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Model Safety Case
Contents1. Introduction....................................................................................................................................3
2. Context of the safety case..............................................................................................................3
2.1 Purpose of the Safety Case.....................................................................................................3
2.2 Scope of the SafetyCase.........................................................................................................4
2.3 Demonstration of safety.........................................................................................................4
2.4 Graded approach....................................................................................................................5
3. Strategy for safety..........................................................................................................................6
4. General description of the facilities, actitivies and the waste........................................................7
4.1 Site conditions........................................................................................................................7
4.2 Description of the facilities and activities...............................................................................9
4.3 Description of the waste inventory......................................................................................16
5. Safety assessment........................................................................................................................21
5.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................21
5.2 Assessment context..............................................................................................................21
5.2.1 Regulatory framework..................................................................................................21
5.2.2 Endpoints for the assessment.......................................................................................23
5.2.3 Approach to the assessment........................................................................................23
5.3 Description of safety elements and functions......................................................................23
5.3.1 Safety elements............................................................................................................23
5.3.2 Site and engineering analysis........................................................................................25
5.3.3 Passive safety and defense in depth.............................................................................28
5.3.4 Operational safety aspects...........................................................................................28
5.3.5 Management system....................................................................................................28
5.4 Development and justification of scenarios..........................................................................29
5.4.1 Normal operation.........................................................................................................29
5.4.2 Scenarios for accidents.................................................................................................33
Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs)...............................................................................................37
Scenarios......................................................................................................................................41
5.5 Formulation and implementation of assessment models.....................................................45
5.6 Performance of calculations and analysis of the results.......................................................53
5.6.1 Radiological impact assessment for normal operation.................................................53
5.6.2 Radiological impact assessment for accidents..............................................................54
5.6.3 Non radiological environmental impact........................................................................59
5.6.4 Management of uncertainties......................................................................................59
5.7 Analysis of assessment results..............................................................................................59
5.7.1 Comparison with safety assessment criteria................................................................59
6 Iteration and design optimization................................................................................................61
7 Identification of safety measures.................................................................................................62
8 Limits, controls and conditions.....................................................................................................62
9 Integration of safety arguments...................................................................................................63
9.1 Comparison with safety criteria............................................................................................63
9.2 Plans for addressing unresolved issues.................................................................................64
10 Interacting processes................................................................................................................65
10.1 Involvement of interested parties........................................................................................65
10.2 Independent review.............................................................................................................65
10.3 Management systems..........................................................................................................65
11 Annex.......................................................................................................................................65
11.1 Standard Operating Procedures...........................................................................................65
1. Introduction
Radioactive materials, mainly sealed radioactive sources (SRS), have been used in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (B&H) for a number of various medical, industrial, research and teaching
activities during the past fifty years.
B&H authorities, in 1998, established Rakovica Radioactive Waste Storage Facility
(Rakovica Facility) in order to accommodate for a relatively long term period the disused
sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) for which regulatory control was lost as a result of the war
(1991-1995). Since then, the Rakovica Facility has been operated as the centralized
radioactive waste storage facility of the Federation of B&H1. The operator of the Rakovica
Facility has been the Institute for Public Health of FB&H (Institute). The purpose of the
Rakovica Facility is to provide for safe and secure storage of DSRS, mainly radioactive
lighting rods (Eu-152/154), but also various industrial gauges and sources used in medicine.
In addition, low level solid radioactive waste collected as a result of the incidents is stored.
2. Context of the safety case
2.1 Purpose of the Safety Case
The purpose of this version of the Safety Case is to assess safety of the existing Rakovica
Facility. A principal application of the Safety Case will be in the license application and
approval process. It will be submitted by the Institute to the Agency as part of the application
to get authorization from the Agency to continue operation of the Rakovica Facility.In
addition, the Safety Case will be used:
for optimization of the dose received by the workers of the Institute,
as a basis for identifying measures to upgrade the facility for conditioning of the
DSRS,
as a case study for the safety cases of the interim storages throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and possibly for the future centralized radioactive waste storage facility.
1B&H consists of two equaly sized administrative units called entities, Federation of B&H and Republic of Srpska.
2.2 Scope of the SafetyCase
The Safety Case documents the assessments of the current status and operation of the
Rakovica Facility based on SADRWMS methodology. Rakovica Facility was evaluated for
compliance with national radiation protection regulatory requirements. Environmental impact
assessment is not within scope of this Safety Case.
2.3 Demonstration of safety
The Radiation Protection and Nuclear Security Act (Act), promulgated in 2007, defines the
legislative framework on radiation safety and security issues in B&H2. The State Regulatory
Agency on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Agency) was established in accordance
with the Act provisions. The Agency is empowered on legislation, authorization and
inspection in radiation safety and security. In terms of the Act, the Agency is the responsible
authority for licensing and exercising regulatory control over the Institute.
In accordance with the Act provisions, Regulation of the radioactive waste management will
be promulgated by the Agency. A Regulation on safe management of the radioactive waste
and DSRS, based on international safety standards, has been drafted. As such, the draft
version and international standards are used in this safety case as a basis for demonstrating
safety.
The Agency and the Institute are different legal entities in line with principle of independence
of the regulating authority and the operator of the radioactive waste storage facility.
The Institute is established by the Health Care Act of Federation of B&H (1997). Decision of
the Ministry of Health of Federation of B&H (2001) and Licence (2011) by the Agency define
scope of the work of the Institute in radiation protection. The Institute performs individual
radiation monitoring, environmental radioactivity monitoring, workplace monitoring, medical
examination of workers and storage of radioactive waste/DSRS.
The Agency developed the Policy for safety of the sources (Policy)3. The Policy included
radioactive waste management emphasizes protection of humans, workers and population,
now and in future from radioactive waste management activities. 2Untill 2007, entity Acts regulated radiation protection, including several Regulations issued in former Yugoslavia
3 The policy for safety of the sources in B&H, 2012
The following radiation protection principles are described in Policy: Primary responsibility,
The role of the institutions, Management system, Justification of the practice, Optimization of
protection, Risk management, Protection of population now and in future, Prevention of
accidents, Emergency preparedness, Protection actions, Graded approach, Threat assessment,
Multilayer protection measures, Data confidentiality.
The Policy defines that the Agency will establish regulatory framework for radioactive waste
management and will authorize technical services for management of the radioactive waste.
The scope of the waste management license will cover one or more waste management
operations, as appropriate. The primary responsibility for the waste management rests with
the generator of the waste. The preferred option of disused sealed sources management will be
return to supplier.
The Agency developed the national radioactive waste management strategy and defined a
centralized radioactive waste management in B&H (2013)4. Generated radioactive waste,
mainly DSRS that cannot be returned to their suppliers/manufacturers will be stored in the
centralized storage facility. The operator of the centralized radioactive waste storage facility
will be the Institute, as there being no other competent organization to assume this
responsibility. The Agency is currently exploring options for a new site with robust buildings
that could be used for centralized long term storage of radioactive waste/DSRS. Awaiting for
the construction of the new centralized radioactive waste storage facility, the Rakovica
Facility needs safety assessment in order to continue operation.
2.4 Graded approach
The Rakovica Facility is simple designed facility for the basic operations of receipt and store
of the DSRS in working containers and dismantling and store of RLR's. The graded approach
included screening of hazards and identification of the relevant ones. The associated impacts
were analyzed qualitatively or quantitatively for increased exposure of the workers or
population.
4 Strategy of Radioactive Waste Management in B&H, 2014
3. Strategy for safety
The strategy for demonstrating safety of the management of the DSRS at Rakovica Facility is
based on isolation and containment and includes both passive and active elements.
Approach to waste management with regards to the following is regarded as contributing to
safety:
Management system,
o Compliant with B&H radiation protection legislation and relevant international
standards and guidelines
o Clearly defined responsibilities for waste management
o Work procedures designed to reduce duration, frequency, and severity of
exposure to hazards
o Trained, qualified and competent persons undertake work that is safety related
o Appropriate records on waste inventory and dose records kept up to date
Multiple safety functions
o Radiation zones designated
o Radiation monitoring during waste management activities
Defence in depth,
o Fenced area secured by the police
o Robust structure of the buildings with high integrity locks
o System for intrusion detection
Shielding and confinement,
o Storage of DSRS takes place inside proper containment such as the original
working shields or another type of suitable containment
o Dismantling of RLR’s inside shielded hotbox
o The optimization of shielding usage during all waste management activities
including transportation and storage
Selection of appropriate approaches to waste processing,
o DSRS received in original working shields or another type of suitable
containment
o DSRS segregated for conditioning based on half-lives
o Compatibility of the processed waste with the WAC of disposal facilities,
Minimization of the generated waste,
Secondary radioactive waste is only expected when a leaking source is found or during
accident scenarios when a source is damaged. The generation of secondary waste during such
an incident will be minimized by isolating the source in a secondary containment to prevent
further contamination.
4. General description of the facilities, actitivies and the waste
4.1 Site conditions
Rakovica Facility is located in the municipality of Hadzici, approximately 20 km west from
capital Sarajevo on the regional road M5 between Sarajevo and Kiseljak (Fig 1). The site
itself is government owned property with several store buildings within fenced area. The
locality is semi urban with residential and agricultural areas. The closest public houses of the
Rakovica settlement are approximately 100 m distant, both north and south of the Facility.
There has been extensive construction of family houses and it is reasonably to predict that it
will continue.
Figure 1 Maps of the Rakovica area, site layout
The site is hilly and the Rakovica Facility is adjoined to a clay hill from which water comes in
during rain. The site is surrounded with bushes and shrubs.
There are no surface water bodies in the immediate vicinity of the Facility. The closest
surface water body, Rakovica brook is 700 m distant. Geology of the area consists of Upper
Cretaceous Flysch (water impermeable to slightly permeable rock) overlying Middle Triasic
limestones and dolomites (water permeable rock)5.
The territory of B&H is seismically relatively active. The recorded data on earthquakes in the
area for the period 1879 to 2009 range from 3.6 to 5.1 Richter scale6. According to the map of
expected maximum earthquakes (Fig 2), the Sarajevo area is located in area where there is a
risk of earthquakes measuring 5.1 Richter scale. Earthquakes of such magnitude cause
damage to buildings and structures.
Figure 2 Seismic actitivities at the territory of B&H
B&H, due to its geography and relief characteristics, has a complex climate7. Rakovica is
located in the central Bosnia where continental climate prevails. Summarized climate
characteristics are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 Summarized climate characteristics
Period Average temperature (ºC)
Minumum temperature (ºC)
Maximum temperature (ºC)
Average annual precipitation (L/m2)
Minimum monthly precipitation (L/m2)
Maximum monthly precipitation (L/m2)
Maximum daily precipitation (L/m2)
1961-1990
9.6 -21.8 37.4 932 1 259 93.2
2005-2014
10.7 -19.0 38.8 983 5 186 73.3
Basic climate characteristics are severe winters and hot summers. The absolute temperatures
range from approximately -20 ºC to nearly 40ºC. The average annual precipitation is
nearly1000 L/m2, evenly distributed throughout the year. The highest recorded daily
5 M. Basagic, F. Skopljak, An Artesian Aquifer in Rakovica Near Sarajevo Area, RMZ-Materials and Geoenvironment, Vol. 50, No.1, pp.13-16, 2003
6Federal Meteorological Institute data
7Federal Meteorological Institute data
precipitation amounts for 93.2 L/m2. Snowfall contributes significantly to total fallout amount
from November to April period.
4.2 Description of the facilities and activitiesGeneral facility description
The Rakovica Facility consists of two buildings: Storage Building and Waste Processing
Building. The Storage Building is a reinforced concrete building previously used by the
Police force for storage of explosive materials. The Waste Processing Building additionally
constructed building designed for receipt, processing of DSRS/waste and interim store, before
transferred to Storage Building. Even though the Waste Processing Building has never been
finished and completed, it entered operation due to lack of operation capacities in the Storage
Building and rather simple operations of receipt and emplacement of DSRS in working
containers and dismantling of only radioactive lighting rods and smoke detectors.
Buildings layout
The Rakovica Facility consists of two buildings, the Storage Building and the Waste
Processing Building (Fig 3)
The Storage Building is a simple one room building sized 6x5 m. The available storage area is
~25 m2 floor space for heavy loads and three wooden shelves with total available storage
space of ~10 m2 for DSRS in smaller working containers. There is a fence around the Storage
Building with lockable door.
The Waste Processing Building layout provides several areas grouped in a radiation
protection control area and a working area. The radiation protection control area consists of
four rooms for staff preparation activities, while the working area layout is divided into
reception/working area (~7 m2/~29 m2) and interim store (~9.5 m2). The reception/working
area contains a vault of approximately 1m3 for drainage of liquids in case of possible
decontamination. The reception/working area is provided with a workstation which consists
of work bench, tool storage and space for storage of empty containers and the transport
trolley. A fume hood is installed in the workstation. The interim store area is designated for
the storage of RLR’s and DSRS in working containers such as industrial gauges etc., awaiting
for conditioning and transfer to the Storage Building. Interior walls of the Waste Processing
Building separate the various areas and provide radiation shielding. Access to the interim
store is secured by lockable door.
Figure 3 Rakovica Facility layout
Building structure
The Storage Building has a solid anti-seismic design and robust construction. It is one story
building 6x5 m made of reinforced concrete, including floor and ceiling, additionally the roof
is covered with ceramic tiles. It has two openings in the walls for providing natural
ventilation, one glass window for natural illumination, a lockable door and a wooden rack
with three shelves.
The Waste processing building is one story building, 8x10.5 m. It is completely built of fly
ash bricks, both outer and inner walls. The ceiling has not been constructed. The roof is of
ceramic tiles on wooden construction. The building has 6 windows, a double sided lockable
metallic door and wooden lockable door for personnel. A 10 cm thick bench (4x1x0.8 m),
made of cement, constitutes the base of the workstation.
Building base slab/floor
The floors of the Storage Building and Waste Processing Building are reinforced concrete
rafts, which also constitute the working floors of the storage facility. Resistance to the water
penetration from the ground is not provided to the underside of the slab. It is not expected that
water from the ground will penetrate the buildings. The Waste Processing Building is
provided with an internal pit with capacity of at least 1m3. Liquid waste is not and will not be
stored in the Storage Building, which is not provided with an internal drainage system.
Data on the load factor for the floor slab of the Rakovica Waste Processing Facility is not
available. Heavy loads of up to 1 ton have been maneuvered in the building.
The doors
The Storage Building and the Waste Processing Building have a 2 m and 1 m wide access
doors, respectively. Door openings are of enough size for loaded hand trolleys to pass by. A
separate personnel door is provided at the Waste Processing Building to separate personnel
from waste movements.
Finishes
The floor finishes and finish paintings of the workstation have not been done in either of the
buildings.
Shielding
The Storage Building concrete structure (45 cm thickness) provides radiation shielding to
limit exposures outside the building. The door on the Storage Building is less efficient and
radiation shine is observable through the door. Individual packages are shielded by other
packages.
For ordinary concrete with the density of 2.3 g/cm3 the value of l10 (mm) (i.e. attenuation of
the intensity of radiation by the factor of 10) is 274 mm for photon radiation energies of 3
MeV and 250 mm for 2 MeV neutrons8.
The Waste Processing Building structure materials are less efficient as radiation shielding
material. Fly ash bricks approximate density is 0.6-0.65 g/cm3.
Table 2 Dose rates of selected radionuclides with and without concrete barrier
Measurement Shield Calculated
Activity Distance Shield Shield Thickness Dose-Rate
Isotope GBq cm Coefficient Material cm mSv/hr
Co-60 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 1.133568
Co-60 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.035024
Ba-137m 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.296649
Ba-137m 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.001774
Eu-152 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.457657
Eu-152 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.010388
Ra-226 3.7 100 N/A None N/A 0.64292
Ra-226 3.7 100 Attenuation/BU Concrete 45 0.013399Calculated by Rad Pro Calculator, version 3.0
The shielding for the workstation is assembled of led bricks and led glass. The workstation
design is made of 4 cm thick led bricks assembled in pairs two provide 8 cm thick led barrier.
Calculated dose rates at selected distances with and without shield from RLR containing Eu-
152/154 are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Dose rates at selected distances from the Eu-152/154, activity 3.6 GBq
Measurement Shield Calculated
Activity Distance Shield Shield Thickness Dose-Rate
Isotope GBq Cm Coefficient Material Cm mSv/hr
Eu-152 3.6 10 N/A None N/A 44.67031
Eu-152 3.6 30 N/A None N/A 4.959869
Eu-152 3.6 100 N/A None N/A 0.445288
Eu-152 3.6 10 Attenuation/BU Lead 8 0.57151
Eu-152 3.6 30 Attenuation/BU Lead 8 0.063458
Eu-152 3.6 100 Attenuation/BU Lead 8 0.005698
Eu-152 3.6 10 Attenuation/BU Tungsten 2 8.093601
Eu-152 3.6 30 Attenuation/BU Tungsten 2 0.898664
Eu-152 3.6 100 Attenuation/BU Tungsten 2 0.080683
Calculated by Rad Pro Calculator, version 3.0
8 Samarin A., Use of concrete as a radiological shield from ionizing radiation, Energy and Environmental Engineering 1(2):90-97, 2013
Drainage system
Rain water is prevented from entering the Rakovica Facility by drainage channels around the
buildings. Drainage channel is rectangular shaped with width of 0.5 m and flow height of 0.25
m. Calculated volume flow in channel, based on Gauckler–Manning–Strickler formula is
0.825 m3/s, assuming Manning roughness coefficient for concrete (cement) finished = 0.012.
Electrical power and lighting
Electrical power is provided for lighting, small power tools and detection/warning equipment.
Wirings are installed additionally on the inner surface of the walls. An aggregate is provided
as back-up in case of power failure.
Water supply
Water supply is not provided at the Rakovica Facility, although several other buildings have
water supply at the Rakovica complex.
Ventilation
The storage building has openings for natural ventilation. Outlets are located high on the
building walls and covered with grids to prevent the access of animals, birds and insects.
Lightning prevention
There are three conventional lightning rods around the buildings.
Fire protection
Fire extinguishers are provided in line with local fire regulations. Concrete material and fly
ash bricks used for the Storage Building and the Waste Processing Building are not
flammable material. Wooden waste shipment boxes, which contain DSRS/working
containers, are stored in both buildings. Wooden racks are used in the Storage Building.
Access
The Rakovica Facility is located approximately 30 m from the western site boundary and
access to the site is via a single gate from the access road. A paved area between buildings
allows easy vehicle movement to the vehicle access door of the buildings. Personnel access is
via a personnel access door on the Waste Processing Building.
Mechanical handling equipment
Trolley and hand pallet truck are provided for heavy loads handling. Different types of tongs
are provided at the site for handling DSRS.
Security
The controlled zone is designated as security zone category B in accordance with legislative
requirements. It means the requirements for the security are minimization of the possibility
for intrusion and unauthorized access.
Potential radiation threat is categorized as III, as the highest activity of the stored DSRS is category 2.
Physical security is provided by a number of passive physical barriers including a site
perimeter fence, a storage building fence, strong building construction and high integrity
doors and locks.
The Storage Facility is within a police guarded area, with continuous (24/7) presence of the police security.
Legislative requirements include the intrusion detection system and security plan developed
and implemented.
Facility operations, activities
Operational activities within the Rakovica Facility involve reception and emplacement of
packages, dismantling and repacking of RLR’s and smoke detectors, storage of conditioned
and unconditioned waste/DSRS, radiation monitoring, operational checks of the buildings,
equipment and the stored packages and maintenance of the building and equipment.
No processing or manipulation of the DSRS or their housing, containers or packaging is
carried out at the Rakovica Facility. Low activity DSRS, namely radioactive lighting rods
(category 4 and 5) and smoke detectors are dismantled, segregated and prepared for future
conditioning. Solid radioactive waste is stored as received in transport containers/packages
and segregated for future conditioning.
Description of the personnel dose monitoring programme
The personnel dose monitoring programme is applied in accordance with the national
regulations. Two categories of personnel involved in Rakovica Facility activities are
distinguished. The workers of the Institute are categorized as occupationally exposed
personnel and Police force security workers are categorized as members of the public.
Consequently, different dose limits are applied. The personnel dose monitoring services are
covered by the Institute by providing thermo luminescent dosimeters to the workers and the
Police force and also electronic dosimeters to the workers.
The dose records, measured Hp(10), by thermo luminescent dosimetry are updated on
monthly basis, calculated as cumulative annual and five year dose and archived.
The summary results of the personnel dose monitoring is presented in the following table.
Table 4 Summary of the personnel dose monitoring
Annual dose range 2013 Five years (2009-2013) dose
range
Hp(10), mSv/y
Workers 0.10-0.55 0.8-4.4
Police force Background-0.18 Background-1.2
Description of the ambient dose monitoring programme
The ambient dose monitoring programme comprises measurements in predefined points
within the controlled and supervised areas, as illustrated in Figure 6. Dose rate measurements,
H*(10), are performed with hand held dose rate monitors. Typically, ambient dose
measurements in several monitoring points are performed during receipt, transfer of the waste
or any other activity in the Storage Facility. The frequency of full monitoring is twice a year.
Results of recent measurements of the ambient dose rate are presented in Table 15.
Table 5 Dose rate monitoring results (Nov 10, 2014)
Parameter Waste Processing Facility
1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 1B 2B 3B 4B 5BH*(10), µSv/h 0.20 0.35 1.0 25 0.8
00.17 0.17 0.2
50.08 0.90 40 0.30
Neutrons 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parameter Storage Facility1C 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D
H*(10), µSv/h 200 2.3 0.2 0.5 10 35
Neutrons 2-4 0-1 0-1 2-3 0 2-4
4.3 Description of the waste inventory
Stored waste in the Rakovica Facility consists of conditioned and unconditioned waste.
Conditioned waste consists of two drums with Ra-226 embedded in cement. Unconditioned
waste consists mainly of the DSRS (RLR's, calibration sources, industrial gauges,
brachytherapy sources), low activity sources (smoke detectors and check sources) and solid
LLRW (depleted uranium penetrators/fragments and scrap metal).
Conditioned radioactive waste
The Drum (1) contain 62 mg total amount of Ra-226, equivalent to activity of 2.3 GBq and
the Drum (2) contain secondary waste generated during conditioning process. Those drums
are standardized 200 L drums made of steel. The maximum value of dose rates measured on
the surface of the drums is 2 mSv/h. The conditioning of Ra-226 waste in drums was made
with the assistance of the IAEA. The report on the conditioning contains information on the
total amount of the radium paint and the Ra-226 content.
Table 6 Conditioned radioactive waste stored in Storage Building
Nature of contents
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste
Activity (GBq)
Drum description
Cemented Ra-226 Radium paint* Solid 2.3 200 L, steel, lidded
Cemented Ra-226 Secondary waste during conditioning process
Solid Unknown 200 L, steel, lidded
*- 31 glass bottles, 80x20 mm, with 20 g of radium paint containing 2 mg Ra-226 each. Total amount of Ra-226 is 62 mg.
Unconditioned radioactive waste – DSRS
The most DSRS account for the industrial gauges (55 sources) and the most activity are
associated with the Co-60 calibration source (897.5 GBq). The DSRS are stored mainly as
received in working containers. The inventory is listed in the following Table 5.
Table 7 DSRS stored in Rakovica Facility
Source storage code
DSRScategory
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste
Activity (GBq) Number of sources
KAL001 2 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC1 897.48 1 sourceKAL003 3-5 7xCo-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 127.81 7 sources
KAL002 4 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 10.31 1 sourceKAL004 5 Co-60 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.002244 1 source
KAL005 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources
Source storage code
DSRScategory
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste
Activity (GBq) Number of sources
KAL006 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources
KAL007 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sourcesKAL008 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sources
KAL009 5 Sr-90 Calibration DSRS in WC 0.02 2 sourcesN001 4 Am-241/B Neutron activation
analysisDSRS dismantled
34.57 1 source
N002 4 Am-241/Li Neutron activation analysis
DSRS dismantled
34.57 1 source
MED001 4-5 Cs-137 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 14.83 45 sources
MED002 5 Co-60 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 0.53 3 sourcesMED003 5 Co-60 Brachytherapy DSRS in WC 0.01 3 sources
MED004 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.02 1 sourceMED005 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.02 1 source
MED06 5 Ra-226 Unknown DSRS in WC 0.01 1 sourceIND001 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS
dismantled0.03 1 source
IND002 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
0.03 1 source
IND003 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
0.03 1 source
IND004 5 Co 60 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
0.03 1 source
IND005 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND006 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND007 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND008 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND009 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND010 4 Cs 137 Gauge industrial DSRS dismantled
7.21 1 source
IND011 4 Am-241/Be Moisture gauge DSRS dismantled
1.41 1 source
IND011 4 Cs-137 Moisture gauge DSRS dismantled
0.17 1 source
IND012 5 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 8.57E-6 1 source
IND013 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND014 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source
IND015 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND016 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source
IND017 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND018 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source
IND019 4 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND020 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC Unknown 1 source
IND021 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 sourceIND022 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 source
IND023 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 sourceIND024 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.01 1 source
IND025 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 3.52E-4 1 sourceIND026 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.21 1 source
IND027 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.21 1 sourceIND028 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 2.61 1 source
IND029 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 2.61 1 sourceIND030 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 1.38 1 source
IND031 5 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.36 1 sourceIND032 4 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 35.58 1 source
Source storage code
DSRScategory
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste
Activity (GBq) Number of sources
IND033 5 Kr-85 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.38 1 source
IND034 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND035 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source
IND036 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 sourceIND037 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC unknown 1 source
IND038 4 Am-241 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 10.52 1 sourceIND039 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS
dismantled0.00 1 source
IND040 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 1.41E-5 1 source
IND041 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 4.38E-7 1 sourceIND042 5 Ir-192 Radiography DSRS in WC 4.30E-10 1 source
IND043 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 4.86 1 sourceIND044 4 Cs-137 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 4.86 1 source
IND045 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 sourceIND046 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source
IND047 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 sourceIND048 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source
IND049 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 sourceIND050 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source
IND051 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 sourceIND052 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source
IND053 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 sourceIND054 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source
IND055 5 Co-60 Gauge industrial DSRS in WC 0.35 1 source1 - WC, Working container
Table 8 DSRS stored in Rakovica Facility
Typeof source
Drum/ContainerDrum 4 Drum Sources Drum N Working container
DSRS 13 sources 4 working containers/4 sources 2 sources 48 containers/58 sources
Unconditioned radioactive waste –Radioactive lightning rods (RLR’s)
The most DSRS stored in the Rakovica Facility account for the RLR's (106 sources) with Eu-
152/154 and Co-60 initial activities 14.8 GBq and 7.4 GBq, respectively.
Figure 4 Design of the RLR Eu-152/154, Led shield with tungsten ingot
In Tables 7 and 8 inventory of RLR’s are presented.
Table 9 RLR’s stored in Rakovica Facility
DSRS category
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste Activity range (GBq) Number of RLR's
4 Eu-152/154 RLR DSRS, dismantled 2-4 975 Co-60 RLR DSRS, dismantled 0.02-0.11 9
Table 10 RLR’s stored in Rakovica Facility
Typeof source
Drum/ContainerDrums 4&5 Drum
2011Container E
RLR 83 20 3
Two drums (4 and 5) were custom made for the containment of sources, mostly Eu-152/154
disassembled from RLR’s. Documentation on the quality of the drums is not available. It is
observable that 4 cm thick led pipes were cemented in the 200 L steel drum. The maximum
value of the dose rate measured on the lower surface of the drum was ~2 mSv/h.
Unconditioned radioactive waste – Low activity sources
A significant number low activity sources have been collected and received. Those sources
include mainly smoke detectors (Am-241) and instrument check sources (Sr-90).
Table 11 Low activity sources stored in Rakovica Facility
Radionuclide Type of source Type of waste Activity (GBq) Number of sourcesAm-241 Smoke detector Working equipment,
Drum Smoke detectors0.000074/source 1643
Am-241 Smoke detector Dismantled, Drum Am-241
0.000074/source 667
Sr-90 Check source Dismantled, Wooden box
Unknown 685
Ra-226 Dial Equipment, Drum Sources Ra-226
~0.0025 2
Ra-226 Marker Equipment, Drum Sources Ra-226
~0.002 4
Unconditioned radioactive waste – Solid radioactive waste
This waste includes depleted uranium ammunition, scrap metal with alloyed thorium and
ribbons with H-3 on the surface of it.
Table 12 Solid radioactive waste stored in Rakovica Facility
Waste category
Radionuclide Waste amount (kg)
Type of source Type of waste Activity range (GBq)
LLRW Depleted 30-40 DU ammunition DU penetrator fragments, Drum PP 0.4-0.6
uranium 20LLLRW Th-232 200 (total
alloy)Thoriated metal Scrap metal, Wooden box Unknown
LLRW H-3 - Marker Solid, ribbons, Drum 20 L (x4) Unknown
Drum/package storage arrangements
Waste in Storage Building is stored as illustrated in Fig 5. Heavy loads are placed on the
floor, while smaller size working containers (<50 kg) are placed on the wooden racks. High
dose rates (~2 mSv/h) drums with conditioned Ra-226 and drums with dismantled RLR’s are
stored on the floor at the right side of the storage.
Waste in the Waste Processing Building is stored as illustrated in Fig. 5. In the working area
heavy weight (~100 kg) working containers with Co-60 sources are placed. In the interim
store area a lead container with Eu-152/154 (~1.5 mSv/h) and three cement lined steel drums
with the sources in it are placed. Working containers with industrial gauges are placed, too.
Figure 5 Drum/package arrangement in Waste Processing Building
5. Safety assessment
5.1 Introduction
The Rakovica Facility was designed to provide for safe temporary storage of conditioned
DSRS and incidental low level radioactive waste for a period until suitable long term storage
is available or repository is available for final disposal. The maximum period of time
anticipated for temporary storage would not exceed 10 years.
The purpose of this assessment is to consider the radiological safety aspects for the existing
centralized waste management facility - Rakovica Facility and activities of the Institute as
operator of the Rakovica Facility.
The assessment covers Rakovica Facility in current operational status. The buildings and
structures are considered to the extent that could interfere with the waste management
operations. Only the radiological risks are addressed. Other possible risk components are not
considered. In order to assess the radiological impact, consideration has been given to the
normal operation of the Rakovica Facility and to accidental situations caused by disturbing
events that could occur.
5.2 Assessment context
5.2.1 Regulatory framework
The following radiological safety criteria, taken from B&H radiation protection regulation,
are used as a basis for evaluation of safety and protection of the Rakovica Facility.
The dose limit and constraint dose for whole body dose to an individual
occupationally exposed worker (worker) are defined as 20 mSv/year and 2 mSv/year9,
respectively.
The dose limit and constraint dose for the most exposed member of the public are
defined as 1 mSv/year and 0.3 mSv/y10, respectively.
The registration and investigation levels for personnel dosimetry are defined as 0.08
mSv/month and 1 mSv/month11, respectively.
Radiation protection workers are classified as Category A workers if their potential
exposure exceeds 6 mSv/y and the rest are Category B workers12.
The radiation zones, controlled and supervised, are distinguished based on potential
for the workers to be exposed to radiation and receive whole body dose in amount of 1
mSv/y (supervised area) and 6 mSv/y (controlled area)13.
The radioactive waste is categorized as Very Short Lived, Very Low Level, Low
Level, Intermediate Level and High Level Radioactive Waste14.
9Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)
10Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)
11Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)
12Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)
13Regulation on Radiation Protection at Occupational and Public Exposure, 102/11 (2011)
14Regulation on Radioactive Waste Management, DRAFT version (Dec. 2013)
The DSRS are categorized into five categories, from 1-5, based on potential risk for
human health15.
Exemption levels are defined based on IAEA BSS16.
Transport packages surface dose rate must not exceed 2 mSv/h (transport index 10)
and non-fixed, accessible contamination levels must not exceed contamination levels
0.4 Bq/cm2 for beta and gamma emitters and low toxicity alpha emitters or 0.04
Bq/cm2 for all other alpha emitters17.
Radiation threats are categorized from I to V based on potential hazard18.
Security levels are categorized from A to D based on category of stored DSRS19.
5.2.2 Endpoints for the assessment
The assessment of safety involves consideration of radiological impacts. Assessment end
points include:
Doses to workers of the Institute during activities involved in storage of the waste
Doses to the Police security personnel involved in security checks
Doses to the public of Rakovica village during the storage operation and during the
storage period
5.2.3 Approach to the assessment
The approach to safety assessment includes the following components:
Analysis of site and engineering aspects
Identification and screening of hazards based on Rakovica Facility design, operation
and stored waste
Development and justification of the scenarios
Dose assessments for workers, security personnel and members of the public
15Regulation on Notification and Authorization of Practice, 66/10 (2010)
16Regulation on Notification and Authorization of Practice, 66/10 (2010)
17Regulation on Radioactive Material Transport Safety, 96/12 (2012)
18Regulation on Categorization of the Radiation Threats, 102/11 (2011)
19Regulation on Security of the Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources, 85/13 (2013)
In general cautious assumptions, based on actual data and records and documents from the
Institute, are taken for the assessment of normal operation and accident situations. The
assessment is carried out using deterministic models. Probabilistic approaches are not applied
at this stage of the assessment.
Safety considerations for normal operations consider exposure, i.e. dose received, for
operators of the facility, security personnel and members of the general public living in the
vicinity of the Rakovica Facility.
Analysis of accident conditions considers the effects of those incidents arising from internal
events, i.e. process related events and those incidents arising from external events, i.e. from
events not related to the internal processes.
5.3 Description of safety elements and functions
5.3.1 Safety elements
# NAME DESCRIPTION
1 Limit and condition-Waste Acceptance Criteria
Rakovica Facility is designed for simple operations of DSRS storage in the working containers and dismantling of the RLR's.
2 Monitoring requirement-Buildings integrity checks
Control for human intrusion and general buildings condition.
3 Monitoring requirement-Testing and calibration of dosimetric and activity meters.
Radiation measurement equipment have to be tested before use and calibrated once in three years.
4 Monitoring requirement-Periodical surveys of ambient radiation and surface contamination
Measurements of radiation in defined spots in and outside of the buildings within Rakovica Facility, twice a year at a minimum or more frequently if needed.
5 Maintenance requirement-Power back up aggregate service
Back up aggregate has to be tested before use and serviced annually.
6 Maintenance requirement-Drainage channel clearance
Drainage channel has to be cleared twice twice a year at a minimum or more frequently if needed.
7 Operational procedure-Receipt of waste/DSRS
8 Operational procedure-Dismantling of
RLR's
9 Operational procedure-Storage of the working container with DSRS and/or RLR
10
Operational procedure-Individual radiation monitoring
11
Operational procedure-Ambient radiation monitoring
12
Operational procedure-Waste inventory records
13
Emergency procedure-Recovery of the bare DSRS
14
Emergency procedure-Decontamination of buildings, equipment and workers
15
Emergency procedure-Fire fighting
16
Management rule-Site access to authorized staff
17
Management rule-Classification of workers
18
Management rule-Compliance with BOH radiation protection regulation
19
Management rule-Documented inventory of waste/DSRS
20
Management rule-Documented procedures for specific activities
5.3.2 Site and engineering analysis
Engineering aspects that ensure safety during operations carried out in the Rakovica Facility
are:
Drainage system is provided to prevent flooding of the buildings. The results for the
volume flow of the drainage system, calculated by the Gauckler–Manning–Strickler
formula are presented in the Table 26.
Figure 6 Rectangular shaped drainage channel
Table 13 Results for the drainage channel flow rate
Channel shape Width
Height
Flow area (cross section)
b, m h, m m2Rectangular 0,5 0,25 0,125kn = 1.486 for English units and kn = 1.0 for SI unitsn = Manning coefficient of roughness 0,012S = slope of pipe (m/m) 0,1R = A / P 0,125A = cross sectional area of flow (ft2, m2) 0,125P = wetted perimeter (m) 1The volume flow in the channel can be calculated asq = A v = A kn / n R2/3 S1/2
q = volume flow (m3/s) 0,8235
Assuming rainfall of 90 L/day and the area of 100 m2 calculated amount of water is 0.1 L/s. It
is significantly lower than drainage channel capacity. The drainage system is sufficient for the
anticipated precipitation rate (max. 93 L/m2) provided it is maintained regularly.
The engineering characteristics of the Rakovica Facility ensure structural stability under
extreme environmental conditions. The Storage Building ensures adequate seismic stability.
The Waste Processing Building is of less structure stability.
The characteristics of the walls of the Storage Building allow ensuring a level of dose rate that
complies with the restriction for public exposure (0.3 mSv/h) for the representative person.
The characteristics of the walls of the Waste Processing Building do not ensure a level of dose
rate that complies with the restriction for public exposure (0.3 mSv/h) for the representative
person. Waste arrangement should provide acceptable dose rates that comply with prescribed
limits.
The lighting system is provided in the Rakovica facility, it is adequate and permits the
performance of operations in a safe manner.
Electric power is provided together with back up power supply.
Physical delineation of areas designed for storage and for the main waste management
operations are isolated, this way it is ensured the appropriated segregation of materials
optimizing worker’s exposure during operations.
Each delineated area has a sufficient physical space that ensures a minimal probability of
accident occurrence during package management.
Storage building is one room area, with drum/package arrangement provided shielding to
optimize the exposure of workers.
Drums with sources are stored on a structure in a manner such that packages do not contact
the interior surface of the building walls. This makes easy control operations and the potential
corrosion of packaging/containers is limited.
Contitioned and unconditioned radioactive sources are DSRS and conditioned radium drums
stored to the maximum of free space ensuring normal operation and minimizing probability of
accidents. Their main characteristics are:
o Storage capacity is almost exhausted due to practice of storing the DSRS in working
containers. The current and foreseen needs of management of DSRS require
conditioning of the stored category 4 and 5 DSRS.
o The workstation is adequate for disassembling the RLR’s. Foreseen needs for
conditioning of the DSRS of category 4 and 5, originated from industrial use and use
in medical institutions will require upgrade of the workstation.
o It ensures source segregation. In this way, periodic inspection and radiological
monitoring of the storage building and of the waste drums/packages is facilitated.
Its structure resists the maximum load of the sources that are intended to be stored.
In case of a potential surface decontamination using liquids there is a collection system inside
the Waste Processing Building that prevents liquid contaminant release to the environment.
The system has a retention tank that permits environmental monitoring before releasing to the
environment. Decontamination is provided by the CBR team of the Civil Protection. The CBR
unit is self sufficient team equipped with specialized military vehicles for CBR
decontamination. The CBR unit is capable to develop field decontamination unit consisting of
the decontamination vehicle with its own power supply, water reservoir tank, agents for
decontamination and different decontamination spreading tools, as well as decontamination
unit for its own personnel.
The Rakovica Facility has its own fire extinguishers. The fire protection system prevents the
fire impact on the Rakovica Facility. Regular maintenance and clearance of the vegetation
will prevent the potential for natural fires.
Another issue is erosion and potential slide of the soil to the facility buildings that may affect
efficiency of the drainage system. Regular maintenance prevents the impact on the facility.
Continuous radiation monitoring equipment is not provided within Rakovica Facility. The
hand held radiation monitoring equipment is available for operational activities in the
Rakovica Facility.
Handling equipment that is used for the on-site transport is adequate for the heavy loads. They
are designed for the foreseen loads of the packages the storage building will manage. The
periodical maintenance programs of these handling systems should be designed to ensure
manufacturer’s operational conditions.
Access to the Rakovica Facility and its surroundings is limited by a complex perimeter fence
that prevents unauthorized access. Apart from the fence, the non-intentional access of a non-
authorized person is limited by other passive barriers lockable doors and steel rods at the
windows. Further, security needs upgrade for intrusion detection system as required by
legislation.
5.3.3 Passive safety and defense in depth
Stored waste is mainly DSRS, the form of waste not prone to migrate in the environment. The
DSRS are encapsulated and in working or storage containers, stored in designated rooms and
areas. Limited ammount of conditioned Ra-226 is embedded in cement in 200 L sealed SS
drums. The buildings itself provide additional barrier and restrict access to the sources.
5.3.4 Operational safety aspects
The Rakovica Facility is designated as a radiologically controlled area and workers of the
Institute are designated as occupationally exposed personnel with the necessary dosimetry
control.
The Storage Building, the fenced area around the Storage Building itself and Waste
Processing Building are designated as controlled areas. An additional safety perimeter is set to
approximately 10 m around the buildings and the area is designated as supervised area.
A radiation monitoring programme has been developed to cover routine monitoring of the
Rakovica Facility and its environment, monitoring of specific operations, such as
emplacement activities and any individual measurements that may be required as needed. The
programme has the ability to monitor external radiation levels and surface contamination.
5.3.5 Management system
IPH is public health institution founded by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and
Hezegovina. IPH is a legal entity with the responsibilities, including radiation protection,
defined in Public Health Act (2010). Organization of the IPH is defined by the Rule/Statute of
the IPH and Regulation on internal organization of the IPH.
Manager of the IPH manages, coordinates and supervise Departments of the IPH. Head of the
RPC, is technical personnel, resposible for the work activities performed by the RPC and
reports to the Manager. Staff of the RPC are technical personnel responsible for technical
performance of the work activities.
Responsibility matrix in the RPC is illustrated in Figure Table xx
Manager RPC Head Technical personnelManagement requirementsOrganization M TManagement system MDocument control MReview of requests, tenders and contracts MPurchasing services and supplies A MService to the customer M TComplaints A M TControl of nonconforming work M TImprovement A M T
Corrective action M TPreventive action M TControl of records M TInternal audits AManagement reviews MTechnical requirementsPersonnel A MTest/work methods M TEquipment A M TReporting the results M TResponsibility: M-Managerial, T-Technical, A-Awareness
5.4 Development and justification of scenarios
5.4.1 Normal operation
Waste management activities include receipt of the waste/DSRS, storage of DSRS in original
shielded container, repacking of RLR’s and smoke detectors and inspections of the waste and
buildings itself.
Normal operation activities are:
1. Waste/DSRS receipt at the Rakovica Facility
a. Off-loading of the waste packages from the transport vehicle
b. Radiation and contamination monitoring of the transport vehicle and the
waste packages
c. Quarantining and subsequent decontamination of the transport vehicle and
the waste packages if contamination is discovered
2. RLR and smoke detectors disassembling
a. Source removal from the holder
b. Contamination check
c. Dose rate check and activity estimation
d. Transfer the source to storage container
3. Storage of conditioned and unconditioned waste
a. Transfer of the waste drums/containers/packages into the storage building;
b. Acceptance and placing of the waste drums/containers/packages into their
storage location within the storage building;
4. Periodic inspection and radiological monitoring of the storage building and of the
waste drums/packages;
a. Quarantining of waste drums/containers/packages within the storage
building if contamination is discovered;
b. Wrapping/bagging of the quarantined waste drums/containers/packages
and transfer to a suitable area for decontamination if contamination is
discovered;
Transport packages sent to the Rakovica Facility are received in the receipt area of the Waste
Processing Building. Sources that arrive at the Rakovica Facility are accompanied by
appropriate documentation indicating the type of sources in the package. It enables Rakovica
Facility staff to ensure that it is handled and stored in the most appropriate and safest manner.
The main hazards in the receipt area of the Waste Processing Building are considered to arise
from external exposure to workers. The hazard of leaking sources and potential intake of
radioactive material should not be neglected.
The DSRS are stored with the working containers, as received, following contamination
check of the outer surface of working container itself. The RLR’s and smoke detectors are
dismantled and transferred to custom made drums. The dismantling of the RLR which source
holder have been deteriorated due to reason that the RLR has been exposed to different
atmospheric conditions for decades is considered anticipated normal occurrence. The
principal hazards existing during unpacking and handling the sources are external exposure to
radiation.
The received waste/DSRS’s are stored in interim store of Waste Processing Building before
transferred to Storage Building for long term storage. The hazards arising from the temporary
storage of DSRS are external exposure to workers during transfer activities with the sources
and regular checks of the stored waste.
The security personnel are exposed to external radiation during security checks of the
Rakovica Facility.
# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
RELEVANCE
RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
CATEGORY OF IMPACT (FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS)
1 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
2 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
3 Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
Outside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
RELEVANCE
RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
CATEGORY OF IMPACT (FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS)
1 Receipt of DSRS/RLR
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
2 Repack of RLR Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
3 Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant
# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
RELEVANCE
RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
CATEGORY OF IMPACT (FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS)
1 Repack of DU Inside Quantitative Exposure via inhalation
Relevant
5.4.2 Scenarios for accidentsAccidents internal
# NAME RELEVANCE
RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
1 The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the
Relevant
design basis.
2 The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Relevant Simple activities in the facility.
3 A criticality event due to the inappropriate accumulation of fissile material, change of geometrical configuration, introduction of moderating material, removal of neutron absorbing material or various combinations of these.
Not relevant
Not relevant as fissile material not present in the facility
4 Explosion due to the evolution of explosive gas mixtures
Not relevant
Not relevant as materials that produce/create explosive gas mixtures not present in the facility
5 Spontaneous combustion Not relevant
Spontaneous combustion material not present in the facility
6 Local hot spots generated by malfunctions of structures, systems or components
Not relevant
Not relevant due to simple design and operations in the facility
7 Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits Relevant
8 Sparks from human activities such as welding or smoking
Not relevant
Not relevant as such actitivites not present in the facility
9 Explosions Not relevant
Not relevant since explosive materials or materials that tend to create explosive mixtures are not present in the facility
10 Gross incompatibilities between the components of a process system and the materials introduced into the system.
Not relevant
Not relevant due to simple design and activities in the facility.
11 The degradation of process materials (chemicals, additives or binders) due to improper handling and storage.
Not relevant
Not relavnt as such materials are not used in simple operations with DSRS
12 The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).
Relevant
13 The generation of a toxic atmosphere by chemical reactions due to the inappropriate mixing or contact of various reagents and materials.
Not relevant
Not relevant as materials or reagents with the potential to create dangerous mixtures are
not present if the facility
14 Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Relevant
15 Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
Relevant
16 Failures of structures, systems and components Relevant
17 The generation of missiles and flying debris due to the explosion of pressurized components or the gross failure of rotating equipment.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
18 The malfunctioning of heating or cooling equipment, leading to unintended temperature excursions in process systems or storage systems.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
19 The malfunctioning of process control equipment. Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
20 The malfunctioning of equipment that maintains the ambient conditions in the facility, such as the ventilation system or dewatering system.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
21 The malfunctioning of monitoring or alarm systems so that an adverse condition goes unnoticed.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
22 Incorrect settings (errors or unauthorized changes) on monitors, alarms or control equipment.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
23 The failure to function when called upon of emergency equipment such as the fire suppression system, pressure relief valves and ducts.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
24 The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
Relevant
25 The malfunctioning of key equipment for handling waste, such as transfer cranes or conveyors.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
26 The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.
Relevant Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
27 The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.
Relevant
28 Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.
Relevant
29 Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.
Relevant
30 Sabotage by employees. Relevant
31 The failure of systems and components such as incinerator linings, compactor hydraulics or cutting machinery that poses the risk of significant additional radiation exposure of personnel called on to assist in effecting repairs or replacements.
Not relevant
Not relevant as such equipment is not present in the facility
32 Encountering an unanticipated radiation source in decommissioning (e.g. different in nature or amount) and not recognizing immediately the changed circumstances.
Not relevant
Not relevant for the facility life stage
33 Removing or weakening a structure or component in decommissioning without realizing the possible effect on the structural competence of other structures and components.
Not relevant
Not relevant for the facility life stage
34 Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building
Relevant
External accidents human induced
# NAME RELEVANCE
RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
1 Explosion Relevant
2 Fire Relevant
3 Aircraft crash Relevant
4 Missile due to structural or mechanical failure in nearby installations
Not relevant
Not relevant due to simple design of the facility
5 Ground subsidence or collapse due to tunnelling or mining
Not relevant
Not relevant as such activities are not recorded in the area
6 Ground vibration Not relevant
Not relevant due to simple design of the facility
7 The release of any corrosive, toxic and/or radioactive Not Not relevant for the simple
substance relevant operations with DSRS
8 Geographic and demographic data Not relevant
Not relevant for simple design and operations of the facility
9 Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)
Relevant
10
External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc.
Relevant
11
Power supply and the potential loss of power Relevant
12
Civil strife Not relevant
Not present in the area
External natural accidents
# NAME RELEVANCE RELEVANCE - JUSTIFICATION (IF NOT RELEVANT)
1 Lightning (effect on power supply) Relevant
2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) Relevant
3 Lightning (effect on facility) Relevant
4 Extreme snowing Relevant
5 Extreme rain Relevant
6 Extreme drought Not relevant Not relevant as drought weather conditions are not typical for the area
7 Strong wind Relevant
8 Extreme temperatures Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
9 Hydrology and hydrogeology Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
10
Geology of site and region Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
11
Seismic events Relevant
12
Other effects of ground stability Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
13
Geomorphology and topography of site Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
14
Terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna Not relevant Not relevant for the simple facility operations and type of waste-DSRS and foreseen storage period
15
Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Relevant Considered in Fire event scenario
16
Flooding Not relevant Not relevant due to distant surface waters bodies.
Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs)# NAME
RELEVANCE
PROBABILITY - GIVEN AS NUMERICAL/QUALITATIVE
PROBABILITY - VALUE (QUALITATIVE)
SITUATION
1 Lightning (effect on power supply) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
3 Lightning (effect on facility) Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
4 Extreme snowing Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
5 Extreme rain Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
6 Strong wind Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
7 Seismic events Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
8 Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
9 Explosion Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
10
Fire Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
11
Aircraft crash Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
12
Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)
Relevant Qualitative Medium Accidental
13
External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous
Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
material etc.
14
Power supply and the potential loss of power Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
15
The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
16
The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
17
Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
18
The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
19
Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Relevant Qualitative Accidental
20
Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
21
Failures of structures, systems and components
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
22
The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
23
The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
24
The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
25
Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
26
Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.
Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
27
Sabotage by employees. Relevant Qualitative Very Low Accidental
28
Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building
Relevant Qualitative Low Accidental
Scenarios# NAME IS SAME
AS IN LINKED PIE
RELEVANT
GIVEN AS NUMERICAL/QUALITATIVE
SITUATION VALUE (QUALITATIVE)
1 Lightning (effect on power supply) True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
2 Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility)
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
3 Lightning (effect on facility) True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
4 Extreme snowing True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
5 Extreme rain True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
6 Strong wind True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
7 Seismic events True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
8 Potential for natural fires, storms etc. True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
9 Explosion True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
10
Fire True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
11
Aircraft crash True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
12
Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Medium
13
External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
14
Power supply and the potential loss of power
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
15
The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
16
The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
17
Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
18
The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
pathogenic).
19
Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental
20
Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
21
Failures of structures, systems and components
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
22
The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
23
The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
24
The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
25
Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
26
Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
27
Sabotage by employees. True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Very Low
28
Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building
True Relevant Qualitative Accidental Low
5.5 Formulation and implementation of assessment modelsNormal operation - Impacts
Assessment is made for the selected activities. Exposure to the workers and police security is
quantified taking into account the external exposure based on monitoring results for dose rates
and calculated dose rates from the selected DSRS. Exposure for the public in normal
operation of the Rakovica Facility is not likely due to simple operations and physical integrity
of the DSRS.
# NAME AFFECTING
QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
RELEVANCE
OPTIONS FOR DOSE RATE AND EXPOSURE DURATION DATA
1 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Use ext.dose rate specified in system description and one exp. time value
2 Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Use ext.dose rate specified in system description and one exp. time value
3 Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
Outside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Use ext.dose rate specified in system description and one exp. time value
# NAME AFFECTING
QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
RELEVANCE
OPTIONS FOR DOSE RATE AND EXPOSURE DURATION DATA
1 Receipt of DSRS/RLR
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Calculate ext. dose rate and specify duration for each waste component
2 Repack of RLR Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Calculate ext. dose rate and specify duration for each waste component
3 Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR
Inside Quantitative Direct external exposure
Relevant Use ext.dose rate specified in system description and one exp. time value
# NAME AFFECTING QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES RELEVANCE
1 Repack of DU Inside Quantitative Exposure via inhalation Relevant
Accidents - impacts
# NAME AFFECTING
QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT
RELEVANCE
CATEGORY OF IMPACT (FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS)
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
1 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on power supply)
Inside Qualitative Relevant Very Low Other
2 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) OUTSIDE
Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to air inside the build. and to atmosphere
3 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) INSIDE
Inside Qualitative Relevant High Increased direct external exposure
4 Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on facility)
Inside Qualitative Relevant Low Other
5 Impact for scenario Extreme snowing
Inside Qualitative Relevant Low Other
6 Impact for scenario Extreme rain
Inside Qualitative Relevant Medium Other
7 Impact for scenario Strong wind
Inside Qualitative Relevant Low Other
8 Impact for scenario Seismic events
Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct external exposure
9 Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc.
Outside Quantitative Relevant Release to atmosphere only
10
Impact for scenario Explosion
Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to atmosphere only
11
Impact for scenario Fire INSIDE
Inside Qualitative Relevant Very High Increased direct external exposure
12
Impact for scenario Fire OUTSIDE
Outside Qualitative Relevant Very High Release to air inside the build. and to atmosphere
13
Impact for scenario Aircraft crash
Outside Qualitative Relevant High Release to atmosphere only
14
Impact for scenario Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)
Outside Qualitative Relevant Low Other
15
Impact for scenario External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc. 1
Outside Qualitative Relevant Low Other
16
Impact for scenario Power supply and the potential loss of power
Inside Qualitative Relevant Very Low Other
17
Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent
Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct
or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
external exposure
18
Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct external exposure
19
Impact for scenario Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits
Inside Qualitative Relevant High Increased direct external exposure
20
Impact for scenario The failure to take account of the non-radiological hazards presented by the waste (physical, chemical or pathogenic).
Qualitative Relevant Medium
21
Impact for scenario Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Inside Quantitative Relevant Increased direct external exposure
22
Impact for scenario Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
Outside Qualitative Relevant Medium Increased direct external exposure
23
Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components
Inside Quantitative Relevant Release to air
24
Impact for scenario The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
Inside Qualitative Relevant Very Low Other
25
Impact for scenario The malfunctioning of structures, systems and components that control releases to the environment, such as filters or valves.
Qualitative Relevant High
26
Impact for scenario The failure properly to inspect, test and maintain structures, systems and components.
Qualitative Relevant Very High
27
Impact for scenario Incorrect operator action due to inaccurate or incomplete information.
Qualitative Relevant Very High
28
Impact for scenario Incorrect operator action in spite of having accurate and complete information.
Qualitative Relevant Very High
29
Impact for scenario Sabotage by employees.
Qualitative Relevant Very High
30
Impact for scenario Traffic accident when transporting waste on-site to processing facility or from processing facility to storage building
Qualitative Relevant Medium
5.6 Performance of calculations and analysis of the results
5.6.1 Radiological impact assessment for normal operationAssessment monitoring
Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building
6 1.20E-006 7.20E-006
Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building
2 2.00E-004 4.00E-004
Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
6 6.00E-006 3.60E-005
Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
30 1.00E-005 3.00E-004
Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
30 6.00E-006 1.80E-004
Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit
(Sv/y)Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside of waste process building Worker 7.20E-006 Dose limit
worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of inside storage building Worker 4.00E-004 Dose limit
worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility
Endpoint Worker Outside 3.60E-005 Dose limit
worker 2.00E-002Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility Endpoint Public 3.00E-004 Dose limit
public 1.00E-003Inspection and radiation monitoring of outside of facility Endpoint Public 1.80E-004 Dose limit
public 1.00E-003
Assessment Processing DSRS and DU
Waste component External dose rate (Sv/h) Exposure time (h/year) Dose (Sv/year)
INC transport container w/Eu-152 5.00E-005 5 2.50E-004INC transport container w/Co-60 cat 3 high 5.00E-005 5 2.50E-004
INC RLR Eu-152 5.00E-005 2 1.00E-004
Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR 2 1.20E-006 2.40E-006
Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit (Sv/y)Receipt of DSRS/RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 5.00E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002
Repack of RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 1.00E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002
Interim Storage of DSRS/RLR Endpoint Worker Inside 1 2.40E-006 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002
Total Endpoint Worker Inside 1 6.02E-004 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002
Impact Exposure time (h/year) Dose rate (Sv/h) Annual dose (Sv/year)Repack of DU 1 1.23E-008 1.23E-008
Impact Endpoint Dose (Sv/year) Criterion Limit (Sv/y)Repack of DU Endpoint Worker Inside 1 1.23E-008 Dose limit worker 2.00E-002
5.6.2 Radiological impact assessment for accidents
Scenario ImpactProbability
- qualitative
Impact - qualitativ
eLightning (effect on power supply) Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on
power supply) Very Low Very LowLightning (effect on surroundings of facility)
Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) INSIDE Very Low High
Lightning (effect on facility) Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on facility) Very Low Low
Extreme snowing Impact for scenario Extreme snowing Low LowExtreme rain Impact for scenario Extreme rain Low MediumStrong wind Impact for scenario Strong wind Low LowSeismic events Impact for scenario Seismic events Very Low Very HighFire Impact for scenario Fire INSIDE Low Very HighPower supply and the potential loss of power
Impact for scenario Power supply and the potential loss of power Very Low Very Low
The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
Low Medium
The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Very Low Very High
Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits
Impact for scenario Sparks from machinery, equipment or electrical circuits
Low High
Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Impact for scenario Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Very High
Failures of structures, systems and components
Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components Low
The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
Impact for scenario The failure of the power supply, either the main system or various subsystems.
Low Very Low
Scenario ImpactProbability
- qualitative
Impact - qualitative
Fire Impact for scenario Fire OUTSIDE Low Very HighCollisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
Impact for scenario Collisions of vehicles or suspended loads with the structures, systems and components of the facility or with waste packages, waste containment vessels and pipes.
Very Low Medium
External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc.
Impact for scenario External impacts from industrial and military installations, transport routes of hazardous material etc. 1
Very Low Low
Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings)
Impact for scenario Changes in population around facility (including illegal buildings) Medium Low
Aircraft crash Impact for scenario Aircraft crash Very Low HighExplosion Impact for scenario Explosion Very Low HighLightning (effect on surroundings of facility)
Impact for scenario Lightning (effect on surroundings of facility) OUTSIDE Very Low High
Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc. Low
Scenario ImpactProbabilit
y - qualitativ
e
Endpoint Case Dose (Sv) Criterio
nLimit (Sv)
Seismic events Impact for scenario Seismic events Very Low
Endpoint Worker Inside 1
Assesment case 1
2.95E+002
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
LowEndpoint Worker Inside 1
Assesment case 1
5.00E-005
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
Impact for scenario The acceptance (inadvertent or otherwise) of incoming waste, waste containers, process chemicals, conditioning agents, etc., that do not meet the specifications (acceptance criteria) included in the design basis.
LowEndpoint Worker Inside 1
Assessment case 2
5.60E-004
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently processed in an
Impact for scenario The processing of waste that meets acceptance criteria but that is subsequently
Very Low Endpoint Worker Inside 1
Assesment case 1
3.47E-002
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
processed in an inappropriate way for the particular type of waste (either inadvertently or otherwise).
Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Impact for scenario Dropping waste packages or other loads due to mishandling or equipment failure, with consequences to the dropped waste package and possibly to other waste packages or to the structures, systems and components of the facility.
Endpoint Worker Inside 1
Assesment case 1
2.53E-003
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
Failures of structures, systems and components
Impact for scenario Failures of structures, systems and components
LowEndpoint Worker Inside 1
Assessment case
Dose limit worker
1.00E-003
Scenario Impact Probability - qualitative Endpoint Case Dose
(Sv) Criterion Limit (Sv)
Potential for natural fires, storms etc.
Impact for scenario Potential for natural fires, storms etc.
Low Endpoint Public 1
Assesment case 1
4.57E-001
Dose limit public
1.00E-003
5.6.3 Non radiological environmental impact
Not covered by the scope of the SC.
5.6.4 Management of uncertainties
For the purpose of the scenarios development, modelling and used parameters the professional
judgment approach is combined with the conservative approach. The selected scenarios and
associated models were selected based on the experience and professional judgment. The
calculations were done based on conservatively selected parameters.
5.7 Analysis of assessment results
5.7.1 Comparison with safety assessment criteria
Normal operation
The results are maximum estimated values for a single worker performing all the activities.
An assessment for the worker covering normal operation including anticipated operational
occurrences reveal potential estimated exposure of 1.35 mSv/a (whole body), which is less
then prescribed constraint and limit values. It is somewhat higher then the personnel dose
monitoring datam probably due to conservative approach. The measured dose with thermo
luminescent dosimeters for the workers ranged 0.10-0.55 mSv/a in 2013. The measured
values confirm that exposure of the workers is within prescribed limits, and bellow dose
constraint value too. Radiation monitoring and cautious approach to shipment of the
radioactive material is crucial for the execution of the activities in safe manner as required by
the legislation and good practice. The adequate skills for handling of radioactive material are
prerequisite for the fast and precise performance of the handling operations. Those skills
coupled with appropriate shielding proves to be sufficient for safe performance of the normal
operations in Rakovica Facility.
An assessment of the police security personnel followed concept of maximum allowable
working hours. In order to assure that the annual dose for the security personnel will be lower
than population constraint value of 0.3 mSv 30 working hours is recommended. Even though
that security personnel is classified as population they are covered by the dosimetry
programme. The results for the annual doses for the security personnel confirm they are
within constraint value.
The risk for the population during normal operations the Rakovica Facility is not likely, due
to fact that there are no releases of the radioactive material to the environment.
Accidents internal
The internal faults can contribute a significant proportion to the total risk of the Storage
Facility. High dose rates are expected in the vicinity of the bare sources if shield is lost, either
in case that DSRS in not properly enclosed in transport container or dropping of the source
during handling or collisions of the load with the structures. The calculated dose rate for the
Co-60 category III source is 126 mSv/h, which indicate significant risk. Another issue is
erroneously repacking of the Co-60 category III source into less shielded container.
Calculated dose rate is 34.7 mSv/h reveals potentially significant exposure for the workers.
The unpacking process, source removal and handling are monitored with handheld radiation
and contamination monitors and this reduces the possibility of handling contaminated sources
and prevents accidental exposures above prescribed limits.
Release of the radioactive material caused by the fire started outside or inside the Facility is
elaborated in the Accidents external natural section.
Accidents external human induced
Identified external accident situations could result in the fire that can spread in the area.
Release of the radioactive material caused by the fire started outside or inside the Facility is
elaborated in the Accidents external natural section. Unauthorized removal of the radioactive
material is.
Accidents external natural
The relevant accident situations due to external factors involve natural fires and earthquakes.
Stored waste, namely DSRS, smoke detectors and DU are not readily dispersible even in
extreme conditions. Still in case of violent fire and assumption of 1% of the stored waste
airborne calculated dose for the staff outside facility ammounts for 457 mSv. The hazard of
intake radioactive material in case of fire accident would be significantly lower for the nearby
population due to dilution effects. The risk is associated with possible intake of radioactive
material via inhalation for fire fighters and workers in supervised area. In case of earthquake
and collapse of the building associated risk due to shield damage of the working container is
external exposure of the first responders and workers during operatios of the recovery of
sources. Loss of shield for stored category II Co-60 source can give rise to ambient dose rate
and result in 295 mSv/h dose rate in close vicinity of the source.
6 Iteration and design optimization
The current version of the safety case is to be considered as the baseline safety case. The
future evolution of the safety cases for the Rakovica Facility are described in the following
Table.
Safety case stage
Description of safety assesssment
Baseline Safety assessment of the current status of the Rakovica Facility; with the current waste
inventory, limited amount of DSRS or solid waste to be received, repacking of RLR's.
Options Safety assessment will include analysis and identification of the viable management options of
stored DSRS and solid waste in the Rakovica Facility.
Prosess and
storage
Safety assessment will include further upgrade of the design of the Rakovica Facility for the
purpose to receive and manage foreseen amount of the DSRS and solid waste.
The Safety Case will be updated as required, minimally in five years. In case of significant
operational changes eg plan for conditioning of the DSRS or receipt of the DSRS from
interim stores throughout the country, the Safety Case will be updated following upgrade of
the Facility.
7 Limits, controls and conditions
The assessment is made for the current inventory of the waste and limited amount of the
incoming waste. The incoming waste limits to DSRS, category 3-5, low activity smoke
detectors and only limited amount of the solid LLRW waste generated in the case of accident.
In case of significant increase of incoming waste the assessment should be updated.
The incoming waste should be adequately packed: DSRS in working or transport containers,
solid waste in standard stainless steel drums.
Rakovica Facility will accept:
DSRS used in industrial, medical, laboratory premises,
Solid radioactive waste, including DU
Rakovica Facility will not accept:
NORM material
Liquid radioactive waste
Hazardeous waste - biological, pyrophoric, explosive
The waste package must be labeled in accordance with the transport regulation.
The documents on radioactive waste must contain the following information:
Waste origin
Waste form – DSRS/solid
Radionuclides content
Activity total (Bq) for DSRS with reference date
Activity total (Bq) and/or activity masic (Bq/g) for solid waste with reference date
Dose rate (mSv/h) at the surface and 1m
Dimensions and weight for packages
The dismantling activities restrict to the RLR’s and smoke detectors. The dismantling and
conditioning of the DSRS category 3-5 needs upgrade of the workstation and update of the
assessment.
The foreseen amount of waste within 5-year period of time is listed in the following Table
Waste type Waste unit Quantity per year Total quantity
RLR Source 10 50
DSRS category 3-5 Source 10 50
Solid waste including scrap metal 200 L/25 L standard drum 2/8 10/40
Smoke detectors Source 500 2500
8 Integration of safety arguments
8.1 Comparison with safety criteria
The facility design is such to make management of DSRS operations simple and easy to
undertake in the least time possible. The Rakovica Facility design is simple and straight
forward. The facility design provides for receipt, handling of radioactive waste packages,
dismantling of RLR's and smoke detectors, containment of the radioactive waste/DSRS,
isolation of the radioactive waste/DSRS from the accessible environment and for secure
storage.
The Storage Building structure is adequate for the envisioned lifetime of 10 years of the
Rakovica Facility. The Waste Processing Building, although of less robust structure, may
serve for planned operations, as the processes involved in the storage Waste Processing
Building are simple.
Under normal operation conditions, taking into account the engineering features of the storage
buildings, the inventory of radioactive material it manages and the operations activities, the
delivered doses ensures the compliance with the restriction for the public exposure (0.3
mSv/y) and occupationally exposed personnel (6 mSv/y). It corresponds to the personnel dose
monitoring data and ambient dose rate monitoring data.
Under normal operation the risk for the workers and the security personnel is within radiation
protection legislative requirements. The hazards arising in the storage facility are unlikely to
result in major disruptive events anywhere in the process.
Under normal operation the Rakovica Facility does not pose a risk for the nearby population.
Members of the public are unlikely to be affected by normal operation, as well as, internally
generated fault conditions in the storage facility. Elevated radiation is measurable in the close
vicinity of the Rakovica Facility, at a safe distance from the boundary fence. Even if fault
conditions occur, the resultant risks for the members of the public will be negligible.
The storage arrangements facilitates retrieval if necessary, transfer to other stores and final
disposal. It is possible to safely visually inspect the items stored in the facility throughout the
period of storage.