MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION

REPORT 152

Independent investigation into thesteering gear failure

on the Australian flag motor vessel

off the east coast of Australia on 10 November 1999

Warden Point

Department of Transport and Regional Services

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Report No 152

Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations

investigation into the steering gear failure

on the Australian flag motor vessel

Warden Point

off the east coast of Australia on 10 November 1999

Issued by the

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

May 2001

ISBN 0 642 20037 8

Investigations into marine casualties occurring within the Commonwealth's jurisdiction areconducted under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, madepursuant to subsections 425 (1) (ea) and 425 (1AAA) of the Navigation Act 1912. TheRegulations provide discretionary powers to the Inspector to investigate incidents as defined bythe Regulations. Where an investigation is undertaken, the Inspector must submit a report tothe Executive Director of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).

It is ATSB policy to publish such reports in full as an educational tool to increase awareness ofthe causes of marine incidents so as to improve safety at sea and enhance the protection of themarine enviroment.

To increase the value of the safety material presented in this report, readers are encouraged tocopy or reprint the material, in part or in whole, for further distribution, but shouldacknowledge the source. Additional copies of the report can be down-loaded from the ATSBwebsite or obtained from:

Inspector of Marine AccidentsAustralian Transport Safety BureauPO Box 967Civic Square 2608 ACT

Phone: 02 6274 60881800 621372

Fax: 02 6274 6699Email: marine@atsb.gov.auInternet address: www.atsb.gov.au

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CONTENTS

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Sources of information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Warden Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

The trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Fly ash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Voyage 554 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Comment and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Flooding of the steering flat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Rope locker hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Division bulkhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Bilge pumping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Bilge alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Failure of the steering motors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Emergency repairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Water in the fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Load line convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Shift of cargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Past events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Passage to Port Kembla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Warden Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Figures

1 Warden Point leaving Port Kembla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv

2 Warden Point general arrangement of holds and self-unloading system . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

3 Warden Point’s steering flat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

4 Steering flat escape hatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

5 Warden Point’s approximate track 9,10,11 November 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

6 Rope locker hatch after new dogs were fitted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

7 Fuel service tank breathers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

8 Warden Point – events and causal factor chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

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FIG

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SummaryOn 9 November 1999, the Australian flagbulk carrier Warden Point was southboundoff the north coast of New South Wales, enroute to Melbourne, with a cargo of fly ash.At about 0230, the weather changed due toan intense low-pressure system approxi-mately 300 nautical miles to the south. By0800 the vessel was experiencing near galeforce winds from the south. The vessel waspitching heavily in large seas submergingthe lower poop deck, at times, under 2–3 mof water.

At 1400, the duty engineer reported that therope locker hatch lid, on the lower poopdeck, was leaking and that water had enteredthe rope locker and adjoining steering flat.The crew subsequently managed to resealthe hatch lid after some problems due towaves that were periodically sweeping thedeck and running over the hatch.

At 2330, Australian Eastern Standard Time(EST), the second mate came on the bridgeto take the watch. After the watch washanded over he instructed the 12–4integrated rating (IR) to go through theaccommodation and advance the clocks 1hour, he also instructed the IR to check therope locker and steering flat. The IR rangback a short time later to report that therope locker and steering flat were awash andthat the water was running over the steeringmotors. The second mate started the stand-by steering motor and called the dutyengineer. Just as he put the phone down onesteering motor failed, followed by the othermotor about 10 seconds later. The secondmate stopped the ship and called the master.The time was 0115, Australian EasternSummer Time (EDT), 10 November 1999,with the vessel east of Sugarloaf Point,

north of Newcastle. Once the vessel lostheadway it became beam-on to the large seaand rolled heavily.

All the engineers and integrated ratings werecalled to the engine room to work onrestoring the steering and pumping thesteering flat and rope locker dry. Bothsteering motors were dismantled and foundto be damaged beyond repair. There was nospare motor so the lower rated stand-bymain engine jacket cooling water pumpmotor was used to make an emergencyrepair. While the crew were completing theemergency repairs to the steering the cargoshifted, causing a port list of 2–3° and anoticeable trim by the head.

At 0852 on 10 November 1999, with thesteering finally restored, the vessel headedfor Newcastle, the nearest port of refuge, toeffect permanent repairs. However,Newcastle Port closed at 1526 on 10 November 1999, due to the bad weather,and the decision was made to divert WardenPoint to Port Kembla.

Warden Point arrived at the Port Kemblapilot boarding ground at 1000 on 11 November 1999 by which time the listhad increased to over 5°. The steering waslimited to a maximum of 15° helm and thevessel was berthed using two tugs. At 1236,the vessel was finally made fast alongsideno.1 coal berth. The ship’s engineers andshore contractors worked into the night onthe steering gear and rope locker hatch lid.The cargo was inspected and found to havemoved in both holds. The list was correctedby re-trimming the cargo in no.1 hold.

Warden Point departed Port Kembla at 0830on 12 November 1999 and completed thevoyage to Melbourne without furtherincident.

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2

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Sources ofInformationThe master and crew of Warden Point

Queensland Cement Ltd

Pozzolanic Industries Ltd

Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Sydney Ports Corporation

Newcastle Ports Corporation

The NSW Bureau of Meteorology

Lloyds Register

The Fly Ash Resource Centre

Marine Accident Investigation Branch, UK

ReferencesCode of Safe Practice for Solid BulkCargoes (BC Code)

Lloyd’s Rules and Regulations for theClassification of Ships

International Convention for the Safety ofLife at Sea (SOLAS)

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FIGURE 2:Warden Point general arrangement of holds and self-unloading system

Cargo control room

LWL LWL

Lowerpoop deck

Cargo control room

ER

Steering flat

No 2 Hold No 1 Hold

Steering flat

Store

Rope locker

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Narrative

Warden PointWarden Point (fig. 1) is an Australian flagbulk carrier of 6 127.7 deadweight tonnes atits summer draught of 6.987 m. QueenslandCement and Lime Co. Ltd (QCL) own thevessel with the registered agent beingCementco Shipping Pty Ltd of Brisbane,which is a division of QCL. It is classedwith Lloyd’s Register as a 100 A1 BulkCarrier Strengthened for Heavy Cargoes,with LMC1 and UMS2 notations.

Warden Point, formerly Red Sea, was builtin 1978 by Gotaverken, Solevesborg, Varu,Sweden. The vessel has an overall length of105.64 m, a beam of 14.95 m and amoulded depth of 9.00 m. The ship waspurchased by QCL in 1990 and convertedfrom a gearless bulk carrier to a self-discharging cement carrier.

The vessel has two cargo holds, each holdhas a width of 12.53 m and a depth of 6.79 m,number 1 hold is 36.8 m long and number 2hold is slightly shorter at 33.6 m in length(fig. 2). The cargo self-unloading systemconsists of PLC (programmable logiccontroller) controlled transverse andlongitudinal scraper conveyors in each hold,which feed a bucket elevator located on theport side between the holds. The cargo isthen discharged overboard to the receptionfacility via a slewing boom conveyor fedfrom the top of the bucket elevator. Thecargo system control gear is located betweenthe two holds in a cargo control room. Thereare inspection windows in the bulkheadbetween the cargo control room and the

holds, which allow the cargo to be sighted.Warden Point is loaded by a shore-basedboom conveyor via circular loading ports inthe main hatch covers.

Main propulsion is provided by a 12cylinder, B&W Alpha 120281 mediumspeed diesel engine, producing 2 200 kW.The main engine is clutched into a reductiongearbox and drives a single controllablepitch propeller giving the vessel a servicespeed of 12 knots. Electrical power isprovided by a 300 kW shaft generator,driven by the main engine, and two auxiliarydiesel generator sets each of 200 kW. Thevessel is also fitted with a single 250 kWbow thruster.

Warden Point is fitted with a rotary vanesteering system manufactured by A.STenfjord Mek.Verksted (fig.3). The systemconsists of two fixed displacement hydraulicpumps driving the rotary vane ‘ruddermotor’ (hydraulic rudder actuator) viaintegral, solenoid actuated, hydraulicdirectional control valves, and independentpiping. The steering pumps are mountedhorizontally 100 mm above the deck, on theforward side of the ‘rudder motor’. Whenoperated alone, each pump is capable ofmeeting the requirements of class withregard to the speed of rudder actuation. Theusual shipboard procedure is to run a singlepump when en route and both pumps forany pilotage. The steering gear has threemodes of operation; automatic from thebridge when the autopilot is engaged, non-follow-up steering when hand steering fromthe bridge, and emergency steering effectedby manually operating the directionalcontrol valves on the steering pumps in thesteering flat.

1 Notation assigned when machinery is constructed and installed under Lloyd’s Special Survey in accordance with Lloyd’s rules.

2 Notation denotes ship may be operated with the machinery spaces unattended.

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FIGURE 3:Warden Point’s steering flat

FIGURE 4:Warden Point’s steering flat escape hatch

Port steeringpump

Forward‘port’ to

rope locker

Starboardsteering

pump

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Warden Point’s accommodationsuperstructure is located aft, with the engineroom located immediately below theaccommodation. Access to the engine roomis via an internal stairway from theaccommodation. The steering gear is locatedin a flat at the after end of the engine room.The steering flat is approximately 5.5 m inlength and 4.5 m wide. Internal access to thesteering flat is through a door from thegenerator flat. An escape hatch from thesteering flat leads to the open lower poopdeck above (fig. 4). Located above the lowerpoop deck is the upper poop deck, alsoopen, and an external staircase links the twodecks.

A rope locker is located on the port sideadjacent to the steering flat. The rope lockeris approximately 5.5 m in length amd 3.6 mwide at the forward end tapering to 1.5 m atthe after bulkhead. The only access to therope locker is via a hatch located on thelower poop deck. The hatch consists of acoaming raised above the level of the lowerpoop deck and a hinged hatch lid secured, atthe time of the incident, by 3 lever dogswhich engage on wedges welded to theinside of the coaming. At the time of theincident the rope locker hatch was securedin the same fashion as the steering gearhatch shown in figure 4. A non-watertightbulkhead divides the rope locker andsteering flat. There are various penetrationsin the dividing bulkhead including; cableconduits, ‘mouse holes’ around transverseframes on the after bulkhead and two 220 x190 mm rectangular ‘ports’ located approxi-mately 500 mm above the deck. The forwardport is shown in figure 3. Neither the ropelocker nor the steering flat were fitted withbilge alarms at the time of the incident. Thesteering flat has a fixed bilge suction, therope locker, however, does not. A paintlocker/store is located on the starboard sideof the steering flat. Access to this space isvia a door from the steering flat.

The Australian crew of Warden Pointconsists of a master and three mates, chiefand three engineers, seven integrated ratings(IR’s) and two catering staff.

The master in command on 10 November1999 had 41 years of seagoing experience inthe British and Australian merchant shippingfleets. He had been employed since 1985 byCementco Shipping and had been onWarden Point for the previous 2 years.

The chief engineer on Warden Point had 19years of seagoing experience and the last 9 years with Cementco Shipping. He hadbeen chief engineer on the vessel since1994.

The deck officers aboard Warden Point workthe usual 4 hours on, 8 hours off, watchsystem both at sea and in port workingcargo. The engineers work ‘daywork’through the day and the first, second andthird engineers rotate through a one-in-three‘duty engineer’ roster for callouts at night.

Warden Point underwent a major dry-docking program in Nantong, China,between November 1998 and January 1999.During this docking the entire doublebottom structure, from the tank tops downand from the collision bulkhead to theforward engine room bulkhead was croppedand renewed. An enhanced survey programwas also carried out at this time. Newrubber seals were fitted to both the steeringgear escape hatch and the rope locker hatchlids at this time.

The tradeSince 1990 QCL has been a wholly ownedsubsidiary of the Swiss-based multinationalHolderbank Financiere Glaris Ltd which isone of the world’s leading suppliers ofcement and building related materials, withinterests in 65 countries. The QCL group isQueensland’s largest manufacturer anddistributor of cement and one of Australia’s

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major marketers of concrete materials.Member companies of the QCL groupinclude Queensland Cement Ltd andPozzolanic Industries Ltd.

QCL have two vessels engaged in varioussectors of their operation. Warden Point isthe smaller vessel and carries cementpowder from Gladstone to Townsville as itsprimary trade. Warden Point also carries aportion of the 90 000 tonnes of fly ash thatQCL ship from Gladstone to PozzolanicIndustries in Melbourne each year. Typically,Warden Point would complete 7–8 fly ashvoyages per year.

Fly ashFly ash is a combustion by-product that iscollected by electrostatic precipitation fromthe flue gases of coal-fired power stations. Itis a fine brown or grey cohesive powdercomposed primarily of aluminosilicate glass,mullite, haematite, magnetite spinel andquartz. Fly ash particles generally have adiameter less than 250 microns and arespheroidal when viewed under amicroscope.

The Australian Manual of Safe Loading,Ocean Transport and Discharge Practices forDry Bulk Commodities has a usefuldescription of fly ash:

Fly Ash is a fine powder used as a partial

cement replacement material, which becomes

almost fluid in nature when aerated or signifi-

cantly disturbed thereby creating a very minimal

angle of repose. After loading is completed

deaeration occurs over several hours and the

material settles into a stable mass…

The fly ash shipped by Warden Point toMelbourne, is a by-product of the Gladstonepower station. It is a very fine powder with20–40 per cent of the particles smaller than7 microns. The fly ash is used by Pozzolanicin their production of concrete and concreteproducts as a supplementary cementitiousmaterial.

On Warden Point, the fly ash is loaded inmuch the same way as cement powder withthe self-unloading equipment being liftedprior to the aerated fly ash being poured intothe hold and then allowed to settle. Theaerated fly ash pours relatively flat with onlyslight mounds formed under the loadingports and does not normally requiretrimming. After loading is completed, theself-unloading equipment is lowered ontothe surface of the cargo.

There is some disagreement regarding thestowage factor of fly ash. PozzolanicIndustries quote a specific gravity of2.05–2.55 which makes the stowage factorapproximately 0.43m3/t. The AustralianManual of Safe Loading quotes a stowagefactor of 0.8–1.2m3/t and the Code of SafePractice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code)quotes the stowage factor as 1.26m3/t. Thecrew of Warden Point stated that, aftersettling, a cargo of fly ash occupied almostthe same volume as powdered cement whichsuggests a stowage factor of approximately0.67–1.0m3/t.

Being a cohesive substance there is noappropriate ‘angle of repose’ quoted forbulk fly ash in the current 1998 edition ofthe BC Code. Previous editions before 1987however quoted an approximate angle ofrepose of 40°.

Voyage 554Warden Point completed the loading of 5 737 tonnes of fly ash at Gladstone, andsailed for Melbourne at 1136 on 7 November 1999 on voyage 554. Thevessel was not carrying any significantballast and was loaded to its summer markswith a mean draught of 6.965 m. Just afterdeparture, the mooring lines were stowed inthe after rope locker and the hatch liddogged down. The vessel cleared Gladstonechannel at 1324. There was a light northerlybreeze blowing and the seas were slight, on

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350

340

330

320

310

1500 15101520 1530 1540

x

x

x

x

xx

x

x

x

x

x1000 11/11/99

0500 11/11/99

0100 11/11/99

2100 10/11/99

1530 10/11/99

Position of incident

0852 10/11/99

1700 9/11/99

1300 9/11/99

0900 9/11/99

0300 9/11/99

ACT

NSW

NT

Qld

WA

SA

Vic

Tas

NT

NSW

ACTLocation ofincident

FIGURE 5:Warden Point’s approximate track 9,10,11 November 1999

a low swell. The second steering pump wasstopped after the pilotage was complete,leaving the starboard pump running for thevoyage south.

Good progress was made south for the firstday and a half, with the speed averagingover 11 knots. The ship’s routines weremaintained including regular deck andengine room maintenance. At approximately1800 on 7 and 8 November the routinewatertight integrity rounds were completedby the integrated rating on the 4–8 watch.During these rounds the IR checked the ropelocker hatch and noted it as being secure.

At approximately 0230 on 9 November, justnorth of Coffs Harbour, NSW, Warden Pointexperienced a southerly change in theweather. The sea and swell began to increaserapidly and, by 0800 the wind was force 7from the southwest and the seas were roughon a short steep swell. The ship, on a courseof 190°, was pitching moderately at times,taking heavy spray on the forecastle andshipping green seas onto the lower poop.The ship’s speed had fallen to just over 8knots as a result of the sea and wind on thebow.

Warden Point continued on throughout theday into the progressively deterioratingweather. By the early afternoon, the lowerpoop deck was being regularly submergedunder 2–3 m of green water. There wereheavy seas also being shipped over theforecastle and number 1 hatch. The vessel’sspeed had fallen to just over 6 knots.

At approximately 1400, the first engineer(duty engineer) reported to the bridge thatthe rope locker hatch lid (on the lower poopdeck) was leaking and water had entered therope locker and steering flat. The chiefengineer and master were called and a partywas organised to go aft to fix the leaking

hatch lid. The party on the poop initiallyconsisted of the chief IR and second mate,who attempted to reseal the rope lockerhatch lid by using silicone sealant. The chiefIR would open the hatch between waves andhold it while the second mate applied thesealant. The vessel was slowed and turned tominimise the pitching. While making theserepairs, the lower poop was swamped by awave, and the two men had to grab anythingthey could to prevent themselves beingswept overboard. Both men were submergedfor up to 10 seconds and sustained cuts,abrasions and bruises in this incident. Thechief engineer, who had been watching fromthe upper poop deck, told the men to abortthe attempt to reseal the hatch.

A second attempt to seal the hatch wasmade with self adhesive foam sealing rubberobtained from the engine room. The chiefengineer and the second mate went back tothe lower poop deck and managed to fitadditional strips of sealing rubber to therope locker hatch lid. The hatch was againdogged and found to be holding reasonablywell.

The first engineer, meanwhile, set aboutrigging up a portable bilge pump to pumpthe water from the rope locker. The pumpsuction was passed through one of the portsin the dividing bulkhead between thesteering flat and the rope locker and thedischarge line passed up and out onto thedeck via the engine room access stairs andaft accommodation door. After the ropelocker had been pumped dry, the pump wasleft rigged and the steering flat and ropelocker monitored for further water ingress.

At approximately 1800, the 4–8 IR againcompleted the watertight integrity roundsand filled in the checklist to indicate that,among other things, he had checked the ropelocker hatch and found it secure.

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At 1930 the first engineer noted a ‘small’amount of water in the rope locker on hisrounds.

The first engineer conducted his finalengine room inspection for the day at 2200and noticed 100–200 mm of accumulatedwater in the rope locker. He pumped therope locker dry, using the ready-riggedportable bilge pump, then went to bed.

The second mate arrived on the bridge at2330 to take over the watch. Warden Pointwas east of Sugarloaf Point and hadmaintained a speed of just over 6 knots inthe preceding four hours into the ‘rough tovery rough head seas and moderate/heavyswell’. The wind was estimated at force 7–8from the southwest and the conditions werestill deteriorating. The vessel had pitchedheavily at times and had taken green waterover the lower poop deck with every heavypitch.

After the second mate had taken over thewatch he instructed the 12–4 IR to advancethe communal area clocks 1 hour fromAustralian Eastern Standard Time (EST) toAustralian Eastern Summer Time (EDT). Healso requested that the IR check the steeringflat and rope locker for any water ingress.The IR rang back a short time later from theduty mess to say that there was water in thesteering flat and that it was running over thesteering motors. The second mate told theIR to wait in the duty mess. He started theport steering pump, and immediatelycontacted the first engineer to tell him thatthere was water in the steering flat. At thistime the ‘alarm/overload’ light came up forthe starboard steering motor on the steeringcontrol panel on the bridge. The portsteering motor ‘alarm/overload’ light cameup about 10 seconds after this. The time was0115 EDT, 10 November 1999.

Once the steering motors had failed, thesecond mate called the master and brought

the propeller pitch control lever back tozero. The first engineer, by this time, hadarrived in the engine room to find thesteering flat awash with 200–300 mm ofwater. Water was also flowing through theopen steering flat door, over the storm sill,into the adjoining generator flat. Heimmediately called the chief engineer.

With the propeller at zero pitch, WardenPoint quickly lost speed and turned tobecome starboard beam-on to the veryrough sea. The wind was force 7–8. Thevessel started rolling heavily, regularlytaking green water over the main deck andhatch covers.

The master arrived on the bridge andinstructed the second mate to extinguish thenavigation lights and display the ‘not-under-command’ lights.

After being called by the first engineer, thechief engineer got dressed and ran to theengine room. When he arrived he couldsmell paint fumes and, as the vessel rolled tostarboard, he could see the water in thesteering flat flowing into the generator flat.The chief engineer looked from thegenerator flat into the steering flat and sawwater running ‘full flow’ through the twobulkhead ports from the rope locker into thesteering flat, on the starboard roll. Rags, amop, and a 25-litre paint drum, which hademptied itself, had been washed from theadjoining store and were floating around thesteering flat. The chief engineer noticed thatthe ‘fault’ lights were illuminated on thestarter panels for the two steering motors,and that the steering alarm was ringing. Hecancelled the alarm, and told the firstengineer to call out the other engineers. The12–4 IR had already started to pump out thesteering flat using the portable bilge pump.

The chief engineer rang the master at thistime to say that they had lost both steeringmotors and that the steering flat was

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flooding. He indicated that he would reportthe situation to the master again as soon ashe could and rang off.

The master contacted the QCL marinemanager and informed him of the situation.AusSAR was also contacted with the masterindicating that he did not feel that assistancewas required at that point. The time was0131, EDT.

The remainder of the engineers quicklyarrived in the engine room and the chiefengineer instructed the first and secondengineers to blank the two division bulkheadports between the steering flat and ropelocker. The third engineer was directed toget the port diesel generator ready foroperation, as it was midway through a 2000hr service and consequently not available forimmediate use.

The first and second engineers quicklyfabricated and fitted blanking pieces to thetwo ports while the chief engineer used thebilge/ballast pump to pump out thegenerator flat and then attempted to pumpout the steering flat. His attempts were soonfrustrated by a floating rag, which wassucked up the bilge suction line from thesteering flat.

At this time the main engine was stillrunning on heavy fuel with the shaftgenerator connected to the switchboardsupplying the ship’s electrical power. Thestarboard diesel generator was set as first‘stand-by’. Once the third engineer hadfitted an oil filter and filled the sump withoil, the port diesel generator was ready forservice and was placed on second ‘stand-by’.

At about 0230 the chief engineer decided toconnect the two diesel generators to theswitchboard instead of the main engine shaft

generator, as the main engine’s governorcharacteristics were not as good withvarying load. There were ongoing problemspumping the water from the steering flatwith the suction of the portable bilge pumpregularly becoming blocked by floatingdebris. At this point, the chief engineer wentto the bridge to update the master andrequest more assistance.

The rest of the IR’s were called and, afterarriving in the engine room, were instructedby the chief engineer to keep the portablebilge pump going and get the steering flatdry. The first and second engineers wereinstructed to start removing the starboardsteering motor to the workshop. The chiefand third engineers were concentrating onclearing a rag from the steering flat bilgesuction line.

The ship continued to roll heavily to port.

The first and second engineers eventuallysucceeded in dismounting the starboardsteering motor from its pump andmanhandling the heavy motor to theworkshop. This was achieved with the vesselrolling heavily and water, paint, and otherdebris running around and over the motor asthe engineers worked on it. The motor wasquickly stripped and the motor’s windingsfound to be damaged beyond repair.

The first and second engineers thendismounted and stripped the port steeringmotor to find that the windings of thismotor were also damaged. As there were nospare steering motors on board, the chiefengineer directed the first engineer to lookfor any motor in the engine room, whichmay be used as a replacement. The shaftsize and mounting flange pitch circlediameter were the critical criteria. By thistime the water had been pumped out of thesteering flat and the IR’s then worked on

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securing a tarpaulin over the rope lockerhatch.

The main engine was stopped at 0400.

At about this time the first engineer reportedback to the chief engineer that the mainengine stand-by jacket water pump motorlooked as though it might fit although it wasnot rated at the same power as the originalsteering motors. This motor wassubsequently removed; the shaft size andmounting flange were compared and foundto be the same as the original steeringmotors, whereupon work commenced fittingthe motor to the starboard steering pump.

At 0630 the port diesel generator tripped offthe switchboard. The generator was found tobe running slowly. The chief engineerdirected the third engineer to find theproblem and get the generator back on line.After a closer inspection, the third engineerfound salt water (tested by taste) in thegenerator’s fuel. The diesel service tankdrain was opened and a considerablequantity of water was found in the tank. Thechief, third engineer and two IR’s started todrain the service tank.

The chief engineer was concerned at thisstage that the ship could blackout. Thestarboard diesel generator was now the onlygenerator supplying the ship’s power andwas also drawing fuel from the contam-inated service tank.

The crew continued to drain the dieselservice tank, eventually draining anestimated 2000 litres of seawater. The heavyfuel service tank was also checked for waterand drained of approximately 200 litres. Thechief engineer did not know where the waterwas coming from but assumed that it wasprobably coming from the service tank air

vents (breathers) on the starboard side of themain deck. He had never seen water in thesetanks during his time on the vessel. Hethought at this time that the breathers mighthave sheared off at deck level.

Once the water had been drained from theservice tank and its fuel lines, the port dieselgenerator was successfully restarted andconnected to the switchboard.

The first and second engineers reported tothe chief engineer at about this time to saythat they had wired up the replacementsteering motor and they were ready to try it.They had checked the motor’s direction ofrotation, as the steering pumps rotate onlyone way.

The steering gear was then tested both onemergency steering and on ‘hand’ from thebridge and found to be operating satisfac-torily. The main engine was restarted andclutched in and, at 0852, Warden Pointresumed the passage.

Warden Point had drifted approximately 11 miles3 in a northeasterly direction in the7 hours, 47 minutes while not-under-command.

Once making way, it was apparent thatWarden Point had acquired a pronouncedport list of 2–3 degrees. The vessel alsoappeared to be trimmed by the head and wastaking more water over the forecastle. Thechief engineer informed the master that thereplacement steering motor was slightlyunder-rated and was concerned that themotor may overload. They agreed to limitthe helm orders to a maximum of 15° toport and starboard. The autopilot had alsomalfunctioned and so the ship was manuallysteered from the bridge.

3 Miles referred as Nautical miles = 1 852 metres.

The master initially decided to head forNewcastle, which was the nearest port ofrefuge at only 60 miles away. AusSAR wasnotified of the vessel’s status and newdestination port. The master contacted theQCL marine manager and told him that theywere under way and heading for Newcastle.The marine manager then spoke to ashipping agent in Newcastle who explainedthat the conditions existing at the harbourentrance were very bad. The agent felt that itwould be difficult for the Newcastle tugs toleave the harbour to assist Warden Point ifthe vessel had problems outside theentrance.

With the steering operating on only oneunder-rated motor, the marine manager hadreal concerns for the safety of the vessel ifan attempt was made to enter Newcastleharbour. The master and marine managerconferred and the decision was made tohead to Newcastle, anchor, and wait for theweather to improve.

After this conversation, the marine managerhad further discussions with the agent inNewcastle who indicated that the swell wasincreasing. The QCL shipping agent in PortKembla was contacted and this port wasconfirmed as an option. The marinemanager spoke again with the masterregarding the destination port. They talkedabout heading for Port Kembla with Sydneyas an intermediate option and the marinemanager said that he would ensure tugassistance was available en route if required.

At 1215, the master informed the chiefengineer that he had conferred with themarine manager and the decision had beenmade to divert the vessel to Port Kembla.The chief engineer rang the QCL marinesuperintendent expressing his concernsabout the steering motor being under-rated,the 2–3 degree list, and the water in the fuel

tanks. (Later in the day it was apparent thebreathers had not been damaged and therewas no further water ingress into the servicetanks).

The marine superintendent transferred thechief engineer’s call to the marine manager.The chief engineer again expressed hisconcerns and when he suggested that theyhad had a cargo shift to cause the list, themarine manager expressed doubt. Themarine manager indicated the last time theship took a list the sounding pipes for theport high wing tanks had been sheared off inheavy weather causing these tanks to fill.The marine manager then instructed thechief engineer to get the mate to ‘strip’ thewater out of the port high wing tanks.

The mate reported back a short time later toindicate that the port high wing tanks werealready empty. The marine manager wasinformed that the tanks were dry and thatthere must have been a cargo shift, causingthe list. The marine manager asked if it waspossible for the cargo gear to be used tolevel the cargo. The master replied that hedid not want to send anyone out to the cargocontrol room located midships on the maindeck in the poor conditions. The master alsoindicated to the marine manager that he wasquite comfortable with the vessel’s stability.At this time the marine manager informedthe chief engineer, via the master, that anyfurther contact with the QCL office shouldbe through the master only.

The vessel continued the passage to PortKembla.

At 1526 on 10 November, the Newcastleduty pilot informed the master of WardenPoint that the port was closed due to theheavy weather. The master informedAusSAR of his intention to divert to PortKembla at this time.

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At 1750 water was again found to beleaking into the rope locker. On furtherinspection it was found that the tarpaulincovering the hatch had been washed loose.The tarpaulin was re-lashed, the leakstopped, and the locker pumped dry.

At 1800 the jury-rigged starboard steeringmotor stopped. The bridge rang down to theengine room to say that they had loststeering again. Investigation revealed thatone fuse had blown on the three phasesupply to the motor. The fuse was replacedand the motor restarted. Control was passedback to the bridge. Shortly after the steeringwas restored, the autopilot was re-engagedand found to be working satisfactorily.

Gale force southwesterly winds continuedthroughout the night of 10 November.Warden Point continued to experience roughto very rough seas and heavy swells withwater being taken over the forecastle andpoop. The steering gear flat and rope lockerwere monitored continuously throughout thenight. During the night the list increasedfrom 2–3 degrees to over 5 degrees bydaylight.

At 1000 on 11 November Warden Pointfinally arrived at the Port Kembla pilotboarding ground. A pilot was taken on boardand two tugs attended the vessel for thepassage to the berth. Initially the vessel wasput alongside no.6 outer berth, port sidealongside, arriving at 1100. After comingalongside, the vessel started to damage thewharf’s timber facings due to the port listand ground swell in the outer harbour. Theowner of the wharf attended the vessel andrang the harbour master to say that ‘WardenPoint was in poor shape and, due to the list,was damaging his wharf’. The vessel wasballasted upright but was still experiencingthe effects of the swell. As a consequence,the harbour master had the ship moved to

the inner harbour no.1 coal loader berth,where it arrived at 1236.

Contractors attended the vessel to modifythe rope locker hatch lid. Six new screw-down dogs were fitted. The crew and cargoinsurance assessors inspected the cargoholds after arrival. The cargo in no.1 holdwas found to have shifted both to port andforward. The cargo in this hold wassubsequently re-trimmed using the cargodischarge equipment. The fly ash in no.2hold was found to have shifted andsubmerged the cargo discharge equipment.The discharge equipment could not be liftedclear to re-trim the cargo in this hold as aresult of the weight of the fly ash. There wasalso found to be a small amount of wateringress into the holds through leaks in thehatch covers.

Two new steering motors arrived at 1930 on11 November and were fitted and tested bythe ship’s engineers, these repairs beingcompleted by 2230. An Australian MaritimeSafety Authority (AMSA) surveyor attendedthe vessel at 0700 on 12 November and,after inspecting the steering gear and repairsto the rope locker hatch, cleared the vesselfor sea.

Warden Point left the berth at 0808 on 12 November resuming the passage toMelbourne. The remainder of the voyagewas completed without incident. On arrivalin Melbourne a ‘sucker’ truck was used topump out the fly ash covering the conveyorsin no.2 cargo hold allowing the cargodischarge gear to be lifted clear. Thedischarge was then completed in the usualfashion.

Warden Point’s approximate track for 9, 10,11 November is shown in figure 5. Theevents and causal factors chart for theincident is reproduced in figure 8.

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FIGURE 6:Rope locker hatch after new dogs were fitted

Comment andanalysis

Flooding of the steering flatThe flooding of Warden Point’s steering flatwas the result of the leaking hatch lid on theadjoining rope locker. Once sufficientseawater had entered the rope locker, itoverflowed through the ports in the divisionbulkhead into the steering flat.

The initial leak through the rope lockerhatch was caused by a combination of theseawater running over and around the hatchand an ineffective seal between the hatch lidand the coaming. The three dogs on thehatch lid exerted insufficient clampingpressure to maintain a positive seal betweenthe hatch lid and the hatch coaming.

There had been previous voyages whenWarden Point had encountered large seasand the lower poop deck had been partiallysubmerged when the vessel had pitchedheavily. The rope locker hatch lid had leakedon some of these voyages in the past. Thecrew stated on this occasion that thecombination of Warden Point’s course,speed, loaded draught and the state andprevailing direction of the sea, was causingthe lower poop deck to be submerged under2–3 m of ‘green water’ at times.

Data was obtained from the Bureau ofMeteorology regarding the NSW coastalweather forecasts and observations, inaddition to wave-rider buoy records (peakand significant wave heights) from the portsof Newcastle, Sydney and Port Kembla. Thisdata shows that the weather experienced byWarden Point at its various positions on

9,10,11 November 1999 was severe and therecorded observations in the deck logbookwere accurate. There is no reason to doubtthe crew’s statement that there was 2–3 m ofseawater over the lower poop deck duringthis time.

Rope locker hatchWarden Point was built to Lloyd’s Registersurvey in compliance with the classificationSociety’s rules applicable at the time ofbuild in 1978. The construction of the ropelocker hatch was in accordance with theserules. Quoting from Lloyd’s RegistersPublished Rules and Regulations, Part 3,Chapter 11, Section 6.1, ‘Small hatchwayson exposed decks’:

6.1.6 Hatch covers are to be of steel, weathertight andgenerally hinged. The means of securing are tobe such that weathertightness can be maintainedin any sea condition.

The Lloyd’s definition of weathertight:

6.3.1 A closing appliance is considered to beweathertight if it is designed to prevent thepassage of water into the ship in any seaconditions.

The lever and wedge dogs fitted to the ropelocker hatch lid, when new, would haveprovided the weathertight seal required bythe class rules. Over the course of thevessel’s lifetime the dogs, wedges and sealhad worn to the point where a satisfactory‘weathertight’ seal was not maintained.

The crew were aware that the hatch closureswere worn and, according to theirstatements, the hatch sealing had beenmentioned for inclusion in the previous dry-dock specification. The hatch lid hadsubsequently been fitted with new sealingrubber during the docking but the wornhatch lid dogs and coaming wedges had notbeen refurbished.

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It was the afternoon of 9 November, twodays after sailing, that the crew discoveredthat the hatch lid was leaking. Up to thistime the hatch seal had been effective. Theeffect of the sea over the lower poop deck inthe preceding 12 hours of rough weather hadprobably ‘worked’ the hatch lid to the pointwhere the soft new sealing rubber could notprovide enough pressure to effectively holdthe hatch dogs tight on their wedges. Afterthe additional sealing rubber had been fitted,the crew indicated that they felt confidentthat the hatch lid was sufficiently tight andthus took no other action to seal the hatch.

The action taken by the crew in resealingthe hatch lid in the adverse conditions onthe afternoon of the 9th was perilous. Thechief integrated rating and the second mateboth sustained minor injuries when thelower poop deck was swamped by a wave.Neither man was wearing a safety harness atthe time.

After resealing the rope locker hatch, aregular watch on the rope locker andsteering flat was maintained to ensure thatthere was no further excessive water ingress.The 4–8 IR conducted the watertightintegrity rounds at approximately 1800,which included a check of the rope lockerhatch. The first engineer conducted engineroom inspections at 1930 and 2200 thatevening. He pumped 100–200 mm of waterout of the rope locker during his finalrounds. At this point, the first engineerattributed the build up of water to smallleaks from the hatch lid over the preceding 6 hours or so. Excessive leakage through therope locker hatch lid would have beenobvious to the first engineer as he pumpedwater from the rope locker. Consequently, atthis time the rope locker hatch was probablyreasonably weathertight.

When the crew placed the tarpaulin over therope locker hatch, after the steering flat hadbeen flooded, they noted that the three hatchdogs were slack but still engaged on thecoaming wedges. Under the circumstancesthe most likely conclusion is that, in the 2 hours between 2230 and 0030, the ropelocker hatch lid dogs were loosened by theaction of the waves over the lower poopdeck. Once the dogs were slack the ropelocker would have taken water with everywave over the poop deck.

After arriving in Port Kembla, contractorsfitted the rope locker hatch with sixbutterfly dogs (fig. 6). This type of dogprovides very positive screw down pressureand, for a hatch that does not have to beopened from the inside, offers far moresecurity that the original lever and wedgedogs.

Division bulkheadThe division bulkhead between the ropelocker and steering flat had a number ofopen penetrations, the lower two being theports which allowed the passage of waterfrom the rope locker to the steering flat.

Warden Point’s keel was laid in May 1977.At the time of building, vessels had to beconstructed to meet the requirements of the1960 Safety of Life at Sea Convention(SOLAS).

Lloyd’s Register submitted:

There are no SOLAS requirements in respect ofbulkhead divisions between rope store andsteering gear flat for vessels of less than 4000grtwhere the keel was laid before 1 May 1980. A0bulkheads became mandatory after this date forall ships above 500grt (78 Protocol of SOLAS74).

An ‘A class’ bulkhead is steel without openpenetrations.

Bilge pumpingWarden Point’s steering flat is fitted with afixed bilge suction and drainage well. Therope locker is not fitted with any fixeddrainage arrangements and is dependent onthe rigging of a portable bilge pump with itssuction line run through one of the ports inthe division bulkhead. When asked to clarifytheir requirements for the drainage of suchspaces Lloyd’s Register submitted:

All compartments are required to be providedwith drainage arrangements. In this case itwould appear in the absence of watertightbulkheads, drainage of the rope store waseffected through the bilge well in the steeringflat.

Clearly the drainage arrangements for therope locker were inappropriate as the twoports are the lowest penetrations in thedivision bulkhead and are located approxi-mately 500 mm above the deck. This meansthe rope locker must fill to this level beforethe water is able to run through and bepumped out of the steering flat bilge well.On an even keel the volume of sea waterretained in the rope locker would be approx-imately 7m3.

Bilge alarmsThere were no bilge alarms fitted in thesteering flat or rope locker to warn of wateringress. Had there been a bilge alarm fittedin either of these spaces, early detection ofthe leaking rope locker hatch would haveallowed the crew to take action to preventthe steering motors from becomingsubmerged and burning out. Warden Pointhas a UMS notation to its class. As themachinery spaces may be left unattended,Lloyd’s Register have specific requirementsregarding the monitoring of bilge levels inthese spaces to protect against flooding.

With regard to Warden Point’s steering flatand rope locker, Lloyd’s submitted that there

was no requirement to fit bilge alarms toeither space under their rules or theapplicable SOLAS convention at the timethe ship was constructed. Given the obviousrisk of flooding from both the steering flatescape hatch and the rope locker hatch, itwould have been prudent to fit a bilge alarmin either or both spaces at the time ofbuilding, or subsequently, although notstrictly required by the rules.

Failure of the steering motorsWarden Point’s two steering pumps aremounted on low angle iron sections weldeddirectly to the deck in the steering flat. Eachsteering pump runs fully submerged inside asmall integral oil tank with the electricmotor and solenoid control valves mountedon the outside of the tank. The electricmotor is mounted horizontally and thebottom of the motor casing is approximately100 mm above the deck level. The lowmounting of the steering pumps means thatthe motors will be wet with a relativelysmall quantity of water in the steering flat.

Lloyd’s rules stipulate a minimum ingressprotection (IP) rating of IP22 for electricmotors fitted in the steering flat. An IP22rating means that the motor must beprotected against ingress from medium sizedforeign bodies >12.5 mm diameter andwater dripping at an angle up to 15° fromthe vertical.

The steering pump electric motors in use onWarden Point are of totally enclosed designwith an ingress protection rating of IP55.The IP55 rating means that they areprotected from dust and water jets from anyangle, as such, they exceeded the Lloyd’srequirement. However, this type of motor isnot designed to be run submerged. Oncesufficient seawater had entered the steeringflat, it could have penetrated the motorcasings via small leaks around the terminal

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boxes, cable glands or motor end covers.Once inside the motor casings, the seawaterwould have had sufficient conductivity tocause a short circuit in the motor windingsresulting in the type of ‘burn out’ damagefound by the engineers.

Emergency repairsAfter stripping the two steering gear motors,and finding both the motor windingsdamaged beyond repair, the engineers foundthemselves with few choices. With no sparesteering motor on the vessel, their only realoption was to find a compatible motoramongst those fitted to other systems. Therewas no other feasible method by which theengineers could have restored any steeringgiven the limited resources they hadavailable.

In this instance they were fortunate enoughto find that the main engine stand-by jacketwater circulating pump motor wascompatible. This motor has a slightly lowerrating at 7.9kW/14.3 amps, when comparedto 8.2kW/15.0 amps of the original motors.Nevertheless it was adequate to operate thesteering hydraulics at almost 100 percentcapacity. When this motor was installed, itoperated the system satisfactorily.

Warden Point has an ‘unbalanced’ singlepintle rudder. With this type of rudder thehydrodynamic forces on the rudder increaseas the angle increases. The steering gearhydraulic system pressure acts to balancethe hydrodynamic forces and thus mustincrease with increasing rudder angles. Thechief engineer felt that the motor beinglower rated was a cause for concern andprudently recommended that the steering belimited to 15° of helm. By limiting therudder angle, the chief engineer also limitedthe maximum system operating pressure andconsequently the load on the steering motor.

On the afternoon of 10 November one of thefuses failed on the 3-phase supply to thereplacement electric motor which resulted inanother steering failure. As the replacementfuse did not fail as well, the first fuse failuremay have been caused by damage sustainedwhen the original steering motor’s windingsshort-circuited.

Water in the fuelCompounding the failure of the steeringmotors was the contamination of the fuel bysea water. The diesel and heavy fuel servicetank breathers were inspected after WardenPoint had arrived in Port Kembla. Theservice tank breathers are fitted beside eachother adjacent to the bulwark on thestarboard side, after end, of the main deck(fig. 7). The breathers consist of steelstandpipes, approximately 800 mm high,

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FIGURE 7:Fuel service tank breathers

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mounted above the deck level with the tankvent at the top. The vents consist of acylindrical air inlet/outlet, fitted with gauze,which is enclosed by a screw downfabricated steel cap with an integral‘tortuous path’ to prevent water ingress. Thediesel tank breather was found to be in aparticularly poor state of repair with thevent cap’s screw-down thread stripped andthe fabricated tortuous path galleries badlycorroded. The heavy fuel breather was in abetter state of repair. Both tank breathershad not been maintained for a considerableperiod of time.

In view of the condition of the service tankbreathers, there is little doubt that they werethe point of entry for the seawater drainedfrom the tanks. For such a large amount ofwater to be taken, particularly into the dieselservice tank, the breathers must have spent aconsiderable time submerged. This verifiesthe observations of the crew concerning thesea conditions they experienced at the timeof the incident.

Load Line ConventionThe International Convention on LoadLines, 1966:

…established uniform principles and rules withrespect to the limits to which ships on interna-tional voyages may be loaded having regard tothe need for safeguarding life and property atsea;

The regulations for determining load linescontain specific construction requirementswith respect to maintaining a vessel’swatertight integrity. Included in theserequirements are rules for the constructionof hatchways on the freeboard deck, such asthe rope locker hatch, and air pipes or tankbreathers.

Warden Point has a current InternationalLoad Line Certificate (1966). In order to

maintain the certificate, the vessel mustundergo periodic surveys (every 5 years) toensure that the structure, equipment,arrangements, material and scantlings fullycomply with the requirements of the presentconvention. Warden Point’s last load linesurvey was conducted on 30 January 1999during the dry-docking in Nantong. Thecondition of the rope locker hatch sealingarrangements and the fuel tank breathershould have been scrutinised by the Lloyd’ssurveyor during this survey. The worn hatchdogs and the wasted diesel fuel tankbreather cast some doubt on thethoroughness of this survey.

Shift of cargoOn arrival in Port Kembla on 11 November,both of Warden Point’s cargo holds wereinspected via two windows in the cargocontrol room. The cargo in each hold wasfound to have shifted. In no.1 hold the cargohad moved to port and forward and in theno.2 hold the cargo had moved to fill thespace between the upper and lower scrapersof the longitudinal and transverse conveyors.The cargo in no.1 hold was subsequently re-trimmed, however the conveyors could notbe lifted in no.2 hold due to the weight ofthe fly ash covering the scrapers.

After leaving Gladstone the fly ash hadtime, with the good weather experienced onNovember 7 and 8, to deaerate and settle.Once this had occurred the cargo wouldhave formed a stable mass. When WardenPoint started to pitch into the deterioratingweather on 9 November, the fly ash cargowas subjected to considerable disturbingforces. At this time, it is possible that thetop of the cargo was sufficiently disturbed toentrain air and become significantly mobile.With the loss of steering and the time spentrolling broadside to the heavy sea, the flyash moved to port. The shift of cargo could

have occurred slowly, over a period of time,or in one or more discrete ‘events’ when theship took large rolls to port.

The master stated that he considered that thevessel was ‘sitting quite well’ most of thetime that they were ‘not-under-command’.Once underway again he felt that, if theyhad lost the steering again with the deterio-rating weather, they would have had to try tokeep the vessel’s head to the sea using thebow thruster.

Once on passage again, and pitching into theheavy sea, the list increased through thenight of 10 November from 2–3° to over 5°by daylight. With regard to the increase inlist the master submitted:

I would like to make the point that WardenPoints bunkers were in No.3 starboard doublebottom tank. As fuel is used the ship develops aport list. This happens every voyage and iscorrected by ballast. On the morning of the 11thI instructed the First Mate to ballast a starboardballast tank with an amount I estimated toreplace the oil consumed.

Warden Point consumes around 12 tonnes ofheavy fuel per day. During the night of 10November, there would have been approxi-mately 6 tonnes of fuel drawn from the no.3starboard double bottom tank. Thus the fuelconsumed would have increased the port listduring the night by a calculated 0.15°. Forthe list to increase the reported 2–3° to portduring the night, there must have beencontinued cargo movement in addition to thefuel consumed.

In both holds the main longitudinalconveyor is located on the port side. Asmaller longitudinal conveyor is located atthe forward end of no.1 hold where thecargo hold is stepped in as the shell plateflares towards the bow. The longitudinalconveyors and the two transverse conveyorsare lowered onto the surface of the cargoafter loading is complete. General shipboard

practice is to stow the transverse conveyors,and the forward longitudinal conveyor inno.1 hold, on the cargo at the centre of theholds. Given the size and location of theconveyors, they would have had somestabilising effect on the surface of the cargo.The forward longitudinal conveyor in no.1hold, particularly, would have acted like apartial ‘shifting board’ and helped preventlateral movement of the cargo in the forwardsection of no.1 hold.

Past eventsA number of long-serving crew members onWarden Point related to the investigationinstances of fly ash cargoes moving in thepast.

In a submission, Cementco Shippingprovided a statement from an employee whohad served as mate on Warden Point 7 yearsearlier when a fly ash cargo had shifted. Heindicated that a wedge of cargo on the portside of no.2 hold had collapsed in heavyweather and caused a list of approximately 3 degrees to starboard. Initially there wassome concern on board and the master, atthe time, had mustered the crew inlifejackets. The mate and two other crewmembers were sent to the cargo controlroom where they discovered the cause of thelist which was subsequently corrected byballasting. The practice on board at the timewas to load cargo favoring the starboardside, to offset the weight of the bucketelevator located on the port side. Thisloading practice was discontinued after thisincident 7 years ago.

In submission, AMSA stated with regard tothis incident:

We can confirm that at least one other incidentinvolving a shift of Fly Ash has occurred.Warden Point developed a starboard list of aboutfive degrees on 30 March 1993 when itencountered heavy weather during a voyagefrom Gladstone to Melbourne.

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The investigation of the incident concluded thata wedge of cargo was left on the port side duringloading. The master was of the opinion that theship had developed a port list during loading andthis had allowed the cargo to flow to form thewedge. To compensate for this, the starboardwing tank was ballasted. During heavy weatherthe wedge shifted and levelled the cargo in thehatch. The additional ballast in the wing tankscaused the ship to list. This was corrected by de-ballasting the wing tank.

The measures Queensland Cement were asked totake included a review of their loadingprocedures to prevent recurrence of the incident,to establish the angle of repose of unaerated FlyAsh and to advise AMSA of future shipments ofFly Ash.

Melbourne University subsequently carriedout tests to determine the angle of repose offly ash with differing moisture contents.These tests indicated that the angle ofrepose is greater than 45°. The result wasqualified by questioning the relevance of astatic test to a dynamic situation.

Another type of incident occurred, onvoyage 544. The sounding pipes to the porthigh wing tanks were sheared off in heavyweather when Warden Point was headingsouth with fly ash. The vessel took a list dueto water entering the ballast tanks and somecargo was damaged as a result of seawaterentering the holds via leaking hatch covers.The vessel was diverted to Brisbane wherethe cargo was inspected and water ingressthrough the broken sounding pipes wasdiscovered as being the cause of the list. Themarine manager’s assumption, on themorning of the 10 November, that the causeof the list was seawater in the port highwing tanks, can probably be attributed tothis recent experience on voyage 544.

On 21 April 2001, just prior to publishingthis report Warden Point experiencedanother shift of a fly ash cargo. The shipwas southbound for Melbourne north east of

Eden on the New South Wales south coastwhen it was rolled heavily to starboard bytwo large waves in succession. A portion ofcargo moved in both holds which caused thevessel to list 10° to starboard. The ship wassubsequently hove to and the crew operatedthe cargo discharge equipment to re-trim thecargo and bring the ship upright. The crewestimated that 184 tonnes of cargo hadmoved to cause the list.

Stability

Warden Point is equipped with a loadingcomputer, stability software and an approvedstability booklet. The maximum shear forcesand bending moments were calculated forthe various stages of the fly ash cargoloading for voyage 554. Draughts weretaken, before and after the cargo loading,and the loaded quantity calculated by themate.

However, no stability calculations wereperformed to ascertain the vessel’s finalloaded condition and no stabilitycalculations were subsequently performedwhen the steering gear and rope lockercompartments became flooded, or when thevessel developed the list to port.

There were some problems using theloading computer during this period. Thestability software on the computer had notbeen updated to reflect some changes madeto the double bottom tanks in the Nantongdrydocking. The stability book, however,was current and contained all of the requiredinformation. The stability book contained aworked example of a loaded condition,which was very similar to Warden Point’scondition departing Gladstone. It appearsthat the assumption was made that thisexample was probably ‘close enough to’Warden Point’s actual condition after thecompletion of loading and, in any case, thatthere was an excess of stability.

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The cargo manifest supplied to the vesselcontained no information on the stowagefactor of the Gladstone power station flyash. Even if an initial stability calculationhad been performed, it would have beenimpossible to ascertain the vessel’s centre ofgravity accurately with the stowage factor ofthe cargo unknown. On Warden Point itappears to have been the practice in the pastto assume that the stowage factor of the flyash is the same as that for the regularpowdered cement cargoes.

The stowage factor for the fly ash loaded atGladstone should have been accuratelyascertained and provided to the master priorto the cargo being loaded.

As part of the investigation, Warden Point’sinitial stability was calculated by a navalarchitect. The stability was also calculatedfor the condition of the steeringcompartment being flooded. The initialstability calculations showed that WardenPoint exceeded all of the minimum stabilitycriteria including a GM (metacentric height)of 0.99 m and a maximum GZ (rightinglever) of 0.80 m at 50°. The calculationsperformed, assuming the steeringcompartment flooded, showed a slightlyreduced metacentric height of 0.97 m whenthe free-surface effect of this compartmentwas taken into account.

When considering the shift of the cargo andthe consequent reduction of stability, themost likely scenario is that the list to portwas developed in a discrete event or events,ie. some fly ash moved during a heavyroll/or rolls, and then stabilised in a newposition. This type of shift results in aneffective raising of the vessel’s centre ofgravity and a translation to port. Stabilitycalculations were performed by the navalarchitect based on this assumption ie. that a‘wedge’ of cargo moved to port andremained there, stable. His calculations

showed that a shift of approximately 92 tonnes of cargo was required to producethe 5° list to port. The movement of cargocaused a slight rise in the position of thevertical centre of gravity and thus a slightreduction in the metacentric height. The netresult was a small loss of stability for therelatively small angles of list involved. Withthe ship’s excess of initial stability, the 5°list to port did not represent a large riskwhen considered in isolation.

If a significant amount of the fly ash hadremained fluid and had been flowing freelywith the movement of the ship ie. acting as afree-surface, Warden Point’s motion, whenmaking way in the heavy seas, would havebeen markedly affected. The ship’s roll andpitch amplitudes and periods would havebeen substantially larger and longer thanusual. Such a change in the ship’s movementwould have been obvious to the crew. Norecord or account of such movements weregiven.

Without knowing the exact mass, positionand the way in which the cargo moved, it isnot possible to make an accurate quanti-tative assessment of the effect of the cargoshift on the vessel’s stability.

Passage to Port KemblaThe master’s initial decision to head toNewcastle at 0852 on 10 November afterWarden Point had regained steerage waslogical and correct. The vessel had a portlist of 2–3°, was being hand-steered after theautomatic pilot had failed, there wereconcerns about the poor weather conditions,steering was by a jury-rigged steering motorand there was water contamination of thefuel service tanks. At a position approxi-mately 60 miles away, the time of arrival atNewcastle would have been around 1800that evening.

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The Newcastle harbour master indicated tothe investigation that the port had beenclosed to inward traffic between 1230 on the10th and 0600 on the 12th of November,with the swell height averaging 8.0 m at theentrance. The maximum swell height duringthis period was recorded as 12.5 m.

As the morning progressed it becameapparent that Warden Point was not going tobe able to enter the port of Newcastle. Themarine manager conferred with the masterto consider alternatives. At this point, themaster made the decision to head towardsNewcastle and anchor outside the port.However after further consideration, anddiscussions with shipping agents inNewcastle and Port Kembla, the marinemanager again conferred with the masterand the decision was made to alter coursefor Port Kembla.

The anchorage outside the port of Newcastleoffered Warden Point no protection from thesea conditions prevailing on 10 November.The Newcastle harbour master alsoindicated to the investigation that conditionsin the anchorage were difficult during theperiod from 10–12 November and that manyvessels had weighed anchor to ride out theweather clear of the coast. Warden Point’smaster felt, quite rightly, that it would havebeen perilous for the crew to go onto theforecastle to anchor the vessel in theprevailing conditions. Given the weatherconditions and the poor holding groundcharacteristics of the anchorage offNewcastle the decision to divert to ananother port was the best alternative underthe circumstances.

The master and marine manager discussedthe alternative ports and apparently themaster made the decision to head for PortKembla with the Sydney ports asintermediate options. The statements to theinvestigation regarding this decision are

somewhat contradictory. While the masterand marine manager maintain that thedecision was the master’s, the chief engineerindicated that the master had told him,around 1215 on 10 November, that themarine manager had directed them to headfor Port Kembla. Why Port Jackson at 40 miles, and Port Botany at 30 miles nearerthan Port Kembla, were not considered to bebetter choices is a matter for someconjecture.

In submission the master stated:

Of the three ports, Sydney, Port Botany, and PortKembla I ruled out Port Botany as it could notbe compared to Sydney for facilities or a safeharbour (this has been known since 1788).Sydney was closer but it offered no shelteroutside the Heads to embark a pilot or make atug fast. It would have been difficult anddangerous to have a pilot launch alongside inweather conditions obtaining. The low freeboardand deck rails of the Warden Point could havedamaged the launch and hurt its crew. Also myown crew would have been exposed to theelements on deck or the forecastle.

Port Kembla was further but had the advantageof offering some shelter from Red Point and theFive Islands whilst taking pilot and making tugsfast.

The marine manager had reassured themaster by indicating that he would ensurethat there would be tug assistance availableif required en route in case the vesselneeded to be towed into port. Sydney PortsCorporation supplied evidence to theinvestigation that they had had no request on 10 November from QCL regarding theavailability of a berth or tug assistance forWarden Point, if required. Both of theSydney ports were open with berths and tugassistance available if Warden Point hadelected to use them. A number of ships didenter the two Sydney ports on 11 November.Three ships entered Port Jackson, and twoentered Port Botany, all these vessels safelyembarked pilots from launches. Under the

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circumstances, with the poor weatherconditions, the condition of the vessel, andthe concerns about the steering gear, it isdifficult to reconcile the master’s decision tohead to Port Kembla and not Port Jacksonsome 5–6 hours steaming time closer.

In the event, Warden Point’s list increased onthe night of 10 November, to be over 5° onarrival in Port Kembla. The crew indicatedthat the preceding early hours of themorning were particularly concerning withthe vessel rolling about the increasing list.

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Conclusions These conclusions identify the differentfactors contributing to the incident andshould not be read as apportioning blame orliability to any particular organisation orindividual.

On 9,10, 11 November 1999 Warden Pointexperienced a series of events in which theship suffered significant damage and whichendangered the vessel and crew.

1. The initial failure of Warden Point’ssteering gear was a result of thesteering pump motors failing aftercontact with seawater.

2. The seawater gained access to thesteering gear flat via the two lowestpenetrations in the bulkhead betweenthe steering flat and the adjacent ropelocker, which had been flooded as aresult of its leaking hatch lid.

3. The rope locker hatch lid leaked as aresult of seawater over the lower poopdeck, and the poor seal between thehatch lid and the hatch coaming. Therope locker hatch lid had not beenmaintained in a watertight conditionin that the worn dogs and wedgeswere not exerting sufficient clampingpressure to secure the hatch lid giventhe recent fitment of soft new sealingrubber.

4. The seawater contamination of thefuel service tanks was a result ofpoorly maintained breather vents andthe weight of seawater over the ventsin the poor weather conditions.

5. The vessel’s initial list to port was aresult of the fly ash cargo shifting. The shift of cargo was the direct resultof the movement of the vessel when

lying starboard beam-on to the largesea.

Although not contributing factors, it isfurther considered that:

6. The initial stability conditions for thevessel should have been calculatedafter completion of loading atGladstone. Some assessment of thevessel’s stability should also have beenmade after the cargo had shifted.

7. Safety harnesses and lifelines wouldhave minimized the risk of crewmembers being swept overboard whenworking on resealing the rope lockerhatch while the lower poop deck wasbeing regularly swamped by waves.

8. The absence of a bilge alarm fitted ineither the rope locker or steering flatprevented the crew being alerted tothe water ingress in sufficient time toavert the failure of the steeringmotors.

9. The knowledge of the transportationproperties of the Gladstone powerstation fly ash is insufficient; anaccurate stowage factor needs to beascertained and the ‘cohesive’categorisation of the cargo reviewed.Adequate measures also need to beprescribed to minimise the risk ofcargo shifting in adverse conditions.

10. The decision to divert the vessel toPort Kembla, rather than a closer portof refuge, may have unnecessarilyendangered the vessel and crew withthe continued movement of the cargo.

11. The efforts of the crew on the days of9,10, 11 November, in resealing therope locker hatch, restoring thesteering and navigating Warden Pointsafely to port in such adverseconditions, were commendable.

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These recommendations are publishedrecognising that corrective action mayalready have been taken by parties toaddress the safety issues identified by theinvestigation.

To the ship operators and theAustralian Maritime SafetyAuthorityReview the physical properties of Gladstonepower station fly ash with a view toestablishing a safe method of carrying thecargo by sea.

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Recommendations

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FIGURE 8Warden Point events and causal factor chart

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SubmissionsUnder sub-regulation 16(3) of theNavigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations,if a report, or part of a report, relates to aperson’s affairs to a material extent, theInspector must, if it is reasonable to do so,give that person a copy of the report or therelevant part of the report. Sub-regulation16(4) provides that such a person mayprovide written comments or informationrelating to the report.

The final draft of the report was sent to thefollowing:

The Master, Warden Point

The Chief Engineer, Warden Point

Marine Manager, Cementco

Lloyd’s Register, Brisbane

Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Submissions were received from the Master,the Marine Manager and the AustralianMaritime Safety Authority. The text of thedraft was amended and portions of thesubmissions included as appropriate.

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35

Warden PointName Warden Point (formerly Red Sea)

IMO No. 7636822

Flag Australian

Classification Society Lloyds Register

Vessel type Bulk Carrier

Owner Queensland Cement and Lime Company Ltd.

Year of build 1978

Builder Gotaverken, Solevesborg, Varu, Sweden

Gross tonnage 3 893.76

Summer deadweight 6 127.7 tonnes

Length overall 105.64 m

Breadth, extreme 14.95 m

Depth 9.00 m

Draught (summer) 6.987 m

Engine B & W Alpha 120281

Engine power 2 200 kW

Service speed 12 knots

Crew 17 (Australian)

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w.a

tsb.

gov.

au18

00 6

21 3

72

ISB

N 0 642 20037 8

Warden Point.05 .2001