INTUITIVE COOPERATION AND SELFISH THOUGHTS

Intuitive cooperation and selfish thoughts:

Are we automatically inclined to cooperate with others?

A replication study of Rand et al. 2012

J.W.M. Schuivens

Bachelor thesis: Psychology and Society.

17-12-2015

Supervisor: Anthony M. Evans. Tilburg University

Abstract

In 2012 researchers Rand, Greene & Nowak studied and analyzed ten studies in which

participants had to take part in economic games in which their reaction time was measured.

They found a strong positive causal relation between intuitive decision making and

participants’ cooperation rate. Replication studies of this experiment did not find this relation,

or not as strong as mentioned in the original paper. The effect, if there is one, seems difficult

to replicate and does not seem to apply within all cooperative settings. This study has used

one of the original experimental designs in order to achieve the same results Rand et al. 2012.

This design featured a public goods game and a multitude of personality, trust and experience

measuring questions. For the public goods game one condition had to decide within 10

seconds and the others condition after ten seconds. Using the same method on naïve

psychology students of Tilburg University (N = 152) who participated in a public goods game

did not yield the same results. The current study did not find a strong positive relation

between intuitive decision making and cooperation, but found a null effect instead. There was

no significant difference between the two conditions. A large number of participants did not

obey the rules of the experiment but analyses show that did not ruin the current study.

Multiple variables such as age, gender, trust and experience were analyzed to see if they can

predict a participant’s cooperation rate but did not find any variable which can explain when

and why participants cooperate more.

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Introduction

Cooperation has been the subject of numerous studies over the years (Martinsson,

Myrseth & Wollbrant, 2014. Nowak, 2006. Nowak, 2012. Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012.

Rand, D.G., Nowak, M.A., 2013a. Rand, Peysakhovich, Kraft-Todd, Newmann, Wurzbacher,

Nowak & Greene, 2014. Verkoeijen, P.P.J.L., Bouwmeester, S. 2014. ) and what its effects

are on human nature. Cooperation does seem the antithesis within evolution (Nowak, 2012).

Evolution is based on a fierce competition between individuals and should therefore only

reward selfish behavior (Nowak, 2006). Yet cooperation is abundant in nature and appears to

be involved in all great constructive steps of life on earth (Nowak, 2012). These two

statements reflect the division among people and scientists on whether the human nature is

cooperative or selfish. It is possible that some people believe that we, as humans, are inclined

to act selfishly and need to choose to act cooperatively. Selfishness could be regarded as an

impulse, as mentioned in Martinsson, Myrseth & Wollbrant (2014), and cooperation, within a

fair context, could be considered moral or social thoughtful behavior. Rand et al. published a

paper in 2012 claiming to have found the opposite effect: people are intuitively inclined to

cooperate and when given the chance to reflect more inclined to act selfishly. To understand

the weight of this claim there must first be an overview of cooperation and how it is shaped

within human behavior.

To understand the (human) nature of cooperation there must first be a clear definition

of cooperation. Cooperation is defined as: ”One individual pays a cost for another to receive a

benefit (Rand & Nowak, 2013a) with the characteristic that defectors have no costs and do not

deal out benefits (Nowak, 2006). There are multiple mechanisms of cooperation which help

us to understand the evolution of cooperation and what shape cooperation can take. There are

five mechanisms of cooperation: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, spatial selection,

multi-level selection and kin selection. The following definitions of these five mechanisms are

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retrieved from Nowak, 2006. Direct reciprocity is based upon multiple (cooperation)

encounters with others. A simple example would be tit-for-tat: you help me, I help you.

Sometimes random mistakes can occur caused by ‘noise’ which can lead to someone

accidentally not reciprocating. This error can explain the evolution of forgiveness (Nowak &

Sigmund, 1992). Indirect reciprocity spreads through (positive) reputation. There are repeated

encounters in a population of individuals, some are observed by others, some are not.

Information about those encounters spreads through communication, thus affecting someone’s

reputation. A good reputation will lead to more trust, which leads to more cooperation and

vice versa. Indirect reciprocity is a major factor in the emergence of moral systems in human

societies. Spatial selection is based upon the structure of the population. Strategies that are

successful in a well-mixed population, where everyone interacts with everyone else equally

may not win in a more structured population and vice versa. Multi-level selection states that

there is not only competition between individuals but between groups as well. Depending on

the population, or group, one is placed in determines the cooperation. Kin selection is a

mechanism of cooperation based upon kin recognition. One is more inclined to help a (close)

family member rather than a stranger. These five mechanisms can individually, or together,

explain how humans cooperate, when reciprocity is involved. Cooperation without

reciprocity, between strangers, is not explained through these five mechanisms.

Economists explain the low reward behavior of people (within laboratory settings)

with social preferences (Wilson, 2010). Social preference is cooperation; a person could

prefer to cooperate within social settings. Evolutionary game theoretic models do often try to

shed light on the issues of origin and change of prosocial behavior but often without explicitly

connecting to specific models of social preferences (Peysakhovic & Rand, 2013). Biologist

Michael Ghiselin (1974) takes the position that social preferences are culturally determined

rules and do not lie within the human nature. Others, such as primatologist De Waal (1996)

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argues that we, together with primates and some other species, have a biologically determined

sense of justice and capacity for experiencing empathy and sympathy, which in turn are

crucial building blocks for morality. Then, he argues, if other primates, with less cognitive

capacity and less developed cultures, have these capacities, it appears clear that human

morality and various kinds of social preferences cannot be explained solely in terms of

culture. Martinsson, Myrseth & Wollbrant (2014) propose that cooperation is positively

associated with self-control. Cooperation can surface as the result of the impulse to act greedy

and the better judgment to act prosocially. As such, the question of acting selfishly or

cooperatively becomes one of self-control and the ‘stronger’ the individual, the more

cooperation we can expect. However, self-control matters only to the extent that the

individual recognizes the decision at hand as a self-control conflict. The dual-process theory

is relatable to the ‘self-control hypothesis’ of Martinsson, Myrseth & Wollbrant (2014) as the

dual process theory proposes two processes used when making a decision: automatic, more

impulsive and deliberate, more cognitive or controlled decision making. The nature of

cooperation is difficult to determine, whether in be cultural, within our nature or a matter of

self-control. Rand et al. 2012 proposes and researched the dual process theory approach

towards cooperation.

Rand et al. (2012) researched the question of whether or not cooperation is an

automatic, intuitive choice, or a controlled, deliberate choice. These two choices are based on

the dual process theory. According to Rand et al. (2012) a decision can be reached through

two different ways, or as a result of two different processes. The two processes consist of an

implicit (automatic or intuitive) unconscious process and an explicit (controlled or deliberate),

conscious process. The researchers proposed and tested the theory that cooperation is, in

general, advantageous in everyday life, which leads to people acting cooperatively from

intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behavior to what is the most beneficial in the

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given situation the person is in. They call this the “social heuristics hypothesis.”

The social heuristics hypothesis, or SHH, proposes that people tend to internalize

social norms as automatic behavioral responses. People develop their intuitions in the context

of daily life, where cooperation is typically advantageous (Rand et al., 2012). Yet it is also

possible people are intuitively non-cooperative if their automatic responses are based on

situation where self-preserving behavior was more advantageous (Rand et al., 2012).

Intuitive responses are more stable throughout time but deliberate responses are not.

Deliberative, more reflective processes may override automatic responses in situations where

we are allowed to reflect on this context and determine what is more advantageous than

cooperating.

To research whether the SHH is correct with regards to cooperation Rand et al. (2012)

examined participants decision time in one-shot public goods games, one-shot prisoners

dilemmas, repeated public goods games and repeated prisoners dilemmas with different

manipulations in rewards and punishments within the settings. The researchers performed and

analyzed data from ten studies. The results the researchers found show strong evidence that,

on average, time pressure increases cooperation relative to time delay. There is a causal

relation between time pressure and cooperation. Rand et al. call this causal relation the

intuitive cooperation effect. The researchers stated that the effect can be strongly positive,

positive or a null effect but there is no negative effect (Rand et al. 2012). The deciding factor

for these results, experience or, for example, trust has not been determined.

In 2014 when Rand et al. tried to replicate the effect by examining 15 studies featuring 6,910

decision they found that the effect decays over time. The researchers concluded this was due

to experience with public goods games, allowing participants to feel more comfortable within

the experiment and increasing the chance they can reflect more on their choice.

Researchers Tinghög et al. (2013) reviewed Rand et al. (2012) claims and research and

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stated a number of problems. The first problem is the exclusion of 50 percent of the

participants who failed to respond in time. This has led to an increase of the intuitive

cooperation effect and was controlled for in an incorrect way by Rand et al. (2012), according

to Tinghög et al. (2013). If done correctly, the effect they had found would not be significant.

Tinghög et al. (2013) performed 5 experiments of their own. Experiment 1 used a different

design. Participants had to choose to either keep ‘X’ amount of money, or donate a larger

amount to the group. In experiment 2-4 they made participants decide within 7 seconds, and

performed the experiments with Swedish, American and Austrian students. In experiment 4

they made participants wait for 20 seconds before deciding. Tinghög et al. found a negative

effect in experiment 2-4, but this was not significant. In experiment 5 they had a one-shot

public goods game with six different treatments. Two of the treatments used were the same as

Rand et al. (2012), but with binary decisions. The remaining four were identical to one

another, with the exception that in two of these treatments information was given before the

public goods game to see if phrasing of the question could prime the participants. For

experiment 5, in all six treatments, they found a null effect.

Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014) also expressed critique towards Rand (2012)

paper. They ran their own 3 separate experiments using eight comparisons. On four they

found a small positive effect, on three they found a negative effect and on one they found a

null effect. In experiment 1 they had the time pressure and time delay condition, participants

knew what the others donated, and used humans and computers (A.I.) resulting in a 2x2x2

design. In experiment 2 they manipulated the use of the text box and who kept track of time:

Experiment 2a was a copy of Rand 2012 design, with the difference in the use of a text box

versus slider bar for donation amount and time being controlled by the experimenter.

Experiment 2b was the same as 2a except the use of a slider bar. 2c was an almost exact copy

of Rand 2012 by using a slider bar and time being controlled by the participant. Experiment 3

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was the same as experiment 2c while controlling for experience by using only naïve

participants. In all of these three experiments they failed to find the same results as Rand.

The effect Rand et al. (2012) has found seems hard to replicate, by others and by Rand

et al. (2014) themselves. This paper has taken one of Rand et al. (2012) design and the

expectation is that it will yield the same results as the original paper.

Rand, Greene and Nowak (2013b) replied to Tinghög et al. critique by saying that

there are only problems stated with two of the ten experiments. They analyzed the data once

more without the exclusion of participants and still found a positive significant result. The

null effect found by Tinghög et al. is contributed as study-to-study variation and that

experience has an effect on the decay of the time pressure effect.

For Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2014) no academic reply has been published (yet),

but there was a discussion on rolfzwaan.blogspot.nl. The website is hosted by a researcher and

colleague who wrote an article on Rand et al. (2012) results and the results of Verkoeijen &

Bouwmeester (2014). On the website David Rand has responded to the critique by stating that

there is a moderating effect of experience, reproducing the pattern seen over two years ago

(referring to Rand et al. 2012) in a single study using experience moderator (retrieved from

rolfzwaan.blogspot.nl/2014/05/are-we-intuitively-cooperative-or-are.html).

This study tries to add to the scientific discussion on intuitive cooperation. Using a

study design similar to Rand et al. 2012 the expectation is to find the same results. The

hypothesis is that participants who have to make a quick, intuitive decision are more likely to

cooperate than participants who can make a slower, deliberate decision. This effect will only

occur if the participant does not have previous experience with similar economic games.

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Method

The sample consisted of 152 Tilburg University students. All of the students were Psychology

students and the majority of the participants were in their first year. Students were recruited

through the university’s participation hours program and got 0,5 hours credit as a reward for

the participation. The study ran for two weeks at the start of the study year and, due to a low

number of participants, another additional week a month later.

Grouping

The study was conducted when at least eight participants showed up for the study. When there

were eight or twelve participants they were randomly placed in groups of four. Participants

were first gathered from the waiting room and placed within a lab cubicle. Within the lab

cubicle there were number sheets placed, at random, by the researchers. These numbers were

connected to a certain group in which the participants would be placed. Participants were not

aware of which group they, or others, were placed in.

If there was no way to make a group of four with the (remaining) participants they were

guided to the other lab to be part of a back-up study. These participants were told they could

participate by registering again at a later time and date.

Experience

The participants used in the sample were, as before mentioned, first year Psychology students.

Before the study there were no other studies the first year students could have participated in,

with the possible exception of the introductory ‘Test week’ experiment. Participants of the

last, later week could have done additional experiments but this would be such a low number

they could not be considered as an experienced participant.

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Survey

After reading and agreeing with the consent form the participants received an instruction

about the public goods game they were about to participate in. Within a group of four

participants every participant “received” 400 eurocents. Of these 400 cents the participants

were free to decide how much they wanted to keep and how much they wanted to contribute

to the group ‘pot’. The amount in the group pot would be doubled and divided amongst all

four group members. The money they kept for themselves was not doubled and could not be

taken. After the instruction the participants started the public goods game. The condition

“Time pressure” was asked to make their donation decision within 10 seconds, reflecting the

intuitive choice/process. The other, “Time delay” condition, was asked to make their decision

after 10 seconds, reflecting the deliberate choice/process. After the game was finished the

participant was asked some comprehension questions, such as “With what donation would the

group have received the biggest payout?” and asked about their motivation on why they gave

the amount they did.

The participants were also asked questions which measured their individualism, collectivism,

family values and their tendency to work with others. The complete survey can be found in

Appendix 1.

Amount donated

The cooperation rate is represented by the amount a participant donated to the group pot. A

donation of 400 cents equals a full 100 percent (1.00) cooperation, 200 cents equals 50% (0.5)

and 0 cents equals no cooperation (0).

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Motivation

The participant’s motivation was coded by both researchers at the same time. The motivations

were randomized in order and did not include the actual donation given by the participant.

The researchers coded motivation within four categories: self-focused, selfless, trust in group

and distrust in group. Example questions of these four categories are, respectively: “I gave a

low donation as this would give me a higher payout”, “I gave a high donation as this would

lead to a higher payout for the group as a whole”, “I think the rest of the group participants

will donate a high amount” and “I don’t think the group participants will donate a lot.” It was

possible to score on positive on one to all four of the categories. It was also possible a

motivation of a participant did not score on any of the categories. A score of all four

categories can be viewed as “ambiguity.” A score on none of the four categories can be

viewed as “other.”

Bonus

After the experiment participants received their 0,5 hour credit and got to keep their earnings

from the public goods game. These were handed within in the booth they were sitting in. The

money was handed to them via closed envelope.

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Results

Coding

The questions and their respective scores regarding experience, trust, individualism,

collectivism, value of family and need for competition were combined to a mean total score

for each variable. Experience was combined and divided between two variables: Experience

with public goods games (ExperiencePGG) and experience with scientific experiments

(ExperienceGeneral). These questions were rated on a scale from 1 to 5. Trust question came

in three different forms with three different phrasing of the questions and three different

scales. These questions were recoded to the same scale and combined to two variables. One

variable included all of the trust measuring questions, (TrustOverall) and one variable

excluded two of the trust questions which proposed a preference between two options, where

the other questions asked about agreement with a statement (TrustExclusion). Even though

the Cronbach’s alpha of all the trust questions was sufficient (Cronbach’s alpha = .74) this

separation was done to see whether or not these two questions were a disruptive factor. Both

trust variables were rated on a scale from 1 to 10.

Participant’s motivation was coded on four variables: self-focused, selfless, trust in group and

distrust in group.1

Exclusion

Three participants were excluded from the study because, based on their motivation text, did

not understand the public goods game. 26 participants were excluded from the study because

they failed the comprehension questions, suggesting they as well did not understand the game.

The remaining sample consisted of N = 123.

1 Further explanation of the four variables for motivation is mentioned within the Method section of the paper.

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Analyses

The sample, N = 123, consisted of 28 males and 95 females. Their average age was 20 (M

=19.76) years (SD = 1.93). Age and gender did not influence the amount donated (Age: r

(121) = -.66, p = .55. Gender: r (121) = .04, p = .63). Of the 123 participants 63 were placed

within the “Time Pressure” condition and the remaining 60 in the “Time Delay” condition.

The time pressure condition was compared to the time delay condition to see if there is

a significant difference between the amount donated. The time pressure condition donated an

average amount of M = .57 (SD = .34) and the time delay condition M = .61 (SD = .27), there

was no significant difference between the means of the two conditions t(121) = -.74, p = .46.

This null effect is represented in figure 1.

An independent t-test analysis was used to see if there was a difference in reaction

time between the two conditions. As expected, there was a significant difference in reaction

time between the two conditions t(121)= -5.65, p < .001. However, not all participants of the

time pressure condition obeyed the “10 second rule”, meaning they made their decision after

ten seconds. The time pressure condition had 63 participants. Of these 63 participants there

were 43 who disobeyed the “10 second rule” with the remaining 20 obeying the rule . The

average amount2 the obeying participants gave was M = .62, (SD = .38) and the average

amount the disobeying participants gave was M = .50, (SD = .25). An independent t-test

sample showed that these means do not significant differ from one another t(61)= 1.381, p

= .172. The researchers experimented with expanding the ten second rule to 15 seconds. In

this case 25 participant disobeyed the rule and 38 obeyed. The mean donation of the obeying

participants was M = .66 (SD = .34) and the disobeying participants was M = .54 (SD = .33).

2 Amount given is represented from a scale of 0 to 1.00. 0 means a participant donated no money, and did not cooperate. 1.00 means a participant donated the entire amount of 400 cents and cooperated to the full extent within the experiment

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An independent samples t-test showed no significant differences between the means of the

two groups t(61) = 1.358, p =.18.Obey or disobeying the ten second rule did not influence the

amount donated. For the Time Delay condition only one participant made his decision within

10 seconds and does not influence the rest of the results.

Figure 1. Mean percentage donated between the two time constraint conditions.

The boxplots shows that the mean donations of the two conditions are roughly the same, based upon the almost equal level medians. The time pressure condition ……………………………participants varied with their donation given, shown by the tall boxplot of this ……………………………condition, suggesting that there is no effect of the time pressure and no difference

between the two conditions.

To check whether reaction time and not the condition could predict the cooperation

amount a correlation analysis was performed with amount donated and reaction time overall.

No correlation was found r(121) = -.06, p = .48. To provide a clear overview of the null effect

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of reaction time on percentage donated, or cooperation rate, is represented in figure 2.

Figure 2. Overall effect of reaction time on overall percentage donated by all participants.

The figure shows no correlation between reaction time and percentage

donated based upon the spread of dots shown. There is no effect of reaction

time on amount donated.

Experience was hypothesized to be disruptive or moderating variable for the time

pressure effect, or intuitive cooperation effect. The participants were scored on the experience

they had with public goods games and experience they had with being a participants of

scientific experiments. Participants in the time pressure condition had an average PGG

experience of M = 2.54, (SD = 1.16) and time delay participants had M = 2.43, (SD = 1.05).

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General experience of the time pressure participants was M = 1.46, (SD = 1.77) and time

delay participants M = 1.72, (SD = 2.24). Participants in both condition had neutral

experience with PGG. This result is interpreted as that participants had, on average, somewhat

experience with PGG. General experience with scientific experiments of the participants was

low, but they were not completely naïve to scientific experiments. To research the level of

experience with the amount donated a correlational analysis was performed. This result

revealed no significant correlation between the variables (Amount Given x ExperiencePGG:

r(121) = .07, p = .42 & Amount Given x ExperienceGeneral: r(121) = -.11, p = .22).

Trust, like experience, was considered to be a possible predictive factor of

cooperation. Participants of the time pressure condition had an overall trust score of M = 6.18

(SD = 2.12) and time delay participants had a score of M = 5.71, (SD = 2.16). The mean

overall trust scores did not significantly differ from one another t(121) = 1.189, p = .237. The

overall trust score did not predict the amount donated to the common pool (Amount Given x

TrustOverall r(121) = .10, p = .3). To check whether or not the two preference trust questions3

had a significant effect on the trust scores of participants these analyses were repeated with

the other trust variable. Participants of the time pressure condition had a trust score of M =

5.94 (SD = 2.64) and time delay participants M = 5.50, (SD = 2.63). These means did not

significantly differ from one another t(121) = 1.013, p = .313. As expected the trust variable

with two questions excluded did not predict the amount given, r(121) = .07, p = .44.

The survey measured four personality variables: Individualism, collectivism, value of

family and need for competition. The regression results are represented within table 1.

The table shows the regression between the personality variables and the amount donated,

providing an overview which variables have a correlation with amount donated and whether

or not this correlation is significant and if it is positive or negative.

Need for competition and individualism correlated with one another r(121) = .27, p = 0.003.

3 These two questions are discussed in the ‘Coding’ paragraph of the Results section.

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Table 1.

Results of the linear regression analyses of personality variables by amount donated

Personality variables T P B SE B Β

Individualism -.775 .44 -.024 .032 -.069

Collectivism 3.515 0.001** .103 .029 .317**

Value of family -1.621 .108 -.046 .029 -.146

Need for competition -1.717 .089 -.039 .023 -.156

** = signicant at the p <.001 level.Note: R2 = . 16.

Motivation was coded on four variables: self-focus, selfless[ness], trust in

group and distrust in group. The regression results for both conditions are represented within

table 2 for the Time Pressure condition and table 3 for the Time Delay condition. Correlation

analyses showed there is a correlation between self-focus and selfless (r(121) = -.32, p

< .001), self-focus and trust in group = (r(121) = -.194, p = .31), selfless and distrust in group

(r(121) = -.195, p = 0.03) and lastly, trust in group and distrust in group (r(121) = -.18, p =

0.04).

Table 2.

Results of the linear regression analyses of motivation by amount donated for the Time Pressure condition

Motivation T P B SE B Β

Self-focus -1.767 .083 -.131 .074 -.192

Selfless 5.11 0.0001** .394 .077 .578

Trust in group -1.141 .259 -.123 .108 -.118

Distrust in group -1.727 .09 -.141 .082 -.181

** = significant at the p < .001 level.* = significant at the p = 0.05 levelNote: R2 = .38.

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Table 3.

Results of the linear regression analyses of motivation by amount donated for the Time Delay condition.

Motivation T P B SE B Β

Self-focus -1.734 .088 -.101 .059 -.189

Selfless 2.895 .005* .168 .058 .307

Trust in group 2.09 .041* .134 .064 .223

Distrust in group -2.318 .024* -.048 .021 -.247

** = significant at the p < .001 level.* = significant at the p = 0.05 levelNote: R2 = .38.

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Discussion

Reaction time

Reviewing the results that are found with this study there are no time constraint effects

on cooperation. The two different conditions vary in reaction time, but not in the amount

donated, or cooperation rate. Disregarding the guidelines of the conditions, by expanding the

time pressure condition to 15 seconds rather than 10 seconds does not reveal a positive causal

relationship between condition and amount donated as well. Looking at the overall reaction

time, fully disregarding the guidelines of the conditions, also does not show us any effect of

reaction time one amount donated.

Predictive variables

Predicting variables for cooperation were mostly not significant for amount donated.

Trust, experience, age, gender and 3 of the 4 personality variables did not yield significant

correlation in regards to amount donated. The significant predictive variables found cannot

explain a possible intuitive cooperation effect. Collectivism was found to be a predictive

value of cooperation. This is not strange, as collectivism is dependents on a good group

cooperation; without it, it cannot exist. The effect of collectivism on cooperation was

previously found in Wagner’s (1995) study. A belief that the group will be distrustful, or

unfair within the public goods game proved to be significant for the donation amount,

providing a negative correlation between the motivation and amount donated. Once again, this

is not strange as cooperation would be low in a distrustful group, based upon the spatial

selection theory of Nowak (2006). Selfless behavior had a positive significant relation with

amount donated for both time pressure and time delay condition. Selflessness could be viewed

as altruistic, and therefor the highest level of cooperation. However Dunn et al. (2009) found

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that people experience personal happiness when giving money to others, suggesting that

selfless behavior is not always done for the group. This could explain why selflessness is

significant for both condition; it is a more complex motivation than would seem. For the time

pressure condition only selflessness was significant, but for the time delay condition

selflessness, trust in group and distrust in group were significant. The time delay condition

had more time to think and could therefor consider the (possible) actions of the group they are

in. Trust in group had a positive relation with amount donated and distrust had a negative

relation. This study would seem to suggest that cooperation occurs randomly, with the

predictive values being so strongly associated with cooperation but they do not provide us

with new, previously found insights.

Time pressure disobeyed

A major problem of this study were the disobeying participants. A large number of the

participants in the time pressure condition did not reach their decision within ten seconds.

This means the ten second rule from Rand et al. (2012) study did not work within this study

design. Even though the participants disobeyed the rules there was no significant effect of this

rule breaking on amount donated. Therefore, however unfortunate this may be, it is not a

reason to disregard this study or its results.

Possible future solution for the disobey problem

A possible way to increase the chance of participants obeying the condition’s rule

could be by framing the experiment in an appropriate way or priming participants before the

game. Participants of the time pressure condition could first read a text of situation in which

the intuitive decision was the best decision. Participants of the time delay condition could read

a text in which a deliberate decision was the best decision. This will frame either decision,

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depending on the condition, to be the best way to make a decision. The expectation would be

that the intuitive cooperation effect would be stronger as behavior tends to depend on whether

information is given in a positive or negative light as well as the wording used in the

experiment (effects of framing; Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans et al. (1998), and Cubitt et al.

(2011), Bardsley (2008)); for effects of different wordings see Ross and Ward (1996), and

Liberman et al. (2004).

Using a Likert scale, as opposed to the slider bar could increase the chance, but limits

the full free choice of donation. In the study there were very specific donations such as 243

cents and it might be possible participants do not distinguish much between a donation of 243

and 250. Another argument to use this, instead of the slider bar, is because all intuitive

cooperation studies (Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2013. Rand et al., 2012. Tinghög et al.,

2013) analyse percentage of cooperation or percentage donated; this study is no exception.

Emphasizing that participants will actually receive the money might also bring

different results. A lot of participants expressed confusion and surprise when actually receive

the money they earned from the experiment. This is also found in the answers given when

asked if the participants thought the experiment featured some misleading aspects; a number

of participants stated that they did not believe to actually receive money. Explicitly stating,

for example, “You’ve now received 4 euro’s/400 cents with this study. The experimenter will

hand you your money at the end of the study, but you must first enter an economic game with

three other participants, which will give you the chance to increase the pay-out for you and

the group as a whole.” could help counter this.

Naïve or low experienced participants

Rand et al. (2014) has stated the results are difficult to duplicate because his original

respondent pool, the MTurk, has become too experienced with the study. A replication study

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by Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester (2013) with naïve MTurk participants could not replicate the

results of Rand. This study, using naïve participants with little experience with the task and

little experience with scientific experiments has to disregard this claim. Experience does not

seem to affect the intuitive cooperation effect.

Trust

The level of trust did not affect or predict the intuitive cooperation effect or the

amount donated to the common pool. However, the trust questions were asked after

participants completed the public goods game, thereby letting their actions influence their

answers as a way to avoid cognitive dissonance. Placing the questions before the public goods

game could have an undesired priming effect thereby letting the answers influence the action.

A more fitting solution could be to relate the questions more to the public goods game (i.e. “I

did not trust my group”) as opposed to keeping the questions broad.

Conclusion

This study was a replication of the Rand et al. (2012) paper. It did not find the same results as

the original paper, finding a null effect. Reviewing our hypothesis which was, in short, that

time pressure condition would cooperate more when compared to the time delay condition

controlling for experience. The two conditions did not differ in their donations and experience

was shown to have no effect on cooperation. Looking at the overall reaction time versus

amount donated also did not show any effect. Even though the disobeying of the ten second

rule occurred on a large scale a controlling analysis which expanded the rule to 15 seconds,

and an analysis to see if the disobeying had a significant effect on the results showed that this

was not the case. This study therefor can claim that there are problems with the design used to

research the intuitive cooperation effect as this is another study which did not find the same

21

results as Rand et al. (2012). The papers of Tinghög et al. (2013) and Verkoeijen &

Bouwmeester (2014) also did not find the same positive results. Further research, using

different manipulations and designs is necessary to state whether or not the intuitive

cooperation effect exists, and if so, to what extent it is a strong and positive effect.

22

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Appendix 1. The survey questions retrieved from the protocol. The participants’ survey was

translated to Dutch.

Screen 1:

In this task, you will participate in a simple decision making study. You will receive a $5

show-up fee/course credits, and then earn additional money based on your decision and the

decision of others.

You will be paid in cash immediately following the experiment.

Screen 2:

You have been randomly assigned to interact with 3 of the other people in the room. All

of you receive this same set of instructions. You cannot participate in this study more than

once.

Each person in your group is given $4 for this interaction.

You each decide how much of your $4 to keep for yourself, and how much (if any) to

contribute to the group’s common project (from 0 to 400 cents).

All money contributed to the common project is doubled, and then split evenly among the 4

group members. Thus, for every 2 cents contributed to the common project, each group

member receives 1 cent.

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If everyone contributes all of their $4, everyone’s money will double: each of you will earn

$8. But if everyone else contributes their $4, while you keep your $4, you will earn $10, while

the others will earn only $6. That is because for every 2 cents you contribute, you get only 1

cent back. Thus you personally lose money on contributing. The other people really will make

this decision too – there is no deception in this study. Once you and the other people have

chosen how much to contribute, the interaction is over. None of you can affect each other's

payoffs other than through the single decision in this interaction.

Screen 3:

Time pressure condition: Please make your decision as quickly as possible. You must make

your decision in less than 10 seconds!

Please use the slider to choose the amount of money you wish to contribute.

Time remaining: <Timer that counts down from 10>

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Time delay condition: Please carefully consider you decision. You must wait and think for at

least 10 seconds before making your decision!

Please use the slider to choose the amount of money you wish to contribute.Time elapsed so

far: <Timer that counts up from 0>

Screen 4 through 6:

- What level of contribution earns the highest payoff for the group as a whole?

- What level of contribution earns the highest payoff for you personally?

[These questions provide a check on the participant’s comprehension of the payoffs.]

- Please describe why you chose to contribute the amount that you did in the study.

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Screens 7 through 27:

These screens will contain the items of the individualism/collectivism scale. The items

will be randomly presented to each participant.

Screens 28 through 32:

Experience 1

“To what extent have you participated in studies like this one before? (i.e. where you

choose how much to keep for yourself versus contributing to benefit others)”.

[Subjects have to answer on a 5 point Likert scale with 1= Nothing like this scenario, 3 =

Somewhat like this scenario, and 5 = Exactly this scenario.]

Experience 2

“How many total experiments have you completed in exchange for credit or extra credit

in your courses?”

[Subjects have to answer this question by entering a number in a box with 0 as the

lowest response option.]

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Experience 3

“How many total paid experiments have you done?”

[Subjects have to answer this question by entering a number in a box with 0 as the

lowest response option.]

Experience 4

“Have you done any experiments on Mechanical Turk or other online sites? If yes, how

many experiments did you do in total online?”

[Subjects first have to select yes or no in response to the first part of the question. If

they select yes, they have to answer the second part of the question by entering a

number in a box.]

Experience 5

“Although this study did not involve deception, have you previously participated in any

studies in which you were deceived about the actual purpose of the study? If yes,

estimate how many studies you have done that involved deception.”

[Subjects first have to select yes or no in response to the first part of the question. If

they select yes, they have to answer the second part of the question by entering a

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number in a box.]

Screens 33 through 35:

Trust-in-others

“To what extent do you feel you can trust strangers?”

Subjects have to answer on a ten-point Likert scale from “1=Very Little” to “10=Very Much”

“To what extent do you feel you can trust other people that you interact with in your daily

life?”

Subjects have to answer on a ten-point Likert scale from “1=Very Little” to “10=Very Much”

Trust 1

“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be

too careful in dealing with people?”

[Subjects respond by clicking radio buttons for “Most people can’t be trusted,” “Can’t be

too careful,” or “Depends”]

Trust 2

“Do you think most people would take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would

they try to be fair?”

[Subjects respond by clicking radio buttons for “Would take advantage,” “Would try to be

fair,” or “Depends”]

Trust 3

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“Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just

looking out for themselves?”

[Subjects respond by clicking radio buttons for “Try to be helpful,” “Just look out for

themselves,” or “Depends”]

Trust 4

“You can’t count on strangers anymore.”

[Subjects respond by clicking radio buttons for “More or less agree” or “More or less

disagree”]

Screens 36 to 39:

These screens will contain the four PARH items

Screen 40:

What year were you born?

Screen 41:

What is your gender?

Screen 42:

In which city and country did you grow up? If you lived in more than one place, list the

one you spent the most time in. (If the United States, please also give the state).

Screen 43:

How many other participants in the room do you know?

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