INVESTIGATION REPORT: THE SINKING OF THE KANDI WON, JULY 4, 2012

INVESTIGATED BY THE NASSAU COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

KATHLEEN M. RICE NASSAU COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

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Investigation Report: The Sinking of the Kandi Won

Overview:

On July 4, 2012 at approximately 10:05 p.m. the overloaded Kandi Won boat attempted to return to Huntington Harbor following a fireworks display in Oyster Bay Harbor. There were 27 people on board, including 15 adults and young adults, and 12 children aged 16 and under. The total passenger weight on the boat was approximately 3,519 pounds. A wave apparently struck the vessel at the worst possible angle, causing the boat to rock and then tip over until the Kandi Won lay on its side. Eleven-year-old Harley Treanor, seven-year-old Victoria Gaines, and 12-year-old David Aureliano were trapped in the boat's cabin with David's parents, Deborah and Greg Aureliano. The cabin was dark and filled quickly with water. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano attempted to hold the children above the water as they struggled to find a way out. They were unable to keep hold of the children. Tragically, the three children drowned. The boat eventually sank to a depth of 65 feet on the floor of the Long Island Sound.

This report will document the immediate aftermath and investigation of the events, analyze the existing legal authorities, and make recommendations in an effort to prevent this type of tragedy in the future.

A review of the statutes and regulations governing pleasure craft revealed a system of laws that rely heavily on long-standing, informal practices. Some people maintain a cultural belief that pleasure boating is the last bastion of recreation that is free from over-regulation. Unfortunately these views tend toward a sentimental oversimplification of the nature of recreational boating. Government’s first role is to ensure public safety, and boaters’ safety must be balanced with freedom and recreation. Basic safety provisions are necessary to provide freedom for individuals to enjoy the waterways knowing that the other people and vessels around them do not pose a threat.

The tragic events of July 4, 2012 should cause a re-examination of the laws, regulations and common boating practices. The nature of this tragedy has raised issues at the federal, state and local levels and these issues are discussed comprehensively in this report. It is imperative that we learn from the capsizing of the Kandi Won and use those lessons to improve boating safety in our communities.

Synopsis of Findings:

• The Kandi Won capsized and sank as a result of being overloaded and apparently encountering a 90º wave.

• Operation of the boat, including the number of people on board, is ultimately the responsibility of the boat operator and, in this case, the boat owner since he was also onboard. However there was no capacity plate required by federal regulation indicating maximum occupancy weight and distribution. Witnesses recalled that the Kandi Won had previously been operated with a large number of people without incident. The combination of the weight, its distribution and the angle of the incoming wave each

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contributed to making the capsizing of the Kandi Won inevitable. The responsibility of the boat operator and owner did not rise to the level of criminality under these circumstances.

• Proposals:

1. Recreational boating safety regulations under federal law should be mandated in the same manner as motor vehicle safety regulations. The current safety standards should be reviewed, expanded to include all sizes of recreational vessels, and the European model of categorizing vessels according to their intended use and geographic location should be explored.

2. 33 CFR §183.21 should be amended to require capacity standards and capacity plates as a basic safety requirement of all vessels, regardless of size or use.

3. The U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies must re-open discussions regarding inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. If permissible, U.S. Coast Guard members should be given peace officer status for the issuance of summons and the availability of rescue divers and their response times should be revisited.

4. The New York State Legislature recently passed a bill requiring boating safety certificates for all operators born on or after May 1, 1996. Persons born before the May 1 date are exempt. The bill goes into effect May 1, 2014 and represents a good first step. However lawmakers should work toward endeavor to include all boaters and should amend the provisions relating to children.

5. The Department of Motor Vehicles should be the repository for all licensing/certifications for any type of vehicle or vessel operated in New York State. Licenses and non-driver IDs should be marked accordingly. All convictions, suspensions or revocations should be reflected on the operating record. Although the law currently requires this record, significant effort must be undertaken to improve reporting.

6. New York State should conform its laws relating to operating any type of vehicle or vessel while intoxicated or impaired by drugs; operating while intoxicated or impaired with a child in the car, vessel, snowmobile or ATV, leaving the scene of collisions, etc.

7. Vessels should not only be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles, they should be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to be determined by the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation.

8. Regulators should convene a work group consisting of boating experts and associations, members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategic boating safety plan with specific legislative and educational goals. New York State should take the lead on these important public safety issues and become the national model for boating safety.

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Detailed Statement of Facts

The Capsizing:

On July 4, 2012 at approximately 7:00 p.m. the Treanor and Aureliano families gathered at Knutson’s Marina at Huntington. The families and a group of friends packed food, soda, beer and wine and boarded Kevin Treanor’s 34-foot Silverton boat, the "Kandi Won", which was moored at the marina. They intended to travel to Oyster Bay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck to watch a fireworks display. There were 27 occupants on the boat when it left the marina, 12 adults, seven young adults or teenagers ranging from 15 -21 years old, and eight children between seven and 12 years old. The total passenger weight on the boat was approximately 3,520 pounds.

Most witnesses interviewed stated it was an "uneventful" trip from the Marina to Oyster Bay Harbor. Guy Denigris, a friend of the boat’s owner, Kevin Treanor, piloted the boat out of the marina and to the area of the fireworks in Cove Neck. A few witnesses stated the boat had "rocked" or "listed" (leaned or tilted) to varying degrees during the outgoing trip. Specifically Mr. Denigris stated to P.O. Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he “thought the vessel had water in its bilge, or, as an afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the vessel had been listing (leaning or tilting) back and forth.” He indicated in retrospect that at one point between Huntington Harbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat “listed quite a bit, but the vessel recovered”.

The Kandi Won anchored among numerous other boats to wait for the fireworks display to start. The boat's occupants ate, conversed and some of the children went swimming. According to records, the fireworks began at 9:20 p.m. and lasted for a half hour. It took approximately 10 minutes to raise the anchor and start to leave the area, along with numerous other boats. The boat was being operated by 50 year-old Sal Aureliano. Mr. Aureliano had taken a boating safety course and had received a boating safety certificate.1 He reports over 500 hours of marine experience prior to the capsizing.

The Kandi Won travelled north out of Oyster Bay Harbor. Mr. Aureliano stated that he "was not operating at full speed, probably around half throttle for that vessel, maybe 12-15 knots". He did not know how many passengers were on board. He advised P.O. Norman McCloy at 1:15 a.m. on July 5, 2012 that there were vessels going in his same direction on both his left and right sides. It was very dark and he could not distinguish the type or size of the vessels. He could only see their navigation lights but the boat to his left was slowly overtaking him. Mr. Aureliano stated that just before the Kandi Won capsized, the boat started turning to the right and then leaned hard to the right. He stated that he tried to steer to the left and used the throttles to slow the boat to "idle". The boat just kept leaning further and further until it capsized and then eventually overturned completely. The bridge contained approximately 985 pounds of passenger weight at the time. Mr. Aureliano stated that it was very dark and he could not tell if he had

                                                            1 The New York State Dept. of Parks and Recreation confirmed this.

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caught a wave. The first call about the incident was received at approximately 10:06 p.m. As a result, the time of capsizing is estimated to be approximately 10:05 p.m.

The boat capsized at the mouth of Cold Spring Harbor at latitude 40°, 55.473 north; longitude 073°, 30.718 west. Accounts vary about how long it took for the boat to turn completely upside down from its position on its side. Most say the boat turned over very quickly. A U.S. Coast Guard boat was at the scene in approximately five minutes and other law enforcement vessels followed shortly thereafter. Three Oyster Bay Bay Constable boats were on scene and participated in the rescue and recovery. Those boats were staffed by Bay Constables Mike Rich, Carmine Montesano, John Plank and Thomas Dillman. Two civilian boats were also there within a few minutes and picked up passengers. Mitchell Kramer was also on scene with a tow boat from BoatUS. Mr. Kramer provided substantial aid to the operation by securing a line to the bow of the capsized Kandi Won at approximately 10:30 p.m. He later handed off the line to members of the NCPD at about 1:00 a.m. after the boat completely submerged. Mr. Kramer assisted throughout the operation and his tow boat was used as a temporary working platform during the rescue and recovery. The Kandi Won drifted and submerged at approximately 11:30 p.m.

Law enforcement personnel did not observe any signs of impairment on either the boat operator, Sal Aureliano or the boat owner, Kevin Treanor. Both men denied consuming any alcohol while on the boat. There was no smell of alcohol emanating from either man, and neither displayed and signs of intoxication. As a precaution both men were administered a preliminary breath test (PBT) at 3:10 a.m. and 3:12 a.m. respectively. Both men registered .00 BAC at those times.

Witness Statements:

Ray Rivers was travelling in his 24-foot boat with three other people behind Kandi-Won in its wake. Mr. Rivers describes the water as “good condition”, stating the wakes “were not crazy”, with “no wind” but a storm was approaching. Mr. Rivers was gaining on the Kandi Won when it stopped. He cut his power and drifted toward the boat which was on its side with people in the water. Mr. Rivers called the Coast Guard at approximately 10:10 p.m. Mr. Rivers stated that from the time of his arrival it only took the boat “one minute” to turn completely upside down in the water. Mr. Rivers said that the police were there in five minutes followed by approximately 10 emergency boats. Mr. Rivers opined that the boat had a bad design since he saw three people on one side of a similar boat rock it while docked in Connecticut. He blamed this on the boat’s flat bottom.

An employee of Knutson’s Marina had just finished work and was preparing to sail over to Oyster Bay to watch the fireworks with a friend. He stated that Kevin Treanor left about a half hour before the employee. The employee stated he only saw around 10 to 12 people on the boat as it left. He met up with the Kandi Won in Oyster Bay and they “tied off together to watch the fireworks. The employee asked Mr. Treano where he got “all these people” but Mr. Treanor “didn’t really answer”. It was the employee’s opinion the boat was “overloaded” so he offered to take some of the people back to Huntington on his boat but once again, he said, Mr. Treanor “really didn’t answer”. Mr. Treanor also “kind of signaled to me that they were okay.” The employee heard a distress call on the way back to Huntington and saw the flare and the police responding but did not know it was the Kandi Won until the next day.

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Sal Aureliano is related to the boat's owner through marriage. Mr. Aureliano was operating the boat when it capsized. In addition to the statement given to P.O. Norman McCloy (above), Mr. Aureliano also gave a statement to assigned NCPD Homicide Detective, David Nystrom at 4:30 a.m. on July 5, 1012. He stated:

After the fireworks were done we left along with some other boats. This was about a little after 10 p.m. and I was piloting the boat. People were in the cabin, in the back and some older kids were on the front of the boat...At this time there was a boat on my right and a boat on my left. After the boat passed me on my left I think I hit a wave and a storm was developing and the water got rough. After hitting the wave I tried to control the boat but it went over fast to my right. The boat started to fill fast with water...I didn't drink any alcohol while we were on the boat.

Guy Denigris is a friend of the boat’s owner, Kevin Treanor. He operated the boat on the trip from Huntington to Oyster Bay. He did not know the number of people on board the boat. Mr. Denigris stated that as he drove the boat out of Huntington Harbor and “got towards the sound, the boat hit multiple wakes and the boat rocked a little. We got to Cold Spring Harbor around 8:30 and waited till about 9:15 when the fireworks started.” It was “dark out” and the “weather was still nice” when they left after the fireworks. Mr. Denigris stated “everybody was spread out on the boat.” After about 15 minutes “I felt that the boat was moving back and forth and it caught my attention. I wasn’t alarmed but I yelled to Sal ‘What’s going on?’ I don’t remember if he replied. I went up top and Sal seemed to be in control. The boat seemed fine and then the boat went over to the right. The water seemed choppy but I don’t recall a big wave or multiple waves when the boat went over.” Two-and-a-half weeks after the capsizing, Mr. Denigris stated to P.O. Norman McCloy that as he operated the boat he “thought the vessel had water in its bilge or, as an afterthought now, maybe a lot of weight on board because the vessel had been listing (leaning or tilting) back and forth.” He indicated in retrospect that at one point between Huntington Harbor and Oyster Bay Harbor the boat “listed quite a bit, but the vessel recovered”.

LuAnn Denigris is the wife of Guy Denigris and a friend of Kevin Treanor’s. Mrs. Denigis stated that everyone boarded at Knutson’s Marina and that the only stop the boat made on the way to Oyster Bay was to empty the bathroom. Mrs. Denigris stated “my husband and I felt that the boat didn’t seem as stable as in the past and we had gone out on the boat before with plenty of people.” She also stated that on the way back, “the boat rocked once to the right and my husband, Guy, went up top to Sal to see what was wrong. When Guy got up to the top, the boat went over to the right and everybody got thrown out.”

Greg Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberly’s father. Mr. Aureliano stated he did not know how many people were on the boat when they left Knutson’s marina. He said they were headed to watch the fireworks in Oyster Bay “like we have done for years”. He described the trip to Oyster Bay as “uneventful”. Mr. Aureliano also stated there were boats docked “all around them” during the fireworks. He stated “my wife and I were inside the cabin of the boat with my son, David, Kevin’s daughter, Harley, and Victoria Gaines.” Mr. Aureliano indicated that about 10 minutes into the trip back from Oyster Bay “the boat unexpectedly rolled to the right side throwing myself, my wife Deborah, and the three children to the right side of the boat, along with the couch, and other things inside. The boat filled up quickly with water and my wife and I

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lifted all three children above the water as it rushed in.” He stated it was dark and they were trying to find a way out when they lost their grip on the children. Mr. and Mrs. Aureliano were eventually able to get out of the boat.

Deborah Aureliano is David, Rocco and Kimberly’s mother. She states there were more than 20 boats watching the fireworks in the area where they anchored. When the fireworks display was over, she went below into the cabin with her husband, Greg and her son, David. Mrs. Aureliano stated that as the boat was heading back to Huntington, “the boat was rocking because it felt like we hit a wake. The boat rocked and then turned over and was not able to recover”. Mrs. Aureliano stated the cabin was filling up with water and she tried to help her son, David and seven year-old, Victoria Gaines. She lost David and Victoria, saw a light and was able to get out from under the boat. Thereafter she swam to a Coast Guard boat where she met up with her husband, Greg and her son, Rocco.

Rocco Aureliano (16 years old) is the brother of David (deceased). He stated that the Kandi Won left after the fireworks display at about 9:50 p.m. He stated that “a lot of boats [were] leaving at the same time.” He had been on the forward bow when the boat capsized and he saw his 10-year-old sister, Kimberly, and his 11-year-old cousin, Julia Aureliano in the water. Rocco also stated “I grabbed hold of them and helped them to get onto a speed boat that came over to assist us. I then swam back to the boat that capsized and tried to get into the cabin to save my brother, David, and my second cousin, Harley Treanor.” Rocco stated that a Coast Guard boat pulled up to him and Coast Guard officials made him get into the boat with them.

Candida Treanor is Kevin Treanor’s sister-in-law. She stated the weather was “fine” when they left from the fireworks display. “About 10 minutes into the ride back, while I was sitting in the back of the boat on the left side, I felt a thrust which pushed the boat over to the right side. I watched the people on the right side of the boat get pulled into the water, and I think I might have been one of the last people into the water. The boat went over onto its right side and totally capsized within seconds…I tried to get into the boat along with Sal, Guy and others…we knew that Harley and David were inside and we were frantically trying to get to them. Eventually rescue people came and took over…”

Joan Treanor is Kevin Treanor’s mother. She did not know the number of people who boarded the boat at Knutson’s Marina and further stated the boat “seemed to be handling the same [as before]”. Mrs. Treanor further stated “As we were heading back, I was sitting in the right rear corner of the boat. While we were heading out of the bay on the way back, boats were speeding past us causing wakes, which at the time didn’t alarm me. Then it seems a big wave hit us, rocking the boat. Water seemed to come into the back by me from the left and then the right and then the boat went over to the right. We all got thrown out of the boat…”

Eric Machado is a friend of the boat’s owner, Kevin Treanor. He stated the trip to Oyster Bay was uneventful and that he did not know how many people were on the boat. Mr. Machado stated while they were stopped to watch the fireworks, people ate and some people swam. He stated that after about 10 minutes on the way back “All of a sudden the boat went over to the right and everybody ended up in the water. Everybody was around me in the water. A lot of boats stopped to help us.”

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Deborah McGovern stated that she was seated in the back of the boat with her boyfriend, Eric Machado, and some other people when they were heading back to Huntington after the fireworks display. “[A]ll of a sudden the boat went over to my left side (I was standing at this time facing the rear of the boat). This happened real fast and I found myself in the water…[there was] a lot of screaming”.

Casey Spanier (21 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. She and her friends were the last on the boat and were not concerned with the number of people. The young adults and teens rode on the forward bow of the boat. They had been anchored among other boats to watch the fireworks. When it ended, the boats began leaving the harbor. About eight minutes into the trip back to Huntington Harbor, “the boat rocked slightly to the right, then left and then back to the right and did not recover.” “The boat was at 90° to the water and everybody was falling or jumping off the boat.” Ms. Spanier described the boat as remaining on its side and then “slowly sank and eventually went totally upside down.”

Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) is a friend of Laine Treanor. He estimated the Kandi Won was carrying approximately 17 people to Oyster Bay for the fireworks. He described the trip there as “normal, uneventful.” He stated after the fireworks they “pulled anchor” and about 8 – 10 minutes later they started back toward Huntington. “About 10 minutes into the ride, I saw lightning and the water seemed a little choppy. Other boats were leaving at the same time, but I don’t know how many. All of a sudden the boat started to roll slowly to its right. Everybody started to scream and I let go and fell into the water”. Mr. Shlakman made it to a boat but “knew from the way everybody was reacting… I know that someone was still on the boat.”

Brendan Gellerstein is a friend of Laine Treanor. He described the trip to Oyster Bay as “normal”. He said it took them about 10 minutes to leave Oyster Bay after the fireworks ended. The boat then travelled about another 10 minutes when the boat went over. “Right before the boat went over, the boat was rocking a little more than normal and then it went up and rolled over to the right side. The water when we left seemed more choppy then on the way over… Everyone was screaming in the water.” Mr. Gellerstein was eventually picked up by another boat.

Recovery of the Children: The body of 11-year-old Harley Treanor was recovered underneath the boat at 11:10 p.m. by Atlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Fire Company firefighter divers Ronald Bagen and Daniel Rivera. The boat was capsized and floating upside down in the water. A second body was observed by the divers but the boat began to sink and the divers were unable to recover the body at that time. Harley Treanor was removed and emergency CPR was performed by Town of Oyster Bay, Bay Constable John Plank. Petty Officer 3rd Class Dillon Palmer of the U.S. Coast Guard assisted transporting Harley Treanor to the Town of Oyster Bay, Roosevelt Park launching ramp which was being used as a staging area. Constable Plank continued CPR throughout the transport. Harly was transported a 1:16 A.M. to Syosset Hospital by East Norwich Fire Department ambulance where she was pronounced dead at 3:46 a.m. NCPD diver Sgt. Andrew Sawula, shield number 527, was on-duty on July 4. NCPD divers P.O. Brian Frey, shield number 2769, P.O. William Gordon, shield number 851, P.O. Gene Drum, shield number 1571 and P.O.

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Norman McCloy, shield number 301, were called in and responded to the location. The New York City Police Department (NYPD) also dispatched a helicopter with 2 divers who landed at Roosevelt Park in Oyster Bay, NY. Seven members of the Cold Spring Harbor Fire Department divers also responded to the scene but NCPD had re-classified the dive operation at 12:35 a.m. from a rescue to a deep dive recovery because the boat had submerged to a depth of 65 feet. The re-classification required the remaining dives to be conducted by police divers. The body of seven-year-old, Victoria Gaines, was recovered at 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 2012 by NCPD police divers Brian Frey and Gene Drum. The body of 12-year-old David Aureliano, was recovered at 2:12 a.m. by NCPD police divers Brian Frey and William Gordon. Both were recovered from inside the cabin of the boat, which had submerged. Both children were pronounced dead by AMT Joshua Gallub, shield number 70, aboard NCPD vessel, “Marine 1” 3:48 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. respectively. The boat had drifted .7 nautical miles southeast from the position of its original capsizing. It was approximately ¼ mile from the shore. The boat was located at latitude 40°, 55.113 north; longitude 073°, 29.819 west at a depth of 65 feet.

Other Boat Occupants:

Passengers were removed from the water. Seventeen passengers were taken by an NCPD vessel and a private boat to the first staging area at the Seawanhaka Yacht Club in Centre Island, NY. Bayville Fire Chief Dennis Kelly provided their large passenger bus and an ambulance to the Seawanhaka location. Six passengers were taken by an Oyster Bay Fire Department vessel and a Town of Oyster Bay Bay Constable boat to the second staging area at Roosevelt Park in Oyster Bay, NY. Four passengers from that location were transported by fire department ambulances to area hospitals. Deborah and Rocco Aureliano were treated for shock at Glen Cove Hospital. Candida Treanor and Guy Denigris were treated for shock at Syosset Hospital

Occupants and Their General Locations at the Time of Capsizing:

The operator of the boat was Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old). He was located on the bridge. The three children who died were located in the boat's cabin with two adults. The children were 11-year-old Harley Treanor, 12-year-old David Aureliano and seven-year-old Victoria Gaines. Harley is the daughter of the boat's owner. David is the nephew of the boat's operator, Sal Aureliano. Victoria Gaines was not related to any of the parties. Her mother, Lisa, was a friend of the boat's owner. (See the relationship list below.)

Cabin Occupants (in addition to the 3 children): Combined Weight in Location

Greg Aureliano (45 years old) Approximately 632 pounds Deborah Aureliano (45 years old)

Forward Bow Occupants:

Sydney Shlakman (16 years old) Approximately 934 pounds Brendon Gellerstein (18 years old) Caitlyn Kemerson (14 years old) Rocco Aureliano (16 years old) Lainie Treanor (20 years old)

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Casey Spanier (21 years old) Haily Treanor (15 years old)

Aft Cockpit (Back) of Boat:

Luann Denigras (47 years old) Approximately 965 pounds Deborah McGovern (43 years old) Eric Machado (42 years old) Kevin Treanor (46 years old) - Owner Joan Treanor (74 years old) Candida Treanor (49 years old) Christina Aureliano (12 years old)

The Bridge:

Madison Treanor (8 years old) Approximately 988 pounds Lisa Gaines (45 years old) Salvatore Aureliano (50 years old) - Operator Cathy Aureliano (49 years old) Ryan Gaines (12 years old) Julia Aureliano (11 years old) Guy Denigris (50 years old) Kimberly Aureliano (10 years old) Total weight: Approximately 3,519 pounds

Relationship of Occupants (Those not listed below are friends):

Candi Treanor Sister-in-law of-- Kevin Treanor (Owner) (Married to Joe Treanor) (- Not on boat -) (ex- wife: Joy) Mother of: Father of: Haily Treanor Harley Treanor Laine Treanor Madison Treanor

Sister of-- Sal Aureliano (Operator) Married to: Cathy Aureliano Parents of: Julia Aureliano Christina Aureliano

Sister of-- Greg Aureliano Married to: Deborah Aureliano Parents of: David Aureliano Rocco Aureliano Kimberly Aureliano

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Daughter-in-law of-- Joan Treanor Mother of adults: Kevin (Boat owner) Joe (**Not on boat) Grandmother of Harley

Weather: On July 4, 2012 at 7:18 p.m. the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a forecast for Long Island Sound west of New Haven, Connecticut/Port Jefferson New York. The forecast for that night indicated northwest winds around 5 knots with seas at one foot or less. It also indicated a chance of showers and thunderstorms for the evening.

At 9:15 p.m. National Weather Service Doppler radar indicated thunderstorms producing winds around 30 knots. The storm was located 21 nautical miles northwest of Bridgeport, (northern) CT and was travelling southeast at 20 knots. Mariners were warned to expect gusty winds up to 30 knots with locally higher waves and occasional lightning strikes. Boaters were advised to seek safe harbor until the storm passed.

At 10:04 p.m. the NWS issued a bulletin and requested immediate broadcast of a special marine warning for the Long Island Sound, west of New Haven, CT/ Port Jefferson, NY. Radar detected a thunderstorm 4 nautical miles northwest of Captain Harbor, CT and moving southeast at 30 knots. The bulletin advised that mariners could expect gusty winds, high waves, dangerous lightning and heavy rains.

The storm was forecast to be in the area of Captain’s Harbor, CT around 10:10 p.m., Hempstead Harbor, NY around 10:20 p.m. and Cold Spring Harbor, NY around 10:25 p.m. Boaters were again advised to seek safe harbor until the storm passes.

At 10:13 p.m. NWS radar continued to indicate a thunderstorm producing winds over 35 knots in the area of Captain’s Harbor, CT moving southeast at 35 m.p.h. The storm was forecast to be 3 miles southwest of Cold Spring Harbor by 10:25 p.m. The same precautions about seeking safe harbor and the effects of the storm remained in effect till 10:30 p.m.

Despite these reports, weather does not appear to have played a significant role in this capsizing other than speculation that boaters were hurrying to “beat the weather” and return to their home docks. At the time of the capsizing the wind was northwest at 7-14 m.p.h., water temperature was 73° and high tide was due at 12:47 a.m. A weather buoy stationed by the University of Connecticut in the general area did not record the weather and wave data. A few of the witnesses indicated their belief that the water was "choppier", or more rough, on the return trip to Huntington. Heavy rains and storm conditions commenced shortly after the capsizing. The wind conditions could play a role in any initial aviation response.

Fireworks: On July 4, 2012 there was a fireworks display scheduled for approximately 9:30 p.m. in Oyster Bay Harbor in the area of Cove Neck. The display was hosted by James Dolan who had

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obtained all of the necessary paperwork including a U.S. Coast Guard marine permit, Town of Oyster Bay explosives permit, Federal Aviation Administration letter, Certificate of liability insurance and site diagram. Zambelli Fireworks, New Castle, PA, were contracted to conduct the display off of two barges supplied by Miller's Launch, Staten Island, NY. A safe perimeter of 350 feet was required for the display. The Nassau County Police Department dispatched a vessel, "Marine 3", to the location at approximately 6:00 p.m., arriving at the location at approximately 6:30 p.m. P.O. Arthur Dalessandro and P.O. Kevin Vienne conducted a pre-inspection of the site with the assistance of two Town of Oyster Bay Constable boats. Law enforcement vessels established a 600-foot safe perimeter with orange buoys and remained in the area to maintain that perimeter. The fireworks display commenced at 9:20 p.m. and concluded at 9:50 p.m.

The Boat:

Boat name: Kandi Won, Remsenberg, NY. Owner: Kevin Treanor. Description: a 34-foot, 1984 Silverton fiberglass, motor powered boat, model 34 Convertible. The boat was registered in Suffolk County under Registration NY 5655MA, Hull Identification number STN34328M84K-34C (there is a transposition in the number, it should be STN34238M84K-34C). The registration also lists a “Motorist” ID number of T1818126579216782-65. Engine: mistakenly registered as an inboard/outboard motor. The actual motor is an inboard twin gas crusader marine engines and a 6.5 Onan marine generator. The assets of the Silverton Company were purchased by Egg Harbor Yachts on July 13, 2012 after Silverton's bankruptcy.

Recovery of the Boat:

On July 9, 2012 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Dive Team conducted a visual survey and videotaping of the boat on the floor of the Long Island Sound. The first dive was executed by Ted Cacroppi and Mas DiLorenzo at 2 p.m. and lasted 35 minutes. The second dive was conducted at 3:05 p.m. for 35 minutes. The two divers were Dave Caskey and Mike Bertrand. Visibility was very poor but it was observed that both throttles were in the "on" position. The port throttle was "forward" and the starboard throttle was "neutral". The instrumentation reflected 2,000 RPMs and the sliding door of the cabin was closed.

On July 10, 2012, divers attached front and rear harnesses to the boat. Pontoon bags were used on July 11, 2012 at approximately 12:15 p.m. to bring the boat to the surface. The flotation bags were used in an effort to cause as little recovery damage as possible. The condition of the boat needed to be maintained for investigatory inspection. By 7:00 p.m. the boat was on the lift at Oyster Bay Marine Center.

Inspection of the Boat:

Marine Bureau, National Association of State Boating Law Administrators (NASBLA) Boating Accident Investigator Norman McCloy, shield number 301, conducted a thorough mechanical inspection of the boat. His findings are contained in the NCPD Marine Bureau, Boating Accident Report at page 7. In summary, no leakage was observed by P.O. McCloy with the exception of a small leak in a freshwater coolant hose to an engine. He indicated that this leak was likely to have been caused during the recovery of the boat. If the leak pre-existed the

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submersion the engine is likely to have overheated. P.O. McCloy also noted the seacock shut-off handle was missing. (A seacock is a valve in the hull that protects the plumbing pipes from water from outside the vessel and/or permits water to flow into or out of the boat depending on the need. Seacocks can be used to intake salt water for a faucet or to cool an engine or to release water out of the boat, such as for a sink drain or a toilet.)

The boat’s 12 volt batteries were energized. There were two bilge pumps, and the bilge pump in the engine compartment had compromised wiring. The pump functioned properly when attached to intact wires. P.O. McCloy was unable to determine whether the corrosion to the wiring existed before the boat sank or whether the corrosion was the result of the submersion. P.O. McCloy's inspection concluded there was no significant source of water entering the vessel before the boat capsized. It was his opinion that even if only one of the bilge pumps was functioning, it should have been able to control any water in the bilge since there was no significant amount of water entering.

There was some “pressure crushing” and resulting leaks in the fuel tanks which P.O. McCloy attributed to the external pressure created by the sea water as the boat sank and remained submerged. There was no water intrusion from the shower and toilet connections. There were two “bilge blowers” (essentially two engine fume exhaust fans). P.O. McCloy indicated it could not be determined with certainty if they were functioning pre-submersion. However, he noted that the motors did not appear to be seized. The switches for the “steaming lights’ and the “navigation lights” were in the “on” position when the boat was recovered. The navigation lights did not work upon inspection but again, the submersion could have damaged the lights.

Life Jackets: Homicide Detective Nystrom reported the recovery of 21 assorted sized life jackets confirmed to be recovered from the boat along with a throwable life ring. There were 16 adult-sized and five youth-sized jackets specifically attributable to the Kandi Won. David Aureliano was recovered wearing one of the youth sized life jackets. There were also numerous life jackets in the vicinity of where the boat capsized. It is impossible to discern how many of these jackets came from the Kandi Won or the other boats who responded to the emergency.

Stability Test:

Neil Gallagher, B.S., M.S., P.E, Professor of Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture at Webb Institute, performed a stability analysis of the Kandi Won on October 18, 2012 after the boat's recovery.2 He first noted that the hull of the boat had no apparent damage. This indicated the most likely cause of the capsizing was "related to the stability of the vessel". Professor Gallagher did a stability test of the vessel "using a procedure called an "inclining experiment" according to methods normally used by U.S. Coast Guard to demonstrate stability on commercial passenger vessels. This method required the boat to be place in the water and outfitted with test equipment. The center of gravity was determined for the empty vessel as well as its "lightship" weight (empty weight) of 16, 500 pounds.

                                                            2 The Stability Analysis is attached hereto.

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Then the center of gravity, "lightship" weight and hull shape were used to examine operating stability with various weights on board such as the weights of passengers, fuel, water, etc. The weights and approximate locations of all persons on board the Kandi Won at the time of the capsizing were required information which was obtained through NCPD interviews. All weights and individual centers of gravity were entered into a computer program that uses the hull shape to determine the stability characteristics.

The Kandi Won's stability in flat water conditions (no waves) was substantially impacted by the weights on the boat. The empty boat with no fuel and no passengers was slightly less than 2.5 times more stable than the fully loaded boat. The fully loaded boat indicated that it was capable of righting itself when "heeled" (tilted or leaned) in flat water but the boat received a low "score" in this regard. The empty boat with no passengers or fuel would have had adequate stability to return upright when heeled (tilted or leaned), but the boat as loaded at the time of the incident had marginal stability in flat water. One commonly used numerical indication of stability was reduced by about 60% when the empty boat was loaded as it was at the time of the incident.

The stability of the Kandi Won was examined against different size waves encountered from various angles. Waves approaching any vessel at a 90º angle to the centerline of the ship's "keel" (center of the hull) "will impart a significant rolling movement". In the case of the Kandi Won the greatest "heel" angle was caused by these 90º waves. "(I)n particular with a 2-foot wave height...the vessel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized."

Gallagher observed:

When loaded with the twenty-seven persons...there was low stability in flat water, although enough to remain upright. However, in beam (90º) waves of only two feet, the boat had inadequate stability to remain upright and was likely to capsize...(T)his analysis demonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exact series of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the Kandi Won, and what steering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on the capsize, may not be known with certainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsize was very likely to have occurred given the loading...Once the boat rolled to 75 or 80 degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded, and the predictions of heel angle no longer would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge immersed sinking was inevitable...It can be concluded that the load of 27 passengers, located as they were on July 4th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

Eric Sorensen is the author of "Sorensen's Guide to Powerboats". He was also the founding director of J. D. Power and Associates Marine Practice and is a consultant for the Navy, boat builders and boat owners. Mr. Sorenson did a theoretical or "academic" analysis of the capsizing for "Soundings: Trade Only Today", posted online on July 27, 2012. He indicated that the Kandi Won (Silverton boat) had "little depth below the waterline, and it has a correspondingly high center of gravity, with most of the boat's mass well above the waterline." In addition ..."no matter where you are standing on board, your own body's CG (center of gravity)... will be above the boat's CG." He also stated generally "The lower the boat's center of gravity with all passengers and gear on board, the more stable it will be." As a result, Mr. Sorenson states "A planing convertible such as the Silverton would likely capsize at 60 or 70 degrees of list..."

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It should be reiterated that Mr. Sorenson's analysis was based on boat specifications (rather than an examination of the Kandi Won) and estimated weights using U.S. Coast Guard averages. In conjunction with naval architects David Gerr, Eric Sponberg and Steve Dalzell, Mr. Sorenson found "with 27 passengers on board ...the resulting calculations appear to satisfy the requirements of the 46 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) stability standards which is surprising." (46 CFR actually applies to commercial boats because there is no such stability standard for recreational boats under 20 feet). He goes on to state "Unfortunately there are no passenger capacity regulations for uninspected boats of this size in the United States, as there are in Europe. But in speaking with other designers and operators of similar planing boats, I find that a sort of bell curve of consensus is that 8 to 12 people is a full load for a boat of this type in sheltered waters. Some went as high as 15 people if half were children...I would allow, at most, 3 of those 8 on the flybridge at any given time..."

Mr. Sorenson observes that "the Silverton is by every indication a fine inshore boat. Moderately loaded and judiciously operated, it should offer safe and satisfactory service in coastal waters..." In other words, the seaworthiness of the boat is directly related to its loading and operation.

Experts agree that the Kandi Won capsized and sank because it was overloaded and apparently encountered a 90º (beam) wave. The wave was likely the result of a vessel of unknown size passing the Kandi Won on its left. It was dark and the specific wave was not observed by the boat's operator or other occupants of the boat. There was no indication the wave was weather-related in spite of the approaching storm. The type and design of the boat did not permit it to "right" itself once it tipped and the "deck edge" immersed. At that point, the capsizing and eventual sinking were inevitable according to Professor Gallagher.

Recommendations and Proposals:

USCG's National Recreational Boating Safety Program, The European Recreational Craft Standard and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)

Both NHTSA and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) have a legislative obligation to issue safety standards and regulations to which manufacturers of both motor vehicles and vessels must conform and certify compliance. Both NHTSA and the USCG rely on self-certification programs. There is a distinction in the federal language used and the resulting responsibility. Whereas the U.S. Secretary of Transportation shall promulgate motor vehicle safety standards (through NHTSA), the U.S. Secretary of the Interior may prescribe regulations for recreational vessels.

According to its website the USCG's mission is:

To minimize the loss of life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental impact associated with the use of recreational boats, through preventive means, in order to maximize safe use and enjoyment of U.S. Waterways by the public.

Its vision is:

As an agency of the Federal government and a servant of the public, the U.S. Coast Guard, in its role as the designated National Recreational Boating Safety Coordinator, is

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a leader in improving the boating experience of the maritime public. We are an organization noted for working in partnership with all stakeholders within the waterways activity spectrum and across all modes of transportation to reach consensus solutions. We measure our success by our customer satisfaction, and our customers' needs help define our workload and priorities.

Title 46 of the United States Code, Subtitle II - Vessels and Seamen, Part B, Chapter 43, - Recreational Vessels contains USCG's legislative directive. According to the USCG website the Recreational Boating Product Assurance Branch is part of the U.S. Coast Guard's Boating Safety Division, and is responsible for developing and enforcing Federal safety standards, investigating consumer complaints, interpreting Federal standards. This includes, but is not limited to:

•Inspecting and testing recreational boats for compliance.

•Investigating consumer complaints involving alleged safety defects and non-compliance with Federal standards.

•Issuing recalls of recreational boats and associated equipment.

•Encouraging development of voluntary safety standards for recreational boats by international and national standards organizations.

•Interpreting Federal standards.

•Handling requests for exemptions to Federal standards.

•Assigning Manufacturer Identification Codes (MICs) to boat manufacturers.

•Publishing the Boating Safety Circular newsletter.

USCG safety standards are data-driven. Annual boating fatality and injury data are compiled and reviewed as trends. That data indicates the majority of these incidents occur on recreational boats under 20 feet and as a result recreational vessel safety standards are targeted at these boats to the exclusion of larger vessels.

The USCG sets minimum safety standards that boat manufacturers must self-certify as being met. The USCG conducts factory visits/inspections to insure compliance. However, consistent with the data-driven approach, the USCG standards do not currently include stability or capacity standards for recreational vessels over 20 feet. Federal pre-emption law prohibits states from creating their own standards. However, the American Boat and Yacht Council (ABYC) sets voluntary manufacturer standards that "include and expand upon the regulations of the USCG". The site goes further to state "Federal Regulations cover very little when it comes to boat construction. This is where the Standards of the ABYC take over". According to its website the ABYC "was created in 1954 as a non-profit organization to develop safety standards for the design, construction, equipage, repair and maintenance of boats. The mission of ABYC is to improve boating safety and reduce the number of injuries and fatalities. Membership is recommended and rewarded." The National Marine Manufacturers Association (NMMA) is a trade association representing the recreational marine industry. It is another voluntary

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membership organization. NMMA certifies vessels by applying the ABYC standards. An NMMA inspector will inspect each model annually to ensure each vessel is compliant with the applicable USCG and ABYC standards for that model year.3 There is no requirement that these voluntary recommendations/standards must be met. It should be noted that the majority of vessel manufacturers participate in one or both of these programs. However, it should also be noted that the USCG, the ABYC and the NMMA do not provide standards for recreational boats over 26 feet. The Kandi Won was 34 feet in length and therefore not subject to the standards. The inspection of the boat also revealed other hazards that could benefit from industry regulation. The sliding cabin door slammed shut and locked when the boat tipped. The cabin furniture, provided with the boat, was unsecured by design. The couch, table, etc. became obvious projectiles as the boat rolled. It seems clear that safety standards would be appropriate to address these circumstances in the same way that seatbelts and head restraints are mandated for cars.

By contrast the European Recreational Craft Directive sets essential requirements for the design and construction of ‘recreational craft’ which it defines as “…any craft intended for sport or leisure purposes, regardless of the type or the means of propulsion, with a hull length of 2.5m (just over eight feet) to 24m (just over 78 feet), measured according to the appropriate harmonized standards”.4 The directive sets regulations and requirements based on four possible design categories:

‘A’ OCEAN: Designed for extended voyages where conditions may exceed wind force 8 (Beaufort scale) and significant wave heights of 4 m and above but excluding abnormal conditions, and vessels largely self-sufficient.

‘B’ OFFSHORE: Designed for offshore voyages where conditions up to, and including, wind force 8 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 4 m may be experienced.

‘C’ INSHORE: Designed for voyages in coastal waters, large bays, estuaries, lakes and rivers where conditions up to, and including, wind force 6 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 2 m may be experienced.

‘D’ SHELTERED WATERS: Designed for voyages on sheltered coastal waters, small bays, small lakes, rivers and canals when conditions up to, and including, wind force 4 and significant wave heights up to, and including, 0.3 m may be experienced, with occasional waves of 0.5 m maximum height, for example from passing vessels

The European directive requires in section 3.6:

The manufacturer's maximum recommended load (fuel, water, provisions, miscellaneous equipment and people (in kg)) for which the boat was designed shall be determined

                                                            3 See the comparison between USCG requirements and NMMA Certification Requirements available at http://legcon.nmma.org/certification/about/chart.asp 4 See Directorate General for Internal Policies: Design Categories of Watercrafts, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201206/20120615ATT46965/20120615ATT46965EN.pdf.  

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according to the design category, stability and freeboard (section 3.2) and buoyancy and flotation (section 3.3).

Section 2.2 requires a "Builder's plate" - Each craft shall carry a permanently affixed plate mounted separately from the boat hull identification number, containing the following information:

• The manufacturer's name;

• CE marking (The mandatory conformity marking for products sold in the European Economic Area [EEA]. It is a statement from the manufacturer that the product meets the requirements of the applicable EC directives. In this case, the recreational craft directive.);

• The boat design category;

• The manufacturer's maximum recommended load excluding weight of the contents of the fixed tanks when full; and

• The number of persons recommended by the manufacturer for which the boat was designed to carry when under way.

By comparison to the Coast Guard regulations, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has a legislative "mandate" to issue safety standards and regulations. NHTSA's mandate is under Title 49 of the United States Code, Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle Safety. NHTSA is required to issue Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) and Regulations to which manufacturers of motor vehicle and equipment items must conform and certify compliance.

Motor vehicle travel is not a luxury and is inextricably intertwined with the daily living of the American people. As a result, NHTSA has implemented a vehicle safety program that has a wider scope than the National Recreational Boating Safety Program conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. NHTSA's scope is fundamentally more proactive inasmuch as it regulates and causes all types of motor vehicles to be inspected, regardless of which vehicles are overrepresented in fatal and injury crashes.

NHTSA provides for an Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC). According to NHTSA, OVSC tests new vehicles and regulated equipment items to applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs), enforces importation and certification regulations, maintains identifying and VIN-deciphering information submitted by motor vehicle and equipment manufacturers, and monitors light and heavy vehicle fuel economy requirements for credits and monetary penalties. OVSC carries out its mission by conducting random compliance testing, and compliance inspections, and by reviewing import data from the Customs and Border Protection Agency, and fuel economy data from the Environmental Protection Agency.

According to NHTSA, the FMVSS is also a self-certification program. The NHTSA does not certify that vehicles or items of motor vehicle equipment meet the requirements of various FMVSSs or issue "approval" stickers, labels, certificates, etc. A NHTSA compliance testing

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program has been in place since 1968. Each year the OVSC randomly selects vehicles and items of motor vehicle equipment for compliance testing by independent testing laboratories under contract with the OVSC to verify that the manufacturer's certification is valid. The OVSC compliance testing program is a strong incentive for manufacturers of vehicles and/or items of motor vehicle equipment to institute and maintain a strong quality control/product surveillance program.

Recommendation: Title 46 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 43 was specifically enacted as "a direct response to the dramatic increase in the number of recreational boats and the Congressional recognition of the maritime safety problems that recreational boating has imposed upon our more than 25 million miles of waterways." There are more than 12 million boats registered in the United States. It is advisable for the federal officials to re-visit its approach to recreational vessels. Boating safety regulations should be the mandate of the Secretary of the Interior rather than an "option". Data-driven regulations that pre-empt states from enacting stricter safety measures are counterintuitive. It is difficult to justify regulations that do not encompass all recreational boats. Therefore, we recommend that federal officials examine and revamp the federal approach to this fundamental safety issue and consider adopting the European model or a hybrid that includes broad stability, capacity, design and "intended use" considerations.

Capacity Standards:

Capacity standards have specific relevance to the capsizing of the Kandi Won. There was no "capacity plate" affixed to the Kandi Won indicating the maximum number of persons or weight the vessel was capable of safely carrying. There is no federal requirement that this basic information be posted on the boat simply because it exceeded 20 feet in length. There was consequently no information about the importance of weight distribution on this particular vessel, with its high center of gravity and flat hull, indicating the critical need to limit the number of person on the fly bridge. It seems to be a matter of common sense that this fundamental information ought to be visibly posted where any operator would see it. This is especially true considering the current state of the law that permits persons with no boater safety training or license to pilot this 34-foot vessel.

Capacity standards are currently imposed by federal regulation applying capacity standards to boats less than 20 feet.5 46 USCA §4306 specifically pre-empts any state laws with different boating safety or equipment standards. Until 2012, New York had a requirement that capacity standards must be affixed via “plate” to all vessels under 26 feet (N.Y. Nav. L. §71-c). Recent legislation repealed §71-c to comply with the federal pre-emption. It is one of the only Navigation Law provisions passed by the legislature in the two legislative sessions preceding the sinking of the Kandi Won. [Note: There were 19 Navigation Law bills submitted in the last two sessions ranging from requiring boater safety certificates to requiring VTL license suspensions after a BWI conviction. The repeal of §71-c, the suspension of the boater safety certificate requirement for leased jet skis under certain conditions and the increased penalties for Boating Leaving the Scene (making them consistent with the VTL) are the only items that passed.]

                                                            5 See Code of Federal Regulations §§ 33 CFR 183.21, 183.23.

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We must call upon New York's elected federal representatives to submit a request for an amendment to 33 CFR 183.21:

Proposal: The federal regulations must be changed to require capacity plates on all vessels (public and private) as follows:

§ 183.21 Applicability. [Deletion] Added Language

This subpart applies to all mechanically propelled vessels [monohull boats less than 20 feet in length], except sailboats, canoes, kayaks, and inflatable boats.

As indicated, New York State cannot require these capacity plates due to the federal pre-emption. However, if the requested federal change were accomplished, enforcement would become the next necessary step. It would be incumbent on NYS to enact and enforce stepped penalties for capacity violations. The Coast Guard, the Police Marine Bureaus and boating experts (such as the Power Squadrons and NASBLA) should be enlisted to assist in the creation of this legislation. Their expertise should be used to determine which capacity violations should result in violations and fines and which should result in misdemeanor charges. It is equally and critically important that education accompany any regulatory/legislative change.

Law Enforcement:

The waterways surrounding Long Island have overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities among the federal government, New York State, Nassau and Suffolk counties and local authorities. Interagency assistance and coordination is an essential part of providing appropriate law enforcement coverage that addresses deterrence and public safety. This need has been heightened in recent years as resources have become increasingly strained. Nassau County alone covers 225 square miles of Marine District territory and 300 square miles of

Law enforcement was geographically and temporally nearby due to the fireworks display coming to an end. The USCG, NCPD and Town of Oyster Bay, Bay Constables all responded to the capsizing within minutes. There was a fast-moving strong storm that passed through the area that may have played a role in the response time of additional emergency service personnel who were not already on the water. The Atlantic Steamer/Oyster Bay Volunteer Fire Department divers received an alarm, acquired their gear, arrived on scene and conducted the first dive at 11:00 p.m. They recovered Harley Treanor’s body at 11:10 p.m., approximately one hour after the Kandi Won capsized. Just two minutes later during their second dive, the boat began sinking to its ultimate depth of 65 feet and the dive had to be terminated. NCPD divers, the Cold Spring Harbor Volunteer Fire Department divers, and NYPD divers arrived thereafter.

This incident exposed a vulnerability on our waterways. Long Island is fortunate to have the services of so many heroic volunteer firefighters and volunteer rescue divers. The nature of their service relies on those divers receiving an emergency call, obtaining the dive equipment, travelling to the water and then boating to the area of the emergency. In spite of every best effort, valuable time is lost in this process.

It is not widely known by Long Islanders engaged in casual water sports that the USCG, Nassau County PD and Bay Constable boats are not regularly equipped with rescue dive gear. These

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entities are prepared to engage in rescue swimming but their dive operations are targeted toward searches and recoveries rather than rescues. Only the NYPD has rescue dive teams on standby with the aviation capability of getting multiple divers and their equipment in the air and to an emergency quickly. The New York State Police have approximately 65 divers but there are no divers stationed on Long Island. The closest dive unit is located in Troop K in Poughkeepsie, NY.

Joy Treanor is Harley Treanor’s mother. She was not on the Kandi Won at the time it capsized. She became aware of the anomaly that law enforcement boats patrolling Long Island’s busy waterways did not have dive equipment through this tragedy. It was incomprehensible to her that a USCG boat was on-scene so quickly, accompanied by the Bay Constables and NCPD, but unable to provide diving assistance.

Joy Treanor has actively worked with Christopher Briggs, president of the Bay Constable Benevolent Association, to provide the Oyster Bay Bay Constables with Rapid Diver units. The units include air sources for both the rescuer and the victim. Briggs raised the money to purchase a number of units. On May 21, 2013 the Oyster Bay Town Board agreed to accept the equipment for future use. Two units will be deployed to the south shore and two to the north shore.

It is advisable that the U.S. Coast Guard, law enforcement and rescue agencies across Long Island re-open the discussion of inter-agency dependency and resource allocation. This discussion should include the reliance on volunteer rescue divers as well as daily patrol coverage and emergency coordination. Consideration should be given to making members of the U.S. Coast Guard peace officers for the purpose of issuing summons rather than simply "boarding officers" capable of doing safety inspections.

Licensing and Other Legislation:

In July of 2012 there was no licensing or general boating safety certificate requirement in the State of New York other than the narrow requirement for 10 – 18 year-old boaters and those operating personal watercraft such as jet skis.

According to NASBLA (National Association of State Boating Law Administrators), Alabama is the only state that requires a boating license. 47 states have some form of boating safety course (including New York). Most states only require the course for young operators. 27 states do not require an adult to take a boater education course. 14 states specify a “born after” date for required certification. Four states have an age and horsepower requirement. New Jersey, Connecticut and Florida are the only three states that do not tie certification to a boater’s age. FLA does specify a minimum of 10 horsepower however.

There were at least nine bills relating to boating before the legislature in the 2013 session. Only one, a boating safety certificate bill, passed both houses and awaits the Governor’s signature. If enacted, the bill will ultimately require all persons born on or after May 1, 1996 to obtain a boating safety certificate before regularly operating a boat alone. People born on or before April 30, 1996 are "grandfathered" into the provision and are exempt from the requirement. It is an important step toward a comprehensive boater safety legislative scheme. The bill also authorizes

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the Commissioner of Parks and Recreation to "develop a method for approving internet-based boating safety courses". This eventual on-line capability (perhaps with an "in-person', proctored exam) is another important step forward. The more accessible boating safety training becomes, the more likely it is to be extended to all boaters. When New Jersey amended its law to require a boating safety certificate for all operators, there were major implementation problems. Apparently there were not enough courses available to meet the needs of both new and existing boaters.

Unfortunately the bill falls short of requiring persons renting boats to have a boating safety certificate while jet skiers (owners or renters) are still required to have a certificate. It seems a little like requiring a driver's license for a motorcycle but not for an automobile. However, as a starting point the bill does require that an explanation of the operation of the rental craft and basic navigational rules are given to the renter before operation. This bill still permits boaters as young as 10 years old to continue to operate power boats alone as long as they have a boating safety certificate. It also continues to have no bottom age limit for allowing a child to operate a boat, without a boater safety certificate, as long as they are accompanied by a person who is 18 years old or older and either has a boating safety certificate or is otherwise exempt. The Town of Huntington's Senior Harbor Master, Harry Acker summed up the reality of this continuing provision during the Public Hearing on boating safety conducted by Senator Carl Marcellino on August 8, 2012 in Oyster Bay. Mr. Acker stated in substance: There's nothing to stop a two-year-old, with an adult on board, from operating a power boat while pulling a water skier.

Finally, the bill states "The commissioner ( of Parks and Recreation) is authorized and directed to establish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates issued by the commissioner. The commissioner is further authorized to require that any other entity approved by the commissioner to provide courses of instruction and award boating safety certificates establish a system for tracking and replacing boating safety certificates so as to enable the replacement of lost or stolen certificates to those who have previously been awarded such certificates."

This provision was apparently enacted because the entities authorized to provide boating education and boating safety certificates had widely variant practices and could not always replace a lost certificate. It was suggested during the Oyster Bay hearings that all designations relating to the operation of motor vehicles, boats, jet skis (personal watercraft), all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and/or snowmobiles should be centralized through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) Operator's Record. A driver's license or non-driver I.D. could reflect whether a person had a boating safety certificate rather than relying on the decentralized certificates provided by individual safety trainers. This would be consistent with the requirement that boats be registered through DMV.

Likewise, legislation presented by Senator Charles J. Fuschillo, Assemblyman Harvey Weisenberg and others proposed that New York State conform its laws relating to operating while intoxicated or impaired by drugs, operating while intoxicated or impaired with a child in the car, vessel, or other vehicle, leaving the scene of collisions, etc. There should be parity and consistency among the laws relating to operation of motor vehicles, boats (including sailboats), snowmobiles or (ATVs). All vehicle operating suspensions or revocations, as well as all

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convictions for summons resulting from the operation of any type of vehicle should be contained in this one record. And a second DWI, BWI or OWI conviction from type of vehicle should be elevated to a felony charge based on a prior conviction from any type of vehicle. A truly comprehensive and integrated approach should be the goal.

The legislature should be congratulated for taking the first steps necessary toward implementing a comprehensive boating safety legislative scheme for the State of New York. Perhaps this starting point can be used to continue the discussion among legislators, law enforcement and the many boating associations and experts who know what is needed to accomplish New York's boating safety goals.

Registration and Inspection of Vessels:

Registration of all vessels is required pursuant to N.Y. VTL § 2251, (unless the vessel has a US marine or foreign country document which will serve as a substitute for NY registration). Vessel registration is the responsibility of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Vessel registrations assign a unique number, certificate and sticker to the vessel. The registration is valid for three years and can thereafter be renewed. However vessels should not only be registered with DMV, they should be required to undergo a safety inspection in a manner and intervals to be determined by the Commissioner of Parks and recreation. There is something inherently wrong with a legislative scheme that requires the inspection of a trailer carrying a boat, but not the boat itself.

Boating privilege and registration suspensions are supposed to be noted on a separate part of the DMV motor vehicle driving abstract pursuant to both the Navigation Law and the DMV regulations. If a boater does not have a driving abstract, a new client ID would be assigned to the boater exclusively to have a record of the status of the boater’s operating privilege.

Navigation Law §49-a(3)(b) provides:

The court shall report each conviction recorded pursuant to this section to the commissioner of motor vehicles and the commissioner of parks, recreation and historic preservation on forms provided by the department of motor vehicles. Such reports shall include the length of any suspension imposed on the privilege to operate a vessel and any suspension imposed against a vessel registration. The department of motor vehicles shall maintain a record of all convictions and suspensions in order to effectuate the provisions of this section.

Per this section, DMV is required to post boating while intoxicated convictions/suspensions and boating refusals (if the Department is informed by the court), on the “VESSEL/SNOWMOBILE” record which follows the regular driving record on a DMV abstract.

Significant efforts should be made to improve reporting of all convictions and suspensions relating to all types of vehicles. DMV may to have statistics on this reporting but anecdotally, experienced prosecutors in this office have never seen this record.

While the centralization of these records through DMV is a costly undertaking, it is an essential part of an effective boating safety program. Deterrence relies on enforcement and

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accountability. There is no real accountability if local convictions are not reported and suspensions or revocations are not enforced.

Governor Andrew Cuomo recently announced increased access to DMV data for use in legitimate law enforcement investigations and prosecutions. The use of this data can result in solving criminal enterprises ranging from economic crimes to child abductions to hit and run crashes. The data also has use in terrorism investigations. It is essential for all purposes that the data is accurate and thorough.

Title 46 of the U.S. Code provides (in pertinent part);

"(c) A State whose recreational boating safety program has been approved by the Secretary is eligible for allocation and distribution of amounts under this chapter to assist that State in developing, carrying out, and financing its program. Matching amounts shall be allocated and distributed among eligible States by the Secretary as provided by section 13104 of this title."

As New York State proceeds with creating a comprehensive boating safety program, perhaps the Secretary of the Interior would consider an application to support that program and the computer upgrades essential to its success.

Conclusion:

The tragedy of the Kandi Won was unspeakable. It was the catalyst for public hearings and legislation. All stakeholders must be open to new common sense regulations to improve boater safety. Federal policymakers should re-examine the role of the federal government’s effectiveness in the area of recreational boating safety. New York State must continue to advance the cause of boating safety through comprehensive and consistent legislation. Local governments must review their own procedures during water events to determine whether additional precautions are necessary, just as the Town of Huntington did after the incident on July 4, 2012. The New York State Department of Parks and Recreation is the state's leader in the field of recreational boating, and the Department should consult with boating experts and associations, members of law enforcement and local governments to create a strategic boating safety plan with specific regulatory, legislative and educational goals. New York State should become the national model for boating safety.

STABILITY Al'lALYSIS OF THE VESSEL K."NDI WON

0)/

JULY 4TH, 2012

1'1

OYSTER BAY, NY

November 25, 2012

Performed For

Nassau County Pollee Department

Neil Gallagher. P.E.

1

1.0) Introduction

On July -tlh, 2012 the 3-t' Silverton powerboat KANDI WO:-': capsized and sank in Oyster BayHarbor. NY. leading to the deaths of three of the 27 passengers on the vessel. After the sinking.the vessel was raised and no apparent damage to the hull was found, indicating that the mostlikely cause of the capsize was related to the stability of the vessel. At the request of the NassauCounty Police Department (NCPD). a stability analysis was made to detennine the probablecause of the capsize. This report presents the result of the analysis.

2.0) Methodology

This analysis follows the methods nonnally used for any commercial passenger vessel requiredby the US Coast Guard to demonstrate adequate stability. There are n.,.o main components of theanalysis: a stability test of the vessel using a procedure called an inclining experiment, andcalculations that use the results of the stability test to detennine the floating, or hydrostatic,characteristics.

The stability test is done to measure the weight and the position of the center of gravity of theempty .,.esse!. commonly called the "lightship weight and center of gravity". The center ofgravity can be considered the average point of all the weight of the vessel and is critical fordetennining stability.

The second pan of the stability analysis is to use the weight and center of gravity infonnationdetermined in the stabilit)', lest. along with a hull shape description provided by a lines plan. toexamine the stability of the vessel when operating with loads such as passengers. fuel. water. andany other weight element. The weight and center of gravity of each load item is combined withthe lightship weight and center of gravity to detennine the total weight and center of gravity ofthe loaded vessel. The hull shape is then used to determine the equilibrium of weight andbuoyancy, and the stability characteristics o[the loaded vessel can be detennined. Traditionallythis detennination was made by hand calculations from data taken off the lines plans. In modemtimes this is done by entering the hull shape into a computer program thaI then perfonns thestability calculations.

In the case ofKANOI WON, there was no information available with regards to either the hullshape or the lightship weight Although a popular boat, the builder has gone out of business.Some attempts were made to delennlne the designer (often not an employee of the builder), inorder 10 ask for the lines. but they were unsuccessfuL Instead, measurements were made on theboat when it was in the Marine Bureau facility of the NCPD, and used in a CAD program calledAutoCad to create a lines plan.

In order to determine the lightship weight and center of gravity. a stability test was conducted onthe vessel. It was placed in the water at the Marine Bureau facility, outfitted with test equipmentand the test was perfonned by the author with assistance from NCPD personnel. In executing

2

the test, lhe procedures Hamuilly employed by a US Const Guard approved stability analysiswere followed to maximum extent possible.

The weights and locations of all the persons on board on July 4th were required infonnation.),""CPD personnel interviewed the passengers after the incident and provided a graphic thatshowed the weight and approximate location of each person on board. This data was used todetermme the actual loading condition at the time of the incident.

The computer program used in the analysis is General Hydrostatics, or GHS, created by CreativeSystems, Inc .. in Port Townsend. \VA. GHS is one of the most widely used stability programs inthe US. and is recognized by the US Coast Guard, among others, for fully approwd stabilitywork on commercial vessels. The lines plan created in AutoCad was entered into GHS to createthe computer model used for the analysis.

Once the hull shape and weight data were entered into GHS. it was possible to examine thestability of the KANDI WON as it was operating at the time ofIhe incident. The stability in flatwater was first examined. followed by Ihe stability in waves.

3.0) Hull Shape and Model:

The figures below show the hull shape developed from measurements of the hull and created inGHS:

------------·---L--.,·---........ -~

-------Figure I: Profile (above) and deck plan (below)

3

Figure 2: Hull sections. isometric (above) and body plan (below).

In the model and in all subsequent calculations, the origin point for longirudinal and venicallocations was the bottom of the transom at centerline, as this was the most easily accessible pointfor measurements. Additionally. the baseline extends forward through this point and serves as areference for drafts and trim. The baseline's angle to the hull happens to be parallel to the floororthe building at the time the measurements were made. but this line's angle is arbitrary, as longas all dimensions and drafts are consistently made from it in this analysis.

It should be nOled that the hull shape was modeled only up to the deck edge. In this analysis, itwas presumed that once the vessel rolled to the point that the deck edge was inuncrsed, the boatwould flood, without recovery. This was due to the open nature of the hull, particularly aft of thedeckhouse, as well as the open windows at the side of the hOllse. There were additional openings

4

on the hull below the deck edge Ihat would lead 10 nooding under angles of heelless than deckimmersion: there were two large port holes left open in the forward cabin. and there are twovents aft for air entrance inlo the engine room. These openings would have caused flooding atlarge heel angles prior to capsize. but as will be seen below they were probably not significant inthe case of a sudden capsize.

4.0) Stability Test:

The stability test was performcd on October ISth• 2012. Sincc the purpose of the test was to

determine the lightship weight and center of gra\-ity of the KANDI WO::--J on July 4lh, it was

important that the \"essel was in the same condition as on the 4th before the incident. Some minordamage had occurred as a result of the sinking and raising. including the dislocation of the swimplatform. an interior couch and the awning over the flying bridge, but these were replaced priorto the test. Many smaller interior items were damaged, and there was a coating of mud overmuch of the interior. but nothing of significant weight appeared to be out of position. The vesselhad been on blocks for se\'cral months prior to the test. so everything inside had dried out. It wastherefore assumed that the vessel was in essentially the same weight condition as on July 4th

,

with the exception of the fuel tanks. These had fuel in them at the time of the sinking. but lheywere drained prior to the test. Since their location was known the weight of the fuel could beaccounted for by calculation.

The \veight of the vessel \vas determined by taking freeboard measurements from the deck edgeto the waterline with the vessel in its as-inclined condition. From the freebonrds the drafts at theforward and an end were detennined and entered into GHS. GHS sets the hull to those draftsand knowing the hull shape detennines the displacement which equals the weight. in the as­inclined condition. By calculation the weight of items onboard during the stability test but notincluded in Ughtship are deducted (these are primarily the testing equipment and personnel).resulting in the determination of the lightship weight. shown below in Figure 3 as 16.500 lb.This is significantly higher than the stated weight of the Silverton 34 in the product literature, butsuch discrepancies between acrual and advertised ,"veights are not uncommon.

The as-inclined fore and aft location of the center of gravity, normally referred to as thelongitudinal center of gravity (LeG) as it is located at the same fore and aft location as the centerof buoyancy of the hull determined by GHS. Calculations were then used to correct the as­inclined LCG to the lightship LCG.

The inclining segment of the stability test resulted in a determination of venical center of gravity(VCG) of the vessel in Ihe as-inclined condition. Briefly. this was accomplished by movingweights to one side in a series of steps. causing the vessel to heel. The resulting heel angle ateach step was carefully measured by three instruments: a pendulum, a digital inclinometer withan output to a computer, and digirallevel read manually. The weight movements and anglemeasurements were repeated to the opposite side. By recording the amount of weight anddistance moved each step, the relationship of heeling moment and Ihe heel angle gave the as­inclined stability. from which the as-inclined VCG was detennined. By calculation Ihe effect of

5

the items not part of lightship was accounted for and the resulting weight and location of thelightship center of gravity was found. The results are also shown in Figure 3.

The data and calculations from the stability test are included in the Appendix.

Figure oJ: Stability Test Results

Item: Weight LCG VCGIb ft Fwd 0 ft ABL

As-Inclined 18,247 12.63 3.90Wls to Deduct: -1,729 10.35 6.40

LiQhlship 16,518 12.87 3.64,

5.0) Passenger Weight

The other major weight element was the passenger weight and center of gra\·ity. Theapproximate weight and location of all 27 passengers was obtained by NePD through interviewswith passengers after the incident and provided for this analysis as sketches sho\Vlng weights andlocations. The sketches were used with the CAD model to detennine each passenger's weight.vertical and horizontal distance from the origin point at the bottom of the transom. These wereentered into a spread sheet, also shown in the Appendix. from which a single value of weight.horizontal and vertical center of gravity was found. These are sbown in Figure 4 below. Thesevalues were entered in GHS as a single weight element representing all the passengers at the timeof the incident.

Total Passenger WeightWeight,lb lCG, ft VCG,ft

3,523 12.22 8.65

Figure 4: Passenger weIght summary

6.0) Fuel Weight

One remaining significant weight element was the fuel in the tanks. There are two tanks, oneeach P0rl and starboard, located under the deck at the aft end of the boat, and each tank has acapacity or 130 gallons. It was observed that both tanks had crushed and rupmred due to waterpressure during the sinking. so there W<lS no way of knowing the acmal amount of fuel in thetanks prior to the capsize. Consequently in the stability annlysis the cases of full, half-full andempty tanks were considered to see how much the fuel weight affected the results. The fuel wasentered as weights inlO the GHS model. (This ignores stability corrections for the fuel sloshingin the tank, which would he very small.) The locations were based on observation of the tankson the vessel and put in the CAD drawing of the hull to detennine the location of the center ofgravity of the fuel.

6

7.0) Stability Calculations - Flat Water

With the \veight data entered into GHS. stability wns detennined ror two conditions: in flatwater and in waves. The principal measure of stability in nat water is a quantity known as GM.or metacemric height. and it is a measure of the ability of a noating vessel to relum uprighl whenheeled by wind or waves. A positive G.Y1 (greater than zero) indicates a \'essel will right itselfwhen heeled, while a negative GM (less than zero) indicates a vessel is in danger ofcapsizing.(In the Appendix a brief explanation orthe term GM is given.) For KANDI WON the GM in theJuly 4th load condition was calculated by GHS and found 10 be as shown below in Figure 5 forthe Ihree cases of fuel load:

figure): GM for each fuel tank load.

Fuel Tank load: 100% 50% 0% lightshiplightship weight, lb 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518Passenger weight, lb 3,523 3,523 3,523 0Fuel weight, lb 1,820 910 I 0 0Total Displacement, Ib 21,861 20,951 20,041 16,518GM, It 1.25 1.31 1.38 3.09

-

The GM \'alues in Figure 5 are quite low for a typical power boat of the style of the Silvenon 34.A major cause of the low GM is the passenger \veight and venical center of gravity, as can beseen by the last column to the right in Figure 5. Ln the lightship case. the weight of thepassengers and fuel are removed. and it can be seen thal the GM in the lightship condition is 3.09ft.

An additional measure of stability is the righting ann curve, \vhich while not discussed in thisnarrative. is included in the Appendix for thoroughness.

8.0) Stability Calculations -In Waves

The stability condition in waves is of great interest in this case. While there were no largenatural waves present, interviews of the operator and passengers on the \'esse! indicate thai otherboats were in the immediate vicinity ofKANDI WON and travelling in the same direction. Thereports are nOI entirely clear, but KANDI WON appears to have encountered significant wakesfrom those boats. Waves approaching any vessel from directly ahead or astern will cause thevessel to pitch. while waves approaching from directly abeam will impan a significant rollingmoment. Waves approaching in benveen the beam and the bow or stem are called quaneringwa\'es and cause a combination of pitch and roll. GHS has the ability to examine the resultantstability condition if a wave is encountered from any angle and thus changes the buoyancysupponing the hull. This was used in these calculations to examine the resulting condition withwaves of varying size and direction of approach. In these wave calculations. the fuel load wasconsidered to be 50% in each tank for simplicity, as fuel load has a small effect on the results. A3D-foot wavelength \vas assumed as a typical wake's wavelength.

7

Figure 6 shows the sUll1malY of the resulting heel angle caused by the vessel encountering wavesat 45-degree increments. where zero degrees represents a wave approaching from astern and 180represents wave approaching from the bow. These results can be thought of as a static case: inother words, if the vessel were positioned on a sloped waterplane. the table shows the resultingangle of heel. This is in contrast to a dynamic case in which the momentum of the rolling vesselis incorporated into the analysis. In this analysis. the static case can be considered the less severecase of response to a wave.

Condition: SO% Fuel, All Passengers

Wave length: 30 ft

Wave Height, h I 1 1 1 11 1Approach Angle (from stern), degrees 0 45 90 1351 180Static heel angle, degress 0 9.3 46 9.3 0

Wave Height, h 2 2 2 2 2Approach Angle (from stern), degrees 0 45 90 135 180Static heel angle, degress 01 20 167 20 0

FIgure 6: Wave analySIS results

As can be seen by examining Figure 6, the waves from abeam. 90 degrees. cause the greatesl

heel angle. and in panicular with a 2~foot wa\'c beight. the resultant angle of heel is 167 degrees.

which simply means that the \essel has insufficient stability to remain upright and has capsized.

9.0) Accuracy of Results

In any engineering analysis the results will only be as good as the information and assumptions

used as inputs. In this analysis. a brief discussion of these inputs is in order.

• Hull shape: as mentioned above, no lines plan was available for detennination ofthe hull shape. There was inevitably some inaccuracy involved in the

measurementS taken with the boal on a concrete surface. However. the

measurements were generally accurate to less than one inch. and the difference inbuoyancy caused by this amount will nOI significantly change the results. While

more accurate methods of measuring the hull surface do exist, they involve a

photographic or laser survey to generate a 3·dimensional surface model and wereprohibitively expensive.

8

• Stability Test - Condition of the wssel: the key infonnation detennined by the

stability test was the lightship weight and center of gravity. The boat was

ccnainly not in nonnal operating condition during the test since it had gone

through a capsize. sinking. spending over a week on the bottom and raising.Although the interior was mud-covered and loose equipment in shambles. the

major weight items were in place. One question regarding hull weight is the

possibility that water could have emered in core of the hull and increased its

weight. However. there was no sign on the exterior of the hull that any cracks orholes had developed, makLng it unlikely that water dJmage had OCCUlTed to the

hull.

• Location of passengers: again a key pan of the analysis. the accuracy of the

weight and venical positions of the passengers is thought to be quite good. Theinfoftnntion provided shows a sketch with the layout and each passenger's weight

indicated on the sketch. The only estimate made herein is whether each passenger

was seated or standing and the difference in wl1ical center relative to the baseline

for either case is not great. The data is probably the best that could be obtained

under the circumstances of this incident.

10.0) Conclusions

The purpose of this analysis was to examine the stability characteristics of powerboat KAt~DI

WON in its load condition on July 41b• 2012. and to determine what led to the capsize. When

loaded with the twenty-seven persons as it was. there was low stability in flat water, although

enough to remain upright. However, in beam waves of only two feet. the boat had inadequate

stability to remain upright and was likely to capsize. This of course is what happened. bUllhis

analysis demonstrates from a naval architectural standpoint why it happened. While the exact

series of events with regards to whether another boat was passing the KA.'\Dl WON, and what

steering and throttle movements may have been made that had an influence on the capsize, may

not be known with cenainty, what this analysis shows is that the capsize was very likely to have

occurred given the loading. II should be noted that while Figure 6 above shows a final heel angle

of 167 degrees in beam seas, it is merely a notional equilibrium angle. Once the boat rolled to 75

or 80 degrees, the deck and interior would have flooded. and the predictions of heel angle no

longer would apply as flooding and sinking at any angle of heel with the deck edge immersed

sinking \vas inevitable.

While analysis does not include a sensitivity study, such as what would have happened if fewer

passengers were onboard, or if they were located lower in the vessel, a brief analysis of the

stability with tcn persons, located on the main deck forward and aft, shows that significant heel

angles would have occurred but nm led to capsizing. It can be concluded that the load of27

passengers. located as they were on July 4th led to the capsizing and sinking of the vessel.

9

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

APPENDIX

STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE VESSEL KANDI WON

ON

JULY 4TH 2012

IN

OYSTER BAY. NY

A·'

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

Description ofGM:

APPENDIX

Stability is the measure ofany vessel's abilit)' to return to an upright condition when it is causedto heel by wind. waves or an)' other disturbance. The following is a brief description of thequantitative measure of stability for a floating vessel.

Consider a vessel floating upright. as in Figure Al belo\\'. The point G is the ··average" poin! ofall the weight of the vessel and is called the center of gravity. G is nonnall)' on the centerline.and does not move. once a vessel is loaded. The ··average··location of all the buoyancy, B,known as the center of buoyancy, is also on centerline assuming the hull is symmetric. G thusrepresents all the weight of the vessel acting down at one point. and B represents the point of allthe upward force of water keeping the vessel afloat.

WATERUNE__-+ -i l-_

c

B

SHIP UPRIGHT, 8 AND G ON CENTER UNE

Figure A·l, vessel upright.

Now assume the hull has been caused to heel to some angle as in Figure A2. It can be seen thatas it heels, the section of the hull below the waterline is no longer symmetric. and B, the·'average" point of buoyancy moves to the low side. as more orthe hull on that side is immersed.Consequently the upward buoyancy force B is acting outboard of the downward gravity force atG, causing the vessel to return upright. This is a condition of positive stability.

At any angle of heel, the center of buoyancy B will always be loc.ated somewhere along an are,as shown in Figure A2, and the center of that arc is a poim known as M. the metacenter. As longas the average weight point G is below M. as in Figure A2. the buoyancy force B will always beoutboard of the gravity force G causing the vessel to right itself when heeled. However. ifGhappens to rise above M, as in Figure A3, any angle of heel will now put the gravity force Goutboard of B. In this case, G now acts relative to B to increase, rather than decrease. the angleof heel and this is what leads capsizing. In other words. having G above M is an unstablecondition.

From Figure A2 it can be secn that the grealer rhe distance G is below M the grealer the rightingmoment will be. This distance is known as GM. or metacentric height; GM is considered

A-2

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

positi\e when G is below M and negative ifG is above M. The value ofGM is the fundamentalmeasure of the stability ora floating vessel.

WATERlINE_--,L +f- ---jL_

G

G BELOW M. SHIP RETURNS UPRIGHT

Figure A-2. positive GM

G

WATERlINE_---jL ++ -+_

G ABOVE M. SHIP ROLLS OVER

Figure A-3, negative GM

A-3

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

Figure A-4, inclining experimem setup. port side.

Figure A-5, inclining experiment setup, stbd side.

Digital Levels"""',c--J

Pendulum Weights

Figure A-6, inclining experiment: weights moved, reading pendulum & level indicators on steps.

A-4

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

Figure A-7, pendulum and oil damper.

Figure A-9. measuring freeboards.

A-S

Fig. A-S. digital levels.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

• ./! ./l

~ m ~ m ·m m ,m/ • m m m

././

I" ._-Figure A-IO: inclining experiment plot of rangents

Freeboards

Draft;"

16.32015.25015.35017.00817.375

Dist fr 0

'"39'29320310'

o

slope=- -000398Intercept: 17.0511

Draft at boW'" 15.483[)faft at stem: 17.375

Draft 011 bow,ft '" 1.290an. at stem, n. '" 1.448

Meas dF eb d'", " 0.'LOClllon' , ;" 118 ths sdFbd Hull Deck Bulwk Draft

'" De ~. I HI '";" ;" '"Bow 394" FWd Port 0 50 2 50.25 6657 0000 16.320

S~' 0 50 2 50.25 6657 0.000 16.320A~... 16320

931n FWd Poo 0 59 0 59.00 71.50 0.000 12.500S~' 0 53 • 5350 71.50 0000 18000

Ave'" 15250

203 In Fwd Pon 0 57 • 57.50 69.60 0000 12 10S~' 0 51 0 51.00 69.60 0000 t8

Ave; 15350

1Q4ln FWd Port 0 52 2 5225 66.82 0000 14 o ,Sib' 0 47 3 47.38 6682 0000 19445

Ave'" 1

Tran5(lm,O" Pon 0 43 2 43-25 58.75 0000 15 500~, 0 39 • 39. • 1

Ave'" 17 3751 Freeboll(d measured from underslde 01 rub ral2. Hull depth measurements made Ie baseline localed at transom lowest pOint, see ~HuIl5_scaled & lines.dwg"

Figure A·I I: inclining experiment freeboards and drafts,

A·6

STABILITY ANALYStS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

1l5.-.a

1 I vMOO &9.60 , V ,."

1:& ,~ / 1&.--- l~,,-", ,..... .. - -'"" "'" ,.,..-

~. ,.. . ,.. . ..INCLINING FREEBOARDS & DRAnS

Figure A·12: inclining experiment frceboards and drafts plot.

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUSBaseline draft: 1.448 @ Origin

Trim: Fwd 0.28 deg., Heel: zeroPart------------·-----------------Wei;ht(LB}----LCG-----TOG·----VCGWEIGET 18,247 12.64t 0.00 0.00

SpGr------Displ(LB}----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RefHtHULL 1.021 18,247 12.63t 0.00 0.79 -1.45

Righting A......s: 0.00 0.00Distances in FBET.------------------------------------------------------------

BaselineBaseline

Draft @Draft @

0.00 - 1.44832.87a .. 1.290

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Fwd 0.16/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 0.00

LCF Displacement Buoyancy-ctr. Weight/ Moment/Draft----Weight(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GMT1.507 18,247 12.63f 0.79 1236 12.35f 2074.06 44.8 6.26

Distances in FEET.-------specific Gravity" 1.022.-----------Moment in Ft-LB.Trim is per 32.BSFt

Draft is from Baseline.

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Fwd 0.1E/32.S8, No Heel

Origin Displacement Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weight(LB}----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------BHL-----aHTI.H8 18,247 12.63f 0.00 0.79 233 12.35f 44.0 5.47

Dis~ances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity" 1.022.--------------------------

Figure A-I3: GHS Output for inclining experiment., as-inclined.

A·7

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WDN APPENDIX

"'­...

.. ".. "--.r-----;---~.oo,------

AS-INCUNED CONDmON

Figure A-14: inclining experiment, location of items to deduct.

WEIGHTS TO OEOUCT

,.. .-.00 lIF¥oO

l,~~.

Flllm Cl. I Mom• S'I5lO II·LOCfI

,,,"'IiL .­,.,

• ..., ~Ilo..c· Wa~'~,""'" - ", ,~ u, " " ,.~ ,,~ ,,~ ,~,,

MGe<:~ ",;)!II' C'UM Nc 2 ~ " - ,~ u, ," ,.~ ~1 :Jll ,,~ ,~,, ~-:. 0..: • •'. r.M ~"'.., "GJ :'" ~,- '" - "~

." ~~ . ,-• - ,._,...-~..,'",~ .

.B:~G ; ,.

~, w,

~. . • - , .. • " ~~,,.

:,~: " " .. , .00 " ~ ,. - , -'- > • .,

" • ,- • - , , - " ,"' ,,~ ,-, ,~ '.)Sl n Aat

Figure A-IS: inclining experiment, weighl and center of deducted items.

NCPO Stability Test10i18f2012

liGHTSHIP WSGHT AND CENTERS

As. INCUNED D1SR..ACEMENTSlope of Targent curveAs·lncIlned GM " 1/(OSptacemernlope)As--Incllne<! Lee ..As-Inclined 8M "As-Inclined KB"As-Inclined KG "

182/17 III (GHS Clutp.)tj

2.3217/1E-Q5 111HD usu'lO A~e Pen<lJk.m 1&22Jon

1263 ft FVv'O Transom (OJ541 f1079 I'l

''''I:em 'No , lCG l-uorn VCG V-Mom

• ftFwdO 11-10 'AEL '-b"'-,,..,.,.,, 18247 "., 230'60 '''' 71 155w:.s to Dedl.a ·172'S 1035 -17901 '''' ·11061

Log'"'''' , , , '" 20_ 6O,IEOCer(1!l" of Gravity 1287 ft Fwd 0 3&1 nABL

Figure A-16. calculation of lightship weight and center of gravity.

A-S

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

- .~'.. c. E'

r' ; .." .• l

. .KANOI WONPASSENGERWEIGHTS AND

--I-LocAnoNS ON m, 21'JULY 4TH, 2012

--tcSased on interviewSI_-Jf.{~>__~B..i'!J~:-c',,, _--Hwith passengers by r- J ..... _ \

NCPO ,..........., _3 ,

Numbers In I ~ ,

--tlboxes

are t:t=t=::t=j::§~~~~=========passengerslD ~--+-lin spreadsheel \

calculatIOnsFORE DECK

FLYING BRJDGELl1£Li<--'l."",,',,_f- _'i2 _.(SS) 51>~

1.1:-. I~~~'~ 15

VO (!15

l'~(~OOJ

LAFT DECK

~('5"\

Figure A-17, stability analysis, location of passengers (I).

A-9

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

/7/

APPENDIX

/ \.\.

\.\.\

II

1

Ifc):\ 23

\\

\\\

........ICABIN I

-

Figure A-18, stability analysis, location of passengers (2).

A-l0

~~

I 323.•---------------1

I >93.9-----------------

I 353.7 I

I 251.1 I

~"""~v;

~

"o~o"

"~~m

"oX

7•.• 'v·73.3

/~

--0I-

I R ~78.6

~

81.5

117.4

76.0

25, P2ASS 23,27 24 26

~80" I

~2.5--

34.6-

11J'9~I 99.'

AS I2

,5 PASS PASS10,1 8,9

I 131.7 I

16.5-

9.50

2.50-,PASS1618

23.5

.2'3.t~41.4 97.9I 112.5127.3

",~~

""PASSENGER LOCATIONS

Figure A-19, Passenger location diagram.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON

NCfO IrlYestigation

Pusenser LoutionsR~: NePO Fa_. ~1.Ny'>tfom: 9/V./12

APPENDIX

Pf'rFu

Pass, No Wf'ight Long'l Long'l leng'1 Trans Trans Vo" ... ~. VonIb InfwdO' Ft [WoO Mom Ft P(.1I5f-) Mom Cede Ht' atlV okl FtABL Mom

"<, "<b In A8L"

fl-Ib1 90 '" 29.50 2655 2 180 m 12.0 7.11 ""2 84 '" 29.50 2478 ~2 ~1" 73.3 12.0 7.11 597, 120 '" 29.50 "'0 0 0 m 12.0 7.11 853, 220 323 26.92 5922 ~, .... 770 16.0

~1705

5 155 251 20.92 3242 0 0 .1.5 1'1.0 " 123<, 129 251 20.92 2693 2 2S8 "5 14.0 " 1027, 1''' 251 20.92 2928 -2 -280 .1.5 14.0 '_96 1114

• 100 132 1LOO ~~,

"" 117.4 "'-0 13.78 1378

• 195 132 11.00 2145 e 0 117.4 "'-0 a7B 268810 55 II' ._SO 523 -2 -110 117.4 36.0 12.78 70311 56 II' .50 532 ~ -224 117.4 36.0 12.78 71612 175 100 8.33 1458 2 'SO 117.4 "0 13.78 2412

13 110 100 8.33 917 0 0 117.4 30.0 12.28 135114 117 100 8.33 975 -2 -234 117.4 30.0 12.28 1437

15 180 100 8.33 1500 4 -no 117.4 36.0 12.78 230116 140 " 6.75 ." , 560 41.4 30.0 5.95 .1317 210 " 6.75 1'1' 2 420 '" 30,0 5.95 125018 115 81 6.75 no 0 0 41.4 30.0 5.95 68419 200 " 2.92 '" e 0 41.4 "'-0 7_'-5 '"''20 65 52 4.33 282 4 -260 41.4 30.0 5.95 '"21 115 3S 2.92 135 4 -460 41.4- "'-0 5.78 78022 120 17 1.42 17(1 4 -<ao 41.4 "'-,0 5.78 '1'" 106 127 10.58 1122 5 530 41.4 30" 5.95 '"" '" 113 9.42 7S3 5 "" '" 30" 5.95 '7'25 190 98 8.17 1552 5 950 '" 30.0 5,95 113126 165 127 10.58 1746 -2 -130 '" "_0 ','-5 122927 91 98 8.17 '43 -2 ·182 '" "'-_0 6.78 617

Pus WI' 3523 Ib Pass LCG:

4303812.22 ft Fwd 0 Pass VCG:

3<"778.65 tt ABL

Assumptions: 1.lol18's &Vf'rtic3l klcJtiorlS from CAD model

2.Pu,en~i'I"·'Yeg above deck estlmat~ tJ..s~d on each's weight ilJldon locatiOll, whethef assumed seated or standing

Figure A-lO, passenger weight and cenler ofgravity calculation.

A-12

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUSBaseline draft: 1.945 @Origin

Trlm: Aft 0.53/32.88, Heel: zeroPart------------------------------Weight(LBj----LCG-----TCG-----VCGLIGHT SHIP 16.518 12.87t 0.00 3.64PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65Fuel Tank Port 910 2.04f 3.00p 2.02Fuel Tank stbd 910 2.04f 3.00s 2.02

Total Weiqht--------> 21,861 11.86f 0.00 4.31SpGr------Displ(L3j----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RetHt

HULL 1.025 21,861 lI.81f 0.00 0.93 -1.95

Riqhtinq Ar!llS: 0.00 0.00Distances in FEEr.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 0.53/32.88, No Heel, VCG. 4.31

LCF Dlsplace~ent Buoyancy-etr. Weight/ Ho.ent!Dratt----Weiqht(LBj----LCB----·VC9-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GHT1.146 21,861 1l.Blf 0.93 1242 12.31f 1841.90 33.3 1.25

Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Homent in Ft-LS.Trim is per 32.BBFt

Draft is from Baseline.

Figure A-21. GM with 100010 load in fuel tanks.

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUSBaseline draft: 1.727 @ Ori;in

Trim: Aft 0.11/32.88, Ileel: zeroPart------------------------------Weiqht{LB)----LCG-----TCG-----VCGLIGHT SHIP 16,51B 12.87f 0.00 3.64PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65Fuel Tank Port 455 2.04t 3.00p 2.02Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.04f 3.005 2.02

Total Weiqht--------> 20,951 l2.29t 0.00 4.41SpGr------Displ(LB)----Lca-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt

HULL 1.025 20,946 l2.28f 0.00 0.89 -1.73

Riqhting Arms: 0.00 0.00Distances in FEET.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 0.11/32.B8, No Heel, VCG - 4.41

LCF Displacement Buoyancy-Ctc. Weight/ Moment!Draftw---WeiqhtlLE)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In tric----GML-----GMT1.6B4 20,94.6 12.28f 0.89 1246 12.37f 187B.82 35.4 1.31

Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Moment in Ft-LB.Trio i3 per 32.B8Ft

Draft is froe Ba5eline.

Figure A-22, GM with 50% load in fuel tanks.

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANOI-WON APPENDIX

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUSBaseline draft: 1.510 @ Oriq1n

Trin: Fwd 0.30/32.88, Heel: zeroPart------------------------------Weiqht(LBl----LCG-----TCG-----VCGLIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65

Total Weight--------> 20,041 12.76f 0.00 4.52SpGr------Di~pl(LBJ----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt

HULL 1.025 20,041 12.79f 0.00 0.86 -1.51

Riqht1nq Arm~: 0.00 0.00Di~tance~ in FEET.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Fwd 0.30/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.52

LCF Di~place=ent Buoyancy-etr. Weightl Mo~entl

Draft----Weiqht(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GHL-----GHT1.624 20,041 12.79t 0.86 1252 12.46f 1920.44 37.8 1.38

Distances in FEET.-------Spec1f1c Gravity - 1.025.--·--------Moment 1n Ft-LB.Trim is per 32.B8Ft

Draft i~ from Baseline.

Figure A~23, GM with 0% load in fuel tanks.

WElGET and DISPLAC~2NT STATUSBa~eline draft: 1.269 @Origin

Tric: Fwd 0.32/32.88, Heel: zeroPart------------------------------Weiqht(LE1----LCG-----TCG-----VOGLIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87! 0.00 3.64

rotal Weight--------> 16,518 12.87f a.ao 3.64SpGr------Di~pl(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----Vca------RefHt

HULL 1.025 16,518 12.90f 0.00 0.72 -1.27

Righting Arms: 0.00 0.00Distances in FEET.-------------------------------·-·--------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPBRTIESTric: Fwd 0.32/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 3.64

LCF Displaceaent Buoyancy-ctr. Weiqhtl MomentlDraft----Weiqht(LB)----l~-----VCB-----Inch---·-LCF---In trim---·GHL-----~

1.386 16,518 12.90f 0.72 1233 12.30f 1893.11 45.2 3.09Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Homent in Ft-LB.

Trim i~ per 32.88FtDraft is from Baseline.

Figure A·24. OM of lightship (no passengers or fuel).

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

FIGURE A-25: STABILITY ANALYSIS ON I·FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES

FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).

WEIGh"! and DISPLACE."!!Nl' STATUSBa~eline draft: 1.727 @ Oriqin

Tria: Mt 0.11/32.88, Heel: zeroPart·-----------------------------Weight(LB)----LCG-----TCG-----VOGLIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65Fuel Tank Port 455 2.0H 3.00p 2.02Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.0H 3.00s 2.02

Total Weight--------> 20,951 12.29f 0.00 4.41SpGr----+-Displ(LBI----LCB-----TC3-----VCB------RefHt

HULL 1.025 20.951 12.28f 0.00 0.89 -1. 73

Rightinq Arms: 0.00 0.00Distance" in FB£T.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 0.11/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.41

LCF Displaceunt Buoyancy-etr. Weight/ Moment/Draft----Weiqht(LBl----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In tria----GHL-----GMT1.684 20,951 12.28! 0.89 1246 12.37f 1878.86 35.4 1.30

Distances in FEEf.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-----------Mo~ent in Ft-LB.Trim is per 32.88Ft

Draft is from Baseline.

WAVE D~SCRIPTION

Wave type: SINUSOIDPhase of crest relative to oriqin: 90.0 deqrees (7.50 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 1.00 Ft

~~DROSfATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 1.52/32.88, No Heel

Origin Displacement Center of BuoyancyDepth----weight{LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT2.316 20,952 12.1Jf 0.00 0.91 233 12.27f 38.1 4.84

Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.----------+---------------Wave in effect.

WAVE DESCRfPTlONWave type: SINUSOfD

Phase of crest relative to origin: 190.0 degrees (15.83 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft Cre~t-to-trouqh height: 1.00 FtAngle of encounter: 45 degrees (starboard quarterinq sea)

A-IS

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WDN APPENDIX

FIGURE A-25 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON I-FT IVA YE. IVA YEENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTri~: Aft 1.82/32.ea, Heel: Stbd 9.35 deg.

Origin Di~place~ent Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weiqht{LBj----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BHL-----3K!2.242 20,950 12.09f 0.57~ 0.94 230 12.03f 36.1 4.86

Distances in FEET.-------specitic Gravity· 1.025.--------------------------Wave in errect.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Pha~e of cre~t relative to origin: 90.0 degree~ (7.50 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft crest-to-trough height: 1.00 FtAngle of encounter: 90 degree~ (~tarboard be~ ~ea)

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Fwd 0.38/32.88, Heel: Port 46.42 deg.

Origin Di~plac~ent Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weiqht(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------BML-----3KT0.432 20,950 12.33f 2.70p 1.84 230 13.27t 37.4 4.71Di~tances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------

Wave in et(ect.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Phage of cre~t relative to origin: 170.0 degree~ (14.17 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft cre9t-to-trough height: 1.00 FtAngle of encounter: 135 degree~ l~tarboard bow sea)

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 1.82/32.8e, Heel: Port 9.35 deg.

origin Di~plac~ent center of BuoyancyDepth----Weight(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BH!2.242 20,952 12.10f 0.57p 0.94 230 12.03t 36.1 4.86

Distances in FEET.-------Specitic Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------Wave in effect.

A-16

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

FIGURE A-2j (CO, TI 'UED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON I-FT WAVE. WAVE

ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTER.\l) TO 180 (AHEAD).

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Phase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 FtlWave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough heiqht: 1.00 FtAngle of encounter:-180 degrees (head seal

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTri~: ~~ 1.29/32.88, No Heel

Origin Displac~ent Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weiqht(LBI----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----W?A-----LCF------8M1-----3HT1.134 20,947 12.43f 0.00 0.91 236 12.53f 40.6 4.83

Distances in ?EET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.-------------------------­Wave in effect.

A-17

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26, STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE ENCOUNTER ANGLES

FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AI·IEAD).

WEIGHT and DISPLACEMENT STATUSBaseline draft: 1.727 @Origin

Trim: Aft 0.11/32.88, Heel: zeroPart------------------------------WeightILB)----LQG-----TCG-----VCGLIGHT SHIP 16,518 12.87f 0.00 3.64PASSENGERS 3,523 12.22f 0.00 8.65Fuel Tank Port 455 2.04f 3.0Op 2.02Fuel Tank Stbd 455 2.04f 3.00~ 2.02

Total weiqht--------> 20,951 12.29f 0.00 4.41SpGr------Displ(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB------RefHt

HULL 1.025 20,950 12.2Bf 0.00 0.89 -1.73

Righting Arms: 0.00 0.00Distances in FEET.------------------------------------------------------------

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTria: Aft 0.11/32.88, No Heel, VCG - 4.41

LCF Displace~ent Buoyancy-ctr. Weightl MomentlDraft----Weiqht(LB)----LCB-----VCB-----Inch-----LCF---In trim----GML-----GHT1.684 20,950 12.26f 0.69 1246 12.37f 1678.65 35.4 1.30

Distances in FEET.-------specitic Gravity· 1.025.-----------Moment in Ft-LB.Trim is per 32.8SFt

Draft is from Baseline.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Phase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degreesWave length: 30.00 F"t Crest-to-trough height:

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 2.69/32.68, No Heel

(7.50 Ftl2.00 Ft

origin Displacement Center af BuoyancyDepth----Weiqht(LBj----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BKL-----BMT2.eBl 20,949 11.99t 0.00 0.96 232 12.19f 37.e 4.87

Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------Wave in etrect.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Phase of crest relative to origin: 190.0 degrees (15.63 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft crest-to-trough height: 2.00 FtAngle of encounter: 45 degrees (starboard quartering sea)

A-IS

STABiliTY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE

ENCOUNTER A GLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 3.14/32.88, Heel: Stbd 19.91 deq.

Origin Di~placement Center of BuoyancyDepth----weight(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BM!2.145 20,958 1l.89f l.21~ l.07 219 12.00t 32.8 4.36Distance~ in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------

Wave in effect.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Phase ot cre~t relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 ?t)Wave lenqth: 30.00 Ft crest-co-trouqh height: 2.00 FtAngle of encounter: 90 degrees (~tarboard beam ~ea)

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Aft 2.58/32.88, Heel: Stbd 161.06 deg.

Origin Di~placement Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weight{LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT

-3.646 20,951 12.23f 0.17s 5.17 311 14.74f 69.7 9.04Di~tances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------

Wave in effect.

WAVE DESCRIPTIONWave type: SINUSOID

Pha~e of cre3t relative to origin: 110.0 degree3 (14.17 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 2.00 FtAngle of encounter: 135 degrees (starboard bow sea)

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTria: Aft 3.14/32.88, Heel: Port 19.96 deg.

Origin Di3placement center of BuoyancyDepth----Weight(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB-----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT2.745 20,952 lI.89f 1.21p 1.07 219 It.99f 32.8 4.36

Distances in FEET.-------Specific Gravity - 1.025.--------------------------Wave in effect.

A-19

STABILITY ANALYSIS KANDI-WON APPENDIX

FIGURE A-26 (CONTINUED): STABILITY ANALYSIS ON 2-FT WAVE. WAVE

ENCOUNTER ANGLES FROM 0 DEG (ASTERN) TO 180 (AHEAD).

WAVE D~SCRIP'ION

Wave type: SINUSOIDPhase of crest relative to origin: 90.0 degrees (7.50 Ft)Wave length: 30.00 Ft Crest-to-trough height: 2.00 FtAngle of encounter:-180 degree~ (head sea)

HYDROSTATIC PROPERTIESTrim: Fwd 2.66/32.88, No Heel

Origin Displacement Center of BuoyancyDepth----Weight(LB)----LCB-----TCB-----VCB~----WPA-----LCF------BML-----BMT

0.552 20,944 12.S7f 0.00 0.96 237 12.82f 41.9 4.73Distances in FEET.-------specific Gravity - 1.025.----------------·---------

Wave in effect.

A-20