Investing in Peace and thePrevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara:Third Regional Conversations

SEPTEMBER 2018

Introduction

Regional security responses to violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara arenecessary, but have been limited in their scope and efficacy. This is in partbecause they have historically addressed the symptoms of violence rather thanthe holistic range of factors that incite and foster it. Violence and violentextremism are complex phenomena that vary from one region to another anddemand contextually specific solutions. In order to transform the conditionsdeemed conducive to violent extremism, regional players at every level mustcommit to serious investment in peacebuilding and peaceful coexistence. The ongoing need for a forum for exchanging ideas and developingmultilateral approaches to violence prevention in the Sahel-Sahara motivatedthe International Peace Institute (IPI), the United Nations Office for WestAfrica and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the Swiss Federal Department of ForeignAffairs (FDFA), and the African Union’s African Centre for the Study andResearch of Terrorism (ACSRT) to organize the third round of RegionalConversations for the Prevention of Violent Extremism, with support fromthe government of Algeria. This meeting was officially opened by the Algerianminister of foreign affairs and brought together more than seventy experts andpractitioners from North, West, and Central Africa: representatives of govern-ments and defense and security forces; political, religious, and traditionalauthorities; members of civil society; representatives of the media and culturalinstitutions; and representatives of regional and international organizationsand partners. Participants agreed that violent extremism is on the rise, a realitythat should motivate those in power to find effective solutions. The Regional Conversations were introduced in 2016 in conjunction withthe Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism launched by the secretary-general of the United Nations. The plan called for “a comprehensiveapproach, to include not only essential security-based measures to combatterrorism, but also systematic prevention measures that directly address thecauses of violent extremism.”1 Prioritizing a regional focus and diverse parti -cipant perspectives, with an emphasis on dialogue, this initiative provides aforum for discussing the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) and connectsactors from varied backgrounds and initiatives representing concrete,programmatic alternatives to violent extremism. The Algiers conversations began with an analysis of factors driving violent

On June 24 and 25, 2018, the thirdRegional Conversations on thePrevention of Violent Extremism inthe Sahel-Sahara took place inAlgiers, Algeria. This event was co-organized by IPI, the United NationsOffice for West Africa and the Sahel(UNOWAS), the Swiss FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs(FDFA), and the African Union’sAfrican Centre for the Study andResearch on Terrorism (ACSRT),with support from the governmentof Algeria. The Algiers conversa-tions followed up on discussionsheld in Dakar in June 2016 andN’Djamena in June 2017 and builtupon a precursor seminar held inTunis in November 2015.

Substantive preparations for theAlgiers meeting were made by acommittee made up of representa-tives from each partner organiza-tion. This summary report waswritten by Aïssata Athie of IPI, onbehalf of the partner organizationsand with their support. The reportreflects the rapporteur’s interpreta-tion of the conversations and is notnecessarily representative of theopinions of all participants.

IPI would like to acknowledge itsgenerous donors and partners,whose support and collaborationmake publications such as thispossible. In particular, IPI would liketo thank the Swiss Confederation.

1 UN General Assembly, Plan of Action of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the Prevention of ViolentExtremism, UN Doc. A/70/674, December 24, 2015.

2 MEETING NOTE

extremism. Participants then addressed factors thatcontribute to resilience and positive peace. Finally,they shared violence-prevention measures taken bydifferent regional actors in order to “turn the tide”and exit the cycle of violence. The conversationswere guided by the need to produce concreterecommendations by and for practitioners in theregion, based on themes identified during previousconversations: state-society relations; politicalparticipation; inclusive dialogue as a transforma-tive tool; cross-border socioeconomic and politicaldynamics; the role of media in prevention efforts;the contribution of defense and security forces; andthe potential for culture, education, and citizenshipto be used as tools for prevention.

The Need for a Multi -dimensional, Inclusive,Dialogue-Based Solution

Security responses to violent extremism in theSahel-Sahara, though sometimes necessary, havelimitations; this transnational threat requires aholistic and comprehensive solution that goesbeyond military action. A multidimensionalapproach is necessary in view of the differentfactors that incite violent extremism. Religion,often viewed as the primary factor, is just oneelement among many. Other factors that should beconsidered in order to understand and respond toroot causes are political, social, and economicinjustice; impunity; desire for revenge; communityinsecurity; poverty; unemployment (especiallyamong young people); poor governance; corrup-tion; marginalization and feelings of exclusion;identity crises; violent regime changes; andresurgence of prior poorly resolved conflicts. The erosion of public institutions has affectedsociety’s capacity to deal with violence. Corruption,poor governance, and lack of transparency castdoubt on the legitimacy of the state and its institu-tions. For example, citizens lose trust in theirjustice system if it is difficult to access andperceived as biased. Instead of investing in institu-tions capable of addressing the root of the problem,governments often concentrate resources in thesecurity sector to respond to short-term threats. The family, as an institution, is also struggling todefend itself against indoctrination and recruit-ment of young people. While participants generally

agreed that the family should be teaching societalvalues and functioning as an early-warning system,some mentioned an “abdication of parentalresponsibility” and a lack of oversight and supervi-sion. Participants expressed concerns that parentsoften have to pull their children from school, feelhelpless to provide them resources or hope for abright future, or actively encourage them to joinviolent causes. Participants likewise noted the loss of traditionalcustoms and practices that have long defendedagainst the rhetoric of hatred and violence. Thishas, in some cases, led to communities losing theirsocial and political influence. What is more,nomadic groups and displacement exacerbated byclimate change in the Sahel-Sahara have promptedthe emergence of tensions between communities.This is especially the case in the central regions ofMali and Niger, where conflicts between nomadicherders and sedentary farmers have multiplied.These inter-community tensions are exploited bymilitias, armed groups, and states to exert control;some people say, “The terrorists aren’t terrorizingus; our own government and the militias are.”Participants recommended encouraging conflictresolution through peaceful, community-leveldialogue and the involvement of traditionalleaders. The persistent and deepening gap between richand poor can also lead citizens to reject the stateand its institutions. This is particularly true duringperiods of political transition or in cross-borderareas far from administrative centers and capitals,where the state struggles to maintain a presenceand populations have difficulty accessing basicservices (especially security services). When thestate fails to ensure the population’s security orcurb its own armed forces’ abuses, violentextremist groups can present themselves as alterna-tives and gain support by promising or providingsecurity, justice, social services, or economicstability. In Libya, for example, violent extremistgroups used the fall of Muammar Qaddafi’s regimeto create and multiply cross-border alliances. In the face of these diverse challenges, partici-pants emphasized the urgent need for a multi -dimensional response that involves all sectors ofsociety. Recognizing that state structures andactions are necessary but insufficient, the whole ofsociety—political actors, opinion leaders, defense

and security forces, educators, women, youth,families, religious and traditional leaders,communities, media, civil society, cultural leaders,and researchers—must be involved as key actors inPVE. Such a response should be presided over by afirm, visible, and inclusive national government. Finally, participants re-emphasized the need fordialogue in changing the approach to PVE.Dialogue can happen within families, schools, andinstitutions; between political and military actors;among communities and their administrators andprotectors; and perhaps even with violent extrem-ists. Likewise, organized fora, where people canshare experiences and issues in a spirit of coexis-tence, are essential.

The Role of Local CivilSociety in PVE

The Algiers conversations paid attention to the roleof local civil society and its relation to the state.Civil society includes not only formal organizationsbut also community leaders, villages and othergroupings of local populations, youth or women’sgroups, and socio-professional associations, all ofwhich can help ensure that development strategiesand prevention projects are adapted to localcontexts rather than the agendas of outsideagendas. Participants discussed cases in whichnational budget priorities have been overlyinfluenced by international donors. They alsoraised the example of Mali’s Conférence d’ententenationale (Conference for National Under -standing), whose recommendation to negotiatewith extremists was abandoned, in part because ofoutside pressure. Participants also spoke about the politicalinclusion of women and youth, especially at thelocal level, as an important component of PVE.This can be achieved, for example, by lowering theminimum age of candidates for political positionsand instituting quotas for representation inpolitical offices; providing capacity-buildingopportunities for those groups; or eliminatingfinancial barriers to participation (campaign costs,transportation, etc.), which are particularly prohib-itive for those in rural areas. Some Algerian officialsshared their experience partnering with UNWomen to provide training for women parliamen-tary candidates. In Tunisia, the national action plan

to implement Security Council Resolution 1325generated a dialogue between the government andcivil society; this resulted in the adoption of aframework law to protect women and supportwomen’s participation in the military, politics, andthe economy. In Algeria and Morocco, “mourchi-dates” (Muslim women preachers and religiousassistants) work alongside their counterparts whoare men to spread Islam’s messages of tolerance notonly in mosques, but also in families, youth homes,hospitals, and schools.

The Media as Tool for PVE

In this age of twenty-four-hour news andomnipresent social media, the media—includingcommunity radio stations, print and onlinepublications, social networks, and audiovisualbroadcasts—can reach actors at all levels, frompoliticians to local communities. The growing useof media and social networks by violent extremistgroups to spread propaganda and conduct recruit-ment highlights the need for media to take anactive role in PVE. Recognizing that impartial,objective media coverage is paramount, partici-pants in the conversations emphasized the need toprevent violent extremist groups from using themedia as a propaganda tool. Though questions offreedom of expression were raised, participantsdetermined that this freedom cannot be absolutewhen used to deliberately incite hatred andviolence. The media can inform, educate, and raiseawareness. Media professionals should researchand report on the realities experienced bycommunities affected by non-state armed actors.Initiatives in Tunisia, Mali, and elsewhere haveproduced web videos of young people testifyingabout local problems, violence, and otherchallenges. Participants also discussed how themedia can promote good governance of theInternet and recognize “fake news,” a tool that canbe used to recruit youth. Finally, the media candedicate publication space or airtime to promoteexisting successful prevention initiatives,increasing the visibility of those projects and givingtheir facilitators a more public voice. Media contributions to PVE, like those outlinedabove, are particularly important at the local level.Specifically, participants mentioned community

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 3

4 MEETING NOTE

radio stations that are geographically, linguistically,and contextually inclusive. Examples of thisinclude broadcasting political cafés (as in Tunisia),making podcasts of discussions between politicalactors and civil society activists, and broadcastingpositive religious messages in order to providealternatives to the rhetoric of extremist groups (asin the Sahel and Nigeria). Some initiatives alsobring media coverage to yet-unreached rural areas. The need for journalists to be trained on PVEstrategies and different types of extremism—notjust religious but also ethnic, nationalist, andmisogynist, all of which threaten social cohesionand are potential sources of violence—was a themethroughout the conversations. Trainings can offer,among other things, strategies for avoiding the useof terms that may have mixed meanings. Finally, participants reiterated that it isimportant to take into account not only traditionalmedia, but also the influence of social networks.They discussed the complex role that online socialconnection can play in recruitment, as well asstrategies to mitigate the potential for such abuse. Participants recommended that a pilotcommittee be created in the context of this initia-tive to formulate a strategy for the production andbroadcast of PVE content, raise awareness andtrain media professionals to this end, and create abest practices guide. A regional forum for journal-ists for peace in the Sahel-Sahara could also becreated to disseminate positive stories, serve as aportal for pro-peace content, raise awarenessamong the media, conduct advocacy initiativesaimed at political leaders, and serve as a database ofcontacts and expert resources. In view of thetransnational and global character of violentextremism, participants recognized that themedia’s contribution to prevention efforts will alsorequire involving international media outlets andthe international community on the importance ofthese fora.

Defense and SecurityForces’ Contributions toPVE

Defense and security forces are at the forefront ofbattling violent extremism, and their contributionto prevention efforts is essential to any holisticapproach.2 Nevertheless, military responses are toooften used because political leaders lack the will tocommit to preventive action or long-term solutionsto conflict. The resulting counterterrorismoperations often involve ill treatment, violence,arbitrary arrest, torture, extortion, and summaryexecution, and perpetrators are rarely heldaccountable. When such actions are dispropor-tionate to the threat, do not respect internationallaw, or are abusive toward the population, they canpush people to join or seek protection with violentextremist groups. In northern Nigeria’s Bornostate, state military abuses are cited as the number-one reason individuals join in the ranks of BokoHaram. Furthermore, defense and security forcesare not always equipped to confront violentextremist groups, and they often operate withoutthe necessary structures in place to direct the chainof command, leading them to overstay or oversteptheir mandate. Participants agreed upon the need to speciallyinstruct and build the capacities of defense andsecurity forces in addressing violent extremism, asthis differs from the conventional warfare forwhich they are trained. New military doctrine mustaddress unconventional warfare carried out bynon-state armed groups. Training is necessary atevery rank level and should explicitly address thecauses of violent extremism and its complex andevolving nature. These trainings should take ahuman security approach, including content onprofessional ethics and promoting human rightsand international humanitarian law. Finally,making armies inclusive is especially important in

2 The contribution of DFS to prevention has already been raised in the context of the previous regional conversations and during a satellite seminar held in 2017 inDakar. The Algiers conversations extended this work and focused on formulating concrete recommendations for DSF in the area of prevention. Centre forAdvanced Studies in Defense and Security (CHEDS) and Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) of Switzerland, “Séminaire regional: Forces de defense etde sécurité dans la prevention de l’extrémiste violent en afrique,” Dakar, Senegal, October 9–10, 2017, available at www.cheds.gouv.sn/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/BAT_RAPPORT-2017.pdf .

cases of identity-related violence (political, tribal,territorial, etc.), as these divides can also exist instate security services. Experience demonstrates that the success orfailure of military interventions depends in largepart on interactions with and participation by thecivilian population. To build and strengthencitizens’ trust, it is vital that armed forces not beperceived as a threat to the population or asperpetrators of violence against it. They can buildmutual trust through awareness-raising programsand fora for dialogue with communities. Defenseand security forces should not engage with civilianpopulations only when they require information;this does not build trust and can endanger thosepopulations. To this end, officers whose primaryactivity is facilitation of civilian-military relationsshould be instated. In order to restore trust, armed forces also needto have a consistent presence. Civilians are oftenunwilling to cooperate with armed forces becausethey fear reprisal by non-state armed groups. Localmilitias sometimes emerge to compensate forinsufficient military protection. Militias—oftenbuilt around community, tribal, or ethnic lines—can exacerbate violence by manipulating socialdivisions. Also, the eventual need to eitherintegrate or disintegrate self-defense militiascreates a political dilemma; participantsrecommended documenting, analyzing, anddistributing existing knowledge on this subject. State militaries can also improve communicationon military operations and outcomes. Participantsin the conversations noted that a lack of communi-cation—due to negligence or concerns forconfidentiality—can cement feelings of distrust,particularly when defense and security forces arealready abusive. Harnessing the media and socialnetworks (e.g., Twitter) to this end could be useful;for example, publicizing proceedings or sanctionsagainst members of these forces who commithuman rights violations and putting an end toinstitutional denial of abuse can disincentivizeextremist violence. In the current context, military forces often takeon the duties of the police because actual policeforces lack the capacities and resources to fulfilltheir role. Thus, it is also important to build localpolice capacities and rebuild local communities’trust in them. In principle, police forces’ proximity

to communities should allow them to be morerepresentative, and thus more inclusive, than statemilitaries. As an example, the 2015 Agreement forPeace and Reconciliation in Mali was cited assuccessfully providing for territorial police andlocal security advisory committees that involvedboth armed forces and local civilians. Participants also identified that, alongsidegovernments and civil society organizations,defense and security forces can aid in the reintegra-tion and rehabilitation of former members ofviolent extremist groups. Operation Safe Corridor,for example, is a program run by thirteen Nigeriangovernmental agencies plus the national army, andaims to de-radicalize, rehabilitate, and reintegrateformer Boko Haram members identified as “low-risk.” This is achieved through psychologicaltreatment (by psychologists and religious leaders)and economic support (professional training).Activities are also conducted to engage in dialoguewith families of ex-combatants. However, reintegrating ex-combatants intocivilian communities poses a challenge due to thescarcity of resources dedicated to forgiveness andjustice as well as the fact that many of thecommunities in question have suffered BokoHaram attacks. Ex-combatants’ wives and partnersalso face social stigma, which may discourage themfrom sharing their experiences. Participantssuggested appointing designated gender officers tofacilitate greater accountability and representationof women in the police and military. Defense and security forces are often the firstpoint of contact for surrendering or capturedextremists, and thus are in a position to gleanfirsthand information not only on the enemy’sstrategies or modus operandi, but also on thejourneys of those who left to fight and have nowreturned. This information could be used todemystify (and subsequently discourage) theattraction of violence for other potential recruits.Some rare testimonies to this effect were given atthe Algiers event, which led participants toseriously consider this largely unexploreddimension of prevention as well as the potential fordialogue with those still fighting in the ranks ofextremist groups (“these are our sons we’re talkingabout,” noted one of the participants). The earlystages of such dialogues have occurred—often inthe context of humanitarian operations—but the

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 5

6 MEETING NOTE

state needs to articulate broader policies, facilitateimplementation, and expand dialogue tocommunities of origin. Finally, a consensus emerged that this workrequires broad cooperation. Defense and securityforces face significant pressure from political actorsas well as the general public to rapidly improvesecurity. Such pressure, especially without invest-ment in other, longer-term responses (political,social, and economic), could be incrediblydamaging and exacerbate existing tensions.

Education, Culture, andCitizenship as Tools for PVE

Participants also highlighted education, culture,and citizenship as potential points of entry forPVE. Childhood was recognized as the ideal time tointroduce tolerance, a sense of national citizenshipand equality, and respect for diversity, inclusion,and dialogue. States in the region were advised tointroduce curricula addressing these values andproviding an alternative to the rhetoric of violentextremism, as Mauritania has recently done.Participants also noted the importance of includinglocal traditions and customs in curricula in order topreserve and transmit national history, as well as topromote these practices as defenses againstviolence. Beyond the classroom, participants highlightedthe need to promote the principles of peacefulcoexistence in all social spaces, starting with thefamily, but also in recreational facilities, neighbor-hood meeting spaces, places of worship, andmarketplaces. States must also invest in youthpolicies and support private initiatives targetingyouth, such as youth homes, community radiostations, or sports infrastructure. These provideplaces or tools to foster social interaction andcreativity. Promoting volunteerism throughprograms such as scouting—a youth movementbased on solidarity, mutual aid, and respect forothers—may also be useful. Similarly, cultural and artistic expression canpromote peace and transmit positive values. Whena television series, documentary, song, film, play, orstreet performance underscores the importance of“unity in diversity,” it delegitimizes discourse basedin difference. Participants lauded a Moroccan

NGO that regularly performs a play that depicts thereintegration of former members of violentextremist groups. The performance is followed by adiscussion between former group members and theaudience. Additionally, working-class andunderprivileged neighborhoods are oftenrecruiting grounds for violent extremist groups dueto lack of opportunities. In both Morocco andTunisia, cultural centers have been opened in suchneighborhoods; these centers provide activitiessuch as music, sports, and theater and encourageyouth to achieve their potential as future citizen-leaders in their communities and countries. Religious leaders and scholars can also offeralternative messages to those of violent extremistgroups. Participants at Algiers proposed thecreation of an academy of religious leaders andscholars in the Sahel-Sahara region that couldprovide alternative religious discourse. Finally, thediscussions touched on women’s roles within thefamily, as women were cited as the “cornerstone ofthe family structure.” If women are aware of PVEstrategies, chances are their children will be as well.Women can likewise play an important role inreintegrating ex-combatants; an initiative inCameroon, for example, engages mothers in reinte-grating former members of Boko Haram andpreventing further recruitment.

Furthering RegionalCooperation andIntegration

In view of the transnational and global character ofviolent extremism, the Algiers conversationsemphasized the urgent need for a coordinated andintegrated regional response. Although militaryand security responses are being developed on aregional level—such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force orthe Multinational Joint Task Force—regionalprevention strategies and actions have progressedslowly and lack cohesion. Participants called uponregional organizations and their partners toimplement coordinated political, economic,developmental, and humanitarian responses. Suchresponses have been attempted (such as the SahelMinisterial Platform for Strategy Coordination),but they have not yet been effective, andharmonization of the many regional laws, strate-

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 7

gies, and programs is essential. Actions like theTunisian National Counterterrorism Com -mission’s ongoing development of an internationalnetwork of such commissions to share experiencesand identify best practices were praised.

Conclusion

Over the course of three Regional Conversations,participants have raised consistent themes. Thismay indicate that solutions currently beingpursued are insufficient or ineffective. However,there is a growing recognition of the need to investin PVE and peacebuilding, and new preventiveapproaches are emerging. A paradigm shift inprevention of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara is increasingly necessary in light of thechallenges posed by reintegration of ex-combat-ants. If the factors that incentivized violence stillexist in their communities upon their return, theyare unlikely to be successfully reintegrated or todissuade future recruitment. Likewise, if the goal isto end violent extremism in the long term, purelymilitary responses will not suffice. Dialogue isnecessary to build trust and the foundations ofpeaceful coexistence. To this end, several prioritieswere highlighted at the third regional conversa-tions:1. Incorporate prevention initiatives into aholistic and pragmatic approach focused onconcrete results. This will require developingfora for dialogue to promote discussions amongstakeholders (public institutions, political

leaders, youth, women, civil society, media,defense and security forces, educational andcultural actors, religious and traditional leaders,etc.). This dialogue must include—wherepossible—members of violent extremist groupsand ex-combatants.

2. Encourage local ownership of initiatives andstrengthen successful existing preventioninitiatives. The state’s role in implementingpreventive public policies is of vital importance,particularly in both rural and urban marginal-ized areas. These policies should strengthenstate-society relations and consolidate “peacefulcoexistence.”3 Inclusion of local actors isindispensable to building and maintainingsustainable peace; the same is true of effectivePVE.

3. Coordinate and integrate regional responses.Lack of cohesion and integration on a regionallevel significantly limits the efficacy of preven-tion initiatives. Authorities should prioritize acooperative approach to national and regionalstrategies to prevent violent extremism.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres said,“The creation of open, equitable, inclusive andpluralist societies, based on the full respect ofhuman rights and with economic opportunities forall, represents the most tangible and meaningfulalternative to violent extremism.”4At the end of thethird Regional Conversations, participants sharedthis conclusion and expressed their commitment toimplement these recommendations.

3 An Algerian initiative adopted by the UN General Assembly in January 2018 that aims to promote tolerance, peace, and inclusion was cited as an example: UNGeneral Assembly Resolution 72/130 (January 15, 2018), UN Doc. A/RES/72/130.

4 United Nations Development Programme, “Journey to Extremism in Africa,” 2017, available at www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf .

Agenda

Sunday, June 24, 2018

8:45–9:30 Opening remarks

Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of theUnited Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

Muriel Berset Kohen, Ambassador of Switzerland to Algeria Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute (IPI) Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, Special Representative in Charge of Counter-terrorism Cooperation and

Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), AfricanUnion

9:30–9:45 Launch of work

Abdelkader Messahel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

11:00–12:30 First plenary session

Investing in peace and prevention of violence: What are the opportunities and challenges?

This session will seek to revisit the main conclusions and the spirit of the regional conversationson the prevention of violent extremism launched in Dakar, and to pursue and deepen thereflection initiated on preventive approaches based on political participation, the improvementof state-citizen/governing-governed relations, and inclusive dialogue in post-conflict societies inorder to avoid new cycles of violence. In particular, the question of dynamics among socio -political actors will be raised.

President Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, Special Representative in Charge of Counter-terrorism Cooperation and

Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), AfricanUnion

Panelists Neila Feki, Vice President, National Counterterrorism Commission (Tunisia) Muhammad Nuruddeen Lemu, Director of Research and Training, Dawah Institute of

Nigeria, and Assistant General Secretary of the Islamic Education Trust (IET), Minna(Nigeria)

Mohamed Anacko, President, Agadez Regional Council (Niger) Ahmad Mohamed Zaied, Member, National Council for Liberties and Human Rights (Libya) Mhand Berkouk, Professor, International expert in political and security issues (Algeria)

12:30–1:30 Lunch

1:30–3:00 Second plenary session

8

Concrete signs of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara: What is the diagnosis of regional,national, and local actors?

This session will seek to continue sharing experiences on how states, citizens, and organizationsfrom the region perceive and define the issue of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara. Localresearchers and/or research centers will present their work conducted in various countries inthe region on socioeconomic, political, and cross-border dynamics that can contribute toviolence as a starting point for the conversations.

President El Haouès Riache, Ambassador, Counsellor for Counterterrorism, Office of the Minister,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Algeria)

Panelists Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, Director, Dakar Office, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)

(Senegal) Rear Admiral (r) Kamel Akrout, National Security Advisor, Presidency of the Republic

(Tunisia) Aliyu Gebi, Senior Special Adviser to the Minister of Interior (Nigeria) Mustapha Saïdj, Lecturer, Head of the National School of Political Science (Algeria) Omezzine Khélifa, Executive Director, Mobdiun—Young Global Leaders (Tunisia)

3:00–6:00 Thematic working groups

Exchanges on successful experiences of prevention in the Sahel-Sahara (in Central Africa,North Africa, and West Africa)

Four separate working groups (each with a designated rapporteur) will discuss the preventionof violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region by looking at factors associated with peacefuland resilient societies, with a particular focus on state-citizen/governing-governed relations,which once strengthened can form a bulwark against the outbreak and spread of violence(rather than looking only at factors that drive and sustain violent acts). Participants areencouraged to give concrete examples of how states, citizens, communities, and organizationscan prevent violent extremism in this specific area. Answers that have been provided or areneeded at the transnational level will also be discussed.

Group 1: How can we identify and strengthen factors associated with peace that immunizecommunities against violent extremism? How can the potential of consultative structures,in particular those led by women and youth, be unleashed?

President Gatta GALI N’Gothe, Member of Parliament, Head of Parliamentary Opposition, National

Assembly (Chad)

Rapporteur Omezzine Khélifa, Executive Director, Mobdiun—Young Global Leaders (Tunisia) Group 2: How can media coverage contribute to prevention?

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 9

President Kouider Zerrouk, Chief of Communications and Public Information UNOWAS

Rapporteur Pauline Bend, Head of Niger Program, Fondation Hirondelle (Niger)

Group 3: How can defense and security forces contribute to prevention efforts?

President Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of

MISAHEL, African Union

Rapporteur Festus Aubyn, Researcher, Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) at the Kofi

Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) (Ghana)

Group 4: Culture, citizenship, education: what contribution can these have for the preven-tion of violent extremism?

President Hafidha Benchehida, Senator, Conseil de la Nation (Algeria) Rapporteur Christian Pout, President, African Center of International, Diplomatic, Economic and

Strategic Studies (CEIDES) (Cameroon)

Monday, June 25, 2018

9:00–10:00 Working group discussions continue

10:15–11:45 Third plenary session

Presentation of the results of the working groups

Moderator Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, International Peace Institute (IPI) 11:45–1:30 Lunch with the screening of the documentary Voices of Kasserine

Preceded by a presentation by Romain Darbellay on behalf of Olfa Lamloum, Director,International Alert (Tunisia)

1:30–3:00 Fourth plenary session

Toward a regional approach to the prevention of violent extremism

Based on the conclusions of the four working groups and the inputs from the plenaries, partici-pants will consider ways in which citizens, states, and their regional and international partnerscan most effectively work toward preventing violent extremism, including through a cross-

10 MEETING NOTE

border regional approach that would take into account the challenges and opportunities of thetransnational context. The objective will be to make recommendations that can beimplemented by practitioners from the region, both within states and through regional andsubregional groupings, in some cases with support from the UN and its partners, including forexisting or new mechanisms, processes, and initiatives at the local, national, and regionallevels.

President Eric Overvest, Resident Representative and Resident Coordinator of the United Nations

Programme for Development (UNDP) in Algeria

Panelists Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Head of

MISAHEL, African Union Ibrahima Dia, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA (Mali) Zainab Kotoko, Coordinator, Sahel Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) Yvan Guichaoua, Lecturer in International Conflict Analysis, Brussels School of International

Studies, University of Kent (France) Giordano Segneri, Peace and Development Advisor, Office of the Resident Coordinator of the

United Nations in Tunisia (Tunisia)

3:30–4:15 Conclusion and closing remarks

El Haouès Riache, Ambassador, Counsellor for Counterterrorism, Office of the Minister,Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Algeria)

Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of theUnited Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

Stéphane Rey, Head, Human Security (Peace/Mediation), and Deputy Head, Human SecurityDivision, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) (Switzerland)

Jake Sherman, Director, Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International PeaceInstitute (IPI)

Idriss Lallali, Deputy Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism(ACSRT), African Union

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 11

Participants

Aboubacar Abdoulaye AliPresident, Nord Tillabéri Council of Herders,Niger

Col. Othmane AdjaliFocal Point on Prevention and the Fight againstTerrorism and Violent Extremism, ACSRT,Algeria

Beatrice T. AgyarkohSenior Events Coordinator, IPI, United States

Rear Admiral Kamel AkroutNational Security Advisor, Presidency of theRepublic, Tunisia

Mohamed AnackoPresident, Regional Council of Agadez, Niger

Aïssata AthieProgram Assistant, IPI, United States

Festus Kofi AubynResearcher, Kofi Annan InternationalPeacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana

Michael AyariSenior Analyst, International Crisis Group,Tunisie

Dougoukolo Alpha Oumar Ba-KonaréPresident, Observatoire Kisal, Mali

Dida Badi Ag KhammadineHead of Research, National Center for PrehistoricResearch, Anthropology, and History, Algeria

Godefroy BarandagiyeSpecial Assistant of the AU High Representativefor Mali and the Sahel, African Union

Hafidha BenchehidaSenator, Conseil de la Nation, Algeria

Pauline BendHead of Niger Program, Fondation Hirondelle,Niger

Mhand BerkoukProfessor, International expert in political andsecurity issues, Algérie

Muriel Berset-KohenAmbassador, Swiss Embassy in Algeria

Jean-Daniel BielerSpecial Adviser, Human Security Division, FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Hatem BoukesraMass’art pour une culture alternative, Tunisia

Arthur BoutellisNon-resident Senior Fellow, IPI, United States

Audu Bulama BukartiSub-Saharan Africa Analyst, Tony Blair Institutefor Global Change, Nigeria

Pierre BuyoyaHigh Representative for Mali and the Sahel,African Union

Cheikh Kamel ChekkatFounding member, League of Ulemas, Preachers,and Imams from the Sahel Countries, Algeria

Amadou CoulibalyDirector of External Services, Presidency of theRepublic, Côte d’Ivoire

Daniel Da HienJournalist, Africa Youth Network, Burkina Faso

Romain DarbellayDirector of Cooperation, InternationalCooperation Division, Embassy of Switzerland inTunisia

Brema Ely DickoChief of the Social Anthropology Department,Faculty of Humanities and Educational Science,University of Bamako, Mali

12

Kyle DietrichHead of Peacebuilding and Violent Extremism,Equal Access, United States

Ibrahima DiaSpecial Representative of the Secretary-Generaland Head of MINUSMA, Mali

Abdoulaye DiopFocal Point on Prevention and the Fight againstTerrorism and Violent Extremism, ACSRT,Mauritania

Abdelkader DridiJournalist, APS, and Professor, l’École nationalesupérieure de journalisme et des sciences del’information, Algeria

Larbi El-Hadj AliHead of Study and Review, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Algeria

Abdel Nasser EthmanePolitical Adviser, AU Liaison Office in Côted’Ivoire, African Union

Zoumana FaneHead of Program, Malian Institute of Action-Research for Peace, Mali

Neila FekiVice President, National CounterterrorismCommission, Tunisia

Gatta Gali N’GotheMember of Parliament, Head of ParliamentaryOpposition, National Assembly, Chad

Larry Gbevlo-LarteySpecial Representative in Charge of Counter-terrorism Cooperation and Director of the AfricanCentre for the Study and Research on Terrorism(ACSRT), African Union

Aliyu GebiSenior Special Adviser to the Minister of Interior,Nigeria

Samia GettoucheMember, High Islamic Council, Algeria

Anne GrobetNorth Africa Program Officer, Human SecurityDivision, Federal Department of Fereign Affairs,Switzerland

Yvan GuichaouaLecturer in International Conflict Analysis,Brussels School of International Studies,University of Kent, France

Pascal HolligerPolitical Adviser, Embassy of Switzerland inAlgeria

Melinda HolmesSenior Adviser and Director of Programs,Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership,International Civil Society Action Network,United States

Mohamed Ibn ChambasSpecial Representative of the Secretary-Generaland Head of the United Nations Office for WestAfrica and the Sahel, UNOWAS

Mounia Ioualalen BengougamDeputy Director of International Security Issues,Directorate General of Political Affairs andInternational Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Algeria

Yassine IsbouiaGeneral Coordinator, Mediterranean Forum forYouth, Morocco

Omezzine KhélifaExecutive Director, Mobdiun—Young GlobalLeaders, Tunisia

Arlette Thérèse Kono AbeDeputy Director, ACSRT Focal Point onPrevention and the Fight against Terrorism andViolent Extremism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Cameroon

Zainab KotokoCoordinator, Sahel Fusion and Liaison Unit

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 13

Séverin KouaméLecturer/Researcher, Université AlassaneOuattara, Bouaké, and President, AssociationIndigo, Côte d’Ivoire

Ahmed LabnoujDirector of MENA Programs, Interpeace,Morocco

Idriss Mounir LallaliDeputy Director, ACSRT, African Union

Muhammad Nuruddeen LemuDirector of Research and Training, DawahInstitute of Nigeria, and Deputy SecretaryGeneral, Islamic Education Trust (IET), Minna,Nigeria

Mehdi MabroukDirector, Arab Center for the Research and Studyof Politics, Tunisia

Lisa MagnollayHead of Programs, Division for Southern, Eastern,and North Africa and the Occupied PalestinianTerritories, Swiss Agency for Development andCooperation

Youssef MahmoudSenior Adviser, IPI, United States

Abdoulaye MaïgaEarly Warning Management, EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS)

Boubker MazozDirector, Sidi Moumen Cultural Center, Morocco

Madeleine MembPresident, MediaWomen4Peace, Cameroon

Abdelkader MessahelMinister of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Wissem MissaouiDirector of Programs, Search for CommonGround, Tunisia

Carol MottetSenior Adviser, Human Security Division, FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Colonel Christian Emmanuel Mouaya PouyiHead of Training, ACSRT, African Union

Aimeric Erwin Koswinde NanemaFocal Point on Prevention and the Fight againstTerrorism and Violent Extremism, ACSRT,Burkina Faso

Colonel Hypolithe Jean NdougouMilitary Adviser to the Executive Secretary, LakeChad Basin Commission

Eric OvervestResident Coordinator for the UN System inAlgeria, Resident Representative of UNDP inAlgeria

Christian PoutPresident, African Center for InternationalStudies, Diplomacy, Economics, and Strategy,Cameroon

Mohammed Abdel Wahab RafikiSheikh, Maroc

Aissa RahimiSenior Police Commissioner, Algeria

Toufik RataAttaché de Cabinet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Algeria

Stéphane ReyHead, Human Security (Peace/Mediation), andDeputy Head, Human Security Division, FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

El Haouès RiacheAmbassador, Counsellor for Counterterrorism,Office of the Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Algeria

Salwa SahloulHead of Mission, Expert on Women, Peace, andSecurity and Mediation, Ministry of Women, theFamily, and Children, Tunisia

Mustapha SaidjLecturer, Head of the National School of PoliticalScience, Algeria

14 MEETING NOTE

Giordano SegneriPeace and Development Advisor, Office of theResident Coordinator of the United Nations inTunisia, Tunisia

Major-General Bamidele Matthew ShafaCoordinator, Operation Safe Corridor, DefenceHeadquarters of the Nigeria Armed Forces,Nigeria

Jake ShermanDirector, Brian Urquhart Center for PeaceOperations, IPI, United States

Lori-Anne Théroux-BénoniDirector, Dakar Office, Institute for SecurityStudies (ISS), Senegal

Vassiriki TraoréNational Information Coordinator, Cabinet of thePresidency of the Republic, Côte d’Ivoire

Ahmat Yacoub DabioPresident, Center for the Study of Developmentand the Prevention of Violent Extremism, Chad

Zara YacoubChad Director, Equal Access, Chad

Ahmad Mohamed ZaiedMember, National Council for Liberties andHuman Rights, Libya

Kouider ZerroukChief of Communications and PublicInformation, UNOWAS

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 15

The Regional Conversations Initiative

The Regional Conversations on the Prevention of Violent Extremism were launched in 2016 by IPI, UNOWAS,and the Swiss FDFA. The first conversations took place in Dakar (Senegal) in June 2016, the second inN’Djamena (Chad) in June 2017. Various other thematic or sub-regional meetings have also taken place inDakar, Yaoundé (Cameroon), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), and Maroua (Cameroon), with summary roundtablesin New York, Geneva, and Dakar. On these different occasions, other partner organizations also participated:the Center for Advanced Studies in Defense and Security (CHEDS) in Senegal, the African Center forInternational Diplomatic, Economic, and Strategic Studies (CEIDES), the Conseil de l’Entente, the DakarOffice of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), and the African Union’s African Centre for the Study andResearch on Terrorism (ACSRT).

The conversations have brought together nearly 500 figures from diverse professional backgrounds in NorthAfrica, West Africa, the Sahel, and Central Africa, as well as several outside experts and regional or interna-tional organizations active in these regions. Purposely informal in nature, these conversations have allowedparticipants to address the sensitive and complex dimensions of the prevention approach to extreme violence(including the political dimension) in an open forum and atmosphere. The objective has been to offer a forumfor discussion and dialogue on the prevention approach, to build ties between actors from differentbackgrounds, and to highlight and strengthen positive initiatives conducted by actors in these regions thatrepresent concrete alternatives to violent extremism.

16

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

international not-for-profit think tank dedicated to managing risk and

building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable

development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy

research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff

from around the world and a broad range of academic fields, IPI has

offices facing United Nations headquarters in New York and offices in

Vienna and Manama.

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017-3521, USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

52-52 Harbour House, Bahrain Financial Harbour

P.O. Box 1467, Manama, Bahrain

www.ipinst.org