INTIMATE FRONTIERS: CHINESE MARRIAGE MIGRANTS ......integrate into the Hong Kong society,” Lin Qin...
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INTIMATE FRONTIERS:
CHINESE MARRIAGE MIGRANTS AND CONTESTED BELONGING IN HONG KONG AND
TAIWAN
by
Man Chuen Cheng
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology
University of Toronto
© Copyright by Man Chuen Cheng 2018
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Intimate Frontiers:
Chinese Marriage Migrants and Contested Belonging in
Hong Kong and Taiwan
Man Chuen Cheng
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Sociology University of Toronto
2018
Abstract
Based on 17 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Taiwan and Hong Kong
between June 2014 and July 2016, this dissertation examines the everyday regulation and
negotiation of belonging at various sites of Chinese marriage migrants' personal lives,
including social service encounters, domestic space of the home, and Chinese marriage
migrant communities. As Chinese women married across the two politically contested
borders, their post-migration lives are situated within the frontiers of intimate family
lives but also historically grounded political struggles and renewed local discontent
against China’s political encroachment. The struggles of belonging faced by Chinese
marriage migrants illuminate the norms, values, and ideologies upheld by citizens and the
states of Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Chinese marriage migrants yearn to integrate into
the Hong Kong and Taiwanese societies, some Chinese marriage migrants mobilized
hegemonic discourses of belonging to make meanings of their everyday lives, others
contested their exclusion by redefining their identities and in the process, producing new
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layers of inequalities against less-privileged Chinese marriage migrants. Delving into the
narratives of belonging developed in everyday interaction, this dissertation shows how
national belonging is a regulated and negotiated process beyond legal categories and
immigration policies. This dissertation also shows how class intersects with gender and
nationality in producing differentiated regulatory practices and narratives of belonging,
illuminating the contradiction and complexity of immigrant belonging in an era of global
interconnection and geopolitical tension. Situating the production and negotiation of
these narratives within enhanced economic integration and shifting geopolitical
entanglement across the China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan borders, this dissertation
also highlights the unfortunate alignment of market logic and nationalist ideology in the
formation of discursive national boundaries against immigrants at geopolitically
contentious times.
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Acknowledgments
“Looking deeply into a flower, we see that the flower is made of non-flower elements.”
— Thich Nhat Hanh, No Death, No Fear1
Just like a flower that cannot grow without sun, rain, earth, and other non-flower
elements, this dissertation is nourished by the minds and hands of scholars, family, and
friends whose names are not on the cover page but have made everything possible with
their inspiration, trust, love, and care.
My foremost thanks to the people I met during fieldwork in Taiwan and Hong Kong. I
am most grateful to the Chinese marriage migrants who shared with me their intimate
stories and home-made food. I have learned from them the power of resilience,
persistence, and perseverance. I also thank the social workers, immigration officers, and
organizations that had let me participate in their seminars and workshops and helped me
recruit informants. This dissertation would not have been possible without their kindness
and trust.
At the University of Toronto, I thank my dissertation committee Ping-chun Hsiung, Hae
Yeon Choo, and Cynthia Cranford for their intellectual nourishment and unwavering
support throughout my academic journey. I thank Ping-chun for challenging me to reflect
on my epistemological and methodological position. I am a better qualitative researcher
because of her. Thank you to Cynthia, who has always inspired me with her intellectual
rigorousness and clarity.
No word can describe my indebtedness to Hae Yeon Choo. Her analytic criticality,
intellectual creativity, and unfailing dedication are everything to this dissertation and my
1 Thich Nhat Hanh 2002, 47-8.
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academic journey. Her teaching with Zen metaphor is also the most powerful. When I got
caught up with reading these days, I could still hear her say, “look at the moon, not the
finger pointing at it.”
Other professors and graduate colleagues have cultivated my intellectual ability and have
helped to develop my ideas at various stages of this research. Bonnie Fox, Anna
Korteweg, Rachel Silvey, Joan Eakin, and Lisa Yoneyama have informed my thinking
and writing. Ito Peng's Gender, Migration & the Work of Care has connected me with
scholars in the field of gender, care, and migration. I thank Rachel Silvey for giving me
the opportunity to work with her team to organize the conference "Im/mobilities and care
work: Social Reproduction and Migrant Families," where I presented part of this
dissertation. Jeanne Mathieu-Lessard, Katelin Albert, Elise Maiolino, Louise Birdsell
Bauer, Terran Giacomini, and Salina Abji have provided me with valuable feedback,
friendship, and intellectual comraderies.
Beyond Toronto, Nicole Constable, Pei-chia Lan, Kristy Shih, Anthony Spires, and
Connie Koo have shared with me their insights and wisdom about research, career, and
life. Academic and life advice from Nicole have been a guiding light at times of
darkness. Pei-chia had helped me gain access to the immigration office in Taiwan. Kristy
and her family had given me valuable advice at the beginning of my research. Anthony
has been my trusted mentor for many years. Connie introduced me to the world of yoga
and meditation that have saved me from chronic spinal pain. I have learned how to
breathe through moments when this dissertation feels too heavy.
My deepest gratitude to my parents, whose migration trajectories have been the
inspiration for this dissertation. Working on this project has unfolded many untold family
stories and has brought me closer to them.
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And finally, I thank my life partner Otto Ng, whose sense of humor and positivity have
carried me through ill health and distress in life. I am grateful to him for encouraging me
to bring my sociology training to community work. I used to think of sociology and
architecture as separate worlds, yet I am amazed by the similarities in our concerns and
approaches to personal and community lives throughout our collaborations. This
dissertation is not possible without his 3 a.m. company and meticulous formatting.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………. iv
List of Appendices ……………………………………………………………………... ix
Chapter 1 — Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
1 A Gendered Geopolitical Economy of Marriage Migration ............................... 5
2 State-building, “Qualities” of Citizens, and Contested Belonging ................... 12
3 Being in the Field: A Methodological Note ..................................................... 21
4 Overview of Chapters ...................................................................................... 31
Chapter 2 — Gendered Narratives of Belonging: Chinese Marriage Migrants,
Labor, and Immigrant Integration in Hong Kong and Taiwan .............................. 34
1 Gendered Narratives of Belonging .................................................................. 36
2 Chinese Marriage Migrants in Political and Cultural Contexts ......................... 39
3 Settings and Methods ...................................................................................... 42
4 Independent Market Narrative in Hong Kong ................................................. 43
5 Deferential Familial Narrative in Taiwan ........................................................ 49
6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 55
Chapter 3 — “I’m not a typical dalumei!” Chinese Marriage Migrants, Gendered
Morality, and Classed Belonging in Taiwan ........................................................... 58
1 Marriage Migrants, Gendered Morality, and Classed Belonging ..................... 59
2 Cross-strait Marriage and Representation of Mainland Chinese Women
in Taiwan ....................................................................................................... 62
3 Settings and Methods ...................................................................................... 65
4 Everyday Reproductions of Dalumei Discourse and the Formation of “Good
Immigrants” ................................................................................................... 68
5 Negotiating with Dalumei Discourse and Becoming “Good Immigrants” ....... 71
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6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 80
Chapter 4 — “Aren’t we all Chinese?” Chinese Marriage Migrants’ Participation
in Transnational Activities and Reterritorializing the Hong Kong — China border
......................................................................................................................... 83
1 Transnational Activities, Reterritorializing Nation-state, and Transmigrant
Subjectivities .................................................................................................. 85
2 The Political and Moral Landscapes of Chinese Marriage Migrants’
Transnational Participation ............................................................................. 88
3 Settings and Methods ...................................................................................... 93
4 Chinese Marriage Migrants’ Participation in Transnational Activities ............. 94
5 Chinese Marriage Migrants’ Narratives of their Political Participation .......... 104
6 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 112
Chapter 5 — Conclusion ........................................................................................ 115
1 Differentiated Immigrant Belonging at Geopolitically Contentious Times .... 119
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 123
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List of Appendices Appendix A — Profile of Chinese marriage migrants who were perceived by social
workers, Taiwanese friends, and the Chinese marriage migrant community as middle-
class in Taiwan………………………………...……………………………………... 139
Appendix B — Profile of Chinese marriage migrants who were perceived by social
workers, Taiwanese friends, and the Chinese marriage migrant community as working-
class in Taiwan ……………………………………………………………………... 142
Appendix C — Profile of Chinese marriage migrants I met in Taiwan who do not fit into
the class categorization………………………………………………….....………….. 145
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Lin Qin and Ming were not sisters, but they shared a strikingly similar migration
trajectory. Both were born in a small town in southwest China, quit high school, and left
their hometowns for Guangdong, an eastern city in China, to look for job opportunities at
a young age. It was in the late 1990s, two decades after China opened its door to
international investment, and jobs in Guangdong were plenty. Lin Qin and Ming took up
their first job at a toy factory but left very soon due to low salary. The two friends then
moved to Zhuhai, another eastern city in China, attended the same workshop about
housing estate, and became property sales agents. Riding the tide of China's rising
property, they earned a million RMB (approx. USD 155,000), and each bought a house in
Guangdong. At the highest point of their lives, they met their husbands, whom they
described as “loving” and “caring,” and had promised them a better life in Hong Kong
and Taiwan. Just before they turned 30, the two friends parted their ways and moved
across the China border to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
“I thought moving to Hong Kong was easy, because we are all Chinese. But what do I
know? These days, some Hong Kong people say they aren’t Chinese but Hong Kongers!”
Lin Qin lamented as she bought me a cappuccino in a busy coffee shop in Tsim Sha Tsui.
In light of the recent anti-China sentiments in Hong Kong, Lin Qin had participated in
political activities organized by pro-China political groups to condemn supporters of
localism— a political movement that emphasizes Hong Kong people’s identity and
autonomy (Law 2013, 96). Besides volunteering in political activities, Lin Qin also took
courses and exams in professional Mandarin speaking and became a certified Mandarin
teacher. When we met, she had just finished all her courses on insurance and became a
full-time insurance agent. “You have to add value to yourself if you really want to
integrate into the Hong Kong society,” Lin Qin explained, “otherwise Hong Kongers
would think that you come here for social welfare!”
Five hundred miles away in her newly furnished apartment in Taipei city, Ming was also
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frustrated with her new life in Taiwan. “Life was very different back in China.” Ming
recalled earning di yi tong jin—the first million RMB—describing that as “the proudest
moment” of her life. After she moved to Taiwan, Ming joked that her life had changed
from “bread-winning” to “bread-making.” Financially supported by her interior designer
husband, Ming stayed at home and had become what she called a Gongyuan Ka—
mothers who frequent parks with their children. In addition to childcare, she also spent
her days learning bread-making and soap-making at various integration programs
organized by the Taiwanese government. “I used to be a confident person when I was in
China, but after coming to Taiwan, I just feel very small. Even my mother-in-law looks
down on me and thinks I married her son for money. But the thing is, I used to live in a
bigger house in mainland!” Ming lamented as she handed me another piece of home-
made bread.
Lin Qin and Ming were among the 782,0002 mainland Chinese women who married
across two contentious borders of People’s Republic of China (China) to the Republic of
China (Taiwan) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong) since
the late 1980s. Contrary to their initial expectations, their post-migration lives were
fraught with insurmountable challenges. Despite their ethnic similarity with the majority
of the population in Hong Kong and Taiwan,3 mainland Chinese marriage migrants like
Lin Qin and Ming were constructed as political and class others in both societies
(Newendorp 2008; Lan 2008). Although the Hong Kong and Taiwanese states had
2 This calculation combines the number of mainland Chinese female spouses in Hong Kong between 1986 and 2016 and the number of mainland Chinese female spouses in Taiwan between 1987 and 2018. More than 460, 000 mainland Chinese women married Hong Kong husbands and migrated to Hong Kong between 1986 and 2016 (Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong SARG 2017). It is estimated that more than 322,000 mainland Chinese women migrated to Taiwan after marrying their Taiwanese husbands between 1987 and 2018 (National Immigration Agency ROC 2018). 3 According to the Home Affairs Bureau Hong Kong SARG (2016), 92% of the population in Hong Kong is Han Chinese in 2018. In Taiwan, Han consists of 97% of the total population in 2018 (Executive Yuan ROC 2018).
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accepted their application to long-term settlement, Lin Qin and Ming were considered
“low-quality” (Ku and Pun 2004; Wang and Bélanger 2008) citizens under the state
discourses in Hong Kong and Taiwan and were asked to participate in various social
integration programs that taught them family values and work ethics. Their morality was
also held in question by the gendered ethnic stereotype of Chinese women as gold-
diggers in both Hong Kong and Taiwanese societies.
For many Hong Kongers and Taiwanese, the recent rise of China’s economic power and
its enhanced trade collaborations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, have symbolized China’s
encroachment in local social, cultural, and political ways of living despite the promise to
boost the local economy (Shih 1998). China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan geopolitical
tensions are on the rise in recent years, as Hong Kong fuels with rising demands for
internal democracy and Taiwan continues to walk the tightrope of national independence
from China since the Chinese civil wars. Not only are these geopolitical tensions echoed
in recent political events, such as the civil disobedience of Umbrella Movement to protest
for universal suffrage in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Students’ Movement against
cross-strait service trade agreements in Taiwan, but they are also deeply embedded
within postcolonial engagements and histories of civil wars. In the face of local concerns
about the future of political autonomy and economic life of Hong Kong and Taiwan,
despite their ethnic similarity with the majority of population in Hong Kong and Taiwan
and their route to legal citizenship through family reunification, mainland Chinese
marriage migrant women (Chinese marriage migrants) are situated at the frontiers of
everyday intimate lives as well as geopolitical struggles, making them the focal point of
legal, political, and social debates in both Hong Kong and Taiwan (Friedman 2015;
Newendorp 2008).
This dissertation examines the space of what I called “intimate frontiers,” where Chinese
marriage migrants negotiate their moral belonging in their everyday post-migration lives
that are embedded within enhanced economic integration and geopolitical tensions across
the China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan borders. In her seminal work on the interracial
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marriages during the colonial rule of Dutch in the East Indies and French in Indochina,
Stoler (1992, 516) uses the term “interior frontier” to describe “the sense of internal
distinctions within a territory (or empire).” Stoler (1992) argues that interracial marriages
between European men and native women had been such a politically charged issue
because it presented a threat to the constitution of European nations. By restricting legal
marriages between European men and native women, colonial states policed the racial
boundary of the nation and excluded the colonized from gaining access to European
wealth and privilege. Building on Stoler, I use the term intimate frontiers to refer to
various sites of contestation and contact over constructed notions of internal distinction
in a given territory. I use the term intimate to describe the political and economic
interconnectedness across the borders of China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan, but also
to refer to the personal and family lives where Chinese marriage migrants are constructed
as the immoral other. Specifically, I examine the everyday regulation and negotiation of
moral belonging at various sites of Chinese marriage migrants’ personal lives, including
social service encounters, domestic space of the home, and local communities, where
Chinese marriage migrants interact with social workers, immigration officers, family
members, and other Chinese marriage migrants. I parse out the multiple narratives of
belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan, including the narratives developed by the states to
define Chinese marriage migrants’ belonging and those developed by Chinese marriage
migrants as they reinforce, maintain, and contest their exclusion in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. In this dissertation, I ask:
1. What are the narratives of belonging developed by the state actors of Hong
Kong and Taiwan at social service encounter? What are the images of
“ideal citizens” that are upheld by state actors in Hong Kong and Taiwan
that Chinese marriage migrants are measured against?
2. In Taiwan, how do Chinese marriage migrants experience the discourses
that exclude them as immoral others? How do Chinese marriage migrants
narrate a sense of self-worth and construct their belonging in the face of
such stigma?
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3. At a historical moment with rising “anti-China” sentiments in Hong Kong,
how do Chinese marriage migrants understand their engagement in
transnational political participation? How do transnational political
activities allow Chinese marriage migrants to construct a sense of
belonging?
Delving into the narratives of belonging developed in everyday interaction, I show how
national belonging is a regulated and negotiated process beyond legal categories and
immigration policies. In my analysis, I attend to how class intersects with gender and
nationality in producing differentiated regulatory practices and narratives of belonging,
illuminating the contradiction and complexity of immigrant belonging in an era of global
interconnection and geopolitical tension. Situating the production and negotiation of
these narratives within enhanced economic integration and shifting geopolitical
entanglement between China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan, this dissertation also
highlights the unfortunate alignment of market logic and nationalist ideology in the
formation of discursive national boundaries against immigrants at geopolitically
contentious times.
1 A Gendered Geopolitical Economy of Marriage
Migration
In her seminal work on the correspondence marriages between American men and Asian
women, Nicole Constable (2003, 118) develops the framework “political economy and
cultural logics of desire” to understand the relationship between economic and political
relations and personal intimacies. Unlike conventional anthropological and sociological
understandings of economic and political relations as the macro-level backdrop of micro-
level social interactions, Constable (2003, 143) argues that “political economy is
implicated in the production and reproduction of desire and is implicated in even the
most minute and intimate levels of interaction.” The desires for American men and Asian
women, Constable (2003, 120) argues, are constituted by their understanding of the
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imagined America and imagined Asia, which is “made thinkable, desirable, and
practicable by a wider political economy.” In other words, political economy and
personal intimacies are mutually constitutive and inextricably intertwined.
Building on Constable (2003), I understand marriage migration between women from
China and men from Taiwan and Hong Kong and the political economy across the
China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan borders as mutually constitutive and inextricably
intertwined. Chinese women’s marriage migration to Hong Kong and Taiwan is situated
within broader economic integration and geopolitical relations across the three societies.
In China, post-Mao social transformation in the 1980s, including rural de-
collectivization, rapid urbanization, an increase in employment opportunities in major
cities, and the relaxation of household registration (hukou) system that used to restrict
mobility, have led to a massive increase in rural-urban migration (Chao 2005; Constable
2005; Gaetano and Jacka 2004). The transformation of China from planned to market-
oriented economy has resulted in an erosion of social security that propels rural women
to seek urban employment. Early process of industrialization and urbanization in Hong
Kong and Taiwan have put both at the forefront of Asia economies in the 1990s, making
them two of the “Asian tigers” in the Asia Pacific region.4 As China opened its doors to
foreign investment in 1987, Hong Kong and Taiwanese businessmen directed their
capital to China to reduce labor costs, forming the so-called “Greater China” economic
zone (Ong 1990; Shih 1998).
4 Other scholars have also pointed out the association between marriage migration and the demographic changes induced by Hong Kong and Taiwan’s economic ascendancies, which include rapid urbanization, a rise in dual-income nuclear families, an increase in women’s education and labor market participation, a decrease in the fertility rate among married couples (Lee 2012; Jones and Shen 2008). These factors coupled with a persistent emphasis on women’s domesticity have resulted in the so-called “bride deficit” in the 1990s (Lan 2008).
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Once seen as potential spies and traitors during the Cold War era, haiwai huaren, or
overseas Chinese, are now considered by the Chinese state as the engine of economic and
national development (Thunø 2002; Ye 2013; Zhou and Lee 2013). In China, Hong Kong
and Taiwanese businessmen are perceived as the “bridge” to economic prosperity and are
perceived to embody “traditional Chinese familism, business acumen, and talent for
wealth-making” (Ong 1999, 44). Accompanying this capitalist embodiment are the
imaginaries about modern manhood. The Chinese women I met talked about marrying
their Hong Kong and Taiwanese husbands for economic security, but they also described
their husbands as more “loving,” “gentle,” and “understanding” than the men they knew
in China, who “smoke, drink, and gamble too much,” “bad habits” that symbolize
backwardness and lower social standing. At the same time, gendered stereotypes have
also informed men’s desires for Chinese women. Compared to Hong Kong women, who
are believed to be spoiled, demanding, and materialistic, Chinese women are thought to
be more submissive, gentle, caring and more traditional when it comes to family values
(Ho, 2014; Li 2001).5
Besides meeting in work settings, China’s open-door policy has also facilitated family
visits and travels to China. Earlier migration of Chinese families in Hong Kong and
Taiwan formed extensive kinship networks across the borders, through which Chinese
women were introduced to their Hong Kong and Taiwanese husbands. Ming, for
example, met her husband through family friends when he traveled to Zhuhai as a tourist.
Family introductions were particularly common for Chinese marriage migrants who
married their veteran husbands from Taiwan in the late 1980s and early1990s when the
Taiwanese government lifted the Martial Law6 to allow communications with China.
5 Ironically, women from China are also subjected to the gendered stereotype of gold-diggers who are believed to be overly-materialistic. I will discuss this in Chapter 3. 6 After the Nationalist Army retreated to Taiwan and took over the island, the corrupt Nationalist government had evoked much political tensions with local residents. The February 28 Incident, triggered by the conflict between a local cigarette vendor and a
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Although complex economic linkages, extensive family network, as well as shifting
gendered ideologies and desires, have facilitated women’s marriage migration across
China’s borders to Hong Kong and Taiwan; paradoxically, geopolitical relations have
informed immigration policies that often regulate, if not constrained, such settlement.
Historically, Hong Kong was an important transit point for Chinese men in search of
settlements in different parts of the world, including Southeast Asia, the Americas and
Europe (Kwok and Ames 1995). Without any border restriction, Chinese men, mostly
from the Guangdong province, came to Hong Kong to work, but sent remittances and
retired in their home villages at a later age. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, refugees
from all over China fled to Hong Kong to escape the newly established communist
government in the People’s Republic of China (Hambro 1955). Over the next 30 years,
the political upheaval in China continued to propel mainland residents to seek refuge in
Hong Kong.7 At the height of such movement, the Chinese communist government had
implemented border control to prevent such border-crossing. At the same time, in the
face of Cold War politics, the British and the U.S. governments feared that communism
in China would compromise the security of Hong Kong and shifted the immigration
policy from “reactive measures to more deliberate control, planning, and hegemonic
discourse” (Ku 2004, 326).8 From the restriction of ration tickets and quota systems in
government officer, created civil disorder and open rebellion among local residents, who were brutally suppressed by the Nationalist government, leading to the beginning of the Martial Law period. 7 A number of political events in China, including Great Leap Forward (1958—1962) and Cultural Revolution (1966—1976) had propelled such movement despite the restriction imposed by the Beijing government to prevent individuals from crossing from China into Hong Kong. 8 Ku (2004) observes that the colonial government had identified “A Problem of People” in the 1950s when massive influx of Chinese immigrants entered Hong Kong to escape the political upheaval in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Those who arrived after 1949 were identified as “refugees” and were integrated into the society instead of being repatriated to China. During the Cold War era, the British government used such
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the 1950s to the limitation of entrants from China9 and the implementation of “touch
base” policy in the 1970s,10 the British colonial government gradually put in place an
inclusionary practice to appease the U.S. government, who did not wish to send refugees back to China. Economically, refugees also provided labor for the British government to develop Hong Kong’s external trade (Ku 2004). Ku (2004) argues that, during this period, the colonial government adopted a discourse of benevolence instead of rights when discussing the acceptance of illegal immigrants. However, not all refugees were accepted. “Proper employment” and “clean criminal record” were two important factors in determining the acceptance of illegal immigrants, which resonated with the government’s longstanding emphasis on “visible means of subsistence,” “useful occupation,” and “honest living” in the ordinance of registration, deportation, and banishment (Ku 2004, 339). The emphasis on employment and clean criminal record sowed the seeds for the government discourse in the 1970s, which highlights “law and order” and “self-reliance” as Hong Kong’s ethos of belonging. In the wake of Chinese- nationalism-incited-labor-riots in 1967, the British colonial government called for tighter immigration control. In 1971, the British colonial government introduced the category “Hong Kong belonger” into the immigration policy, separating those who were born in Hong Kong from the “Chinese residents” who were immigrants in Hong Kong, while at the same time demarcating both categories from “resident United Kingdom belonger.” Ku (2004) argues that it was during this period that the government narrated belonging as a set of political rights and entitlement within the local context that were denied to other categories of people. The invention of such categories contributed to the identity-making of “Hong Kongers,” but it was also a by-product of British government state-building process to keep out non-British from moving to the United Kingdom, a post-colonial immigration trend that the British government wished to curtail. In the late 1970s, as the colonial government turned to develop Hong Kong into a knowledge-based city, the government abolished the “touch base” policy to curtail illegal immigrants further. 9 In the early 1950s, the British Colonial government first discouraged entrants from China by denying them social welfare such as ration coupons and subsidized rice. Then, in the mid-1950s, a quota system of 50 was implemented to limit the number of Chinese residents entering Hong Kong (Newendorp 2008). Mainlanders who intended to go to Hong Kong were also required to have valid exit permits issued by the Chinese government (Hambro 1955). 10 “Touch base” policy was implemented in 1974 to reduce the number of illegal immigrants from China in Hong Kong. Under this policy, illegal immigrants could stay in Hong Kong only if they successfully met with their families and entered the city center. Those who were caught before entering the city center were sent back to China.
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immigration policy that restricted immigrants from China.
Following the transition of China from a planned economy to a socialist market economy
in 1979, a large number of mainlanders began to enter Hong Kong through illegal means.
To control immigration-induced population growth, the Hong Kong colonial government
abolished the “touch base policy” in 1980 so that no amnesty would be granted to illegal
immigrants. An agreement on stricter implementation of the exit permits was then forged
with the Chinese government to limit legal immigrants. Since 1982, the Chinese
government implemented the One-Way-Permit Scheme (OWP)11 that grants residency to
mainlanders to enter Hong Kong for family reunification. The OWP forms a legal basis
through which Chinese marriage migrants apply for residency, together with other
Chinese migrants (e.g., children of Hong Kong permanent resident(s) born in the
mainland) who seek permanent residency in Hong Kong for family reunification.
Following Hong Kong’s reunification with China, the waiting period of OWP has been
shortened from 10 years to four to five years, depending on the provincial government
through which the prospective Chinese marriage migrant submitted their application.12
11 The One-way Permit Scheme (OWP) states that: “for entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People’s Government after consulting the government of the Region.” OWP is issued by the relevant authorities of the Public Security Bureau in China. The daily quota of OWP is 150, among which 60 are reserved for Chinese nationals born in the mainland of Hong Kong Permanent Resident(s), and 30 are reserved for mainland residents who have separated from their spouses in Hong Kong for 10 years or more (Census and Statistics Department Hong Kong SARG 2012, 79-80). 12 Currently, the Chinese government gives out 150 permits per day, resulting in about 55,000 mainland immigrants to Hong Kong per year. Prior to obtaining OWP, the mainland spouses could visit their families in Hong Kong on an exit-entry permit for travelling to and from Hong Kong with an endorsement for visiting relatives, known as the “two-way-permit,” which allow them to stay for fourteen days to three months, at the discretion of Public Security Bureau Office in China.
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In Taiwan, geopolitical relations have also informed the implementation of immigration
policies towards immigrants from China (Friedman 2010b). Cross-strait contacts were
cut after the Nationalist government and army lost in the Chinese civil war against the
Communist Party and settled in Taiwan in 1949. This remained the case until the
Taiwanese government lifted Martial Law in 1987 and re-opened travel to China. Since
then, marriage migration between China and Taiwan has grown, but it continues to be
shaped by tensions over political sovereignty between the two nations. Marriage migrants
from China are put under different administrative categories and face more restrictive
immigration policies compared to marriage migrants from Southeast Asia13. While
marriage migrants from Southeast Asia face a four-year time frame to citizenship,
Chinese spouses face a more extended waiting period in obtaining residency. Before the
revisions of law in 2009, the average time frame for marriage migrants from China to
obtain legal citizenship was about eight years, in addition to a two-year delay in getting
residency and work rights (Friedman 2010b). They were not allowed to work during the
two-year unification period. After being granted kin-dependent residence, only those who
were in abject financial situations could apply for work permits. While the policy
amendment in 2009 has ameliorated the unequal citizenship trajectory by shortening
Chinese spouses’ waiting period to six years and by granting them work rights upon the
first arrival, Chinese marriage migrants continue to face various post-naturalization
restrictions, such as restricted access to civil service positions (Friedman 2012).14
13 Immigrants from China are regulated by The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area promulgated in 1992. Immigrants from Southeast Asia are regulated by the Nationality Law promulgated by the Nationalist government in 1929. 14 Since the enactment of The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in 1992, the immigration policies have been amended four times (Mainland Affairs Council 2018). From 1991 to 1999, Chinese spouses’ route to citizenship only involved three stages: tanqin (family visit); juliu (residence); and dingju (permanent residence). From 2000 to 2003, the process changed from three to four stages: tanqin (family visit); tuanju (unification); juliu (residence); and dingju (permanent residence). After the couple registered their marriage in China,
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2 State-building, “Qualities” of Citizens, and Contested
Belonging
The era of global migration has presented both opportunities and challenges for
immigrant belonging. On the one hand, the integration of global economy has facilitated
the movement of capital and people across national borders; on the other hand,
geopolitics and national ideologies continue to exclude certain groups of immigrants
Chinese spouses could apply for family visit and stay in Taiwan for three months each time, for the maximum of six months per year. The newly added unification period prolonged the application by requiring Chinese spouses (after two years of marriage) to stay in Taiwan for 300 days per year (for the maximum of three years) on a renewable visa before applying for juliu (residence). During this period, only those who fell under the circumstances stipulated by the Act could apply for work permits. After they completed the stage of unification, Chinese spouses might apply for residence and were granted the right to work. After staying in Taiwan for two more years, Chinese spouses might apply for permanent residence. The third and fourth rounds of the amendment were enacted from 2004 to August 2009 and August 2009 to the present, which changed the procedures into four stages: tuanju (unification), yiqin juliu (kin-dependent residence), changqi juliu (extended residence), and dingju (permanent residence). Since the amendment in 2004, Chinese spouses were required to do an immigration interview before entering Taiwan. Between 2004 and 2009, the interview was conducted at the unification stage; the revision of the law in 2009 postponed the interview when Chinese spouses entered Taiwan for kin-dependence residence. Before the revision of the law in 2009, Chinese spouses had to wait for two years after unification to apply for kin-dependent residence. The amendment in 2009 allows Chinese spouses to apply for kin-dependent residence immediately. The revision also relaxed the restriction of work rights. As of 2009, Chinese spouses can work in Taiwan in the kin-dependence stage without applying for work permits. After four years of marriage, Chinese spouses are eligible to apply for extended residence. After two years of continuous extended residence, Chinese spouses may be granted permanent residence, the equivalent of citizenship. The 2009 amendment also revoked the regulation made in 2004 that required Chinese spouses to provide financial proof of NTD 5,000,000 (approx. USD 165,000). Once granted permanent residence in Taiwan, Chinese spouses’ official residence in China will be revoked. Before this period, however, Chinese spouses’ legal status in Taiwan is contingent on the continuation of the marital relationship, or in its absence, on a dependent bond with a Taiwanese child.
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from being full members of the host societies. While some scholars (Soysal 1994) have
pointed to a “post-national” turn in citizenship, arguing that the state’s sovereign power
has weakened in the face of global capital and international agencies in governing
migrant rights, within a given context, the state remains an important institution in
granting or denying rights (Choo 2017, Hansen 2009, Ong 2009, Stasiulis and Bakan
2005). From implementing immigration policies to devising various integration
programs, the state continues to define the ethos of belonging—a hegemonic narrative of
what it means to belong to a national community (Basch et al. 1994, Newendorp 2008).
Scholars on migration and citizenship have pointed out how modern nation-state
regulates the national boundary through managing the discourse on “qualities of citizen”
and constructing a homogenized identity of the people in a given territory (Bonjour and
Kraler 2015; Choo 2017; Chao 2005; Ku 2004; Ong 1999 Tseng 2006.) In the era of
global capitalism, market logic has become one of the most salient aspects underlying the
terms of national membership. Ong (1999) observes that the state often adjusts its bio-
political technologies concerning different kinds of immigrants to profit from global
capital while minimizing the costs. In the Asia Pacific region, various states, including
Hong Kong and Taiwan, have benefited from the paid reproductive labor of migrant
domestic workers but have avoided the costs of immigration by denying them the route
to legal citizenship. Marriage migrants, on the other hand, are given access to legal
membership but are often perceived by the states as “low-quality” citizens and hence
subject to various state integration projects (Cheng and Choo 2014).
In Hong Kong, scholars have noted how the discourse on “qualities of citizens” and the
formation of Hong Kong identity is closely linked to British colonial government’s state-
building process began in the 1960s, manifested in the shift in immigration control and
the development of social policies. Prior to the late-1960s, most residents in Hong Kong
considered China to be their “motherland” (Matthews 1997, 7) and saw Hong Kong only
as “borrowed time and borrowed space” (Tse 2002), or a “transitional home” (Matthews
1997, 7) that they would eventually leave for China.
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As a large number of people in China entered—or attempted to enter—Hong Kong
illegally to escape the political upheaval in China, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the
immigration policies in Hong Kong towards illegal immigrants from China had shifted
from reactive measures and accommodation towards regulation (Ku 2004).
Accompanying with this change was a shift in the discourse regarding illegal immigrants
from victims of communist regimes deserving humanitarianism to a threat to the
development of local economy. The British Colonial government’s presentation of illegal
immigration had also shifted from identifying them as problems of “poverty, poor
hygiene, overcrowding” in the 1950s to “lawbreaking, low productivity and declining
standards of living” in the 1970s, raising questions about the “quality of citizens” (Ku
2004, 351). As Ku (2004, 352) points out, underlying the dominant discourse against
illegal immigration was a sense of cultural distinction that distinguished Hong Kong
people from that of “mainlanders” who were associated with “backwardness and cultural
inferiority.”
While the colonial government had restricted its policy towards illegal immigration, from
the late-1960s through 1990s, it had also initiated a series of programs to integrate
residents in Hong Kong—who were early Chinese immigrants— by providing social
services. These programs included housing (e.g. the resettlement programs in mid-1950s
and the establishment of public housing program in mid-1960s), nine years of free
education (established in 1978), labor legislation (implemented in 1968), and the public
assistance program (established in 1971). Through expanding the social services
provision for Hong Kong residents, the colonial government cultivated its legitimacy
after a massive riot in 1967, a labor-dispute-turned-anti-Colonial-movement organized by
pro-Communist groups.
The oppositional depiction of mainlanders and Hong Kongers in the Hong Kong mass
media has also prolonged the colonial government’s discourse on the “qualities of
citizens.” The famous TV Hong Kong serial, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, portrayed
an illegal immigrant, Ah Chian, from the mainland who came to Hong Kong to join his
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family. Ah Chian was depicted as a pre-modern subject—backward, unruly, and ill-
disciplined (Ku 2004; Ma 1999; Newendorp 2008)—who was associated with
lawbreaking and low productivity (Ku 2004). His Hong Kong family members, on the
other hand, were depicted as sophisticated, modern, and urban who were law-abiding and
hardworking (Leung 2004). Ku (2004) argues that such media discourse was later
appropriated by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR)
government during the 1997 right-of-abode debate to keep out mainland immigrants.15
By identifying all Hong-Kong-born Chinese children as a threat to social order and
unbearable burden to the society, the government undermined the moral right of family
reunification (Ku 2001). However, such exclusionary immigration practice only applies
to marriage migrants and their children from China, who are perceived as unskilled and
inadequate to contribute to the economic development of Hong Kong (Ku and Pun 2004;
15 The right of abode, or obtaining permanent residency in the local sense, is a tricky and contested issue that could stir a constitutional debate about Hong Kong’s political framework “one country, two systems.” The 1997 political transition triggered intense debates about mainland Chinese people’s legal citizenship claims in Hong Kong. Central to the debate is whether Chinese children born in Hong Kong to non-Hong Kong parents are entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong. The ambiguity of the Article 24 in the Basic Law—the mini-constitution of Hong Kong—states that “Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong” (Basic Law Promotion Steering Committee 2012). This clause had given false hope to many Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong to non-permanent resident parents, believing that they would automatically be granted the right of abode after 1997. When the Court of Final Appeal ruling affirmed the right of abode to claimants, the Hong Kong government, afraid that the chain migration from China would potentially burden Hong Kong’s public systems, sought to revoke such ruling by requesting a constitutional reinterpretation by the Beijing government for the first time. The Hong Kong government’s action caused many protests from pro-rights political camps, bringing hundreds of lawyers, legislators, rights activists, and students to the street, who believed that the Hong Kong government’s actions had given power to Beijing, which undermined Hong Kong’s constitution. In the end, the National People’s Congress’ constitutional reinterpretation altered the ruling and granted the right of abode only to Chinese children born in Hong Kong with one of the parents having permanent residency status (Newendorp 2008).
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Leung 2004). Meanwhile, to upgrade its “population quality” (Ku and Pun 2004, 9;
Leung 2004, 97), the Hong Kong SAR government introduced the Admission Scheme
for Mainland Talents and Professionals to attract professionals from mainland China to
enhance Hong Kong’s status as the Asian’s world city.
From the self- reliant subject under (British) colonial citizenship (Ku and Pun 2004)16 to
the “enterprising individual”17 under (Hong Kong SAR government) neoliberal
governance (Ku and Pun 2004, 7), the government has continuously developed an ethos
of belonging based on a similar discourse of law-abiding, economistic, and
independence. Specifically, the ideal Hong Kong citizen embodies the personal qualities
of “intelligence, determination, and adaptability,” that allow one to strive for “self-
improvement” and to “rise to the occasion” even during times of adversity (Ku and Pun
2004, 1). As the Hong Kong SAR government promotes Hong Kong as a “global city”
and a knowledge-based society, its ideal citizen image is projected through a discourse of
“population quality” (Ku and Pun 2004, 9; Leung 2004, 97) which emphasizes “talent”
16 According to Ku and Pun (2004, 3), the early idea of citizenship used by the colonial government was very much about law and order. To educate residents in a “proper understanding of the privileges and obligation of citizenship” was to shape law-abiding subjects. This inscribed a colonial conception of citizenship, which has three aspects (Ku and Pun 2004, 4):
1. Dependent status of political membership attached to the colonial sovereign rather than to the nation;
2. The making of a new urban-civic subject as a civilizing (modernizing), depoliticizing, and de-nationalizing project;
3. The limited development of rights and the prioritizing of economic development, with a residual concept of social welfare, over political participation within the colonial state.
17 The “enterprising individual” is “someone who is always on the lookout for resources and new opportunities to enhance their income, power, life chances, and quality of life in order to take advantage of the rapid changes of economy and society” (Ku and Pun 2004, 1).
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and “value-added human resources” (Ku and Pun 2004, 9). However, as scholars pointed
out (Ku and Pun 2004; Leung 2004), not only has the discourse of “population quality”
deepened pre-existing social hierarchy among citizens, but it has also created new forms
of social inequalities between citizens and non-citizens. Chinese marriage migrants, who
enter Hong Kong under the category of family reunification, are positioned as the
inadequate class others who lack the qualities of human and cultural capital to contribute
to the global competitiveness of Hong Kong (Pun and Ku 2004).
In Taiwan, the formation and meanings of Taiwanese identity have shifted many times
over the course of its nation-building process. Similar to Hong Kong, the majority of the
Taiwanese population is descended from Chinese immigrants. Despite the difference in
dialects and customs, different groups of Han Taiwanese are submerged under the broad
umbrella of Confucian culture against the coexistence of the ethnic other (Lan 2008).
According to Melissa Brown (2004), Taiwanese identity first emerged during Japanese
colonization (1895-1945) as a form of grassroots initiated nationalistic identity among
Chinese immigrants against Japanese rule. Later, the Japanese colonizers developed a
household registration system that divided Chinese immigrants into Hoklo and Hakka. At
the same time, Aborigines, who inhabited Taiwan for thousands of years before Chinese
immigration, were divided into sheng (raw) and cooked (shu), with the latter adopted
much of the Hoklo culture.18 Historically, Aborigines were considered by the ruling-state
as ethnic others and were heavily stigmatized and sexualized.
The Taiwanese identity took up a different meaning during the Martial Law period
(1947-1987). During this time of political suppression by the Nationalist government,
Benshengren, or Taiwanese, was used to refer to Hoklo and Hakka whose ancestors came
18 “Raw” Aborigines live in high central mountains and Taiwan’s eastern plain, and Orchid Island off Taiwan’s southeastern coast, had adopted few or no Han customs. “Cooked” Aborigines, living on Taiwan’s western plains and in the western foothill of the central mountains had adopted much of Han culture (Brown 2004, 9).
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to Taiwan before the Japanese colonizers suspended immigration from China.
Waishengren, or Mainlanders, was used to refer to those who arrived Taiwan following
the Nationalist Army between 1945 and 1949, as well as their children and grandchildren
born and raised in Taiwan (Brown 2004; Lan 2008). During this time, cooked Aborigines
had disappeared into the Taiwanese category, and raw Aborigines were classified
separately as gaoshanzu (mountain tribes) but had disappeared in the political sphere
(Brown 2004).
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, as Taiwan’s democratization process flourished,
and Martial Law came to an end, Taiwanese identity changed drastically. Against the
backdrop of Taiwan’s political tension with China, the then-President Lee Teng-hui
developed the discourse of “new Taiwanese” to include both Taiwanese, Mainlanders,
and Aborigines (who later obtained the official title as yuanzhumin or original
inhabitants). To differentiate Taiwan from Chinese culture in China, the discourse of
“new Taiwanese” considered Aborigine culture as part of the official Taiwanese identity
(Brown 2004; Lan 2008).
As the Aborigines became incorporated into the “new Taiwanese” identity, marriage
migrants from China and Southeast Asia have become the new “ethnic frontiers” in
Taiwan since the 1990s (Lan 2008). Scholars have pointed out that the early exclusion of
marriage migrants from China and Southeast Asia stemmed from the state’s concerns
about national security and population quality, two key elements embedded in the
Taiwanese state’s nation-building project (Wang and Bélanger 2008). Although Chinese
marriage migrants shared a similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds with the majority of
Taiwanese people, they were nevertheless considered as the class and political others
(Lan 2008) due to the disparity in economic development and the ongoing political
tensions between China and Taiwan in the 1990s. Because of their cultural proximity,
Taiwanese policymakers worried that marriage migrants from China would be “too
easy…to become part of us” (Tseng 2004, 33) and had banned the importation of migrant
laborer from China. As Shu-mei Shih (1998, 294-95) and Sara Friedman (2015, 18)
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succinctly put, respectively, Chinese marriage migrants present a “threat of similarity”
within the Taiwanese nation, who “lacked the difference necessary to maintain and
police the boundaries of national identity.” In the mass media, Chinese marriage migrants
were hypersexualized and were associated with sex workers with low moral quality
(Chen 2015; Shih 1998).
On the other hand, Southeast Asian marriage migrants were considered ethnic others due
to the difference in their culture, language, and physical features. The Taiwanese
government was worried about the quality of the child born and raised by mothers from
Southeast Asia. This fear stemmed from an emphasis in the “quality” (in terms of
education and health) of Taiwan’s population19 and the belief that the “quality” of
national-born children was higher than those of transnational families (Hsia 2007; Wang
and Bélanger 2008). Such beliefs aligned with the public discourse that links Taiwan’s
economic miracle with the “good quality” (i.e., diligence) of Taiwanese people (Hsia
2007). Early concern about contamination of the “good quality” of Taiwanese was
targeted towards the quality of children from rural areas, aboriginal communities, and
low-income families. In 1998, marriage migrants from Southeast Asia became the target
of this concern. Such a shift in discourse is related to Taiwan’s threatened position in the
global economic stage after the 1997 Asia Financial Crisis and the rise of China as the
“world factory” (Hsia 2007, 78). Fearing that Taiwan would lose its global economic
competitiveness, the children born and raised in families of transnational families,
labeled as “New Taiwanese Children” (Hsia 2007, 77), are constructed as the “new
others” and considered as a threat to Taiwan’s economic power.
19 For example, Article 15 of the “Population Policy Guiding Principles” identifies “elderly, females, disabled, and low-income people” as well as those who are “genetically deficient, infected and mentally ill” as of low quality, hence the government has to “improve their capability to serve the society so that human resources can be fully utilized” (Wang and Bélanger 2008, 96). This guideline was revised in 2006, and the chapter on population quality was later revoked.
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Since 2002, the Taiwanese state has shifted its citizenship regime from exclusion to
integration, cultivating a multicultural society to embrace immigrants (Bélanger et al.,
2010; Hsia 2009; Lan 2008; Wang and Bélanger 2008). Examples of such shift are seen
in the entitlement of social rights to marriage migrants, including easier access to the
labor market (Southeast Asian marriage migrants in 2003 and Chinese marriage migrants
in 2009), free Mandarin language classes (mainly for Southeast Asian marriage migrants)
and public health coverage (both groups). From 2003 onwards, the Taiwanese
government has also granted significant funding to social services for immigrants. Some
of these state resources are channeled to non-government organizations (NGOs), which
are encouraged to develop service provision for marriage migrants and their families.
Working as an extension of the government (Hsia 2009), these NGOs provide an array of
social integration programs to the marriage migrant communities, including legal
assistance, employment advice, marriage counseling, parental class, language class,
indigenous cultural learning class (Tsai and Hsiao 2006). However, as scholars have
pointed out, these integration programs continue to adopt discourses that reinforce the
image of marriage migrants as inferior, helpless, and underclass “others” who need to be
“Taiwanised” (Wang and Bélanger 2008, 93).
Although various projects of exclusion have come to define the ethos of belonging and
delineate national boundaries, such hegemonic definitions are not fixed and are subject to
contestation (Faier 2009; Choo 2016; Constable 2003; Ornellas 2015; Hsia 2009; Suzuki
2000). For example, Ornellas’s (2015) study shows how Chinese marriage migrants
developed a sense of political consciousness to claim their rights and belonging in Hong
Kong as mothers and wives of Hong Kong citizens even before obtaining their residency.
In addition, Chinese marriage migrants also actively negotiated their otherness by
changing their expectations of marital lives and by taking up ideologies of the receiving
society. Newendrop (2010) argues that while some Chinese marriage migrants did not
intend to do paid work after coming to Hong Kong in the pursuit of domestic life as
wives and mothers, they nonetheless engaged in paid employment, as it is perceived as
central to their integration in Hong Kong. In Japan, Filipina marriage migrants have
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articulated their marriage using the discourse of love (Faier 2007) to detach themselves
from the stigma of Japanyuki (Japan-bound) that associated them with sex workers.
While some marriage migrants used the gendered morality attached to their roles as
mothers and wives as a protective shield against the label of Japanyuki, others challenged
the dominant gendered ideologies that required them to give birth by claiming their
sexual subjectivity through pursuing romantic love, sex, and affection in extramarital
affairs that were absent in their marriages (Suzuki 2003). As a collective, marriage
migrants also organized public events to introduce themselves as wives and mothers to
local Japanese by highlighting their good feminine virtue (Suzuki 2000).
Building upon the insights of critical feminist scholarship on gender and marriage
migration, in this dissertation, I understand belonging as both a regulated and negotiated
process, subject to reproduction but also transformation as Chinese marriage migrants
maintain and redefine the terms of belonging when they interact with state actors—
immigration officers, social workers—family members, and the Chinese marriage
migrant community. In my analysis, I also attend to how national boundaries are gender
and class constructs which operate differently for Chinese marriage migrants of different
class backgrounds. Understanding the class divide among Chinese marriage migrants is
particularly crucial at the present moment, as China’s economic development and
enhanced trade integration with Hong Kong and Taiwan have facilitated the marriage
migration of educated and professional Chinese women to both locations (Friedman
2016). By situating the production and negotiation of narratives of belonging within
enhanced economic integration and shifting geopolitical entanglement across the China-
Hong Kong and China-Taiwan borders, this dissertation highlights the complications and
contradictions of immigrant belonging during geopolitically contentious times.
3 Being in the Field: A Methodological Note
This dissertation is based on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth
interviews that I conducted in Taiwan and Hong Kong between June 2014 and August
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2015, as well as two months of follow-up fieldwork in June and July 2016. The three
chapters in this dissertation use different elements of the fieldwork and interview data. I
will discuss the methods and data used in each chapter. Here, I offer a reflexive account
of my entry to the fields, my presentation of the self, my evolving relationship with
informants, and the ethical dilemmas that I encountered during fieldwork.
3.1 Taiwan
I first began my fieldwork in New Taipei City, an area where I used to travel to every
year to visit my family since adulthood. When hearing the topic of my dissertation, my
uncle in Taiwan told me, “It’s not difficult to locate Chinese marriage migrants, you can
find them everywhere.” In a marketplace in Xindian area, a neighborhood in New Taipei
City where I began my fieldwork, shops opened by Chinese marriage migrants stand
side-by-side shops and vendors owned by Taiwanese. Chinese marriage migrants were
the owners of small Shanghai Noodle Place, Northeast Dumpling Place, or they helped
out at their husbands’ noodle stall, selling Danzai mian—a southern Taiwan noodle dish.
In less visible ways, some opened low-end boutiques selling clothes made in China,
others had transformed the first floor of their house into a hair salon or other small
businesses. I spent the first month of my fieldwork frequenting this marketplace, where I
got to know a few business owners who are Chinese marriage migrants. Later, as I
followed my informants to gatherings outside of the neighborhood, I extended my field
site to other areas in New Taipei City and Taipei City. Therefore, instead of staying in a
single neighborhood, I followed my participants as they commuted across different parts
of the city for errands, for work, and for gathering.
Because I am interested in learning the integration programs offered by the state, at the
beginning of my fieldwork, I also approached the immigration office at New Taipei City
and a local NGO that provided services to Chinese marriage migrants. After evaluating
my dissertation proposal, I was given access to participate in two biweekly programs
offered by the immigration office—Family Education Program for Foreign Spouses and
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the Mobile Immigration Service Program. A collaboration with the Family Education
Center, the Family Education Program for Foreign Spouses provided biweekly family
education classes to both Chinese marriage migrants and Southeast Asian marriage
migrants. Every other Friday, Chinese marriage migrants recruited by local NGOs would
gather at a conference room at New Taipei City immigration office, sit around a large
oval table, and listen to two teachers from Family Education Centre talk about family
values.20 The program was followed by a brief introduction to Taiwan’s immigration
policy to help marriage migrants familiarize with the procedures, and a thirty-minute
employment recruitment session.
Every other Tuesday, I followed social workers and immigration officers to different
suburban and mountainous areas around New Taipei City to bring various immigration
services, such as visa renewal, to new immigrants living in remote neighborhoods. In the
morning, we would station at a nearby local district office or an NGO to provide
immigration services to immigrants and migrant workers. After lunch, we would visit
local new immigrant families arranged by the local district office. Social workers at the
immigration offices told me that they were required to visit at least three families per
month to be considered as having “good record” on their annual report. Although the
Mobile Immigration Service Program is not an integration program per se, participating
in the program enhanced my interactions with social workers and immigration officers
and allowed me to understand their perspectives on marriage migrants in Taiwan.
In addition to the immigration office, I also volunteered as an English teacher at a local
NGO in Taipei city that serves Chinese marriage migrants. Chinese marriage migrants I
met on the first day at the NGO asked me to teach basic English so that they could use it
when they traveled to English-speaking countries. I organized my class accordingly and
taught basic vocabularies for self-introduction, wayfinding, airport and hotel check-in,
20 More on Family Education Program will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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and shopping. For three months, I taught an hour of English to a small class of ten
Chinese marriage migrants every Monday. Five Chinese marriage migrants in my class
later became my informants; others introduced me to Chinese marriage migrants who
volunteered at the NGO as well as friends outside the NGO. Chinese marriage migrants
who attended my class had met each other earlier at a Hokkien class—a dialect spoken
by Hoklo in Taiwan— offered by the same NGO, became friends and came to my
English class together. In addition to classes offered by different NGOs, Chinese
marriage migrants also signed up for classes organized by various local district offices,
such as computer class, manicure class, and dance class, as well as large events
organized by the Immigration Office, including Immigration Day, Taipei City
Multicultural Expo, and Asia-Pacific Cultural Day. During my fieldwork, I followed my
informants to a variety of these classes and events. It was then I learned that the
integration programs had become a space where Chinese marriage migrants negotiated
their belonging. For example, one Chinese marriage migrant from Sichuan, a southwest
province in China known for its spicy food, often brought us home-made chili paste
during lunch. Other Chinese marriage migrants from nearby provinces were all elated at
the opportunity to enjoy a “taste of home,” because Taiwanese food was too bland and
sweet for their taste. Over lunch, Chinese marriage migrants would talk about childhood
memories, share homeland recipes, and discuss family problems.
Some of my informants—including Chinese marriage migrants, immigration officers,
and social workers— did not want to know me just as a researcher, but they also wanted
to learn about me as a person. On each occasion, I introduced myself as a graduate
student working on a dissertation on the lived experience of Chinese marriage migrants
in Taiwan. “Why would a Ph.D. student from Canada be interested in our stories?” was
the question I often got when I told Chinese marriage migrants about my topic. My
personal background as a young woman who was born and grew up partly in China then
migrated to Hong Kong as a teenager, who had a Chinese mother who had remarried a
Taiwanese husband, lent me moral credibility in the Chinese marriage migrant
community. After listening to my stories, some felt more comfortable to share their own.
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One informant, who later revealed that she did not trust me at the beginning, had opened
her heart to me when she found out that I was born in China and hence “one of them.”
Because of our shared social locations—as women born in China and as immigrants —
some informants, especially those who were older than me, started to call me meimei
(younger sister); those around my age saw me as a trusted friend who would lend them
listening ears when their families were far away.
Not all Chinese marriage migrants and I developed our relationships in the same way. To
some, especially those who became insurance agents, my personal background did not
interest them as much as my networks in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Toronto. One Chinese
marriage migrant who worked as an insurance agent tried to recruit me to work for her by
bringing me to a seminar where a manager-level insurance agent talked about his journey
of becoming an insurance agent after getting his Ph.D. in political science. Some Chinese
marriage migrants brought health supplements to our meeting to introduce me to the
benefits of their products in between their migration stories. Therefore, my relationships
with Chinese marriage migrants were diverse and complex, beyond what the categories
of “researcher” and “informant” can encapsulate.
Immigration officers and social workers, too, were interested in my personal background.
Because of my education background in Hong Kong and Canada, social workers and
immigration officers saw me as “different” from Chinese marriage migrants despite our
shared backgrounds in gender and place of origin. For example, at the end of a Hokkien
class, the teacher said to me, “I’ve always wondered why a high-quality (gao suzhi)
person like you always hangs out with Chinese marriage migrants. You don't look them
one of them!” At times, immigration officers took advantage of my mainland background
to make themselves look “closer” to Chinese marriage migrants and to make their work
easier. One of the tasks for immigration officers was to record the number of marriage
migrants they visited during the Mobile Immigration Service Program in order to renew
funding from the Ministry of Interior. Immigration officers usually relied on local district
offices to arrange visits to marriage migrant families, but this was not always successful.
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Marriage migrant families could reject the visit, or they sometimes forgot the
appointment. When this happened, immigration officers would go out of their way to
meet marriage migrants and asked them to sign a form so that they could maintain a good
record (yeji). This is where my mainland background became useful. For example,
during a Mobile Immigration Service Program at Jinshan, a remote district in northern
New Taipei, immigration officers introduced me as someone from China when we
visited a Fujian restaurant opened by a Chinese marriage migrant. It was a hot summer
day, and the restaurant owner was sweating as she sliced bean-curd for our small dish.
One immigration officer, desperate to get her record met, interrupted the owner’s meal
preparation and said, “Hello! We are immigration officers. Are you from China?” After
the owner nodded her head, the officer continued, “From where?” “Fujian” “Oh you are
from Fujian, she’s from Hangzhou!” pointing her finger at me and exposing my
birthplace. Confused at where this conversation was going, the owner and I looked at
each other, smiled, and sank into silence. The officer then passed a form to the owner,
“Could you sign this form for us?” Without asking any questions, the owner put down
her knife, took out a pen from her apron, and filled out the form. I then realized my
identity could be mediated by my informants as they presented me to someone else.
3.2 Hong Kong
In March 2015, I extended my fieldwork to Hong Kong, a place where I grew up since
the age of ten. Unlike Taiwan, where I could quickly locate small restaurants and stores
opened by Chinese marriage migrants, in Hong Kong, high property prices made small
businesses difficult for immigrants and citizens alike. I began my fieldwork by meeting
with Lin Qin, one of the Chinese marriage migrants I introduced in the opening vignette,
whom I met through Ming when I was in Taiwan. Friends and family had also introduced
me to Chinese marriage migrants they knew who were willing to talk about their personal
experiences.
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Unlike Taiwan, where the government is as much involved as NGOs in providing
services to immigrants, in Hong Kong, most of the immigrant services are outsourced to
NGOs. In Hong Kong, I approached an NGO I called WeCare, which received funding
from the Hong Kong government at the time of my research. WeCare organizes various
social integration programs, including employment seminars, language classes, and
computer classes for Chinese marriage migrants. From April to June, I served as an
English teacher and taught classes twice a week at a WeCare branch located in the
eastern district of Hong Kong Island. Upon request from social workers and Chinese
marriage migrants, I taught simple English vocabularies that they might encounter at
work, as one informant observed, “You need to know English even if you are not talking
to foreigners! There are too many English words in Cantonese!” Besides teaching, I also
volunteered in social activities organized by WeCare, where I got to meet Chinese
marriage migrants who were core members of the organization. These core members
later invited me to participate in various transnational activities, which I was not aware of
before approaching WeCare. These transnational activities included visits to China, as
well as political activities organized to support the Hong Kong government’s universal
suffrage bill.21
At WeCare, I introduced myself as a graduate student born in China, who grew up in
Hong Kong, and was working on a Ph.D. dissertation on Chinese marriage migrants’
post-migration lived experiences. Because of my migration history and family
background, social workers at WeCare, most of whom shared a similar migration
trajectory as mine, had welcomed me with hospitality. Chinese marriage migrants that I
met at WeCare or through personal network also treated me warmly. Many saw me as a
“model immigrant” who had excelled in Hong Kong’s educational system and hoped that
I could tutor their children who were lagging behind in schools. Their concerns for their
children reminded me of the difficult days when I first came to Hong Kong—the fear of
21 More will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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“being behind” and a sense of helplessness in an extremely competitive environment.
The “ghost” of my past, in this case, my memory as a Chinese immigrant in Hong Kong,
had come to “haunt” me as a researcher (Gordon 1996, 24) and informed the relationship
I built with informants and the ways in which I understood their worlds. As Avery
Gordon insightfully points out (1996, 24),
a “ghost” is “a case of haunting, a story about what happens when we admit the
ghost—that special instance of the merging of the visible and the invisible, the
dead and the living, the past and the present—into the making of worldly
relations and into the making of our accounts of the world.”
I wished to contribute to the immigrant communities by tutoring my informants’
children, but I also had limited time for fieldwork. In the end, I offered free English
tutoring to a key informant’s son twice a week. In other ways, I also tried to contribute to
the community by helping some Chinese marriage migrants purchase online textbooks or
by helping them apply to NGOs for food coupons, small things that some Chinese
marriage migrants, especially those from the working-class background, found difficult.
At the time of my research, Hong Kong was undergoing a critical political moment.
Student activists and pro-democratic political groups had organized the Umbrella
Movement, a civil disobedience movement to protest and to bargain with the Hong Kong
government for universal suffrage in the next Chief Executive election. It was mid-
September in 2014, and I was in the middle of my fieldwork in Taipei city when I heard
that student protestors were occupying different locations in Hong Kong. I took a short
break from my Taiwan fieldwork to go to Hong Kong to support the Umbrella
Movement, through which I learned that the Hong Kong government and other pro-
establishment political groups had also organized a counter-movement. When I began my
research at WeCare, I was not aware of its collaboration with pro-establishment political
groups, such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong,
to organize events to support government’s heavy-handed crackdown of student
protestors. An ethical dilemma arose as Chinese marriage migrants invited me to
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participate in the political events organized by WeCare, especially an event that
promoted the government’s version of universal suffrage22, which I did not support. As a
researcher, I wished to participate in these events to better understand Chinese marriage
migrants’ involvement, the kind of political work they do, and how they make meanings
of their participation, but as a resident of Hong Kong that cares about its democratic
future, I was concerned about the political consequences of my participation at a
historical moment that could potentially change Hong Kong’s democracy system. It was
a moment where my political orientation and my research agenda did not align, and I
struggled to make a decision. It the end, I selectively participated in activities that did not
have a direct impact on the political system, such as the “Harmony Carnivals” and post-
election debriefing seminars.
3.3 Evolving Relationships and Ways of Seeing
As time passed, my relationship with different groups of informants has evolved. While
my relationship with social workers and immigration officers mostly ended with
fieldwork, some Chinese marriage migrants and I have kept in touch. With the advent of
social media, such as instant chat applications, communications with informants have
become much easier. Technically, I never really left the field. From time to time, my
informants and I exchange news on instant message application — LINE for those in
Taiwan and Wechat or What’s app for those in Hong Kong. When I took a short break
from Taiwan fieldwork in summer 2014 to support Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement,
an informant from Taiwan messaged me on LINE and asked if I could help her
communicate with a suspicious Hong Kong woman who had been talking to her husband
22 In 2015, a year after the Umbrella Movement, the Hong Kong government proposed a new electoral system, which expanded the nominating committee base from 800 to 1200 members, with public vote at the final stage of the election. The proposal was rejected by Umbrella Movement leaders and pan-democrats, believing that the mere increase in the number of committee members would not make the electoral system more democratic, as the committee still has the power to screen out candidates at early stages of the election process (South China Morning Post 2015).
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online. After I went back to Toronto, a divorced Chinese marriage migrant called me to
report exciting news of meeting a new boyfriend; others sent me pictures of their children
cheerfully playing in the playground. During Chinese New Year, I also received warm
messages and voice recordings that wished me “good health” in the year to come.
These small moments of connection built up to my follow-up visit in summer 2016 to
both Hong Kong and Taiwan. As my informants stayed in Hong Kong and Taiwan
longer, their lives, hopes, and desires had also changed. Some Chinese marriage migrants
had embraced motherhood despite saying they would not have children when we first
met; others had closed their restaurants to establish a marriage migrant NGO. In Hong
Kong, many of my informants had found either a full-time or part-time job, so that they
could become a “useful person.”
My multiple interactions with Chinese marriage migrants have taught me to understand
their stories as evolving and changing. In my follow-up fieldwork, some of them had
disclosed the other side of their personal stories which contradicted the earlier versions of
what they had told me. These inconsistencies are mostly revealed in issues that could
potentially hold their morality into question, such as the ways they met their husbands
and their relationships with men outside of marriage. When inconsistencies arose, I tend
not to judge nor to pressure them to find out the ultimate truth, but to see them as the
“partial truths” (Haraway 1988, 583) that were told against our dynamic and changing
relationship. This understanding later shaped the writing of this dissertation, which
focuses on parsing out the narratives of belonging constructed by both state actors as well
as by Chinese marriage migrants against broader social, political, and moral landscapes
of Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Andrea Doucet (2008, 80) reveals, there are certain sites
of research that “do not lend themselves to knowing subjects, but rather to knowing only
their narratives.”
My understanding and narration of Chinse marriage migrants’ stories are partially
informed by my own “conceptual baggage” (Kirby McKenna 1989, 32; Hsiung 2010) –
my personal background as a Chinese immigrant, the theoretical lens that I wear, and the
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epistemological position where I stand. Critical feminist scholarship’s understanding of
different institutions as interlocking and interdependent has impacted my ways of seeing.
Instead of seeing different social institutions as separate spheres, I understand the labor
market, family, and civil society as interlocking and interconnected systems (Collins
2000, Glenn 2002). They are spaces of domination but also have transformative
potential. Such understanding has also propelled me to see marriage migrants as holistic
persons engaging in multiple social institutions—as mothers, wives, daughters-in-law,
workers, volunteers, and activists. In my analysis, I attend to the interconnection between
different institutions and Chinese marriage migrants’ involvement in them, as well as the
fluid meanings that Chinese marriage migrants attached to their position in one
institution to make sense of another. Informed by postcolonial feminists’ critique on
early representation of Third World Women as victims of oppression (Mohanty 1988)
and critical feminist scholars’ efforts to illuminate the agency of marriage migrants
(Constable 2003, 2005; Choo 2016; Faier 2009; Kim 2013), I see Chinese marriage
migrants as active agents who reinforce, contest, and challenge pre-existing inequalities
in their everyday encounters with state actors, family, and immigrant communities. These
epistemological and theoretical positions, weave into my personal journey of belonging,
have come to shape the direction of this dissertation, the relationship that I built with
informants, as well as the ways in which the stories are told in the following chapters.
4 Overview of Chapters
This dissertation examines the narratives of belonging constructed by the Hong Kong and
Taiwanese states as well as by Chinese marriage migrants as they define and contest their
exclusion in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Chapter 2 parses out the states’ narratives of belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan to
show how national boundaries are articulated through institutionally-grounded gendered
norms at various social service encounters. I show how Chinese marriage migrants’
belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan, while both discursively organized around their
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labor in relation to low fertility, are differentially defined by state actors based on
distinctive interpretations of the demographic challenge. Chinese marriage migrants in
Hong Kong face an independent market narrative that defines their belonging through
their productive labor, subjecting them under the normative image of disembodied,
independent, masculine worker-citizen. Chinese marriage migrants in Taiwan are
subjected to a deferential familial narrative that defines their belonging through their
reproductive labor to maintain a heterosexual family and the nation and are measured
against the normative image of middle-class, modern, feminine familial worker-citizen.
Chapter 3 focuses on the heterogeneous narratives developed by Chinese marriage
migrants as they negotiate with the moral stigma of dalumei (mainland little sister) in
Taiwan. This chapter shows that, while the discourse of dalumei renders all Chinese
marriage migrants as moral suspects, the everyday reproduction of dalumei discourse is
used to construct the category of “good immigrants” that differentiate Chinese marriage
migrants based on their perceived class backgrounds. In everyday interactions, class
markers, such as Chinese women’s educational backgrounds and professional work
experiences in China, as well as their Taiwanese husbands’ background, were translated
into the intention of women’s marriage migration to Taiwan. Chinese marriage migrants
who had a university degree of professional work experiences in China were considered
as married for love, compared to the dalumei—Chinese marriage migrants married
veterans—who married for money. In the search for moral acceptance, more educated
Chinese marriage migrants also distanced themselves from the Chinese marriage
migrants who were considered as dalumei. While all Chinese marriage migrants I met
mobilized the morality attached to their gendered labor as mothers, wives, and daughters-
in-law to narrate themselves as a moral figure, more educated Chinese marriage migrants
also drew upon their volunteer labor to refashion themselves as a selfless subject in the
public arena, hence reinforcing the moral distinction against less educated Chinese
marriage migrants.
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Chapter 4 looks at how Chinese marriage migrants redefine their belonging through their
participation in transnational activities organized by pro-establishment political camp
amid heightened political tension between Hong Kong and China. By delving into the
meanings that Chinese marriage migrants attached to their transnational participation, I
show how, in the face of competing political ideologies organized by the Chinese state
and Hong Kong localist groups, Chinese marriage migrants mobilize diverse ethos of
belonging to resist their everyday discrimination while at the same time reproduce the
broader moral landscape of Hong Kong that produces their marginalization in the first
place.
This dissertation ends with a summary of all finding. By highlighting how class interacts
with gender and nationality in producing differentiated regulatory practices and multiple
experiences of belonging, this dissertation brings out the complexity of immigrant
belonging in an era of global migration amidst geopolitical tension. Situating the
production and negotiation of these narratives within enhanced economic integration and
shifting geopolitical entanglement between China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan, the
concluding chapter also highlights the unfortunate alignment of market logic and
nationalist ideology in the formation of discursive national boundaries against
immigrants at geopolitically contentious times.
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Chapter 2
Gendered Narratives of Belonging:
Chinese Marriage Migrants, Labor, and Immigrant Integration
in Hong Kong and Taiwan
In a flat, know-it-all tone, Ms. Lee, a 35-year-old social worker in Hong Kong welcomed
Chinese marriage migrants to an employment seminar with three questions, “Do you ever
wonder why you are capable, but still can’t get a job? Are you upset, disappointed,
feeling worthless? Has unemployment made you doubt yourself?” It was a rainy Monday
morning and the audience, mostly Chinese marriage migrants, were late to the seminar
after sending their children to school. Without receiving much response, Ms. Lee probed
the questions one more time. Then, in a can-do attitude, Ms. Lee told Chinese marriage
migrants to face the challenge head-on by diving into Hong Kong’s labor market.
Similarly addressing a room of newly arrived Chinese marriage migrants, Director
Wang, the head of an immigration office in New Taipei City, a man in his late-50s
dressed in his white and navy-blue uniform, greeted everyone in a gentle and
grandfatherly voice, “Welcome to Taiwan!” Pleased by the sight of a few babies brought
by Chinese marriage migrants sleeping peacefully in the arms of experienced caretakers,
Director Wang encouraged the group to have more children, “Children are the future of
our country, the assets of our society, and Taiwan’s future relies on you!”
In recent years, state actors in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, such as Ms. Lee and
Director Wang, have actively organized programs to integrate Chinese marriage
migrants— the largest group of immigrants—into Hong Kong and Taiwanese societies.
These integration projects highlight different forms of immigrant women’s labor—
productive labor in Hong Kong and reproductive labor in Taiwan—as defining features
of their belonging.
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Through an analysis of the social integration programs designed to assimilate Chinese
marriage migrants into desirable citizens in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this chapter
compares how Chinese marriage migrants’ belonging is differentially articulated in both
settings in relation to their labor. Based on 15 months of multi-sited ethnography and 21
in-depth interviews with state actors in Hong Kong and Taiwan, I examine what I call the
“gendered narratives of belonging” in the two contexts to capture the different classed
and nationality-based gendered norms and practices evoked in the constitution of state’s
narrative of belonging. Specifically, I examine the production of gendered narratives of
belonging and delineate its operation as the independent market narrative in Hong Kong
and the deferential familial narrative in Taiwan. In the two narratives, “market” and
“family” refer to institutions through which Chinese marriage migrants’ labor is defined
and discursively regulated; “independent” and “deferential” refer to the gendered norms
and practices against which Chinese marriage migrants are measured.
I show how Chinese marriage migrants’ belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan, while
both discursively organized around their labor in relation to low fertility, are
differentially defined by state actors based on distinctive interpretations of the
demographic challenge. Understanding low fertility as a crisis of productivity, state
actors in Hong Kong developed an independent market narrative that defines Chinese
marriage migrants’ belonging through their productive labor, subjecting Chinese
marriage migrants under the normative image of disembodied, independent, masculine
worker-citizen. In Taiwan, the patriarchal state understands the demographic challenge as
reproductive crisis and adopts a deferential familial narrative that defines Chinese
marriage migrants’ belonging through their reproductive labor in maintaining
heterosexual family and the nation, subjecting Chinese marriage migrants under the
normative image of middle-class, modern, feminine familial worker-citizen. By
examining the narratives of belonging in two “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983),
I contribute to the critical feminist literature on immigration and citizenship by showing
how national boundaries are drawn through institutionally grounded gendered norms in
social service encounters.
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1 Gendered Narratives of Belonging
Recent critical feminist literature on immigration and citizenship has moved beyond
family and labor market to examine the pivotal role played by the state in organizing
political projects of belonging (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008; Herrera 2013).
The state delineates the boundary between “us” and “them” through organizing political
projects that “aim at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies which are
themselves being constructed in these projects in very specific ways and in very specific
boundaries” (Yuval-Davis 2011, 10). Marriage migrant women, who enter host societies
through family reunification, are often considered by different nation-states as “low
quality” immigrants and subjected to restrictive immigration control (Bonjour and Kraler
2015; Chao 2005; Tseng 2006) and integration projects that regulate their bodies and
labor (Choo 2006; Kim 2013).
At the border, ethno-nationalist political projects of belonging often take the form of
restrictive immigration control. The recent resurgence of nationalist identities in various
European countries, for example, have led different states to see Muslim marriage
migrant women and their perceived “uncivilized cultural practices,” such as honor-
related violence and arranged marriages, as a threat to the national value of gender
equality and liberalism (Adamson et al. 2011; Kofman et al. 2013). Different European
states have implemented restrictive admission criteria, such as pre-entry tests, minimum
age of marriage, and income requirement, as a form of border control. In East Asia,
where marriage migrants are mostly women from China and Southeast Asian countries,
states often consider them as a homogenous group of working-class women with low
education credential and suspicious marital motives (Choo 2016; Constable 2004; Suzuki
2003). In Taiwan, where its state sovereignty is unrecognized by China and its
international allies, state actors often held Chinese migrant women’s marriage against the
ideal of love marriage as a means to exert border control, thereby producing “sovereignty
effects” (Friedman 2015, 14) for the precarious state. Yet, as Tseng (2006) argues, this
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nationalist project of border control is selectively enforced on guest-workers and
marriage migrants from China, but not high-skilled professionals.
Beyond border control, marriage migrant women are subjected to the state’s project of
integration (Cheng and Choo 2015), where their biological and social reproductive labor
are put under state surveillance. Kim’s (2013) study on the integration projects in South
Korea shows that the state requires Filipina marriage migrants to take classes that help
them perform daily tasks at home as Korean wives and mothers, hence upholding an
“ethnicized maternal citizenship” that aims to transform ethnic others into Korean
maternal-citizens. In Hong Kong, state-led social services for Chinese marriage migrants
has organized around the theme of “responsibility” to transform them into “civilized” and
“responsible” mothers that do not depend on the city-state’s welfare (Newendorp 2008).
By delineating what marriage migrants should or should not do as mothers, state-led
integration projects evoke norms and practices imbued with gender, ethnic, and class
meanings in the process of assimilation, reconsolidating what it means to be desirable
citizens.
Building upon critical feminist scholarship, I highlight the need to examine how gender
operates in tandem with class and nationality in shaping normative ideologies underlying
state-led integration projects. As an instance of political projects of belonging, state-led
integration projects provide sites where state actors organize what Korteweg and
Yurdakul (2014, 2) called national narratives of belonging, which refers to “public
discourses that define what it means to belong to a geographical community governed by
a particular nation-state.” As modern states form a partnership with its “satellite” (Haney
2010, 16), such as NGOs, in the implementation of integration programs, national
narratives are not only formulated by national state-actors, but are also reproduced and
contested by “street-level bureaucrats” (Lispsky 1980)—social workers, NGO staff,
volunteers—as they interact with immigrants (Choo 2016; Ong 2003).
Based on Korteweg and Yurdakul’s (2014) framework as well as insights from critical
feminist studies on immigration and citizenship, in this chapter I examine the gendered
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narratives of belonging, highlighting the different classed and nationality-based gendered
norms and practices evoked in the constitution of states’ national narratives of belonging.
Following Korteweg and Yurdakul’s ideal-typical approach to national narratives (2014,
4-5), I argue that each nation has only one national narrative at the time of my research,
yet the meanings of these narratives are subject to different interpretations at specific
historical moments. I also argue that national narratives contain contradictory discourses
regarding what it means to belong, but such messiness is often organized around a few
overarching concepts. In the contexts of Hong Kong and Taiwan, discursive elements of
narratives of belonging involve defining immigrant women’s labor within a particular
social institution (e.g., market or family) as solutions to low fertility and the ensuing
gendered norms. Contestations over what low fertility means and whether Chinese
marriage migrants’ labor should be mobilized as state’s solution somehow “give them
longevity and structuring force” (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014, 5) in the constitution of
national narratives.
Unlike existing critical feminist studies that focus on integration programs of one nation-
state, my study of Hong Kong and Taiwan offers a comparative lens to explore how
gender operates differently in different states’ regulation of belonging. The cases of
Hong Kong and Taiwan bring important insights to the study of national narratives of
belonging because their nationhood is formally unrecognized in the international political
community. Both Hong Kong and Taiwanese states are subjected to the political
framework of “One China” where the former is a part of, and the latter maintains an
ambiguous relationship with, China. However, the “One China” political and cultural
framework largely departs from local imaginaries, as different cultural and political
histories have shaped the formation of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983) and
locals are increasingly identified with the categories of “Hong Kongers” and
“Taiwanese” (Brown 2004; Mathew et al. 2008). By parsing out the gendered narratives
of belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan, I show how, in contexts with ambiguous and
unrecognized nationhood, national boundaries are expressed through gendered normative
images grounded within a particular social institution.
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2 Chinese Marriage Migrants in Political and Cultural
Contexts
Since the 1990s, Chinese marriage migrants, mostly women who married men in Hong
Kong and Taiwan, have become the largest group of immigrants in both Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Greater economic integration, enhanced travels, and rapid development of
telecommunication across the regional borders of China-Hong Kong and China-Taiwan
have facilitated the increase in cross-border marriage migration. Between 1997 and 2015,
about 828,000 Chinese immigrants have settled in Hong Kong, among which 98% are
wives and children of cross-border marriage families (Chief Secretary for
Administration’s Office 2015). Most cross-border marriages consist of the union between
working-class men in Hong Kong and working-class women from China. However, in
recent years, there has been an increase in the education level of Chinese marriage
migrants coming to Hong Kong (Chief Secretary for Administration’s Office 2015). In
Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrant women have become the largest group of immigrants
since 1992, soon after the Taiwanese state ended the Martial Law in the late 1980s and
resumed contact with China. Between 1992 and 2018, approximately 322,000 Chinese
marriage migrants have settled in Taiwan (National Immigration Agency ROC 2018),
more than the marriage migrants from Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam,
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
The contested political history of Hong Kong and Taiwan with regards to China have
implications on the social positioning of Chinese marriage migrants in these two
societies. As a former British colony and a Special Administrative Region of China as of
1997, Hong Kong is a “quasi-city state” (Ku and Pun 2004, 2) under the political
sovereignty of China while enjoying limited autonomy in governing local affairs.
Although Basic Law, the mini-constitutional document of Hong Kong, guaranteed that
Hong Kong would maintain its political, economic, and social ways of life after the
handover, many local Hong Kongers worried that the political transition would
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compromise Hong Kong’s freedom. Taiwan had political tensions with China since 1949
when Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist army lost the civil war to the Chinese
Communist Party and retreated to the island. Since its establishment, Taiwan’s
sovereignty as an independent nation-state remains contested, locally and internationally.
The connection of China with the international political and economic community since
the 1970s makes Taiwan an illegitimate government. Locally, the question of Taiwan’s
sovereignty as an independent state has always been the subject of political debate.
Under such geopolitical histories, immigrants from China are considered as outsiders and
others. The cultural construction of Hong Kong identity is developed in opposition to
immigrants from China in many ways. In media and sensational news reports, Hong
Kongers are portrayed as sophisticated, modern, urban, law-abiding, and hardworking
(Leung 2004) with immigrants from China as backward and unruly country bumpkins
often associated with law-breaking and low productivity (Ma 1999). Due to the ongoing
political tensions between China and Taiwan, marriage migrants from China are
positioned by some Taiwanese state actors as political others posing threats to national
security (Lan 2008). Chinese marriage migrants, especially those who married veterans,
are also considered as the gold-diggers who married for their husbands’ money (Chao
2004).23 In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrants are considered a
potential “welfare burden” that may drain local resources (Leung 2004; Chao 2005). As I
will show in my analysis, some of these presumed national differences informed the
ways in which state actors interact with Chinese marriage migrants at social service
encounters.
Upon their arrival in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrants are subjected to
state-led integration projects. Both Hong Kong and Taiwanese states have relied on local
state agencies as well as collaboration with NGOs to organize social services for Chinese
marriage migrants. In Hong Kong, the Home Affairs Bureau collaborates with NGOs
23 More will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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through subvention systems to offer social services for Chinese immigrants since the
mid-1990s (Provisional LegCo Panel on Home Affairs Hong Kong SARG 1997). After
welfare reform in 2004, Chinese marriage migrants’ services that were previously
provided by New Arrivals Service Centers are now offered by Integrated Family Service
Centers. Welfare reform aims to reduce the labeling of service recipients, but Chinese
marriage migrants are often unsure of their eligibility for services at Integrated Family
Service Centers. Social workers told me that Chinese marriage migrants usually turned to
NGOs where the categories “New Arrivals” or “Immigrants” were indicated as service
users. In addition to Home Affairs Bureau, NGOs also compete for state funding from
the Employment Retraining Bureau (ERB) to organize language courses (e.g., Cantonese,
Mandarin, English) and job training (e.g., beauty industry, child-care, and postpartum
care) for Chinese marriage migrants.
The Taiwanese state has organized integration activities around the category of “foreign
spouse” and “mainland spouse,” referring to marriage migrants from Southeast Asia and
China, or just “foreign spouse” to denote both groups of marriage migrant. State-led
immigrant integration is marked by the administration of Development Funds for
Immigrants (previously known as the Foreign Spouse Care and Guidance Fund) in 2003,
through which the state forms partnerships with NGOs to deliver immigrant-related
social services and to organize immigrant-related public events, such as the Taipei City
Multicultural Festival and Immigration Day. The Development Funds for Immigrants
sponsors over 50 items of social services, including those to enhance family lives and
employment skills (Tsay 2004, 186), with the objective for marriage migrants to
“enhance their adaption in Taiwanese society…and maintain a happy family with
nationals to avoid family and social problems due to poor integration” (National
Immigration Agency ROC 2017, 1). Marriage migrants were encouraged to attend
Vocational Training Centers and to take state-sponsored classes and exams to certify
them as professional service providers. Chinese marriage migrants who married veterans
were also recruited and trained by various Veterans Service Offices to become certified
caregivers to take care of veterans in nursing homes and hospitals (Chao 2015). In
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addition to Development Funds for Immigrants, each district office also receives annual
funding from the Department of Civil Affairs to organize at least two marriage-migrant-
related activities per year. The Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Interior worked with
NGOs to set up two special windows at each local district’s Employment Service
Stations to serve marriage migrants to enhance their labor market participation. Although
many of these social services appear to be gender and nationality-neutral, as I show
below, classed and nationality-based gendered norms are evoked by state-actors as they
highlight what it meant to belong to Hong Kong and Taiwan.
3 Settings and Methods
This chapter draws upon the ethnographic data from participant observation at various
settings of state-led integration programs. Because the Hong Kong city-state relied
heavily on NGOs to implement state-led integration projects specifically for Chinese
marriage migrants, most of my participant observation was at WeCare.
Compared to Hong Kong, my field sites in Taiwan were more diverse as state agencies
such as immigration offices and local district offices were as much involved as NGOs in
providing services specifically for marriage migrants. While I did participant observation
at both NGOs and local state agencies that provided state-led integration programs, in
this chapter, I mostly draw upon my fieldwork data at the immigration office in New
Taipei City as well as employment seminars organized by the Employment Service
Centers.
I supplement my ethnographic data with 21 in-depth interviews (n=15 in Taiwan; n=6 in
Hong Kong) I conducted with state actors—social workers, NGO workers and directors,
volunteers, immigration officers, and local district officers— that were involved in
organizing state-led integration projects for marriage migrants. My fieldwork experience
allowed me to interact with state actors on a more personal level. Many were eager to
share with me their experiences interacting with marriage migrants and their views on
state-led integration programs. These interviews ranged from one to two hours.
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Interviews were conducted in Mandarin in Taiwan and in Cantonese in Hong Kong. I use
pseudonyms in this chapter to protect my informants’ identities. I also use archival
documents, including government reports and newspapers regarding the latest population
policy in Hong Kong and Taiwan to situate the narratives within states’ broader
population policy framework.
During my fieldwork, I noticed that many state actors discussed state-led social
integration programs in relation to the demographic challenge of low fertility. Similar
discursive patterns appeared in my interview data. When coding my data, I followed this
thread and focused on how state actors viewed Chinese marriage migrants’ positions in
the two societies; how they articulated Chinese marriage migrants’ labor in relation to
specific understanding of low fertility; how they perceived the state’s integration
program and what they believed Chinese marriage migrants had to do to become “us.” I
also paid attention to how Chinese marriage migrants respond to these narratives in
social service encounters.
4 Independent Market Narrative in Hong Kong
Responding to an angry Hong Kong citizen who expressed discontent against new
immigrants from China as “taking away the society’s resources,” Carrie Lam, the current
Chief Executive, then the Chief Secretary for Administration and the former Chair of
Steering Committee of Population Policy (Steering committee), restated the city-state’s
position that “immigrants have always been the bedrock of Hong Kong population
development,” and their productive labor contributed to Hong Kong’s economic
development:
Hong Kong is having a population challenge. The median age of new arrivals was
36 last year. That’s an active working population, with more training, they can fill
jobs in Hong Kong’s construction, sales, and catering industries. Hong Kong
government has the responsibility to help new arrivals to integrate into the society
(Hong Kong China News Agency 2013).
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Carrie Lam’s statement was directed to all immigrants from China, including marriage
migrant women and immediate relatives of Hong Kong citizens. Matthew Cheung, the
former head of Labor and Welfare Bureau, later echoed this, arguing “Hong Kong should
not limit the number of immigrants due to its low fertility,” highlighting that “enhancing
immigrant women’s labor market participation through training would be a solution to
the demographic challenge of labor shortage” (Apple Daily 2013).
Underlying Carrie Lam and Matthew Cheung’s statements is the Hong Kong city-state’s
neoliberal ideology in understanding its fertility crisis. The Steering Committee, of which
Carrie Lam was the Chair, defined its low fertility crisis in terms of “shrinking working
population” and a “rising overall dependency ratio” (Legislative Council Secretariat
2014, 4). Such understanding, however, was not established without internal debates.
Early meetings of the Steering Committee debated using pro-natalist policies to
encourage childbirth (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
2013). However, after weighing the costs and effectiveness of pro-natalist policies in
other countries, the Steering Committee decided not to adopt pro-natalist policies in
Hong Kong as “childbirth” was a matter of “individual choice”:
We need to appreciate that any policy involving government giving out cash
allowances or requiring employers providing increased employee benefits would
involve substantial public money and increased operating costs for enterprises.
Therefore, we need to handle the subject with great care (The Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2013).
The adoption of a market narrative in understanding and resolving low fertility crisis was
driven by the fear that explicit pro-natalist policies, such as cash incentives and
pressuring employers to provide employers benefits, would transfer the costs of
childbearing to the state and business enterprises, and therefore should be “handled with
great care.” The prevalence of market discourse and the protection of corporations from
shouldering the costs of childbearing reveals a long-standing institutional practice of the
entrepreneur state of Hong Kong, which places private accumulation and market logic at
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the core of its policy-making, a practice that was historically rooted in the British
colonial governance (Mathews et al. 2008) and continued by local Hong Kong political
elites (Law 2009).
Many state actors who implemented integration programs adopted the market narrative
that defines Chinese marriage migrants’ belonging through their productive labor.
WeCare was one of the main NGOs that collaborated with the Hong Kong city-state in
organizing integration programs. In collaboration with the ERB to organize job training
and language classes, WeCare emerged as one of the biggest social service providers for
Chinese marriage migrants and their children. Located on the ground floor of a private
housing estate in Eastern district, WeCare’s entrance was framed by bulletin boards filled
with regularly updated job postings from the Labor Department. Inside WeCare, posters
of ERB job training programs and state-sponsored language classes were hung alongside
after-class activities (e.g., singing, dancing, drawing) organized for children from
marriage migrant families, sprinkled with notices of volunteer recruitments, group travel
to China, and family outdoor field trips. In response to the state’s initiative to enhance
Chinese marriage migrants’ labor force participation, WeCare also organized a project
called Integrating New Forces, which involves monthly employment talks and
recruitment services.24 These employment talks and recruitment services provided
important settings where Chinese marriage migrants from different class backgrounds
were called on to be not only productive workers but also independent and self-reliant
citizens.
Social workers I met sympathized with the challenges faced by Chinese marriage
migrants who were professionals in China but could not find a decent job in Hong Kong.
24 During this period of my fieldwork, NGOs collaborating with the city-state to enhance Chinese marriage migrant integration did not offer Family Life Education programs discussed in Newendorp’s (2008) study. Thus, while such programs were offered at local welfare offices to all residents Hong Kong during Newendorp’s study, it was not a defining feature in the city-state’s immigrant integration programs compared to labor market integration in my research.
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However, instead of discussing the structural barriers, such as labor market
discrimination, social workers highlighted individual attitudes as the reasons for their
unemployment. For example, Ms. Lee, the social worker I mentioned in the opening
vignette, sympathetically told a group of Chinese marriage migrants how unemployment
often resulted in “a decline in self-worth.” Knowing that some Chinese marriage
migrants used to be professionals in China, such as Chinese medicine doctors and
accountants, Ms. Lee complimented them as “smart” and recognized that they had a
“glorious past” in China, yet she told the audience that the biggest obstacle to finding a
job in Hong Kong lay in whether or not they could “forget the past and focus on the
present”:
You can’t always think, “I want to be at the top!” That’s impossible. When you
are met with a challenge, do you try resolving it? Or do you just run away? What
happened in the past should remain in the past. If you always dwell on a past in
which you did well, you’ll never be able to see the options ahead of you.
Ms. Lee’s “pep talk” drew upon neoliberal logics of the city-state and individualized
Chinese marriage migrants’ experience of downward mobility as a “personal challenge”
that needed overcoming, rather than a form of structural inequality that required a policy
change. By asking Chinese marriage migrants to “forget the past and focus on the
present,” Ms. Lee diagnosed downward mobility as a result of indulgence in “past glory,”
and offered therapeutic solutions—to move on and “to see the options ahead.” Ms. Lee
used the neoliberal logic to regulate Chinese marriage migrants’ understanding of their
problem into accepting their deskilling in the Hong Kong labor market. Underlying her
gender-neutral speech, I would argue, was a disembodied “male-worker” figure detached
from any childcare responsibility (Acker 1990), which deviated from the lived reality of
many Chinese marriage migrant women, who had difficulty getting a job due to
constraints imposed by their familial responsibilities (Newendorp 2008).
For Chinese marriage migrants from working-class backgrounds, social workers
highlighted the normative ideology “self-reliance” to avoid dependence on government
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assistance. During an employment talk under the project Integrating New Forces, Ms.
Chan, a 30-year-old social worker at WeCare told a story when Chinese marriage
migrants asked questions about applying to the Comprehensive Social Security
Assistance (CSSA) in Hong Kong:
I had a client who came to me and asked me how to get on CSSA. He’s very
young and he’s a local Hong Konger. He told me dozens of reasons why he
wanted to apply for CSSA. What a shame! After he told me all his reasons, I said
to him, “Are you done? How could you? Get out of my room if you want social
security!” I didn’t teach him how to get CSSA and I asked him to think about
why he needed assistance. He came three times more asking for the same thing
and I continued to do the same. He later told me he wanted social security
because he disliked his jobs. Are you all unemployed because you dislike the jobs
in the labor market?
By telling this story, Ms. Chan not only highlighted the “shame” attached to welfare
recipients in Hong Kong but also evoked the normative ideology of “self-reliance” as the
defining feature of being respectable Hong Kong citizens. Unable to reach such
normative expectations, the working-class “male client” was considered “shameful,”
implying the class privilege of the ideal figure. Working-class Chinese marriage migrants
were also subsumed under this normative ideal and were expected to get a job easily if
they could change their attitude about the job market. In this articulation, Chinese
marriage migrants’ gendered responsibility and class position were completely obscured.
In light of the rising Hong Kong localist movement that depicted mainland Chinese as
“locusts”— a lazy, greedy, and classed “other”— that would drain Hong Kong’s
resources with greed and massive quantity (Sautman and Yan 2015), the independent
market narrative was often promoted by social workers out of good intentions to protect
working-class Chinese marriage migrants from becoming the target of these verbal
assaults.
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A “silent” operation of the independent market narrative at WeCare was the inattention
to Chinese marriage migrants’ childcare responsibility. State-led integration programs
did not include a budget for childcare arrangements. The Hong Kong city-state’s laissez-
faire approach on family-related matters meant that Chinese marriage migrants relied on
personal networks or the market for childcare arrangements. Social workers at WeCare
sometimes helped with childcare, but these services were voluntary, not institutionalized.
The social workers I met at another NGO that also held state-sponsored integration
programs but with a stronger advocacy bent, had organized Chinese marriage migrants to
demand that the city-state provide more affordable childcare arrangement. Kevin, a 26-
year-old social worker expressed his discontent:
Many ERB training programs are full-time, without an affordable childcare
arrangement, sisters (i.e., Chinese marriage migrants) have to rely on themselves
when it comes to childcare. Their participation in the program is interrupted by
their childcare responsibility. This dilemma will continue when they look for
jobs.
Kevin believed that the current childcare system in Hong Kong, which was heavily
reliant on kindergarten and community volunteers, was unable to meet childcare demand.
Insufficient affordable childcare arrangements have significant implications for Chinese
marriage migrants from the working-class, who did not have the resources to afford paid
domestic work. By organizing Chinese marriage migrants to protest against inadequately
funded public childcare facilities, Kevin also resisted the independent market narrative
that required Chinese marriage migrants to enter the labor market while individually
shouldering the burden of childcare.
In Hong Kong, the ideal image of disembodied, middle-class, independent male-citizens
that state actors held Chinese marriage migrants against resembles the “masculine
worker-citizenship” described by Korteweg (2006, 315) in the American context. Such
narrative differs significantly from the deferential familial narrative in Taiwan.
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5 Deferential Familial Narrative in Taiwan
In New Hometown, New Life, an introductory handbook for Chinese marriage migrants
edited by the Ministry of Interior, the Taiwanese state defines Chinese marriage
migrants’ belonging to the nation through their familial labor:
Chinese marriage migrants come to Taiwan because of marriage. Not only do
they live with our nationals, but they also contribute to the caring, educating, and
earning of family members. The government has the responsibility to help
marriage migrants integrate into the Taiwanese society and to help them create a
happy family (Ministry of Interior 2014, 1).
In Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrants’ position was mediated by their relations to their
husband-citizens and defined through their familial labor, both reproductive (i.e., caring
and educating family members) and productive (i.e., earning family income).
Although the patriarchal Taiwanese state has historically used a familial narrative to
mobilize local women’s labor for economic development (Hsiung 1996), at this historical
moment, the familial narrative of belonging needed to be situated within the state’s larger
discursive framework that understood low fertility as a “reproductive crisis” (Lan 2008)
that could challenge the biological and cultural reproduction of heterosexual family, and
by extension, the nation:
With the change in society, family structure and function have changed, and our
nationals’ family, marriage, and parenting values are different from the past.
Therefore, rebuilding family values and restoring the younger generation’s
relations with family are important issues. We have been encouraging marriage
and fertility through various activities to redirect our nation’s attention to family
and to change the values of delaying in marriage, single-hood, and childlessness
(Executive Yuan ROC 2013, 56)
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In the face of its unrecognized national sovereignty and struggle for nationhood, former
President Ma Ying-jeou even declared “low fertility as a national security matter”
(Executive Yuan ROC 2013, 9) at the 13th Presidential Financial Report Meeting in 2010,
connecting the declining citizen bodies and family values to national extinction. As such,
even though the Taiwanese state has organized integration activities to “unleash marriage
migrants’ economic potentials” (Executive Yuan ROC 2013, 120), some state actors
continued to adopt a familial narrative in organizing and understanding Chinese marriage
migrants’ belonging.
Held bi-weekly from 9 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. in a conference room at an immigration office in
larger Taipei area, the Family Education Program for Foreign Spouses (Family Program)
was an avenue where state actors mobilized Chinese marriage migrants to give birth for
the nation, discursively reinforcing the familial narrative at the social service encounter.
Director Wang of the immigration office, mentioned in the opening vignette, promoted
pregnancy at each session of the Family Program:
All of you cross the ocean to come to Taiwan, but you are not alone, because we
are your natal-family! In Taiwan, we have a very low fertility rate, and this has
become a national security crisis (guoan weiji). Back in the old days, we said,
“One (child) is not too few, two (children) is good enough,” but nowadays, the
fertility rate among Taiwanese couples is 0.9%, even less than one! New
immigrant couples, however, have about 2.3% fertility rate, more than two, so I
hope that you can continue to work hard. Do not let our birth rate get lower!
Children are the future of our country, the assets of our society, and Taiwan’s
future relies on you!”
Director Wang’s claim that marriage migrants were more “fertile” than Taiwanese
women was ungrounded, as scholars have argued that marriage migrants’ fertility rate
was not higher than that of Taiwanese women, only that they tended to give birth sooner
after marriage (Lan 2008; Yang et al. 2012). Adopting the state’s discourse of national
crisis, Director Wang provoked a sense of urgency and legitimacy in his efforts to
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motivate marriage migrants to serve the country through biological reproductive labor.
Director Wang’s promotion of pregnancy contrasted sharply to the discourse adopted by
other state actors who perceived marriage migrants as “unfit mothers” (Lan 2008, 841)
who were incompetent to reproduce the nation biologically and socially and therefore
had discouraged them from giving birth. Different state actors’ approaches towards
marriage migrants’ pregnancy and motherhood show that while the meanings of familial
narratives that state actors adopted were full of contradiction and dissonance,
reproductive labor continued to be an important element upon which marriage migrants’
belonging was organized. By defining the Taiwanese nation as marriage migrants’ “natal
family,” Director Wang evoked emotions and feelings of shelter and care commonly
associated with one’s natal family (McClintock 2000) to justify the state’s mobilization
of marriage migrants’ bodies for the reproduction of heterosexual families and by
extension, the nation. At integration programs, the notion of “natal-family” was practiced
through providing childcare arrangements, paying each childcare worker not more than
the monthly minimum wage of TWD 22,000 (approx. USD 720) (National Immigration
Agency ROC 2017, 3).
The Family Program was also a site where state actors called upon Chinese marriage
migrants to adopt the normative ideal of deferential, modern, feminine worker-citizen.
Ms. Chen, a 40-year-old senior instructor and the chief organizer of the Family Program
explained to me that she was approached by the immigration office in 2011 to organize
the Family Program because the state wanted to “fix the high divorce rate among cross-
border marriage couples,” which they believed was “two to three times higher than
Taiwanese couples.”25 Ms. Chen believed that the high divorce rate was rooted in
marriage migrant couples’ “money-based” marriages, and she hoped to use the Family
25 The belief that marriage migrant couples were more likely to get a divorce was a misconception, as scholars have pointed out that marriage migrants’ families were no more prone to divorce than Taiwanese couples (Wang 2011).
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Program to help them understand “love.” As such, her class often involved requiring the
couples26 to “perform intimacy” (Lan 2008, 844). In each class, Ms. Chen would pair up
with another junior teacher from the Family Education Center to teach marriage migrants
concepts derived from American family counseling, such as “love” (ai),
“communication” (goutong), and “listening” (lingting). The notion of “love” was often
defined as romantic love and was associated with white middle-class heterosexual
couples. For example, our handout showed a picture of a white heterosexual couple at
breakfast smiling and enjoying a glass of orange juice. Below the picture was the
instructions “eye contact,” “nod,” and “smile” that Ms. Chen required marriage migrants
(and their husbands, if present) to practice in class. During this exercise, Ms. Chen asked
marriage migrants to sit facing their husbands (or each other, if their husbands were
absent) to share their happiest moment of the week. Pacing, Ms. Chen would chant,
“Maintain eye contact! Remember to nod and smile!” The exercise usually ended with
Ms. Chen asking marriage migrants to share their feelings and request husbands to kiss
their “brides.”
While both Chinese marriage migrants and Southeast marriage migrants were subjected
to the same class materials, teachers delivered the materials differently based upon
nationality-based assumptions. Teachers often considered Chinese marriage migrants as
more “expressive” (shanyu biaoda) and “forceful” (qiangshi) when they spoke, unlike
Taiwanese women who were more indirect (wanzhuan) and gentle (wenrou).27 They
considered this as a “national difference” (guoqing bu tong) and Chinese marriage
26 Ms. Chen understood marriage migrants’ family problem as caused by Taiwanese husbands as well, and she invited marriage migrants’ husbands to her class. Southeast Asian marriage migrants’ husbands usually attended the class to help their wives navigate transportation and to do on-site translation, and the class counts towards the 72-hour education requirement for naturalization. However, Chinese marriage migrants’ husbands rarely attended the class as it is voluntary, and their wives do not have language barriers and naturalization requirements. 27 Teachers considered Southeast Asian marriage migrants as “too submissive” to patriarchal domination, hence susceptible to becoming victims of domestic violence.
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migrants’ “forceful” characters needed to be corrected because it was not conducive to
maintaining a loving marriage and family.
For example, when teaching the concept “communication,” Ms. Chao, a junior teacher
from the Family Education Centre, told us that communication was the key to trust, an
important element in building solid family relationships. Illustrating this, she showed us
a car advertisement featuring a middle-class Taiwanese couple — a young Taiwanese
woman dressed in an elegant black suit and high-heel shoes exchanging friendly banter
with her husband while driving the family car. Realizing that her husband did not trust
her driving skills, the wife asked gently, “Why don’t you trust me more? How come I
always feel secure when you drive?” “Because I drive better!” “What a patriarchal belief!
No, because I trust you!” The advertisement ended with the husband saying “I love you”
and the couple entering their house with their son. After the advertisement, Ms. Chao
told us that listening was central to building trust. Xiao Yao, a Chinese marriage migrant
in her late 20s from Sichuan, lamented aloud, “Sometimes, I communicated with my
husband, but he didn’t want to change. He always thought that it was my problem and
criticized me for being self-centered.” Xiao Yao went on to explain her conflicts with her
mother-in-law:
When I was pregnant, I still had to cook for my husband and his parents. My
husband only ate and put dirty dishes in the sink. Whenever I argued with my
husband, his mother would side with her son. She did nothing to help me because
now she has risen from the position of a daughter-in-law to a mother-in-law (xifu
ao cheng po)!
Before Xiaoyao could go on, Ms. Chao interrupted her, “You can try to be gentler when
you speak (wenrou dian) to your husband. In front of the mother-in-law, you have to act
in a silly way and to let her get her way.” “But I don’t want to change myself for them!”
Xiao Yao protested. “Do you love your mother-in-law? I love my mother-in-law very
much because, without her, my husband wouldn’t exist, so I’m willing to change myself
for her. Everything is easy when there is love.” Ms. Chao concluded the interaction with
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her personal experiences.
Here, the national boundary was expressed through the normative image of a middle-
class, modern, feminine, familial, worker-citizen that Chinese marriage migrants were
measured against. As Lan pointed out (2008, 848), the discourse of romantic love as the
sole basis of marriage was “an ideal that the Taiwanese state projects to represent as a
modernized nation” (Lan 2008, 848) rather than a lived reality for married couples in
Taiwan. For Ms. Chen and Ms. Chao, Taiwanese nationals themselves, Xiaoyao and
other Chinese marriage migrants were too “forceful,” an emotion associated with China’s
socialist past (Friedman 2015, 156) that was not compatible with the normative image of
loving, harmonious and modern family that represented Taiwan’s imagined present and
future. By demanding Chinese marriage migrants defer to their husbands and mothers-in-
law using the narrative of “love,” teachers at Family Programs not only reproduced a
familial narrative of the state but also reinforced the patriarchal gender norms of
deference (Wolf 1972) with a modern twist. Xiao Yao’s protest also shows that such a
narrative is not promoted without contestation.
The deferential familial narrative was also reproduced in settings that promoted marriage
migrants’ labor market participation. As marriage migrants’ employment somehow
contradicted the state’s familial narrative, state actors resolved such tension by
reconfiguring the meanings of marriage migrants’ paid work as secondary to, or an
extension of their familial duties. During a recruitment event, Director Li of an
Employment Service Center in Taipei welcomed marriage migrants by recognizing their
contribution to the family:
All of you come to our country because of marriage. At home, you were simply a
family member, but here, you are other people’s wives, mothers, and daughters-
in-law. I admire how you are doing this (mothering) work, taking caring of your
children, and I think that deserves recognition. I know that after taking care of the
family, you’d want to think about how to have personal growth through paid
work, right?
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Then she introduced Pxmart, a large supermarket chain in Taiwan and focused on the
part-time vacancies available in their company:
I know you are interested in part-time jobs because you want to take care of your
family, but you also want to help your husbands earn some money for the family.
In Pxmart they can provide you with that kind of job.
In her presentation, Pxmart’s representative emphasized part-time vacancies, benefits of
part-time work, and childcare subsidies. For Director Li, paid work was considered as
“personal growth” that came after caretaking and was defined in relation to Chinese
marriage migrants’ wifely role to “help their husbands.” This narrative was reinforced by
the practice of employment service workers, who often introduced marriage migrants to
jobs that allowed them to take weekends off and to have flexible working hours to
accommodate familial duties. Not only did Director Li use the familial narrative to define
women’s paid labor but she also perceived marriage migrants as a homogenous group of
working-class women and reinforced their vulnerability in the labor market by recruiting
them into low-wage flexible service work.
6 Conclusion
This chapter builds upon critical feminist literature on marriage migration and citizenship
to examine the production of gendered narratives of belonging at state-led integration
projects in Hong Kong and Taiwan. I show how gendered narratives of belonging operate
as an independent market narrative in Hong Kong and a deferential familial narrative in
Taiwan. The meanings of these narratives, while incomplete and contested by some,
were organized around the recurring theme of marriage migrants’ labor in relation to the
states’ concerns for low fertility as well as their respective gendered norms. Divergent
understanding of the demographic challenge has informed a different discursive focus
developed in Hong Kong and Taiwan. State actors in Hong Kong understood low fertility
as a productive crisis, thereby discussing Chinese marriage migrants’ productive labor as
the defining feature of their belonging. State actors in Taiwan interpreted low fertility as
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a reproductive crisis and encouraged Chinese marriage migrants to engage in biological
and social reproductive labor to maintain heterosexual families, and by extension, the
nation. Such difference in articulation is rooted in Hong Kong and Taiwan’s political and
cultural histories—the perpetuation of neoliberal market logic fostered by British
colonial ruling has shaped the prevalence of Hong Kong’s market narrative; Taiwanese
state’s historical practice of defining the nation as the heterosexual family has
perpetuated the familial narrative.
Gender norms operate in tandem with nationality and class differently within these two
narratives. The independent market narrative of Hong Kong is articulated in a gender-
neutral way, where state actors subjected Chinese marriage migrants from different class
backgrounds to the normative image of a disembodied, middle-class, independent
masculine worker-citizen without any childcare responsibility. The deferential familial
narrative of Taiwan is gender-specific, and state actors imposed Chinese marriage
migrants with the normative image of a middle-class, modern, feminine familial worker-
citizen. By highlighting the normative gendered images mobilized in narratives of
belonging, I show how national boundaries are drawn through gendered norms grounded
in specific social institutions such as labor market and family.
The two gendered narratives of belonging, while allowing state actors to uphold local
moral orders, reproduce intersecting inequalities of gender, class, and nationality. In
Hong Kong, state actors’ inattention to Chinese marriage migrants’ childcare
responsibility while upholding the ideal of independence could create emotional and
practical burdens for many Chinese marriage migrants who are full-time mothers. In
Taiwan, highlighting Chinese marriage migrants’ family responsibility while subsuming
their paid work under the notion of “familial work” not only perpetuates immigrant
women’s vulnerable structural location in the labor market (Tang and Wang 2011) but
also marginalizes career-driven Chinese marriage migrants who do not want to be
mothers. However, how Chinese marriage migrants experience these narratives and
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whether or not these narratives are taken up in the formation of their subjectivities would
require further analysis beyond the scope of this chapter.
The gendered narratives of belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan not only regulate
Chinese marriage migrants’ sense of belonging and uphold local gendered moral orders
but also allow state actors to draw “national” boundaries against an “imagined China.” It
is noteworthy that while the term “national difference” was explicitly evoked in Taiwan,
it was not a common local repertoire in Hong Kong. This is likely due to a long history
of state-led nation-building efforts in Taiwan (Chang 2015) while the Hong Kong city-
state is “learning to belong to a nation” (Mathew et al. 2008) while upholding a sense of
superiority. By evoking different gendered norms and practices in the narratives of
belonging, state actors in Hong Kong and Taiwan differentially construct “national
boundaries” against imagined “China.” In Hong Kong, the notion of “national boundary”
was drawn by evoking a male figure who enjoyed the class privilege of independence
vis-à-vis working class and immigrant women with presumed dependence. In Taiwan,
the term “national difference” was used and expressed through an image of modern,
deferential femininity against the imagined aggressive femininity that was associated
with China’s socialist past. Despite its intention to eliminate boundaries, state-led
integration projects ironically reproduce and deepen the perceived gendered, classed, and
“national” differences between the image of an ideal citizen and the imagined others. As
Chinese marriage migrants cross two geopolitical contested borders, their integration has
become a site through which boundaries of “imagined communities” of Hong Kong and
Taiwan are drawn.
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Chapter 3
“I’m not a typical dalumei!” Chinese Marriage Migrants,
Gendered Morality, and Classed Belonging in Taiwan
Feng had lived in Taiwan for more than 20 years, but she had very few friends. Despite
taking good care of her veteran husband until he passed, Feng was considered by other
Chinese marriage migrants as a “typical dalumei” (typical mainland little sister) who
married her Taiwanese husband for money. Even a fellow Chinese marriage migrant
hailed from the same hometown in Hubei believed that “she is all about money!”
Contrastingly, Hui Lin, who also married her Taiwanese husband 20 years ago, was
considered by her church group leader as a “good immigrant.” At church, I was told that
Hui Lin was different from the “typical damulei” who came to Taiwan at the early days
because she was “educated” and “met her husband at work.”
I later learned that the expression “typical dalumei” was used to refer to less educated
Chinese marriage migrants whose Taiwanese husbands came from disadvantaged
backgrounds, such as veterans, who struggled to find wives in the local marriage market
and had to resort to cross-strait marriage. As such, despite their similar migration
trajectory from China to Taiwan 20 years ago, Feng and Hui Lin were perceived very
differently by social workers, their Taiwanese friends, as well as the Chinese marriage
migrant community. In this chapter, I ask: How do Chinese marriage migrants from
different class backgrounds experience the discourse of dalumei differently? How do
Chinese marriage migrants narrate a sense of self-worth and belonging in a context that
excludes them as the immoral other?
Building upon insights from critical feminist scholarship on marriage migration, this
chapter examines Chinese marriage migrants’ heterogeneous experiences of, and
responses to, gendered ethnic stereotypes that define them as the immoral other. I argue
that the everyday reproduction of the term dalumei has become a discursive frame
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through which both locals and marriage migrants themselves evaluate Chinese women’s
marriage migration experiences and belonging. I show how class markers, such as
Chinese marriage migrants’ educational backgrounds and work experiences, as well as
their husbands’ backgrounds, were translated into the intention of Chinese women’s
marriage migration to Taiwan. Chinese women with university education and
professional work experiences were considered by social workers, Taiwanese friends,
and the Chinese marriage migrant community as “married out of love” and therefore
“good immigrants.” Chinese marriage migrants who married veterans were considered to
embody the immoral figure of dalumei who married Taiwanese men for money. In the
search for moral acceptance, Chinese marriage migrants also distanced themselves from
the Chinese marriage migrants who were considered dalumei. While all Chinese
marriage migrants I met mobilized the morality attached to their gendered labor as
mothers, wives, and daughters-in-law to narrate themselves as moral figures, more
educated Chinese marriage migrants also drew upon their volunteer labor to refashion
themselves as selfless subjects in the public arena, hence reinforcing the moral
distinction against less educated Chinese marriage migrants. By delving into the
heterogenous experiences of, and responses to, the dalumei discourse among Chinese
marriage migrants, I complicate critical feminist scholarship on marriage migration to
show how class intersects with gender and nationality in shaping migrant women’s
belonging.
1 Marriage Migrants, Gendered Morality, and Classed
Belonging
The rise of cross-border marriages in the 1990s has become a sensational subject in mass
media and public discussion. Media constructions often cast migrant women as the
immoral other, producing an image that goes against ideal womanhood. Within the U.S.,
early discussion of cross-border marriages is fueled by the media discourse of mail-order
brides, where marriage migrant women from Asia are imagined as the poverty-stricken
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other, who trick men into marriage for green cards or work opportunities (Constable
2003). Similarly in Asia, media also conflates marriage migrants, who are mostly women
from China and Southeast Asia, with the image of sex workers and depicts them as the
immoral other (Choo 2016; Hsia 2007; Lan 2008; Nakamatsu 2005; Plambech 2010). In
Taiwan, the discourse of dalumei renders all mainland Chinese women as “poor, greedy,
cunning, promiscuous, and uncivilized” (Chen 2015, 89) gold-diggers who engaged in
“sham marriage” in Taiwan for work opportunities. These images go against the notion
of ideal womanhood, which is constructed in relation to sexual purity and the
essentialized notion of feminine virtue attached to women’s identities as mothers and
wives.
Critical feminist scholars have argued that marriage migrants are not passive victims of
these “controlling images” (Collins 2000, 76); instead, they actively negotiate with these
stereotypes to claim a sense of belonging. For example, studies have shown how Filipina
marriage migrants in South Korea and Japan drew upon the discourse of love to describe
their marriage (Faier 2007, 2009) and performed local gendered norms of motherhood to
negotiate with the gendered racial stereotypes of gold-diggers (Choo 2013; Kim 2013).
Filipina marriage migrants in Japan performed oyomesan (unpaid care labor in Japanese
ways) to counteract the stigma of Japayuki (Japan-bound) that conflated them with sex
workers (Faier 2009). On a collective level, Filipina marriage migrants also organized
charity events where they deployed images and symbols of respectable womanhood (e.g.,
Christian wives) to win wider social acceptance in both Japan and the Philippines
(Suzuki 2000).
While critical feminist scholarship has fruitfully demonstrated how marriage migrants
negotiate their stigma through performing gendered cultural norms and practices (Faier
2009; Friedman 2015; Newendorp 2008), the focus on the intersection of gender and
ethnic dimensions of exclusion has not yet fully captured how the perception of marriage
migrants could be differentiated by class. In many studies (Faier 2009; Friedman 2015;
Newendorp 2008), class is conceptualized in relation to the national hierarchy that
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constructs ethnic differences between local citizens and marriage migrants. Such
conceptualizations have unintentionally constructed marriage migrants as a homogenous
group, despite powerfully demonstrating the gendered national boundary drawn between
local citizens and marriage migrants. Paying more analytical attention to the perceived
class difference among marriage migrants and how it translates into their position within
the gendered morality allows us to see the divergent experiences of Chinese marriage
migrants in the face of similar “disciplinary discourses” (Suzuki 2000, 432) as well as the
different meaning-making processes that marriage migrants engaged in to counteract
their stigma. For example, in Newendorp’s study (2008), Chinese marriage migrants
perceived as middle-class may or may not be put under the disciplinary gaze of social
workers who encouraged poor Chinese marriage migrants to adopt Hong Kong parenting
style that was deemed more modern, westernized, and attentive to emotional
development compared to the Chinese parenting style that was considered traditional,
backward, and overly-reliant on physical discipline. Furthermore, if middle-class Chinese
marriage migrants were subjected to a similar disciplinary gaze, what would be their
response? Delving into the perceived class divide among Chinese marriage migrants and
its moral implications open up new questions about the social mechanisms that produce
the boundary of inclusion and exclusion among marriage migrants.
In this chapter, I examine the heterogeneous experiences of the dalumei discourse among
Chinese marriage migrants who are perceived by social workers and the Chinese
marriage migrant community in Taiwan as having different class backgrounds. I also
delve into the different narratives that Chinese marriage migrants developed to forge a
sense of belonging in the face of dalumei stigma. Building on critical feminist
scholarship, I understand marriage migrants’ belonging as an interactive accomplishment
that involves negotiation with “controlling images” (Collins 2000, 76) built upon
constructed notions of gendered morality. “Controlling images” (Collins 2000, 76) or
“disciplining discourses” (Suzuki 2000, 432) serve to regulate a nation’s ethnic boundary
by defining the meaning of respectable womanhood. Writing from the U.S. Context,
Patricia Hill Collins (2000) argues that the “controlling images” of African-American
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women as “mammies, matriarchs, welfare recipients, and hot mommas” (p. 76) serves to
“transmit distinctive message about the proper links among female sexuality, desired
levels of fertility for working-class and middle-class Black women, and U.S. Black
women’s placement in social class and citizenship hierarchies” (p. 92). Very often,
“cultural practices and beliefs” work with “controlling images” developed on ideal
notions of female sexuality and respectable womanhood to form “criteria of belonging
within a national population and territory” (Ong 1996, 738) and construct the boundary
upon which inclusion and exclusion are negotiated.
I understand class as a form of inscription “that shapes bodies in the making of strata and
behavior” (Skeggs 2004, 12). Using an intersectional approach, Skeggs (2004) argues
that class “can never be made alone” but always intersects with other categories such as
gender and nationality. The process of inscription is an important element in
understanding belonging as it marks the value of particular bodies (p. 17) and its
legitimacy to belong to a nation (p. 19). In the same way as privilege and power are often
considered as ascribed rather than achieved (Bourdieu and Waquant 1992), Skeggs
argues that the working-class does not have to achieve “immorality” or “criminality” but
are often “positioned” with these values (p. 4). Similarly, in my research, the Chinese
marriage migrants who are perceived as working-class are positioned as the immoral
figure of dalumei while those perceived as middle-class are seen as “good immigrants.”
The positioning of such stigma is not fixed, as Chinese marriage migrants actively
narrate a sense of worth based upon their performance of unpaid gendered labor at home
and in the communities.
In what follows, I discuss the representation of mainland Chinese women in Taiwan and
my research methods, before showing the formation of moral hierarchy among Chinese
marriage migrants and the narratives that Chinse marriage migrants developed to
negotiate with the stereotypes that cast them as the immoral figure.
2 Cross-strait Marriage and Representation of Mainland
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Chinese Women in Taiwan
Chinese marriage migrant women have become the largest group of immigrants in
Taiwan since 1992, soon after the Taiwanese state ended the Martial Law in the late
1980s and resumed contact with China. Between 1992 and 2018, more than 322,000
Chinese marriage migrants have settled in Taiwan (National Immigration Agency ROC
2018). Understanding the perceived class differences among marriage migrant women
from China is important, as China’s rapid economic development has led to the
emergence of professionals and middle class (Wang and Davis 2010), which gradually
changed the demographics of marriage migrant women in Taiwan (Friedman 2016).
Scholars have observed that, while early cross-border marriages involved mostly unions
between elderly veterans that came to Taiwan following the Nationalist army in 1949 and
women from their home provinces in China (Lu 2012), in recent years, cross-strait
marriages have diversified, with Chinese women with university degrees marrying
Taiwanese husbands whom they met during their business trips and travels (Friedman
2015; Lu 2012).28 Although more educated, professional Chinese women are also
subjected to the discriminatory labor market after moving to Taiwan, some of them were
able to pursue comparable career trajectories in Taiwan due their educational
background, social networks, and professional ties in China (Friedman 2016).
In Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrants have been depicted by the media as dalumei since
the late 1980s, but the meaning of dalumei is not fixed. Chen (2015) acutely observes a
shift in the meaning of dalumei over the last three decades. In the late 1980s, dalumei
was used to imply a poor and pitiful young female victim trapped and forced into
prostitution by their traffickers. At the turn of the year 2000, however, as the number of
mainland Chinese women in Taiwan increased following the opening of marriage
28 While such scholarly discourse may reflect the demographic characteristics of Chinese marriage migrants and their husbands in Taiwan, as I discussed below, it does not necessarily reflect Chinese women’s own sense of migration experiences.
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migration between Taiwan and China, perceptions of dalumei changed to refer to all
mainland Chinese women as “mainland gold-diggers” who engage in “sham marriages”
in Taiwan. The discourse of dalumei then depicts Chinese women as “poor, greedy,
cunning, promiscuous, and uncivilized” (Chen 2015, 89). The Taiwanese state’s effort to
combat fake marriage in early 2000 by setting up marital interviews at the Taiwanese
border for Chinese marriage migrants has echoed the discourse of dalumei, further
reinforcing the image of Chinese women as an immoral figure. In a context where its
sovereignty is unrecognized by China and its international allies, scholars argue the
cultural production of marriage migrant women as dalumei is arguably a form of
resistance against China’s political assertion of power over its sovereignty (Friedman
2015; Shih 1998). Such resistance against China’s geopolitical domination, however, is
only applied to Chinese migrant laborer and marriage migration. As Tseng (2006) points
out, Taiwanese policy has gradually opened up to attract educated IT professionals from
China to boost economic competitiveness, showing how neoliberal logic has played a
more important role in shaping immigration policy than nationalist ideology.29
Since 2002, the Taiwanese government has officially advocated multiculturalism to
welcome immigrants. The adoption of a multicultural framework is evidenced in the
expansion of social rights such as easier access to the job market and public health
coverage. During my fieldwork, the Ministry of Interior has also organized large-scale
events, such as Immigration Day, Taipei City Multicultural Expo, and Asia-Pacific
Cultural Day, to welcome immigrants and celebrate the diversity of multicultural family
in Taiwan. At these events, NGOs that received the Development Funds for Immigrants
would set up game booths, where Chinese and Southeast Asian marriage migrants were
both volunteers and participants. As the Taiwanese state invests itself in the project of
29 The effort to recruit IT professionals from China contradicts early restrictions on the importation of migrant laborers from China, showing how geopolitical concern is only selectively placed on working-class Chinese immigrants, and that class has increasingly paid a more important role in shaping immigration policy (Tseng 2006).
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multiculturalism, it has adopted a more gender-neutral term dalu peiou (mainland
spouse) to describe Chinese marriage migrants. In the news, government officials
sometimes used a less derogatory term dalu xinniang (mainland bride) to describe
Chinese marriage migrants (Friedman 2015). Despite the adoption of these new terms,
the negative stigma against Chinese marriage migrants as dalumei continues to circulate
in everyday interactions. Chinese marriage migrants I met also described negotiating
with the discourse of dalumei in their everyday life.
3 Settings and Methods
The Chinese marriage migrants I met in Taiwan were in their mid-20s to mid-70s, and
their length of stay varied from one month to over 20 years. Chinese marriage migrants
in Taiwan came from a variety of locations in China. Some hailed from major cities like
Tianjin, Chongqing, and Shanghai while others originated from villages and cities in
more remote parts of China. Many Chinese women met their Taiwanese husbands at
work as they migrated from villages or inner cities to coastal areas for employment.
Some couples met through friend and family introductions, QQ,30 or commercial
matchmaking agencies; others met during their travels across China.
In everyday interactions, the perception of class was determined by three indicators:
(1) Chinese marriage migrants’ education,
(2) Chinese marriage migrants’ work experiences in China, and
(3) the background of Taiwanese husbands.
Chinese marriage migrants who were perceived as middle-class included Chinese women
with a university degree and professional work experience in China. Some of their
30 QQ is a popular online chatroom commonly used in China.
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husbands held professional, managerial-level job positions; others owned mid-scale
businesses (e.g., education center and factories). This group of Chinese marriage
migrants was often described by social workers, Taiwanese friends, and the Chinese
marriage migrant community as the “recent cohort” of Chinese marriage migrants and
was considered “good immigrants” (see Appendix A).
Chinese marriage migrants perceived as working-class include Chinese women who
married veterans, those without a university degree, and those married to Taiwanese
husbands with entry-level jobs or who owned petty businesses (e.g., low-end restaurants
and betel nut stores). This group of Chinese marriage migrants was described by social
workers, Taiwanese friends, and the Chinese marriage migrant community as the “past
cohort” of Chinese marriage migrants and was associated with the image of dalumei (see
Appendix B).
It is important to note that this class categorization is more perception rather than an
actual representation of Chinese marriage migrant class backgrounds. It oversimplifies
Chinese marriage migrants’ class backgrounds, as Chinese marriage migrants without
university education or professional work experiences who married husbands with
professional jobs or owned businesses are left out in this classification (see Appendix C).
It also assumes that Chinese marriage migrants’ class position is solely dependent on
their jobs in Taiwan or their Taiwanese husbands’ backgrounds, overlooking Chinese
marriage migrants’ material resources in China, which also contribute to their income.
For example, Cai Hong was considered working-class by other Chinese marriage
migrants because she married a veteran, but she was a respectable Chinese medicine
doctor in China and owns two houses in Beijing that give her monthly rent. The
categorization of poor, less educated Chinese women as marriage migrants “in the past”
and professional, more educated Chinse women as marriage migrants in the “recent
cohort” has also simplified Chinese marriage migrants’ own sense of migration
experience. Hui Lin, for example, had a university degree and used to work as a
marketing director in China, but considered herself as the first cohort of Chinese
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marriage migrants because she married her husband twenty years ago.
Chinese marriage migrants I met engaged in all kinds of employment before migrating to
Taiwan. Some left home at a young age to work in the cities as factory workers, service
workers (e.g., salesclerks, beauticians), and restaurant servers. Those who graduated
from high school and university worked in different professions, such as teaching,
marketing, accounting, merchandising, Chinese medicine, and real estate. Some used to
run family businesses, and others opened small businesses with their husbands in China
before moving to Taiwan. Chinese marriage migrants in their sixties and seventies used
to work in state-owned enterprises.
After moving to Taiwan, less privileged Chinese marriage migrants engaged in illegal
jobs (e.g., working in the market, breakfast stores, or as caregivers) to make ends meet
before the relaxation of their work rights in 2009. After obtaining their work rights,
middle-aged Chinese marriage migrants were employed as live-out domestic workers at
various health institutions. Upon garnering enough saving after years of hard work, some
Chinese marriage migrants opened small businesses, such as low-end restaurants and
salons. Chinese marriage migrants with extensive social networks in China became
insurance agents.
Chinese marriage migrants with a university degree and professional work experiences
described a sense of downward mobility after moving to Taiwan, as most employers did
not recognize their educational credentials and work experiences. Many had turned to
volunteer labor as a strategy to increase their social status while avoiding job
discrimination in the labor market.
This chapter draws on my fieldwork and 40 in-depth interviews with Chinese marriage
migrants in Taiwan. I conducted the interviews in Mandarin, at Chinese marriage
migrants’ homes or public areas, such as parks, coffee shops, or restaurants. Despite the
rise in nuclear families (Lan 2008), it was not uncommon to find three generation
cohabitations among immigrant families in Taiwan. More than half of my informants in
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Taiwan were living with their parents-in-law at the time of the interview and some
couples I met lived with all affinal members in a three-story building. Those who lived
apart from their in-laws would visit their in-laws regularly, at least once a week to help
with grocery shopping and house cleaning. In some families, the in-laws had passed
away before the couples were married. Chinese marriage migrants in Taiwan who
married elderly veterans did not have in-laws in Taiwan, as their husbands were low-
ranked soldiers who came to Taiwan alone. When coding the data, I focused on how
Chinese marriage migrants were perceived by others (e.g., social workers, Taiwanese
friends, and other Chinese marriage migrants), how they understood the discourse of
dalumei, how they narrated a sense of self-worth to negotiate their belonging in the
Taiwanese society.
4 Everyday Reproductions of Dalumei Discourse and
the Formation of “Good Immigrants”
Chinese marriage migrants I met in Taiwan were all familiar with the stereotype of
dalumei. Their first encounter with the term usually happened at the market, where they
learned that dalumei was used by locals to refer to “Guangdong lettuce.” Many felt
humiliated and degraded that dalumei—a term that described their country of origin—
were used to refer to vegetables. Hui Lin, the Chinese marriage migrant I introduced in
the opening vignette, told me how the term dalumei angered her:
I first heard of the term dalumei when I came to Taiwan in 1996. I was at the
market, and there was this vegetable, Guangdong lettuce, and they called it
dalumei. I didn’t know that, and I asked the store owner how much it was. He
asked me if I was asking about dalumei and pointed at the lettuce. I was so angry,
and I didn’t know how to respond. It’s like we are just as cheap as a bunch of
vegetables.
Despite its derogatory moral implications, the reproduction of dalumei discourse in
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everyday interaction was not always used to reproduce the negative image of Chinese
marriage migrants (Chen 2015; Friedman 2015). On many occasions, its circulation was
used to produce the category of “good immigrants.” For example, Hui Lin’s Taiwanese
friends often told me how much Hui Lin was different from the “typical dalumei” (yiban
de dalumei). One day after church service, Hui Lin’s church group leader told me that
immigrants like Hui Lin were the “good ones”:
There are many immigrants in Taiwan now, and Hui Lin is one of the good ones.
She’s very different from those women who came in the past. She is not like the
typical dalumei because she’s very well-educated and she used to have a good job
in a big company in China. She met her husband at work. When family problems
arise, she also tries to resolve them rather than running away.
According to Hui Lin’s group leader, “typical dalumei” referred to Chinese marriage
migrants who came to Taiwan “in the past,” who were poor, less educated Chinese
women; but Hui Lin, with her university education and work experience as a marketing
director in Tianjin, a metropolitan city in China, was considered as “different.” Here,
education and job status are class markers that distinguish Hui Lin from the Chinese
marriage migrants “in the past.” These class markers also evoked Chinese marriage
migrants’ position within the hierarchy of gendered morality, indexed by the ways of
meeting their husbands and their ability to maintain a harmonious family in times of
conflict. The formation of “good immigrants” relies on the relational positioning of an
immoral subject, the “typical dalumei,” which is positioned as Chinese marriage
migrants from working-class backgrounds.
Chinese women who married veterans falls under the category of “typical dalumei.”
Social workers at NGOs described their marriages as “abnormal,” or in a more
euphemized term, as “care marriage.” For example, a social worker at an NGO that
provides services to Chinese marriage migrants explained to me:
Cross-strait marriages are very different nowadays. In the past, it’s the poor
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women who married veterans. They engaged in care marriages (zhaogushi
hunyin). In recent years, cross-strait marriage has normalized (zhengchanghua),
[and is] very similar to the Taiwanese ones. Many Chinese spouses have a
university education, and they meet their husbands at work and fall in love before
getting married.
According to this social worker, Chinese marriage migrants who married veterans were
considered as marriage migrants “in the past.” They were believed to be exchanging care
for money, hence “abnormal” in the eyes of Taiwanese who believed in the modern ideal
of love marriage (Adrian 2003; Lan 2008). According to Bonnie Adrian (2003, 80),
romantic love was not associated with marriage until the 1960s and 1970s in Taiwan.
Before this period, marriage was more about family duties while love and individual
desires were experienced by men outside of marriage.31 The dichotomization of love and
pragmatism not only simplifies the complexity of marriage migrants’ desires (Choo
2013; Constable 2003; Lan 2008) but also forms a moral basis that defined immigrants’
belonging. This moral hierarchy that stratifies Chinese marriage migrants is a gendered,
classed, and nationality construct; with more educated Chinese women seen as moral
figures and as more deserving immigrants compared to their working-class counterparts.
The categorization of poor, less educated Chinese marriage migrants as those who came
to Taiwan “in the past,” and professional, more educated Chinese women who came to
Taiwan “in recent years” does not necessarily match with Chinese marriage migrants’
own sense of migration experience. Hui Lin, who was often classified by others as a
Chinese marriage migrant of the “recent” cohort, repeatedly told me that she was among
the “first wave” of Chinese women who came to Taiwan:
31 Lan’s (2008) study of Southeast Asian migrant women in Taiwan also argues that the love-based marriage is more of an ideal than the reality in contemporary Taiwanese society. However, immigration officers often used the ideal of love marriage to determine whether cross-border marriages between Southeast Asian marriage migrants and their Taiwanese husbands were “real” (Lan 2008, 846).
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I was among the very first wave of Chinese spouses who came to Taiwan. I came
here 20 years ago. At that time there were many Taiwanese people who ‘bought’
their wives (maihun) from China. Their marriages were fake, and people called
these women dalumei because they were young, and they were here for
prostitution. At that time, there were very few cross-strait marriages based on
love. I had to tell people that I fell in love with my husband so that they wouldn’t
misunderstand.
Hui Lin’s understanding reveals the conflation between marriage migrants and sex
workers under the dalumei discourse. Marriages arranged by commercial agencies were
considered by both Taiwanese and Chinese marriage migrants as a practice from “the
past” that was deemed illegitimate in contrast to the ideal of modern romantic love. The
misplacement of Hui Lin in the “recent cohort” of immigrants based on her educational
level shows how class markers intertwined with gendered morality in defining marriage
migrants’ belonging in Taiwan. By claiming her marriage as based on “love,” Hui Lin
mobilized the discourse of love to claim a space within the modern marriage ideology. In
doing so, Hui Lin also relegates the controlling image of dalumei to working-class
Chinese marriage migrants and perpetuates the moral hierarchy among Chinese marriage
migrants.
5 Negotiating with Dalumei Discourse and Becoming
“Good Immigrants”
The discourse of dalumei has become a discursive frame through which Taiwanese and
the Chinese marriage migrant community evaluate women’s migration experiences and
negotiate belonging in everyday life. This section shows how such moral hierarchy is
both reproduced and challenged in marriage migrants’ reflexive accounts of their
migration experiences as well as in their everyday interactions. In my analysis, I show
how Chinese marriage migrants drew upon morality attached to the performance of
multiple forms of gendered labor to negotiate with moral hierarchy and to assert their
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belonging in Taiwan.
5.1 Sacrificing Mother and Diligent Worker
Many Chinese women who married veterans had already had children from previous
marriages. They were believed to engage in fake marriages for money. In response to this
stereotype, they mobilized the morality attached to motherhood and paid work to
refashion themselves as moral subjects deserving respect.
Feng, the first Chinese marriage migrants I introduced in this chapter’s opening vignette,
had lived in Taiwan since 1995, through her marriage to Wang, her late husband, whom
she had met in her hometown in 1992. Then a 39-year-old widow, Feng struggled to feed
her daughters from her previous marriage. Born during the Mao era, Feng did not receive
much education as a teenager. While her peasant background was appreciated during
Mao’s revolution, her lack of education put her in a disadvantaged position after China’s
economic reform and after she migrated to Taiwan. Back in 1992, Feng was working in
construction site, earning only RMB 1 (USD 0.20) per day. When Wang revisited his
hometown for the first time after Taiwan resumed communication with China,32 Feng’s
friend introduced them, and they kept in touch by mail. Initially, Wang wanted to keep
Feng as a mistress so that he could have her company when he visited China. Feng
rejected the idea outright and insisted on marriage because she “didn’t want to be the
town’s laughing stock!” Wang later proposed, and Feng agreed, after much hesitation,
believing that Taiwan was a good place to work, which could help her support her
32 The Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese civil war to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Between 1949 and 1987, all communications between Taiwan and China were cut due to the contentious political relations between Taiwan and China. In 1987, Taiwan lifted many restrictions on the mainland, including travels, business investment, and family visits. Many veterans, who followed the Nationalist government to Taiwan alone, took advantage of this policy to visit their hometowns in China.
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daughters’ education in China. However, Feng was unable to work legally before gaining
residency status at that time.33 She then took up ad hoc service jobs illegally, serving
meals and washing dishes at various family-run breakfast stores and she eventually
started to work as a caregiver at a private elderly home and Taoyuan Veteran Hospital,
earning about TWD 20,000 (USD 669) per month. Just as Feng’s work started to gain
stability, Wang became very sick and Feng quit her work to take care of him, explaining:
“We came from the same place of origin, and he is the one who brought me here, we are
each other’s family, if I don’t take care of him, nobody will!” In 2005, Wang died of
kidney cancer, and Feng thought of going back to Hubei to stay with her daughters, but
eventually decided to stay in Taiwan because, as a veteran’s widower, she was eligible to
receive half of veteran retirement fund, about TWD 10,000 (USD 334) per month. Feng
continued to work at a veteran hospital and met Zhao, a veteran who also originated from
Hubei. Zhao liked that Feng was attentive and patient and that she spoke Hubei dialect.
He then requested that Feng take care of him outside of the hospital, instead of receiving
care organized by the Veterans Organization. Zhao was willing to pay Feng half of his
veteran retirement fund, about TWD10,000 (USD 334) per month, on condition that she
took him home. At first, Feng rejected the idea because she “did not want other people to
talk.” However, Zhao was persistent in his request and Feng later relented, because she
felt close to Zhao, who came from the same province. Later, Feng quit her job at the
caregiver center, and took care of Zhao at her home, “just like family.” Although Zhao
and Feng did not get married, Zhao gave Feng half of his retirement fund and let her use
the other half for daily expenses. Feng earned about half of what she had earned at her
job at the hospital.
Despite her financial sacrifices, quitting her job to take care of her husband and then after
taking care of Zhao, Feng was considered a dalumei by fellow Chinese marriage
migrants. Xiao Yan, a Chinese marriage migrant from Hubei, was embarrassed to
33 The Taiwan immigration policy restricted Chinese marriage migrants’ work rights until its amendment in 2009.
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introduce me to Feng: “You don’t need to interview her. I can tell you her story, it’s all
about money! Otherwise, who would marry a man who’s old and frail?” Xiao Yan’s
sentiments show that the controlling image of dalumei is not only externally imposed by
the Taiwanese society, but also works as a distancing mechanism within the Chinese
marriage migrant community. Because “good immigrants” were associated with class
markers such as educational credentials, which indexed an image of a love-based
marriage, Chinese marriage migrants like Feng were imagined as the immoral other,
hence less deserving members of the society.
Feng was aware of the social stigma in the Chinese marriage migrant community.
Although she thought of Xiao Yan as “young and smart” and more educated than herself,
she was assertive about her integrity:
I know what other people think of me. But there is nothing to be ashamed of—I
didn’t kill or rob, I work hard and sacrifice for my daughters!
She also referred to herself as a “hard worker,” doing the dirty jobs at the hospital that
“other Taiwanese people felt were disgusting.” Hoang (2016) argues that Vietnamese
migrant domestic workers in Taiwan often negotiate their motherhood by mobilizing the
narrative of self-sacrifice and endurance, which are at the core values of Vietnamese
womanhood. She argues that when negotiating with the stigma attached to their
migration, migrant women performed a gendered morality of sacrifice and endurance to
“regain their self-esteem and achieve a sense of empowerment” (p. 904). Similarly, by
narrating her self-sacrifice for her daughters, care labor, and work ethics, Feng reasserted
her moral superiority in a world where she was considered as immoral.
5.2 Hardworking Wife and Deferential Daughter-in-law
Chinese marriage migrants also drew upon the morality attached to the domestic labor
they performed at home to detach themselves from the stigma of dalumei. Li Hua, a 38-
year-old working-class Chinese marriage migrant from rural Shandong, met her husband,
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a Taiwanese man 12 years of her senior, through a mutual friend when she worked at a
construction company in Weihai city in Northern China. Following her husband, a tour
bus driver, Li Hua moved to Taiwan after their marriage in 1997. She was living in a
three-story building in Xin Dian with her husband, parents-in-law, two brothers-in-law
and their Taiwanese wives. Although her husband was also from a working-class
background, Li Hua’s background from rural China made her a morally suspect, assumed
to have married for “ulterior motives.” Li Hua told me that, whenever she came home
from grocery shopping, her mother-in-law would watch her interactions with neighbors,
fearing that she would make new friends and run away. Li Hua also recalled frustrating
interactions with her brother-in-law:
He always said to me, “You are so young, why did you marry to our family?
What things in our family are you after? I say you wouldn’t be able to stay here
for more than two years.” This made me really angry, but I told him, “Big
brother, time will tell. I’m not like the typical dalumei, I’m not aiming for your
money!”
To prove that she was not a lazy gold-digger, Li Hua responded by performing both
unpaid and paid gendered labor. Every day, Li Hua prepared three meals for eight family
members. In addition to everyday cleaning, bed-making, grocery shopping, and laundry,
she also prepared snacks for the two brothers-in-law when they invited friends over for
mahjong. Not only did she take up all the household chores, but she also did it the way
her mother-in-law deemed proper—clothes needed to be washed, folded, and put away
every day, the pointed end of chopsticks should go down (not up!) in the chopstick
basket, and slippers should be arranged facing the house entrance. Performing deference
to her mother-in-law required Li Hua to “enact her social locations” (Hanser 2008, 105)
within the family hierarchy, but it also allowed her to resist the dalumei image that her
Taiwanese family imposed on her, as Li Hua told me:
I remember I was washing dishes and my brother-in-law came to the kitchen and
said to me, “I didn’t know you well before, but over these years, I’ve seen the
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contribution you made to this family.” I said to him, “You said I wouldn’t be able
to stay for more than two years but see? I’ve stayed for seven years.”
5.3 Responsible Daughter-in-law and Selfless volunteer
Chinese marriage migrants I met described their difficulties finding decent jobs in
Taiwan because most employers did not recognize their educational credentials. Unlike
their working-class counterparts, who quickly jumped into the labor market to make ends
meet, Chinese marriage migrants who were more educated or whose husbands had a
decent, steady financial income often delayed their employment. They engaged
themselves in community work as they considered community organizations, such as
NGOs or religious groups, a site where they could learn about people and the job market
of Taiwan. This strategy allowed them to take care of their domestic duties while
familiarizing themselves with Taiwanese society and enlarging their social networks,
which eventually led some to find paid jobs.
Hui Lin, the 45-year-old middle-class Chinese marriage migrant I introduced in the
opening vignette, spent the beginning years of her marriage working in Tianjin, her
hometown, together with her husband, so that the couple could pursue their career
together. In 2010, Hui Lin’s husband lost his job, and the couple relocated to Taiwan and
moved in with her mother-in-law. By this time, the revision of the Taiwanese
immigration framework in 2009 enabled Hui Lin to work before gaining residency. Hui
Lin took advantage of this policy change and applied for jobs in marketing in Taiwan but
did not get any response. Hui Lin wanted to learn more about the work environment in
Taiwan and became a volunteer at Rainbow Mothers (Caihong Mama)34 at her son’s
primary school. Hui Lin recalled how her mother-in-law was upset at first:
34 Rainbow Mothers is a volunteer group under the Rainbow Family Organization, a nation-wide faith-based organization developed to promote life education in various kindergartens and primary schools in Taiwan.
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She said to me, “A woman should know her place. You should stay at home to
take care of the family.” But how can I find a job when all I do is stay at home
and cook?
To ease family tension, Hui Lin made sure she did all the housework before she went to
volunteer in the afternoon. Like Li Hua, Hui Lin also deferred to her mother-in-law’s
way of household labor (e.g., making breakfast before her mother-in-law wakes up and
doing laundry every day). At school, Hui Lin’s teaching skills impressed many teachers.
She was later invited by a Chinese teacher to teach Chinese calligraphy in the summer
with pay. As Hui Lin’ s responsibilities at school grew, she was no longer able to do
housework like before. Later, with her savings and some borrowed money RMB 200,000
(USD 31,264) from her parents, Hui Lin bought a new apartment and convinced her
husband to move. Unlike Li Hua, whose financial constraints did not allow her to seek
living arrangements that were independent of her in-laws, Hui Lin was able to
accommodate her new responsibility at school by seeking alternative living
arrangements. After taking the summer job, Hui Lin was constantly invited as a paid
guest teacher at school to teach Chinese arts to primary school students.
In addition to leading to potential paid job opportunities, unpaid community work, a form
of feminine virtue in the public sphere, also enabled Chinese marriage migrants from
more privileged backgrounds to substantiate their moral claims that they were selfless
and caring and in doing so, reinforced the moral hierarchy among Chinese marriage
migrants. As Hui Lin told me:
What’s good about volunteering is that, other people won’t treat you with
hostility, because you don’t get paid, it’s all about selfless contribution. My
Taiwanese friends see me differently, they often said, “Hui Lin, you are different
from other mainland Chinese brides (daluxinniang), the typical ones are very
instrumental (gongli), but you are not.”
Similar to previous studies where scholars found that volunteer labor enabled immigrants
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to combat various form of stigma, such as the idle socialite stigma of expat wives in
China (Wang 2013) and the Japanyuki stigma of Filipina marriage migrants in Japan
(Suzuki 2000; Faier 2009), the moral values attached to volunteer labor allowed Hui Lin
to narrate her belonging in Taiwan through the language of “selfless contribution,” which
earned her respect and acceptance in the local community. However, this narrative of
belonging is nonetheless built upon the continuous otherization of working-class Chinese
marriage migrants who were too poor to perform unpaid volunteer labor and sometimes
had to engage in multiple jobs to make ends meet.
Similar to Hui Lin, Xiao Hua, a 40-year-old Chinese marriage migrant who volunteered
for 12 years as Caihong Mama was also able to gain acceptance at school with her
volunteer work. The headmaster at her son’s primary school even invited her to be a
substitute teacher, not knowing about her immigration history and work restrictions at
that time. Xiao Hua recounted this story with pride:
I was so happy, but I couldn't accept the job because I couldn’t work, so I told the
headmaster, “I can’t work at your school because I’m from China. I haven’t got
my residency yet, so I can’t work. My education credential is not recognized here
in Taiwan, if you hire me you will get into trouble!” He was so shocked when he
heard that I’m from China, he said I was different from the typical dalumei and
thought that I was a local Taiwanese all this time!
Xiao Hua was considered as a “Taiwanese” not only because of her southern Mandarin
accent and the ability to present herself confidently in public but also because of her
involvement in volunteer labor that set her apart from the immoral figure of dalumei.
In the most extreme case, volunteer work has enabled educated Chinese marriage
migrants to rise to leadership positions within the marriage migrants’ community,
allowing them to gain status and recognition in the society at large. Fang Fang, a 45-
year-old Chinese marriage migrant from Shanxi, for example, became a leader in the
marriage migrant community through her volunteer work. Similar to Hui Lin and Xiao
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Hua, Fang Fang volunteered at her daughter’s school as a rainbow mother, through
which she honed her communication skills and public speech performance. After
volunteering for nine years, accumulating 300 volunteer hours in total, Fang Fang
learned about the activities offered by a local district office for new immigrants. After
attending several social integration programs, such as manicure class and computer class,
offered at the Nangang New Immigrant Hall, Fang Fang made friends with other
marriage migrants—including both mainland Chinese and Southeast Asians—as well as
local district officers, who were all impressed by her enthusiasm, determination, and
confidence interacting with strangers. Later in 2012, when the Neihu Local District
Office wanted to sponsor the first immigrant peer-support group in Taiwan, Fang Fang
was invited to be the leader of the group. The Neihu Local District Office provided the
space and Fang Fang, together with a few other members of the peer-support group,
organized weekly events for marriage migrants in the neighborhood. When the peer-
support group was first established, the former director of Taipei immigration office
visited them, and the group gained much publicity in the media. From then on, Fang
Fang became one of the representatives of marriage migrants in Taiwan and was invited
to give presentations at various government departments to help improve immigrants’
social services. Fang Fang’s leadership position was unpaid, but as a leader of the
immigrant group, she gained status and recognition. Fang Fang received an award from
the Department of Civic Affairs in Taipei city for her contribution to immigrants’
activities and was considered a “star” in the immigrant community. Recounting all the
years she spent doing volunteer work, Fang Fang said:
I’m very tired! (laugh) But I have learned a lot and grown a lot too! I’ve devoted
most of my time to community work; it’s unpaid but I’ve benefited in many other
ways. Besides becoming more and more confident and outspoken, I’ve also met
many resourceful people who were willing to help me and my daughter. For
example, my daughter is in a Chinese opera school, and just the other day,
someone connected me with a good instructor!
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Fang Fang’s reputation in the marriage migrant community was later converted into
material gains when she was recommended to host the radio broadcast Happy New
Residents, a government-sponsored project funded by the Development Funds for
Immigrants at National Education Radio together with a few other marriage migrant
women from Southeast Asia. Fang Fang’s recognition peaked when she, together with
the other five radio hosts, won the Best Education and Cultural Radio Hosts in the 50th
Golden Bell Award in 2015.35
Although the community offers a space for marginalized immigrant groups to negotiate
their belonging, it is also a field of status competition that is not immune from class
inequality (Espiritu 2003). Working-class Chinese marriage migrants, who were
disadvantaged in their educational backgrounds and had previous work experience
mostly in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, were less confident to present
themselves in public and had fewer chances of converting their unpaid labor into material
and status gains compared to their middle-class counterparts. Although jobs offered to
middle-class Chinese marriage migrants were temporary and part-time, they saw the
opportunities as a form of “acceptance” and “recognition” that they yearned for but were
often denied in Taiwan’s labor market.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that class intersects with gender and nationality in
producing Chinese marriage migrants’ divergent experiences of the stigma of dalumei
and I have illustrated the meaning-making processes through which Chinese marriage
migrants developed a sense of self-worth and belonging in Taiwan. I have argued that
while the discourse of dalumei renders all Chinese marriage migrants as morally
35 The Golden Bell Awards is an annual Taiwanese television production award organized by the Bureau of Audiovisual and Music Industry Development under the Ministry of Culture.
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suspicious gold-diggers, in everyday interactions, educated, professional Chinese
marriage migrants were considered by social workers, Taiwanese friends, and the
Chinese marriage migrant community as “good immigrants” who married out of love,
and were hence morally acceptable under the ideal of love-based marriage in Taiwan. I
have demonstrated that the everyday reproduction of dalumei discourse operates as a
figure of speech to produce the category of “good immigrants” and to construct a
gendered moral hierarchy among different groups of Chinese marriage migrants. The
relational positioning of the dalumei and good immigrants is further reinforced by
educated Chinese marriage migrants, who distinguished themselves from the typical
dalumei, thereby crossing the gendered and national boundary to ally with the
constructed notion of being Taiwanese.
In the face of the reproduction of dalumei discourse in everyday life, Chinese marriage
migrants negotiated their belonging by performing gendered virtue attached to multiple
roles as mothers, workers, wives, daughters-in-law, and volunteers. They narrated
themselves as a sacrificing, diligent, hardworking, deferential, responsible, and selfless
subjects. Both working-class and middle-class Chinese marriage migrants drew upon the
gendered morality attached to their unpaid gendered labor at home, yet they differed in
their public performances. Constrained by their financial needs, working-class Chinese
marriage migrants often jumped into the labor market—sometimes illegally—to make
ends meet. They narrated themselves as diligent workers who contributed to Taiwanese
society; yet, the fact that they were engaged in paid work soon after coming to Taiwan
reinforced the belief that they were dalumei. Contrastingly, Chinese women with more
privileged backgrounds tended to engage in community work to avoid facing the
discriminatory labor market. The morality of selfless contribution attached to unpaid
volunteer labor allowed middle-class Chinese women to, once again, distinguish
themselves from the figure of dalumei and gain moral acceptance in the various
communities, presenting themselves as moral subjects. Community work also allowed
them to enlarge their social networks and to gain recognition which, sometimes,
rewarded them with status and job opportunities. Unlike Southeast Asian marriage
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migrants who have organized themselves to subvert the stereotyped image (Hsia 2009),
Chinese marriage migrants I met did not challenge and disrupt the dalumei discourse on a
collective level. Instead, some mobilized the existing dalumei discourse and values to
distinguish themselves, others resisted the image on a personal level by drawing upon
moral discourse attached to their everyday gendered performance, and in doing so,
perpetuated the local moral order within Taiwanese society.
Situating my research with the critical feminist scholarship on marriage migration, I have
complicated the analysis to show how class intersects with gender and nationality in
shaping migrant women’s belonging. The dalumei discourse homogenized the multiple
social locations that Chinese marriage migrants occupied. Focusing on the everyday
operation and reproduction of dalumei discourse, I have illuminated how class
distinctions are simultaneously produced as local Taiwanese and immigrants demarcated
the “good immigrants” from the “bad” ones. If, like Shu-mei Shih (1998) argues, the
construction of dalumei discourse operates as a form of resistance against China’s claim
of Taiwanese sovereignty, then this study shows such resistance produces uneven effects
for Chinese marriage migrants perceived from different class locations. The divergent
experiences of belonging among Chinese marriage migrants again prompts the question
of “who can be part of us?” (Tseng 2006) in Taiwan, and to whom, among Chinese
marriage migrants, do geopolitical concerns apply.
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Chapter 4
“Aren’t we all Chinese?” Chinese Marriage Migrants’
Participation in Transnational Activities and Reterritorializing the
Hong Kong-China border
Fei Fei used to hate politics. Born in Guangdong, China, she grew up listening to
horrifying stories from her parents who were sent to the countryside at a young age
during the Cultural Revolution. It had never crossed her mind that one day, she would be
involved in any political campaign, especially after marrying and moving to Hong Kong,
a city that she believed would offer a better education for her children. However, as the
debate about Hong Kong’s political reform continued, things took a different turn.
WeCare, the NGO where Fei Fei volunteered, became involved in the Alliance for Peace
and Democracy—a pro-Beijing political alliance established to counter the Umbrella
Movement in Hong Kong and support the government version of universal suffrage.36 It
36 Currently, adult citizens in Hong Kong can vote directly to elect members of the Legislative and Urban Councils. The Chief Executive is elected by the Election Committee, which changes every five years and whose members are elected by different occupational sectors. As the Election Committee mostly comprises of members from the Beijing-leaning pro-establishment political groups, the election of Chief Executive in Hong Kong is often mocked as a “small circle election” that is pre-selected by the Beijing government instead of expressing the wishes of Hong Kong people (Haas 2017). Under the Basic Law, the mini-constitution of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Hong Kong citizens are promised gradual access to universal suffrage. On Aug 31, 2014, the National People’s Congress released the framework for electing Chief Executive (commonly known as the Aug 31 Framework) by universal suffrage. In 2015, the Hong Kong government proposed a universal suffrage framework for the election of Chief Executive in 2017. In this proposal, candidates need to be nominated and elected by 1200 nominating committee before going to public vote. Pan-democratic parties in Hong Kong rejected this government proposal on two main accounts. First, the 1200 nominating committee represents only 7% of registered voters in Hong Kong. Second, although the nominating committee consists of people from different occupational sectors, the distribution of seats is not proportional to the number of registered voters within a particular sector. For example, the fishing industry has only 154 registered
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was then political mobilization became one of Fei Fei’s responsibilities. One day, Fei Fei
stormed into my English class at WeCare waving a paper in her hand and asked, “Could
all of you sign this? It is to support the government’s 2017 universal suffrage bill!”
Without more explanation, she passed the paper around and instructed Chinese marriage
migrants in my class to sign.
Despite Fei Fei’s disinterest in politics, her political participation—or those of Chinese
marriage migrants at large— in activities organized by pro-establishment political camp
was seen by supporters of localism (buntou)— a political movement in Hong Kong that
emphasizes Hong Kong people’s identity and autonomy (Law 2013) — as Chinese
government’s strategy to dilute Hong Kong population, with the aim to manipulate
elections in Hong Kong and to maintain stability (weiwen) across the China-Hong Kong
borders after the Umbrella Movement. As such, Chinese marriage migrants’ political
participation has become the focal point of social debate in Hong Kong, triggering both
media and scholarly discussion (Standnews 2015; Yep 2016).
Building upon insights from the literature of migrant transnationalism that attends to the
subjective experience of transmigrants—immigrants who “develop multiple relations that
span borders” (Basch et al. 1994, 7)— and their engagement in transnational activities,
this chapter examines Chinese marriage migrants’ participation in transnational activities
and unwraps the meanings that they attach to their political participation amid heightened
political tension between Hong Kong and China. This chapter asks, how do Chinese
marriage migrants understand their engagement in transnational political participation?
How do Chinese marriage migrants narrate a sense of belonging at a historical moment
voters but occupies 60 seats in the committee; meanwhile, the educational sector has 80,000 registered voters but holds only 30 seats in the committee. Also, more than half of the seats in the political sector are allocated to pro-Beijing politicians. Pan-democrats proposed alternative frameworks; some suggested revising the composition of the nominating committee, others called for the public nomination of candidates.
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with rising anti-China sentiments?
Echoing the literature on migrant transnationalism that shows transmigrants used
participation in transnational political activities as a form of resistance against their
discrimination in the immigrant-receiving country, this chapter argues that transnational
political activities have provided a space for Chinese marriage migrants to articulate their
belonging to both Hong Kong and to China at a historical moment where Chinese
marriage migrants are socially denied as Hong Kongers and where their mainland
background is heavily stigmatized. However, unlike previous studies that show
transmigrants have gained status through their engagement in transnational political
activities (Andrews 2014; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005), Chinese marriage
migrants in this study did not rise to the role of political leadership. At a historical
moment of heightened discontent against China’s rule, Chinese marriage migrants’
transnational political participation are considered by localist groups as a threat to the
liberal value of Hong Kong. As Chinese marriage migrants mobilized different ethos of
belonging to resist their discrimination and to claim their sense of self-worth, they also
reinforced the wider moral landscape in Hong Kong that produces their marginalization
in the first place.
1 Transnational Activities, Reterritorializing Nation-
state, and Transmigrant Subjectivities
Scholarship on migrant transnationalism has challenged earlier migration scholarship for
narrowly focusing on the integration of immigrants in host societies (Basch et al. 1994;
Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Instead of abandoning everything in the home country once
they set foot in migrant destinations as described by earlier literature on migration,
transmigrants often maintain multiple relationships across borders. Besides maintaining
family ties, personal networks, and business relations, transmigrants also participate in
transnational political projects organized by immigrant-sending states as well as various
voluntary organizations.
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Through organizing transnational political activities and mobilizing transmigrants’
participation, immigrant-sending states expand their political, social, and economic
borders as part of the nation-building process (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Itzigsohn 2000).
Such mobilization often varies according to immigrant-sending states’ political relations
with the immigrant-receiving states, the characteristics of the migration flow, the profile
of the diaspora, and the ways in which immigrant-sending states position overseas
nationals/citizens in national struggles (Landolt et al. 1999; Margheritis 2011; Portes et
al. 2007; Thunø 2002; Zhou and Lee 2013). Mexican and Chinese governments, for
example, were reluctant to support the development of immigrant organizations in the
U.S. until the 1990s when they realized overseas nationals had sent significant amount of
remittance to the homelands and could be an important source of national economic and
political development (Portes et al. 2007; Thunø 2002, Zhou and Lee 2013). In China,
market reform has transformed the state’s political relations with the U.S. and how the
state perceives overseas Chinese. Once seen as potential spies and traitors during the
Cold War era, overseas Chinese are now considered by the Chinese state as the engine of
economic and national development (Thunø 2002; Zhou and Lee 2013). Since the 1990s,
the Chinese state has adopted proactive policies and measures to develop transnational
ties with overseas Chinese by sponsoring various immigrant organizations to facilitate
remittances, promote business investment, and philanthropic and civic activities across
the borders (Portes and Zhou 2012; Thunø 2002; Zhou and Lee 2013). Partnered with the
immigrant-sending states, immigrant organizations play a significant role in organizing
transnational activities while simultaneously incorporating them into the host societies
(Basch et al. 1994). For example, Vincentians and Grenadians voluntary organizations in
New York have organized cultural, political, and social activities to connect immigrants
to the nation-building projects of St. Vincent and Grenada while at the same time helping
them to integrate into the U.S. society (Basch et al. 1994).
The organization of transnational political participation contributes to the
reterritorialization of the nation-state but also helps reconfigure transmigrants’ identities
(Basch et al. 1994). In many postcolonial immigrant-sending contexts, the pursuit of
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decolonialization and independence movements often produce a series of nation-building
projects that involve reconstruction of race, class, and culture, which could
simultaneously “reject and reinscribe the global meanings of race developed during
European conquest and colonialism” (Basch et al. 1994, 38). For example, political
leaders in St. Vincent and Grenada, Caribbean countries that obtained independence after
more than three centuries of European colonialism, produced another hegemonic racial
construct based on historical and cultural commonalities to forge an image of the
homogenous and autonomous nation as they rejected the racial and class construct from
the colonial era. Such nation-building projects reconfigured self-identification of
transmigrants from St. Vincent and Grenada in the U.S., who started to see themselves as
nationalists with a sense of national pride to counter the discrimination they experienced
in the U.S. (Basch et al. 1994). Thus, participation in transnational political events helps
transmigrants reimagine a nation-state beyond borders and works as a form of resistance
against discrimination in the host societies (Basch et al. 1994).
In addition to the identity dimension of transnational political activities, migrant
transnational literature that focuses on transmigrants’ subjective experience also shows
how transnational political activities have allowed transmigrants to counter their status
loss in the immigrant-receiving countries by advancing their status and class positions in
the sending-countries (Basch et al. 1994). For example, to avoid being assimilated into
the marginal underclass in the U.S., some Mexican immigrant women have returned to
Mexico, where they took up political leadership roles and sought state development
funds to sustain themselves and to support their husbands who had become breadwinners
in the U.S. (Andrews 2014). Similarly, immigrant men from Latin America and the
Caribbean who experienced downward mobility in the U.S. joined political organizations
in their homelands as a strategy to counter their status loss (Itzigsohn and Giorguli-
Saucedo 2005). In sum, migrant transnationalism literature has shown different ways in
which transnational political activities are beneficial to transmigrants— status
enhancement, class position maintenance, or a form of resistance against discrimination.
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Building on the literature on migrant transnationalism, in this chapter, I understand the
social and political activities that Chinese marriage migrant participated in as
transnational activities, as they are organized to facilitate economic exchange as well as
to harmonize political relations across the Hong Kong and China border. However,
unlike most of the American literature on migrant transnationalism that focuses on
postcolonial immigrant-sending contexts that have undergone the process of
decolonialization and political independence, Hong Kong as a postcolonial city was
returned to China, a country that is often portrayed as the opposite of its ethos of
belonging in the local context (Newendorp 2008). After the political handover, as the
Chinese state reterritorializes the Hong Kong-China border through instilling national
pride and Chinese identity, many Hong Kong people feel an encroachment of the
Chinese state’s power and diminishing political freedom, leading to growing discontent
against its rule. Under a historical moment of heightened anti-China sentiments in Hong
Kong, Chinese marriage migrants’ participation in the Chinese state’s nation-building
projects are considered by the localist groups as a threat to Hong Kong’s liberal values.
By examining Chinese marriage migrants’ participation in transnational activities as well
as the meanings they attached to their participation, I show how, despite the
discriminatory discourses against Chinese immigrants’ political participation perpetuated
by the localist groups, Chinese marriage migrants made use of the space offered by
transnational political activities to develop a sense of belonging to both Hong Kong and
to China. These narratives, however, also reproduce the wider political and moral
ideologies organized by the Hong Kong city-state and the Chinese state.
2 The Political and Moral Landscapes of Chinese
Marriage Migrants’ Transnational Participation
It may sound strange to describe “cross-border activities” between Hong Kong and China
as “transnational,” given Hong Kong’s political reunification with China in 1997.
However, unlike the unification of East and West Germany, where two states merged
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into one political and economic system, or other post-colonial states in the Caribbean that
obtained political independence after long history of colonialism, Hong Kong’s legal and
political framework, “one country, two systems,” continue to reinforce the political and
economic differences with China while submerging its political autonomy under the
“One China” national framework (Newendorp 2008).
Compared to residents in China, however, Hong Kong people do have access to civil
rights, such as freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, with a guarantee that
these rights will remain unchanged for 50 years after reunification under the Basic Law.
As Newendorp (2008: 21) points out, such rights not only distinguish Hong Kong
people’s daily life from their mainland counterparts, but also shape a “rights-based
imaginary” political difference apart from China and informs the “ethos of belonging”—
how one should act, think, and behave in relation to the state and the people around
them—in Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong people were promised gradual access to
universal suffrage after the political handover in 1997, a series of government proposals
have triggered an intensification of democracy movements. These include the proposals
to legislate National Security Law (Article 23) in 2003—an anti-subversion law to
constrain political rights— and to legislate National Education in Hong Kong in 2012.
For many Hong Kong people, these government proposals symbolize an encroachment of
Beijing’s political power and a loss of political freedom in Hong Kong.
Mass mobilization of various social movements, such as the annual July 1 pro-
democracy march, Occupy Central, and anti-national education student movement, has
created momentum for the Umbrella Movement in 2014, garnering supporters of pan-
democratic parties to pressure the Chinese government to grant open nominations for the
election of Chief Executive. Meanwhile, supporters of pro-establishment or pro-Beijing
political camps also started counter-movements. One notable movement is the “Alliance
for Peace and Democracy,” a campaign organized by Robert Chow, a pro-Beijing
journalist and media personality, to gather petition from the so-called “silent majority” to
speak up against the Umbrella Movement (Wong 2014). In October 2014, angry scuffles
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broke out between two political camps in different occupied areas, as anti-Umbrella-
Movement groups dismantled barricades and violently disrupted students’ protest. After
about two-and-a-half-months of sit-in, the police cleared the main protest site, bringing
an end to the Umbrella Movement.
Some student protestors turned to localism after the failure of Umbrella Movement in
bringing changes to the electoral system, believing that a more radical approach to
preserving Hong Kong’s identity is needed; some even call for Hong Kong’s
independence. Although Hong Kong localism is historically rooted in the 1970s, then
expressed in a sense of cultural superiority over Chinese, and it prevailed through
movements of heritage preservation during the 2000s, it was only recently that localism
became the foundation of mobilization for electoral politics, with seven localist political
parties established between 2010 and 2016 (Kwong 2016). Key localist publications also
fueled the rise of localism, calling for Hong Kong to become an autonomous city-state
(Chin 2011) and highlighting Hong Konger as a different ethnic group from mainland
Chinese (Undergrad Editorial Board 2015). The rise of such anti-China sentiments has
shifted the stigma against Chinese from “backward” and “uncivilized” in need of help in
the 1970s to “locusts”— harmful predators that act as a group to suck up nutrients of its
host37—in recent years. As Chinese tourists took advantage of the relaxed immigration
restrictions to travel to Hong Kong for daily and luxury goods consumption, Hong Kong
people expressed this renewed anti-China sentiments through online media—such as
37 “Locust” is a racial slur developed by localist supporters in 2011 to refer to mainland Chinese who had taken opportunities of their tourist visa to give birth in Hong Kong hospitals so that their children could be residents of Hong Kong (The Wall Street Journal 2012). In 2011, more than 35000 babies were born in Hong Kong whose parents were not Hong Kong permanent residents (Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau 2018). The term was later expanded to refer to all mainland Chinese, including tourists who came to Hong Kong.
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making the song Locust World38— as well as through organizing a series of “anti-locust”
protests, demanding mainland tourists to “go back to China” (Lam 2015).
In 2015, a year after the Umbrella Movement, the Hong Kong government proposed a
new electoral system, which expanded the nominating committee base from 800 to 1200
members, with the public vote only at the final stage of the election. The proposal was
rejected by Umbrella Movement leaders and pan-democrats, believing that the mere
increase in the number of committee member would not change the electoral system, as
the committee still has the power to screen out candidates at early stages of the election
process (South China Morning Post 2015). The continuous influence of Umbrella
Movement student leaders, as well as the popularization of localism, triggered pro-
establishment groups, such as the “Alliance for Peace and Democracy,” to organize a
nine-day petition to support the government’s version of electoral reform. WeCare, the
NGO where I did my fieldwork, had mobilized Chinese marriage migrants to volunteer at
the campaigns.
At a historical moment of rising anti-China sentiments amid Chinese state’s effort to
reterritorialize the Hong Kong-China border, Chinese marriage migrants’ participation in
transnational activities, especially those organized by pro-establishment groups,39 have
become the focal point of heated debate. Chinese marriage migrants were considered the
target recipients of Se Chai Beng Jung, a local colloquium referring to the provision of
free meals and food in exchange for political allegiance. In light of Chinese
38 The song Locust World was first published on HKGolden forum by localist supporters, which later went viral and become an internet phenomenon (Iloathelilyallen 2012). 39 In Hong Kong, Chinese marriage migrants also engaged in political activities organized by pro-democracy camps. At least one grassroots Chinese marriage migrant group participated in the Umbrella Movement. Their participation was also reported on the news (Apple Daily 2014).
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government’s recent social management efforts40—a coping mechanism for the Chinese
state to manage heightened social tensions in an era of growing inequality and
unprecedented “mass incidents” (qunti shijian) in China (Fewsmith 2012; Lee and Zhang
2013)— localist supporters in Hong Kong developed the “dilution discourse,” claiming
that Chinese immigrants are political tools of the Chinese government (Standnews 2015),
whose immigration and political participation are ways to drain Hong Kongers’ and
Hong Kong’s liberal values. Scholars have critiqued such “dilution discourse,” arguing
that it is based on the unfound assumption that immigrants will blindly support China’s
authoritarian values and pro-establishment political campaigns (Yep 2016). Within this
political context, Chinese marriage migrants’ participation in transnational activities is
heavily stigmatized. In what follows, after discussing the setting and methods of my
research, I describe the transnational activities that Chinese marriage migrants
40 The concept of social management (shehui guanli) involves a three-level management of social unrest, including “building a more “service-oriented” government to “prevent and reduce” the number of social problems; strengthening of “dynamic management” to “resolve the masses’ legitimate and rational appeals;” and strengthening the party-state’s ability to manage the sudden outbreak of public protests (Fewsmith, 2012, 2). In China, social management has become a coping mechanism for the Chinese state to manage heightened social tensions in an era of growing inequality and unprecedented “mass incidents” (qunti shijian)— a government term for collective actions (Fewsmith 2012), contributing to the “micro-foundation” of Chinese authoritarianism (Lee and Zhang 2013). Three mechanisms built such “micro-foundations”: buying stability, bureaucratic absorption, and revamping patron-clientelism (Lee and Zhang 2013). In an era of rising political unrest, protesters and officials in charge of stability maintenance both benefited materially from Chinese government’s stability work— the former received cash and petty employment from the latter in exchange for compliance, and the latter advanced their careers through meeting social stability targets. When bargaining fails, low-ranked officials would incorporate aggrieved citizens into its bureaucratic procedures, buying time through an arbitrary deployment of institutional processes such as litigation and meditation. To identify potential social unrest, grassroots officials also develop patron-clientelist relations with not only Chinese Communist Party members and civil servants to obtain information about complaints and potential protests, but also to cultivate relationships with the elderly through the provision of neighborhood activities, such as dance classes, enticing them to act as liaison between grassroots authority and the wider community (Lee and Zhang 2013).
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participated in and the diverse meanings that Chinese marriage migrants attached to their
participation.
3 Settings and Methods
While doing field work at WeCare, I was invited by Chinese marriage migrants who
were core volunteers to participate in transnational activities. After finishing teaching my
English class, I continued to participate in various activities organized by WeCare.
Established in 2010 by a Hong Kong business tycoon, WeCare has emerged as one of the
biggest NGOs in Hong Kong providing social service to Chinese immigrants, with five
offices locating in different districts in Hong Kong. My field site was the office located
in the eastern district, a neighborhood with Chinese marriage migrants from different
class backgrounds. Besides Hong Kong, WeCare also has its mainland chapters in
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Quanzhou. Although WeCare is registered as an NGO,
Leung Chun-Ying, the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and Zhang Xiaoming, the
former Director of Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong,
serving as its Honorary Patrons. WeCare received Hong Kong government funding to
offer social integration programs at various stage of migration, with the mainland
chapters organizing pre-departure training programs and the Hong Kong offices
providing social integration programs— including Cantonese class, computer class, and
employment seminars—for immigrants from China, including Chinese marriage
migrants and their families. In addition, WeCare also received sponsorship from Chinese
government officials—in the form of personal donations—to organize social and
economic exchange programs for Chinese immigrants in Hong Kong, such as those
discussed in this chapter. I participated in most of the transnational activities discussed in
this chapter, except for signing the petition and helping at booths to mobilize support the
Hong Kong government’s universal suffrage bill.
To understand the diverse meanings of Chinese marriage migrants’ political
participation, I supplement my ethnographic data with 19 in-depth interviews with
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Chinese marriage migrants in Hong Kong who participated in transnational activities
organized by WeCare. These interviews ranged from one to two hours and I conducted
them in Mandarin or Cantonese, depending on the preference of my informants. I
conducted the interviews at my informants’ homes, or in various public spaces, such as
parks, restaurants, and cafes. All names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. Among my
informants, eight came from a middle-class background, and 11 came from a working-
class background. They came from different parts of China. Some hailed from major
cities such as Guangdong and Shanghai; others came from rural towns in Sichuan and
Henan. Most of them went through a series of internal migration, mostly for work, before
marrying and moving to Hong Kong. Many Chinese women met their Hong Kong
husbands at work; others were introduced through family and friends. Before moving to
Hong Kong, the Chinese women I met engaged in diverse forms of employment, ranging
from factory worker and boutique salesgirl to merchandizer and postal worker. At the
time of the interview, some of them have in Hong Kong for as long as 20 years while
others had only lived in Hong Kong for ten months. After coming to Hong Kong,
however, most of them engaged in flexible employment: those from middle-class
backgrounds capitalized on their networks in China and worked as insurance agents;
others set up online retail businesses on WeChat and Taobao, selling cosmetics, clothing,
jewelry from Hong Kong to China. Working-class Chinese marriage migrants, on the
other hand, entered the service industry in Hong Kong as live-out domestic helpers, hotel
janitors, and salesgirls.
The theme of transnationalism developed from the open coding I did when I was working
on Chapter 2. Later I did more focused coding on the types of transnational activities that
WeCare organized, as well as on Chinese marriage migrants’ development of a sense of
belonging in Hong Kong through their political participation.
4 Chinese Marriage Migrants’ Participation in
Transnational Activities
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Besides organizing activities that help Chinese immigrants integrate into Hong Kong
society as discussed in Chapter 2, WeCare also organized transnational activities that
aimed to maintain a harmonious relationship between Hong Kong and China, or, to
reterritorialize the Hong Kong-China border, after the Umbrella Movement. Some of
these activities were organized with other WeCare branches in China, such as exchange
trips to China to instill national pride. Others were organized in association with pro-
establishment political campaigns in Hong Kong. Activities included organizing the
Harmony Carnival to construct the discourse of “harmonious Hong Kong society” after
the Umbrella Movement and mobilizing support for pro-establishment political leaders.
Many Chinese marriage migrants are aware of WeCare’s close affinity with the Chinese
government. As one Chinese marriage migrant told me on my first day at WeCare, “this
place is taken care of by the Chinese government,” referring to the financial support
received by WeCare from the Chinese officials through personal donations.
In what follows, I describe different types of transnational activities organized by
WeCare to i) instill Chinese national pride; ii) construct the discourse of “Harmonious
Hong Kong Society”; and iii) maintain the power of pro-establishment political leaders.
Through these activities, WeCare contributes to the reterritorializing processes that
advance the rule of the Chinese government. However, such reterritorializing process is
often incomplete. While some Chinese marriage migrants were well aware of the
political impact of their participation, most of them used the space for socializing
purposes.
4.1 Unanswered Call to Instill National Pride
WeCare organized exchange trips to different cities in China from time to time to
facilitate participants’ national pride through enhancing their knowledge of China’s
recent economic achievements. Social workers described these trips as “members’
welfare,” as most expenses of the trip, including transport, meals, and accommodations,
were sponsored by WeCare. These trips, together with other resources given to new
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immigrants, such as discounts at a specific supermarket, are considered by pan-
democrats as a trade-off for political allegiance. Within WeCare, Chinese marriage
migrants from both working class and middle-class backgrounds welcomed these trips as
they saw them as benefits that would otherwise be unavailable to them. For Chinese
marriage migrants that were active volunteers at WeCare, these trips were perceived as a
reward for their hard work. As Hua, an active member at WeCare, told me, “We’ve
contributed to the organization in so many ways, they should give us something nice in
return.”
In summer 2015, I went on a two-day trip to Guangzhou, a city in China close to Hong
Kong. The trip was one of the six Hong Kong-Guangzhou trips to facilitates exchange
between China and Hong Kong that brought about 250 participants to China. Initially
intended for “teenagers” in Hong Kong, the trip was designed to bring members of Hong
Kong’s younger generation to China to understand its recent economic development and
to enhance their sense of national belonging to China. It was envisioned as an initiative to
“retain the heart of Hong Kong teenagers” after the Umbrella Movement, as social
workers told me. However, since most of the members at WeCare were Chinese marriage
migrants and their children were too young to understand what was going on, most
participants in this trip were Chinese marriage migrants, with a few bringing their
husbands and children.
Despite the mismatch of participants, an introduction to China’s economic
transformation filled our trip. As our tour bus traveled from Shenzhen to Guangzhou, the
tour guide, who worked for the Guangzhou WeCare branch, talked about the
transformation of Shenzhen from a piece of bare land to a metropolitan city. Pointing to a
piece of land 15 minutes away from Shenzhen Bay, the tour guide said:
This used to be bare land but look at it now, it’s so developed, thanks to the
newly launched “Framework Agreement on Hong Kong-Guangdong
Cooperation.” This is the second phase; the other one is the third phase. In the
future, this would serve as a place to give Hong Kong service, logistic, and
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financial support. The second phase is now in its reclamation stage, and the third
project will last until 2020! As we all know, our honorable Deng Xiaoping
opened the China market in the late 1970s. Shenzhen then transformed into a
special economic zone…Shenzhen is attracting a lot of investment, and a lot of
the investment was from Hong Kong. Do you know the drone company DJI? It’s
established by a Hong Kong young graduate from Polytechnic University in
Hong Kong. He’s only 28 years old, and he opened this company in Shenzhen,
which has a market value of 9 billion!
Despite his enthusiasm and energetic pitch, most Chines marriage migrants were resting
on the bus. Some were texting their family members to make sure their children were
okay; others were chatting or watching videos on their smartphones. Fei Fei, the Chinese
marriage migrant I mentioned in the opening vignette, was sitting next to me. As the bus
departed Shenzhen Bay, she expressed her relief of leaving home for the first time in ten
years, “I’ve spent all my time with the children. I’m so happy that I got to join this trip
without my children because I feel so much more relaxed.” Yet, Fei Fei’s mind was all
about her children. In the next hour or so, all Fei Fei talked about was her children,
wondering if they had eaten their meals, done their homework, and taken their naps.
When she received signals on her phone, she called her children; when not calling, she
was looking at the pictures of her children and barely paid attention to the tour guide.
The two-day trip included visits to the headquarter of a pharmaceutical company, an
elderly home complex, a primary school for children with disabilities, and a business
investment seminar at WeCare’s branch in Guangzhou. Besides showcasing China’s
economic growth and its social initiatives, the trip was also meant to encourage business
investment in China. Greeting us as, Gaai Fong, a Cantonese colloquial term that refers
to people living in the same neighborhood, the social worker at WeCare Guangzhou
encouraged Chinese marriage migrants to invest their money in China:
I called you all Gaai Fong because Guangzhou and Hong Kong share a lot of
similarities! I know most of you were originally from China. This is good because
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that means you all have your networks in China. Now that you are in Hong Kong,
you are in an excellent position. Because you can act as a bridge to bring back
things in Hong Kong that have not yet been picked up by people in China. Now
China has opened-up. Compared to the past, Hong Kong has lost its competitive
edge. The more open China becomes the less competitive Hong Kong will be.
However, Hong Kong still has some advantages, like its international connection
and its exposure to information. But remember, your market is always in China,
not Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s not big enough a market to make you successful.
You should all act as a bridge and bring business to China.
In the next hour or so, the social worker invited an entrepreneur consultant to talk about
the trend of online start-up businesses and encouraged Chinese marriage migrants to set
up their businesses in China. Fei Fei was not impressed, “How can we manage a business
when we are so busy taking care of our kids?” The efforts to reterritorialize Hong Kong-
China border were not successful, as it did not address Chinese marriage migrants’
gendered needs of childcare.
At the end of the talk—and every activity of the trip— social workers pulled out a large
banner that read “A Model Project that Enhances Cross-border Exchanges among Hong
Kong and Mainland Teenagers, Explores Business Opportunities in Mainland”
(xianggang qingnian yu neidi qingnian jiaoliu beishang fazhan shifan xiangmu) for a
group photo. A reporter from Wen Wei Po—a pro-Beijing news agency based in Hong
Kong—who had been following us throughout the trip then interviewed select
participants about their experience and their perceptions of China’s economic
development. The day after our trip, WenWei Pao published an article, titled “Hong
Kong teenagers went on an exchange trip to Guangzhou, looking for opportunities and
collaborations.” The news featured interviews with one young-looking Chinese marriage
migrant who talked about how she was impressed by China’s economic development,
how she believed that both China and Hong Kong should further their collaboration to
achieve economic prosperity, and how she hoped to have more exchange opportunities
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like this one. Chinese marriage migrants featured in the news thus became the face of the
“Hong Kong teenager” to reproduce a discourse of harmonious relations across the Hong
Kong-China border.
4.2 Constructing a Discourse of “Harmonious Hong Kong
Society”
In addition to activities that facilitated social exchange, Chinese marriage migrants also
participated in social events organized by WeCare to construct a discourse of
“harmonious Hong Kong society” to reinstate the “culture of depoliticization” (Lam
2004, 221)—a discourse developed by the British colonial government— in Hong Kong
after the Umbrella Movement. Pro-establishment politicians used the discourse of
“violence” to describe the Umbrella Movement (Chan 2014) and adopted the discourse
of “love,” “care,” and “harmony” when organizing community activities to support the
government’s action against the students’ movement. For example, on its fifth
anniversary, WeCare organized a large scale “Harmony Carnival” at Tamar Park41 with
the theme of “Love with Care,” inviting key government officials, such as the former
Chief Executive, the Deputy Chair of Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government
in the Hong Kong SAR government, and the former Chair of Labor and Welfare
Department, to speak at the event.
In July, I was invited to participate in “Harmony Carnival,” together with a hundred of
Chinese marriage migrants and their families. Ah Hong, a Chinese marriage migrant
from Guangdong, was an active member at WeCare and was asked to be one of the group
leaders of this trip. She called me —and other participants in her group— the night
before to remind us about the event and asked us to bring an umbrella “to prevent
41 Tamar Park is a public park adjacent to the Central Government Complex and the Legislative Council Complex in Admiralty in Hong Kong. It is also one of the locations that student activists occupied during the Umbrella Movement.
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sunstrokes” but cautioned us not to bring a yellow one to avoid association with the
Wong Saam Gwan, or the “Yellow Shirt,” as Ah Hong called it, referring to the student
activists in the Umbrella Movement.42 On the day of the event, WeCare social workers
and participants shared a tour bus to go from the WeCare center to Admiralty. On the
bus, Ah Hong moved back and forth, giving each of us a name tag, a bus number, and a
blue jacket—the color symbolizing government supporters during the Umbrella
Movement.
When we were walking to the event site, Ah Hong saw a Chinese marriage migrant
wearing a yellow T-shirt and holding a yellow umbrella. She turned to her and yelled,
“Don’t you know that we were not allowed to bring a yellow umbrella? Now you even
dressed in yellow!” “Yea, what’s wrong with that?” “Just put on the blue jacket and don’t
use the umbrella; otherwise people will think that you are one of those Wong Saam
Gwan! Didn’t your group leader tell you on the phone?” “No, I didn’t get any phone
call.” “Everybody received the call. You are not supposed to bring a yellow umbrella!”
At Tamar, where the Hong Kong government’s building is located, WeCare set up a
stage surrounded by game booths designed by different local branches of WeCare and
other pro-establishment social service agencies. Instant photo booths were also set up,
with a frame that read “Celebrating Hong Kong’s Harmony.” Chinese marriage migrants
as well as ethnic minorities—WeCare’s primary service target— filled the space, most of
them were in their forties; some brought their kids and husbands, others came alone.
Near the harbor front was a large stage with a big screen, where two hosts ran the
program, with singers and dancers backstage waiting for their turn to perform. All seats
were reserved for government officials, who did not come until 4 p.m.
42As student protestors used the yellow umbrella to shield tear gas attacks by the police, “yellow umbrella” and the color “yellow” have become the symbol of Umbrella Movement and its supporters; in opposition to the color “blue” which is used to symbolize the police force and hence the Hong Kong government.
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Around noon, the heat at Tamar became unbearable, and many participants escaped the
sun by standing in the shade away from the stage. Some Chinese marriage migrants
started to get impatient and wanted to leave. “No! You can’t leave yet!” Ah Hong, our
group leader, said as she was changing a diaper for her son at WeCare’s game booth. Her
husband, a grey-haired retired civil servant in his sixties, went to redeem free ice-cream
for them. “We were instructed not to leave until the major event!” Ah Hong explained.
The “major event” Ah Hong referred to was a performance that involved using our
bodies to form the letter “H” to break the Guinness World Record. But some Chinese
marriage migrants no longer wanted to stay. One of them complained, “I have no idea
why I’m here. Actually, what’s today for?” She then told us she was invited to the event
by her neighbor who told her today was a “one-day tour at Admiralty for fun!” Ah Hong
then enticed her with some tickets to redeem free snacks and convinced her to stay
longer. After waiting for another hour, the crowd slowly entered a designated area for the
Guinness Record breaking event. Each of us was given a tag earlier that showed where
we were supposed to stand. By 4:30 p.m., we were instructed to put on the blue jacket
and to form the letter “H,” juxtaposing a banner with a big heart and a letter “K.” Then,
we were asked to look at a drone camera hovering above us for six minutes. A Chinese
marriage migrant next to me complained, “Okay, this is why they want us here. We’ve
been here for two hours, just for six minutes!”
The next day, pro-Beijing newspaper agencies, Wen Wei Pao, published an article with
the title, “Thousands of Hong Kong-loving people breaking Guinness World Record
together by forming a letter!” The article focused on how the Hong Kong government
was trying hard to create a “harmonious” society after the political turmoil, citing the
carnival as an example of how the Hong Kong government was working with non-profit
organizations like WeCare to help new immigrants, low-income groups, and ethnic
minorities in Hong Kong. The article also quoted the Chairman of WeCare, a business
tycoon who was also a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference, who pointed out that “too much effort was wasted on
political issues” and encouraged “Hong Kong people to shift their focus and resources to
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develop the economy and to care about disadvantaged group to cultivate a harmonious
society.”
Such discourse echoes with “the culture of depoliticization” (Lam 2004, 221) developed
by the British colonial government, which made Hong Kong people to believe that “they
took no interests in politics” while casting Hong Kong as a “stable, secure, and law-
abiding” place (Lam 2004, 221) that could easily be undermined by any political
insurgency (Goodstadt 2005; Newendorp 2008). While Hong Kong people had
consistently challenged “the culture of depoliticization” in different social movements
(Lam 2004), the discourse had been consistently adopted by politicians—including
WeCare—to discourage the political participation of Hong Kong people to maintain the
hegemonic power of status quo.
4.3 Maintaining the Power of Pro-Establishment Political
Leaders
Besides participating in social activities that formed the material basis for the discourse
of “harmonious Hong Kong society,” Chinese marriage migrants were also politically
mobilized by pro-establishment political parties through WeCare. WeCare was one of the
organizations that worked with Robert Chow’s “Alliance for Peace and Democracy”
(The Alliance), a pro-Beijing political alliance established to counter the Occupy Central
movement and to support different Hong Kong government’s initiatives. When the
government proposed the electoral reform after the failure of the Umbrella Movement,
the Alliance organized a nine-day petition to garner public support for the bill. To a
certain extent, any activities held at WeCare could be a potential site for mobilization. As
described in the opening vignette, my English class was sometimes used as a space for
mobilization. A few days after of Fei Fei’s intervention in my class, the Alliance
announced in the news that they had gathered a total of 1.2 million signatures to support
the Hong Kong government’s universal suffrage bill and urged the pro-democratic
legislative council members to adhere to the voice of the public (Li 2015).
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After the defeat of government’s universal suffrage bill at the legislative council,43
WeCare organized a debriefing seminar “Social and Political Focus Group” to appease
its supporters and to mobilize them for future political campaigns. WeCare invited Mr.
Lau, a district council member to talk about the failure of the pro-establishment
legislators to uphold the vote for electoral reform. Dressed in smart casual short sleeve
shirt and light brown pants, Lau explained the recent walk-out of the pro-establishment
political leaders at the legislature meeting, hence failing to vote in supportive of the
Beijing-backed electoral reform. While condemning the democratic party for not voting
for the reform, Lau also called the pro-establishment camp “stupid,” saying what they did
was “a mistake that one shouldn’t make.” He said, “I had spent the last 20 months
lobbying public support for the reform, see, I got so tanned from standing outside of the
legislative council, and they walked out of the room and didn’t vote!”
Ah Hong—our group leader at the Carnival—and her husband, who were both active
members at WeCare, shared Lau’s sentiment and said that they were very disappointed
with the pro-establishment camp. To appease their emotions, Lau said, “Unlike the
democrats, who are used to walking out and are familiar with the flow, it’s the first time
that we walked out of the chamber! Not that I’m giving them an excuse, they really need
to reflect on their mistakes, but it’s true that they weren’t prepared and poorly
communicated.” Lau encouraged the audience to continuously support the pro-
establishment group and asked them to show their support for the next district election in
November. Besides a few attentive audience members, such as Ah Hong and her
husband, however, Lau’s speech mostly fell on deaf ears as most Chinese marriage
migrants were looking at their phones rather than paying attention.
43 On the day that voting for electoral reform took place, 31 pro-establishment lawmakers walked out of the legislative chamber just seconds before the vote, claiming that they wanted to “wait for Uncle Fat” to vote in unity. However, they failed to garner enough council members to stall the voting procedure, and the bill was denied with only eight supporting votes.
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5 Chinese Marriage Migrants’ Narratives of their
Political Participation
Working closely with the Chinese government, WeCare organized activities to
reterritorialize the Hong Kong-China border, mobilizing Chinese marriage migrants and
their families as participants. However, as I mentioned above, such reterritorializing
efforts were often incomplete, as most Chinese marriage migrants used such space for
socializing purposes instead of adhering to its political agenda. In this section, I further
delve into the diverse meanings that Chinese marriage migrants attached to their
participation in transnational activities, particularly in the political activities organized by
WeCare.
Despite their different class backgrounds, their childcare responsibility and unemployed
status produced a similar condition for them to participate in WeCare’s political
activities. While the popular “dilution discourse” (Standnews 2015) often treats Chinese
immigrants as political puppets of the Chinese government, Chinese marriage migrants’
own narratives contain multiple layers of expectation and imagination about how to
integrate into the Hong Kong society. Some Chinese marriage migrants understand their
political participation as a form of community work or as an opportunity to rebuild Hong
Kong while others took it as a process to reconstruct their identities as Hong Konger or
as Chinese. Their narratives are informed by multiple moral discourses of Hong Kong
civility, to be contributive, to be fair, to be law-abiding (Lam 2004; Newendorp 2008),
perpetuated by the Hong Kong city-state as well as Chinese state’s national ideology. By
drawing upon these discourses, Chinese marriage migrants resist the anti-immigrant
discourse developed by the localist movement while simultaneously reinforcing the
wider moral landscape of Hong Kong and Chinese nationalism.
5.1 Developing a Sense of Belonging to Hong Kong through
Community Work
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Contrary to the popular belief that Chinese marriage migrants are used as a political tool
by the Chinese government to “dilute Hong Kong’s values” or to “stabilize China-Hong
Kong relations” (Standnews 2015), many Chinese marriage migrants understood their
participation as volunteer work through which they gained confidence, which allowed
them to contribute to Hong Kong society. It was a way for them to gain a sense of
belonging in Hong Kong.
Hailed from Guangzhou, Ah Shan, a 46-year-old working-class Chinese marriage
migrant, spoke Cantonese, but her mother-in-law asked her not to interact with strangers
so that neighbors would not know her mainland Chinese identity. Ah Shan used to be
very talkative before her migration, but now she felt ashamed of her background. She
used to hide her “two-way permit” (temporary spousal visa) fearing that people would
know about her mainland background and think that she came to Hong Kong to
“compete for welfare,” an anti-mainland Chinese discourse that had gained popularity in
recent years with the rise of localist movement amid anti-China politics in Hong Kong
(Sautman and Yan 2015). The family lived off Ah Shan husband’s retirement fund,
which gave them about HKD 10000 (USD 1270) per month. Even though they were
quite happy with what they had, Ah Shan learned that a job was still important. However,
with only a high school diploma, Ah Shan found getting a job difficult. With no job and
no friends, Ah Shan felt isolated, until she joined WeCare. Ah Shan learned about
WeCare through a local supermarket, where she saw a notice that gave her a discount for
being a member. After she registered as a member, Ah Shan was invited to volunteer to
care for the elderly; later, as she became a core member, she was invited to participate in
the signature drive to support Robert Chow’s campaign for the Hong Kong government’s
universal suffrage bill.
Ah Shan enjoyed helping others, including vulnerable groups such as the elderly, but also
social workers at WeCare, whose transnational activities relied on the participation of
Chinese marriage migrants. When Ah Shan talked about her political participation, she
often conflated her experiences with other volunteer work, such as visiting elderly homes
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and doing membership drives. However, such conflation is not a coincidence. At
WeCare, social workers often described participating in political activities as “volunteer
work.” They also mobilized Chinese marriage migrants during other voluntary occasions
such as visiting the elderly.
Ah Shan was very grateful to be able to participate in various activities at WeCare. Not
only had she made more friends and learned how to speak with confidence, but she felt
like now she had “become part of Hong Kong society.” Ah Shan felt that she had
enjoyed much of Hong Kong’s welfare, such as the public housing that she lived in, and
she wanted to be a “useful person in the society”:
I like being part of a group, and I think helping at WeCare is my contribution to
the Hong Kong society. When I came to Hong Kong from China, I brought here
nothing, yet I have a place to live, a park to visit. I am using Hong Kong’s
resources. Although I don’t have a job, I am still contributing to the society
because I’m helping other people. That makes me feel like I’m more entitled to
the resources that I’m using. If other people questioned that, I could tell them that
I contributed to Hong Kong loud and proud!
The narrative of “contributing to Hong Kong society” echoes with the Hong Kong
government’s independent market narrative described in Chapter 2—a normative
narrative of belonging that emphasizes employment and productive labor as the key for
belonging in Hong Kong society. Since Ah Shan had difficulty getting a job in Hong
Kong, she defined her “contribution” not in terms of paid productive labor, but through
being active in the community. By drawing upon the independent market narrative to
describe her political participation, Ah Shan develops a sense of belonging in Hong Kong
while at the same time resists the anti-immigrant discourse that stigmatized Chinese
marriage migrants as “lazy” and excludes them from becoming “Hong Kongers”
(Sautman and Yan 2015).
5.2 Fighting for Peace
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Unlike Ah Shan, whose narratives were informed by the independent market narrative,
other Chinese marriage migrants drew upon pro-establishment politicians’ visions of
Hong Kong in their discussion of political participation. They talked about their
engagement in politically active terms, through the language of bringing back “peace”
and “harmony” to Hong Kong after the Umbrella Movement.
Before joining WeCare, Yun, a 40-year-old working-class Chinese marriage migrant
from Sichuan, had volunteered at a neighborhood women’s organization, where most
social workers were pro-democrats, or in Yun’s words, “belonged to the yellow-ribbon
camp.” Like Ah Shan and May, Yun wanted to do some volunteer work because she was
unemployed at the time and wanted to meet more friends in her neighborhood. Yun first
helped at a children’s art class, but later, as her communication skills improved, she was
involved in more outreach work, such as organizing membership drives. At the height of
the Umbrella Movement, Yun witnessed a disagreement between a pro-establishment
passer-by and social workers of the women’s organization:
The social workers there were yellow-ribbon supporters. They wore yellow-
ribbon pins and even brought yellow tents to the membership recruitment booth.
Once, there was a middle-aged man who came to argue with them; he’s on the
government side. The social workers didn’t agree with the man, and they started
to point fingers and move their fists…I don’t think social workers should act like
this, but they acted like the violent ones on the news.
Yun’s understanding of the Umbrella Movement supporters as “violent” was informed
by her personal experience but was also shaped by the popularization of the discourse on
violence adopted by the pro-establishment groups as they criticized the Umbrella
Movement (Chan 2014). In actuality, violent encounters, such as the Fishball Riots—a
violent clash between the police and localist groups—also contributed to Yun’s fear. Her
personal experience, news about the violent outbreaks, as well as pro-establishment
politicians’ adoption of the discourse of peace and anti-violence to evoke an image of
Hong Kong as an orderly and lawful city—a legacy of colonial government to
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distinguish Hong Kong’s stability and superiority in contrast to China (Lam 2004)—all
informed Yun’s understanding of the political situation.
However, Yun’s fear of “violence” was further complicated by her anxiety that
volunteering for the pro-democratic camp would jeopardize her immigration status and
her future visits to China:
I was really scared. When I witnessed the fight, the first thing that came to my
mind was, what would happen to my immigration status if the media captured the
fight and the Chinese government officials found out that I’m volunteering at a
pro-democratic women’s organization? Would they prohibit my entrance to
mainland China? Just like what they did to some democrats?
Yun’s fear points to the salience of the state in controlling the movement of people
across borders, especially in the case of China where dissidents are often not allowed to
enter or leave its territories. Frightened, Yun later turned to WeCare, participating in all
sorts of volunteer activities. Believing that the “yellow ribbon group” was “violent,” Yun
frequently sent messages of support on WeCare’s Wechat group, instructing other
volunteers to calm down when they faced confrontation from the opposite camp, “we
need to stay calm because we are fighting for peace!”
5.3 Becoming a Hong Konger
While some Chinese marriage migrants understood their political activities as a form of
community work and a political opportunity to rebuild Hong Kong, others took it as an
opportunity to learn about the political culture of Hong Kong, which is part and parcel of
their journey of becoming a Hong Konger.
May is a 33-year-old middle-class Chinese marriage migrant from Guangdong. After
graduating university, May worked as a merchandiser in Shenzhen, where she met her
husband who, after graduating from a Canadian university, opened a business in
Guangdong. The couple dated for two years, tied the knot, and moved to Hong Kong
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when May got pregnant, believing that Hong Kong was a better place for their children’s
education. May’s daughter was born prematurely and suffered from many medical
complications. To take care of her daughter, May stayed at home full-time and hired a
domestic helper. After her daughter went to kindergarten, May joined WeCare, because
she wanted to make friends and learn more about Hong Kong. Following social workers
at WeCare, May visited the elderly in the neighborhood twice a month. Later, as May
became an active volunteer, she was recruited to help with political activities, including
the petition for Robert Chow’s campaign. May volunteered at the campaign because she
had never experienced it in China:
This is all new to me. I have not experienced this kind of campaign in China, so I
wanted to see what’s going on. I wanted to have the experience. I’m a Hong
Konger now so I should know what’s happening, right?
May understood her participation as gaining knowledge about local political culture in
Hong Kong, which is part of the process of “becoming a Hong Konger.” However, this
does not mean that she conformed to the political view of the campaign. Unlike Ah Shan,
who did not talk about the political dimension of her participation, May was adamant that
she did not support the government’s universal suffrage bill even though she had
participated:
I know the universal suffrage bill was not a true democracy. The government said
it was, but the Hong Kong government nowadays is just a puppet of Beijing. I
volunteered because I was curious about what’s going on.
Contrary to the “dilution discourse” or the “stability discourse” that treats Chinese
immigrants as “tools” of Chinese government political agenda (Standnews 2015), May’s
case shows that participating in the pro-establishment campaign does not necessarily
mean conforming to the political agenda.
In the end, May helped at the petition booth only for four hours and quit after learning
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that all the volunteers could receive remuneration of HKD 50 (USD 6) per hour. May
explained to me that “volunteer work should come from the heart” and believed that such
payment was a form of “bribery.” The remuneration WeCare paid to volunteers to
achieve its political goal reminded May of the unfair treatment she experienced in China
when she was a little girl:
It happened a long time ago, but I can still remember it today. I was in primary
school, and our teacher came to our classroom and asked a student to stand up.
She said, “Chan Xiao Fang, please stand up, I want to know who you are!” I was
surprised because that classmate was not particularly bright. It was not until later
that I learned the student’s father was the secretary of our local government. I
can’t believe that my teacher did that. Our teacher was supposed to teach us
integrity, but that teacher was teaching us to treat privileged people better!
Throughout my childhood, I’ve encountered unfair treatment like this, so I’m
disappointed with China’s system. When I came to Hong Kong, I thought Hong
Kong was different. But it seems to me that Hong Kong’s getting more and more
like China these days!
May’s case shows that Chinese marriage migrants’ political participation is often
complicated by their status as an immigrant as well as their expectations of the host
society. In explaining her withdrawal, May pointed out her expectations of Hong Kong
as being “fairer” compared to a “corrupt” China, a discourse developed during the
colonial era to distinguish Hong Kong’s moral superiority over China (Newendorp
2008). By drawing upon such discourse, May simultaneously reinforced an ethos of
belonging constructed by the British colonial government and Hong Kong people that
highlights Hong Kong’s moral superiority over China through principles of
accountability, fairness, and justice (Lam 2004; Newendorp 2008). The withdrawal from
“corrupt” campaign practice also allowed May to construct a Hong Kong identity that
conforms to the ethos of belonging described by the colonial discourse.
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5.4 Reaffirming Chinese Identity
Some Chinese marriage migrants drew upon the Chinese state’s national ideology that
highlights national unity and homogeneity when talking about their political
participation. For them, participating in political activities organized by WeCare allowed
them to reaffirm their Chinese identity to resist identifying with Hong Kongers.
Ah Hong, a 46-year-old working class Chinese marriage migrant from Guangxi, actively
involved in WeCare’s social and political activities. After dating her husband for a year,
the couple got married and Ah Hong moved to Hong Kong in 2003 to stay with her
husband while waiting for her Hong Kong residency. For five years, she could not go to
work due to immigration restrictions. She read the news every day and learned about the
political debates in Hong Kong and was disappointed that Hong Kong people were
increasingly identifying themselves as “Hong Kongers” more than “Chinese” (Standnews
2017).
After joining WeCare, Ah Hong became particularly vocal in supporting the
government’s electoral reform. She volunteered for Robert Chow’s petition campaign for
the entire week. She also brought other Chinese marriage migrant friends to stand outside
the legislative council to support the government’s policy address:
I wanted to support it because it’s a way to stabilize Hong Kong’s society. Aren’t
we all Chinese? Why do we keep fighting ourselves? Mainland China is our
family. The Hong Kong government should support the Chinese government.
In addition to the pro-establishment politicians’ discourse of maintaining stability, Ah
Hong also drew upon the national ideology that unifies all people in Hong Kong as
Chinese to describe her political participation. By adhering to the Chinese state’s national
ideology and reaffirming her Chinese identity, Ah Hong orients her national belonging
towards China.
At a historical moment where localists defined Hong Konger as an ethnic group that is
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separate from Chinese, Ah Hong’s narrative of national belonging could arguably be a
form of resistance and a challenge to her exclusion. As Ah Hong talked about her
political participation, she recalled a first-hand experience in a shopping mall where she
was asked by a stranger to “go back to China”:
I was bringing my two-year-old son to use the washroom in a shopping mall. He
was just two years old, and he couldn’t go to the men’s room by himself, so I
brought him to the lady’s room. But this woman stopped me and yelled, “this is
the lady’s room!” and then said, “go back to China!” I was so angry! Everybody
is from somewhere else. Maybe she’s born in Hong Kong, but her parents or
grandparents were from China too! Hong Kong is part of China and I don’t
understand why people treat us like this. Those “Yellow Shirts” were aweful, and
they shouldn’t do things like this.
Conflating the stranger with participants in the Umbrella Movement, Ah Hong felt that
Umbrella Movement was to blame for the rise of anti-mainland sentiments in Hong
Kong. By identifying herself as Chinese—instead of Hong Konger—Ah Hong resists the
definition of Hong Kongers as a separate ethnic group from Chinese and reimagines a
reterritorialized Chinese nation-state of which Hong Kong is a part. As Ah Hong
challenges the localist definition, however, Ah Hong also perpetuates the Chinese state’s
nationalist ideology.
6 Conclusion
At a historical moment when Hong Kong’s localism is on the rise and discontent towards
the Chinese state continues to grow, Chinese marriage migrants across different class
backgrounds are mobilized to participate in transnational activities organized by
immigration organizations that have a close tie with the Chinese state. These activities
include trips to China to instill national pride, social events that construct a discourse of
“harmonious Hong Kong society,” and political campaigns that mobilize support for pro-
establishment political parties in Hong Kong. Despite their different class backgrounds,
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Chinese marriage migrants shared a marginal position in the labor market and the
gendered responsibility of childcare. These shaped their unemployed status, which
allowed them to participate in transnational political activities in the first place.
Unlike studies conducted among Mexican and Latin American transmigrants, where both
men and women gained status as they took up leadership positions in transnational
political activities (Andrews 2014; Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo 2005), Chinese
marriage migrants in this study did not rise to the role of political leadership. At a
historical moment of contentious relations across the China-Hong Kong border, Chinese
marriage migrants’ transnational political participation is considered by localist groups as
threatening to the liberal values of “Hong Kong,” adding to their already marginalized
position in Hong Kong society. Against multiple discriminatory discourses, the
transnational political activities offered a space that enabled Chinese marriage migrants
to articulate their belonging to both Hong Kong and to China. These spaces also allowed
them to enjoy one-off benefits, such as free trips to China and socializing opportunities
with other Chinese marriage migrants and social workers.
While the popular “dilution discourse” often treats Chinese immigrants as political
puppets of the Chinese state (Standnews 2015), Chinese marriage migrants’ own
narratives contain multiple layers of expectations of how to live as respectable citizens in
Hong Kong. Some redefined their political participation as a form of community work;
some saw it as a chance to restore peace and harmony in Hong Kong after the Umbrella
Movement; others took it as a process to reconstruct their identities as “Hong Konger” or
to reaffirm themselves as “Chinese” amidst the localist movement. Their diverse
narratives are shaped by the various ethos of belonging in Hong Kong. Some are
advocated by the Hong Kong government, such as the independent market narrative, the
colonial discourse that prioritizes economic stability over political advocacy. Others are
informed Chinese state’s national ideology which homogenizes all Hong Kong’s people
as Chinese. By drawing upon these discourses, Chinese marriage migrants resist the anti-
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immigrant discourse developed by the localist movement while simultaneously
reinforcing the broader moral landscape of Hong Kong and Chinese nationalism.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
This dissertation has examined the regulation and negotiation of Chinese marriage
migrants’ belonging in Hong Kong and Taiwan. As Chinese women married across the
two contested borders, their lived experiences are situated within the frontiers of intimate
family lives but also historically grounded political struggles and renewed local
discontent against China’s political encroachment. The struggles of belonging faced by
Chinese marriage migrants illuminates the norms, values, and ideologies upheld by
citizens and the states of Hong Kong and Taiwan. As they yearn to integrate into the
Hong Kong and Taiwanese societies, some Chinese marriage migrants mobilized
hegemonic discourses of belonging to make meanings of their everyday lives, others
contested their exclusion by redefining their identities and in the process, producing new
layers of inequalities against less-privileged Chinese marriage migrants.
Both Hong Kong and Taiwanese states have organized the narratives of Chinese
marriage migrants belonging within institutionally grounded gendered norms. In Hong
Kong, the market logic adopted by the British colonial government continues to shape
how the Hong Kong SAR government understands immigration, how it organizes
immigrant integration programs, and how it defines Chinese marriage migrants’
belonging today. Chinese marriage migrants’ immigration to Hong Kong was described
by the state as a solution to resolve the productivity crisis against the backdrop of low
fertility. At the service encounter, such market logic was translated into a market
independent narrative, positioning Chinese marriage migrants within the labor market
and defined their belonging with their productivity without carefully considering their
childcare responsibilities. As described in Chapter 2, social workers called upon Chinese
marriage migrants to enter the labor market to be “independent” and “self-reliant”
citizens of Hong Kong. For working-class Chinese marriage migrants, this was narrated
through the normative ideology of self-reliance to prevent them from potentially
applying for social assistance. For middle-class Chinese marriage migrants whose
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credentials were not recognized in Hong Kong and who experienced downward social
mobility, social workers encouraged them to swallow their pride and to enter the labor
market without addressing the structural barriers that had constrained their job options.
Outside the integration program, the market independent narrative was adopted by some
Chinese marriage migrants to make sense of their participation in community work,
albeit with a slight twist. As discussed in Chapter 4, for those who were unable to find
employment in Hong Kong, unpaid community volunteer work was understood as their
contribution to Hong Kong society. At a political moment of unrealized democracy
dreams, deteriorating freedom, eroding welfare, and skyrocketing property prices in
Hong Kong, Chinese immigrants had become scapegoats for all sorts of frustrations
against Hong Kong and China’s governance. The adoption of the market independent
narrative by Chinese marriage migrants is arguably a form of discursive resistance to the
anti-immigrant discourse that excludes their belonging on the basis of their being
“locusts” who devour local resources.
In addition to the market independent narrative, Chinese marriage migrants also drew on
the ethos of belonging in Hong Kong in a time of rising anti-immigrant sentiments. As
discussed in Chapter 4, Chinese marriage migrants from both working-class and middle-
class backgrounds participated in transnational activities organized by WeCare, such as
trips to China to instill national pride, carnivals to construct a discourse of “harmonious
Hong Kong society,” as well as political campaigns and seminars to stabilize the power
of pro-establishment political groups. While their political participation could be seen as
a sign of successful integration under the liberal value of Hong Kong, at a time of rising
anti-China sentiments, Chinese marriage migrants’ political participation in fact
marginalized them further, as they were considered by many locals as puppets of the
Chinese government that was intervening in the political affairs of Hong Kong. In light
of various discourses of exclusion, some Chinese marriage migrants mobilized the
culture of depoliticization discourse, a discourse constructed by the colonial government,
to rationalize their political participation to “restore peace” after the Umbrella
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Movement. Others understood their participation as a way to reconstruct their identities
as Hong Kongers or as Chinese. In doing so, Chinese marriage migrants reaffirmed their
sense of belonging on the one hand, meanwhile reproducing the wider moral landscapes
of Hong Kong on the other.
In Taiwan, Chinese marriage migrants were understood by the state primarily as a
solution to resolve the purported “national security crisis” of low fertility. The framing of
low fertility as a “national security” issue is arguably a result of Taiwan’s political status
as an unrecognized nation in the international polity, despite its history of nation-
building. As Taiwanese women went on what has been called a “womb-strike” (Lan
2008, 842), immigration officers turned their focus to marriage migrants, both from
China and Southeast Asia, whom they encouraged to give birth to children to “save
Taiwan’s future.” Such mobilization presented a sharp contrast to other state actors, who
had discouraged marriage migrants from childbearing out of the fear that they would
produce lower the “quality” of Taiwanese citizens, and by extension the Taiwanese
nation (Lan 2008). Despite the dissonance and contradiction of the state’s narratives,
reproductive labor continued to be an element through which the state organized the
belonging of marriage migrants. As discussed in Chapter 2, such familial logic was
translated into a deferential familial narrative in various integration programs. Based on
the assumption that marriage migrants married their husbands for economic reasons, in
the Family Program, Chinese marriage migrants were seen through nationality-based
stereotypes as “forceful” women who needed to learn to be “loving” and “caring” and to
defer to their husbands and mothers-in-law. At employment seminars, Chinese marriage
migrants’ paid labor was described as secondary to, or an extension of, their familial
responsibility as mothers.
When facing the stigma of dalumei that cast them as immoral others in Taiwan, Chinese
marriage migrants’ performance of deference or other gendered morality associated with
their familial duties allowed them to restore a sense of self-worth and to earn respect
from their family members, especially from their mothers-in-law. However, the stigma of
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dalumei is “stickier” for Chinese marriage migrants perceived as being from working-
class backgrounds. As discussed in Chapter 3, class markers, such as educational
background and professional job experience, attributes of middle-class Chinese marriage
migrants, were translated into love-based marriages, which are an ideal in Taiwanese
society. In everyday interactions, middle-class Chinese marriage migrants were seen as
“good immigrants’ who were different from dalumei, who were considered lazy, money-
oriented, and promiscuous. In a context where the Taiwanese state used multiculturalism
as a strategy for nation-building, with programs that welcome immigrants and encourage
immigrant integration, the discourse of dalumei did not fade away but rather was
reworked to form the category of “good immigrants” in everyday interactions while
imposing the stigma on the body of working-class Chinese marriage migrants. As they
searched for moral acceptance, middle-class Chinese marriage migrants also
distinguished themselves from dalumei, thereby crossing the gendered and national
boundary to ally themselves with a constructed notion of Taiwanese.
Similar to Hong Kong, where participation in community volunteer work had allowed
Chinese marriage migrants to develop a sense of belonging, in Taiwan, community work
enabled Chinese marriage migrants, especially middle-class ones, to become and to be
seen as a selfless subject. Unlike working-class Chinese marriage migrants who jumped
into the labor market after migrating to Taiwan, middle-class Chinese marriage migrants
I met often took up community work to familiarize themselves with Taiwanese people
and Taiwanese culture. Because community work is unpaid, the attached morality of
selfless contribution allowed middle-class Chinese women to distinguish themselves
from the figure of dalumei and to present themselves as a moral figure, which, in some
cases, rewarded them with status and job opportunities.
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1 Differentiated Immigrant Belonging at Geopolitically
Contentious Times
The three chapters in this dissertation show how immigrants’ belonging is a regulated but
also a contested process. In the era of global migration, the state remains an important
institution in defining what it means to belong to a given political territory. In everyday
interaction, the project of exclusion is enacted by various actors, such as social workers,
employers, or family members. Chinese marriage migrants made claims of belonging by
drawing upon the competing ethos of belonging as well as the moral meanings attached
to their gendered labor. The Chinese marriage migrants I met shared gender and
nationality but were differentiated by class. By attending to how class interacts with
gender and nationality in producing differentiated regulatory practices and multiple
narratives of belonging, this dissertation illustrated the complexity of immigrant
belonging in an era of global migration amidst geopolitical tension.
In contemporary Hong Kong, the othering of Chinese marriage migrants represents a
continuity of the historical marginalization of Chinese illegal immigrants in Hong Kong.
Although neither the British colonial government or the Hong Kong SAR government
have proclaimed Hong Kong as a nation, the adoption of liberal definition of “self-
reliance” or “independence” to paint the image of ideal citizens who are always
productive, disembodied, and “enterprising” (Ku and Pun 2004, 7), has produced a sense
of “Hong Kong superiority” over Chinese. Localist groups developed in recent years
have partly taken up such ideology in developing the grassroots nation-building project
of “Hong Kong independence” that exclude Chinese immigrants, labeling them as locusts
who came to Hong Kong to drain public resources. In 2014, when the Equal
Opportunities Commission initiated a public consultation to revise its policies on ethnic
discrimination to include discrimination against nationality and residency statuses, Hong
Kong localist groups vehemently condemned such revisions, fearing that they would
further erode the freedom of speech and that any criticism against mainlanders could
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120
potentially be considered as a form of discrimination.44 They were also concerned that
Chinese immigrants would gain access to various resources that are in short supply, such
as housing, before they obtain permanent residency.
The unfortunate alignment of nationalist ideology and market logic has operated together
to form the discursive national boundary of Hong Kong against China. Not only do these
discourses homogenize Chinese marriage migrants’ lived experiences, but they have also
produced different layers of marginalization for Chinese marriage migrants from
different class backgrounds. At the service encounter, working-class Chinese marriage
migrants were constructed as “low-quality” citizens who needed to learn to be
independent; middle-class marriage migrants, on the other hand, were made into “low-
quality” citizens as social workers turned a blind eye to the structural barriers that
constrained their career options. By delving into the different ways in which the
independent market narrative operates for Chinese marriage migrants from working and
middle-class backgrounds, this dissertation illuminates how class intersects with gender
and nationality in producing differentiated regulatory practices of immigrant belonging.
In Taiwan, historically-rooted geopolitical tensions with China together with Taiwan’s
nation-building process have produced the dalumei discourse that defines Chinese
marriage migrants as the immoral other. However, the moral predicament of dalumei are
differentially experienced by Chinese marriage migrants perceived from different class
backgrounds. In the contemporary era, where the Taiwanese state has embraced
multiculturalism, I argue that the discourse of dalumei in everyday interactions is used to
produce the category of “good immigrants.” Combined with the prevalence of market
logic in Taiwanese society, class markers come to define the boundary of “good
44 The article is a collectively drafted document that criticizes the Equal Opportunities Commission’s efforts to revise their ethnic discrimination policies to extend the protection to people who felt discriminated against because of their “nationality” or “residency statuses.” Localist groups saw the revision as a form of “Chinese colonization” and condemned such proposal. See more on https://antichinesecolonization.wordpress.com.
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121
immigrants” who are deserving of integration and the “bad immigrants” not worthy of
respect. Working-class Chinese marriage migrants, who lacked the class markers of
education and professional background, were thus positioned as dalumei while middle-
class Chinese marriage migrants were able to rise to a position of worthy immigrants that
are more like Taiwanese. By paying attention to the different experiences and narratives
of Chinese marriage migrants from different class backgrounds in the face of dalumei
discourse, this dissertation illuminates the class aspect of belonging in the era of global
migration under the prevalence of market logic.
Finally, this dissertation also illuminates how national boundaries refer not only a legal
and official territory, but they are frontiers—constructed notions of internal distinction in
a given territory— that are subject to contestation in everyday interactions, given the
geopolitical tensions between the immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving societies.
Whether it is the mother-in-law who considers her Chinese marriage migrant daughter-
in-law a dalumei who married her son for money, or the social workers who see Chinese
marriage migrants as “forceful” speakers who needed to learn to be more “caring,” they
draw on discursive national boundaries between them as Taiwanese versus Chinese
marriage migrants, despite Chinese marriage migrants’ legal route to citizenship. In
Hong Kong, national boundaries are drawn as localist groups condemned Chinese
marriage migrants’ participation in transnational activities. In response, Chinese marriage
migrants also redraw national boundaries by repositioning themselves within the moral
landscape. From positioning themselves as sacrificing mothers and selfless volunteers, to
redefining their identities as both Hong Kongers and Chinese, not only do Chinese
marriage migrants reposition themselves within the legal national boundary but in some
cases, also reterritorialize national boundaries through their involvement in transnational
activities. As such, the intimate frontiers in which Chinese marriage migrants are situated
is not a fixed boundary but continues to evolve as Chinese marriage migrants interact
with the state, family, and civil society. By examining the intimate frontiers where
Chinese marriage migrants negotiate their regulated belonging in Hong Kong and
Taiwan, this dissertation brings to the fore the significance of historical and ongoing
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geopolitical relations between the immigrant-sending and receiving societies in shaping
immigrant belonging.
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Appendix A
Profile of Chinese marriage migrants and their husbands who were perceived by social
workers, Taiwanese friends, and the Chinese marriage migrant community as middle-
class in Taiwan
Chinese
marriage
migrants’
Pseudonym
Age Place of
origin
Education
background/
Last work
experience in
China before
migrating to
Taiwan
Employment in
Taiwan at the
time of
interview
Taiwanese
Husbands’
employment at
the time of
interview
Fang Fang 40 Hunan Bachelor’s
degree in
Fashion Design/
Secretary at a
design company
Completing a
master’s degree
in Chinese
medicine while
being a radio
host at National
Education
Radio
Manager at
China Airlines
Yang Fan 50 Hunan Bachelor’s
degree in
Chinese
medicine/Chine
se medicine
doctor
Radio host at
National
Education
Radio
Engineer
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Hui Lin 45 Tianjin Bachelor’s
degree in
Arts/Marketing
manager at a
major paper
company
Life Education
teacher at her
son’s primary
school (Part-
time)
Manager at a
major food
export company
later opened a
grocery store in
Taiwan
Lan Fang 47 Dongbei Bachelor’s
degree in
Account/
Accountant at a
Chinese oil
company
Fruit store
manager; selling
health
supplements on
the side
Accountant
Xiao Mei 34 Hunan Bachelor’s
degree in
Commerce/
Beauty store
owner
Secretary (Part-
time)
Electronic
factory owner in
China
Zi Xin 35 Guangxi Bachelor’s
degree in Arts/
Primary school
teacher
Just received
Certificate as a
travel agent
Toy company
owner in
Taiwan
Shao Min 28 Anhui Bachelor’s
degree in
Tourism/Owner
of a
Commercial
Immigration
Agency
Travel Agent Engineer
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Ping 58 Changchun Professional
Chinese music
performer
Music teacher
(Part-time)
Manager at a
Taiwanese
Electronic
factory in China
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Appendix B
Profile of Chinese marriage migrants who were perceived by social workers, Taiwanese
friends, and the Chinese marriage migrant community as working-class in Taiwan
Chinese
marriage
migrants’
Pseudonym
Age Education
background/ Last
work experience in
China before
migrating to
Taiwan
Employment in
Taiwan at the time
of interview
Taiwanese
Husbands’
employment at the
time of interview
Li Fei 70 Junior high
school/state-owned
factory
Retired Veteran
Mei Yan 43 Junior high school/
make-up artist
Dance teacher and
make-up artist
Veteran
Jin Yan 71 Primary
school/state-owned
factory
Part-time caregiver Veteran
Feng 61 Primary
school/construction
worker
Caregiver at a
government hospital
Veteran (passed
away)
Yu Jie 40 Primary
school/electronic
factory worker
Electronic factory
worker
Veteran
Xiao Lan 49 Primary
school/electronic
factory worker
Cleaner at private
homes and
commercial
buildings
Veteran
(passed away)
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Chen Yan 60 High school/ state-
owned gun factory
worker
Homemaker
Veteran
Cai Hong 45 Diploma in Chinese
medicine/Chinese
medicine doctor
Unemployed due to
illness
Veteran
Zi Yue 34 High
school/Assistant in a
biotechnology
company
Homemaker Small business
owner in China
Li Hua 38 High school/office
assistant at an
architecture
company
Low-end boutique
store owner
Tour bus driver
Yao Hong 40 Primary school/hair
stylist at low-end
hair salon
Low-end hair salon
owner
Small business
owner
Wang An 35 High school/ no
working experience
as she got married
soon after
graduation
Homemaker Technician at an
electronic factory
Xiao Yan 46 High school/ family
restaurant business
Low-end restaurant
owner
Small business
owner
Jiao Bao 45 High
school/Secondary
school teacher
Low-end dumpling
restaurant owner
Low-end dumpling
restaurant owner
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Huang Fang 30 Primary
school/electronic
factory worker
Low-end dried-food
stall owner
Technician at an
electronic factory
Xiao Yao 27 Junior high school/
toy factory worker
Homemaker Truck driver
Xiao Chan 33 High school/sales at
a beauty store
Electronic factory
worker
Account assistant at
a psychiatric
hospital
Lan Lan 36 High school/sales at
a furniture store
Electronic factory
(Part-time)
Small business
owner
Tang Juan 35 Junior high school/
sales at a low-end
boutique store
Golf club worker
(Part-time)
Betel nut store
owner
Xiao-li 40 High school/ toy
factory worker
Korean restaurant
owner
Korean restaurant
owner
Yu fen 48 Primary school/
state-owned steel
factory worker
Caregiver at private
homes
Unemployed due to
illness
Fu Juan 38 High
school/Waitress
Sales at a watch
company
Unemployed due to
illness
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Appendix C
Profile of Chinese marriage migrants I met in Taiwan who do not fit into the class
categorization
Chinese marriage migrants’ Pseudonym
Age Place of origin
Education background/ Last work experience in China before migrating to Taiwan
Employment in Taiwan at the time of interview
Taiwanese Husbands’ employment at the time of interview
Mei Lin 52 Hunan Diploma in Commerce /Electronic factory worker
Insurance agent Supervisor at a Taiwanese electronic factory in China
Ming 33 Sichuan Junior High school/Property sales agent
Homemaker Interior Designer
Xiao Hua 40 Zhuji Junior high school/ Toy factory worker
Top sales at a major shopping mall
Car component company owner
Fu Hua 26 Dongbei High School/Primary school teacher
Homemaker Manager
Rui Lai 34 Fujian High School/ Assistant at a Pharmaceutical company
Dancer in an immigrant dance group (Part-time)
Official in Taiwanese Marine Corps
Fang 36 Hubei High School/ Electronic factory worker
Mid-range Ceramic store owner
Mid-range Ceramic store owner
Lin Shen 40 Henan High school/Electronic factory worker
Jewellery store owner
Former manager at an electronic factory in China; currently unemployed due to illness
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Mu Yin 27 Sichuan Junior high school/ Property sales agent
Temporary worker at Government Labor Department
Owner of a reputable education centre
Min Yue 43 Sichuan High school/Owner of a mid-range shoe store
Chained Braised Dishes Store owner
Chained Braised Dishes Store owner
Yao Lin 30 Suzhou High school/Secretary
Secretary at her husband’s company
Owner of an electronic company in Taiwan