Introduction to the DOD 101 workshop - narrative H$D Stanford 2016

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License DOD/IC Workshop: Hacking for Defense Joe Felter, Pete Newell, Jackie Space Page 1 of 20 Hacking for Defense @ Stanford DOD/IC 101 Workshop Read this narrative along with the slides at http://www.slideshare.net/sblank/h4d-dod-101-workshop-040516 Slides 1 -11 Joe Felter: In the spirit of doing more work than any of your other classes, it's 7pm and its not a scheduled class session and you're all here. We appreciate all of you attending and we’ll not waste your time. I'm going to give you a little background, and a few vignettes and context to help frame and understand the nature of the contemporary and emerging challenges we are facing. This is a brave new world and a threat environment unlike those we have faced in previous decades. I’d like to describe the complexities and challenges of this environment to help you get you motivated to address the problems your teams are taking on. Next, Pete Newell is going to give you some background on where our DOD and IC problems come from. And our guest, Jackie Space is going to talk to us about some of the practical applications of the acquisition process and the challenges and opportunities it presents. (Slide 2) This is a scene from West Point in 1963. You may recognize the speaker, Douglas MacArthur, just before he passed away. This is his famous duty honor country speech. …the “big idea”- to use Steve Blank’s vernacular - from this speech was that, “the mission of West Point cadets and the entire DOD is to win our nation's wars”. How do we do this? Think about the types of wars that General MacArthur was thinking of when he said "Our mission is to win our wars." (Slide 3) Back in his day, wars were not easy but much simpler to understand how to fight. When a state was attacked, they knew the source of the attack and it was usually another nation state with the capacity to project power. For example, consider the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. We knew who attacked us and in general terms how to respond. The US mobilized its resources and industrial base, raised powerful military forces and projected power - directing it at a defined enemy and the enemies industrial base. In conventional state-on-state warfare, the operational and tactical level activities that support a strategy to win are often clear. You mass fire power on objectives. You destroy the enemy’s military and industrial capabilities and seize terrain. All those things are missions that the military can get their head around. Conventional wars against well defined enemies are not easy but are simple to appreciate what it takes to win them.

Transcript of Introduction to the DOD 101 workshop - narrative H$D Stanford 2016

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HackingforDefense@StanfordDOD/IC101Workshop

Readthisnarrativealongwiththeslidesat

http://www.slideshare.net/sblank/h4d-dod-101-workshop-040516Slides1-11JoeFelter:

Inthespiritofdoingmoreworkthananyofyourotherclasses,it's7pmanditsnotascheduledclasssessionandyou'reallhere.Weappreciateallofyouattendingandwe’llnotwasteyourtime.I'mgoingtogiveyoualittlebackground,andafewvignettesandcontexttohelpframeandunderstandthenatureofthecontemporaryandemergingchallengeswearefacing.

Thisisabravenewworldandathreatenvironmentunlikethosewehavefacedinpreviousdecades.I’dliketodescribethecomplexitiesandchallengesofthisenvironmenttohelpyougetyoumotivatedtoaddresstheproblemsyourteamsaretakingon.Next,PeteNewellisgoingtogiveyousomebackgroundonwhereourDODandICproblemscomefrom.Andourguest,JackieSpaceisgoingtotalktousaboutsomeofthepracticalapplicationsoftheacquisitionprocessandthechallengesandopportunitiesitpresents.(Slide2)

ThisisascenefromWestPointin1963.Youmayrecognizethespeaker,DouglasMacArthur,justbeforehepassedaway.Thisishisfamousdutyhonorcountryspeech.…the“bigidea”-touseSteveBlank’svernacular-fromthisspeechwasthat,“themissionofWestPointcadetsandtheentire

DODistowinournation'swars”.Howdowedothis?ThinkaboutthetypesofwarsthatGeneralMacArthurwasthinkingofwhenhesaid"Ourmissionistowinourwars."(Slide3)

Backinhisday,warswerenoteasybutmuchsimplertounderstandhowtofight.Whenastatewasattacked,theyknewthesourceoftheattackanditwasusuallyanothernationstatewiththecapacitytoprojectpower.Forexample,considertheaftermathofPearlHarbor.Weknewwhoattackedusandingeneraltermshowtorespond.TheUSmobilizeditsresourcesandindustrialbase,raisedpowerfulmilitaryforcesand

projectedpower-directingitatadefinedenemyandtheenemiesindustrialbase.Inconventionalstate-on-statewarfare,theoperationalandtacticallevelactivitiesthatsupportastrategytowinareoftenclear.Youmassfirepoweronobjectives.Youdestroytheenemy’smilitaryandindustrialcapabilitiesandseizeterrain.Allthosethingsaremissionsthatthemilitarycangettheirheadaround.Conventionalwarsagainstwelldefinedenemiesarenoteasybutaresimpletoappreciatewhatittakestowinthem.

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(Slide4)

Ifyoufightthesewarseffectivelyyoueventuallywin.InMacArthur’stimeweactuallydefeatedourenemies,drovethemtounconditionalsurrender.Wehadvictoryparades-kissedthenurse,wenthomeanddemobilized.TheUSandtheirallies’back-to-backworldwarchampions.…We'rethewinningteam.Itwasgoodtobekingthen,right?

Weusedtowinourwars,andweknewhowdoit.WenotonlywonconventionalwarslikeWWIandWWII,wewereprettygoodatwinninglow-intensityconflicts,unconventionalwars,limitedwars.There'snolow-intensityconflictwhenyou'reattheotherendofanAK47,trustme,butwewereevengoodatleveragingourtechnologyandourcapabilitiestowinlow-intensityconflictsandsmallwars.Weweredominant,buttoday'sit'ssomethingthat'schanged.(Slide5)

Thisisapictureatthetailendofthecoldwar.It’stakeninDecember1989inOperationJustCauseinPanamawherewewereconductinganightcombatairborneassaultintoPanamaandultimatelyseizedformerPanamanianPresidentManuelNoriega.PeteNewellandIwerebothjuniorofficers,Iwaswiththe3dRangerBattalion,Petewasinthe82ndAirbornedivision.Weknewthemissionwasdangerous.Wewere

parachutingininthemiddleofthenighttohostileterritoryunderfire.Wewerenotcocky,butwehadacertainlevelofconfidencegoingintothemission.Wewerethewinningteam-nobodycouldstanduptoourpowerfulmilitary.WehadaircraftcarriersandICBMs,butwealsohadaprettygoodtechwhenitcomesdowntothesmallunit,theindividualleveltechnology.Letmetellyouaboutsomeofthetechnologywehadbackthen.(Jokingly)It'sgoingtojustblowyouaway-nobodybuttheUSandotherpowerfulstates’militarieshadaccesstothisleveloftech.Wehadnightvisiongogglesyoucouldputonyourheadandyoucouldseeinthedark.Nokidding.Seeatnight!Itwasphenomenal.Welandedontheairfield,peopleareshootingatyou,theydon'tknowwherewearebutthey'resprayingtryingtohitpeople,wecouldseethem.Wehadnightvisionscopesonsomeofourrifles.WecouldputacrosshaironthewhiteT-shirtstheywerewearing.Itis“goodtobetheking”andhaveaccesstothesegamechangingtechnologies.Beforewewentinwehadoverheadimagesfromsatellitestakingpicturesoftheearthandgivingusmapssoweknewhowtoplan,andknewwhereourobjectiveswere.Theseimagesobtainedfromnationalassetsweresosensitivethatthesatelliteimagerywasclassifiedmaterial.Iremembertyingmyimagerywithparachutecordontomycargopocketbecauseifyoulostit,itwaslosingasensitiveitemandIwouldbesubjecttoaninvestigation.

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IliterallywasjumpingoutofaC-130at450feetwhichwasprettylow.Gettingshotat.Mymapripsoutofmypocket.AllIcanthinkofis,“ohmyGodI'minbigtroublebecauseIjustlostmyoverheadimagery,”whichisprettysensitivestuff.Atthesametimewealsohadsatellitesupinorbittriangulatingtotelluswithin10metersofaccuracywherewewerestanding.GPS.Itwascrazy.Wehadcommunications,whereeveryindividualsoldierinmyplatooncouldtalktoeachother.Imeanlittletinyradiosthatcouldtalktoeachother.Theselittlepensthatcouldshootalasertodirectfireandmaneuver.Neverbeforeinthehistoryofwarfarehasanorganizationbeenabletodirectitsoperationsandfireandmaneuverwiththatkindoftechnology.Andallofthiscostthousandsandthousandsandthousandsofdollars,reallyexpensivestuffthatfewotherstatesifanycouldaffordtodeploy.There’sasayingthat,“thestrongdowhattheywanttodoandtheweakdowhattheyhavetodo.”We'reoneofthestrongstates.WhatdostrongstatesliketheUnitedStatescareabout?Whodotheyworryabout?Otherstrongstates,right?SowhowasbiggerthantheU.S.backthen?Butthiswastheendofanera.Thisis1989,thecoldwarwasaboutover.Insomeways,despitethenuclearmenace,thoseseeminretrospectlikethegoodolddays.Whenitwasgoodtobeking–wherepowerandresourcestranslatedalmostdirectlyintobattlefielddominance.What'schanged?Whoarethesefolks?(slide6)

Iwasjokingabouttheadvancedtechnologywehadin1989.TodaywithacreditcardandInternetconnectionandyoucangetanyoneofthosethingsdescribedasgamechangingadvantagesforuswhenPeteandIjumpedintoPanamafora$100.Nightvisiongogglesarecheapandavailable,GoogleMapswithimagesofalmostanypartoftheplanetare

online,youcanjustgetthatanddownloadit.Allofthiswasformerlyonlyinthehandsoftheverystrongeststates,theverystrongestsuperpowers.Thefollowingslideshighlightjustafewexamplesofhowtheproliferationanddiffusionoftechnologychangesthefaceofthebattlefieldtodayandwhythismatters.Let'slookatsomeexamplesoftheasymmetriesthatgroupslikeISIS,al-Qaedaandothergroupstakeadvantageoftodousharm.

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(Slide7)

ISISisabletouseoverheadimageryanddronesurveillancetoplanandexecutetheiroperations.It'snotsohardtodo,they'vegottheirowndrones.They'reusingthisagainstus.Thisisanexampleoftechnologythat'snowinthehandsofouradversariesthatformerlywasonlyinthehandsofthestrongeststatesliketheUnitedStates.

(Slide8)Terroristsandothernationstatesareusingsocialmediaagainstus.IremembergoingtoSEREschoolasaspecialforcesofficercandidate.Weweretrainedtodevelopacoverstorytohideouridentifyifcaptured.Thiswasawholeconvincingcoverstorythatyougivesoyoudon'tgetfoundout.Today,ifyouGooglemeorcallupmyFacebookpageitwouldbeprettyclearwhoIwasandmybackground.

(Slide9)

Imaginewhatourourenemiescandowithreadilyavailabletechnologylike3Dprinting?Theinstructionsformakingthesemi-automaticrifleinthisphotoareavailableonline.

(Slide10)

CyberThreatstoCriticalInfrastructure.Thinkabouthowtheinternetandsocialmediahavechangedtheabilitytorecruit,totrain,toradicalize,motivateandinspireourenemies.It'sjustunbelievablewhatthistechnologyisdoingtoempowerourgroupsintentondoingusharm.

Oneofthebigadvantagesofbeingastrongsuperpower-likestatewasthatyougottoprojectpower.Nowanyonesittinganywhereintheworldcanprojectpower…sonowtheabilitytoprojectpowerisnotonlythepurviewofstrongstatesandsuperpowers,it'skidswhoarejustloggingonandthey'reabletoattackusfromafar,withcyberthreats.(Slide11)

BacktoMacArthur.…whenhetoldtheWestPointCorpsofCadetsin1963thattheirmissionwastowinourhewastalkingaboutdefeatingstrongstateswhichwereourbiggestthreatsatthetime.Thinkaboutwhatthethreatsarenow.Internationalrelationstheorystatesthatsaid,strongstatesneedtobemost

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concernedbythreatsposedbyotherstrongstates,hasbeenturnedonitshead.Today,weakstates,sub-stateactors,evenindividualsarenowempoweredthroughincreasinglyavailabletechnologytodousharm.Addressingtheseemergingandlethalthreatsisnowalsorequiredto“winourwars”,-thisisdefinitelyadifferentkindofthreatenvironmentthatwe'rein.Sowhatdowedoaboutit?Howdowewinourwarsgoingforward?Ataminimumweneedtostackthedeckagaininourfavor.Weusedtobeback-to-backworldwarchamps,abletomobilizeourresourceseffectivelyandtakeittoourenemies.WellIwouldarguethatinmanywayswe'renotdoingwellintodayschangedthreatenvironment.Notonlydoweneedtostackthedeckinourfavor,insomecasesweareatadisadvantageandjustneedtoleveltheplayingfield.Ironicallywearen'tthereyet.We'vegottocontinuetodefendagainsthigh-intensitythreats.Thisisn'tjustawaragainstISISandterrorism,we'vegotaresurgentChina,pushingusintheSouthChinaSea.Wehavetobasicallydefendonbothfronts.ISISdoesn'thavefederalacquisitionregulations;inSteveBlank’sdefinitionISISisaLeanOrganization.Theyarepivoting,learningandadaptingandtheyrapidlyreacttoevolvingthreatenvironments.Thisisatoughadversary-anadaptiveenemy.Thisisathreatenvironmentwhereouradversarieshaveaccesstotechnologiesandthey'reabletoadapt,toovercome,andimproviseandpivotanddeploythattechnologyinwaysthatarewayaheadofus. I’mtryingtoemphasizethatthisisadifferenttypeofthreatenvironment,differenttypeofadversaries.Theformerlylinearrelationshipbetweenstatepowerandmilitaryeffectivenesshasforeverchanged.Statesdon’tautomaticallygeneratethepowerpredictedbytheirresources–choicesmatter.Someoftheadvantagesthatweenjoyedbackinthedaywhenwewere“back-to-backworldwarchamps”don'treallyapplytoday.Thestakesarehighandwe'relosinggroundonmanyfronts.Weneedtodosomethingaboutit.Youcanhelp.PeteNewellisgoingtogiveyouthebackgroundofhowwedevelopourrequirements,whereourmissionscomefromandthenourguestJackieSpaceisgoingtotalkaboutsomeofthechallengesandopportunityoftheacquisitionprocess.Slides12-29PeteNewell

Obviously,thingshavechangedovertheyears.Theenvironmenthaschanged,ourcountryhaschanged,theeconomyhaschanged.Eachofyourteamshasaproblemthatwasgeneratedbyagovernmentsponsorforareason.Therestofthediscussion

tonightispeelingbackthelayerstofigureoutwhatthatreasonis,wherethatproblemmighthavecomefromandwhoelsesharesthatproblem.

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TobeginthesearchyoumustunderstandhowourNationalStrategiesarebuiltandhowtheycometogethertodrivethismassiveorganizationcalledtheDepartmentofDefense.Whatwe'regoingtotryanddohereisfastaswepossiblycan,isgiveyouaoneovertheworldofhowstrategyandfundingeffecthowthingsarebought.(Slides13-15)

Onthisfirstslideisabig,complicatedchartthatwouldtakeme30yearstoexplaintoyou.Sowe'renotgoingtodothat.We'llcutitdownfrom2000slidestoabout15.Here'sthechart.Thisisthedefenseacquisitionsystem.Wayupthereintheupperlefthandcorner,iswherethe

requirementsformilitarysystemscomefromandwhatgetsthingsstarted.TomakeitsimpleifyoustartonthetopleftyouhavetheJointCapabilitiesandIntegrationDevelopmentSystem,(JCIDS).JCIDSishowwehandlethecollisionbetweentwomanyrequirementsandnotenoughmoney. We'regoingtosplitthistalk.I'mgoingtotakecareofthetanksandairplanesideofthisandthenwe'regoingtohanditofftoJackieSpaceandshe'sgoingtotalkthroughtheislandsofinnovationwherealotoftheserulesdon'tapply,orthey'vecondensedthemintomuchtighteracquisitioncycles.LookingattheredboxesatthetopofthechartI’vehighlightedthekeyactivitiesyouneedtounderstand,beginningwithhowrequirementsaredeveloped.Nextwedevelopprototypes.Thenwefigurehowwe'regoingtoproducesomething.Thenwefigureouthowwe'regoingtosustainit.That'skindofthelifecycleoftheacquisitionsystem.It'snotrealcomplicateduntilyoudigintowhodoeswhattowhoandhowandwhentheymakedecisions.Forthepurposesofthisclasswhatisintheredboxesattopoftheslidearethethingswe'vegottokeepinmind.(Slides16-17)

Here'swhatyou'vereallygottoremember,therearethreekeyactivitiesthattakeplace.Inthebottomleftcornerofthisslideistheplanning,programming,andbudgetexecutionwork-nodifferentthananymajorcorporationoutthere.Youhavetofigureoutwhatfundsarecominginandwhereyou'regoingtoprioritizeandsendthosefundsoutto.Thisislargelydrivenbyaprocess

ofstrategydocumentsthatwe'lltalkthroughinjustasecond.TotherightinyellowisJCIDS,thesystemusedtodeveloprequirements.Finally,inredatthetopoftheslideistheacquisitionprocessofhowwebuythingstofillthegapsthatwereidentifiedinoriginaldocuments.JackieSpace:Dothepeopleintheaudienceknowwhatwemeanbyrequirements?Basicallyrequirementsarewhatareusedtobuildasystem,it’sthetechnicalparametersbywhichthesystemisbeingbuilt.Sothereisawholeprocessofpeoplethatdevelopthe

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requirementsandthecostrequirements,thetechnicalrequirementsaroundwhatsystemisactuallybeingbuilt.JoeFelter:Forexample,defendingagainstdismountedIEDs(roadsidebombs)inAfghanistanversustheIEDthreatinIraq,whichwereagainstvehicles.ThelagtimethatittookforthemilitarytoaddressthedismountedIEDsthreatinAfghanistancausedthousandsofcasualties.Petemadethataverypoignantpointlastweek.PeteNewell: (Slide18)

Allrightsoherewego.Let'sstartwiththestrategydocuments.ThestrategydocumentthatstartsitallistheNationalSecurityStrategy(NSS).ThisisadocumentthatthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesproducesthatlaysoutAmerica'senduringinterests,notjustmilitarilybutalsoeconomically,andsocially.

TheNSSlistsfourthingsthatareconsideredtobeourenduringinterests.1. ThesecurityoftheUnitedStates,itscitizens,andUSalliesandpartners.2. AstronginnovativeandgrowingUSeconomy.3. Anopeninternationaleconomicsystemthatcanproduceopportunityfor

prosperity,respectforuniversalvaluesathomeandaroundtheworld,and4. AninternationalorderadvancedbyUSleadershipthatpromotespeace,security,

andopportunitythroughcooperationtomeetglobalchallenges.(Slide19)

TheSecretaryofDefenseusestheNSSasabasisforissuinghisstrategy.TheDepartmentofDefensecallsittheNationalDefenseStrategy(NDS).TheNDStakesthePresident’sNationalSecurityStrategy,looksatitfromadefenseperspective,andsaysherearethethingsthatweneeddothatmeetthosePresidentialobjectives.ThecurrentNDSincludesthingslikecounter-terrorism,irregularwarfare,

deferanddefeataggression,projectpower,counterweaponsofmassdestruction,provideastabilizingpresence,conductstability,andcounterinsurgentoperations,andhumanitariandisasterreliefandotheroperations. There'sabunchmoreintherebutbroadlyitdetailswhattheDepartmentofDefenseisgoingtodotomeetthePresident'sNationalSecurityStrategy.(Slide20)

Thencomesthequadrennialdefensereview(QDR).It’sdoneeveryfouryears.Younoticethedatesoftheseareoutofsync,becauseseveralyearsgoesbetweeneachoneofthem.Soonedocumentmaybeissuedin2015butwe'restilloperatingoffonefrom2012anotheronefrom2013andone

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more.Thequadrennialdefensereviewisreallythedocumentthatstartstotakethosestrategiesandlookatthemintermsofwhatcanwereallyafford.TheQDRdescribeswhatarewereallygoingtodoinordertomeetthePresident’sandtheSecretaryofDefense’srequirements.Thedocumenthassomeverybroadstatementslike,“Protectthehomeland”and“DeteranddefeatattacksontheUnitedStates,”“Buildsecuritygloballytopreserveregionalstability.”“Projectpowerandwindecisivelyanddefeataggression.”Butunderneaththere'sanicelinethatsays"AtthePresident'sbudgetlevelthemilitarywillbeabletodefendthehomeland,conductsustaineddistributedcounterterroristoperations,anddeteraggressionandassurealliedinmultipleregionsbeforepresenceandengagement."Youknowwhatitdoesn'tsayanymore?Thatwe'regoingtofightandwintwowarssimultaneously.Seriously.AtthePresident'sbudgetlevel,whichmeansthePresident'salreadytoldhimhere'swhatwe'regoingtopayforintermsofdefensethisyear,theydeterminethatthesearethebestthattheycandotomeetthekeyobjectivesthatweresetupbytheNationalDefenseStrategyinordertomeetthePresident'sNationalSecurityStrategy.Ithinkyou'restartingtoseethewherethegapsmightstarttoappear.AswechangeonewordinonelineintheQDRandsuddenlytheStrategydocumentsmeansomethingradicallydifferent.Arewebuyingtanksnow?Orarewedoingmorehumanitarianoperations?Moreaircraftcarriersormoreairplanes?Dependingonwhereyousitinthatbigsystemitcanveryrapidlychangebasedonhowyouperceivethebestanswertothoseproblems.Whatthethreedocumentsendupgivingus,andwhatfallsoutofit,iscalledtheDefensePlanningGuides.Itreallyishowwedevelopthebudgetsthatdrivetheorganizationofthemilitaryandeventuallytheactivitiesoftheseagencies.(Slide21)

IntheU.SwehavefourMilitaryServices:theArmy,Navy,AirForce,andMarines.(TheCoastGuardgetstoactlikethefifthservicebuttheyactuallybelongtoanothergovernmentagency.)Themilitaryservicesareresponsibleforprovidingpeopleandequipmenttocombatantcommanders.It'stheirjobto

raisethearmy,navy,airforceandmarines.It'stheirjobtotrainandequipthem.It’stheirjobtoprovidetrainedequippedreadyforcestocombatantcommanderswhoaretheguysoutherewhoactuallyfightthewars.InbetweentheMilitaryServiceswehaveanumberofDefenseAgencies.Theeasywaytoknowifyourtalkingaboutanagencyisthelastwordintheirnamesaysagency.It'sthingsliketheNationalGeospatialIntelligenceAgency,theNationalSecurityAgency.There'sonlyagencywhodoesn'thavethewordagencyistheirnameistheNationalReconnaissanceOffice.Forsomereasontheygottobedifferentthaneverybodyelse.

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TheagenciesoutthereallhaveconsolidatedportfoliosofactivitiesthattheydoatthebehestoftherestofthegovernmentforDOD,butthey'realsostrategicforceprovidersforthecombatantcommanders.I'llshowyouacoupleofslidesthatactuallymakesthisalittleeasiertounderstand.Finally,wehaveabunchofDODfieldactivities.It'sinterestingwhatshowsupasfieldactivities.Forexample,WashingtonHeadquartersServicesisresponsibleforthemilitaryinstallationsofWashingtonDC.AnotherexampleofafieldactivityistheDefensePOWmissionpersonneloffice.60someoddyearsaftertheendoftheKoreanwarwearestilllookingforpersonsmissinginactionorremainsthatwereneverrecovered.WestillhaveanactivitythatactuallygoestoVietnam,Laosandsomeotherplaceslookingfortheremainsofservicememberswhonevercamehome.Therearelotsofothersmallactivitiesthatdon'tneatlyfitanywherewithinsomeplaceonthatchartupthere.Student:InoticedthattheCentralIntelligenceAgencyisnotonthere.Why?PeteNewell:TheCentralIntelligenceAgencyisnotaDODactivityoragency.Although,I'lltalkabitlaterabouthowsomeoftheothergovernmentagenciesactuallyhaveinterestthatareembeddedinDOD.AsadeployedbrigadecommanderinIraqinsouthernIraqin2010IhadmembersoftheCIA,DIA,theNSA,theFBI,thesecretservice,allwhowerepartofmyorganizationorpartofmyfootprintthatIwasresponsibleforensuringthattheycoulddowhateverthegovernmentsentthemtheretoactuallygetdone.Student:Whenthere'sagroupthat'smadeupofDODpersonnelandsayCIApersonnel,howdoesthatworkintermsofcoordination?PeteNewell:Therearefirstaseriesofstandinginter-agencyagreementsthataccountforcross-agencyactivities.Thenthereareaseriesofcontingencyplansthatareareactiontosomething,thatautomaticallyenact.Oneexampleiswhathappenedon9/11.On9/11littleknowntoanybodytherewasa1960’sagreementthatallowstheUnitedStatesAirForcetotakecontrolofalloftheairspaceintheUnitedStates.About30minutesaftertheplanehitthesecondtower,therewasayoungwatchofficeratNORAD,whichisinColorado,whoreadsaone-linesentenceoverthephoneonelinesentence."WeatNORADareenacting..."andwhatyouheardonthephonewasdeadsilencewhilepeoplewerefocusedonfiguringoutwhathewastalkingabout.ThefirstguyonthephoneisaguyfromtheFAAwhosays"SoifIunderstandthisrightyouwantustoturnoffallthenavigationalaidsintheUnitedStates."Therewasapregnantpauseandthisguy'sflippingthroughthebook,andsays"NoIwantyoutodoX,Y,andZ."Insomecasestheseareagreementsandrulesgobackyears.Inthiscasetherewasastaffanddecisionmakerswhozeroedinonthatregulationwhounderstandswhat'ssupposedtohappen.

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Student:TowhatextentisthestructurehereembracedbypersonnelwithinDOD?Likehoweasywoulditworkthistime?PeteNewell:Whatyouhavetounderstandiseverytimeanagencygetstheirnameuphereonthischart,theyhaveabudgetthatcomeswithitfromCongress.IttakesalmostanactofCongresstochangeoneofthosethings.Ifyou'reaneworganizationandyouwanttobecomeanofficialagency,ittakesanactofCongresstogetyournameuphere.FromastructuralcontextthelastmajorchangethatwasmadewasbasedontheGoldwater-NicholsActthatmandatedtheformationofcombatcommandersandanumberofotherthings.Itchangesfromtimetotime,butnotfrequently.(Slides22-24)

AsImentioned,theservices–theArmy,Navy,AirForce,Marinesjobistoprovidepeopleandequipmenttothecombatantcommanderswhoareresponsiblefortheworld.Onthebottomofthischartarethecombatantcommands.The

AfricanCommand(AFRICOM)isacommandresponsiblefor53Africancountries.TheCentralCommand(CENTCOM)isresponsiblefortheMiddleEast,NorthAfricaandCentralAsia.TheyarealsoresponsibleforprosecutingonewarinIraq,oneinAfghanistan,andalsodealingwithpiratesoutsideofYemen.Thecombatantcommandersgetallthebadstuffthatgoesonintheworld.Tohelpdealwiththeworldtheygetpeople,equipment,assetsfromalloftheseServices,andfromallofthoseagenciesthatlistedonthepreviousslide.Basedontheirmissionstheyhaveaseriesofcontingencyplansthataredevelopedinresponsetothestrategies,thatsay,“ifthishappensweapportionthesekindsofforcestoyou.”Eachoneofthosethingsalsocomeswithabudget.Andthebudgetcomewithspecific“typesofmoney”called“titlesofmoney.”TitleXmoneybelongstotheservices.Forinstances,astheDirectoroftheArmy'sRapidEquippingForce,Ihada$200millionbudgetwhichwastitleXmoney.I'llgiveyouascenario.InAfghanistan,ifaMarineelementworkingaspartofanArmyorganizationcametousandsaid“heywe'rehavingaproblemandweneedtofindasolutionfor,”Icouldn'tdoit.Icouldn'tgiveittothembecauseIcouldn'tspendtitle10moneydirectedtotheArmybyCongresstoprovideequipmenttotheMarines.However,IcouldprovidethatequipmenttotheArmyelementthatcontrolledthem,whocouldthenassignitdowntothem.TherearetitlesofmoneydirectedatReservesandNationalGuardforcesstrictlyfortheiruseintheUnitedStates.Therearetitlesofmoneyforcombatantcommanders.Thereisadifferenttitleofmoneythat'sdirectedtothemfortheircontingencyoperationstodothingsandthenthere'sallkindsofcolorsofmoneyrelatedonwhatactivitiestheyplaceinthesayofthings.We’llcomebacktotalkaboutthe“colorsofmoney”inSlide27.

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Thekeytakeawayhereistheworld'sbrokenupintoregions,thatarerunbycombatantcommands.Andit’sthesecombatantcommandsstarttoidentifygapsbasedontheiroperations.Forexample,InCentralcommand,theArmyandDepartmentofDefensefeltthatgettingMRAPSintoIraqwouldsavesoldiersinHumveesfromgettingblownupbyIEDs.MRAPswerethebestthingsinceslicedbutter,buttheywereasbigasanelephant,armoredbutsavedlotsoflives.WemovedtoAfghanistanandMRAPStherewerelikedrivinginquicksand.VeryshortlyafterwardtheCENTCOMCommanderwastellingtheDepartmentofDefenseistheMRAPstheywereprovidinginAfghanistanwereinadequatetomeettheconditionsoftheenvironmentandthatcreatedagap.(Slide25)

Thatgapthen,leadsusbacktothatJCIDSprocessImentionedontheinitialslide.InJCIDsagapisassignedapriorityforsomebodythentogofigureouthowtosolveit.Thatsolutionthenturnsintoarequirement.ThesolutioninthiscasewasadifferentkindofarmoredvehiclewhichwereasmallerversionoftheMRAP.Theywerelighter,couldhandlethesandalittlebetter.

Herewego.Gaps,notrequirements,gaps.Thosetopthreethecompetitionwithwhattheseguyssaytheyhavetodoinordertoactuallyachievesomething.Soletstakeoneoftheteamsinclasshere,distributedISR.Isitagaporarequirement?Student:Itisagap,PeteNewell:Who'sgapisit?Student:Thegapislackofacapabilitytorapidly,tohaveeyesonmostofthedomainthe7thFleetissupposedtobekeepingtrackof,andsimultaneouslybeabletodeploysomethingquicklyto,iftheywantedtoseesomethingrapidly.PeteNewell:Correct.IfI'mresponsibleforhuntingRussiannuclearsubmarinesinthePacificandIcan'tfindthembecausetheocean'stoobig,it'sagap.IfIamresponsibleforsecuringthehighspeedaccesstothewesterncoastfromdrugandillegalpeopleimmigration,thosekindsofthings,that'sagap.Whichcombatantcommandisit?It’sPACOMwhere7thFleetisassignedasaNavycomponenttothecommand.We'llwalkthroughalittlebit,butyoucanseewherefrommultipleperspectivesthesamegapmayproducedifferentrequirements.Thegapisstillthecenter,wecan'tmanagetodoX,Y,orZ.(Slide26)

Obviouslythereisfrictionthere.I'lltellyouthishappensalot.Theseguysgetabudgetandtheyplanonafive-yearcycle.Istartedbuildingatankinyear1,we'recomingupwithasolution

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thatI'mstilldeployinginyear5.However,inYear2,thecombatantcommandercomesinandsayswhateveryouwerebuildingdoesn'tsolvemyproblemanymore.Theguyupatthetopsays,wellifyouwantmetostartoverit'sgoingtobeanotherfiveyearsbeforeIgetyoursolutiontoyou.Insomecasesthecombatantcommandswillusetheirmoneytoactuallyprocurematerialsolutionsthatfillimmediategaps.Whenthey'redonewiththematerial,orwhenitgetsreallyexpensivetomaintain,they'lllookattheservice,becausetheyhavealltheauthoritiestomaintainthatstuff,andsayhereyougoIneedthemaintenancepackagethatgoeswiththisstuff.There'sfrictionbetweenthetwooverhowtheysolvethosekindsofproblems.Whenithappensitcanbereallyugly.Student:8problemswerechosenfortheteamsinthisroomtoworkon.Wereanyofthemrequirements,orweretheyallgaps?PeteNewell:Noneofthemarefull-fledgedrequirements.Alotofpeoplemisusetheterminology.Ihavea“requirement”tofixthisproblem.Theonlywayyougetarequirementistocomeoutthebottomendofthismassivechartuphere.Weveryspecificallytoldoursponsorsnottogiveusrequirements.Yourgapcamefromthepartofthechartuphereunderjointoperatingconcepts.EventuallygapsturnintoJCIDSrecommendationsthatsaywe'regoingbuyatankthatrequiresthreepeoplethathastobetrainedandsustained,andalonglistofthingsthatgoeswithit.Eventuallythatcomesoutalistofrequirements.Onceitcomesoutasarealrequirementit'svery,veryhardtochangebecauseyouhavetogobackthroughtheentireprocess.Inourcase,forthisclassweveryspecificallyvettedsomeoftheproblemstoensurethattheyweremoreonthegapside,thattheyhadn'tdeterminedwhattherequirementwasgoingtobeanditwasn'twellwithinthatprocess.Alloftheproblemsforthisclassfallwithinrecognizedgapsthatareoutthere…Student:What'stheauthoritythatcertifiesthatarequirementhasbeenmet?Forinstance,ifIhavearequirementthat'soutthereandI'dliketobealittlebitflexiblewithit.Whocertifiesthatyestherequirementismetandthewaythatit'smet?PeteNewell:I'llgiveyouthebookanswerandthenI'lltellyouthepolitics.Atonetimetheysetastandardformeasuringbatteryusage:9peopleoperatingfor72hoursawayfromthebase.Thismakessense.72hoursmeanswecarryalotofweight,alotofwater,foodandalotofbatteries.AtthetimedependinguponwhatmissionwewereperforminginAfghanistanthosemyguyshadtodistribute247poundsofbatteriestooperatefor72hours.Thefirststandardthatissetisnotreallyastandardfortherequirements.itusedforthestandardforthemeasurementofperformingeffectivelyfor72hours.Sothefirstguysayswhyisit72hoursandnot120hours.Nuclearpowerguyswhohaveitintheirheadsthattheywanttodeploysmallnucleardevicestopowerthis.Youknowwhatthosenukedudes

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have?Theyhaveareallygoodpowerfullobbyist.Thatcausedadebatefor18monthsoverthecapabilitiesmanagerandtheotherguyswhosaid72hoursisstandard.Theyhadtogobackover10yearsworthofdocumentstoarticulatewhythestandardwas72not120or24,orsomethingelse.Becauseassoonasyouopenacanofwormseverybodycomesinandsayswellmysolutionwouldbeperfectifitwas24hours.Butifit's36thenI'museless.I'vegotalobbyist,I'mgoingtoattackthesystemtotryandgetthestandardchanged.Peopleplayalotofgameswhenitcomestowhodeterminestherequirement.WithintheArmy,theTrainingandDoctrineCommandisresponsibleforactuallytrainingpeopleanddetermininghowmanypiecesofequipmentweneedtoperformamissionisresponsibleforwritingtheinitialrequirementdocument.ThatdocumentthengoestothePentagonwhereitgoesthroughaseriesofboards.Theboardsthendecidethatyesisitavalidrequirementwrittencorrectly,theparametersfitwithinourpriorities,itdoesn'tviolatethelaw,etc.Ican'ttellyouhowmanyofthoseboardsthereare.Eventuallyitcomesouttheotherendandpoofwehavearequirement.Itdependsonwhatyou'retouchingandhowmanydifferentcomplexitiestherearetoit,butifyoulistencarefullyyou'llstarttohearvendorsandotherpeoplewhohavethingstosellstartingtotalkabouthowtheirthingdoesbetterthansomethingelse.They'llstartquotingnumbers.I'vedoneitwithsensors.I'mactuallyworkingonavehicleatonepointatGeorgiaTechResearchInstitutevalidatingthesensorsplacedinsidestrikervehiclestoprovidedataloggingagainstIEDblasts.Wewantedtoknowwhathappenedinsidethevehicle.Wecameupwithasetofparametersforthatsensor.Itwasapoundspersquareinchreadingthatithadtowithstand.LiterallyIhadavendorstartaCongressionalinvestigationoverwhyitwas10poundsandnot8pounds-becauseitmeanthisversusanothervendor’ssensor.Yourunintothosethingsallthetime.Whichiswhysometimessomebodyiswillingtosayexactlywhatitisbecauseassoonasyousaidit,andyoucan'tretractit.Iknowthat'salonganswerbutIjustwanttotellyouit'snotsimple.Student:foraprogramlikespace-basedradar,ledbyAirForce,dotheyconsidertheneedsofotheragenciesandtakerequirementsfromthosepeople?PeteNewell: Ifthey'resmarttheywill.They'llnotonlyconsiderwhatthoseotherpeopleneed,they'llconsiderwhatthosepeoplearealreadydoing.Ifyouwanttobesuccessfulyouavoidduplicatingsomethingelse.Student:Whowasthemainsponsorofthisclass?Iwasjustwonderingwhat'stheirexpectationfromtheoutcomeoftheclass.…PeteNewell:Doyoumean,“What'sthegapthatthisclassmeets?”It’stheLackofDOD/ICinnovation.Thereisalackofopportunityforyoungtechnologisttoperformanationalpublicservice.Thereisamassivegapbetweenthemilitaryandtheciviliansthatthey'rechargedwithprotecting.Ashrinkingmilitaryinaverycomplexworldwheretechnologyisblowingpastthematlightspeedwhohasnoaccesstotheintellectthatyouhaveona

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recurringbasis.Thoseareallgaps.Nobody'swrittenarequirement,althoughthey'retalkingallovertheplaceabouthowdoyoudealwiththoseissues.Forfolkslikeusthatrecognizethatthere'sagapourhopeisthatwecanstepinandprototypesomethingtohelpvalidatethatthegapisrealandthattheremaybeapotentialpathwaytosolvingit.Thisclassisexactlywhat'sgoingtohappen.We'llprototypeit.It'sapilot.It'sgoingtogrow.Somebodyinthegovernmentisgoingtodecidetoputawholelotofmoneyinit,youknow$20-$30millionayeartoensurethatitgrowsintoanother30collegesacrossthecountry.Somebodyelsefromanotheragencysaysthat'sreallycoolIwanttoconnectmyprogramtoit.Andeventuallywe'llbeatthesustainmentmode.…Student:WespokewithsomefolksfromabigsystemintegratorwhosaidsaidthatpartofthereasonwhythesensorsaresoexpensiveandhardtodeployisbecausewehavetosourceeverythingthroughtheUSfacilitiesandassembleinsecurefacilities,andsoonandsoforth.Ifoursolutiongoesdownthispipeline,atwhatpointmightwebeexpectforsomeonetosayheyweneedtosourceeverythingintheUS.JackieSpace:Youaretooearlyintheprocesstojudgewhereyouneedtosourceit.Becausetheyhavetogothroughthetraditionaldefenseindustrialbaseforthemostpartitstrue.ButIthinkthattherearecertainlysensorsorothertechnologiespotentiallythatarebeingbuiltontheoutside.Eventuallyatsomepoint,ifyou'regoingtocontinuedevelopmentonsomethingbigyouwillhavetoconsiderthat.Student:…Iguessyou'resayingincommercialsitestheirtoleranceforsensorerrorarealothigherbecausethey'renotusedtoapproachingitfromthe‘heywecanfixthisarea.’Theyneedtohaveamuchlowererror.…PeteNewell: Iwouldsaythere'safundamentaldifferencewhenyouapplythemwithpublicmindthathastobeaccountedfortothenthlevel.Myexperienceindealingwiththesefolks,andit'snotbecausethey'rebadpeoplebutthesystemcreatesbadbehaviors.Itdis-incentspeopletotakerisk.Notonlyaretheynotrewardedforacceptingriskandfailingbutthey'reactuallypunishedfornotbeingperfect.Sointhegoaloftryingtoperfectlyacquiresomethingwetendtofailbigger,morefrequentlythanwewouldotherwise.PartofthebeautyofwhatSteveBlankhasdonewithLeanLaunchPadisessentiallybuildaframeworkbywhich,withalittlebitoftranslating,we'vebeenabletoprovideastrategybywhichwecanfailinthissystemmuchearlierandmuchlessexpensively.Atleastthat'sourhypothesis.That'swherewe'reattoday.…JackieSpace:Thereareplacesinthegovernmentthatarealwaysgoingtoremainmilitarygrade.Thebillion-dollarsatellitethattheylaunchthatenablessomebodytoreadalicenseplate?That'sgoingtostayamilitarygradesystem,butthere'sthisawarenessnowinthemilitaryandgovernmentthatthere'salotofotherthingsouttherethataregoodenough,withamuchlowerresolutionthatyoucanfindtheprivateindustry.

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(Slide27)PeteNewell:Oneofthethingsthatyouhavetounderstandismoneyhasdifferentcolors.There'sdifferenttypesofmoneytosaywhatitwasusedfor.BelieveitornottheDepartmentofDefensecauseditselfthisproblem.Itdoesn'thavetobethisway.IfCongresswouldquitehonestlychangeitifDODsaid“wewanttochangeit.”Buthere'swhathappens.Operationsmoneyisessentiallyone-yearmoneythatisused

foreverythingfrombuyingtoiletpaperinabarrackstopayingforgasforvehiclesorforbuyingthingsthatcostlessthan$250,000peritem.Icanbuysomethingfor$200,000,evenifit'sapieceofequipment,usingoperationaldollars.Theproblemthatyourunintowithoperationalmoneythoughisonthe30thofSeptemberitgoesaway.Itdoesn'tgobackintothegovernment'sbank,itdoesn'tgobackintosomemagicbagtopulloutlater.Itisgone.Disappeared.IfyouareworkingonaproblemandaguysuddenlyshowsupinJulyandsaysI'vegotamilliondollarsIcanspendittoday,whatcanIget.Myguessishe'sprobablyusingendofyearmoneyandhe'sinapanicbecauseheknowsitdisappearsthe30thofSeptember.Hereiswhathappens.ThefolksinthePentagonwhomanageamassivebudgetsayonthe30thofAugustifyouhavemoneyleftinyouraccountsubordinatetouswe'retakingitallandwe'regoingtospenditonourun-forecastedrequirements.Sothenextlayerdown,theysay“ifyouhavemoneyleftinyourbudgetonthe30thofJulywe'retakingitallforouruse.Onitgoesuntilyouhavethepoorguy,whoonthe1stofApril,isinapanicbecausehehasn'tspenthismoneyyet.JackieSpace:Ifyoudon'tspendyourmoneyyougetyourbudgetslashedthenextyear.Theysayohyoudidn'tspendyourmoney.…anotherpointonthesecolorsofmoneyisthatifyouhaveaprojectthatyou'reworkingonyoushouldbeaskingbeneficiarieswhattypeofmoneyareyouworkingwith.Howyouendupputtingyourproposalandprojectstogethercanactuallyfitinallthreeofthosedependingonhowyouwriteit.Reallyhavinganunderstandingbeforehandofwhattypeofmoneyyou'reworkingwithisveryimportantPeteNewell:Herearethequestionsyoustarttoasksoyoucanfigureoutwheretheyare.First,procurementdollars.Iwilltellyouprocurementisnotmyexpertise.Iprobablyviolatedmorerulesthannot.Procurementprocesswasdesignedtobuymuchlargerthings.That'showwebuytanks.That'showwebuysustainment.Thelifecyclecostofputtingsomethingoutthere.Unfortunately,youcan'tuseprocurementdollarstobuytoiletpaperoranythinglikethat.Soit’sdesignedtobuymajoritems.Itdoeslastforthreeyears.Whichmeansthatwe'reinthemiddleof2016soattheendofSeptember2016,2014procurementmoneyisgoingtoexpire.Whyisthatimportanttoknow.Ifsomebody'stellingyou“heycomedothisforuswe'vegot$3million,”Youmightwanttoaskwhattheexpirationyearis.Becauseifsomething'sdraggingalongandyou're

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abouttohitthe30thofSeptember,andyoudon'tknowifthecontractisgoingtobesignedyet,ifit'sexpiringmoneyyou'renotgoinganyfurther.JackieSpace:ThesmartmoneymanagerwillhavehismoneyspentbyJuly1stjusttoavoidlosingitorhiscontracts.Alotofpeopledon't,soanothersmartmanagerknowshowtogoaroundgetmoneytouseintheirprogramfrompeoplethatcan'tgettheirmoneyspent.Oneofthequestionswhenyou'retalkingtoyourprogramsponsor,especiallyprogrammanagers,ishowdoyouhandleyourendofyearbudget.Youwanttoknowiftheyaregoodatplanningmoneyatendofyeartosupportyourprograms.PeteNewell: I'mgoingtohitthelastone,RDT&Emoney,research,development,testingandevaluationmoney.Withthismoneyyoucanbuildprototypes,youcantest,etc.MostofyouworkingonyoursolutionswouldlikelyfirsttouchRDT&Emoney.Therearespecialcasesofmoneystartingwithpurplemoneywhichmeanstheycandowhatevertheywantwithit.Insomeofthesecasesorganizationshavebeengivenspecialauthoritiestoallowthemtoessentiallybreakalltherules.Theproblemsometimesthoughiswhenyou'regivenspecialauthoritiesyoualsogetspecialoversight.ThoseorganizationsareprobablythemostscrutinizedorganizationsoutthereintermsofCongressionaloversight.Notthatthey'regoingtodosomethingwrongbutbecauseCongressmenwanttoknowthatthatmoney'sbeingspentwheretheythinkit'sbeingspent.TheSecretaryofDefensehasaRapidAcquisitionAuthority(RAA).WhenIwaswiththeRapidEquippingForce,theSecretaryofDefensecouldauthorizetheupto$200millionayearinRAAthatwouldallowustochangethewaymoneywasused.TousethatauthoritywewouldsimplywriteamemothatsayswearegoingtouseRDT&EmoneytobuygasorsomethinglikethatandstaffitthroughtheSecretary.Ifheapprovedtherequestwewereabletodowhatweneededto.Itwasn’teasybutitwasn’thardeither.ItwasfairlyquickbutitalsorequiredCongressionalnotificationbecauseweweredoingsomethingotherthanwhatCongressdirectedwiththemoney.Thefollowingtypeofmoneyisoneyouhavetopayattentionto.OverseasContingencyOperatingmoney.Thisisthethingtheyslapontopofthebudgeteveryyearbecausewekeephavingconflictssomeplacethatweren’tplannedforaspartofthebudget.WhatyouhavetoknowaboutOCOisthatifyou'reworkingonsomethingandsomebody'sofferingyouOCOmoneytodosomething,whatyou'redoinghastobefocusedonsolvingagapoverseas.Youcan'tuseOCOdollarseverywhere,becauserightnowIthinkOCOisstilllimitedtoCENTCOMwhichmeansthatwecan'tsolvethedistributedISRprobleminPACOMusingthesedollars-evenifthat'sallwehaveatourdisposal.Thelastthingyououghttopayattentionto,continualresolutions(CR’s).Forexample,ifwe'renotgoingtopassadefensebudgetinSeptemberbecauseCongresswantstoseewhathowtheelectionturnsoutfirst,wewilllikelyendupwithacontinuingresulutiontofundtheDoD.Whathappenswithacontinuingresolutionisthatthebudgetfolkswillsay“youarenotallowedtoprogramspendingmorethan65%oflastyear'sbudget.”Thatpoorguywho'ssupposedtospendallhismoneybyAprilorifit’salreadytakenaway,isnowtold

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you'vegottostretch65%ofyourbudgettolastallyear.WhenthebudgetsfinallypassedinJanuary,whathappens?Hesuddenlyhasthismassive(influx)ofcashandhe'sgothowlongtospendit?Twomonths.Whichmeanshehastofigureoutwhathe'sgoingtobuy,hehastocontractit,hehastodoeverythinginaveryshortperiodoftime.Student:Sotheyliterallycannotspend35%ofthatbudgetonanythingoverthisperiod?…PeteNewell:No,infacttheyhavetoturninabudgetthatdoesnotexceed65%ofthepreviousyear’sbudgetandshowhowthatwillcoverthemfortheentireyear.OncethereisaDefensebudgetpassed,theyhavetosubmitawholenewbudget.Thismeansthey'realwaysplayingwithtwobudgets.Thisissometimeswhatcausesexpensiveprogramstotripleinexpense.Failureofpoliticianstodotheirjobisoneofthebiggestexpenseswehave.(Slide28)

Let’sgobacktothemissionmodelcanvas;Valuepropositions,buyin,advocates…accordingtowho?Therearealotofpeopleoutherewhowilltellyoutheyfallinallthreeofthesecategories.Onthisslideisalistoffolksyoushouldlookfor.OnitI'vealsoleftyousomequestionsyououghttobeaskingwhoeveryouaretalkingto.Thefirstoneis:

• whoareyou?• Wheredoyoufallinhere?Beneficiary,advocate,areyouboth?• Areyoufromaservice?AreyoufromaCOCOM?• Wheredoyoufitinthismassivelistofthings?• What'syourmission?• Whatareyousupposedtodo?Whatareyounotsupposedtodoandnotallowed?

Makesureyou'vegotthatclearinyourhead,whataretheysupposedtodo,whataretheynotsupposedtodo.Where'dyourfundingcomefrom?Whatkindsdoyouhave?Whatareyoutalkingtomeabout?Iwouldaskabouttypesofcontractsifit'sappropriate.Finally,whodoyouworkwith?Thenfinally,whoelsedoyouknowthathasthisproblemthatmightbeworkingthisarea?ThiswhatIcallanassetinventory.Everybodyyoumeetexistsinanecosystem.You'retryingtofigureoutwheretheybelongandhowtheyconnect.Hereare8questionsyoucanaskthatwillhelpyouclarifywheretheyare.Theanswerstothosequestions,orthewaytheyanswerthemwillallowyoutofigureoutwheretheybelonginyourecosystemofthingsthatyoumightneedeventually.

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(Slide29)UsingoneofourteamsworkingonDistributedISRasanexample,thesponsoristhe7thFleet.The7thFleetispartoftheUSNavy,however7thFleetisassignedtoPACOMastheNavycomponentofthePacificcommand.Sowhohastheproblem?IsittheNavy'sproblemorisitPACOMsproblem?Orisitboth?Mighttheyhavedifferenceof

opiniononhowtosolvethatproblembasedonhowexpensiveitistotrainpeopleandhowmanypeopleitcosts.Doyouseewherethefrictionmightcomefrom?Youcanbegivenconflictingguidancewhenyou'retalkingtopeople,onesideversustheotherside.AlltheseagencieswhoprovideassetstoPACOM,probablyhavesomeamountofequityinthatproblem.Byequitywemeantheyhaveauthorityandtheyhavebudgetstotakeactionagainstpartsoftheproblem.TheymayalsohavefivedifferentopinionsonthescopeoftheproblemthataredifferentthanthatofPACOMor7thFleet.Now,theCIA,theCoastGuard,otherfolks.Don’tyouthinkthattheymighthaveavestedinterestinhowthisissolved?Aretheyauser?Aretheyacapabilityprovider?Aretheyanadvocate?Aretheytryingtokilltheeffort?Otherservices.IftheNavycomponentofPACOMsaysthisisaproblemrestassuredthere'sanArmycomponent,there'saMarinecomponent,there'sanAirForcecomponentwhoallthinkitisaswell,butfordifferentreasons.Doyouthinktheymighthaveavestedinterestinthis?Finally,SOCOMisacombatantcommand,butSOCOMalsoprovidesfolkstoPACOM.SoSOCOMhasavestedinterestinthisright?Slide28iswhatyou'vegottopayalotofattentionto.Money,contract,strategyandallthatotherstuff,it'sinterestingbutnotnecessarilygoingtohelpyouforthenext8weeks.Slide28will.Slides30-36JackieSpace:

SoPetejusttalkedabouttheacquisitionsystematlargeandIwanttojustdrilldownreallyquicklyintothemorepracticalaspectsofwhatitmeansforyourteamsandtheprogramsponsorsthatyou'reworkingwith,theproblemstatements,andhowitfitsintothis.Alsoforyou'rebeneficiariesandhowyoushouldbetalkingtothemasyou'reworkingthroughtheirproblems.

(Slide31)Quicklyaboutme,I'masystemsengineerbytrade,IwenttotheAirForceAcademy.Ispentthemajorityofmycareerdoinggovernmentacquisitions.I'veworkedverylargeprogramslikeGPSandI'vealsoworkedverysmallprogramsintermsofgettingthingsrapidlyfieldedintothefieldfromatechnologyperspective.

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(Slide32)Thepurposeofthisslideistotoconveytoyouthateventhoughyou'reallworkingwithdifferentgovernmentorganizationsandtheyallfallunderthisbigsystemofacquisitions.Everyorganizationisquitedifferentincultureandsowhenyou'reworkingwiththemyouneedtofigureout,1)dotheymove

rapidlyinhowtheydobusiness,2)howtheydeveloptechnology,3)howtheyfieldthem.Aretheyfocusedonlargerweaponssystemsandisit'sgoingtobetenyearsbeforetheyactualdevelopandfieldcapability.WhenIsayrapidImeanlikelessthan2years,versus10-yeartimelines.Partofyourworkistofigureoutwheredoesyourorganizationprogramsponsorresideinthattimeframe.(Slide33-34)

Thewholeacquisitionprocessisdesignedtodevelopbigprograms-liketheF35,ballisticmissiledefense,helicopters,-thatsortofthing.Allofthisexiststobeabletofieldbigweaponsprograms.Alotofthefrictionendsupwhenwehaverequirementsorwhenwehaveneedsthatemergethatdon'tfitintothetimeline.

Onslide33we'vegottheDARPA’sandtheAirForceResearchLabandtheotherlabsthatexistinthegovernmentthataredevelopingtechnologythatwillprobablynevereverleavethelab.Orinsomecasesitwilltake10yearsbeforeitactuallydoesanything.OnthisslideIputsomeoftheorganizationthattheteamsintheclassareworkingwithtoshowwheretheyfitintechnologymaturityandhowthey'redifferentfrombothendsofit.Ifyoulookattwoofthesponsorsinthisclass,theAsymmetricWarfareGroupandtheJointImprovisedThreatDefeatAgency,theyoperatedifferently.They'renotconcernedaboutweaponsystemsordevelopingthingsinsupportofthoseweaponsystems.Theseguysareonarapidtimelineandtheywanttofieldcapabilitiestouserrequirementsinlessthan2years.Alloftheproblemstatementsforteamsinthisclassfitwithinthiscategory.Thisiswheretheopportunitiesresidetoactuallymakeanimpactbecauseyouhaveashortertimelinetofieldinganddelivery.ThenyouhaveotherorganizationslikeSOCOM,NSA,CIA,andtheservicecomponentsthatplayinallpartsofthetimeline.Evenwiththeteamthat'sworkingwithSOCOMIwouldbetthattheyaremoreonthis2-yeartimelineforfieldingasolution.Butthat'ssomethingthatyoushouldbeaskingyourprogramsponsorswhenyou'reworkingwiththem,“Whatisyourtraditionaltimelineforfieldingtechnologies?”(Slide35)

Forentitiesoutsideofthetraditionaldefenseindustrialbasetoengage(ie.Startups),it'sreallyintheR&Dareaaswellasprototypedevelopment.Onecaution,whenyoutalkaboutgovernmentR&D,ifyoubringacapabilityyouwantthe

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governmenttogiveyoumoneytohelpdevelop,youwilleventuallyhavetodealwithIPissues.Becauseanytimethegovernmentgivesyoumoneytodevelopsomething,theynowownit.Inothercaseswhereyouhaveacapabilitythat'smoredevelopedthatyoubringthattothegovernmentanddemoit,that'swhenyoucanactuallymaintainthemajorityofyourIP.(Slide36)

Iwanttotalkmoreaboutthequestionsthatyoushouldbetalkingtoyourbeneficiariesabout.…Mostofyouhavetalkedtothepotentialusersofyoursystemandyou'regettingfeedbackfromthem,whichisreallyvaluable.However,youneedtofindtheprogrammanagersand/orthepeoplethatareactuallyexecutingaprogramthatis

eithersimilarorhaspartsoftheproblemthatyou'redealingwith.That’sbecausetheprogrammanagerunderstandsthetimelineittakestofieldsomething,ie.Whatareallthethingsthattheyhavetogothroughtoactuallybringonacapabilitylikethat?Howdotheyengagewithindustry?Howdotheyactuallyparticipatewithpeopleoutsideoftheirprogram?Findingthatindividualorsetofindividualsisreallyimportantwillbereallyimportantforthisclass.Intermsoftheculture,Ithinkit'sincrediblyimportanttoasyou'retalkingtoyoursponsorstoaskthequestionsaboutthetrackrecordoftheirorganizationinactuallygettingsomethinglikeyoursolutionfielded?Howlongdidittake?Howmanytimeshavetheyactuallyattemptedthisparticulartechnologyset?Doyouknowwhothemissionpartnersaroundyouthatmaybeabletocontributetothat?TogetmoreinformationgotoFedBizOpps.gov.FedBizOpps.govisthemainmechanismbywhichthegovernmentwillpostorsolicitforindustryfeedback.They'llposttheirproblemssaying,wewantaproposalorwewantsomeinformationaroundthisactualtechnologythatwe'relookingat.IfyougotoFedBizOpps.govandyoutypeinakeywordaroundyourparticularproblem,whatcomesupwillbereallyinterestingbecauseyoumightfindthatthere'sfiveorsixotherorganizationsthatareactuallysolicitingforthesametechnology.Thanks,JoeFelter,PeteNewell,JackieSpace