IPCablecom Security

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IPCablecom Security IPCablecom Security Eric Rosenfeld, CableLabs Sasha Medvinsky, Motorola Simon Kang, Motorola ITU IPCablecom Mediacom Workshop March 13, 2002 Geneva, Switzerland

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IPCablecom Security. Eric Rosenfeld, CableLabs Sasha Medvinsky, Motorola Simon Kang, Motorola. ITU IPCablecom Mediacom Workshop March 13, 2002 Geneva, Switzerland. Agenda. IPCablecom Overview How it Works Services and Capabilities Security Goals of IPCablecom - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of IPCablecom Security

Page 1: IPCablecom Security

IPCablecom SecurityIPCablecom SecurityEric Rosenfeld, CableLabs

Sasha Medvinsky, MotorolaSimon Kang, Motorola

ITU IPCablecom Mediacom WorkshopMarch 13, 2002

Geneva, Switzerland

Page 2: IPCablecom Security

AgendaAgenda

• IPCablecom Overview• How it Works• Services and Capabilities• Security Goals of IPCablecom• IPCablecom Security Architecture • Security Mechanisms & Component• Summary

Page 3: IPCablecom Security

What is IPCablecom?What is IPCablecom?

IPCablecom is a set of standards that define protocols and functional requirements for the purpose of

providing Quality-of-Service (QoS) enhanced secure communications

using the Internet Protocol (IP) over the cable television Hybrid Fiber

Coax (HFC) J.112 network

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IPCablecom FrameworkIPCablecom Framework

Broadband Modem Physical Layer

Media Access Control

Internet Protocol

IPCablecom Protocols

Voice/Video TelephonyConferencing

Video/DataApplications

J.112

IPCablecom

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IPCablecomServers

PSTN

IPCablecom How it WorksIPCablecom How it Works

HFC

J.112Cable Modem

CMTS(J.112 AN)

Cable IP Network

Internet

Upgrade toUpgrade toIPCablecomIPCablecom

+ MTA

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IPCablecom ArchitectureIPCablecom Architecture

Managed IP Backbone

(QoS Features)(Headend, Local, Regional)

PSTN

Media Gateway

Signaling Gateway

Call ManagementServer

HFC accessnetwork

(J.112)

MTA

Embedded MTA

CMTS

HFC accessnetwork

(J.112)

CableModemMTA

Embedded MTA

CMTS

Media GatewayController

OSS Back Office

MediaServers

Announcement ServersConference Mixing Bridges

...

BillingProvisioningProblem ResolutionDHCP ServersTFTP Servers

Key Distribution Center (KDC)

CableModem

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IPCablecom : What Equipment?IPCablecom : What Equipment?

• Home:– Embedded Multimedia Terminal Adapter (MTA) --

cable modem with RJ-11 jacks

• Headend:– Cable Modem Termination System (CMTS): J.112 AN– IPCablecom Servers: Call Management Server

(CMS), Record Keeping Server (RKS), Device Provisioning Server, Key Distribution Center (KDC)

– Gateways: To link IP calls to backbone or PSTN

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And now the security…And now the security…

Page 9: IPCablecom Security

Why do we need security?Why do we need security?

• Threats to the IPCablecom Network– Threats exist because:

• Shared network• Access in the users home• Valued functionality

– Types of threats:• Network attacks• Theft of service• Eavesdropping• Denial of Service

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Security Services provided by Security Services provided by J.112J.112

• Baseline Privacy Interface + (BPI+)– Privacy between the Cable Modem and CMTS

• DES encryption

– Protection from theft of Service• Authentication of Cable Modems via X.509 digital

certificates

– Enable secure code download to the Cable Modem• Authentication of Cable Modem software image via

X.509 Code Verification Certificate

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BPI+ Applicability to BPI+ Applicability to IPCablecomIPCablecom

• Embedded MTAs rely on Cable Modem for secure code download

• Privacy of J.112 QoS messages prevents some denial of service attacks

• Theft of Service protection doesn’t apply:– CPEs behind a CM are not authenticated– IP Telephony servers also not authenticated

• Additional security at application layer is needed to protect IPCablecom services

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IPCablecom Security ObjectivesIPCablecom Security Objectives• End-to-end secure communication

– Must be at least as secure as PSTN networks

• Protection for the user– Ensure privacy of media sessions

• Protection for the operator– Combat theft-of-service– Protect infrastructure

• Comprehensive plan– Who/What needs to protect and why?– When/Why do we protect this information?– How will we incorporate security?

Page 13: IPCablecom Security

IPCablecom Security ObjectivesIPCablecom Security Objectives

• Use open standards whenever possible

• Conduct a risk assessment• Provide a reasonable level of security• Specify Interface security

– No device or operator network security• Assume operators must have reasonable

network management security policy

• Require J.112 networks with BPI+ enabled

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IPCablecom Security IPCablecom Security ArchitectureArchitecturepkt-s20: TGCP

pkt-s4: : RTCP (IPSec / CMS-based KM)

pkt-s4: : RTCP (IPSec / CMS-based KM)pkt-s3: RTP (Cipher + HMAC / CMS-based KM

pkt-s3: RTP (Cipher + HMAC / CMS-based KM

pkt-s16: C

MS

S

pkt-s16: C

MS

S

pkt-s16: CMSS

pkt-s1: TFTP (CMS)

pkt-s0 : SNMP

pkt-s18: IntServ+ RSVP

pkt-s21: UDP

pkt-s8: COPS (IPSec / IKE-)

pkt-s1

0: TG

CP

pkt -s 1

1: IST

P

pkt-s9: TCAP/IP

pkt-s2: DOCSIS 1.1

pkt-s24: UD

P

pkt-s22: UD

P

pkt-s12: PKINIT

pkt-s23:UD

P pkt-s6: R

adiu

s

pkt-s7: Radius

pkt-s14: P

KC

RO

SS

pk

t- s5

: NC

S

pkt-s17:Kerberos

Issue KerberosTickets

MT

A

TF

TP

SE

RV

ER

OS

S

CM

TS

CM

CM

Spkt-s15: Gate Coordination Msgs

Re

mo

teM

TA

MG

SG

MS

OK

DC

PR

OV

SE

RV

TE

LE

PH

ON

YK

DC

pkt-s13: PK

INIT

EB

PCM

S

Re m

ot e

Tel ep

ho

ny

KD

CEd

ge

Ro

ute

r

Ed

ge

Ro

ute

r

pkt-s19: DiffServ+

Aggregated RSVP

MP

C

MP

DF

DF

CM

SM

TA

MG

IPS

ec / IKE

+

IPS

ec / I KE

-I P

Sec / I K

E-

IPSec / IKE-

IPS

ec / IKE

-

BPI+ / BPIKM

RK

S

I PS

ec / Kerb

er os + P

KI N

I T

IPS

ec / IKE

-

IPSec / IKE-

IPSec / IKE-

Radius authenticator / CMS-based KM

Issue Kerberos Tickets

Issue Kerberos Tickets

SNMPv3 Security

IPSec / IKE-

IPS

ec / Kerberos

IPS

ec / Kerberos

IPSec / Kerberos

RSVP Integrity Object

pkt-s17:Kerberos

Issue KerberosTickets

RSVP Integrity Object

IPSec / IKE+

MG

C

pkt-s25: RadiusIPSec / IKE-

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Security MechanismsSecurity Mechanisms

• Kerberos– Centralized network authentication via

a Key Distribution Center (KDC)– Public Key Initialization (PKINIT)

• Digital Certificates are used to authenticate the MTA to the KDC and KDC to MTA

– Key Management• Allows MTAs and CMSs to agree on

cryptographic keys for secure communications

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Security MechanismsSecurity Mechanisms

• IPsec– IP-layer security protocol (IETF standard)– Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)

• Transport mode for end-to-end security• Privacy/authentication/integrity of payload

– 3DES, HMAC SHA1 or HMAC MD5

– Initial Authentication & Key Management provided by:

• Kerberos+PKINIT for MTAs• Internet Key Exchange (IKE) with pre-shared keys

for infrastructure components (CMS, CMTS, RKS, Gateways)

Page 17: IPCablecom Security

Security MechanismsSecurity Mechanisms

• SNMPv3 security– SNMPv3 is used to monitor & manage

MTAs– Initial Authentication & Key

Management• Kerberos+PKINIT

– Message Authentication & Integrity• HMAC MD5 algorithm

– Privacy (optional)• DES algorithm

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Security MechanismsSecurity Mechanisms

• Call Signaling Security– NCS, TCAP/IP, ISTP, and TGCP Protocols– Protocol security provided by IPsec– Mix of authentication & key

management technologies:• IKE with pre-shared keys for servers

– Default for IPsec, comes bundled with off-the-shelf implementations

• Kerberos+PKINIT for MTAs– Needed to address scalability issues on

the CMS-MTA interface

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Security MechanismsSecurity Mechanisms• RTP/RTCP (Media Stream)

– Initial Authentication• Each end-point (MTA or MG)

authenticated by the Call Management Server

– Key Management• Via IPsec-secured Network-based Call

Signaling (NCS)

– Privacy• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

– Authentication & Integrity (optional)• MMH (Multilinear Modular Hash)

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Key Distribution Center (KDC)Key Distribution Center (KDC)• The only standalone security

component in IPCablecom• Acts as a trusted third-party

authentication service• Implements:

– Kerberos version 5– PKINIT w/X.509 digital certificates

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Multimedia Terminal AdapterMultimedia Terminal Adapter• X.509 Digital Certificates for

authentication– IP Telephony Root CA Certificate– MTA Manufacturer CA Certificate– MTA Device Certificate

• MTA Private Key

• FIPS 140-1 Cryptographic Module– Level 1 required (minimal physical security)– Additional physical security recommended for

higher value services

• Random Number Generator• AES, MMH, IPsec, Kerberos+PKINIT• Embedded J.112 CM with BPI+

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Device Provisioning ServerDevice Provisioning Server

• Authentication & Key Management– Kerberos+PKINIT authentication

• Integrity & Privacy– SNMPv3 security

• Authentication– HMAC MD5

• Privacy (optional)– DES

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PSTN GatewaysPSTN Gateways• Media Gateway Controller (MGC)

– IPsec,IKE w/pre-shared keys for call signaling

• Media Gateway (MG)– AES, MMH for media stream– IPsec, IKE w/pre-shared keys for call

signaling

• Signaling Gateway (SG)– IPsec, IKE w/pre-shared keys for call

signaling

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Other ComponentsOther Components• Cable Modem Termination System

(CMTS)– J.112 Access Node (AN) w/BPI+– IPsec w/pre-shared keys and RADIUS

authentication for QoS interface with CMS

• Call Management Server (CMS)– IPsec w/pre-shared keys– IPsec w/Kerberized Key Management for

MTAs

• Record Keeping Server (RKS)– IPsec w/pre-shared keys for billing events

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On-Net to Off-Net Media On-Net to Off-Net Media PathPath

PSTN

CableModem

MTAMedia Gateway

Hi Mom. How are you today?

HmDMSmB7HTKgEwLE3aSmttcBYAizqPicdTZKyXxVp7A4GxaPw/BH7kwYtuKxEr3nPS70i15nB+z7miTw2TXwrc+pYGO+FNvIScRQIrlaOqwYUMLF+5LjagzZSlbX8rrw+Y2uE21YZJxIirVuTX/tZI9af16nz75VcF5x0N4YRAjtjwpo3GW0CK+B4ihcg/6

MTA Encrypts

MG Decrypts

Hi Mom. How are you today?

CMTS RTP / RTCP

AES, MMH

Page 26: IPCablecom Security

SummarySummary

• IPCablecom provides QoS-enhanced secure communications

• Security is a major component and is integrated into the architecture

• A range of security protocols and services are used

• IPCablecom security architecture is fully defined in the J.170 recommendation

Page 27: IPCablecom Security

For More Information…For More Information…Eric RosenfeldCableLabsPacketCable Security [email protected]

Sasha MedvinskyMotorolaSenior Staff [email protected]

Simon KangMotorolaInternational Regulatory and Standards [email protected]