Introduction Searching for Foundations

19
 Introduction: Searching for Foundations Page 1 of 18 PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy ). Subs cri be r: Po ntificia Un iversidad Cato li ca del Pe ru (PUCP); dat e: 30 Apri l 20 15 University Press Scholarship Online Oxford Scholarship Online Ph ilosophical Foundations of Criminal Law R.A. Duff and Stuart Green Pr i nt pu bli cati on d ate: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780199559152 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011 DOI : 10.1093/a cprof:oso/97 80199559152.001.0001 Introduction: Searching for Foundations RA Duff (Contributor Webpage) Stuart P Green (Contributor Webpage) DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0001 Abstract and Keywords This introductory chapter sets out the purpose of the book, which is to reveal and to explore some of the foundational questions that the institutions of criminal law raise: to work down through some of the salient doctrinal and normative debates in contemporary criminal law theory, to reveal the deeper and broader philosophical questions and problems that they reveal, and to suggest fruitful ways in which those questions and pro blems can b e approached . T he b ook is ‘foundationa l ’ in relati on to the ques ti ons that it raises and clarifies, to the approaches to those questions that its contributors explore and develop, and to the further debates and inquiries that it hopes to provoke among criminal l aw th eor i sts. An over view of the sub seque nt cha pters i s al so pr esented. Keywords: criminal law, legal theory , foundations, debates The title of this volume,  Philosophic al Found ations of Criminal Law, might seem to beg at

description

Los fundamentos del Derecho Penal

Transcript of Introduction Searching for Foundations

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    UniversityPressScholarshipOnlineOxfordScholarshipOnline

    PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

    Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

    Introduction:SearchingforFoundationsRADuff(ContributorWebpage)StuartPGreen(ContributorWebpage)

    DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0001

    AbstractandKeywords

    Thisintroductorychaptersetsoutthepurposeofthebook,whichistorevealandtoexploresomeofthefoundationalquestionsthattheinstitutionsofcriminallawraise:toworkdownthroughsomeofthesalientdoctrinalandnormativedebatesincontemporarycriminallawtheory,torevealthedeeperandbroaderphilosophicalquestionsandproblemsthattheyreveal,andtosuggestfruitfulwaysinwhichthosequestionsandproblemscanbeapproached.Thebookisfoundationalinrelationtothequestionsthatitraisesandclarifies,totheapproachestothosequestionsthatitscontributorsexploreanddevelop,andtothefurtherdebatesandinquiriesthatithopestoprovokeamongcriminallawtheorists.Anoverviewofthesubsequentchaptersisalsopresented.

    Keywords:criminallaw,legaltheory,foundations,debates

    Thetitleofthisvolume,PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLaw,mightseemtobegat

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    leasttwoimportantquestions.First,doesthecriminallawhavefoundations?Second,ifitdoes,isittheresponsibilityofphilosophytoconstruct,ortoexcavate,thosefoundations?

    Talkoffoundationsimpliesthatthecriminallawhasanordered,stablestructure,whosebasicorfoundationalelementscanbediscovered;tocallthosefoundationsphilosophicalisalsotoimplythattheyareamatterofreason.But,criticswillargue,thecriminallaw(indeed,lawgenerally)isnotlikethat.Itiscertainlynotamatterofreason,ifthatistakentomeanthatitisgroundedincoherentprinciplesorthatitdisplaysarationalstructureofconsistentrulesordoctrines.Norcanitclaimthesecurityorstabilitythatfoundationsaresupposedtoprovide,sinceitisgroundedinanddeterminedbynothingmorestablethantheshiftingsandsofhistoricalcontingenciesofpolitical,social,andeconomicforces.Whatanunderstandingofthestructures,thedevelopment,andthebasesofcriminallawthereforerequiresisnot(justorprimarily)themetaphysicalexplorations,conceptualanalyses,orrationalreconstructionsthatmaybeofferedbydifferenttypesofphilosopher,butthemoreempiricalandinterpretiveskillsofthehistorianandthesociologist.Theyhavemorechanceofexplainingcriminallawwhatitmeans,howandtowhatendsorwith(p.2) whateffectsitfunctionsbyexplaininghowithasdeveloped,andbyidentifyingthehistoricalandsocialfactorsthathavemadeitwhatitis,andthathavecreatedtheconflictsthatitembodies.Tounderstandthecriminallaw,ortoidentifywhateverfoundationsitmighthave,wemustattendtoitshistoryandtoitssocialandpoliticalcontext,nottotherational(re)constructionsofphilosophers.1

    Suchcriticsmightfindsymbolicsupportintheexplanationofthisvolume'stitle,sinceitwasindeedamatterofhistoricalcontingencyratherthanofrationalorprincipledreflection.OxfordUniversityPressaskedtheeditorsiftheywouldliketoorganizeavolumetofollowinthestepsofPhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLaw,2andthatgaveusourtitle:nodeeperorphilosophicallymoreambitiousmeaningistobefound.Tounderstandourchoice(ifitwasachoice)oftitlethereadermustthereforelooknottophilosophicaltheory,nortoaconceptionofcriminallawashavingphilosophicalfoundations,buttothecontingenciesofpublishinghistoryandtothemarketingconcernsthathelptodrivethathistory.So,too,criticswillargue,anunderstandingofcriminallawrequiresattentionnot(justorprimarily)totheabstractionsofphilosophicalinquiry,buttothemessycontingenciesofitshistorymoreprecisely,ofthehistoriesoftheverydifferentsystemsofcriminallawtobefoundinourcontemporaryworld.

    Wewillresistthiscriticism.Thisisnotbecausewethinkthatphilosophicalinquiryisthekeytounderstandingcriminallaw,orthatphilosophicalinquirycanisolateitselffromotherdisciplinessuchashistoryandsociology.Thereisindeednosuchthingasthekey,inpartbecausethereisnounitarygoalofunderstandingcriminallaw.Differentunderstandingsaregainedthroughdifferentdisciplinaryperspectives,andalthoughtheycannotbeisolatedfromeachother,eachhasitsowndistinctivecharacter;theoristsshouldaspire,nottodevelopsomeall-embracingtheorythatcouldcountasthetheoryofcriminallaw,butrathertoexplorethetheoreticalinsightsthatemergefromdifferentdisciplinary(andcross-disciplinary)inquiries,andtheextentandcharacteroftheconnectionsbetweenthem.

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    What,then,shouldemergefromaphilosophicalapproachtocriminallaw?Whatkindofunderstandingshoulditoffer?Whatkindsoffoundationshouldconcernit?Suchquestionscouldbeadequatelyansweredonlythroughathoroughdiscussionofthewiderangeofverydifferentapproachesandmethodsthatmightcountas(p.3)philosophicaladiscussiononwhichwewillnotembarkhere.Afurthercloselyrelatedquestioniswhetherphilosophersshouldseektodevelopatheoryofcriminallawand,ifso,whatkindoftheorythatshouldbe,andwhatitshouldbeatheoryof.Asfarasthatquestionisconcerned,wecanusefullystartwiththetraditionaldistinctionbetweenanalytical,orexpository,andnormative,orcensorial,jurisprudencebetweenafocusonwhatcriminallawis,andafocusonwhatitoughttobe.3

    Expositoryjurisprudence,ifitistoclaimtobephilosophical,cannotofcoursebesimplyamatterofdescribingthecontentandtheoperationsofexistinglegalsystems:itmustdelvebeneaththesurface,toarticulatethestructuresthatinformthatcontentandunderpinthoseoperations.Somewouldtalknowofanenterpriseofconceptualanalysisthatexplicatesthemeaningsoflegalconcepts(conceptsthatcanofcoursebeunderstoodonlyinthecontextsinwhichtheyareused);somewouldtalkofarelatedenterpriseofdiscerningthelogic,orthelogicalstructure,ofthecriminallaw;others,withlargermetaphysicalambitions,wouldtalkofdiscerningtherealnatureofcriminallaw.4Censorialjurisprudence,bycontrast,isfocusednotonthestructureorcontentofexistingsystemsoflaw,buttheaims,values,andprinciplesthatshouldstructureasystemofcriminallaw(onekeyquestionforanysuchtheoristwillofcourseconcernthegroundsforsuchnormativeclaims,andtheirrelationshiptotheanalyticalorexpository).

    Itiseasyenoughtostatethisdistinctionbetweenanalyticalandnormativejurisprudence,butweshouldnotsupposethatitcanbesharplydrawn,fortworeasons.

    First,ananalyticalapproachcannotavoidnormativeengagement.Thisisnotjustbecausewhatwearetryingtoanalyseisitselfanormativeinstitutiononethatcentrallyinvolvestheauthoritativecreationandapplicationofnormativejudgments;itisbecauseanythingmoreambitiousthananunstructured,piecemealdescriptionofthatinstitution(andphilosophicalanalysismustbemoreambitiousthanthat)willinevitablyinvolveanattemptatmoreorlessradicalrationalreconstructionanattemptwhosefailurewouldbejustasinstructiveasitssuccess,sinceitwouldshowtheinstitutiontolackanyrationalstructure.Ascriticaltheoristsrightlyremindus,ourcriminallawisnotthecarefullycraftedproductofadivinelyinspiredcreativemoment,butthemessyoutcomeofthevariegated,shiftingforcesthatdetermineditshistoricaldevelopment.Thechallengeistomakesenseofthissetofpracticesa(p.4) sensethatmustbeanormativesense,giventheirnormativecharacter:todiscernanormativestructurethatexpressescoherentprinciplesandvalues,andthatisadaptedtothepursuitofidentifiableends.Thisisnottosaythatarationalreconstructionmustproduceanormativestructurethatisfreeofallconflict:oncewerecognizetherealityofconflicting,incommensurablevalues,wemustrecognizethatconflictsorcontradictions,eventhosebetweenwhichonlyuneasycompromizeratherthandefinitiveresolutionispossible,neednotmarkarationaldeficiencyinthesysteminwhichtheyarefound;theymightinsteadmarkthewayin

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    whichthesystemissensitivetothepluralityofvalues.5

    Thetaskofrationalreconstruction,assofardescribed,isnot(yet)fullyHerculean,sinceitdoesnotinvolvetheconstructionofapoliticaltheory:6butitisproto-Herculean,sinceitscompletionrequiresthereconstructionofacompletesystemofcriminallaw.Inevitably,suchreconstructionwillrequireconstructionratherthanmereexcavation,blurringthealwayslessthansharpdistinctionbetweendiscoveryandcreation.Itwillalsorequiresomesubstantialtheoryofmistakes:notonlywillparticularjudicialdecisionsturnouttobeinconsistentwiththedoctrines,principles,andrulesthatrationalreconstructionshowstobeatleastimplicitinthesystemoflaw;thesamewillbetrueofstatutes,ofdoctrines,andofprinciplesorslogansthatmanymightseeasentrenchedfeaturesofourlaw.

    However,thetaskofrationalreconstructionmustbecomemorefullyHerculeanthanthis,sinceitcannotattendonlytowhatisstrictlyinternaltothelaw.7Analysisorreconstructionthatattendsonlytowhatthelawitself(insofaraswecanevenseparatethelawitselffromwhatliesbeyondthelaw)offerscanrevealconflictsorinconsistenciesbetweenthisaspectofthelawandthat,andmightsometimesalsobeabletoshowthatoneofthoseaspectsmustbeclassedasamistake,sincetheaspectwithwhichitisinconsistentliesclosertothecentreofthelaw'sstructure;8butboththeinterpretationofthedoctrinesorprinciplesinvolved,andthedeterminationofwhatshouldcountasamistake,willoftenneedtolookbeyondwhatisstrictlyinternaltothelaw,tosomesetofmoralorpoliticalvaluesthatwecansupposethelawtobeintendedtoembody.Whatcountsasmakingnormativesenseatallmustdependinpartonsuchunderlyingvalues,andanyattempttodecidewhichreconstructionmakesbetternormativesensemustappealtosuchvalues.Thereconstructivetheoristcantrystilltoremaindetachedtoidentifythepoliticalandmoralvaluesthatmakebestsenseofaparticularlegalsystemwithouteitherendorsingorcriticizing(p.5) thosevalues(thoughtherearequestionstobeaskedabouthowfarsuchadetachedviewwillbeabletojudgewhatmakesbestsense);butwhatisbeingreconstructedisnowanaccountofwhatthelawoughttobeevenifitisanaccountofwhatthelawoughttobefromaparticularnormativeperspective.9

    Second,anapproachthatisavowedlynormativefromthestartmuststillengagewiththeanalyticalordescriptive,sinceanormativetheoryofcriminallawmustbeatheoryofwhatcanberecognizedascriminallaw,asaparticularkindofhumanpractice.Normativetheoristsmightargue(anynormativelyplausibletheorywillhavetoargue)thatourcriminallawmustbemoreorlessradicallyreformedifitistoclaimlegitimacy;somemightarguethatitcannotachievelegitimacy,andmustthereforebeabolished:10butsuchargumentsmustbegroundedinanunderstandingofwhatitisthatistobereformedorabolished,andofwhatwouldcountasaradicalreformasdistinctfromabolition.Thatmuchistrueevenfortheoristswhoaspiretoauniversalistnormativitythatwouldgenerateanaccountofthebasicprinciplesoraimsofcriminallawassuch,wheneverandwhereveritexists,sincethatwouldstillneedtobeanaccountofwhatcanberecognizedascriminallaw:auniversalistnormativeaccountofwhatcriminallawought

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    tobeneedsacorrespondinglyuniversalistanalyticordescriptiveaccountofwhatcriminallawis.Anengagementwiththeanalyticalanddescriptiveis,however,evenmoreimportantfortheoristswhoeschewsuchuniversalistambitions.11

    Onequestionthatarises,whenwelookbeyondourownlocalsystemsandrecognizetheverydiverseformsthatcriminallawcantake,iswhetherweshouldaspiretoananalyticalordescriptiveuniversalismonemoresubstantialthanBenthamthoughtpossible.12Theremustofcoursebesomesubstantivefeaturesofapracticethatwarrantdescribingitasasystemofcriminallaw:as,thatis,bothasystemoflaw,andasystemofcriminallawinparticular,asdistinctfromotherkindsoflegalregulation.Butshouldwehopetospecifythenecessaryordefiningfeaturesthatanypracticemustdisplayifitistocountasasystemofcriminallaw;orshouldwerathersaythatwhatconnectsthemanyverydifferentinstancesofcriminallawisamatteroffamilyresemblanceratherthanofcommondefiningfeatures?Isit,forinstance,anessentialfeatureofanythingthatistobeclassedasacriminallawthatwhatiscriminalizedisportrayedasmorallywrong;orthatitprovidesforthepunishment(p.6) ofthosewhocommitwhatitcriminalizes?13Orcouldwefind,orimagine,practiceswhichweshouldcountascriminallaw,butwhichlackthosefeatures?

    Butevenifamodestlysubstantiveanalyticalordescriptiveuniversalismisplausible,thisdoesnotguarantee,andneednotleadusto,anormativeuniversalism.Moreprecisely,itneednotleadustowardsthekindoftop-downuniversalismwhichgroundsitselfinasetofaprioriprinciplesrevealedbyapracticalreasonoperatingindependentlyofanyparticular,contingenthumanpracticesorcultures:towardsauniversalismthataspirestodeclare,fromsuchaviewfromnowhereinparticular,whatcriminallawoughttobeortodowhereverandwheneveritoperates.Toeschewthatkindofuniversalistambitionistoinsistthatnormativetheorizingcannotbeindependentofthehistorical(andgeographical)contingenciesofthepracticestowhichitistoapply.Thepointisnotjustthatwemustrecognizethehistoricallycontingentcharacterofthosepractices(noonewoulddenythat):itisthatnormativetheorizingisitselfinextricablyrootedinitshistoricalandculturalcontext.Anynormativetheorizingmustbeginfromwherewe,thetheorizers,are,withinourparticularcontext;norcanwesensiblyaspiretobreakfreefromallsuchcontexts,totakeaGod'seyevieworaviewfromnowhere,andarticulateauniversalnormativetheoryofwhatthecriminallaw,assuch,oughttobe.14Butitdoesnotfollowthatwecannotaspiretorationalnormativetheorizingabout,ortoarationalcritiqueof,criminallaw;nordoesitfollowthatsuchcritiqueandtheorizingmustbelimitedtotheverylocalsettingofaparticularlegalsystem.Tosupposetheformerwouldbetoshowoneselftobeadisappointedmetaphysicalabsolutistforwhomreasoncouldberealonlyifitwasapriori;15tosupposethelatterwouldbetoignorethepossibility(onethatamoment'sreflectionshowstobeoftenactualized)thatdifferenttraditionsandformsofthoughtmightbesufficientlycloselyconnectedtopermitrationalmutualdiscussionandargument.

    Todenythepossibilityofapriorinormativetheorizingistoinsistthatsuchtheorizingispossibleandintelligibleonlywithinsomehumanpractice.Thatpractice,thatformoflife,

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    providestheweofandtowhomwetalkwhenwetalkofwhatweshouldbelieveorsayordothewewithwhomtheorizingconstitutesaconversation;itprovidesthelanguageinwhichsuchconversationscantakeplace.Thatwe,however,expandsaswecometorealizetheporouscharacteroftheboundariesbetweendifferentpracticesorformsoflife,andthepossibilitiesofdiscussionanddialoguebetweenthem.Whenlegaltheoristsaskwhatthecriminallawoughttobe,theycannotbutbeaskingandarguingaboutourcriminallaw:butthetemporalandculturalscopeofthatourisopenforexplorationandextension,including(p.7) expansionthroughotherlegaltraditions.Furthermore,atheoreticalnormativeengagementwiththecriminallawmust,aswehavealreadynoted,includeengagementwiththemoralandpoliticalvaluesthatitmustclaimtoembody:thisopensupfurtherpossibilitiesforrationalnormativetheorizing,inthefamiliarrealmsofmoralandpoliticalphilosophy.Ifwetakethiskindofbottom-upapproach,whichbeginsfromwhere(arelativelylimited)wearenow,weneednotabandonalluniversalistambitions:wecouldstillaspiretoworktowardssomesetofaimsorvaluesthat,wecanclaim,shouldinformanysystemofcriminallaw.But,first,suchanapproachrequiresacloseattentiontotheanalyticalordescriptivedimensionoftheorizing,sinceitmustbegroundedinadetailedunderstandingofthecharacters(andcontexts)ofthesystemsofcriminallawwithwhichwearedealing.Second,wemustnotassumeinadvancethatsuchuniversalistaspirationswillbefulfilledorfulfillable:wemightdiscoverthatthedifferences,notjustbetweenthesystemsofcriminallawbutbetweenthepoliticalandsocialstructuresinwhichtheyareembedded,runtoodeepforustobeabletosustainanyclaimsaboutwhatcriminallawshouldbeordoatalltimesinallplaces.Perhapsthemostthatwecanhopetoachieve,throughnormativephilosophicaltheorizing,istoarticulateaseriesofconceptionsofcriminallaw(asdistinctfromtheconceptofcriminallaw);16toidentifythewaysinwhichtheyconflict(aswellasthewaysinwhichtheyagree,astheymustagreeiftheyaretocountascompetingconceptionsofcriminallaw);toarticulatethepoliticalandmoralvaluesonwhichtheydepend,andsolocatethemwithinthedebatesanddisagreementsthatsurroundsuchvalues;andaskourselveswhatisintheendnolongeraphilosophicalquestionwhetherwecanmakeanyoftheseconceptionsourown.Thatisnottosaythatanythinggoes:somesuggestedconceptionsmightberejectedasnotconceptionsofcriminallawatall;othersmightberejectedasbeyondtheboundsofreasonableboundsthatarethemselves,ofcourse,alwayscontroversial.Itistosuggest,however,thatphilosophersneedtobemodestintheirclaimsaboutwhatphilosophicaltheorizingcanachieve.

    Thisleadsustoafurtherquestionaboutnormativecriminallawtheorizing(asaboutanyotherkindofnormativetheorizing):whatkindoftheoryshoulditaspiretoproduce?Shouldit,inparticular,aspiretoarticulateatidilyconsistentsetofgoals,values,andprinciples,evenifthatsetislocalratherthanuniversal,bywhichwecansaythatthe,oratleastour,criminallawshouldbestructured?Orshouldweinsteadrecognizethatcriminallaw(likeotherhumanpractices)cannotbetheorizedinthatwaythatwemusteitheradoptadifferentconceptionoftheory,orabandonanyambitiontotheorizecriminallaw?Whatisatissuehereisnotthecriticaltheoristschargethatthecriminallawisasitenotofreasonandprinciple,butofunreasonandcontradiction:itis,rather,amatterofwhatwouldcountasrationalizingthecriminallawasshowingifnotthatitis,

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    thenatleasthowitcouldbe,arationalpractice(p.8) thatisappropriatelystructuredbyprinciplesandvalues.17Wecanclarifythisquestionbynotingthetwospectraalongwhichtheoreticalaccountsofcriminallawcanbedistinguished:onerunsfromcomplexitytosimplicity,theotherfromneatnesstomessiness.

    Complexityandsimplicitybelongtotheunderlyingconceptualarchitectureofcriminallaw:howcomplexmustthatarchitecturebeifitistodisplay,orhowsimplecanitbewhilststilldisplaying,thesignificantfeaturesofasubstantivecriminallaw?Shouldit,forinstance,distinguishoffencesfromdefences;orcanwedoallthatweneedtodobyanalysingtheelementsofanoffence?18Ifitshoulddistinguishoffencesfromdefences,whatdistinctions(ifany)shouldwedrawamongdefences:shouldwe,forinstance,distinguishjustificationsfromexcuses;shouldweaddfurthercategories,ofexemptions,19orofwarrants?20Shouldit,foranotherinstance,distinguishdifferentspeciesofmensrea(and,ifso,whichandshoulditdosoacrossalloffences);orcanwecaptureallthatweneedtocapturebytalkingsimplyofonekindoffaultinsufficientconcern,perhaps?21Asimpletheoristwillarguethatthecriminallaw'snormativestructureisadequatelycapturedbyarathersimplearchitecture,andthatthedistinctionsandcomplicationsintroducedbymorecomplextheoristsareunhelpful,unnecessary,anddistorting.Complextheoristswillinturnaccusesimplifiersofprocrusteandistortionsoftwisting,andsomisrepresenting,significantfeaturesofthecriminallawtomakethemfittheir(over-)simplearchitecture:22weneedthesecomplexities,theywillargue,ifwearetodojusticetothelogicofthecriminallaw.

    Thespectrumfromneatnesstomessinessisquitedifferent:althoughsimplertheoristsaremorelikelyalsotobeneater,neatnessandsimplicityaredifferentqualitiesasaremessinessandcomplexity.Atheoryisneattotheextentthatitcapturesallofcriminallawwithinsomecoherent,integrated,non-conflictualstructureofgoals,principles,andconcepts:thestructuremightbeverycomplex,butitfitstogetherintoasystematicallycoherentwhole.Atheoryismessy(andportraysthecriminallawasmessy)totheextentthatitdeniesthepossibilityofsuchneatnessto(p.9) theextentthatitpositsdifferentgoalsforthecriminallaw,forinstance,thatareincommensurableornon-integratable;ortotheextentthatitportrayscertainkindsofconflict,betweengoals,values,orprinciples,asaninevitablefeatureofthecriminallaw;ortotheextentthatitdeniesthepossibilityofdrawingclearorsharpdistinctionsbetweendifferentcategoriesordimensions.

    Therearetwokindsofmessytheory,parentalandEtonian.Theparentaltheoristsregardmessiness,asparentsmightregardtheirchildren'smessiness,asadefectthatisregrettablebutincurable;criticaltheoristscommentsontheunreasonofthecriminallawmightreflectthisview.Etoniantheoristsaccept,orevencelebrate,messinessasanineliminablefeatureoftheworldtowhichtheoristsmustdojustice:23messiness(oftherightkindandintherightcircumstances)isavirtueratherthanadefect,andisnothreattorationality;atheory,andthepracticethatittheorizes,mustbeasmessyasistheworldwithwhichithastodeal.

    Neattheoristsregardmessinessasadefect.Ifthereisconflictbetweendifferentgoalsorprinciplesorvalues,theremustalsobeaprocedureforresolvingthoseconflictsifthe

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    lawistoattainthekindofprincipledrationalitytowhichitshouldaspireandtowhichitmustatleastcomecloseifitistoclaimourrespectorallegiance.Ifdistinctionscannotbeclearlyandsharply(evenifcomplicatedly)drawn,theyarenotreal,orhavenoplaceinarationaltheoryofcriminallaw.Messytheorists(oftheEtoniansort)regardtherightkindofmessinessasanecessaryvirtue,andcriticizeneattheoristsfordistortingtherichanddetaileddiversityoftheworldtofittheirrigidstructures.Conflictisineliminableinourworldofdifferent,conflicting,andirreconcilablevaluesbetweenwhichonlyuneasycompromiseratherthanreconciliationispossible;24precisionandthetidyexactitudeafterwhichneattheoristsyearnisunavailableintherealmofhumanactionandvalue:anadequatetheorymustbetruetothatmessyreality.

    Intheirdifferentways,BenthamandKant(intheGrundlegung)wereparadigmexamplesofneatness.ForBentham,ifwearetotakethefelicificcalculusseriously,wehaveavailableasinglecriterionofvalue,ameasurablefinalgoodtowhichallhumaninstitutionsshouldbeinstruments:complexthoughthecalculationsofutilitymustbe,theunderlyingstructureisbothsimpleandneat.25FortheKantoftheGrundlegung,thestructureofmoralthinkingisequally,thoughdifferently,neat:wejudgethepermissibilityofanyproposedcourseofactionbyidentifyingitsmaxim,anddeterminingwhethertheagentcanuniversalizeit.Aristotle,bycontrast,isa(p.10) paradigmofonekindofmessiness:althoughheheldtosuchastrongversionoftheunityofvaluethatanyapparentethicalconflictcouldbedissolvedbytheclearperceptionofthephronimos,andwasthusaneatratherthanamessytheoristontheissueofconflict,heinsistedthatethicsasanormativedisciplineshouldseekonlysuchprecisionasthesubjectmatteradmitsof,whichisfarlessthanwemightseekinscienceorlogic.Thetheoristmustbecontenttoindicatethetruthroughlyandinoutline,26whilethephronimos,theparagonofpracticalwisdom,mustrelynotontheapplicationofneatprinciples,butonaperceptionoftheinevitablymessyparticularitiesofeachsituation.27

    Howdosuchotherdisciplinesashistoryandsociologybearonphilosophicaltheorizing,asthusunderstood?Ataminimum,asHerodotuswasthefirsttopointout,theycangenerateasuitablecautioninthetheorist:theyremindusboththatwhatwedohereisnotdonebyotherselsewhere,andthatwhatwedoherewasnotalwaysthus;whatwemighttaketobeunchangeablefeaturesofany(civilized)humansocietyturnouttoberatherrecentfeaturesofcertainspecificsocieties.Theyalsoremindusthatthingsarenotalwaysastheymightappeartothehastyeye:thatmeaningsandfunctionsarenotalwaysevident,andthatthewayinwhichaninstitutionpresentsitselfmightnotalwaysgiveatruepictureofitsaimsorworkings.Theyarealsoasourceofalternativeinterpretations:rationalreconstructersmightfindotherpossiblepurposesandprinciplesinthehistoryorsociologyofaninstitution.Theyalsoremindnormativetheorists,ofcourse,ofthefactualcharacterofthatwhichtheyseektotheorize;andwhenitcomestoproposingreforms,theycanhelptheoriststorecognizewhatisorisnotfeasible,atwhatkindofcostaswellasremindingthemoftheunintendedconsequencesthatcanflowfromprincipledreform.

    Noneofthisistosay,however,thatsuchotherdisciplinesshouldunderminenormative

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    philosophicaltheorizing,orthattheyrenderitotiose,impossible,orpointless.Theyremindusofitslimitslimitsthatitsproponentsshouldalreadyhaverecognized;oftheneedforcautionandsomehumility;oftheconcreterealities,context,andhistoryoftheinstitutionsthatwetheorize;ofthewaysinwhichsuchtheorizingcanbefrustratedbytherecalcitranceoftheworldandofthehumanagentswhotrytoapplyit:butsuchremindersservetoimprove,nottoundermine,normativetheorizing.

    Ouraiminthediscussionoverthelastfewpageshasnotbeentolaydownadeterminateaccountofwhatphilosophicaltheorizingaboutcriminallawmustamounttoorinvolve;ithasrather,moremodestly,beentoindicatethedifferentformsitcantake,andthedifferentkindsoftheoryitcanaspiretodevelop.Thiswasalsointended(p.11) asamodestdefenceofthetitleofthisbook,byshowingthatanexplorationofthephilosophicalfoundationsofcriminallawneednothavethekindsofgrandioseambitionthatcriticsmightrightlyrejectasunwarrantedthatitneednotaspiretoproducethekindofneat,apriori,universaltheoryofcriminallawthatis,arguably,anillusorygrail.Theexplorationsinwhichthecontributorstothisvolumewereaskedtoengagearefoundationalinthesensethattheyaimtouncoverandtoilluminatethedeeperstructuresconceptualandnormativeofcriminallaw;theyarephilosophicalinthesensethattheydeployfamiliarphilosophicaltechniquesbothofanalysisandofnormativetheory.Theaimofthevolumeasawholeisnottorevealthetruth,analyticalornormative,aboutcriminallaw,ortorevealthestructurethatcriminallawmusthave.Itisrathertorevealandtoexploresomeofthefoundationalquestionsthattheinstitutionsofcriminallawraise:toworkdownthroughsomeofthesalientdoctrinalandnormativedebatesincontemporarycriminallawtheory,torevealthedeeperandbroaderphilosophicalquestionsandproblemsthattheyreveal,andtosuggestfruitfulwaysinwhichthosequestionsandproblemscanbeapproached.Wedonotexpectthatthecontributionsinthisbookwillsettlemany,orany,ofthosequestionsorproblems,althoughtheycertainlyrecastsomeofthem,andshowthatsomeexistingdebatesandcontroversiesmightbemisdirectedorbasedonassumptionsthatshouldbequestioned:butwehopethattheycanhelptosetthetermsanddirectionofphilosophicallyinformedcriminallawtheoryforthenextdecadeormore.Thebookisthusfoundationalinrelationtothequestionsthatitraisesandclarifies,totheapproachestothosequestionsthatitscontributorsexploreanddevelop,andtothefurtherdebatesandinquiriesthatithopestoprovokeamongcriminallawtheorists.

    Thisisanapttimeforavolumeofthiskind,foratleasttworeasons.First,theroleandthescopeofthecriminallawincontemporarynationstateshaveinrecentyearscomeunderincreasinglyintensetheoreticalscrutiny,andmoreacutepoliticalpressure.Thatpoliticalpressurebearspartlyonpenalpolicy(perhapsmostobviously,atleastinBritainandtheUnitedStates,ontheroleofimprisonment),andonaspectsofthecriminalprocess(mostobviouslyoncriminaltrialsandtheirproperstructure).Itbearsonthecontentandstructureofsubstantivecriminallaw:forinstance,inthewaysinwhichnewandeverbroaderoffencesarecreated,capturingconductevermoreremotelyconnectedtotherelevantmischief,28andthewaysinwhichthePresumptionofInnocencehasbeenprogressivelyerodedbybroadoffencedefinitions,shiftsinburdens

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    ofproof,andtheuseofstrictliability.29Itbearsontherolethatcriminallawplaysinrelationtoothertypesofstateregulationand(p.12) controlin,forinstance,thewaysinwhichgovernmentsanxioustofindmoreeffectivewaysofcontrollingundesirableconductorofwardingoffperceivedthreatsmakeincreasinguseofsystemsofadministrativeregulation,orofprovisionsforthepreventivedetentionorconstraintofthosethoughttobedangerous,orofvarioushybridcivil-criminalproceedings.30Thetheoreticalscrutinyhascomepartlyfromradicallycriticaltheoristsfrom,forinstance,advocatesofrestorativejusticeandotherkindsofnon-criminalpracticewhourgeustoturnawaynotjustfromcriminalpunishment,butfromcriminallawitself,withitsfocusonwrongdoing;31andfromthoseinfluencedbycriticallegalstudieswhoarguethatanyattempttomakerationalnormativesenseofthecriminallawisdoomedtofailure.32Italsocomesfromtheoristswho,whilstcommittedtotheidea(l)ofcriminallaw,wonderwhetherourexistinginstitutionsofcriminallawarealostcause,orlookwithincreasingdespairontheirunprincipledgrowthandabuse;33and,inadifferentway,fromphilosophicaltheoristswhobringtheinsightsofpoliticalandmoralphilosophy,andofphilosophyofmindandaction,tobearoncriminallawinwaysthatcancastnewlightonitsnormativestructures,whilstalsoputtingintoquestionmanyofitstraditionaldoctrinalassumptions.

    Thesecondreasonwhythetimeisaptforsuchavolumeisthatphilosophyofcriminallawisbooming:thelastcoupleofdecadeshaveseenanimpressiveincreaseintheamountofinteresting,goodworkbeingproducedbybothestablishedandnewerscholars.Thisisdue,insignificantpart,tothewayinwhichmorelegalacademicshavebecomemoreawareoftheneedforlegaltheorytoengagewithotherdisciplines(philosophy,butalsosociology,history,andpolitics),andhavealsobecomebetterversedinthoseotherdisciplines;andinparttothewayinwhichthoseworkinginotherdisciplinesthatbearonlaw(notablyphilosophy)havealsobecomemoreawareoftheneedtoengageseriouslywithlegaldoctrinesandpractices,ratherthantheorizingaboutthemfromtheoutside.Theresulthasbeenasignificantgrowthinphilosophicalworkthattakesboththelawitself,andotherdisciplinesthatbearon(p.13) thelaw,seriously,whilstreachingnewlevelsoftheoreticalsophisticationanddepth.Theessaysinthisvolumeexemplifythisgrowth,andstrengthenit.

    Awordshouldbesaidabouttheplanningandorganizationofthisbook.Onepossibilitywouldhavebeentostartwithasystematicconceptionofthekeyfoundationalphilosophicalissuesincriminallaw,andthencommissionauthorstowriteessaysonspecificissueswithinthatconception,thussecuringanorganizedandthoroughcoverageof(whattheeditorstooktobe)thecentralterrainofphilosophyofcriminallaw.Wedecidedagainstthatwayofproceeding:inpartbecausewewerenotconfidentthatwecouldagree,witheachotherorwithcontributors,aboutjustwhatthekeyorcentralissuesare(thatisitselfacentralmeta-issueinphilosophyofcriminallaw);butprimarilybecausethebestwaytosecureinteresting,ground-breakingworkistoselectinteresting,originalauthorsandinvitethemtowriteonwhatintereststhem,leavingthema(relatively)freehandinchoosingtheirtopics.Thisiswhatwedid:theresultofthisstrategyisthattherearesomeobviousgapsinthetopicsdiscussedinthevolume(we

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    leaveittoreaderstoworkouttheirownlistsofkeymissingtopics),butwebelieveitisvindicatedbytheinterestandqualityoftheessays.IntheremainderofthisIntroduction,weprovideabriefsurveyoftheessaysandtheirinterrelationships.

    Theessaysinthisvolumetraverseawiderangeoftopicsthatdefyanyneatcategorization.Manyessaysdealwithmultipletopics,butforpresentpurposeswehavegroupedtheessaysintofourbroadthematicclusters,coveringdifferentaspectsofthephilosophyofcriminallaw.Thefirstclusterinvolvesthresholdquestionsaboutthemethodsoftheorizingaboutthephilosophicalfoundationsofcriminallaw,aboutthepurposesandproperscopeofcriminallaw,andaboutcriminalization.Thesecondandlargestclusterdealswiththesubstanceofcriminallaw,includingquestionsabouttheascriptionofcriminalresponsibility,aboutoffencesanddefences,andaboutactionandintent.Thethirdclusterfocusesontherelationshipbetweencriminallawandcriminalprocess,andonthequestionofpunishment.Thefinalclusterdiscussessomerecentdevelopmentsthatposenewchallengestocriminallawtheory:thegrowingimportanceofinternationalcriminallaw,andtheimplicationsforcriminallawofnewtechnologies.

    1CRIMINALLAWANDPOLITICALTHEORYForthelastfewdecades,onepreoccupationofAnglo-Americancriminallawtheorizing,whichreflectstheprevalenceofretributivistideas,hasbeenwiththequestionofhowthenormsofcriminallawareorarenotlikethoseofeveryday(p.14) morality.Manyofthechaptersinthisvolumecontinuedownthatpath,offeringfreshinsightsonthemeaningofretributivism;theroleofintent,motive,andcharacterjudgmentsindefiningresponsibility;andthebestwaytoformulateoffencedefinitionsinaccordancewithmoralnorms.Butthebookalsoreflectsanewtheoreticalturntowardabroaderconceptionofcriminallawtheory,onerootednotjustinmoraltheorybutalsoinexpressconsiderationofhistory,politicaltheory,andsocialtheory.

    ThechaptersbyMalcolmThorburn,RichardDagger,andMattMatraversareall,intheirownways,exemplaryofsuchanapproach.Thorburnarguesthatcriminallawscholarshavetendedtodrawtoocloseananalogybetweenthesystemofcriminallawandthatofprivatemorality.Inplaceofsuchalegalmoralistaccount,Thorburnofferswhathecallsapubliclawaccountofthecriminaljusticesystem,whichhesaysdoesabetterjobofexplainingandjustifyingthecoerciveaspectsofcriminallaw,itsliberty-respectingaspects,andvariousdoctrinalissuesconcerningjustificationdefences.Dagger,forhispart,offersaspecificallyrepublicantheoryofcriminallaw,one,hesays,thatreflectsthepublicnatureofcriminalwrongs,thedevelopmentofthecriminallawhistorically,andthepublicnatureofthecriminallawasacooperative,self-governingenterprise.AndMatravers,followingaparallelpath,lookstocontractariantheoryforaprincipledgroundingforcriminallaw,arguingthataRawlsianperspectivehasmoretoofferherethanRawlshimselfallowed,andexploringtheimplicationsforourattitudestowardsthosewhocommitcrimesofRawlsideathatwemustagreetoshareoneanother'sfate.

    TwootherchaptersthatexpresslyseektobroadenthefocusofcriminallawtheoryarethosebyMarkusDubberandAliceRistroph.Dubberisbroadlyconcernedwithhowweshouldconceiveoftheinquiryintothefoundationsofcriminallaw,whetherlegal,

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    philosophical,historical,genealogical,orpolitical.Hearguesthatwecannothopetodevelopafoundationalaccountofthecriminallawwithoutanaccountofwhat,ifanything,legitimizesthestatepowerthatunderliesthecriminallaw,aninquiry,hesays,thathasmostlyescapedtheattentionofAmericanthinkersbothatthetimethenationwasfoundedandintheyearssince.Ristrophcontendsthatcriminallawtheoryhasbeentoonarrowlyfocusedontheresponsibilityoftheoffenderforhiscriminalacts,andseekstoshowhowotherkeyplayersinthesystemincludinglegislatures,police,prosecutors,andcourtsshareresponsibilityforthesystemofcriminallawandhowitchoosestotreatitssubjects.

    AntonyDuff'schapterisalsoconcernedwiththeproperbasisofcriminalresponsibility:withitsgroundinginpoliticalcommunity.Inaliberaldemocracyweareparadigmaticallycriminallyresponsible,heargues,ascitizenstoourfellowcitizens.Thisfocusoncitizenship,however,generatesconcernsabouthownon-citizensaretreatedunderthelaw,andaboutthepossibilityofexclusionfromcitizenship:Duffsuggeststhatsuchconcernscanbemet,butthattheyhighlightsomeofthechallengesfacedbyaliberalcriminallaw.(p.15)

    2THESUBSTANCEOFCRIMINALLAWThesecondclusterofchaptersreturnsthefocustothecontentandstructureofthesubstantivecriminallaw,whileofferingsomestrikinglynewapproachestoahostofissuesthathaveoccupiedtheoristsinrecentyears.Firstamongthemistheproperbasisforcriminalresponsibilityandliability.Forexample,canwesaywhether,analyticallyornormatively,criminalresponsibilityisfocusedonchoice,oraction,orcharacter?IllustrativehereisthecontributionfromNicolaLacey,whoarguesthatjudgmentsaboutanoffender'scharacter,centraltopre-modernconceptionsofthecriminallaw,haveexperiencedaresurgenceincontemporarycriminallaw,asisevidentinphenomenaasdiverseassexoffendernotificationrequirements,lawsrelatingtoterrorism,evidentiaryrulesregardingpresumptions,andthepracticeofoffenderprofiling.ThisleadsLaceytoconcludethatthecriminalconvictionitselfincreasinglyimpliesajudgmentofbadcharacter,andtorelatesuchpracticestoabroader,extra-doctrinalexplanationrootedinthecontextofvariouspolitical,economic,andsocialconsiderations.

    Alsocentralhereisanexaminationofthepsychologicalconceptsthatstructureourunderstandingofcriminalfault,includingthecentrallyimportantconceptsofintentionandmotive,whichareexploredbyMichaelMooreandVictorTadros,respectively.Bothconceptshavealifeoutsidethelaw,ofcourse,andMooreandTadrosdrawonthatlifetoilluminatetheirroleinthecriminallaw.Mooreisinterestedintherolethatintentionplaysindefiningthemostseriousformsofcriminality.Hearguesthatthecriminallawasitnowexistspresupposeswhatisessentiallyafolkpsychologyofintention,andheproposesasanalternativeamorenuancedandcomplexconceptionofintentionthatwouldtakeintoaccountrecentdevelopmentsinphilosophyofmind,cognitivescience,andmoralpsychology.Tadros,forhispart,isinterestedintherolethatmotiveplays,oroughttoplay,injudgmentsofculpability.Takingontheconventionalviewthatmotivationisrelevant,ifatall,onlyiftherehasfirstbeenadeterminationthatthedefendanthas

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    causedharm,Tadrosarguesthatmotivesshouldbegivenamoresignificantroleindeterminingwhatiswrongspecifically,thatanactcanbewronginvirtueofthemotivationwithwhichitwasperformed.

    Anotherproblemthathasbedevilledcriminallawscholarsinrecentyearsisthatofhowtoformulatethenormsthatdefinethesubstantivecriminallaw.ThisisthefocusofthechaptersbyKennethSimonsandbyLarryAlexanderandKimFerzan.Simonsisinterestedinthedegreeofspecificityweshouldemployindecidinghowtoformulatethenormsthatinformboththegeneralandspecialparts.Hecontrastswhathecallstheparticularistapproachwithageneralistapproach,andcomparestheirrelativeabilitytotrackunderlyingmoralnormsandpoliticalvalues,whetherthickorthin,neatormessy,descriptiveornormative,intuitionistorpluralistic.AlexanderandFerzanbelievethatcontemporarycriminalcodesdoapoorjobofcapturingwhatitisthatmakesstatepunishmenttrulydeserved.Theyproposea(p.16) radicalrewritingofcriminalcodes,whichwouldeliminatenegligenceasabasisforcriminalliability,abolishliabilityforincompleteattempts,andreplacedetailedoffencedefinitionsandhierarchicallyarrangedmensreatermswithastreamlinedstandardaccordingtowhichpeoplewouldbesubjecttodeservedpunishmentwhentheyshowinsufficientconcernforothers,definedasriskingharmtoothersforinsufficientlygoodreasons.

    TheextenttowhichthecriminallawshouldbeconcernedwithpreventingriskybehaviourisalsotakenupbyAndrewAshworthandLuciaZedner,andbyPeterWesten.AshworthandZednerareinterestedinthewaysinwhichthelawcriminalizesthecreationofrisksofharm,andofferacatalogueofvariouskindsofcriminaloffencethatareprimarilyconcernedwithpreventingthecreationofrisk.Buttheyalsohighlighttheprotectionsthatthecriminallawprovides,throughthecriminalprocess,forthosesuspectedofcreatingrisks,andthewaysinwhichsuchprotectionsareunderminedbytheuseofcivilpreventiveordersthateffectivelybypassthecriminallaw.AsforWesten,hisfocusisonoffencesthatpunishoffenderswhoengageinriskybehaviourthatneverinfactcausesanyharm.Hearguesthattheproblemofpunishingactorsforrisksthatinsomesensedonotexistmustbesolvednotbythinkingofriskasaformofprobabilitythatis,thefactuallikelihoodofharmbutratherintermsofcounterfactualeventsthatajudgeorjuryfearcouldhaveoccurredand,hadtheydoneso,wouldhaveproducedthesamekindofharmthattheoffenceatissueisdesignedtoprevent.Theproblemofsuchoffences,hecontends,isthereforecloselyrelatedtotheproblemofcriminalizingimpossibleattempts.

    Twootherchapters,byDouglasHusakandbyStuartGreen,dealinverydifferentwayswithwhatmightlooselyberegardedasthetheoryofcriminaldefences.Husakoffersacriticalanalysisofwhathesaysmayormaynotbeademinimisdefencetocriminalliability,usingthissomewhatobscuredoctrinetoshedlightonmoreoverarchingissuessuchastheappropriatelimitsofcriminalization,theproperexerciseofprosecutorialdiscretion,andthedistinctionbetweenoffencesanddefencesandbetweenjustificationandexcuse.AndGreen,inhiscontribution,isconcernedwiththeproblemofimposingcriminalliabilityonoffenderswhoarethemselvesvictimsofseriouseconomic,social,or

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    politicalinjustice.Hearguesthattheextenttowhichsuchoffendersdeservetobepunishedwillvaryfromcasetocase,dependingonthetypeofcrimetheoffenderhascommitted,thetypeofdeprivationtowhichhehasbeensubjected,andthecircumstancesofthecrimevictim.

    3PROCESSANDPUNISHMENTWhilephilosophershavehadmuchtosayaboutthesubstantivecriminallawandaboutpunishment,andquitealottosayaboutissuesconcerningcriminalization,(p.17) theyhavehadconsiderablylesstosayaboutthecriminalprocessthatconnects(alleged)crimetopunishment.ThechaptersbyPaulRobertsandDonaldDripps,includedinthethirdcluster,helptocorrectthatrelativeneglectbybringingprocessbackintotheframeasanessentialdimensionofthecriminallawasasetofinstitutionalpractices.Robertsseekstobroadenthecanonofcriminallawtheorytoincludeaconsiderationofcriminalevidence.Hedescribesfourrivalapproachestoevidencelawtheorywhichhecallsdoctrinal-conceptualist,epistemological,legal-institutional,andnormativeanddemonstratesbothitsconvergenceswith,anddivergencesfrom,criminallawtheory.Dripps,inhischapter,takesontherelationshipbetweensubstanceandprocedureincriminallaw,arguing,asdovariousothercontributors,thatitmustbeexplainedwithreferencetocompetingconceptionsofunderlyingpoliticalandmoraltheory.Particularlyconcernedwiththewaysinwhichasystemofcriminalprocedureismeanttoimplementthegoalsofsubstantivecriminallaw,heoffersthreemodelswhichhecallsrationalism,pluralism,andreductionismandexplorestheextenttowhichtheyshouldbeviewedasmutuallycompatibleorincompatible.

    MitchellBermanthentakesonanissuethathasbeenmuchmoreattheforefrontofcriminallawtheory,thoughhedoessoinanovelway.Bermanarguesthatthetraditionaldistinctionbetweenconsequentialistandretributivejustificationsforpunishmentisnolongeraccuratebecauseretributivismhasincreasinglymorphedintoanaccountthatrestsonajustificatorystructurethatisitselfconsequentialist.Retributivism,hesays,oratleastsomeformsofretributivism,isthusmorecorrectlyunderstoodasasubtypeofconsequentialistjustificationsforpunishment.

    4ACROSSBORDERSANDINTOTHEFUTUREThetrioofchaptersthatconcludesthevolumeseektopushcriminallawtheorybeyondtherealmofbothdomesticlawandcurrenttechnology.Twoofthecontributions,byChristopherWellmanandAdilHaque,dealwithcriminallawintheinternationalcontext.Wellmanaskswhatrationalethereisforinternationalcriminalcourtjurisdictionovercrimesthatdonotcrossinternationalborders.Hearguesthatstateshaveauniqueabilitytorealizetheimportantaimsofpunishment,butthattheyareentitledtoamonopolyinthisareaonlywhentheyareinfactableandwillingtorealizetheseaims.Wherestatesareunableorunwillingtoprotecttheirowncitizenshumanrights,theirclaimtosovereigntyislost,andinternationalinstitutionsliketheInternationalCriminalCourtmayjustifiablystepin.Haqueissimilarlyinterestedinextendingtheuseofconceptualtoolsusedtotheorizeaboutdomesticcriminallawtothecontextofinternationalcriminallaw.Hisparticular(p.18) concerniswithenvisioningthemoral

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    normsapplicabletokillingsthatoccurinthemidstofarmedconflict,ofbothciviliansandcombatants,whetherdirectlyparticipatinginhostilitiesornot,andwithevaluatingtheconsistencyofsuchnormswiththelawintheseareas.

    Inthefinalchapterinthevolume,MireilleHildebrandt,lookingtothefuture,isconcernedwithtwocriminallaw-relatedproblemsthatmightbeposedbydevelopingtechnologies.Thefirstisthatofhumanbeingswhobecomesoentangledwiththesmarttechnologicalenvironmentsinwhichtheyworkthatitbecomeshardtoviewthemasdistinct,autonomous,andresponsibleindividuals.Thesecondistheproblemofcomputer-relatedtechnologiesthatbecomesoself-awareandautonomousthattheyarguablytakeontheattributesofmoralagencythatispresumablyaprerequisiteforcriminalliability.

    Betweenthem,thesechaptersattesttotheflourishingconditionofcontemporarycriminallawtheory.Moreimportantly,theyoffernewdirectionsforfutureworkinthisarea,andhighlightsomeofthepressingissuesthatcriminallawtheoristsneedtoaddressissuesthatdirectlyconcerntheproperrole,scope,andstructureofthecriminallawinthecontemporaryworld.

    Notes:(1)ExtremeversionsofsuchcriticismswerepressedbyproponentsofCriticalLegalStudies(egMKelman,InterpretiveConstructionintheSubstantiveCriminalLaw(1981)33StanfordLawReview591,andTrashing(1984)36StanfordLawReview293).Formorerecent,lessradicallynegative(andforthatreasonmoreinteresting)critiquesseeegLFarmer,CriminalLaw,TraditionandLegalOrder(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996);NLacey,Contingency,CoherenceandConceptualism,inDuff(ed),PhilosophyandtheCriminalLaw(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),9,andPhilosophicalFoundationsoftheCommonLaw:SocialnotMetaphysical,inJHorder(ed),OxfordEssaysinJurisprudence,4thSeries(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2000),17;AWNorrie,Crime,ReasonandHistory(2ndedn;London:Butterworths,2001).

    (2)DGOwen(ed),ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995).

    (3)SeeJBentham,AnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation(1789;edBurnsandHart,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1996),ch19onexpositoryasagainstcensorialjurisprudence(hecommentsthereonlocalasagainstuniversaljurisprudence,andremarksthat,giventhediversityoflaws,inbothcontentandform,expositoryjurisprudencecanclaimuniversalapplicationonlyifitconfinesitsattentiontoterminologyortheimportofwords).Foramorecontemporarydiscussionofthedistinctionbetweenanalyticalandnormative(ordescriptiveandprescriptive)jurisprudence,seeDNHusak,PhilosophyofCriminalLaw(Totowa,NJ:Rowman&Littlefield,1987),206.

    (4)SeerecentlyMSMoore,PlacingBlame:AGeneralTheoryoftheCriminalLaw

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    (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997):conceptualanalysis,onMooresview,isatbestasomewhatuncertainguidetotheunderlyingmetaphysicsthatitisthepropertaskofphilosophicalinquirytouncover.

    (5)SeefurtherDNMacCormick,ReconstructionafterDeconstruction:AResponsetoCLS(1990)10OxfordJournalofLegalStudies539;RADuff,PrincipleandContradictionintheCriminalLaw,inDuff(ed),PhilosophyandtheCriminalLaw,156.

    (6)SeeRMDworkin,LawsEmpire(London:Fontana,1986),espchs710.

    (7)SeeJTasioulas,Philosophy,CriticismandCommunity(2009)26JournalofAppliedPhilosophy259;VTadros,Law,StrategyandDemocracy(2009)26JournalofAppliedPhilosophy269.

    (8)CompareWVQuine,TwoDogmasofEmpiricism(1951)60PhilosophicalReview20,onthewebofbeliefandthewaysinwhichpropositionsaremoreorlessrevisable.

    (9)CompareJRaz,TheAuthorityofLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1979),1539,ondetachednormativestatements.

    (10)Someabolitionistsarguethatweshouldabolishnotjustcriminalpunishment,butcriminallawitselfasadistinctivelegalpractice:egNChristie,ConflictsasProperty(1977)17BritishJournalofCriminology1;LHulsman,CriticalCriminologyandtheConceptofCrime(1986)10ContemporaryCrises63.

    (11)Thisisanissueonwhichtheeditorsaredivided:compareGreenscommentsinthisvolume(at354),andSPGreen,TheUniversalGrammarofCriminalLaw(2000)98MichiganLawReview2104,withRADuff,AnsweringforCrime(Oxford:HartPublishing,2007),611.

    (12)Seen3above.

    (13)Whichraises,ofcourse,thequestionofwhatcountsaspunishment.

    (14)See,eg,Lacey,Contingency,CoherenceandConceptualism.

    (15)JMFinnis,OnTheCriticalLegalStudiesMovement,inJEekelaarandJBell(eds),OxfordEssaysinJurisprudence,3rdSeries(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987),145,at160,onproponentsofCriticalLegalStudies.

    (16)SeeDworkin,LawsEmpire;seealsoWBGallie,EssentiallyContestedConcepts(1956)56ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety167,onessentiallycontestedconcepts.

    (17)SeeJGardner,OntheGeneralPartoftheCriminalLaw,inDuff(ed),PhilosophyandtheCriminalLaw,205.

    (18)ContrastGWilliams,OffencesandDefences(1982)2LegalStudies233,TheLogic

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    ofExceptions(1988)47CambridgeLawJournal261,withGFletcher,RethinkingCriminalLaw(Boston:Little,Brown:1978),55279,683758.Forotherdefencesofthedistinctionsimportance,seeKCampbell,OffenceandDefence,inIHDennis(ed),CriminalLawandJustice(London:Sweet&Maxwell,1987),73;JGardner,FletcheronOffencesandDefences(2004)39TulsaLawReview817;VTadros,CriminalResponsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),ch4.

    (19)SeeegJGardner,TheGistofExcuses(1998)1BuffaloCriminalLawReview575;JHorder,ExcusingCrime(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),810,1036;Tadros,CriminalResponsibility,1249.

    (20)SeeDuff,AnsweringforCrime,2717.

    (21)SeeLAlexanderandKKFerzan,withSJMorse,CrimeandCulpability:ATheoryofCriminalLaw(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009);alsoAlexanderandFerzaninthisvolume.

    (22)CompareHartsobjectionstoAustinsaccountoflaw:HLAHart,TheConceptofLaw(2ndedn;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),chs23.

    (23)Etonmessisadessertthatismuchprizedinsomequarters.

    (24)Afamiliarthemeofonekindofcontemporaryliberaltheorizing:seeegIBerlin,FourEssaysonLiberty(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1969);TNagel,MortalQuestions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978);SHampshire,MoralityandConflict(Oxford:Blackwell,1983).

    (25)Intense,long,certain,speedy,fruitful,pureSuchmarksinpleasuresandinpainsendure.Suchpleasuresseekifprivatebethyend:Ifitbepublic,wideletthemextend.Suchpainsavoid,whicheverbethyview:Ifpainsmustcome,letthemextendtofew(Bentham,AnIntroductiontothePrinciplesofMoralsandLegislation).Comparealsotheaspirationstoneatnessdisplayedbyeconomictheoristsoflaw.

    (26)Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics(transRoss)I.4.

    (27)JSMillwasalsoamessytheorist,eveninUtilitarianism,atleastascomparedwithBentham:onceheinsistedthatwemustattendtothequalityaswellasthequantityofpleasures,hemadeimpossibleanyneatBenthamitefelicificcalculus.

    (28)Forsomeexamples,seeDNHusak,Overcriminalization:TheLimitsoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),3345.InEnglishlaw,offencesrelatedtoterrorismprovideclearillustrationsofthisexpansionisttendency:seeegTerrorismAct2000;VTadros,JusticeandTerrorism(2007)10NewCriminalLawReview658.

    (29)SeeAJAshworthandMBlake,ThePresumptionofInnocenceinEnglishCriminalLaw(1996)CriminalLawReview306;WStuntz,ThePathologicalPoliticsofCriminalLaw(2001)100MichiganLawReview506;VTadrosandSTierney,ThePresumption

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    ofInnocenceandtheHumanRightsAct(2004)67ModernLawReview402.

    (30)SeeAJAshworthandLZedner,DefendingtheCriminalLaw:ReflectionsontheChangingCharacterofCrime,Procedure,andSanctions(2008)2CriminalLawandPhilosophy21;PreventiveOrders:AProblemofUnder-Criminalization?inRADuff,LFarmer,SEMarshall,VTadros,andMRenzo(eds),TheBoundariesoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming,2011),andinthisvolume;alsoRADuff,PerversionsandSubversionsofCriminalLaw,inDuffetal,TheBoundariesoftheCriminalLaw.

    (31)Seen10above.

    (32)Seen1above.

    (33)SeeegAJAshworth,IstheCriminalLawaLostCause?(2000)116LawQuarterlyReview225;IHDennis,TheCriticalConditionofCriminalLaw(1997)50CurrentLegalProblems213;Stuntz,ThePathologicalPoliticsofCriminalLaw;DADripps,TerrorandTolerance:CriminalJusticefortheNewAgeofAnxiety(2003)1OhioStateJournalofCriminalLaw9.

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