OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.

 

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-BautistaManuel C. PascualJose C. PascualSusana C. Pascual-BautistaErlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino PascualIsoceles PascualLoida Pascual-MartinezVirginia Pascual-NerNona Pascual-FernandoOctavio PascualGeranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. PascualHermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the following:

Dominga M. PascualMamerta P. FugosoAbraham S. Sarmiento, IIIRegina Sarmiento-MacaibayEleuterio P. SarmientoDomiga P. San DiegoNelia P. MarquezSilvestre M. PascualEleuterio M. Pascual(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.

The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).

Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that:

Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a successionab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.

Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.

On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the petitioner on this point.

The Court held:

Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and

relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).

Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.

Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.

It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners, vs.HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

 

VITUG, J.:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment.

The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

The petition before us raises the following contentions: That —

1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.

2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.

3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. 1

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:

What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:

Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance;  6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and

Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and

Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and

Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving

of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse

Illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nephews and Nieces

Nieces and Surviving Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 1995 [1] which affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent’s  Demurrer to  Plaintiff’s Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending therein.

The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.  It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero who is the sister of petitioners’ father, Hermogenes Dezoller.  Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners.  Petitioners’ father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement[2]adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074 was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero.  On January 2, 1988, Martin Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the latter’s name.

Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988.  Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988, claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both parties for resolution:

(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;

(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by right of representation from the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller;

(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent) must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on the title of the defendant;

(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages, moral and exemplary, plus attorney’s fees for the willful and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller, despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are the niece and nephew of said deceased; and

(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation can be considered as conjugal property of the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.[3]

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller; certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora Guerrero.[4] Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a

written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment [5] was filed by herein private respondent.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the Family Code.  It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish filiation.  Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.[6]

On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance .[7]

In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation.  Hence, this appeal.

We find for petitioners.

The bone of contention in private respondent’s demurrer to evidence is whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and filiation.  There are two points for consideration before us:  first is the issue on petitioner’s legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.

I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree.  It is important to note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree on both counts.

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on

legitimacy.  There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.[8] And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:

“The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x  actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.  The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.  The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.’  This principle applies under our Family Code.  Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.” This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.

Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought.  The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned.  The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time.  It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.

x  x  x

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.  He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved.  It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.  Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.[9]

The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action

for reconveyance.  This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.  The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.

Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same.  This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence.  It would have delimited the issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.

Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. [10] The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. [11] And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the contrary.[12]

Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, [13] and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. [14] Perforce, a presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted.  This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. [15]

Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.  Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.

II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner’s relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive examination.

Petitioners’ evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage

certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which she identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece. [16] Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements.  What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborate the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.

American jurisprudence has it that a distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:

“One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant’s pedigree, he may not do so by declarant’s own statements as to declarant’s relationship to the particular family.  The reason is that declarant’s declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature.  Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that declarant’s relationship to the common family must appear is not met.  But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant’s estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite different.  In such case the declaration of the decedent, whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of relationship.  While the nature of the declaration is then disserving, that

is not the real ground for its admission.  Such declarations do not derive their evidential value from that consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to which the declarations belong.  The distinction we have noted is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent from reasons of necessity.”[17] (Italics ours.)

The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant’s estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself.  There must be some independent proof of this fact. [18] As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. [19]

We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.  Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself.  Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.[20] More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the sole basis of the decedent’s declaration and without need for further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.  As held in one case,[21] where the subject of the declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person, it seems absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish.  The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.

Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce the same result.  For while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence.[22] It is elementary that an objection shall be

made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence,[23] otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, [24] since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.[25]

As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al.,[26] it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it will be deemed to have been waived.  The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred.

Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law.  That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked.  An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. [27] Thus, for instance, failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.[28]

The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the documentary evidence that were offered.  At no time was the issue of the supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection thereto, ever raised.  Instead, private respondent’s counsel elicited answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her obtention of said documents:  The observations later made by private respondent in her comment to petitioners’ offer of exhibits, although the grounds therefor were already apparent at the time these documents were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom.  Hence, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private respondent’s failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.[29]

Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller [30] (Exhibit H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter, together with the Joint Affidavits of

Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar (Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of Hermogenes Dezoller -- these can be deemed to have sufficiently established the relationship between the declarant and herein petitioners.  This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facieshowing is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is required.[31] Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants, who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller.[32]

III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

“Art. 975.  When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.  But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.”

“Art. 995.  In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.”

“Art. 1001.  Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership.  Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.  Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent.  Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied.  Nonetheless, private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that “if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.”[33]

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO,petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N 

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate court’s resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989.

The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows:

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil.  Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa. [2] Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.

Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother,  Primitiva Uriarte, was  the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon.  Domingo Arnaldo and Justa’s father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.[3] Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.

The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.[4] The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are  Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte.  The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitiva’s brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa.  These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo.

Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares  by purchase.[5] Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justa’s tenant,  refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest.[6] He contended  that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.[7]

Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs. [8] In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa [9] but the latter’s heirs entitled to her entire land.

 They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10] their great granduncle.  It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocio’s nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.[11] Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, one-third. [12] The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it.[13] They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, [14] the original owner of the property.

The trial court sustained petitioners’ contention.  In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:

As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latter’s death.  The entire 2.7588  hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.  The latter however died intestate and without issue.  Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives.  Thus, the rights to the succession are

transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).[15]

Accordingly, the court ordered:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering.  No cost.

SO ORDERED.[16]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.  Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justa’s parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered -

Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the following manner:

(1)          .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and

(2)          2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.

For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo.  Petitioners allege:

I  THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF

AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING;

II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY;

III  THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS;

IV  AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. [18]

After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares.  Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.  The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justa’s property should be as follows as private respondent contends:

A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to  petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent.

B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was  consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and  who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo.[19]

The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justa’s estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code.

As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only now.  It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore,  should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to  this Court.[20]

It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals, [21] petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justa’s nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justa’s half-sister. Apparently they are now questioning private respondent’s filiation  because,  as explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate.

Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justa’s parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her father’s (Juan Arnaldo’s) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares.  In addition, Justa inherited her mother’s (Ursula Tubil’s) share consisting of 0.25 hectares.  Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land.  This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justa’s nearest surviving relative.  As the Court of Appeals held:

According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines.

The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code.  They provide:

ART. 963.          Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations.  Each generation forms a degree.

ART. 964.          A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.

A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.

ART. 965.          The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.

The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.

In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.

In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.  Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.

In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa.

On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa’s cousin.  They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa.  The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.[22]

Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursula’s daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza.  They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate.

Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent.  As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justa’s half-sister Agatonica.  He is therefore Justa’s nephew.  A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial.  This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunt’s heir.  As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, “The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.”[24]

Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

CAROLINA ABAD GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HONORIA EMPAYNADO,  CECILIA H. ABAD, MARIAN H. ABAD and ROSEMARIE S. ABAD, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 1994, finding private respondents as the heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad as well as annulling petitioners’ extra-judicial partition of the decedent’s estate.

The facts are as follows:

On April 18, 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad, before the then Court of First Instance of Manila.  In their petition, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 86792, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo de Mesa Abad, as the latter allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.  On May 9, 1972, petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021, listed therein as belonging to the decedent, were actually only administered by the latter, the true owner being their late mother, Lucila de Mesa.  On June 16, 1972, the trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad.

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1972, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de Mesa, copying therein the technical descriptions of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021.  By virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds cancelled the above-mentioned TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina Abad Gonzales.  The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.

On July 7, 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in Special Proceedings No. 86792.  In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during these period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado.  Private respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho.  As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of

collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.

On July 24, 1972, private respondents filed a motion to withdraw their first motion and, in lieu thereof, filed a motion for reconsideration praying that Cecilia Abad be appointed administrator instead of Cesar Tioseco.  The trial court denied private respondents’ motion to remove Cesar Tioseco as administrator, but allowed them to appear in the proceedings to establish their right as alleged heirs of Ricardo Abad.

Private respondents later discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 through the stratagem of extra-judicially partitioning their mother’s estate.  Accordingly, on October 4, 1973, private respondents filed a motion to annul the extra-judicial partition executed by petitioners, as well as TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484, the Torrens titles issued in substitution of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671, and 64021 and the real estate mortgages constituted by the latter on said properties.

After due trial, the lower court, on November 2, 1973, rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1)               Declaring Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad and Rosemarie S. Abad acknowledged natural children of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad;

(2)               Declaring said acknowledged natural children, namely: Cecilia E. Abad, Marian E. Abad, and Rosemarie S. Abad the only surviving legal heirs of the deceased Ricardo M. Abad and as such entitled to succeed to the entire estate of said deceased, subject to the rights of Honoria Empaynado, if any, as co-owner of any of the property of said estate that may have been acquired thru her joint efforts with the deceased during the period they lived together as husband and wife;

(3)               Denying the petition of decedent’s collateral relatives, namely: Dolores M. Abad, Cesar M. Tioseco and Carolina M. Abad to be declared as heirs and excluding them from participating in the administration and settlement of the estate of Ricardo Abad;

(4)               Appointing Honoria Empaynado as the administratrix in this intestacy with a bond of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS; and

(5)               Ordering Cesar Tioseco to surrender to the new administratrix all property or properties, monies and such papers that came into his possession by virtue of his appointment as administrator, which appointment is hereby revoked.[1]

The trial court, likewise, found in favor of private respondents with respect to the latter’s motion for annulment of certain documents.  On November 19, 1974, it rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds oppositors’ Motion for Annulment, dated October 4, 1973 to be meritorious and accordingly –

1.  Declares that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021, all registered in the name of Ricardo Abad, as replaced by TCT No. 108482 in the name of Dolores de Mesa Abad, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco and TCT No. 108484 in the name of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, and the residential house situated at 2432 Opalo Street, San Andres Subdivision, Manila, to be the properties of the late Ricardo Abad;

2.  Declares the deed of Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Lucila de Mesa, executed on May 2, 1972 (Doc. No. 445, Page No. 86, Book No. VII, Series of 1972 of the notarial book of Faustino S. Cruz) by petitioners and Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, to be inexistent and void from the beginning;

3.  Declares as null and void the cancellation of TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 and issuance in lieu thereof, of TCT Nos. 108482, 108483 and 108484;

4.  Orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel TCT No. 108482 of Dolores de Mesa Abad; TCT No. 108483 of Cesar de Mesa Tioseco; and TCT No. 108484 of Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales and in lieu thereof, restore and/or issue the corresponding certificate of title in the name of Ricardo Abad;

5.  Declares as inexistent and void from the beginning the three (3) real estate mortgages executed on July 7, 1972 executed by (a) petitioner Dolores de Mesa Abad, identified as Doc. No. 145, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; (b) petitioner Cesar de Mesa Tioseco, identified as Doc. No. 146, Page 31, Book No. XX, Series of 1972; and (c) Carolina de Mesa Abad-Gonzales, identified as Doc. No. 144, Page No. 30, Book No. XX, Series of 1972, all of the notarial book of Ricardo P. Yap of Manila, in favor of Mrs. Josefina C. Viola, and orders the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration or annotation thereof from the back of the torrens title of Ricardo Abad; and

6.  Orders Atty. Escolastico R. Viola and his law associate and wife, Josefina C. Viola, to surrender to the new administratrix, Honoria Empaynado, TCT Nos. 108482, 108483, and 108484 within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 1973 decision was denied by the trial court.  Their notice of appeal was likewise denied on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Because of this ruling, petitioners instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed there as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-03268-R.  On November 2, 1974, the appellate court granted petitioners’ petition and ordered the lower court to give due course to the latter’s appeal.  The trial court, however, again dismissed petitioners’ appeal on the ground that their record on appeal was filed out of time.

Likewise, on January 4, 1975, petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the November 19, 1974 ruling of the trial court.  On March 21, 1975, this appeal was similarly denied on the ground that it had been filed out of time.

Due to the dismissal of their two appeals, petitioners again instituted certiorari and mandamus proceedings with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as C.A.-G.R. No. SP-04352.  The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the two appeals, prompting petitioners to appeal to the Supreme Court.  On July 9, 1985, this Court directed the trial court to give due course to petitioners’ appeal from the order of November 2, 1973 declaring private respondents

heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad, and the order dated November 19, 1974, annulling certain documents pertaining to the intestate estate of deceased.

The two appeals were accordingly elevated by the trial court to the appellate court.  On October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders of the court a quo in SP No. 86792, to wit:

1.  Order dated November 2, 1973, declaring in substance that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie, all surnamed Abad as the acknowledged natural children and the only surviving heirs of the deceased Ricardo Abad;

2.  Order dated November 19, 1974, declaring in substance that the six (6) parcels of land described in TCT Nos. 13530, 53671 and 64021 are the properties of Ricardo Abad; that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of the deceased Lucila de Mesa executed on May 2, 1972 is inexistent and void from the beginning; the cancellation of the aforementioned TCTs is null and void; the Register of Deeds be ordered to restore and/or issue the corresponding Certificates of Title in the name of Ricardo Abad; and

3.  Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco from the latter Order, for being filed out of time, are all AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against petitioner-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners now seek to annul the foregoing judgment on the following grounds:

I.   THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS CECILIA E. ABAD, MARIAN E. ABAD AND ROSEMARIE S. ABAD ARE THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN OF THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

II.  PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO THE SUBJECT ESTATE WHETHER THE SAME IS OWNED BY THE DECEASED RICARDO DE MESA ABAD OR BY LUCILA DE MESA, THE MOTHER OF PETITIONERS AND RICARDO DE MESA ABAD.

We are not persuaded.

Petitioners, in contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad’s filiation, submits the startling theory that the husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born in 1948 and 1954, respectively.

It is undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to Jose Libunao, their union having produced three children, Angelita, Cesar, and Maria Nina, prior to the birth of Cecilia and Marian.  But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.

The date of Jose Libunao’s death is important, for if he was still alive in 1971, and given that he was legally married to Honoria Empaynado, the presumption would be that Cecilia and Marian are not Ricardo Abad’s children with the latter, but of Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.  Article 256, the applicable provision of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[4]

To bolster their theory, petitioners presented in evidence the application for enrolment at Mapua Institute of Technology of Angelita Libunao, accomplished in 1956, which states:

Father’s Name:             Jose Libunao

Occupation:                   engineer (mining)

Mother’s Name:           Honoria Empaynado[5]

as well as Cesar Libunao’s 1958 application for enrolment at the Mapua Institute of Technology, which states:

Father’s Name:             Jose Libunao

Occupation:                   none

Mother’s Name:           Honoria Empaynado[6]

Petitioners claim that had Jose Libunao been dead during the time when said applications were accomplished, the enrolment forms of his children would have stated so.  These not being the case, they conclude that Jose Libunao must have still been alive in 1956 and 1958.

Additionally, petitioners presented the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos[7] stating that to their knowledge Jose Libunao had died in 1971, leaving as his widow, Honoria Empaynado, and that the former had been interred at the Loyola Memorial Park.

Lastly, petitioners presented the affidavit of Dr. Pedro Arenas, [8] Ricardo Abad’s physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a consequence thereof.

With these pieces of evidence, petitioners claim that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado.

At the outset, it must be noted that petitioners are disputing the veracity of the trial court’s finding of facts.  It is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[9] Petitioners, however, argue that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court when there appears in the record of the case some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked, or the significance of which has been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the case.[10]

This Court finds no justifiable reason to apply this exception to the case at bar.

First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least, far from conclusive.  Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one’s parent is “deceased” is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter’s death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof.  Jose Libunao’s death certificate would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died.  Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao’s death.  More telling, while the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado’s first husband, the latter’s name being Jose Santos Libunao.  Even the name of the wife is different.  Jose Bautista Libunao’s wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.

As to Dr. Arenas’ affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[11] The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.[12]

Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites.  They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” does not blacken the character of the deceased.  Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation.  In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to blacken the reputation of any patient.  We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence.  And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.  As stated by the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that: “The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established precedents.  It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician.  After one has gone to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

Given the above disquisition, it is clearly apparent that petitioners have failed to establish their claim by the quantum of evidence required by law.  On the other hand, the evidence

presented by private respondents overwhelmingly prove that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad.  We quote with approval the trial court’s decision, thus:

In his individual statements of income and assets for the calendar years 1958 and 1970, and in all his individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970, he has declared therein as his legitimate wife, Honoria Empaynado; and as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian (except in Exh. 12) and Rosemarie Abad (Exhs. 12 to 19; TSN, February 26, 1973, pp. 33-44).

x x x                                                x x x                                        x x x

In December 1959, Ricardo Abad insured his daughters Cecilia, then eleven (11) years old, and Marian, then (5) years old, on [a] twenty (20) year-endowment plan with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and paid for their premiums (Exh. 34 and 34-A; 34-B to C; 35, 35-A to D; TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 7-20).

In 1966, he and his daughter Cecilia Abad opened a trust fund acount of P100,000.00 with the People’s Bank and Trust Company which was renewed until (sic) 1971, payable to either of them in the event of death (Exhs. 36-A; 36-E).  On January 5, 1971, Ricardo Abad opened a trust fund of P100,000.00 with the same bank, payable to his daughter Marian (Exh. 37-A).  On January 4, 1971, Ricardo Abad and his sister Dolores Abad had (sic) agreed to stipulate in their PBTC Trust Agreement that the 9% income of their P100,000.00 trust fund shall (sic) be paid monthly to the account reserved for Cecilia, under PBTC Savings Account No. 49053 in the name of Ricardo Abad and/or Cecilia Abad (Exh. 38) where the income of the trust fund intended for Cecilia was also deposited monthly (TSN, February 27, 1973, pp. 21-36).  Ricardo Abad had also deposited (money) with the Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank in the name of his daughter Marian, represented by him, as father, under Savings Account 17348 which has (sic) a balance of P34,812.28 as of June 30, 1972. (Exh. 60-B)…

With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother.  The applicable provisions are:

Art. 988.  In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003.  If there are no…illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Italics supplied)

As to petitioners’ claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence

presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad.  As stated earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. [13] In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad or by Lucila de Mesa.

Digressing from the main issue, in its decision dated October 19, 1994, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco on the ground that the same was filed out of time.  This affirmance is erroneous, for on July 9, 1985, this Court had already ruled that the same was not filed out of time.  Well-settled is the dictum that the rulings of the Supreme Court are binding upon and may not be reversed by a lower court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30184 dated October 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATION that the affirmance of the Order dated March 21, 1975 denying the appeal of Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco for being filed out of time is SET ASIDE.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ARNELITO ADLAWAN,                         G.R. No. 161916                             Petitioner,                                                                    Present:

                                 Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),

          - versus -                                               Ynares-Santiago,                                                                      Austria-Martinez,

   Callejo, Sr., and   Chico-Nazario, JJ.

EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN andNARCISA M. ADLAWAN,                       Promulgated:

Respondents.                                                                      January 20, 2006 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x 

DECISION  

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:            Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment [3] of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan’s unlawful detainer suit against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan.  Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.           The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties’ dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842,[5] registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu.   In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue.   Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.[7]  Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC.  Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.[9]

 On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of

age, respectively,[10] denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon since birth.  They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan[11] and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan.  The spouses had nine[12]children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa.  During the lifetime of

their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property.  Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.[13]  Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.

 Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the

renovation of their house.  Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college education.  By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale,[14] a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral.  Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents’ ownership of the lot.   He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.           Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature at the back of petitioner’s birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of Lot 7226.[15]  They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.[16]

                   On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of petitioner’s filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner’s action for ejectment.  It added that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226.  The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

             In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff’s cause of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.             SO ORDERED.[17]

 On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding

that the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked.  It thus

ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.  The decretal portion thereof, provides:

 Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the

Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed.  Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.

 So ordered.[18]

 Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending

appeal[19] which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention.[20] They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property.  In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made. 

 The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.[21]  It, however, recalled

the order granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.[22]

 On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the

RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC.  It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226.  As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus –

 WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated

September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED.  Costs against the respondent.

 

SO ORDERED.[23]

 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.  Hence, the instant

petition.  The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly

maintain the instant case for ejectment. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole

heir of Dominador.  He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property.  In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot.  The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226.  This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.[24]  By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.[25]  The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.  The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

 Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226,

he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

 ART. 487.  Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in

ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. 

Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).[26]  A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of

joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.  It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed.[27]

 The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained – A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.  If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)[28]

 In Baloloy v. Hular,[29] respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title

claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property.  In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s authority to file the case, the Court held that –

 Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners

may bring an action in ejectment.  This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including anaccion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action.  A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.  Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.  If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. 

 In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming

sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof.  There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court.  The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of

the latter’s siblings.  Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.

 Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was

mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties.  The respondent failed to comply with the rule.  It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it.  It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.  The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[30]

 In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for

unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property.  It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador. 

 In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal

personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners.  However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages.  If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana.   Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.  Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her share[31] and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

 

The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code.  InResuena v. Court of Appeals,[32] and Sering v. Plazo,[33] the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property.  InCelino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago,[34] the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common.[35]  Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,[36] the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.

 In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-

ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot.   A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well.  The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot.  In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:

 3.         The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole

heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

 x x x x 5.         Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole

heir of the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot x x x.  (Emphasis added)[37]

 Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action

operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof.  Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper.  As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras “[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all.   Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper.”[38]

 

Indeed, respondents’ not less than four decade actual physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the instant case.  Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  The September 23, 2003

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, areAFFIRMED.

 SO ORDERED.  

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO                                                                 Associate Justice