Introducing Cpcc

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c y

#6July 2008

ESDP news letter

ISS

N 1725-0552

Council of the European Union

> Visit to operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA > Kosovo – preparations for enhanced EU engagement

> Climate change and security

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c y J u l y 2 0 0 8 I s s u e 602

>

Dans le cadre de la PESC, l’Union élabore une politique de

sécurité commune, qui couvre l’ensemble des questions

relatives à sa sécurité, y compris la définition progressive d’une

politique de défense commune, qui pourrait conduire à une

défense commune, si le Conseil européen en décide ainsi, sous

réserve que les États membres adoptent une décision dans ce

sens conformément à leurs exigences constitutionnelles

respectives.

Parallèlement à la nomination de Javier Solana en tant que

premier “Haut Représentant pour la PESC”, le Conseil européen

réuni à Cologne en juin 1999 a placé au cœur du renforcement

de la PESC les missions de gestion des crises.

Celles-ci incluent des missions humanitaires et d’évacuation,

des missions de maintien de la paix et des missions de forces

de combat pour la gestion des crises, y compris les missions de

rétablissement de la paix.

Ce même Conseil européen a décidé que “l’Union doit

disposer d’une capacité d’action autonome soutenue par des

forces militaires crédibles, avoir les moyens de décider d’y

recourir et être prête à le faire afin de réagir face aux crises

internationales, sans préjudice des actions entreprises par

l’OTAN”.

C’est sur cette base que des efforts soutenus ont abouti à la

mise en place de structures politiques et militaires perma-

nentes et à l’établissement de capacités civiles et militaires, y

compris la formulation par l’UE d’un ensemble de concepts et

de procédures en matière de gestion des crises. L’Union a éga-

lement conclu des arrangements relatifs à la consultation et à

la participation de pays tiers à la gestion des crises. Elle a en

outre défini avec l’OTAN le cadre des relations entre les deux

organisations, qui comprend des arrangements permettant à

l’Union de recourir aux moyens et capacités de l’OTAN.

Depuis janvier 2007, l'Union dispose d'un Centre d'opéra-

tions (OpsCentre) lui fournissant une nouvelle option pour la

planification et la conduite d'opérations. Elle dispose égale-

ment de forces de réaction rapide, les groupements tactiques

(“EU Battlegroups”).

L’Union européenne mène des opérations au titre de la

Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense depuis 2003.

À ce jour, elle a mené, mène ou s'apprête à mener une vingtaine

d'opérations, dans les Balkans occidentaux, en Afrique, au

Moyen-Orient et en Asie.

Pour un aperçu des missions et opérations de l'UE, voir page 30.

Pour en savoir plus sur ces missions et opérations, consulter le site

Internet du Conseil de l'UE: www.consilium.europa.eu/esdp –

www.consilium.europa.eu/pesd

PESD La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense

en un coup d’œil

Camp Europa à N'Djaména, Tchad.

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c yJ u l y 2 0 0 8 I s s u e 6 03

Editorial

E d i t o r i a l>

The year 2008 marks a threefold anniversary. Fifteen years ago, the Treaty on European Union saw the launch of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP); ten years ago, the French/British Saint-Malo summit paved the way for the European security and defence policy (ESDP) as we know it, and for the major decisions of the European Council in 1999; and five years ago, the first EU operations under the ESDP were launched.

This momentum is still very much alive today. A total of 19 ESDP operations and missions have been launched, 11 of which are ongoing.

Two major operations have been decided in recent months, both of them with ambitious objectives, and both challenging in their own ways.

As part of international efforts to respond to the Darfur crisis and its regional ramifications, the EU operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has now started to implement its mandate. To do so, it has had to overcome a series of hurdles related to the demanding geographic parameters, the resulting logistical challenge, and the security situation in the region. This issue of the ESDP newsletter will try to give you an insight into the first few months of this operation.

Closer to home, the EU rule of law mission EULEX Kosovo, which will be the Union's largest civilian mission, faces other challenges. Kosovo lies within Europe and is easy to reach. But the political context makes deploy-ment and the assumption of responsibilities more complex.

This edition also looks at some of the issues facing Europe in the coming years, one of which is climate change. Last spring, High Representative Solana, together with the Commission, presented EU leaders and ministers with a report on the impact of climate change on international security. Climate change, the report tells us, is best viewed as a “threat multiplier” which exacerbates or magnifies existing trends, tensions and instabilities. For Europe and its partners, one aim is to develop proactive policies and mechanisms that can prevent global warming from overburdening states and regions which are already fragile and prone to conflict.

Another aim for the Union is the continued development of capabilities. Daniel Keohane, from the EU Institute for Security Studies, looks at the prospects and sees the twin pressures of static budgets and growing opera-tional demands prodding EU governments to pool more of their military resources in the future, benefiting both their armed forces and European taxpayers.

Acting in the field, in theatres such as Africa and the Western Balkans, developing a common vision of threats and how to respond to them, and pooling resources: these are just three aspects of the EU's continued efforts to be active, informed and capable.


ImprintPublisher: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union

Editorial coordination: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (DG Press, Communication, Protocol), EU Institute for Security Studies

Photo credits: cover 1: Council of the EU; p. 2: Council of the EU; p.3: EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EULEX Kosovo; p.4: iStockphoto, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EULEX Kosovo; p.5: Council of the EU, Bor Slana/BOBO; p.6: EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, Council of the EU; p.7: EUFOR Tchad/RCA; p.8: EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Raymond Frenken; p.9: EUFOR Tchad/RCA; p.10: EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Council of the EU; p.11: EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Council of the EU, Raymond Frenken; p.12: EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Council of the EU; p.13: Council of the EU; p.14: EUFOR Tchad/RCA; p.15: Council of the EU; p.16: EUFOR Tchad/RCA; p.17: EULEX Kosovo, AFP Photo/Laura Boushnak; p.18: Fisnik Dobreci, EULEX Kosovo; p.19: EUPT; p.20: Fisnik Dobreci; p.21-22: iStockphoto; p.23: iStockphoto, AFP Photo/Sonny Tumbelaka; p.24: EUPOL Afghanistan, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, EUPM Bosnia & Herzegovina, Council of the EU; p.25: EUPOL RD Congo; p.26-27: Council of the EU and Belgian MoD; backcover: Council of the EU.

Editorial deadline: 13 June 2008Copyright: European Communities 2008

Covers: cover 1: EUFOR troops at Koloma IDPs camp, Eastern Chad – cover 4: EUFOR soldier with children in Goz Beïda

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30

Names and News

Chad/CAR – EU Force aims to enhance stability and protection

Interview: Gen Pat Nash on the EUFOR operation to Chad/CAR

Kosovo – Enhanced EU engagement

Interview: Yves de Kermabon on the EULEX KOSOVO rule of law mission

Climate change: Creating a climate of security

Introducing CPCC

European military capabilities: sharing the burden

Clippings

Aperçu des missions et opérations de l’Union européenne

C o n t e n t s>

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c yI s s u e 6 J u l y 2 0 0 8 05

Nominations Deux nominations récentes témoignent des renforcement du partena-

riat UE-Afrique.

Le Général Pierre-Michel Joana a été

nommé à compter du 1er mars Conseiller

spécial pour les capacités africaines de

maintien de la paix auprès du Haut

Représentant Javier Solana. L’Union atta-

che une importance particulière au ren-

forcement du partenariat avec l’Afrique

dans le domaine des capacités africaines

de prévention, de gestion et de résolu-

tion des conflits. Le Général Joana appor-

te à cette nouvelle fonction son expertise et sa connaissance du conti-

nent. Il a notamment dirigé de 2005 à 2008 la mission européenne de

réforme des forces armées congolaises – la mission EUSEC RD Congo.

Avant cela il avait occupé différents postes de commandement et de

responsabilité au sein de l’Armée française dans plusieurs pays africains.

Koen Vervaeke a été nommé le 6 décembre 2007 Représentant spé-

cial de l’Union européenne (RSUE) et

chef de la délégation de la Commission

auprès de l’Union africaine à Addis-Abeba.

Il y poursuivra les objectifs de l’Union

dans le cadre du partenariat stratégique

UE-Afrique. Sa nomination permet à

l’Union d’avoir une présence permanente

renforcée auprès de l’Union africaine.

M. Vervaeke, diplomate belge qui a été en

poste dans plusieurs pays africains, était

depuis 2003 conseiller pour les questions africaines auprès du Haut

Représentant Javier Solana.

Par ailleurs, Kees Klompenhouwer a été nommé directeur du CPCC

(Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) et Commandant des opéra-

tions civiles (voir p.24) à compter du 1er mai.

Relations avec le Parlement euro-péen et les parlements nationaux Les activités sur la PESC et la PESD ont continué à se développer avec

le Parlement européen, ainsi qu'avec les parlements nationaux des

États membres.

Le Haut Représentant Javier Solana a effectué plusieurs interventions au

Parlement européen, notamment aux sessions plénières des 30 janvier

et 4 juin et à la commission des Affaires étrangères du 8 avril. Le HR a

par ailleurs rencontré le président du PE, Hans-Gert Pöttering les 6 mars

et 11 juin avant les réunions du Conseil européen. Des réunions ont eu

lieu aussi avec le comité spécial sur les informations sensibles dans le

domaine de la PESC en janvier, en février et en mai. M. Solana a égale-

ment rencontré les dirigeants des principaux groupes politiques du PE.

S'agissant des relations avec les parlements nationaux, le Haut repré-

sentant Solana est intervenu devant la COFACC (Conférence des prési-

dents de commissions des Affaires étrangères) le 17 mars à Ljubljana.

Le Haut Représentant a également rencontré des parlementaires natio-

naux, notamment des membres des commissions Affaires étrangères de

la chambre des communes du Royaume-Uni et du parlement danois et

des commissions Défense des parlements suédois et néerlandais. Le 4

juin à Berlin il est intervenu devant les commissions Affaires étrangères

et Affaires européennes du Bundestag.

D'autres acteurs de la PESC et de la PESD ont eu l'occasion de participer

au développement des contacts avec les parlements, comme le prési-

dent du Comité militaire, le Général Bentégeat, devant la commission

Sécurité et Défense du PE (SEDE) en février. Les 2-3 mars à Ljubljana, le

Représentant personnel du HR pour les affaires parlementaires dans le

domaine de la PESC, Michael Matthiessen, ainsi que plusieurs respon-

sables dans le domaine de la PESD sont intervenus à la Conférence des

présidents des commissions Défense.

Industrie et marchés: lancement des travaux sur un “paquet défense”La Commission européenne a présenté le 5 décembre 2007 de nou-

velles mesures en faveur de la compétitivité des industries et des

marchés de défense.

Ce “paquet défense”, en discussion actuellement au Conseil et au

Parlement européen, comprend une communication exposant diver-

ses recommandations en vue d'accroître la compétitivité du secteur,

une directive relative aux marchés publics dans le domaine de la

défense et de la sécurité pour une plus grande ouverture et une

concurrence intra-européenne accrue dans ces marchés publics et,

enfin, une directive relative aux transferts intracommunautaires de

produits liés à la défense, dont le but est de réduire les obstacles aux

échanges commerciaux de ces produits dans l'Union européenne.

Le “paquet défense” et les nouvelles initiatives prises depuis 2004 par

l'Agence européenne de défense (AED), ont notamment pour objectif

de contribuer à la création d'un marché européen des équipements de

défense, facteur clé pour soutenir la politique européenne de sécurité

et de défense (PESD).

Le Général Pierre-Michel Joana

Koen Vervaeke

Le HR Solana à Ljubljana le 17 mars à la Conférence des prési-dents des commissions des Affaires étrangères des États membres.

> N a m e s a n d N e w s


Stratégie européenne de sécurité Au Conseil européen du 14 décembre 2007, les chefs d’État et de gou-

vernement de l’UE se sont penchés sur la stratégie européenne de

sécurité. Ils ont souligné l’utilité de cette stratégie adoptée en 2003 et

jugé qu’elle fournissait à l'Union le cadre approprié pour sa politique

extérieure. À la lumière de toutes les évolutions qui ont eu lieu depuis

lors, notamment l'expérience acquise dans le cadre des missions PESD,

ils ont invité le Haut Représentant, en pleine association avec la

Commission et en étroite coopération avec les États membres, à exa-

miner la mise en œuvre de cette stratégie en vue de proposer, pour que

le Conseil européen les adopte en décembre 2008, des éléments qui

permettront de l'améliorer et, au besoin, de la compléter.

ESDP high level course 2007- 2008 and alumni network seminarIn the year 2007-2008 the European Security and Defence College

organised the third European Security and Defence Policy High Level

Course (ESDP HLC).

The High Level Course 2007-2008 took place in the form of five one-

week residential modules each taking place in a different member

state. The aim of this course is to provide participants with an update

on current policies and their implementation within the ESDP, and also

to serve as a forum that helps in building up and developing a common

European security culture.

Seventy people coming from EU member states and EU institutions

attended this year’s ESDP High Level Course. Modules took place in

Brussels, Lisbon, Prague/Brno, Tartu and Ljubljana.

In the margins of the fifth and last module of the High Level Course

2007-2008, for the purpose of networking, the very first ESDC Alumni

Network Seminar took place in Ljubljana from 10 to 12 April 2008.

This first seminar was organised by the Slovenian Ministry of Defence

and supported by the Council Secretariat.

The alumni seminar gave the participants the opportunity to meet

again with their colleagues and get to know participants of previous

ESDP High Level Courses, to share experiences and to learn about new

developments in the field of the ESDP (the new developments in civil-

ian aspects of the ESDP for example).

Lancement de la mission PESD en Guinée-BissauL'Union européenne lance une mission PESD de conseil et d'assistance à

l'appui du processus national de réforme du secteur de la sécurité en

Guinée-Bissau. Cette mission – dénomée EU SSR Guinée-Bissau – vient

compléter de façon cohérente les activités menées au titre du Fonds euro-

péen de développement et des initiatives communautaires. La mission

s'inscrit dans le contexte du partenariat stratégique conjoint Afrique-UE

adopté au sommet UE-Afrique de décembre 2007, qui identifie la paix et la

sécurité comme domaine majeur de coopération.

La mission, dirigée par le général espagnol Juan Esteban Veràstegui, sera

composée de 21 experts internationaux et de 18 personnels locaux. Le

Général Esteban Veràstegui était jusqu'à sa nomination le 4 mars com-

mandant des forces aéromobiles de l’Armée de terre espagnole. Les

experts de cette mission visant de manière intégrée l'ensemble du

secteur de la sécurité travailleront avec l'armée, l'armée de l'air, la

police judiciaire, la police et le parquet.

Il s'agira notamment de rendre opérationnelle la stratégie nationale de

réforme en contribuant à la mise en œuvre de plans détaillés de res-

tructuration des forces armées et de sécurité.

Après le déploiement d'une première équipe à la mi-avril, le lancement

officiel de la mission est prévu pour la mi-juin, pour une durée initiale

de douze mois.

> N a m e s a n d N e w s

Head of Mission General Esteban Verástegui in Guinea-Bissau, April 2008

Alumni College

>

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c yI s s u e 6 J u l y 2 0 0 8 07

E S D P I N A C T I O N – E U F O R T C H A D / R C A

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The European Union's involvement in the African desert in Chad and the Central African

Republic takes on a unique logistical challenge and opens a new chapter in the history of

European operations. The objective – to create security in one of the world's hot spots:

eastern Chad and north-east CAR, near the border with war-torn Darfur.

EU Chad/CAR force aims to enhance stability and protection On the occasion of High Representative Javier Solana's

visit to Chad in May, the ESDP newsletter reports on the deployment of operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the field.

By Raymon Frenken


>

A demanding operation

Thousands of tonnes of military equipment, fuel and water are being

shipped to the east of the country, by boat from Europe, with heavy-lift

aircraft and by convoy overland via the Cameroon port of Douala.

Camps are being built from scratch in the middle of the desert to house

3,700 European troops from several Member States, under Irish, Polish

and French command.

All this is happening in a landlocked country with a chronic water

shortage, where temperatures often reach well over 40 degrees Celsius.

The east of Chad is at the heart of an international humanitarian crisis

with nearly half a million displaced people fleeing the fighting, killings

and banditry in Darfur and eastern Chad. During the visit, there were

unconfirmed reports coming in of continued fighting and pillaging.

Amid an international public outcry over the ongoing atrocities in

Darfur, last September the United Nations authorised the EU to deploy

a military force in Chad and the CAR. Under UN Security Council

Resolution 1778, operation EUFOR Tchad/CAR complements the UN's

MINURCAT police force in Chad and the CAR and a hybrid African

Union-United Nations force deployed inside Darfur. The EU gave its final

green light for the mission in January.

Besides Chad, EUFOR also includes a detachment of 200 troops,

under French command, near Birao in the Central African Republic, help-

ing to protect refugees there, too.

The EU operation reached Initial Operational Capability on 15 March,

triggering the start of its one-year mandate which will end in March 2009.

Europe aims to contribute to the protection of refugees, civilians and

aid workers in the east of Chad. This will involve a total of 3,700

European troops from 22 EU Member States (at OHQ level – 18 are

present in theatre). By mid-June, 3,000 troops had been deployed. Full

deployment is expected this summer, with more troops from Poland, the

Netherlands, Ireland, and additional helicopters from Russia.

Irish Lieutenant-General Patrick Nash commands the mission from

the EU 's multinational operational headquarters in Mont-Valérien, near

Paris. “It is the international community's ambition to create in Chad

and CAR a safe and secure environment that is self-sustaining without

the continued support of an international military presence,” says

General Nash.

“I hope very much that our presence here will solve some of the prob-

lems that are being so dramatically exposed in this region,” said the EU's

High Representative Javier Solana on completing his two-day visit.

At the end of his visit, Mr Solana himself experienced directly what it

is like to work in the land-locked heart of Central Africa. His French

Transall C-160 military transport plane was grounded only minutes

before the scheduled take-off from the Goz Beida airstrip, close to the

Irish camp, south of the operating area.

As Solana walked towards the plane, red hydraulic liquid began pour-

ing forcefully from under a flap on the starboard wing. It instantly

became evident that Solana's return would be delayed as the engines

were shut down and darkness set in at the unlit airstrip.

French C-160


Unloading equipment at the port of Douala (Cameroon)

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c y J u l y 2 0 0 8 I s s u e 6 09


<

However, such incidents are not deterring the European forces there.

The French dispatched a second Transall aircraft. When it showed up in

the star-lit sky two hours later, Irish rangers lit up no more than five fuel

barrels along the dusty airstrip, allowing the plane to make a “tactical

landing”. At a barely lit airstrip in the dark heart of Africa, that is not

without risk, so special forces were on hand with night-vision

equipment.

Nine days earlier, the airstrip and a few huts for local tribesmen were

the only features in the immediate Goz Beida area, about 70 kilometres

from the border with war-torn Darfur. As the EU's top diplomat arrived,

Irish Army engineers, together with a handful of Dutch and French, had

begun to construct the Goz Beida operating base in a six-week assign-

ment. Since the end of May, Goz Beida has been home to a 230-strong

Irish battalion and 60 Dutch Royal Marines, all under Irish command.

The logistical challenge

Logistics is a key element to what is probably Europe's most demand-

ing military mission to date.

The EUFOR operating area – approximately 280,000 square kilome-

tres – is more than half the size of France. The long distances here create

particular challenges for fuel and logistics.

Most of the heavy equipment and supplies are shipped by sea to

Douala, Cameroon – a two-week journey from Europe. From there, the

containers, trucks and other vehicles face a 1,700 kilometre overland

journey, a distance similar to the Rome-Stockholm stretch, on roads far,

far worse.

“The distance and road conditions between here and Abéché and

indeed, more specifically Goz Beida, are probably the largest single

EUFOR troops go out on patrol



difficulty we have,” explains lieutenant Enda de Bruin, who oversees Irish

logistics at EUFOR from Camp Europa near N'Djamena.

By air, it takes between four and nine hours to reach Chad from

Europe, depending on the type of aircraft. Having sufficient airlift capac-

ity inside the country is seen as essential for this mission in the heart of

Africa. France has offered 12 tonnes per day; the equivalent of about

three C-160 flights. By air, the route between N'Djamena and Abéché is

760 kilometre long. By road, it would take five days in the dry season to

travel the 1,380 kilometres.

The Goz Beida base houses generators, a field kitchen, dormitories,

toilets and three large tents behind the levees, ditches and barbed wire.

The quadrant base roughly covers the size of four football fields. Several

dozen trucks, armoured vehicles and four-wheel drives are parked here.

Italian military hospital at Abéché

The forward base at Forchana

EUFOR on patrol in the village of N'Jarouma

Planning Goz Beida forward base



>

More Irish trucks, and also Viking traction vehicles for the Dutch Royal

Marines, recently disembarked in the port of Douala, 2,300 kilometres

to the west. It takes the convoy about two weeks to reach Camp Europa

in Chad's capital N'Djamena. From there, it is another four or five days

to Goz Beida – when the road stays dry, that is. The N'Djamena-Goz

Beida journey may take as long as ten days during the rainy season.

Enhancing security for refugees and IDPs

The Goz Beida area encompasses about a dozen camps for refugees

from Darfur and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chad. The camps

in this area house more than half of the 180,000 IDPs in Chad and a quar-

ter of the 285,000 refugees from Darfur. To put these figures into perspec-

tive: eastern Chad's local population is estimated at about 700,000.

Eastern Chad is home to various local rebel groups. Ethnic militias and

bandits are responsible for frequent attacks. In the last year, about a

dozen off-road vehicles used by aid groups have been hijacked.

“The situation still is not stable, especially close to the border,” insists

an UNHCR official during a briefing for Solana at the EUFOR camp in

Goz Beida. “Security is our major preoccupation, and we hope that

EUFOR will give us a hand.”

The killing less than a week earlier of French aid worker Pascal

Marlinge, the country head for British aid group Save the Children, dem-

onstrates that the risks remain real. Marlinge was killed by bandits nine

kilometres from the EUFOR base in Forchana in the central part of

eastern Chad. He is the third aid worker killed since January.

Humanitarian workers, wearing black, were still mourning their col-

league's death as they received Solana at the UN's office in Abéché, the

biggest town in eastern Chad. From this office, the work of 78 humanitar-

ian agencies is coordinated by a the UN's humanitarian office, OCHA.

Solana told humanitarian workers that “the idea is not to put a sol-

dier in each convoy, but to create secure conditions. We're here to cre-

ate a secure environment.”

Abéché is also the location for EUFOR's main operational camp – or

Force HQ – known as Stars Camp. It is still under construction but a

modern Italian military hospital has already been set up.

Logistics convoy

Irish EUFOR troops at Goz Beida



The Italian hospital is a fully-fledged ‘level-two’ field hospital, com-

posed of about 15 air-conditioned tents that are all linked to each other.

The maze includes operating rooms, modern x-ray equipment, a phar-

macy and even a dentistry unit.

The three ‘forward’ bases in Goz Beida, Forchana and Iriba are sup-

ported from Abéché. Iriba is the camp under Polish command in the

north. In Abéché, during the build-up stage, the European Union is lean-

ing on the spartan facilities at an existing French camp. That will change

once construction of EUFOR's permanent Stars Camp has been com-

pleted on the other side of the airport. This camp will able to house

nearly 2,000 troops.

There is also a EUFOR special forces camp in Abéché town. This unit

includes elite specialists from Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and

Belgium who carry out reconnaissance missions, among other things.

>

Helicopters are a critical asset for the operation

Complex political context

Chad and Sudan accuse each other of helping rebels in the diffuse

border area in the east. In February, pro-Sudan rebels reached the capital

and attempted to oust Chad's president Idriss Déby during an offensive.

In N'Djamena's government district, where much of the fighting took

place, remnants of the February battle are clearly visible in the trash-

ridden streets. Abandoned pieces of artillery are among the rubble.

The agreement reached in Dakar, Senegal, in March between Chad's

president Déby with Sudan's president Omar Hassan al-Bashir was the

topic of Solana's meeting with Déby the night before he travelled to the

east. As Solana visited, fresh peace talks between Chad and Sudan were

due to take place in Libya soon. “There will be a meeting in the coming

days in Tripoli to check how that can be implemented,” Solana said after

the meeting, referring to the Dakar agreement.

But by the end of the week, diplomatic ties between Chad and Sudan

had been cut. Sudan's capital Khartoum was attacked by rebels in an

offensive strikingly similar to the one on N'Djamena in February. Sudan

claimed the attack was inspired by the Chad government.

A new attempt at direct peace talks between Chad and Sudan will

now be made during a meeting in Brazzaville, Congo, in June.

Water - an all important commodity


The water factor

Even when standards are reduced to 60 litres of water per person per

day – as is the case at EUFOR – supplying sufficient fresh water for

3,700 troops in the middle of the desert remains a serious challenge.

Responsible consumption is actively encouraged.

“Imagine what would happen here if we were to drill wells and

deplete all the water in this town in a few years,” says an Irish support

engineer. “There would be nothing left. We can't afford to create such a

future problem, so we have to find other ways, like recycling waste

water.”

Ditches have been dug at all the EUFOR camps which can handle

substantial amounts of rain water. Camp Europa, near the capital

N'Djamena, has already been nicknamed “little Venice”.

In Goz Beida, the first rains have come already. As Solana's motorcade

travelled towards the Gourounkoun IDP camp, it was soon evident that

the rains would be a significant factor. The roads turn into rivers, and

wadis – dry riverbeds – can no longer be crossed easily.

The Irish are eagerly awaiting the arrival of 60 Dutch Royal Marines

with their Viking traction vehicles, which will allow the EUFOR troops in

the southern part of the operating area to patrol even when the rains

make local travel impossible for normal vehicles.

Although the prospect of the rainy season places extra pressure on

the deployment, the rains themselves are not necessarily a disadvantage

for EUFOR, explains Brigadier-General Jean-Philippe Ganascia,

Commander of EUFOR on the ground.

“This rain is a handicap for those we are trying to fight,” he continues.

“The rainy season could be a handicap, but we are going to use it as best

we can.”

At the Gourounkoun IDP camp, the elders used Solana's visit to raise

interest for their plight.

They would like to move back to their town on the border with

Darfur, but want to do so only once a bridge has been built across a wadi

at the west of their village. With such a bridge, they say they can escape

faster when their village is attacked by the Janjaweed, the armed gun-

men on horseback who cross the border from Sudan.

When the wadi is flooded, they simply cannot escape the violence,

which is why they have stayed in this camp for two years already.

During the visit, aid agencies had already delivered sufficient food to

last the people in Gourounkoun for six weeks to two months. But once

these supplies run out, and if the rains have not disappeared by then, these

displaced people will face new problems. Security is just one of them.

Europe's operation has a mandate for one year, until March 2009. A

mid-mandate review of the mission will take place in September, not

least with a view to determining the arrangements for following up on

the EU operation, including a possible UN operation. The aim is for the

international community, building on the results that will have been

achieved by EUFOR, to continue to support stability in this fragile part

of the world.

>



C'est le 28 janvier 2008 que l'Union européenne a décidé de lancer

cette opération militaire de transition dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le

Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine, conformément au mandat

figurant dans la Résolution 1778 (2007) du Conseil de sécurité.

Pleinement déployée, l'opération de l'UE comptera environ 3.700 hom-

mes. A la mi-juin, quelque 3.000 personnels étaient déjà déployés sur

le théâtre d'opérations.

Le déploiement comprend un quartier général de force arrière à

N'Djaména, un quartier général de force à Abéché et trois bataillons

multinationaux stationnés dans les régions de l'est tchadien respective-

ment à Iriba (nord), Forchana (centre) et Goz Beïda (sud), ainsi qu'un

détachement à Birao (RCA).

Dans sa résolution 1778 du 25 septembre 2007, le Conseil de sécurité des

Nations Unies a approuvé la mise en place d'une mission des Nations

Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad (MINURCAT) et a autorisé

l'Union européenne à déployer ses forces, pour une durée d'un an à partir

du moment où celle-ci aura déclaré sa capacité opérationnelle initiale.

En menant une telle opération, l'UE renforce l'action qu'elle mène de

longue date visant à faire face à la crise du Darfour, dans le cadre

d'une approche régionale de cette crise. Cette opération est conduite

en consultation avec les gouvernements tchadien et centrafricain.

Avec 14 États membres présents sur le terrain, 18 sur le théâtre et 22

au quartier général opérationnel (OHQ), situé au Mont Valérien (France),

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA est l'opération la plus multinationale jamais

envoyée en Afrique par l'UE.

Au regard de la situation sur le terrain, de l'immensité de la zone cou-

verte et des difficultés logistiques, cette opération constitue un vrai défi

pour l'UE.

Le commandement de l'opération est assuré par le Général de corps

d'armée Patrick Nash (Irlandais), celui de la force par le Général de

brigade Jean-Philippe Ganascia (Français).

EUFOR Tchad/RCA est une opération militaire de transition, étroitement

coordonnée avec la présence multidimensionnelle des Nations Unies

dans l'Est du Tchad et dans le Nord-Est de la République centrafricaine,

afin d'améliorer la sécurité dans ces régions. La mission de l'UE a plus

particulièrement les objectifs suivants:

■ contribuer à la protection des civils en danger, en particulier les

réfugiés et les personnes déplacées;

■ faciliter l'acheminement de l'aide humanitaire et la libre circulation

du personnel humanitaire en contribuant à améliorer la sécurité dans

la zone d'opérations;

■ contribuer à la protection du personnel, des locaux, des installations

et du matériel des Nations Unies et assurer la sécurité et la liberté de

circulation de son propre personnel, du personnel des Nations Unies

et du personnel associé.

L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA a atteint sa Capacité opérationnelle

initiale (COI) le 15 mars 2008.

La déclaration de la COI a marqué le début effectif de cette opération.

Elle signifie que la force européenne a les moyens de débuter ses mis-

sions, elle dispose notamment des outils de commandement (FHQ), de

soutien logistique et de santé (hôpital de campagne italien à Abéché),

d’ouverture de théâtre et de contrôle de zone (bataillon français à

Forchana et Birao).

Parmi ses activités l’EUFOR effectue des patrouilles afin d'observer la

situation sécuritaire dans sa zone d'opération et répondre au besoin de

sécurité des populations.

• www.consilium.europa.eu/eufor-tchad-rca

Libye

Soudan

Cameroun

Nigeria

Niger

TCHAD

N'DjamenaGoz Beïda

Forchana

Abéché

Iriba

Birao

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

The forward base at Birao (CAR)>

L'opération EUFOR Tchad/RCA



Pat Nash is the Operational Commander of the EU force in Chad and Central African

Republic (CAR). A native of Ireland, Nash has served overseas on six separate

occasions, with experience in Cyprus, Lebanon and the Balkans and as commander of

an Irish battalion in Lebanon in 1999.

Interview

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash on the EUFOR operation to Chad/CAR

How does this EU operation relate to UN action?

■ This EUFOR military action is in line with the EU’s policy of co-

operation with the UN in the field of crisis management and is part of

a package of EU initiatives. It is the EU contribution to a wider interna-

tional and multi-dimensional presence under the auspices of the UN,

and is part of a wider regional response to the Darfur crisis.

Why is Europe acting and why now? What are the EU’s spe-cific interests in this area?

■ Stabilisation of the Darfur region is an important objective for

Europe. Security is a precondition for development, and the military

operation will reinforce and complement other EU initiatives, political

economical and diplomatic, in the region.

How would you characterise the delay in getting the operation started?

■ The Force Generation process can only commence when the Council

has validated the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), outlining the forces

and capabilities required. Progress was slow and difficult to achieve,

involving several meetings with long breaks in between. The delay in get-

ting the operation started was then compounded in early February by

the return of the rebels attempting to overthrow the Chadian govern-

ment, who then had to be beaten back. The combined effect of these

delays however has been positive because the newly deployed force will

now have time to consolidate on the ground during the rainy season and

have a clear period of some six months thereafter (instead of the previ-

ously scheduled one or two) to achieve its mission.

What is the goal of the military operation in Chad/CAR?

■ My task is to translate diplomatic policy into military action; the

operation is based on UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007), and

is aimed at contributing to a general improvement in security, creating a

safe and secure environment in eastern Chad and in northeast CAR. This

will allow for humanitarian aid to be delivered, and provide for the safety

of the UN's MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central African

Republic and Chad) police mission and the return of internally displaced

persons. Resolution 1778 was unanimously approved and authorises “all

necessary measures” to achieve the mandated tasks.

The mission will take place in Chad/CAR. Why not in Darfur itself?

■ It is essential to remember that the situation to which we are

responding is a regional problem – with EUFOR and MINURCAT achiev-

ing stability in the Chad and CAR regions neighbouring on Darfur, it will

be complementary to UNAMID (United Nations African Union Mission

in Darfur) undertakings in Darfur itself.

Can you describe the logistical challenges you are facing?

■ The area of operations is in the heart of Africa. It’s remote, vast, and

inhospitable. It was obvious from my reconnaissance and subsequent

visits that the nature of the theatre is unforgiving. You don’t speak of

journey times in terms of distances but in terms of hours of flying

and/or driving. Operations are based approximately 2,000 km from

the nearest seaport (and 4,500 km from Brussels). Extreme climatic

conditions and the inevitable arrival of the rainy season dictate that

EUFOR camps and facilities be established as soon as possible. The

putting in place of infrastructure is essential. EUFOR troops must be

provided for with a minimum level of camp facilities in order to carry

out their mission.

General Nash

“The EU operation in Chad/CAR is distinctly multinational in its mandate, in its chain of

command and in its composition, being the EU’s most multinational military operation yet to be

conducted in Africa.”

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash

<“Security is a precondition for development”

>



>

It appears France is contributing the bulk of troops. Who else is participating?

■ As I speak we have just concluded the deployment of the Irish-led

battalion into theatre to be followed shortly by the Polish-led battal-

ion. 22 EU nations are represented in the Operational Headquarters

and 18 are presently in theatre. The EU operation in Chad/CAR is dis-

tinctly multinational in its mandate, in its chain of command an in its

composition, being the EU’s most multinational military operation yet

to be conducted in Africa.

What are the particular challenges involved in commanding a multinational force?

■ The challenge I face is to give purpose, direction and motivation to a

multinational force seeking to be deployed into a remote inhospitable

environment, in very poor countries in humanitarian crisis, and with a

security dimension. It is a broad, deep, and multifaceted challenge.

Now that the operation is up and running, what specific chal-lenges are you facing? Anything unexpected?

■ Getting a force was a problem, putting it on the ground was the next.

For now the ongoing development of that deployment including the

creation and improvement of infrastructure is concentrating our minds,

as is the build-up of our sustainment capability in advance of the

shortly arriving rainy season. The long lines of communication from

Europe with limited airport capacity means we need considerable sea

lift and port capabilities. The environment is very challenging, the heat,

wet and rough terrain and very poor infrastructure place heavy

demands on personnel, equipment and logistics. The security

operational situation also poses difficulties. There is a blurring of the

violence that is inspired by political motivation and bandit activities, a

mosaic of associations that is constantly shifting.

What is the biggest difference between this operation and other operations you have been involved in?

■ Having served overseas, I’ve learned that multinational forces have

the ability to combine humanitarian and military roles without losing

focus, while still operating with compassion and competence.

Undoubtedly however the big difference for me is to apply all this at

the strategic military level while remaining conscious of parallel

demands at the strategic political level.

What are your personal feelings about this operation?

■ I am optimistic and have good reason to be. The planning has gone

well and with resolve and leadership the force has achieved a signifi-

cant footprint in theatre. It will continue to increase gradually and

incrementally, providing the necessary safe and secure environment

whereby the humanitarian improvements can begin to take effect for

the people.

RésuméPat Nash est le commandant de l'opération de l'UE au Tchad et en

République centrafricaine (RCA). Originaire d'Irlande, Pat Nash a déjà

servi à l'étranger, notamment à Chypre, au Liban et dans les Balkans.

Voici quelques extraits de son entretien pour la ESDP newsletter:

“La stabilisation de la région du Darfour est un objectif important pour

l'Europe. La sécurité est une condition préalable au développement, et

cette opération militaire renforcera et complétera d'autres initiatives

politiques, économiques et diplomatiques de l'Union européenne dans

la région. [...]

En service à l'étranger, j'ai appris que les forces multinationales sont en

mesure de combiner leur rôle humanitaire et militaire sans perdre de

vue leur objectif, en faisant toujours preuve de compassion et de com-

pétence. [...]

L'opération de l'UE au Tchad et en RCA est indéniablement multinatio-

nale par son mandat, sa chaîne de commandement et sa composition.

À ce jour, il s'agit de l'opération militaire de l'UE la plus multinationale

jamais menée en Afrique.[...]

Le défi auquel je suis confronté consiste à donner un but, une orienta-

tion et une motivation à une force multinationale sur le point d'être

déployée dans un environnement lointain et inhospitalier, dans des

pays très pauvres qui sont victimes de crises humanitaires, sans oublier

la dimension de sécurité. Il s'agit là d'un défi vaste et complexe, présen-

tant de nombreux aspects. [...]

L'obtention d'une force a été problématique et sa mise en place ne s'est

guère avérée plus simple. Pour l'instant, c'est principalement le déve-

loppement continu de ce déploiement qui nous occupe l'esprit, notam-

ment la création et l'amélioration de l'infrastructure, tout comme le

développement de notre capacité de résistance avant l'arrivée de la

saison des pluies.”

Gen Nash with Gen Ganascia, EUFOR Force Commander

“Stabilisation of the Darfur region is an important objective for Europe. Security is a precondition for

development, and the military operation will reinforce and complement other EU initiatives...”

Lieutenant-General Pat Nash

>


In March 2004, once again the world turned its attention to Kosovo.

What started with a rumor that some Serbs had chased a few Albanian

children into a river in North Kosovo and they had subsequently drowned

ended with Kosovo-wide riots that resulted in 19 deaths and a around a

thousand injured. Serb-Orthodox churches and Serb property were

burned mainly by furious young Albanian men in retaliation for the

alleged drownings. These serious incidents reopened the discussion about

how the international community should handle the Kosovo issue.

Late in 2005, negotiations towards a final settlement started in

Vienna, Austria. Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish President, led the UN

team engaging in extensive talks with both main parties – negotiation

teams from Belgrade and Pristina – and with international partners.

More than 16 months later, on 26 March 2007, President Ahtisaari

presented his comprehensive package to the UN Security Council in

New York.

In light of the remaining differences in the UNSC on Kosovo and the

ensuing agreement in the six-member contact group to drive the proc-

ess forward, the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and

Security Policy, Javier Solana, appointed Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger

– a German diplomat – as EU representative in the European Union/

Russia/United States Troika charged with facilitating a further period of

engagement between Belgrade and Pristina on the future of Kosovo.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed this initiative stat-

ing that “the international community must find a solution that is

timely, addresses the key concerns of all communities living in Kosovo

and provides clarity for Kosovo’s status. The status quo is not

sustainable.”

E S D P I N A C T I O N – E U L E X K O S O V O

Following the 78-day NATO intervention in 1999, that put an end

to the armed conflict in Kosovo, the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 1244 which opened the way for a civilian and military pres-

ence in Kosovo under the authority of the UN. Kosovo came to be

administered by the international community until a status settlement

could be found. The UN administration, UNMIK, was organised in four

pillars according to its main responsibilities: civil administration, recon-

struction, humanitarian aid and institution building. The UN, EU,

UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees) and OSCE (Organisation

for Security and Cooperation in Europe) were given responsibility of the

pillars, respectively. In May 2001, the UNHCR pillar was replaced by a

pillar for police and justice under UN management.

Enhanced EU engagement in Kosovo The European Union is about to enhance its

presence in Kosovo. It will do this by a three-

fold effort with the same overall objective: to

support the Kosovo authorities at all levels to

meet European standards. On 16 February

2008, the EU Council decided to launch ‘EULEX

KOSOVO’ – an EU rule of law Mission in

Kosovo. At the same time, the Council also

appointed Pieter Feith as EU Special

Representative in Kosovo. Alongside the

Commission’s decision to establish a

permanent delegation in Pristina to drive the

reform process forward, it is evident that

Kosovo is a key priority for the EU.

Yves de Kermabon talks to the press

>

Pristina



Even though the Troika did not leave any stone unturned, it con-

cluded that the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final

status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the

fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This was regrettable,

as a negotiated settlement would have been in the best interests of

both parties. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its

independence.

Faced with this new and complex reality in south-east Europe, the EU

is now making preparations to take up its responsibilities. All Union

Member States agree that in Kosovo the best way to move towards

European integration is by creating a democratic and multi-ethnic

Kosovo with full respect for the rule of law, co-operating peacefully with

its neighbours and contributing to regional and European stability. This

includes extensive measures to safeguard the future of all communities,

thereby creating a basis for its sustainable economic and political devel-

opment. It is precisely for this reason that the EULEX mission has been

launched and an EU Special Representative appointed.

The EU's enhanced and renewed efforts in Kosovo will build on the

significant support it has been providing since 1999. The Union is

already the largest donor to Kosovo (nearly EUR 2 billion to date) and

in the coming years (until 2010) it will allocate an additional

EUR 330 million, making Kosovo a leading per capita recipient of EU

assistance.

The EU is working in Kosovo on the understanding that there will be

a major shift from international governance towards Kosovo govern-

ance. However, the international presence continues to provide strong

guarantees and safeguards concerning community rights, cultural and

religious heritage, and the principles of the rule of law.

Role of the European Special Representative (EUSR):The objective of the EU in Kosovo is to support and assist the Kosovo

authorities in developing a stable, viable, peaceful and multi-ethnic

Kosovo, cooperating peacefully with its neighbours in the region. To

promote these objectives, the Council of the European Union appoint-

ed Pieter Feith as EU Special Representative (EUSR) in Kosovo on

4 February 2008.

His mandate is to:

• Offer the EU’s advice and support to the Kosovo government in

the political process of European integration

• Promote overall coordination of EU presences in Kosovo, e.g.

European Commission liaison office and the EULEX rule of law

mission

• Ensure consistency and coherence of EU action towards the

public

• Provide local political guidance to the Head of the European

Union rule of law Mission EULEX in Kosovo.

• Contribute to the development and consolidation of respect for

human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo

The European Special Representative holds a simultaneous mandate from the International Steering Group as International Civilian Representative (ICR).

Role of the International Civilian Representative (ICR):The International Civilian Representative, Pieter Feith, supervises the

implementation of the Comprehensive Status Settlement (Ahtisaari

Plan) by the Kosovo government. He is the final authority in Kosovo

regarding the interpretation of civilian aspects of the Comprehensive

Status Settlement.

Pieter Feith is supported by the International Civilian Office (ICO) in

exercising his mandate. The ICO consists of international experts from

EU Member States and third countries in policy areas of the

Comprehensive Settlement, such as decentralization, cultural and reli-

gious heritage and community affairs. In June 2008 the ICO consists of

96 local and international staff, this number will rise to over 300 when

the office builds towards full capacity.

International support for a European perspective of Kosovo

>

EU “roadshow” in Klina/Klinë

Pieter Feith


> EULEX KOSOVO n'assumera ses responsabilités qu'à l'issue d'une

période de transition pendant laquelle la responsabilité continue à

incomber entièrement à la mission des Nations unies pour le Kosovo

(MINUK).

Une fois qu'elle aura atteint sa pleine capacité opérationnelle, la

mission comptera quelque 1.900 officiers de police, juges, procureurs et

agents des douanes internationaux et environ 1.100 agents locaux; elle

sera établie au quartier général de Pristina ou intégrée dans les diffé-

rents services judiciaire et de police au Kosovo. M. Yves de Kermabon

(France) a été nommé chef de la mission EULEX KOSOVO.

Le représentant spécial de l'UE (RSUE) au Kosovo, Pieter Feith, four-

nira des orientations politiques au niveau local au chef de la mission

EULEX KOSOVO, qui rendra compte au commandant d'opération civil à

Bruxelles. Le Comité politique et de sécurité (COPS) de l'UE exercera,

sous la responsabilité du Conseil de l'UE, le contrôle politique et la direc-

tion stratégique de la mission.

Le mandat initial de la mission est fixé à deux ans, mais il est prévu

qu'elle s'achèvera lorsque les autorités du Kosovo auront acquis une

expérience suffisante pour garantir l'État de droit à tous les membres de

la société.

Le montant de référence financière destiné à couvrir les dépenses

liées à une durée de seize mois sera de 205 millions EUR.

• www.consilium.europa.eu/kosovo

• www.consilium.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo


Gros plan sur EULEX KOSOVO

Dans le cadre de son approche globale à l'égard du Kosovo, l'UE a

décidé de lancer, le 16 février 2008, une mission “État de droit” au

Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO).

Objectif: aider les autorités du Kosovo en les suivant, les encadrant et

les conseillant dans tous les domaines liés à l'État de droit, en particulier

dans les domaines de la police, de la justice, des douanes et des services

pénitentiaires.

La mission aidera les institutions du Kosovo, les autorités judiciaires

et les organismes chargés de l'application des lois à progresser sur la

voie de la viabilité et de la responsabilisation et à poursuivre la mise sur

pied et le renforcement d'un système judiciaire multi-ethnique indépen-

dant, ainsi que de services de police et des douanes multi-ethniques. Les

principales priorités de la mission consistent à répondre aux préoccupa-

tions immédiates en matière de protection des minorités et de lutte

contre la corruption et la criminalité organisée.

La mission est conçue comme un effort mené conjointement avec les

autorités locales, conformément au principe de la maîtrise locale du

processus, en vue de faciliter la mise en place, au Kosovo, d'un système

judiciaire et administratif viable de façon autonome et reposant sur

l'État de droit et les normes européennes. Néanmoins, EULEX KOSOVO

assumera certaines responsabilités exécutives, dans des cas définis.

>

19

Kosovo police service officers

E u r o p e a n S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c y I s s u e 620 J u l y 2 0 0 8


The EU is currently preparing for its biggest civilian crisis management operation under the

ESDP umbrella to date. The mission that was agreed by the EU on 16 February 2008 aims to

consolidate the rule of law in Kosovo. The build-up of the EULEX KOSOVO rule of law

Mission has started and the recruitment of mission personnel is in its final stages. In charge

of this important and sensitive mission in the Balkans is Yves de Kermabon, who was

appointed Head of Mission by the Political and Security Committee on 7 February 2008.

What is your plan for the EULEX mission which is currently build-

ing up? How do you intend to establish this ESDP mission in this

very sensitive environment?

■ I am sure we can all agree that a

solid rule of law is necessary for any

society built on democratic princi-

ples and therefore we are convinced

that this mission will be of benefit

to all communities in Kosovo. EULEX

is a mission composed of rule of law

professionals supported by all EU

member states and it is intended to

be deployed Kosovo-wide.

Furthermore, we expect that the

mission will have a very strong

impact not only on Kosovo, but on

the whole region, as organised crime,

inter-ethnic-, financial- and sensitive crimes still pose a threat on the

societies’ structures. By strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo we will

be able to take a big step forward in the European integration process.

All member states have a clear view on this. The EU is committed to the

region and the EULEX mission is a key instrument for enhancing stability

in the region which is a key necessity for the social and economic devel-

opment of Kosovo and of the whole Western Balkans. We all know about

the impact that the current situation in Kosovo has on our member

states.

How do you want to implement this philosophy in the field?

■ The mandate of the mission is to monitor, mentor and advise the local

authorities in the broader field of rule of law, while retaining certain

executive powers to be used in a corrective way. The EULEX experts will

cover all aspects in police, justice and customs and our professionals will

be co-located with their Kosovo counterparts. The key concept is local

ownership and accountability: the Kosovo authorities will be in the

driver’s seat.

But, let me be very clear on one thing: If I need to use executive powers,

be sure that I will. Should the Kosovo authorities fail to meet their

responsibilities in the areas of organised crime, war crimes, inter ethnic

crimes, terrorism, corruption, financial crime or property issues, I will not

hesitate to take the necessary action. Though I hope I can avoid the use

of these powers as much as possible.

EULEX is facing major opposition from Serbia, supported by

Russia. How will you meet this opposition and convince those

countries that the EULEX mission will have a positive impact for

everybody?

■ As I already mentioned you have to be aware that EULEX is a technical

mission. I will not discuss the political process. However, if we want to

help create a peaceful and democratic society, which is needed for the

stability of the region, everybody, all the communities must be able to

rely on a strong rule of law situation. This means freedom of movement,

unrestricted access to justice, impartial trials and security for the whole

population of Kosovo – security being the key to good living standards

and economic development.

Let me give you one example of how the rule of law can bring benefits

to the minorities in Kosovo; the prosecution and adjudication of serious

crimes and the handling of conflict-related property claims is essential to

the peaceful development of Kosovo’s multi-ethnic society. It ensures

equal treatment of all ethnic communities in Kosovo, establishes legal

certainty with respect to property and housing and encourages the

return of displaced persons.

What is the main challenge?

■ What we need to do is look to the future, not the past. It is time to

develop a functional relationship between the different sections of the

population in Kosovo, between Kosovo and its neighbours and between

Kosovo and the EU. There are a lot of things to do in this area. We need

to speak to everybody, to the Kosovo Serb community, to Belgrade, to

the minority communities in Kosovo and last but not least to the

Albanian majority as well. We need to be involved in the reconciliation

process and to build trust. To do this, we need to have open communica-

tion channels. All people, regardless of their background, should be aware

that the rule of law is of common interest, and maybe in particular for

the Serbs, as they are part of the same geographical area. If we really

want to fight organised crime and corruption we have to work together,

we have to speak to one another.

> Interview

Yves de Kermabon on the EULEX KOSOVO rule of law mission

The Head of the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo, Yves de Kermabon, during his visit to Kosovo on 14 and 15 March 2008

“Our mission will benefit all communities”


E S S AY

For humanity, climate change, and its social, political and economic

repercussions could well be the defining challenge of the 21st cen-

tury, potentially jeopardising the security of the world. In fact, global

warming is already having a profound impact on international security,

as individuals and states scramble for diminishing resources.

The potential implications relate to the lack of resources – crucially –

water and the availibility of land for food production and to food prices.

We have already seen how skyrocketing food prices and shortages have

triggered food riots and unrest across the developing world.

The United Nations estimated that all but one of its emergency

appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related. Last year, the

UN Security Council also held its first debate on climate change and its

implications for international security, while the 2003 European Security

Strategy recognises the link between global warming and competition.

The report focuses on the impact of climate change on global security,

how this could affect Europe’s own security, and what the EU should do

about it. “The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are

already taking place,” Solana wrote in an article published in several lead-

ing European newspapers. “Nor is it ‘just’ an environmental challenge, no

matter how urgent and important. Climate change also causes serious

political and security risks that directly affect European interests. That is

why we need to address these together, as Europeans.

“Saying that climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to

stick to our commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,” the EU’s

foreign policy chief went on to emphasise.

Magnifying threatsClimate change may create some new problems but it is best viewed

as a threat multiplier which exacerbates or magnifies existing trends,

tensions and instabilities. Without proactive policies and mechanisms,

global warming threatens to overburden states and regions which are

already fragile and prone to conflict, potentially wiping out decades of

development efforts.

The economic damage associated with climate change could carry a

hefty price tag, potentially wiping 20% off global GDP each year, studies

predict. However, the burden will not be evenly distributed, with coastal

regions and the world’s poorest suffering the most.

The report revealed a number of threat categories. Perhaps first and

foremost among them will be the scramble for dwindling resources.

Reductions in available arable land, widespread water shortages, dimin-

ishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts

are already occurring, and this trend looks set to increase.

Shortage of water, the source of life, will prove the most problematic

and could lead to civil unrest and significant economic losses, even in

robust economies. The world’s driest regions, such as the Middle East and

North Africa, could witness the emergence of ‘water wars’.

There is also the looming energy crunch and its possible ramifications

for international security. As oil supplies dwindle and demand rises, the

global competition for remaining energy resources will rise dramatically,

potentially leading to greater conflict, particularly as previously inacces-

sible but resource-rich regions open up due to climate change. The Arctic

could become such a flashpoint, mainly due to the emergence of new

waterways and the increasing accessibility of its massive hydrocarbon

reserves.

Nevertheless, handled pragmatically there is no reason why the world

cannot weather these difficulties collectively.

Sea change for coastal areas

Coastal regions,

home to about a

fifth of the world’s

population, are likely

to suffer severely. As

the tsunami in 2004

and Hurricane Katrina

in 2005 foreshadowed,

extreme climate events

in the future are likely

to have devastating local

effects and strain global

relief mechanisms.

Rising sea levels will

most likely lead to territori-

al losses in many parts of

the world, and some small

island nations may disap-

pear entirely. In addition

to the devastation

wrought on local popu-

lations, this could trig-

ger disputes over land

and maritime borders.

Many think of climate change as a purely environmental issue, but it also poses significant global

security challenges which are of major concern to the EU. Such concerns require concerted action,

according to a report by Javier Solana, the Union’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and

Security Policy, and the European Commission presented to the European Council in March 2008.

Climate change Creating a climate of security

<

difficulties collectively.

,

ts

ly

cal

bal

e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e P o l i c y 21

-

>


E S S AY

>

lost a third of their area in the second half of the 20th century alone,

while Kyrgyzstan has lost over a thousand glaciers in the last four

decades.

All these challenges associated with climate change are likely to test

the global governance system to the limit. That is why concerted effort

is needed to strengthen the world’s multilateral institutions.

Prevention, better than cureThe international scientific consensus is that a certain amount of cli-

mate change (perhaps a 2ºC rise above pre-industrial levels) cannot be

averted, even if we slash our greenhouse gas emissions to below half of

1990 levels by 2050. Of course, we should redouble efforts to reduce

emissions because a failure to do so could take us beyond a natural

ecological ‘tipping point’, with unknown consequences.

However, we also need to develop and implement robust strategies to

deal with the socio-economic and security consequences of the inevita-

ble changes that will occur to the global and local climates in the coming

decades. In fact, it is imperative that Europe and the world adopt a pre-

ventive approach to the climate-related security challenge.

The report recommends a number of actions to boost the EU’s capac-

ity to deal with the security ramifications of climate change. One area of

major attention is knowledge by intensifying the Union’s research, moni-

toring and early-warning capabilities (particularly in areas of political

instability). This would also include commissioning research to gauge the

region-by-region implications of climate change. Another important

focus is boosting Europe’s civil protection, crisis-management and disas-

ter-response capabilities, both civilian and military.

In addition, the EU should further develop a comprehensive European

migration policy which takes into account the future growth in environ-

mentally induced migration.

Leadership in co-operationClimate change is a key element of international relations and will be

increasingly so in the coming years. If recognised, it can even become a

positive driver for improving and reforming global governance.

Europe cannot and should not attempt to handle the security aspect

of climate change alone. Just as the EU is all about multilateral co-

operation, the Union must lead the way in promoting global multilateral-

ism in combating global warming.

Building on the successful Bali climate change conference in December

2007, the EU needs to continue strengthening its global leadership by

directing attention to the security risks related to climate change in the

different multilateral arenas. The Union also needs to spearhead efforts

to enhance international co-operation in the detection and monitoring

Environmental changes are already creating what have become

known as ‘environmental refugees’. Further loss of coastal areas, deserti-

fication and other climate-induced changes will accelerate this process,

prompting large-scale, environmentally induced migration, both within

and between countries. Although Europeans are unlikely to suffer this

themselves, Europe will experience increased pressure from illegal migra-

tion. The extra strain placed by climate change, particularly on fragile and

failing states, could lead to greater dissent, bring down governments, and

provoke greater tensions between various ethnic and religious groups.

Hot spotsThe report identified a number of developing regions which are most

at risk from climate change: Africa, the Middle East, South and Central

Asia, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.

“Those most affected by climate change are not those most responsi-

ble for causing it,” Solana pointed out.

Africa is perhaps most vulnerable to climate change because of the

multiple stresses it will face and its low adaptive capacity born of pov-

erty. North Africa and the Sahel could lose as much as 75% of their

arable, rain-fed land, up to 15% of arable land in the Nile Delta could be

lost this century owing to rising sea levels, and southern Africa is experi-

encing poor harvest due to droughts.

Water systems in the largely arid Middle East are already under

intense water pressure, with roughly two-thirds of countries in the region

depending on water sources outside their borders. This could lead to seri-

ous water-related conflicts. Two-fifths of Asia’s population (around 2 bil-

lion people) live in coastal areas, which means that rising sea levels could

displace millions of people.

In addition, changes in the monsoon patterns and reductions in the

melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than a billion people.

Central Asia is similarly affected by diminishing water sup-

plies. For instance, the glaciers in

Tajikistan

E S i t d D f P l i22

Central Asia is similarly affected by diminishing water suCentral Asia is sim

plies. For instance, the glaciers

Tajikista

>

>


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E S S AY

of climate-related security threats, as well as boost regional prevention,

preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. On the bilateral level,

the security aspect of climate change should be woven into all the co-

operation and political dialogue instruments the EU has with third-

country partners.

“It is up to Europe to lead the international response,” the High

Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy concluded.

RésuméEn juin 2007, le Conseil européen a invité la Commission européenne et

le Haut Représentant pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune

de l'Union, Javier Solana, à préparer un rapport conjoint sur l'incidence

du réchauffement climatique sur la sécurité. Voici les principaux éléments

de ce rapport:

Aggravation des menaces: Le changement climatique est peut-être à

l'origine de nouveaux problèmes mais il convient plutôt de le considé-

rer comme un multiplicateur de menaces qui exacerbe ou aggrave des

tendances, des tensions et des instabilités existantes.

Régions côtières: Abritant environ un cinquième de la population mon-

diale, les régions côtières risquent d'être gravement touchées.

L'élévation du niveau de la mer entraînera très vraisemblablement des

pertes territoriales dans de nombreuses régions du globe et certaines

petites nations insulaires pourraient disparaître complètement.

Zones sensibles: Le rapport a identifié un certain nombre de régions en

développement qui sont les plus menacées par le changement climati-

que: l'Afrique, le Moyen-Orient, l'Asie du Sud et centrale, ainsi que

l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes. “Les pays les plus touchés par le chan-

gement climatique n'en sont pas les principaux responsables”, souligne

M. Solana.

Mieux vaut prévenir que guérir: Le rapport recommande un certain

nombre d'actions pour renforcer la capacité de l'Union européenne à

gérer l'incidence du changement climatique sur la sécurité. Il convien-

drait notamment de commander des recherches destinées à évaluer la

situation région par région, de renforcer la protection civile et les capa-

cités européennes de gestion des crises et de réaction en cas de catas-

trophe (tant civiles que militaires), ou encore de développer une politi-

que européenne globale en matière de migrations.

Chef de file de la coopération: L'Europe ne peut pas et ne devrait pas tenter

de gérer seule les aspects de sécurité du changement climatique. L'UE

doit promouvoir un multilatéralisme mondial dans la lutte contre le

réchauffement climatique en s’appuyant sur la conférence sur le change-

ment climatique organisée avec succès à Bali en décembre 2007.UN Climate change conference in Bali, December 2007

UN Climate change conference in Bali, December 2007


Back in October 2005, at an informal meeting in Hampton Court,

EU heads of state and government agreed to take forward pro-

posals to strengthen Union crisis-management structures. Under the

leadership of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, new

measures were agreed, including the creation of the position of

Civilian Operations Commander and the reorganisation of the inter-

nal EU crisis-management structures to establish CPCC.

These changes reflect developments in ESDP in recent years. In

essence, wherever there is conflict, and wherever there is a peace deal,

there is work to be done to stitch together security forces, police and/

or the justice system and to help raise standards to a European level.

Since 2005, the EU has been called in to manage political crises in many

more places than before. Typically, missions are increasingly tailored to

meet a demand for integrated action, whether between different sec-

tors of civilian crisis management or as a combination of civilian and

military assets. Also, the Union is deploying in more challenging secu-

rity environments. The case for bringing these operations under a single

chain of command had become compelling.

Established in August 2007, CPCC is located in Brussels and is part of

the Council General Secretariat. It is responsible for eight missions in

the areas of police, border assistance management, rule of law and

security sector reform: EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina); EUPT and EULEX

KOSOVO (the former is supporting the build up of the latter); EUPOL

COPPS and EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories); EUJUST LEX (for the

Iraqi justice system); EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL RD Congo; and EU SSR

Guinea-Bissau which is due to be deployed in June 2008.

CPCC totals approximately 60 staff in Brussels combining a unique

blend of expertise: 50% Council officials, many with extensive interna-

tional and ESDP experience, and 50% seconded national experts,

largely senior police officers as well as rule of law, procurement, logis-

tics and finance experts. In all, 17 different EU nationalities are repre-

sented. In a drive to assemble the best civilian crisis-management

practices within the Council Secretariat and member states, CPCC has

developed integrated working methods and procedures to link up its

different units and sections. Based on their expertise, staff are assigned

to informal project groups tasked with the development and imple-

mentation of various activities under CPCC’s work plan.

In theatre, the statistics are impressive. This year, with the foreseen

deployment of EULEX KOSOVO, some 3,000 men and women will be

serving in three continents under civilian ESDP – Africa, the Middle East,

Afghanistan and Kosovo being areas of high-intensity EU foreign policy

engagement. CPCC is responsible for their well-being and protection on

a 24/7 basis and supports them in the day-to-day conduct of the mis-

sions, including through the help of the newly created Watchkeeping

Capability. This support ranges from administration and finance to the

E S D P S T R U C T U R E S - C P C C

> Introducing CPCC

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau

EUPOL Afghanistan

EUPM (Bosnia & Herzegovina)

What lies behind the acronym chosen for the new

member of the ESDP family, CPCC? At first glance, it

is hard to tell. In English, CPCC translates as Civilian

Planning and Conduct Capability. In plainer English,

CPCC is a new entity in charge of the planning,

deployment, conduct and review of civilian ESDP

crisis-management operations.

Kees Klompenhouwer was appointed

director of the CPCC and civilain opera-

tion commander as of 1 May.

He comes from the Netherlands Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, where he was direc-

tor for Eastern and Southeast Europe.

Kees Klompenhouwer


E S D P S T R U C T U R E S - C P C C

EUPOL RD Congo

processing of mission-related planning documents and regular reports

through the Council preparatory bodies. Most of the personnel on the

ground or in Brussels-based support teams hail from the EU. An addi-

tional 15 other nationalities are also participating, either as secondees

or contracted staff.

Over the last few months, CPCC has been busy building its internal

capacity while fulfilling its 24/7 duties as of day 1. This involved nearly

doubling its staff and securing the means and material resources to

carry out its mandate. During the same period, two new missions in

Guinea-Bissau and Kosovo were planned and launched, both presenting

novelties of scale, design and purpose when compared with previous

ESDP operations. CPCC has devoted time and energy to strengthening

command and control over the missions under the responsibility of the

Civilian Operations Commander, i.e. through output-oriented planning

methodologies, more frequent visits and VTCs and a focus on quality

reporting and information flows. Relations with other ESDP stake-

holders have been developed on the basis of respective competences,

and operational contacts with the UN, the OSCE and other interna-

tional partners are being established.

CPCC’s main deliverable by its first anniversary will be a unified and

clear chain of command for civilian ESDP operations, as envisaged in

the follow-up to Hampton Court. Managing change is always

a challenge, in particular in a set-up such as ESDP which involves a

variety of actors, i.e. civilian, military, policy and financial, in two thea-

tres (Brussels and the area of operations concerned). Looking back over

the past few months, much has been achieved, largely thanks to the

dedication of staff, missions, Council Secretariat authorities and

member states.

For all personnel and CPCC partners, it has felt like constructing a

fast car while driving it at the same time. Much of the intensity con-

tinues, especially in the wake of the appointment, on 1 May 2008, of

its Civilian Operations Commander, Kees Klompenhouwer, a Dutch

diplomat. CPCC is aiming to acquire full operational capability later

this year and to bringing about quality improvements in the planning

and conduct of all missions under its responsibility.

RésuméLa Capacité civile de planification et de conduite (en anglais Civilian Planning

and Conduct Capability, CPCC) est une nouvelle structure de la PESD en charge

de la planification, du déploiement, de la conduite et de l'évaluation des opéra-

tions de gestion civile des crises. Elle reflète les développements récents qu'a

connus la PESD: pour chaque conflit ou accord de paix, un travail doit être

mené à bien pour rapprocher les forces de sécurité, la police et/ou le système

judiciaire, et pour contribuer à améliorer les pratiques jusqu'aux normes

européennes.

Établie en août 2007, la CPCC se trouve à Bruxelles et relève du secrétariat

général du Conseil. Elle est responsable de huit missions dans les domaines

de la police, de l'aide à la gestion des frontières, de l'État de droit et de la

réforme du secteur de la sécurité: MPUE (Bosnie-et-Herzégovine); EPUE et

EULEX KOSOVO (deux missions à venir); EUPOL COPPS et EUBAM Rafah

(territoires palestiniens); EUJUST LEX (pour le système judiciaire irakien),

EUPOL Afghanistan; EUPOL RD Congo et UE RSS Guinée-Bissau (qui devrait

être déployée en juin 2008).

Dirigée par le diplomate néerlandais Kees Klompenhouwer, la CPCC emploie

environ 60 personnes à Bruxelles et dispose d’un savoir-faire unique: 50%

sont des fonctionnaires du Conseil, bénéficiant souvent d'une grande expé-

rience dans le domaine de la PESD et des relations internationales, et 50%

sont des experts nationaux détachés, en grande partie des officiers de police

de haut rang ainsi que des experts en matière d'État de droit, de passation de

marchés, de logistique et de finance. Sur le terrain, la CPCC est responsable

du bien-être et de la protection de quelque 3.000 hommes et femmes qui

participent ou participeront aux missions civiles de la PESD et ce, 24 heures

sur 24 et 7 jours sur 7.

“CPCC now provides an upper command level to the Head of Mission on the ground; this enables us to

finally have eye-to-eye contact with our military ESDP counterparts and facilitates situations where two missions are deployed in the same theatre or when planning or conducting integrated civilian/

military missions. This is a real improvement and has long been needed.”

Birgit, German Council official, with military and civilian ESDP experience.


Some member state armed forces are already overstretched

because of commitments in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan

and Lebanon – and demand for European action is growing. Since its

first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the EU has initiated roughly

20 operations through its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

For instance, in February 2008, the EU started deploying a peacekeep-

ing force to Eastern Chad and North-East CAR, which will comprise

3,700 soldiers.

Part of the reason for a lack of deployable soldiers is that there are

roughly 220,000 conscript troops in the EU. Conscripts – a legacy of

Cold War military planning – are largely redundant for foreign deploy-

ments. Another reason for Europe’s lack of military muscle is a shortage

of useful equipment, such as transport planes and communications

technology.

The budgetary challenge faced by European defence ministries is

great. The cost of defence equipment is rising by six to eight per cent a

year, while current missions are consuming money that had been set

aside for buying new equipment. This is putting EU military establish-

ments under enormous stress; for example, the UK Ministry of Defence

estimates that it is EUR 3 billion short of money needed to buy all

equipment it plans to buy in the next decade.

In addition, inefficiency abounds in European spending on defence

equipment, with too many small procurement programmes for essen-

tially the same capability. For example: the EU-27 currently spends

roughly EUR 30 billion a year on some 89 equipment programmes; the

US spends much more (roughly EUR 83 billion annually) on just

27 projects. In other words, EU governments collectively spend just

over a third of what the US spends on equipment procurement – on

three times as many programmes.

The good news is that military reform is now widely recognised at

the EU level as absolutely necessary if the Union is to fulfil its security

aims. Member States have agreed to commit to be able by 2010 to

respond with rapid and decisive capabilities covering the whole range

of tasks defined in the Treaty of the Europen Union and in the European

Security Strategy. Although the Union has not yet managed to con-

vince European governments to rapidly improve their military capabili-

ties, the process of military reform in Europe will continue. In addition,

a number of major equipment investments started by EU defence min-

istries should enter into service in the coming years. These capabilities

include A400M transport planes; A330 air tankers; Eurofighter, Rafale

and Joint-Strike-Fighter jets; and Franco-British aircraft carriers.

Military reform does not mean that the EU will have its own army.

But there should be much greater integration between European armed

forces. In effect, Europe could have a collection of interlocking

‘European armies’ rather than a single force. Multinational military

units make sound military as well as budgetary sense. They ensure that

soldiers from different countries work well together on the ground,

since they would train together and use the same equipment. Tentative

efforts to encourage greater military co-operation have already started,

such as the battle groups initiative, in which EU member states pool

their troops to form a 1,500 strong, rapid-reaction force capable of

long-distance deployment.

If successful, the battle groups might convince EU defence ministries

to develop more ambitious joint units in the future. For example,

France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal could combine to form a

Mediterranean fleet of frigates. France and Germany already train their

Tiger helicopter pilots together, and could potentially use the same

combat helicopter units. Another possibility would be for countries

that are part of battle groups to think about forming multinational

divisions (around 10,000 troops) together.

E S S AY

>

The 27 EU governments collectively spend EUR 200 billion

per year on defence. This means that, together, EU

governments are the world’s second biggest defence

spenders after the US. That amount of money should be

enough to cover Europe’s defence needs. But despite these

hefty financial resources, Europeans do not have nearly

enough soldiers whom they can use. The EU-27 governments

have close to 2 million personnel in their armed forces, but

they can barely deploy and sustain 100,000 soldiers around

the globe. This amounts to a mere five per cent of the EU

armed forces.

European military capabilities Sharing the burden

By Daniel Kehoane, Research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies.


A number of member states would also save money by pooling

some of their military equipment, such as aircraft which are very

expensive to maintain. For instance, the Union could set up a pool of

transport aircraft, starting with the 180 A400M transport aircraft which

will be owned by six EU countries. In order to achieve significant cost

savings, some countries could operate their A400Ms from one main

base, using a single planning, servicing and logistics organisation to

support the force. The European Defence Agency is currently drafting

proposals for pooling some A400Ms.

To sum up, the twin pressures of static budgets and growing opera-

tional demands mean that EU governments have little choice but to

pool more of their military resources in the future. If EU defence min-

istries managed to share more resources, those benefiting would

include not only their armed forces, who would get badly needed mili-

tary equipment, but also European taxpayers, who would get better

value for money.

Battlegroups exercise

E S S AY

RésuméLes 27 gouvernements de l'UE consacrent collectivement chaque année 200 mil-

liards d'euros à la défense et leurs forces armées comptent près de 2 millions de

personnes. Pourtant, ils peuvent à peine déployer et entretenir 100.000 soldats

dans le monde entier. Sont en cause le grand nombre d'appelés, difficilement

déployables à l'étranger, et le manque d'équipement adéquat, notamment au

niveau des avions de transport et des technologies de communication.

Une réforme militaire est désormais largement reconnue comme nécessaire

pour que l'UE puisse atteindre ses objectifs en matière de sécurité. Les États

membres ont convenu d'objectifs à atteindre dans le domaine des capacités

militaires d'ici 2010 et ils ont décidé de lancer ensemble un certain nombre

d'investissements d'envergure en matière d'équipement: des avions de trans-

port A400M, des avions ravitailleurs A330, des jets Eurofighter, Rafale et

Joint-Strike-Fighter, et des porte-avions franco-britanniques.

Une réforme militaire ne signifie pas que l'Union européenne disposera de sa

propre armée; mais elle devrait permettre une intégration bien plus étroite

entre les forces armées européennes. À titre d'exemple, l'initiative de groupe-

ments tactiques permet aux États membres de l'UE de réunir leurs troupes

pour former une force de réaction rapide de 1.500 hommes. D'autres forma-

tions pourraient être envisagées, telles qu'une flotte méditerranéenne de fré-

gates ou la formation de divisions multinationales (environ 10.000 hommes).

En bref, la double pression imposée par des budgets statiques et des demandes

opérationnelles croissantes implique que les gouvernements européens n'ont

guère d'autre choix que de mettre en commun une plus grande partie de leurs

ressources militaires à l'avenir.

<


Clippings

> "Wir werden im ganzen Kosovo tätig sein"

Enver Robelli.

Der EU-Sondergesandte Pieter Feith will auch in den serbischen Gebieten

Sicherheit und Ordnung schaffen - auch wenn das lange dauern wird

Die EU will bis zum Sommer die größte zivile Mission in ihrer Geschichte im Kosovo stationieren; sie soll den Namen "EULEX" tragen. Etwa 2000 Beamte sollen helfen, dass die Justiz, die Verwaltung und die Zollbehörden den neuen Staates ein europäisches Niveau erreichen. Neben EULEX wird im Kosovo in Zukunft noch eine zweite Mission in mehreren Bereichen das Sagen haben: die internationale Verwaltungs-behörde (ICO), die von Pieter Feith geführt wird. Der 63-jährige niederländische Diplomat mit großer Balkan-Erfahrung ist gleichzeitig EU-Sondergesandter für den Kosovo. Seine Aufgabe ist es, die Umsetzung des Plans für die Unabhängigkeit der früheren serbischen Provinz zu überwachen.

SZ: Herr Feith, im serbisch dominierten Norden des Kosovo ist den vergangenen Tagen die Gewalt eskaliert. Die serbische Regierung lehnt die Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo kategorisch ab. Sehen Sie einen Ausweg aus dieser Sackgasse?Feith: Es ist klar, dass durch die Gewalt im Norden die rote Linie der internationalen Gemeinschaft überschritten wurde. Ich fordere alle Seiten zum Dialog auf. Das gilt insbesondere für die Belgrader Regierung und für die Vertreter der serbischen Minderheit im Kosovo.

SZ: Kürzlich mussten Sie aus Angst vor serbischer Gewalt ein Vorbereitungs-team für die EU-Mission aus dem Norden der Stadt Mitrovica abziehen.Feith: Wir sind erst daran, unsere Mission aufzubauen. Eins ist aber klar: Wir werden im ganzen Kosovo tätig sein.

SZ: Die serbische Regierung ist an der Kosovo-Frage gescheitert. Am 11. Mai finden dort Wahlen statt. Wie beeinflusst das Ihre Arbeit?Feith: Das ist eine Angelegenheit für Serbien. Es stehen zwei Themen zur Diskussion: Eines ist die europäische Perspektive Serbiens, das Zweite ist der Konflikt über den Kosovo. Darüber haben sich die serbischen Wähler zu äußern.

SZ: Der Plan des UN-Vermittlers Martti Ahtisaari für die Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo gründet aber auf der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Serbien, der EU-Mission im Kosovo und der kosovarischen Regierung in Pristina.Feith: Der Plan enthält klare Vorgaben für die kosovarische Regierung. Meine Aufgabe als internationaler Zivilvertreter ist es, zu assistieren und zu beraten. Die Entscheidungen werden von den lokalen Institutionen getroffen. Was Serbien betrifft: Der Ahtisaari-Plan ging von der Voraussetzung aus, dass es eine einvernehmliche Lösung über den Status des Kosovo gibt. Das trat nicht ein. Serbiens Kooperation ist jedoch wichtig für die Umsetzung einer Reihe von Vorlagen.

[…]

SZ: Es bleibt die Frage nach Rechts-Gleichheit. Im Norden und in den Enklaven bezahlt niemand Steuern, viele Autos fahren ohne Kennzeichen. Wer sollte da das Gesetz durchsetzen?Feith: Ich werde die Einhaltung von Gesetzen nicht durchsetzen. Wir werden die Regierung des Kosovo unterstützen, die Ahtisaari-Vorgaben umzusetzen. Dazu gehören privilegierte Beziehungen zwischen Belgrad und den serbischen Gemeinden in den Bereichen Gesundheit und Bildung. Was die Nummernschilder betrifft: Das müssen wir in einem passenden Moment regeln.

SZ: In Serbien beginnt bald der Wahlkampf. Werden Sie diesen auch in serbischen Gebieten im Kosovo zulassen?Feith: Es ist nicht an mir, solche Entscheidungen zu fällen, die UN-Mission (UNMIK) muss eine Antwort darauf finden. Es wird natürlich eine Kampagne geben, es werden wohl Minister aus Belgrade anreisen. Es ist aber unerwünscht, dass Leute kommen, um hier Gewalt zu provozieren order die Lage zu destabilisieren.

SZ: Sie schieben die Verantwortung der UNMIK zu. Gemäß dem Ahtisaari-Plan muss die EU nach einer Übergangsphase von 120 Tagen das Zepter von den UN übernehmen.Feith: Wir bauen unsere Präsenz auf im Einklang mit den Entscheidungen der EU und werden die EULEX-Mission einsetzen. Wie sich die Vereinten Nationen verhalten, ist offen.

SZ: Nochmals: Hat jemand die 120 Tage zu zählen begonnen?Feith: Ich zähle immer. Doch ich zähle meistens mein Geld und meine Murmeln.

SZ: Wird UNMIK jemals den Kosovo vollständig verlassen?Feith: Die Resolution 1244 bleibt gültig. Es liegt an den UN, darüber zu entscheiden, in welcher Form sie weitermachen: Vermutlich werden sie im Kosovo präsent bleiben.[…]

I N T H E P R E S S

>

> Au Tchad, les militaires de l’Ouest construisent des villes

Nicolas GROS-VERHEYDE.

Du sable, du soleil, du vent... Voici les principaux éléments dont

disposent les militaires de l’Eufor, la force européenne au Tchad, pour

relever un défit logistique: monter quatre camps en un temps

record.

Au départ, il n’y a “rien ou presque rien, explique le Lieutenant-Colonel Axelos de l’opération Eufor. Il faut faire des forages pour aller chercher l’eau, damer un camp et le stabiliser, installer un drainage, des fossés, en prévision des pluies, enterrer les conduites d’eau et de téléphone, construire des merlons pour protéger le camp”… voire même créer des routes comme à N’Djamena ou Abéché.

De vraies petites villes

Quand les Marsouins du Régiment d’infanterie de chars de marine (RICM), complétés d’éléments du 11e régiment d’artillerie de marine (Lande d’Ouée), sont ainsi arrivés à la mi-mars, sur place à Farchana, par la route, au terme d’une “croisière noire” de plusieurs jours, les premiers moments ont été rustiques. “La première nuit, on s’est réveillé avec plusieurs couches de poussière dans la bouche et sur le sol, raconte le lieutenant-colonel Faguet. Et même aujourd’hui, les conditions restent rudimentaires”.

“C’est simple, explique le Colonel Serge Duval, un des responsables “soutien”, c’est un bout de désert sur lequel on doit faire pousser trois petites villes de 600 habitants et une ville de 2000 habitants, à partir de rien. Et tout doit être terminé en un temps record, avant la saison des pluies en juin…”, dans des conditions climatiques (35° à 50° avec des vents de sable) et sécuritaires difficiles.

Dans cette opération, la logistique est donc fondamentale. Il faut, en effet, tout acheminer sur place: des douches au radar, en passant par les ambulances, les munitions, une partie de la nourriture et de l’eau, voire du ciment… Les militaires français de l’opération Épervier (bien implantés, sur des bases en “dur” près des aéroports de N’Djamena et Abéché) prêtent main-forte à leurs collègues “européens”. “Chaque jour, explique le colonel Périé, commandant “Épervier”, nous devons transporter 12 tonnes de fret entre N’Djamena et Abéché”, sans compter les “missions de reconnaissance avec des Mirages F1”.

Reste ensuite à organiser la vie du camp tous les jours, ce qui inclut aussi une compatibilité fine! Comme il n’y a pas d’armée européenne, chaque État doit contribuer pour ses propres troupes. Mais pour éviter les doublons, c’est la France, là encore, qui a été désignée comme chef de file logistique. “L’électricité, l’eau, la nourriture sont ainsi refacturées à chaque unité nationale, au prorata de l’utilisation” explique le lieutenant-colonel Villuendas, “maire” du camp “Europa”, situé à N’Djamena, dans l’enceinte de ce qui était destiné à devenir… une prison.


> La Belgique commandera un “groupement

tactique” européen fin 2009

La Belgique prendra pour la première fois, au second semestre 2009, le commandement d'un “groupement tactique interarmées” (ou “Battle Group”) européen d'intervention rapide et y contribuera à hauteur de 1.350 hommes, a-t-on appris dimanche auprès du ministère de la Défense.

La décision, qui marque une ambition accrue de la Belgique dans cadre de la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), a été prise vendredi par le Conseil des ministres, après des mois de tractations. Le gouvernement a également approuvé une participation importante – 1.100 hommes – à la force de réaction rapide de l'OTAN, la “NATO Response Force” (NRF), au second semestre 2008.

L'idée de prendre le commandement d'un groupement tactique (GT, en anglais EUBG) était déjà contenue dans l'accord de politique étrangère négocié l'été dernier par les partenaires de l'orange bleue. Elle a été reprise dans la déclaration gouvernementale du cabinet Leterme 1er.

“Ce projet ambitieux, inscrit dans l'accord gouvernemental, nécessite la mise à disposition d'environ 1.350 personnes et d'un quartier général de force”, a souligné le ministère dans un communiqué.

Concrètement, la Belgique fournira à l'Union européenne un état-major de brigade – celui de la 7ème brigade de Marche-en-Famenne – et un contingent de plusieurs centaines d'hommes pour former l'ossature de l'un des deux EUBG de 1.500 hommes en “stand by” chaque semestre.

Le complément sera fourni par la France, a précisé un spécialiste du dossier à l'agence BELGA.

Un EUBG est constitué d'un bataillon renforcé par des éléments d'appui et de soutien logistique, soit environ 1.500 hommes. Il peut se déployer en cas d'urgence dans un délai de cinq à dix jours pour des missions d'une durée initiale de 30 jours, pouvant être portée à 120 jours, moyennant un réapprovisionnement approprié.

Deux groupements tactiques sont disponibles en permanence depuis le 1er janvier 2007, ce qui permet à l'UE de mener deux opérations militaire d'une manière quasi simultanée. Ils sont soit nationaux, soit multinationaux, avec la participation de 26 des 27 pays membres de l'UE, le Danemark bénéficiant d'une exemption en matière de défense dans les traités européens.

Selon un système de rotation, les deux groupements tactiques en “stand-by” sont relevés chaque semestre par deux autres constitués d'unités d'autres pays européens.

Mais l'Union n'a encore jamais fait appel à ces unités, recourant par exemple à une force ad hoc (3.700 hommes, dont une majorité de Français) pour son opération EUFOR au Tchad et en République centrafricaine lancée au printemps.

Jusqu'à présent, la Belgique s'était pour sa part contentée de fournir une contribution parfois substantielle – jusqu'à 500 hommes – à certains EUBG, mais sans jamais en assurer le commandement..../...

I N T H E P R E S S

Clippings <

> Chad.- Un avión español participa en el puente aéreo entre Yamena y Abeché para

apoyar la misión de EUFOR en Chad

Un avión C-295 del Ejército del Aire comenzó a operar ayer entre los aeropuertos de Yamena, capital del Chad, y Abeché, en la frontera con Sudán, para proporcionar apoyo logístico a la misión que EUFOR desarrolla en la frontera con la región de Darfur (Sudán), en lo que supone el primer vuelo del contingente español desplegado en la Operación EUFOR Chad-RCA, informó hoy el Ministerio de Defensa en un comunicado.

Está previsto que este avión, junto con uno similar que llegará a la zona en los próximos días, realice misiones de apoyo al contingente multinacional de EUFOR, que proporciona seguridad al personal de Naciones Unidas y de ONG que trabajan en los campos de refugiados y desplazados por el conflicto de Darfur en el Chad y la República Centroafricana.

El avión ha transportado a 32 militares de diferentes nacionalidades (franceses, polacos, suecos, austriacos), entre Yamena y Abeché, y alrededor de mil kilos de carga. El C-295 es un avión que cuenta con gran capacidad para operar en todo tipo de campos con limitada estructura o medios de apoyo en tierra, como ocurre en el Chad.

Con el apoyo unánime del Congreso de los Diputados, España contribuye a la Operación EUFOR Chad-RCA con el envío de dos aviones C-295 y 100 efectivos del Ala 35 del Ejército del Aire.

Este contingente, que se contabiliza dentro del límite de 3.000 efectivos autorizados por acuerdo de Consejo de Ministros de 28 de diciembre de 2007 para participación en misiones internacionales de paz en el exterior, incluye personal de operaciones, seguridad e información, apoyo logístico y comunicaciones, así como personal destinado en los Cuarteles Generales en Francia y en Chad.


E S D P O P E R AT I O N S

>

www.consilium.europa.eu/esdpwww.consilium.europa.eu/pesd

ESDP homepage

Aperçu des missions et opérations de l’Union européenneJuin 2008

Balkans occidentaux

Caucase du Sud> EUJUST THEMIS

Géorgie, 2004-2005

>

>

>

>

>

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EULEX KOSOVOPhase pré-opérationnelleEffectif: 1900

EUPMBosnie-Herzégovine, depuis 2003Effectif: 182

EUFOR ALTHEABosnie - Herzégovine, depuis 2004Effectif: 2500

EUPOL PROXIMAAncienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2004-2005

EUPATAncienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2006

CONCORDIAAncienne République yougoslave de Macédoine (ARYM), 2003

Asie> EUPOL AFGHANISTAN

Mission de police, depuis 2007Effectif: 230

AMM Monitoring MissionAceh/Indonésie, 2005-2006

>

Moyen-Orient> EUJUST LEX

Irak/Bruxelles, depuis 2005Effectif: 25

EUPOL COPPSTerritoires palestiniens, depuis 2006Effectif: 31

EUBAM RafahTerritoires palestiniens, depuis 2005Effectif: 27

>

>

> Missions civiles: missions en cours / missions achevées

> Opérations militaires: opérations en cours / opérations achevées

Autres missions :

>

Afrique

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

EU SSR Guinée-BissauDepuis 2008Effectif: 39

EUSEC RD CongoDepuis 2005Effectif: 40

EUPOL RD CongoDepuis 2007Effectif: 39

EUFOR Tchad/RCA2008-2009 Effectif: 3700

EUPOL KinshasaRD Congo, 2005-2007

Soutien à AMIS IISoudan/Darfour, 2005-2006Effectif: 31 civils et 20 militaires

ARTEMISRD Congo, 2003Effectif: 1800

EUFOR CongoRD Congo, 2006Effectif: 2300


P U B L I C AT I O N S

EU Institute for Security StudiesEU-ISS Publications

Spring 2008> Books and reports The European Institute for Security Studies 2002-2006: five years for the EU L’Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’Union européenne 2002-2006: cinq années pour l’Union, 2007 The New Global Puzzle – What World for the EU in 2025?

edited by Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, 2006.

> Chaillot Papers n°109 Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia

Ummu Salma Bava , Feng Zhongping, Sabine Fischer, Marco Aurélio Garcia, François Godement, Giovanni Grevi, Dmitri Trenin, Alfredo Valladão, Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Christian Wagneredited by Giovanni Grevi, Álvaro de Vasconcelos, May 2008.

n°108 Ukraine: Quo Vadis?Sabine Fischer, Rosaria Puglisi, Kataryna Wolczuk and Pawel Wolowskiedited by Sabine Fischer, February 2008.

n°107 Is there an Albanian question?Judy Batt, Misha Glenny, Denisa Kostovicova, Nicola Mai, Nadège Ragaru, Fabian Schmidt, Miranda Vickersedited by Judy Batt, January 2008.

n°106 Pioneering foreign policy: the EU Special Representatives Giovanni Grevi, October 2007.

n°105 Seeing blue: American visions of the EU Esther Brimmer, September 2007.

n°104 Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans Milica Delevic, July 2007.

n°103 Transformational diplomacy Justin Vaïsse, June 2007.

n°102 Fermer Yalta Salomé Zourabichvili, May 2007.

> Occasional Papers n°70 The EU and Georgia: time perspectives in conflict resolution

Bruno Coppieters, December 2007.

n°69 Lessons learned from European defence equipment programmesJean-Pierre Darnis, Giovanni Gasparini, Christoph Grams, Daniel Keohane, Fabio Liberti, Jean-Pierre Maulnyand May-Britt Stumbaum, October 2007.

n°68 Relations in the Russia-EU triangle: ‘zero-sum game’ or not? Vsevolod Samokhvalov, September 2007.

n°67 Crisis in Turkey: just another bump on the road to Europe? Walter Posch, June 2007.

<

> Recevoir l’ESDP newsletter – To receive ESDP Newsletter e-mail: [email protected]

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