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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40675 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.HON. VICENTE ERICTA, Judge, Court, of First Instance of Quezon City, BranchXVIII; THE ACTING BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, Branch XVIII; REGISTER OFDEEDS- OF QUEZON CITY; and JAIME 0. RIVERA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner. Renato B. Herrera for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, Act ing C.J:

The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to set aside the questioned orders of respondent judgegranting execution of its final and executory decision and judg[nent ordering petitioner corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private respondentand to annul the corresponding transfer certificate of title issued by respondentregister of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the deed of sale executed by

respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of petitioner corporation as authorized byrespondent judge.

Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the judgment of December 28, 1971 granting his 6tction for specific performance and "ordering thedefendant petitioner [PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [respondent Rivera] of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of the complaint"and to pay P2,000.00 - attomey's fees and costs. The judgment was - enteredpursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3802 enacted by Congress on June 22,1963 providing for the sale at cost to registered tenants/lessees like respondent of thedwelling units occupied by them and for the application in full in their favor of an thepast rentals paid by them to the purchase price. Petitioner failed to appeal the said judgment which has long since become final and executory. In fact, in Resolution No.17 of its board approved on July 25, 1972, petitioner formally accepted respondent'sproposal to waive the P2,000.00 - attorney's fees awarded in his favor by the judgment and approved the sale of the entire property (Lots 12-A to 12-H, Block 447,together with the rowhouses thereon) with one unit for residential purposes and theothers for a general and maternity clinic.

Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed of sale in favor of respondent despite two writs of execution issued by respondent judge at respondent'sinstance, with the claim not set forth in the aforesaid board resolution that respondenthad not completed payment of the purchase price (at cost). Respondent consequentlyfiled a motion for the lower court to appoint and authorize the clerk of court to executethe deed of sale on behalf of petitioner corporation in his favor, expressly assertingthat "as duly proven during the trial of this case, [that] he has completed payment of the total consideration of the sale as he is covered by Republic Act No. 3802 whichprovided for the sale at cost [of the 'properties] to registered tenants."

1Overruling

petitioner's opposition thereto, respondent judge issued the questioned Order of March 14, 1975 granting the motion, as follows:

Acting on the plaintiff's motion dated March 3, 1975, and thedefendant's opposition thereto dated March 6, 1975, the Courthereby orders Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, Acting Branch Clerkof Court, to execute a Deed of Sale of the property described inparagraph 2 of the complaint for the amount of P31,427.01 which,as per decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971, hadalready been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant People's

Homesite and Housing Corporation.

xxx xxx xxx

The execution of this Deed of Sale shall be done at the cost of the defendant People'sHomesite and Housing Corporation and the Deed of Sale shall have the same effectas if it was executed by the defendant itsell "

2

Petitioner filed an extended motion for reconsideration and respondent judge,squarely meeting the issues raised, denied the same in the questioned extendedOrder of April 21, 1975, as follows:

The motion for reconsideration is based on the allegation that thedispositive portion of the decision of this Court dated December 28,1971 does not contain the purchase price of the property and,

therefore, its inclusion in the Order of the Court dated March 14,1975 is allegedly contrary to Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The PHHC contends that only the dispositive portion of thedecision constitutes the real judgment which should be executed.

The dispositive portion which is being executed reads as follows among others:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant to execute a deedof sale in favor of the plaintiff of the entire property described in paragraph 2 of thecomplaint;'

Precisely, the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 orders theexecution of the aforecited dispositive portion of the decision. Thisdecision has become final and executory. The inclusion of the purchase pyice of P31,427 01 in the Deed of Sale to be executed by the Clerk of Court does not prejudice the PHHC nor does it alter the decisiom Although the purchase pyice does not appear in thedispositive part; it can be found on page two of the decision itself

The Court does not wholly subscribe to the view that the judginentcan be found only in the dispositive portion of the decision.

It is true that the resolution of the court in a givenissue, which determines and settles the rights of the parties, is ordinarily embodied in the last or dispositive portion of the decision (Manalang vs.Rickards, G.R. No. L- 11986, promulgated July31, 1958), yet, not infrequently such resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts thereol

Style in decisionmaking or preparation ispersonal to its writer. As long as the decision



satisfied the requirement of the law (Art. VIII Sec.12, Philippine Constitution; Rule 35, Sec. 1.Rules of Court), we find no compelling reason toadopt a definite and stringent rule underlininghow and where the judgment would be framed.Indeed it is well said that to get the true intentand meaning of a decision, no specific portionthereof should be resorted to but same must beconsidered in its entirety (Escarella vs. Director of

Lands, 83 Phil. 491; 46 Off. Gaz. No. 11, p. 5487;I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957Ed. p. 478, Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans'Board and AssGciates Insurance & Surety Co.,Inc., No. L-12779, dated August 28, 1929, 106Phil. 125).

3

Hence, the present action of petitioner contending that respondent judge's court"abused its discretion or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction" in issuing theaforesaid questioned Orders leading to the execution of the deed of sale by the clerkof court on behalf of petitioner corporation and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 206668 of Quezon City in respondent's favor "by adding therein matters which were not includedin the dispositive portion of the decision dated December 28, 1971. " As above stated,the Court has found the petition to be without legal basis and merit.

Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did he act"capriciously or whimsically" as to amount to lack of jurisdiction in issuing thequestioned Orders. As correctly stated by respondent judge in denyingreconsideration, his court was merely ordering the execution of the dispositive portionor judgment of the decision for 11 execution of a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondentj," no more, no less. Said judgment ordered the execution of suchdeed of sale unqualifiedly and unconditionally and has long become final andexecutory. The entire record shows that no claim is made by petitioner that theamount of P31,427.01 paid by respondent by way of rentals for a period of ten years(1954 to 1964) (as expressly found in the decision) does not cover the full cost to it of the property. The decision's clear implication is that these rentals did fully cover thecost to petitioner of the property and therefore constituted full,,payment of thepurchase price as fixed by

Republic Act No. 3802. Hence, the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of the sale to respondent, subject to no further payment of any amount.

If petitioner wanted to dispute such judgment, it should have appealed the same but itdid not do so. Nevertheless, when respondent moved for authority for the branchclerk of court to execute the sale due to petitioner's failure to heed the writs of execution, pursuant to Rule 39, section 10 of the Rules of Court,

4petitioner was

given full opportunity both in its opposition and at the hearing of respondent's motionto show that such rentals paid by respondent did not cover the fun cost to petitioner of the property (as fixed by the cited covering Act) but it could not cite any deficiency. Itstill had another opportunity when it filed its motion for reconsideration, but could notdo so. Manifestly, respondent's rental payments fully covered the purchase price (atcost) of the property. All petitioner could do was raise a technical question that the

trial court's final decision of December 28, 1971 did not contain the purchase price of the property. This was utterly untenable since the judgment unqualifiedly ordered the

execution of the sale without any further payment and petitioner failed to show thatrespondent's substantial rental payments over a ten-year period did not fully cover thecost of the property. Finally, having submitted this issue for respondent judge'sresolution, petitioner is now in estoppel from "speculating on the fortunes of litigation"and now challenging the adverse orders in these certiorari and prohibitionproceedings.

5

Two other submittals of petitioner are equally without merit. First, the fact thatrespondent branch clerk of court executed the deed of sale before petitioner wasfurnished a copy of the execution order of March 14, 1975 (due to an oversight of the

mailing clerk) in no way constitutes a jurisdictional defect that affects the validity of the order.

6The order for execution of the deed of sale was a matter of right flowing

from a final and executory judgment and could have been issued ex parte under Rule39, section 1 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, petitioner had fuu opportunity tocontest the order, through its motion for reconsideration which was denied in duecourse by respondent judge per the reasoned Order of April 21, 1975. Second,contrary to petitioner's claim, no abuse of disicretion was committed when respondent judge issued the execution order notwithstanding the pendency in the Court of Appeals at the time of CA-G.R. No. 51545-R entitled "Jaime O. Rivera, petitioner-appellee vs. PHHC, respondent-appellant," which was an appeal by petitioner fromthe adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City permanentlyenjoining it from enforcing an ejectment order agikinst respondent in view of petitioner's subsequent approval of the sale of the property to respondent pursuant to

Republic Act No. 3802. Clearly, the pendency of such appeal had no bearing on thequestioned execution orders at bar. At any rate, the ejectment order had manifestlybecome moot and academic as correctly held therein by the lower court. Finally therecords of said case show that as per judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals onSeptember 14, 1978, the judgment appealed from by herein petitioner PHHC wasaffirmed and final entry of judgment was therein made on October 13, 1978.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is lifted effective immediately. No costs.




Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004

Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner,

vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J. :

A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and thelaw is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form,the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Courtand relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar,the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12,2003 Decision

2and July 29, 2003 Order

3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch

49).4

The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief 5

filed before the

RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. ThePetition prayed for the resolution of the question "whether or not the act of a religious leader likeany of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or inurging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of theletter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."

6

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositiveportion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before thetrial court. Soriano, his co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. Inresponse, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows:

"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only toclarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. TheDecision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required

only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that theprevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, isdirect appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of theConstitutional provision to the Supreme Court."

7

The Antecedent Proceedings

On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party,sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,

8specifically on the separation of

church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religiousleaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words:

"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], aMotion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Eraño Manalo and Bro. Mike

Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period andsimilarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petitionon the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no

justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement,which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro.Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Eraño Manalo moved toreconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to filememorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting hisMemorandum. x x x.

"x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsiderationfiled by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister ErañoManalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in themotions to dismiss x x x."

9

After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition,because "in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondentsare violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only aquestion of law."

10It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition –

the separation of church and state – even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the"[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of theseparation clause."

11

After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion inits assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration

which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.12

This Court, in a Resolution13

dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Courtgave the other parties -- impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunityto comment, if they so desired.

On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14

The Issues

In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Court’s resolution:

"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo wasproper and valid;

"2. Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondent’s Petitionfor declaratory relief;

"3. Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief;

"4. Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by hereinrespondent is ripe for judicial determination;

"5. Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and,

"6. Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratoryrelief of herein respondent."

15

During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows:

"A. Procedural Issues



"Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state acause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

"B. Substantive Issues

"1. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required bythe Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court?

"2. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, beprohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may theybe banned from campaigning against said candidates?"

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious.

Procedural Issues:

Requis ites of Pet i tions for Declaratory Relief

Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief,provides in part:

"Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contractor other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determineany question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or

duties thereunder."

Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interestedunder a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by astatute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is tointerpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.

16The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1)

there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests areadverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issueis ripe for judicial determination.

17

Justiciable Controversy

Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish beforethe trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest betweenthem; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by

petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations,contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy.Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail.

A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or mere ly anticipatory.

18The SJS Petition for

Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did notsufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondentstherein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or theConstitution.

As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in hi s Comment,19

what exactly has he done thatmerited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJSPetition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." HisEminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003,

the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been activelyinvolved in partisan politics.

An initiatory complaint or petition fi led with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise anddirect statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x."

20Yet,

the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.

Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders,the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidateor candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable[them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders,enabling them to control the government"[;]

21and "pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious

erosion of the people’s faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religiousleaders determine the ultimate result of elections,"

22which would then be violative of the

separation clause.

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does notsuffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate,or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right.

Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any threatened,imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The

judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actua l controversies involving rights that are legallydemandable and enforceable

23cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened

violation of a legal right.

All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was "that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved."

24In other words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the

speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated theconstitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of itsdeclared rights. Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.

25

Cause of Action

Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need notbe any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one party against theother.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, aregulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is "the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge

or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate."

26

According to petitioner,this subject matter is "beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief."27

Petitioner avers thatin the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence,should have been dismissed outright by the court a quo.

A cause of action is an act o r an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.

28Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor

of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violatesuch right; and (3) such defendant’s act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

29

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal.30

However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involvedor of rights arising thereunder.

31Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending,

imminent or at least threatened.



A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that theformer had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest,supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it "has thousands of members who arecitizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of theconstitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in theprocess to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x."

32

Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not onlyis the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculativeand uncertain.

33The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by

the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in

the question raised.34

To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the "[p]laintiff in adeclaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeksa judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct,and the essential distinction between a ‘declaratory judgment action’ and the usual ‘action’ isthat no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain thedeclaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded."

35

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference – that there must be nouncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded . Precisely, asdiscussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents below)might actively participate in partisan politics, use "the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock[to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government."

36

During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all stronglyasserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics.They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue raised andto entitle SJS to the relief sought.

Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact uponwhich SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even grantingthat it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of theelections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided thecertainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of thoserespondents.

Legal Standing

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the

case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challengedact.37

Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

38

Petitioner alleges that "[i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of areligious leader to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specificcandidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy";

39it has failed to

establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.

Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show"not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediateor imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and notmerely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way."

40They must demonstrate that they

have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled,or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

41

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest inpreventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.

42 A taxpayer’s action may be

properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.43

In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers’ money isbeing illegally disbursed.

Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political partyor its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of therespondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJShad suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents.Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilegeto be voted for a public office they are seeking.

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters" is too general44

and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague,highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

45

Transcendental Importance

In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing,considering that "the issues raised are of paramount public interest."

In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raisesan issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.

46Recently, after

holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v. Zamora47

nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that "the IBP has advanced constitutionalissues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weightas precedents."

48

Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petitionto be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply concern a delineationof the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the governance of our country.The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never beendecided before.

The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve theconstitutional issue despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviatedproceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties --particularly for Respondent SJS -- made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that wouldsupply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this casefrom the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because thetranscendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates the elementary procedure

49that must be followed by

trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.50

Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss acomplaint

51 (or petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiff’s (or petitioner’s)

cause or causes of action.52

A complaint or petition should contain "a plain, concise and directstatement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense."

53It

should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents,with a directive that the defendant answer

55within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed by

the court.56

The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, theplaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.

57

The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after

the time fixed by the Rules.58



If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) daysfrom service.

59A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded

to.60

When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse party’spleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except inactions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation).

61Meanwhile, a

party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratoryrelief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary

judgment in its favor.62

Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim isasserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its

favor.63

After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is ashowing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

64

Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendantmay file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of theRules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on thequestions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.

65After the hearing, the court may

dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It shallnot defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is notindubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.

66

If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originallyprescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from thereceipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shallfile an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless

the court provides a longer period.67

After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,68

which is amandatory proceeding.

69 A plaintiff’s/ petitioner’s (or its duly authorized representative’s) non-

appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action withprejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shallbe a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court torender judgment on the basis thereof.

70

The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect asfailure to appear at the pretrial.

71Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order

reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, theamendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by theparties regarding any of the matters considered.

72The parties may further avail themselves of

any of the modes of discovery,73

if they so wish.

Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74

in which the parties shall adduce their respectiveevidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their written consent or upon theapplication of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the issuesto be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by theparties.

75The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if

held before the court.76

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a writtenreport on the matters referred by the parties.

77The report shall be set for hearing, after which the

court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting itwith instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court.

78

Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. Thedecision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed

with the clerk of court.79

Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court inthe instant case.

First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petitionimmediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon whichthe petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the court,but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.

Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as aresult of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.

80As already discussed earlier, the

Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact81

or of any specific violation of the

petitioner’s rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to afailure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive relief could be sought and adjudicated. ThePetition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been dismissedat the outset.

Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their respectiveanswers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; CardinalSin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which helikewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.

82SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde,

who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were "several scheduled settings, inwhich the "[c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of the parties."

83The nature of such

settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling onthe Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order

84dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties

to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another Order 85

dated May 14, 2003,denying all the Motions to Dismiss.

In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled:

"The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memorandaare submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for resolution."

86

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, theMotions were not heard. Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did notstate any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. Therewas not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legalfindings and conclusions of the trial court.

Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties’memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trialcourt again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue itsDecision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions.

Furthermore, the RTC issued its "Decision" without allowing the parties to file their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those answers,the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them(endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit.

Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, whichwas entitled to be heard upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes andother measures.

87

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court wasutterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

All in all, during the loosely abbreviated p roceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted withinexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rulesof procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion.



Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief muststill follow the process described above -- the petition must state a cause of action; theproceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision mustadhere to constitutional and legal requirements.

First Substantive Issue:

Fundamental Requirements of a Decis ion

The Constitution commands that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court withoutexpressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or

denied without stating the basis therefor."88

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Proceduresimilarly provides:

"Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly preparedby the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,signed by him and filed with the clerk of court."

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads asfollows:

"Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in theofficial language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him andshall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the

accused and the law upon which the judgment is based."x x x x x x x x x."

Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges "to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinizeclosely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoidthe tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which suchconclusions are deduced."

In many cases,89

this Court has time and time again reminded "magistrates to heed the demandof Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution." The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. DavideJr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,

90discussed at length the implications of this provision and

strongly exhorted thus:

"Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution isindisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by

the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of howit was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and

just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitledto know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe thatthe decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the factsand the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and isprecisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the courtfor review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the partiesthat, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus,a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit .Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with thesovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the

judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision."

In People v. Bugarin,91

the Court also explained:

"The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must setforth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves manyfunctions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to theappellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which hedisagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, inreaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x."

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information onhow the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led tothe conclusions of the court.

92

In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensurethat their decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legalfindings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties.

In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts-- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the co urt’s findings as to the probablefacts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the questionor issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, andwhat the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trialcourt are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she hasreached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her "Decision" with theclause "SO ORDERED."

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the

distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, whatwere the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings andconclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTC’s Decision cannot be upheld for itsfailure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial courtclearly transgressed the constitutional directive.

The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it beso if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstancesare unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison?

Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-calledDecision. The importance of such portion was explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuasonde Rickards,

94from which we quote:

"The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the

decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles therights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding theexistence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may beconfusing."

The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of thePetition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial courtgrant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says,"SO ORDERED." But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a"Decision," when nothing was in fact decided.

Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailedDecision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the statementof the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads: "Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separationclause."

95

We cannot agree.



In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag ,96

the obligation of the party imposed by the Court wasallegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The Court, however, held:

"x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in thedispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that wherethere is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevailover the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while theopinion is merely a statement ordering nothing." (Italics in the original)

Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS andembedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, thatstatement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to thePetition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, asrequired of a dispositive portion.

Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of theconstitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.

97

Parts of a Decision

In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of thecase; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which eachissue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The

ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especiallyin cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.

98

An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- alonger introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of thecontroversy and the issues involved. An epilogue may be a summation of the importantprinciples applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. Itmay also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle.

Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of agood decision.

1. Statement of the Case

The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action. At the firstinstance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the

specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on apetition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositiveportion of the assailed decision.

In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide indetermining the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be foundculpable. As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or graver than thatcharged.

Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a questionon the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances havebeen adequately alleged therein.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of theproceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious

irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellatecourt would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to

mention the fact of the appellants’ detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query --whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail.

Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating theconsolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.

2. Statement of Facts

There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorialmethod, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each witness and thecontents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judge’sbest light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge issimply narrated without explaining what the parties’ vers ions are. Finally, through a combinationof objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge thenformulates his or her own version of the facts.

In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of thedefense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases,depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. Theplausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a readingof the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions shouldbe explained.

On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctlyresolved all factual and legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds noreason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower court’spatent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified.

In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction;hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factualissues are not entertained in non-criminal cases. Consequently, the narration of facts by thelower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be reproduced; otherwise, the material factualantecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate.

In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should belaid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain

way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.

3. Issues or Assignment of Errors

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, asmentioned in the appellant’s brief, may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoidmotions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to consider allassigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presentsrepetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may berestated in clearer and more coherent terms.

Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases aregiven de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generallylimited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction;questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned

errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends thedetermination of the question properly raised.



4. The Court’s Ruling

This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint,petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a

just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them should beseparately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties shouldalso be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, itis better to resolve the former preliminarily.

5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion

In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific

crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifyingcircumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the courtmust order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused isdetained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when theaccused were set free.

In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether thecomplaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs. The followingtest of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should know their rights and obligations.Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the caseshould be terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends uponwhat the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command theperformance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific acts. The disposition

must also adjudicate costs.The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be presentand plainly identifiable in the decision. Depending on the writer’s character, genre and style, thelanguage should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; muchless highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the decision must be clear,concise, complete and correct.

Second Substantive Issue:

Religious Leaders’ Endorsement

of Candidates for Public Off ice

The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OFCANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deservesserious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of

paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and itspeople. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, thisCourt still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room toentertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factualand legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition andthe assailed Decision.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factualallegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in theassailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. Ineffect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the court’sconstitutional mandate and jurisdiction.

99

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because itmade no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent.Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramountquestion involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarilyinvolved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the partiesconcerned."

100

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED . The assailed June12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) arehereby DECLARED NULL A ND VOID and thus SET ASIDE . The SJS Petition for DeclaratoryRelief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate andrecommend whether the trial judge may, after observing due process, be held administrativelyliable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevantcirculars of this Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.




Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO,petitioners,vs.

HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of QuezonCity; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, MetropolitanTrial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, QuezonCity; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUSALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. :

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamusproceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through

their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of thePhilippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al ." She was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested bya Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P.Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not deniedby respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previouslybeeen issued against NOLASCO.

3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-BMayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, notspecifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents havealleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG,applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, ExecutiveJudge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B MayonStreet, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE,after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a"suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been longwanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of thePhilippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippinesvs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (theSEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing wassubmitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus,were examined under oath by Judge Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus hasbeen submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were

kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of theCPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreignand local sources intended to be used for rebellion.

1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may bestated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested bythe searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials,2

andadditionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.

3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August10th,

4the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the

premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that TOLENTINOwas present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return wassigned by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO andTOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL,for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of PresidentialDecree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitionersbefore Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVEDOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL,

praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. TheMotion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCHWARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are presently pendingagainst Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court.

5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled thatthe seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the caseagainst respondent."



8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVEDOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them bereturned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant wereunlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that thevalidity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued inthe SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set asidethe (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order

admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and(3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoiningthe respondents or their duly authorized representatives from introducing evidenceobtained under the Search Warrant.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is ageneral warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the thingssubject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properlyestablished for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, addingthat the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition withoutpetitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the

issuing Judge.We find merit in the Petition.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searchesand seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides thatno Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by theJudge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to beseized.

The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized asfollows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National DemocraticFront, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of thesegroups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive booksand instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, andsupport money from foreign or local sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracingdescription which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what thesubversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available tothe public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the

crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as towhat items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion

regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portabletypewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant andinfringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things tobe seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar descriptionwere considered null and void for being too general. Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of thesubversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines.Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

6

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as 'subversive documents, propagandamaterials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversivematerials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline tothe search team as to what articles might be lawfully seizedthereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than,the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. theChief of Staff" which this Court declared null and void for being toogeneral.

7

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judgeallowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies

subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recordingmachines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as toinclude all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrantunder consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which isconstitutionally objectionable.

8

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witnesspresented by the applicant for Search Warrant.

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajenoand the Court would like to know if you affirm thetruth of your answer in this deposition?

(The deposition instead)—

A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.

Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?

A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.

Q So, you are more or less familiar with therequisites of the application for search warrant?

A Yes, Your Honor.



Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?

A Because of our day and night surveillance,Your Honor, there were so many suspiciouspersons with documents.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.

Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials fromthe National Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?

A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups,Programs, List of possible supporters, subversivebooks and instructions, manuals not otherwiseavailable to the public and support money fromforeign and local sources.

9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to theapplicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The"probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehendssuch facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and actin pursuant thereof.

10Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to

Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8threfer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that inthe Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examinationconducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of saidwitness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a

Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this original, independentaction to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue inthe SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact,they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the SearchWarrant, even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in theSUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners hadquestioned the legality of the Search Warrant.

Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANTCASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts isnot conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable that,whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal

prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of theSearch Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the

criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial thanthe Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case shouldhave the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily,the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot beordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may bemade without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitlyprovides:

Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested .— A personcharged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weaponsor anything which may be used as proof of the commission of theoffense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without asearch warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, asan incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can alsobe search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent andreasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances,and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is someconfusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or premiseswhich may be searched.

12"What must be considered is the balancing of the

individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the

apprehension of criminals."

13

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is acrime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for aconsiderable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B MayonStreet, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective resultsin the interest of public order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possibleintroduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE toobject to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 byrespondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, andthe Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing evidenceobtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case herebymade permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the ConstabularySecurity Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1,pending before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return toher any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

SO ORDERED.




Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17938 April 30, 1963

ESPERIDION TOLENTINO, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

ADELA ONGSIAKO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Esperidion Tolentino for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.Edmundo M. Reyes and Senen Ceniza for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J .:

Appeal f rom the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of NuevaEcija, in its Civil Case No. 3197.

The plaintiff-appellant, Esperidion Tolentino, prays in the complaint that hefiled with the lower court on 20 May 1959, for the enforcement of thedissenting opinion rendered in the case entitled "Severo Domingo, et al. vs.Santos Ongsiako, et al., G.R. No. 32776."

The decision in said case (in favor of appellees' predecessors, and adverseto those of appellant) was promulgated by this Court on 4 December 1930,and, together with the dissenting opinion, appears in Volume 55 of thePhilippine Reports, starting on page 361. Unfortunately, the records of saidcase were lost, or destroyed, during the war.

The plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-interest of the late SeveroDomingo, who died without having received a copy of the decision, andalleges that plaintiff-appellant learned of the decision, only about a weekbefore he filed the aforementioned complaint; that the decision of the majorityof the Court was erroneous and unjust; that the dissenting opinion is thecorrect view of the case, and should be enforced. The court below, on motion

of one of the several defendants, dismissed the case, for lack of cause of action.

Not satisfied, the plaintiff-appellant interposed the present appeal, and urgesthat the failure of service of a copy of the decision upon the late SeveroDomingo was a denial of due process, which invalidates the decision, andasks that, on equitable grounds, the present case be heard as a proceedingcoram nobis.

Assuming the truth of the allegation that Severo Domingo, appellant'spredecessor-in-interest, was never furnished a copy of the decision in G.R.No. L-32776, it appears in the printed report of the case (55 Phil. 361) that hewas represented by Atty. Ramon Diokno. Being represented by counsel,

service of the decision is made upon the latter by the clerk of the SupremeCourt (Sec. 250, Act 190), and not upon the client (Palad vs. Cui, 28 Phil.

44); and the unrebutted presumption is that the said official of this Court hadregularly performed his duty (No. 14, Sec. 334, Act 190; Sec. 69 [m], Rule123, Rules of Court). Appellant's alleged predecessor-in-interest was not,therefore, denied due process of law.

Appellant's position that the decision was erroneous and unjust is entirelyuntenable, because the issue sought to be reopened is res judicata, asidefrom its having stood unchallenged for 30 years. The ridiculous prayer toenforce a dissenting opinion requires no discussion, it being sufficient to

state that there is nothing to enforce in a dissenting opinion, since it affirmsor overrules no claim, right, or obligation, and neither disposes of, nor awards, anything; it merely expresses the views of the dissenter.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of factsbe admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to theparties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by thisstipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Lastly, the appellant's claim that "the lower court erred in not allowingplaintiff-appellant's cause as a proceeding coram nobis", is devoid of merit.The ancient common law writ of error coram nobis, now substantiallyobsolete even in common law jurisdictions (49 CJS 561), does not lie after

affirmance of a judgment on writ of error on appeal (49 CJS 562); nor can itbe grounded on facts already in issue and adjudicated on the trial (49 CJS567). Moreover, the jurisdiction of a writ of error coram nobis lies exclusivelyin the court which rendered the judgment sought to be corrected (49 CJS568), so that it should have been sought by appellants, if at all, in theSupreme Court, and not in the Court of First Instance.

In the Philippines, no court appears to have ever recognized such writ, therule in this jurisdiction being that public policy and sound practice demandthat, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become finaland irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.

1 Interes rei publicae ut

finis sit litium.

The order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. Costs against theappellant.




Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.

MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:p

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of LaTrinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4,

Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time inDecember 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in themorning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2)days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonoganbus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City,accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila tocatch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused tooka Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.

1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco,the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at CampDangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,

Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the CordilleraRegion. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistentreports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in hispossession prohibited drugs.

2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay PoliceStation, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morningand inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped.Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officersstarted their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was

the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting thebulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring outwhatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouchbag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to openone of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, aderivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alightedfrom the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrie r.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulgesinside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers hadopened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, LaTrinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers openedthe teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative sampleswere taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the samewere brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. aprohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed againstaccused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raisedthe issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish wasplanted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags werenot owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he metin Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same buswith him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to takethe next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meeteach other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport andother Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which washanging on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden andother papers. The officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outsidethe bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in

the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bagplaced around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, wasbelied by his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused wasinvestigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer thatthe hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) monthsafter said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of thetwo (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyondreasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended.

3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt

established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and



hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and topay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First NarcoticsRegional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, asamended.

SO ORDERED.4

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crimecharged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it wasmade without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discoveredduring the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

5 However, where thesearch is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. Alawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.

6

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant ; when lawful . –– A peace officer or aprivate person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he haspersonal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrestedhas committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped froma penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped whilebeing transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the personarrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearestpolice station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordancewith Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crimewas actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus,the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of theforegoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when thesearch was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstancesof the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accusedwas then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead areasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, andthat the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to besearched.

8The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure

is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Courtas valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanatedfrom a plastic bag owned by the accused,

10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee. 12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming fromSagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day hadprohibited drugs in his possession. Said information was received by the CommandingOfficer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagadaon his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of hereinaccused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with himprohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,

13

the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy.San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tanglibenwho was acting suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended andsearched by the police authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the-spotinformation, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to secure a searchwarrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine checkof the bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensivesearch was initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waistof accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present hispassport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to doso, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide hisidentity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from theauthorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada hadprohibited drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to producehis passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believethat the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From thesecircumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that wasmade on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOMofficers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrappedobjects found inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two

(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish stuffed inside them, wereprompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport,and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagadahad prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability andfacility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of suchcircumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, tothe detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trialcourt is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.



CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC.VS.

CITY OF HIALEAH

A. FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church) and

Ernesto Picardo its president filed an action against the city if Hialeah and its city council named as defendants alleging violationof the their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.

In April 1987, the church announced plans to establish a house of worship, school, cultural center, and museum with the goal to bringthe practice of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of animal sacrifice,into the open.

On June 9, 1987 and other subsequent days the Hialeah citycouncil held an emergency public session where several ordinancesand resolutions where passed in response to the distress of members

of the community regarding practices of the Santeria religionspecifically animal sacrifice.

o On June 9, Resolution 87-66,noted the "concern" expressed byresidents of the city "that certain religions may propose toengage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals,peace or safety," and declared that the City reiterates itscommitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any andall religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals,peace or safety.

o On June 9, Ordinance 87-40, incorporated in full, except as to

penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws, which punishesunnecessarily or cruelly killing of any animal. With the consentof the attorney general of Florida the city attorney assured thatthe prohibition of sacrificing of animals in a religious practice or ritual is not inconsistent with the state law therefore the citycouncil can make ordinances against it.

o On August 11, Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah was passed.

o On Sept. 8, Ordinance 87-52 prohibiting public ritualistic animalsacrifice, other than for the primary purpose of food consumption

was passed.

o On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-71 stating that It shall be unlawfulfor any person, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice

any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah,

Florida where the word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarilykill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or privateritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of foodconsumption was passed.

o On Sept. 22, Ordinance 87-72 stating that it is unlawful for anyperson, persons, corporations or associations to slaughter anyanimal on any premises in the City of Hialeah, Florida, exceptthose properly zoned as a slaughter house, and meeting all thehealth, safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City for theoperation of a slaughter house was passed.

After a 9-day bench trial the District Courts favored the defendantsfinding absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that noviolation of the petitioner s’ rights were made finding four compellingreasons: (1) that animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk,both to participants and the general public, (2) that the children whowitness the sacrifice of animals suffer from emotional injury, (3) thatthe city's interest in protecting animals from cruel and unnecessarykilling and (4) that the city's interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion stating that theordinances were consistent with the Constitution.

per curiam decision (or opinion) a ruling issued by an appellatecourt of multiple judges in which the decision rendered is made bythe court (or at least, a majority of the court) acting collectively andanonymously

B. ISSUES OF THE CASE

Whether or not the Hialeah city council is in violation of the First Amendment in enacting Ordinances 87-14, 87-52, 87-71 and 87-72.

C. HELD

Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by acompelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailoredto that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that theyapplied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the



activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conductthan was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied toreligious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religiousbehavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict strutiny.

The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner and reversed theprevious decisions concluding that that each of Hialeah's ordinancespursues the city's governmental interests only against conductmotivated by religious belief.

Decision: 9 votes for Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 0 vote(s)against

Legal provision: Free Exercise of Religionn D. RATIO

The US Constitution provides that the Congress shall make nolaw respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the freeexercise thereof through the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment, which was applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Given that the Santeria is a religion, its beliefs such as animal sacrifice―need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible toothers in order to be protected by the First Amendment.

To support the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion,(a) neutrality and (b) general applicability in the law needs to beestablished. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be

justified by a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowlytailored to advance that interest even if it has the incidental effect of

burdening a particular religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. The ordinances of theHialeah city council fail to satisfy these Smith requirements.

o Neutrality need not only be facial (evident at the text used in thelaw) but can also be supported by the equal protection mode of analysis in the formulation of the law. The ordinances werefound to be inconsistent with these requirements and led tothe conclusion that the ordinances had as their object thesuppression of religion.

o General applicability needs to be establish with laws burdening

religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause "protect[s] religiousobservers against u nequal treatment and inequality results

when a legislature decides that the governmental interests itseeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only againstconduct with a religious motivation. The ordinances fall wellbelow the minimum standard necessary to protect First

Amendments rights. The Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71were claimed to advance two interests: protecting the public healthand preventing cruelty to animals but this may be done not byprohibiting Santeria sacrifice alone and there are far more greater ways to do this that would not discriminate the practice of theSanteria religion.

Also a law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny it mustsatisfy ‘interests of the highest order,' and must be narrowly tailored inpursuit of those interests. In this case the ordinances fail to satisfythese requirements as well.

Lastly, the Free Exercise Clause commits government to religioustolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for stateintervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices,all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to theConstitution and to the rights it secures.

INTROLAW 6.docx

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