has performed the only tests on live electrical equipment. All results pre-

sented for live electrical equipment are from their testing.


17/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 16


to reduce decomposition products by quicker extinguishment. CEA410 also

produces no damaging water condensation although discharge results in anoticeable fog.

CEA410 has been successful in extinguishing live electrical equipment fires.Successful test concentrations where 8%, which, with a safety factor of 20%,yields a design concentration of 9.6%. Unlike with FM200, the NOAEL is notexceeded.

Similar to FM200, the poor flow characteristics of CEA410 prohibit pipe runsof over 150 feet as well as elevation changes associated with multiple stories.Therefore, this agent must be stored in close proximity to the areas they protect.

1. Advantages

Requires approximately 1.67 times the storage space of Halon 1301, designconcentrations (6% to 9.2%) well below NOAEL (40%), possibility that existingHalon 1301 pipe network may be reused (if low pressure Halon 1301 systemexists).

2. Disadvantages

Not as environmentally accepted as other agents, therefore, it is possibly subjectto future regulations, only viable for use after documentation that other agentscannot be used per SNAP, high cost per pound vs. Halon 1301, required agentstorage proximity to protected areas due to agent flow restraints.

c. Inergenis the trade name for IG541. It is a mixture of two inert gases, nitrogenand argon, with CO2. Inergen

extinguishes fires by reducing the oxygen levelto under 15% which is the minimum oxygen concentration to support combustionin most circumstances. This is equivalent to a 37.5% Inergenconcentration.CO2is added to increase the respiration rate of occupants remaining in the room.This technique has come under question but nonetheless the agent has beendeemed safe for use in occupied areas although evacuation is required within 30seconds of discharge if agent concentration exceeds 42% and before the agentconcentration reaches 52%.

The agent is on the SNAP list, is UL, and is recognized by NFPA 2001. As typical

of inert gas agents, Inergen

has no ODP or GWP and is, therefore, safe fromfuture regulations. The UL listing is for engineered and preengineered systems.

The design concentration for Inergenis 38%. This value is significantly higherthan Halon 1301s design concentration of 4.2%. In addition, it takes over 2 timesthe amount of agent by weight to protect the same volume space with Halon 1301.This equates to approximately 11 times the storage space of Halon 1301.Inergensystems are designed with a typical system pressure of 2,175 psi, whichis substantially higher than that of a high pressure Halon 1301 system (600 psi).


18/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 17


Inergenoffers advantages over HFCs and PFCs in corrosivity. Inergenresults

in no corrosive decomposition products. Inergen

also does not produce ameasurable temperature drop or water condensation.

Preliminary tests with Inergenhave yielded test concentrations of 4142% forextinguishing of live electrical fires. Test results have not yet been finalized orpublished but the preliminary figures yield design concentrations exceeding the42% NOAEL.

Inergen, relative to Halon 1301 and even FM200, is not very costly. This isdue to the simple chemical composition of Inergen. Inergenis sold by the cubicfoot and not by the pound.

Inergenis the only agent, which lends itself well to long pipe runs that would be

associated with central bulk storage location. Inergen

can be transported asmany as three typical stories vertically as well as a substantial distancehorizontally.

The largest drawback of Inergen is the large amount of agent needed forextinguishment. The agent requires substantially more storage space than Halon1301.

1. Advantages

Replacement or recharge of agent is less costly than that of Halon 1301, noenvironmental concerns (0 OPD, GWP, and atmospheric lifetime), designconcentration (37.5%) below NOAEL (43%)

2. Disadvantages

Large storage space required, approximately 11 times that of Halon 1301, nopossibility of reusing existing Halon 1301 system pipe hardware

d. FE13TMis the trade name for HFC23. The agent is chemically known as CHF3..

The agent is on the SNAP list, listed by UL, and approved by FMRC and NFPA2001 recognized. The product extinguishes fire by interfering with the chemicalchain reaction and absorbing heat.

The agent weighs approximately 1.95 times Halon 1301, and it has a volume 2.8times larger than Halon 1301. The design concentration is 18%. Therefore, largerstorage space is required. As with FM200and CEA410, FE13TMhas flowcharacteristics similar to Halon 1301 and may be able to reuse existing Halon1301 piping hardware.

One advantage of the agent is its high NOAEL, 30%. Compared to its designconcentration, 18%, there is considerable design flexibility before the NOAELlimits are reached. Another attribute that distinguishes itself from the other agentoptions is its effectiveness in cold environments up to40F.


19/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 18


In regards to environmental concerns, FE13TM has an ODP of 0 and an

atmospheric lifetime of 280 years.1. Advantages

Design concentration (18%) is well below NOAEL (30%), agent is effective in coldtemperature up to40F possibility that existing Halon 1301 pipe network may bereused.

2. Primary Disadvantage

High atmospheric lifetime compared to other substitute agents and therefore,possibly subject to future regulations.

7.2 Fire Alarm and Detection System OptionsThe fire alarm and detection system is critical for proper activation of both gaseousHalon 1301 substitute agents and waterbased systems (i.e., preaction system).There are two alarm and detection system options available:

Standard system consisting of conventional spottype smoke or heat detectors,and early warning system (i.e., laser detectors or airsampling detection).

The standard system will provide adequate detection and initiation of the firesuppression system. However, if the current investment of protected equipmentor the facilitys safety objectives warrant early and faster detection and response

to a fire emergency, then an early warning system can be implemented.Currently, the early warning alarm and detection system consists of either lasertype detectors or air detection systems.

7.2.1 Laser Type Detection System

The laser detector type system consists of a control panel, laser detectors andsignal processing software. The control panel is equipped with an ultrahighspeed microprocessor. The laser detectors operate on a photoelectric typedetector principle, except that it utilizes a controlled laser diode, chamber and lighttrap to detect the smoke scattering of the laser (i.e., light). The chamber includes

a mirror device which is electrically charged to detect dust and false alarms.These detectors have a sensitivity range of 0.031.0% per foot and have acoverage area of 400 ft. These detectors are substantially more sensitive thantypical photoelectric detectors which have a sensitivity range of 12% per foot.Finally, the software offers nine (9) levels of alarm sensitivity selection perdetector, drift compensation, automatic testing, day/night compensation andmaintenance alert capabilities.

This system is UL listed, and the cost of these types of detectors, areapproximately three (3) times the cost of standard photoelectric detectors.


20/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 19


a. Advantages

Wider range of sensitivity detection, addressable system and components, whichoffers the capability of pinpointing fire location, more cost effective whencompared to air type system when protecting relatively small areas less than8,000 ft (or less than 20 detectors), continuously supervises all systemcomponents and wiring.

b. Disadvantages

Not retrofit friendly and system components are not compatible with othermanufacturers, application in high air velocity areas such as clean rooms isquestionable.

7.2.2 Air Sampling SystemAn airtype system consists of an aspirator or pump, control panel, detector, andfilter air ductwork. Air samples are drain into the detector by the air aspiratorutilizing the air ductwork equipped with smallbore ports. Once inside thedetector, the air sample is exposed to a highly intensive light source. Thescattering of this light source from particles in the air sample such as smoke willgenerate an alarm signal to the control panel. The detector has a wide sensitivityrange of .00156.0% per foot. This range is even far more sensitive than that ofthe laser detection system. These systems are also UL listed and FMRCapproved. Some manufacturers include VESDA, IFD Cirrusand EnvironmentOne.

a. Advantages

More sensitive than laser detection type system, retrofit friendly, detector and airnetwork can be tied into any control panel type, more cost effective than laserdetection system when protecting larger areas greater than 8,000 ft(or greaterthan 20 laser detectors).

b. Disadvantages

Air aspirator or pump life expectancy is only 7 years, system cannot supervise airnetwork (i.e., ductwork and ports) for trouble conditions.

7.3 Power Shut Tripping or Deenergizing of Equipment

As with the waterbased, preaction sprinkler system, consideration should alsobe given to methods for turning off power or deenergizing electrical equipment.FM200, CEA410 and Inergenhave all been successfully used on electricalequipment. However, if an electrical malfunction was the cause of ignition, andelectrical power is not removed, then the fire could reignite once the agentconcentration in the room disperses. Additionally, higher concentrations arerequired to extinguish live electrical fires. In the case of FM200and Inergen,


21/21

REVISION FECHA



PDVSA IRS12

Pgina 20


this higher concentration exceeds the NOAEL, requiring evacuation of the space

within 30 seconds of discharge. Leaving equipment energized also results in anincreased extinguishing time, which translates into increased HF production.

It should be also pointed out that providing this feature can be very difficult andcostly due to varying electrical equipment type and age along with the supply ofelectricity.

8 FINAL DISPOSAL OF HALONThe final disposal of halon is an important topic and it is being discussedaccordingly in order to establish an environmentally acceptable solution. Whilethis final solution is being achieved, the following considerations shall be

addressed.

8.1 The venting of halon into the atmosphere for final disposal is totally prohibited.

8.2 Thought must be given to recycling those volumes of halon that have beendecommissioned, and the two options mentioned below shall be taken intoaccount:

a. Redistribute within the Petrochemical and Petroleum Industry (IPPN), in thecase of a need.

b.Send to the supplier or, if not possible, to the manufacturer, for final disposal

Option b. (above shall be the preferred choice). In case that redistribution of halonis decided, the redistribution of halon within IPPN may be accomplished byimplementing a halon Management Plan comprising of the following steps:

Depositing the halon inventory from the converted systems into a halon bank,to draw upon for critical systems.

Ir s 12 Sustitutos Halon

Documents

Transcript of Ir s 12 Sustitutos Halon