Investigation report Report

Report title Activity number

Investigation of lifeboat incident of 14 January 2015 on Mrsk Giant 400003004

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Restricted

Confidential

Strictly confidential

Summary

An unintentional launch of lifeboat number 2 occurred on Mrsk Giant at about 05.10 on

Wednesday 14 January 2015. The PSA was notified at 08.20.

When the incident occurred, two inspectors from Westcon Lfteteknikk as the enterprise of

competence were conducting a periodic competent control of the lifeboat davits together with

maritime personnel from Mrsk Drilling Norway (MDN). As part of this check, a dynamic

braking test was to be conducted. This involved lowering an empty boat at full lowering speed

and halting its descent with the aid of a manual brake.

The lifeboat was first lowered and halted, but had not descended fast enough and the enterprise

of competence requested a repeat of the test. Lowering of the lifeboat resumed until full speed

was reached and then halted on the brake. Nothing abnormal was observed.

Following the brake test, the lifeboat was hoisted back up. The crane operator had brought the

boat up a little way when the winch stopped. The operator checked whether the electrical limit

switch was activated before hoisting resumed. The lifeboat then began to descend. Efforts

were made to activate the manual brake on the lifeboat winch, but it was not working. The

lifeboat entered the water, and the steel wires holding it were eventually torn off.

The direct cause of the incident was that the braking effect of the manual brake had been

reduced owing to faulty adjustment of the manual brake control handle.

Since the brake was only partially effective, exactly how much weight change was required to

release it cannot be established. But a potential existed that the lifeboat could have begun to

descend with a person on board during maintenance work. The possible consequence under the

prevailing weather conditions is estimated to be serious personal injury. Should the lifeboat

have begun to descend during an actual evacuation, a partially filled lifeboat could have

reached the sea without a lifeboat captain on board. We also consider it likely that people

would have been at risk of falling from the lifeboat or the muster area should a descent have

begun. The potential consequence could be fatalities.

Involved Main group Approved by/date

T-F Mobile Leif J Dalsgaard

Members of the investigation team Investigation leader

Bjarte Rdne Anne Marit Lie

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Contents

(M lages p nytt)

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1 Summary

Course of events

An unintentional launch (descent to the sea) of lifeboat number 2 on the starboard side of

Mrsk Giant occurred at about 05.10 on Wednesday 14 January 2015. The Petroleum Safety

Authority Norway (PSA) was notified at 08.20 on the same day.

When the incident occurred, two inspectors from Westcon Lfteteknikk as the enterprise of

competence1 were conducting a periodic competent control2 of the lifeboat davits together

with maritime personnel from Mrsk Drilling Norway (MDN). As part of this check, a

dynamic braking test was to be conducted. This involved lowering an empty boat at full

lowering speed and halting its descent with the aid of a manual brake. Such a test had already

been conducted earlier that night on lifeboat number 4 with an approved result.

An operations and maintenance roustabout from MDN was positioned on the platform above

lifeboat number 2 in order to lower the lifeboat by lifting the weighted handle which keeps the

manual brake engaged on the steel lifeboat wire. A crane operator from MDN stood on the

deck at lifeboat level in order to operate the lifeboat winch. Lifeboat number 2 was first

lowered and halted, but it had not descended fast enough and the enterprise of competence

requested a repeat of the test. Lowering of the lifeboat resumed until full speed was reached

and then halted on the brake. Nothing abnormal was observed. Following the brake test, the

lifeboat was hoisted back up. The crane operator had brought the boat up a little way when the

winch stopped. The operator checked whether the electrical limit switch was activated before

hoisting resumed. The lifeboat then began to descend. Efforts were made to activate the

manual brake on the lifeboat winch, but it was not working. The lifeboat entered the water,

and the steel wires holding it were eventually torn off.

Weather conditions

Wind 223 degrees, 30-37 knots

Wave height 4.3m significant (Hs)

Wave height 7.6m maximum

Consequences

The actual consequence was the loss of lifeboat number 2.

The lifeboat posed no threat to Mrsk Giants structure/legs. Mrsk Giant is positioned as an

accommodation unit on Yme, and has no current drilling activity. Nor is the lifeboat

considered to have represented any risk or threat had a drilling operation been under way from

Mrsk Giant at the time of the incident.

1 Enterprise of competence has sufficient theoretical knowledge and practical experience to

understand calculations for lifting equipment, its design and function, and to carry out

necessary examinations and tests in order to issue certificates (section 92 of the activity

regulations, see the guideline which refers to Norsok R-003, 3.1.33). 2 Competent control control carried out by an enterprise of competence in order to verify

that lifting equipment satisfies relevant requirements and is designed, embedded, installed, set

up, tested, documented and maintained in such a way that use of the lifting equipment is fully

justified (section 92 of the activity regulations, see the guideline which refers to Norsok R-

003, 3.1.31).

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The lifeboat was accompanied by a standby vessel to control and monitor it. The boat later

drifted ashore at Obrestad south of Stavanger.

Potential consequences

Should the manual brake fail during maintenance with people in the lifeboat, or during an

actual evacuation under the prevailing weather conditions, serious personal injury or deaths

could have been suffered.

Investigation

The PSA decided on Wednesday 14 January 2015 to conduct its own investigation of the

incident, with departure for Mrsk Giant the same evening.

Nonconformities Five nonconformities were identified by the investigation. These related to

maintenance routines for the lifeboat davit system

training

procedures relating to lifeboats and evacuation

periodic programme for competent control and ensuring the expertise of personnel carrying out maintenance work

qualification and follow-up of contractors.

Two improvement points were also identified in relation to the incident.

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2 Introduction

Mrsk Giant is a jack-up drilling rig. It was built in 1986 and received an acknowledgement

of compliance (AoC) on 15 February 2002. The facility flies the Danish flag and is classed by

Lloyds Register.

Consent to use Mrsk Giant as an accommodation unit on the Yme field was issued on 11

September 2014.

Mrsk Giant has a total of four conventional davit-lowered lifeboats, of which two are of the

Waterman type with a Schat FDA 101/22 davit installed in 1994. This was the installation

involved in the incident.

Figure 1: Mrsk Giant, source Mrskdrilling.com

During work on competent control of the lifeboat davits, an unintentional launch of lifeboat

number 2 on the starboard side of Mrsk Giant occurred at about 05.10 on Wednesday 14

January 2015. There were no people in the lifeboat.

Weather conditions reported immediately after the incident were wind from the south-west,

30-37 knots. Wave height was 4.3m Hs and 7.6m maximum. When the incident occurred, two

inspectors from Westcon Lfteteknikk as the enterprise of competence were conducting a

periodic competent control of the lifeboat davits together with maritime personnel from

MDN. The lifeboat descended completely to the sea, and the steel wires holding it were torn

off because of the weather conditions.

Ninety-five people were aboard Mrsk Giant. Nobody was injured in the incident.

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The PSA decided on 14 January 2015 to conduct its own investigation of the incident. The

investigation team went offshore on 14 January 2015 and returned to land on 16 January

2015.

Composition of the investigation team:

- Anne Marit Lie F-Logistics and emergency preparedness, emergency preparedness, investigation leader

- Bjarte Rdne F-Logistics and emergency preparedness, logistics

We conducted our own interviews offshore with those involved in the incident, the lifeboat

captain, the electrician, the technical manager, the head of the marine section and a

representative from Harding, the manufacturer of the equipment involved in the incident.

An inspection was conducted at the incident site, and disassembly of the winch brake was

observed.

A concluding meeting was held to present the status of the investigation with preliminary

findings. Interviews were subsequently conducted on land with the technical vice president of

MDN, the te