interrelating with animals - Ideals - University of Illinois at Urbana

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INTERRELATING WITH ANIMALS: NONHUMAN SELVES IN THE LITERARY IMAGINATION BY JOANNE MIEREK THESIS Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Library and Information Science in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign, 2010 Urbana, Illinois Adviser: Assistant Professor Kate Williams

Transcript of interrelating with animals - Ideals - University of Illinois at Urbana

INTERRELATINGWITHANIMALS:NONHUMANSELVESINTHELITERARYIMAGINATION

BY

JOANNEMIEREK

THESIS

SubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofScienceinLibraryandInformationScience

intheGraduateCollegeoftheUniversityofIllinoisatUrbana‐Champaign,2010

Urbana,Illinois

Adviser: AssistantProfessorKateWilliams

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ABSTRACT

Children’sliteratureisfullofanimalcharacterswidelyunderstoodtobesymbolic

humans.Theyarebelievedtoprovidethereaderwithacombinationofdelightandthe

neutralityandemotionaldistanceconsiderednecessaryfornavigatingvariousstagesof

maturationorcomplexandchargedsocialissues.Inthispaper,Iaskwhetheranimal

charactersmaysometimesbeunderstoodasanimalselves,andnotassymbolic

humans.Interestintheselfhoodofnon‐humananimalshasbeengaininggroundin

academicdebatesinthefieldsofanimalandcognitivescience,philosophyofmind,and

anthropology,resultingintheoreticalworkthatpaintsanintriguingpictureofwhat

animalselvesmightconsistofandhowwemayalreadyknowthoseselves.Asthe

foundationforthisstudyofcontemporarychildren’sbookswithanimalcharacters,

selectedcurrenttheoryisreviewed,beginningwithanintroductionofbasicconcepts

andincludingLeslieIrvine’sCoreSelfelementsandNuritBird‐David’sRelational

Epistemology.Currentthinkingonthefunctionandroleofanimalsinchildren’s

literatureisbrieflydiscussed.Thestudyitselfisdesignedtodistinguishpatternsin

animalcharacterizationinordertobuildonJohnAndrewFisher’sframeworkforthe

disambiguationofanthropomorphism,atermreferringtothecommonpractice,often

consideredacategoricalfallacy,ofattributing‘human‐like’characteristics(including

selfhood)tonon‐humans.Fisherrecognizestwobroadtypesofanthropomorphic

attributionthathecallsInterpretiveandImaginative,thelatterfoundinworksofthe

imagination.Thepresentstudyconsistedofasurveyandanalysisof46contemporary

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children’sbookswithdomesticanimalcharacters,developedusingcriteriafromthe

theoreticalconceptspresentedonanimalselfhood.Significantdifferenceswerefound

inthosecharactersportrayedasclothedand/orbipedalandthosepresentedmore

naturalistically,intheactivitiesengagedin,andinthecharacters’voices,suggestingat

leasttwobroadapproachesbyauthorsandillustratorstoanimalcharacters,here

labeled‘symbolichuman’and‘animalself.’

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1

CHAPTER1:WHATAREANIMALSELVESANDHOWDOWEKNOWTHEM?………………….3

CHAPTER2:ANTHROPOMORPHISMANDTHELITERARYIMAGINATION……………………..14

CHAPTER3:CASESTUDY:ANIMALSELVESINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE………………………19

ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHYOFCORESOURCES…………………………………………………………25

APPENDIXA:SURVEYSAMPLE…………………………………………………………………………………….51

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INTRODUCTION

Nonhumananimalsfascinateus.Theyhaveappearedinartandstories

throughouttimeandacrossmosthumancultures(Boyd,2007;DastonandMitman,

2005).Inourstoriesandart,particularlyinchildren’sliterature,fantasy,andfolktales,

weourselvestransformintootheranimals,wecommunicatewiththem;weevenmarry

them,livewiththem,andlearnfromthem.Thereisasenseofalargercommunityof

beingsofwhichweareonepartandinwhichwetakedelight.

Butthereisanothersidetoourrelationshipwithnonhumananimals,especially

inthemodernWesternworld.Overthelast150years,inresponsetoEuro‐American

industrializationpracticesandsomeaspectsofempiricallaboratoryinvestigation,a

steadilygrowingconcernforanimalwelfareandanimalrightshasarisen(Irvine,2004;

Wynne,2004).Increasinglywearecomingtounderstandthatouractionsinpursuitof

perceivedhumangoalshaveresultedinthedevastationofournaturalenvironment,

includingwildanimalhabitatsandpopulations.Animalswehavedomesticatedoften

farenobetter.

Inhisinfluential1967articleforSciencemagazine“TheHistoricalRootsofour

EcologicCrisis,”historianLynnWhite,Jr.tracesthefusionofwesternscienceand

technologyanddiscussestheprofoundinfluenceofChristianaxiomsonthescientists,in

particulartheaxiomthat“noiteminthephysicalcreationhadanypurposesaveto

serveman’spurposes.”(1205)Thesetrendscombined,accordingtoWhite,tocreate

ourmodernecologiccrisis.Heconcludesthatapplyingmoretechnologywillnotsolve

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currentecologicalproblemsoravoidfuturebacklashes.Wemusttracerootcausesby

rethinkingouroldreligionandideasaboutourrelationshipwiththenaturalworld.

Inthispaper,Ihopetocontributetotheefforttorethinkourhumanrelationship

withnonhumancreaturesbyoutliningrelevantscholarshipinthescienceofmind,

philosophy,literature,andinanthropologythatpointtoawayofengagingwithour

environmentandwiththenonhumananimalswhoshareitwithus.Thiswayisoneof

relationship;ithasancientroots,affordsknowledgeandunderstanding,andmaybe

foundintheWestinworksoftheimaginationincludingliteratureandartaswellasin

everydaycommonsense.

Iambeginningfromthepremisethatanimalsareselvesinmanyoftheways

thatweare;thatcapacitiessuchasemotionalexpressionandcognitiveprocessingare

presentinnonhumananimalsinwaysbothsimilartoanddistinctfromourown,and

thatwecanunderstandandrelatewithindividualanimalselvesinwaysthatarenot

dependentonlanguageAspartofmyanalysis,Iwillpresentfindingsfromasurveyof

animalcharactersinasmallsampleofmodernchildren’sfiction,nonfiction,andpoetry.

AsIwillshow,animalcharactersarepresentedintwobroadways,whichIamcalling

‘symbolichuman’and‘animalself’.Theyaredistinguishedbyphysicalpresentation,

charactervoice,andbytheactivitiesengagedin.Theimaginativedevelopmentof

naturalisticanimalprotagonistsmayitselfbeinformedbythedirectexperienceand

knowledgeofanimalselves.

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CHAPTER1

WHATAREANIMALSELVESANDHOWDOWEKNOWTHEM?

Twotheoriesofanimalselfhoodexistingintherealworldareintroducedinthis

chapterafterabriefcontextualdiscussionofevolutionarycontinuity.Thefirst,

sociologistLeslieIrvine’sCoreSelfelements,stemsfromherworkwithdomesticpet

animals,especiallycatsanddogs.Thesecondhasbeendevelopedfromscholarshipin

animism,ananthropologicaldescriptorfor“awayofbeingthatisaliveandopentoa

worldincontinuousbirth.”(Ingold2006,9)

CONTINUITY

CharlesDarwin’stheoryofnaturalselectionimpliescross‐speciescontinuity;that

is,thedifferencesbetweenhumansandotheranimals,andamonganimalspecies,are

ofdegreeandnotkind.Darwinwrotein1871of‘numberlessgradations’separatingall

animals.1Theanimalsoftheearthareunderstoodtobekinduetosharedevolutionary

ancestry.Indeed,biological,physiological,andgeneticcontinuityiswidelyassumed.

Currentunderstandingofanimaltaxonomyandtheapplicationofexperimentalresults

fromanimalstopeoplerelyonthisassumption.

1SeeTheDescentofManandSelectioninRelationtoSex.NewYork:TheModernLibrary,[1936].

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Theassumptionofmentalorpsychologicalcontinuitybetweenhumansand

otheranimals,althoughsimilarlyimpliedbynaturalselection,iscontroversial,justas

biologicalcontinuitywas(andstillis,forsome).Uncomfortablefeelingsaboutspecies

ambiguityandthe‘demotion’ofhumanbeingsareprovoked.Becausementaland

psychologicalcapacitiesaredifficulttomeasureempiricallyeveninverbalhumans,

attemptstodosoinnonverbalanimalsappearsabsurdandimpossibletomany.

Despitetheseobstacles,Darwinhimselfpracticed,inpart,whathascometobe

calledanecdotalcognitivism;hedescribedmanyinstancesoftheexpressionofmental

andemotionalcapacitiesintheanimalsheobserved.Forexample,Dastonquotesfrom

TheDescentofManDarwin’sobservationthatadoghasimagination“asshewnbyhis

dreams”(45)ThoughmorecriticalthanDarwinofanecdotalcognitivism,disciple

GeorgeRomanescollected,classified,andpublishedanecdotes(AllenandBekoff,1997)

inwhichheincludes,forexample,observationsofmaternalandmischievousfeelingsin

monkeys.

Theideaofcontinuitybetweenhumansandotheranimalshasgeneratedan

ongoinginterestanddebateaboutboundariesbetweenspecies,aboutkinship,and

particularlyaboutwhatitisthatmakesushuman.Manyofthetwentiethcentury’s

findingsofanimalstudiesscientistsinbehavior,languageacquisitionanduse,and

geneticshavechallengedspeciesclassificationsandassumptionsaboutthecapacitiesof

nonhumananimals.Chimpanzeesmakeandusetools,elephantsreturnrepeatedlyto

siteswherecloserelativeshavedied,anddolphinscoordinatehuntingactivityand

communicatewitheachotherusingcomplexsystemsofsound.Itisbecomingmore

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apparentthatunderstandingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesamonghumansandother

animalsiscomplicated,dependingontheanimalinquestionandthecapacityunder

investigation.

PsychologistCliveD.L.WynnehasproposedwhathecallstheSimilarity

Sandwichinordertoframetheissueofcross‐speciescontinuityinahelpfulway.Likea

sandwich,therearethreelayers.Thebottom,orbread,layerasksthequestion,whatis

different?Wynneobservesthatallspeciesaredistinguishable,thatspecificsensory

abilities(batsonar,dog’ssenseofsmell,eagle’sfovia)varywidelyacrossspecies

affectingperceptionandexperience.

“Aboveallthiswonderfuldiversity,thewhirring,humming,perceiving,reacting

multiplicityofanimalnature,isanothermorepeacefullayer.”(228—229)Themiddle

layer,thepeanutbutterandjelly,describeswhatisshared.Wynnelistscognitive

capacitieswhichseemtobe“commontoawiderangeofspeciesandtooperatein

similarways.”(6)Theseincludeasenseoftime,number,same‐different,navigation,

learning,somekindsofmemory,andproblemsolving.

Thetoplayeridentifieswhatisnearlyuniqueinhumans.HereWynneincludes

sophisticatedlanguageabilitiesandasenseofindependentself‐awarenessasthose

capacitiesthatdistinguishusmostclearlyfromotheranimals.

ANIMALCORESELFANDINTERSUBJECTIVITY

AccordingtosociologistLeslieIrvine,whohasworkedextensivelywithdomestic

companiondogsandcats,animalshavethecapacityfortheelementsofacoreselfthat

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enablesthemtoparticipateinrelationshipswithus.Interactionswithinallofour

relationshipsconsistoftwosimultaneousprocesses.First,theselfoftheotheris

revealedtousthroughtheiractionsandresponsesandsecond,wereceiveconfirmation

ofourownself.Althoughhumandevelopmentaddsastrongverbaldimensionto

selfhood,thecoreselfthatwesharewithotheranimals,whichdoesnotdependon

language,allowsthisprocesstooccurinrelationshipswiththem.So,forexample,when

potentialadopterscometoananimalshelter,theyoftendecideonaparticularanimal,

whichmaynotbetheanimaltheadopterwasoriginallylookingfor,basedona

‘connection’thatIrvineconcludesisacompatibilityofcoreselves.

IrvineborrowsWilliamJames’fouraspectsof‘I’andrefinedbystudieswith

preverbalinfants.2Theyareagency,orasenseofcontrol,coherence,orindividual

integrity,affectivity,orthecapacityforemotion,andself‐historyormemory.Irvine

describesthislastelementasconnectingtheselftogetherintoanindividualsubjectivity.

Thecoreselfhasafunctionalaspectbasedongoalsandactionsandanexperiential

aspectallowingustoknowandtofeel.Thesecoexistingaspectsinformeachotherand

arepartofthedevelopmentofthespecificcoreselfelementsinindividuals.

Evidenceforagencyindogs,accordingtoIrvine,canbefound,forexample,in

behaviortraininginwhichdogsarebeingtaughttoexerciseself‐control.Theimplication

oftheabilitytocontrolone’sbehavioristhatonemusthaveameasureofvolitionor

2Inparticular,Irvineliststhesesources:James,William.ThePrinciplesofPsychology.[1890]NewYork:Dover,1950;Myers,Gene.ChildrenandAnimals:SocialDevelopmentandOurConnectionstoOtherSpecies.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1998;Stern,DanielN.TheInterpersonalWorldoftheInfant:AViewFromPsychoanalysisandDevelopmentalPsychology.NewYork:BasicBooks,1985.

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will.Catsinitiateinteractionswithpeopletoachievegoalssuchasfood,companionship,

orplay,oftenbyinterferinginhumanactivities.Indicatorsofasenseofnonverbal

coherenceincludeactionsthatprotectbodilyintegritysuchashiding.Affectivitycanbe

understoodtomeanbothindividualfeelings,likehappinessorgrief,andbodily‘vitality

affects’,throughwhichweoftenrecognizetheindividualfeelingsofothers.Self‐history

turnsinteractionsintorelationships.

Sharingthoughts,intentions,andfeelingswithanimalsdoesnotdependon

language;thatis,althoughtheabilitytotalkabouttherelationshipdoesrelyon

language,theabilitytohaveitdoesn’t.Withanimals,‘thoughts’canbeunderstoodas

thefocusofattentionthroughvocalizingoreyecontact,aswhenadogchecksinor

glancesatthedoorortheleashorthefooddish.Thebestexamplesofsharedintentions

betweenguardiansandanimalscomefromplayactivitieswithdogsandcats(especially

kittens)becausecommunicatingintentioncreatesthenecessarycontextforthe

behavior.AccordingtoAllenandBekoff:

Tosolvetheproblemsthatmightbecausedby,forexampleconfusing

playformatingorfighting,manyspecieshaveevolvedsignalsthat

functiontoestablishandmaintaina‘mood’orcontextforplay.Inmost

speciesinwhichplyhasbeendescribed,play‐solicitingsignalsappearto

fostersomesortofcooperationbetweenplayerssothateachresponds

totheotherinawayconsistentwithplayanddifferentfromthe

responsesthesameactionswouldelicitinothercontexts.(98—99)

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Mostpeoplewhospendtimewithanimalsbelievethemtobesensitivetoemotional

states.IrvinerelatesthefamousexampleofCleverHans,thecelebratedcountinghorse:

CleverHanslivedinBerlinintheearlytwentiethcentury.Hebecamea

celebrityforhispurportedabilitytosolvemathematicalproblems.His

ownerwouldaskhimforthesumoftwonumbers,andHanswouldgive

theanswersbystrokinghishoofontheground.Manypeoplesuspected

fraudandaccusedHans’ownerofgivingthehorsecuesforwhentostop

stompinghishoof...(Arigorousinvestigationdiscovered)thatHanswas

indeedrespondingtocues,butofasortdifferentfromwhatanyone

expected...Hanswaspickingupsubtle,unintentionalcuesfromthe

peoplearoundhim,whoimperceptiblyrelaxedorquietlyexhaledwhen

hereachedthecorrectanswer.(158)

Irvinearguesthattheunderstandingofemotionalstatesobservedinanimalshasboth

aninstinctive‘affectcontagion’aspectandisasocialnecessity.Theinterplayofthese

aspectsacrossspeciesthataremoreorlesssocialmayhelptoexplaindifferences,for

exampleincommunicationstylesandmodes,betweendogsandcats.

Whydowehaveactiverelationshipswithanimals?Irvinereviewsvarious

answerstothissuchasthewilltodominanceorthatanimalsaresurrogatepeople

standinginfordeficienthumanrelationships.Becausetheyrefertosinglecauses,she

findsthem‘lacking.’Animals,accordingtoIrvine,helptoconstructandmaintainwho

weare.Ouridentitiesare‘fluid’and‘interactive.’Wedevelopandultimatelythriving

throughintersubjectiveinteractionswithothersentientbeings.

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ANIMISTPERSONHOODANDRELATIONALEPISTEMOLOGY

EdwardTylor,consideredthefatherofanthropology,coinedtheterm‘animism’

inthelatenineteenthcenturyfromseventeenth‐centuryalchemistGeorgE.Stahl’s

‘anima,’usedtorefertothevitalizingelementoflife.AccordingtoTylor,animismisa

ubiquitousandprimitivedelusion,definitiveofreligion,andacategoryerrorthatcould

stillbefoundinthemodernspiritualismofhisday.Tylorwasinterestedintheoriginsof

religionand,usingsecond‐handaccountsfromnewlycolonizedindigenouslands,

developedhisideasthatreligionandreligiousperspectivesaremythopoeticandlearned

mistakesabouttheworld.3

Definitionsofanimismchangedverylittlethroughmuchofthetwentieth

century,despitericherandbroaderdatasets.Scholarscontinuedtoattributeanimistic

beliefsandpracticestochildisherror,fancifulinterminglingofcorrectrepresentations

ofthingswithmysticaltales,projectionsofinternalprocesses,orasareasonablebut

mistakenperceptualsurvivalstrategy(Bird‐David,1999;Harvey,2006).

However,animistpracticesandconceptionsoftheworldareincreasinglybeing

reexaminedbywesternscholarsinfluencedbychangesinthesovereigntyand

subsequentself‐definitionofindigenouspeopleandby“anewacademictendency

towardsdialogueandagrowingrespectfordiversity...metwithadegreeof

uncertaintyaboutmodernity’spreferenceforobjectivityoversubjectivity(whichhas)

3SeeTylor,EdwardB.PrimitiveCulture:ResearchesintotheDevelopmentofMythology,Philosophy,Religion,Language,ArtandCustoms.NewYork:H.HoltandCo.,1874.

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resultedinahostofnewconversationsbetweenacademicsandothers.”(Harvey,205)

Amongthe‘fruitful’areasofinvestigationarepersonhoodconcepts(Irvine,Bird‐David)

andecologicalperception(Bird‐David,Ingold).

In1960,notedanthropologistA.IrvingHallowellpublished“OjibwaOntology,

Behavior,andWorldView”inwhichhebeginstodescribewhathascometobeknown

asthe‘newanimism.’4Theconceptofpersonhoodiscentraltothisunderstanding.

AccordingtotheOjibwe,theworldisfullofpeople,onlysomeofwhom

arehuman.However,itisamistaketoseethisasaprojectionor

attributionofhuman‐likenessorlife‐likenessonto‘inanimate’objects.

Whiletheydodistinguishbetweenpersonsandobjects,theOjibwealso

challengeEuropeannotionsofwhatapersonis.Tobeapersondoesnot

requirehuman‐likeness,butratherhumansarelikeotherpersons.

Personsisthewidercategory,beneathwhichtheremaybelistedsub‐

groupssuchas‘humanpersons’,‘rockpersons’,‘bearpersons’,and

others.Personsarerelatedbeingsconstitutedbytheirmanyandvarious

interactionswithothers.Personsarewillfulbeingswhogainmeaningand

powerfromtheirinteractions.Personsaresociablebeingswho

communicatewithothers.”(Harvey,17—18)

Hallowellcoinedtheterm‘other‐than‐human‐persons’todescribenon‐human

membersofthislargerpersonhoodcategory.

4SeeDiamond,Stanley.CultureinHistory:EssaysinHonorofPaulRadin.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1960,pp.19—52.

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Theanimismthatinformsthisviewofpersonhoodisfoundmoreofteninthe

eldersofagroupthaninthechildren.Thisisbecauseitmustbetaughtandlearnedasit

involves“developingtheskillsofbeing‐in‐the‐worldwithotherthings,makingone’s

awarenessofone’senvironmentandone’sselffiner,broader,deeper,richer.”(Bird‐

David,S77—78)Attention,openness,interaction,communication,(Bird‐David,Harvey,

Ingold,Brown,1992)andhumility(Brown)aresomeoftheskillsthatmustbedeveloped

overalifetime.

IsraelianthropologistNuritBird‐Davidmadeamorerecentcontributiontothe

conceptof‘new’animismwiththepublication,in1999,of“‘Animism’Revisited:

Personhood,Environment,andRelationalEpistemology.”Afterreviewingthemajor

anthropologicalliteratureonanimism,Bird‐DavidintroducesDevaru,aconcept,

“enigmatictopositivistthought,”usedbySouthIndianNayakapeopletodescribe

beings/personswithwhomtheyregularlyrelate.Devaruisaspecificexample,according

toBird‐David,ofHallowell’s‘other‐than‐human‐persons.’Theyareneitherspiritbeings

norsupernatural(aboveoroutsidenature),butareunderstoodbytheNayakatoreally

existintheworld.

Bird‐Davidborrowstheterm‘dividual’5tocointheverb‘todividuate.’Adividual

isonewhoisacompositeofrelationshipsandisnotaseparateentitysetagainstother

boundedentities.Nonhumanpersonsaresimplyotherdividualsdefinedanddescribed

throughtheirrelationships.

5SeeStrathern,M.TheGenderoftheGift:ProblemswithWomenandProblemswithSocietyinMelanesia.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1988.

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WhenIindividuateahumanbeingIamconsciousofher‘inherself’[asa

single,separateentity],whenIdividuateherIamconsciousofhowshe

relateswithme.ThisisnottosaythatIamconsciousoftherelationship

withher‘initself,’asathing.RatherIamconsciousoftherelatedness

withmyinterlocutorasIengagewithher,attentivetowhatshedoesin

relationtowhatIdo,tohowshetalksandlistenstomeasItalkand

listentoher,towhathappenssimultaneouslyandmutuallytome,toher,

tous.”(S72,emphasisintheoriginal)

Asnotedearlier,Bird‐Davidconsidersecologicalperceptiontobeanimportant

avenuetoinvestigateforscholarsinterestedinanimism.Theanimists’perceptionofthe

worldreliesonthe“trafficofinteractionswiththeirsurroundings”(Ingold,11)from

whichmodernlifeprotectsuswithcars,largeindoorspaces,andothercontrolled

environments.Theworldlyenvironmentisconsidereda‘domainofentanglement’

experiencedmoreorlessdirectlyandnotasaninteriorschematicwithoutward

manifestations.

Bird‐DavidconsidersGibson’secologicalapproachtovisualperception6as

centraltounderstandingtheclaimmadebytheNayakathatdevaruexistintheworld.

ForGibson,ecologicalperceptionseestheworldinecologicalterms,asexistingona

scaleofchangetopermanenceinitsmultiplerespects.Somethingschangerelatively

quicklyandothers,likemountains,persistforaverylongtime.Animistperception

6SeeGibson,J.J.TheEcologicalApproachtoVisualPerception.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1979.

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affordstheperceiverinformationaboutchange,communication,andrelationship

based,inpart,onwhattheperceiverbringstothesituation.

Relationalaffordancesareunderstoodtomutuallyaffecttheactorsinvolved.

Bird‐Davidgivestheseexamplesofmutualeffects:“ananimal‐avoiding‐meinrelationto

me‐upsetting‐the‐animal,astone‐coming‐towards‐meinrelationtome‐reaching‐for‐

the‐stone,arock‐securing‐meinrelationtome‐seeking‐a‐shelter.”Bird‐Davidcallsthis

typeofinteraction‘two‐wayresponsiverelatedness’so,forinstance,anelephantwho

makeseyecontactwithmeisconsideredDevaru,buttheelephantthatdoesn’tinteract

issimplyanelephant.FortheNayaka,beingsareregardedaspersons,orDevaru,as,

when,andbecausetheyinteract.

TheexamplesgivenbyBird‐DavidarefromherfieldworkexperienceinSouth

India;howevershemakesitclearthatsheconsidersrelationalepistemologytobea

universalhumantendency.Bird‐Davidfurthertheorizesthatrelationalepistemology

enjoys‘authority’asawayofknowinginsomeculturegroups,primarilyhunter‐

gatherers,andissecondaryinothers,suchasthemodernEuro‐Americanculture.The

chapterthatfollowsbuildsonthetheorythatknowingtheworldisadirectresultof

openlyengagingwithit.

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CHAPTER2

ANTHROPOMORPHISMANDTHELITERARYIMAGINATION

INTRODUCTION

Anthropomorphism,generallyspeaking,canbeunderstoodastheattributionof

humancharacteristicstononhumanothersand,althoughbannedinthesciences,itis

ubiquitousinworldmythology,folklore,art,andliterature.(Boyd,DastonandMitman,

Bird‐David,Harvey)Particularlyinliteratureforchildren,anthropomorphictendencies

arepracticeduncriticallyinthecreationofanimalcharactersandstorieswithanimals.

Bothanthropomorphismandthecloselyrelatedfolkpsychologymaybeexpressionsofa

relationalepistemologyintheWest,acommonsenseknowingthatdevelopsfrombeing

inrelationshipwithothersandthatmayinformtheliteraryimaginationofauthorsand

readers.

ANTHROPOMORPHISM

Theexactmeaningofanthropomorphismiscurrentlyamatterofsomedebate.

It’smeaninghaschangedovertimefromit’soriginalreligiousoneofattributinghuman

characteristicstoGod,somethingthatwasconsideredasin.(DastonandMitman,

Fisher,1996)Manyvariationsofanthropomorphismaredescribedintheliterature.For

example,LorraineDastondescribessociomorphismasanalogiesaremadeatthelevelof

society,generallyhumanandinsect.Gametheoryappliedtoanimalbehavioriscalled

coldanthropomorphismandempathybroughttobearonanalogiesiscalledhot

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anthropomorphism.GordonBurghardt(inRistau,1991)positsa‘critical

anthropomorphism’thatmaybeusefulforgeneratingscientificideasandpredicting

outcomes.Despitebeingwidelypracticed,it’smeaningamongmanyanimalscientistsis

thefalseattributionofhumanlikecharacteristicstoanimalsandtothingslikecarsor

computers.Changingmeaningsimplythattheyarehistoricallyandculturallybound.As

furtherevidenceforthis,Fisherstatesthat,“Japaneseprimatologistsaresingularly

unconcernedaboutissuesofanthropomorphismintheirstudiesofprimates.Cultural

historycannotbeignoredinexplainingthisfact.”(3)

Becausethepracticeofanthropomorphicattributionisunderstood(intheWest)

asauniversal,yetultimatelyfalse,tendency,itisthereforeconsideredanentrenched

probleminwesternscience,adangerouslyunempiricalreturntomysteriouscausesand

unfoundedsuperstition,and“anembarrassmenttobeavoided.”(3)Anychargeof

anthropomorphisminthescientificstudyofanimalsleadstoassumptionsoflaziness,

sloppythinking,orchildishnessinthesenseofnaïveinnocenceandalsointhesenseof

simpleorprimitive.(Irvine,Fisher,DastonandMitman,AllenandBekoff)

PhilosopherJohnFisherhasdevelopedabasicframeworktohelpclarifywhat

maybemeantbyanthropomorphism,andwhetherattributionsarefalseinallcases.He

beginswithtwobroadcategories,whichhelabelsInterpretiveandImaginative

Anthropomorphism.Interpretive,whichismeanttobeexplanatory,describes

inferencesofmentalisticpredicates(M‐predicates)suchasloyal,brave,orsneakyfrom

observedanimalbehavior.FisherarguesthatHardAnthropocentriccritics,whosupport

asharpdivisionbetweenhumansandotheranimals,havenotmadeaconvincingcase

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thatanthropomorphicattributionsarecategoricallyfallaciousbecausetheaccuracyof

theattributionsdependsonthespecificpredicate,situation,andspeciesinquestion.

FisherhasconcentratedhisanalysisonInterpretiveAnthropomorphism,leavingthe

Imaginativehalfoftheframeworkundeveloped.Heconcludesinpartthat,duetothe

hardwirednatureofourperceptionsofothers,innateunderstandingacrossspeciesis

plausibleandthatcommonsense“persistentlyrefusestodrawasharplinebetween

humansandotheranimals,andpersistsinretainingsympatheticfeelingsforanimals

andinunderstandingthemalonghumanlines”(11—12).

FisheragreeswithIrvinethatpeopledonotattributeindiscriminatelybut

insteadresponddifferentlytodifferentanimals.Whenwespendtimewithanimals,we

perceivetheirindividualityandrelatetotheirselveswithourselves.Thiscommonsense

approachissometimescalledfolkpsychologyandisdescribedastheuseofinsightor

self‐knowledgecombinedwithoutwardattentiontodescribeandpredictthebehavior

ofothers.Emotionalintelligenceandtheaccurateinterpretationofbodylanguage,

including‘vitalityaffects,’maycomprisesomeofthenonverbalskillsweuseto

understandanimalselves.AllenandBekoffsuggestthatfolkpsychologyisaprototheory

thatmayprovevaluableindevelopingmorerigoroustheoriesofanimalmind.Ristau

arguesforasimilarapproach;cognitiveethologistsshouldborrowwhatisneededfrom

folkpsychologyandleavetherest.

Anauthor,inordertocreateabelievableliterarycharacter,mustpractice

perspectivity;thatisheorshemustimagineaway,usinginsightsandknowledgegained

throughrelationships,intothesubjectiveexperienceofanotherpersonalitywithwhom

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readerswillrespond.Itislikely,givenevolutionarycontinuity,someformofsharedcore

selfamongEarth’sanimals,andanattitudeofopen,humbleattention,tounderstand

nonhumananimalsenoughtocreatebelievableanimalcharacters,notassymbolic

humans,butasanimalselves.

REALISTICANIMALSINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE

AssociationsbetweenchildrenandanimalsrundeepinEuro‐Americanculture.

Aswehaveseen,originsofanthropomorphictendenciesandanimistattributionsare

sometimessaidtoexistinchildhoodorinchildishunderstandingsoftheworld.(Irvine,

AllenandBekoff,Harvey,Bird‐David,Boyd,Morgenstern,2000)Animalsandchildren

areoftenportrayedtogetherinvisualimages,especiallythoseappealingtonostalgia

andinnocence.Animalsarecentralinchildren’sliteraturetoo,providingsimplicity

(Morgenstern),neutrality(BurkeandCopenhaver,2004),andchallenge(Marchant,

2005).

Animalsinchildren’sstorieswhowalkandtalklikepeopleareconsideredtobe

symbolichumansdelightinguswiththeirsimultaneoussimilaritiestoanddifferences

fromus(Morgenstern).Symbolichumancharactersprovidetheneededemotional

distancethatallowschildrentosafelytryonrolesandwrestlewithdifficultlife

situations(BurkeandCopenhaver).Verylittlehasbeendiscussed,however,aboutthe

realisticportrayalsofanimalsascharacters,althoughtheyhavebeenwithussincethe

Britishchildren’sbookpublishingindustrybegantoflourishinthemid‐eighteenth

century.

18

Animalprotagonistnarratorsmaybeconsideredanimalselvestellingthestory

fromtheirownperspective,justashumannarratorsare.Earlystoriesofthistypewere

oftengenerallifehistories,commentaryonhumanbehavior,oranti‐crueltytales.An

earlyexampleisDorothyKilner’sTheLifeandPerambulationofaMouse,publishedin

1783.AnnaSewellcombinedtheseelementsintoherclassicBlackBeauty(1877).

Towardtheendofthenineteenthcenturyandintothetwentieth,astyleboth

dramaticandrealisticwasbeingdevelopedinNorthAmerica.Examplesofthisnewstyle

includeWildAnimalsIHaveKnownbyCanadianE.T.Seton(1899)andstoriessuchas

CalloftheWild(1903)andWhiteFang(1906)byAmericanJackLondon.Manybooks

werebeingwrittenthatfeaturedanimalrelationships(bothwithandwithouthumans),

dramaticanddangerousplots,andnaturalisticsettings.TheYearling(MarjorieKinnan

Rawlings,1938),MyFriendFlicka(MaryO’Hara,1941),andIncredibleJourney(Sheila

Burnford,1961)areclassicexamples.EnglishmanRichardAdamswroteWatershipDown

(1972),arecentmodernclassicthatappealsequallytochildrenandadults.

Inadditiontotheirnaturalisticcharacterportrayalsandsettings,thesebooks

featurerelationshipsamongtheanimalsorbetweenanimalsandhumansthatarerich,

important,andrecognizablefromtheperspectiveofthereader.Theanimaloranimals

arethecenter,however,andtheconcernsoftheanimalcharactersareanimal

concerns.Assuchtheyarequitedistinctfromstoriesinwhichanimalswalkandtalklike

peoplewehaveknown.

19

CHAPTER3

CASESTUDY:ANIMALSELVESINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE

SURVEYDESCRIPTION

BurkeandCopenhaverdiscussfunctionsofwrittentextsinliterateculture

includingthatofmirroringtheworldaswehaveperceivedit.Howdoauthorsofrecent

children’sliteratureperceiveanimals?Whataresomeofthecharacteristicsofrealistic

portrayalsandoftheinteractionsbetweenhumanandanimalcharacters?Thefollowing

studywasconductedtoexploreanimalcharacterizationinmodernchildren’sliterature.

Iaminterestedinunderstandingwhethertheimaginationmaybeinformedbyaccurate

perceptionsofanimalsintheworldandhowthoseperceptionsaremanifestedin

naturalandrecognizablecharacterizationsofnonhumananimals.

Adescriptiveexploratorysurveyquestionnairewasdevelopedtoassessthe

animalcharactersinasmallsampleofrecentlypublishedchildren’sliterature.Three

bibliographiesofchildren’sbookswithdomesticanimal(usuallypet)characters

publishedbetween2000and2007providedtheinitialsampleof51booksforthecase

study.ThebrieflyannotatedbibliographiesarepublishedonthewebsiteofUniversityof

Illinois’CenterforChildren’sBooks;allthebookshavebeenfavorablyreviewedinthe

prestigiousBulletinoftheCenterforChildren’sBooks.Duplicatetitlesandoneyoung

adultnovelthatfeaturedananimalonlyinthetitlewereremovedfromthefinalsample

of46.(SeeAPPENDIX1)Thewide‐rangingsampleincludesfiction,nonfiction,and

poetryforpreschoolersthroughhighschoolteenagers.

20

Eachbookwasreadandthensurveyedonaseparateform.Descriptive

informationaboutthecharacters,andaboutspecificinteractionsandcommunication

modesbetweenhumanandanimalcharacters,evidenceofIrvine’sselfhoodelements,

andanycognitiveskillsattributedtoordemonstratedbytheanimalswererecorded.A

spreadsheetwasthencreatedtocollecttogetherdemographicdataoneachtitleand

thedescriptivedatagatheredinitially.Thespecificdetailsemergingfromthegeneral

surveywereusedtocreatesomegranularityinthespreadsheet.Patternsin

characterization,activities,species,targetreaderage,wereassessed.Muchmore

rigorousanalysiswithlargersamplesareneededbeforeconclusionscanbedrawnwith

confidence.However,afewinterestingresultsemerged,asshowninthetablesand

discussioninthenextsection.

FINDINGSANDDISCUSSION

Table1comparestwomaintypesofanimalcharacters,bipedal/clothedand

natural,intermsofvoiceandactivity.Talkingvoiceisdefinedasspeakingoutloudin

humanwordsandsentences.Novoiceissilenceorsimplythekindsofsoundsnormally

madebythespeciesinvolvedsuchasbarks,meows,chirps,andsoon.Innarrated

stories,theanimalprotagonisttalksdirectlytothereader;theanimaldoesnottalk

withinthestoryitself.Asshowninthetable,animalcharactersthatareportrayed

naturallyareoverwhelminglynarratorsorhavenovoiceandthosewhoarebipedal,

clothed,orbothspeakoutloudover50percentofthetime.Activitiesengagedinbythe

21

naturalcharactersarerecognizablythoseweseeinanimalsaroundusincontrasttothe

veryhumanactivitiesoftheclothedcharacters.

Bothfictionandnonfictionbooksarenarratedbyanimals.Forexample,Murphy

thedognarratesthefictionalADayintheLifeofMurphy(2003)inwhichhetellsthe

readerabouthisdaywithJohnthehounddogandTomFoolthecat.Thebarnanimals

are“dumb”andthehumanfamilyis“they.”Harry,alonghaireddachshund,introduces

tothereadertheproperwaytogreetdogsinthenonfictionbookMayIPetYourDog?

(2007).

Table 1. Comparing the voice and activities of bipedal/clothed and natural animalcharacters.

Type N Talking NarrationNoVoice

HumanActivitiesNaturalisticActivities

Bipedal/clothes

9 5 1 3

Cooking,dress‐up,goingtoschool,usingcarpenter’stoolsandpaintbrushes,superheroadventuring

Beingheldinlap,climbingatree

Natural 37 6 13 18 Singing

Gettingintostuff,eating,playing,goingtothevet,greeting,working,training,hunting,barking,runningaway,ridingincar

22

ThetwobroadcharacterizationsshowninTable1canbelabeledSymbolic

HumanandAnimalSelf.Animalcharacterswhoaresymbolichumanstendtospeakout

loudusinghumanlanguage.Theyarebipedalandoftenwearclothing.Thesecharacters

engageoverwhelminglyinhumanactivitieslikecooking,usingcarpenter’stools,and

superheroadventuring.AnimalSelfcharactersoftennarratestoriesdirectlytothe

reader,butdonotspeakwithinthem.Theymovewithanaturalgait,don’twear

clothing,andtheiractivitiesarerecognizableasnaturaltotheirspecies.

Table2.Animalnarrationinallbooksandinpicturebooks.

BookSample N AnimalnarrationPercentofbooks

AllBooks 46 14 30%

PictureBooks 24 10 42%

Animalnarratorsappeardemographicallyacrossthesample,although,asshown

inTable2,most(70%)arefoundinpicturebooksforyoungerchildren,includingthe

twoexamplesdescribedabove.OneveryinterestingexampleofanimalnarrationisI,

Jack(2000),afictionaljuvenilechapterbookinwhichaheroicyellowLabradorretriever

tellsacomplexstory.Inan“Interpreter’sNote”attheback,PatriciaFinney

acknowledgestheinfluenceofbothRudyardKipling’sThyServant,ADog(1930)and

booksondogpsychologyincreatingJack’svoice.Finneyusesvariationintextfontto

effectivelyrelaynonverbalcommunicationbetweenJackandhisApedogpack(italic

23

style)andJack’sstrengthoffeeling(fontsize).Thecommunicationitselfisusually,but

notalwayssuccessful;however,itisrecognizableasthatbetweenadogandahuman.

Forinstance,afterJackiscaughtraidingtherefrigeratorforhispregnant‘PackLady’

Petra,thedogsrunawaytofindanearbysafeplaceforPetratohaveherpuppies.On

thewayhome,Jackmeetshishuman‘Packleader’:

Hithere,Packleader!Areyoubetter?Whyareyououtofyournestand

walkingalongthepath,going‘Phhheeeweeet!’betweenyourteeth...

Youshouldberestinginyounest,gettingbetterfromyournastycold.

Oh.That’snice,youwerelookingforme.ShallwegoseePetra?

Sheisveryunfriendly,though.Canyousmellher?ThereisSpecialness

happeninginhertummy.It’sallverystrange...

Packleaderputsmyleashon.Heisbarkinglotsnow,veryquickly.

HeissayingBadBad.Heiscallingmestrangenames.Whatis‘vandal?

Whatis‘fiend’?”(84—85)

InJoyceSidman’sTheWorldAccordingtoDog:PoemsandTeenVoices(2003),

poeticattemptsaremadetodescribetheinteriorworldanddog‐nessofdogs.For

example,in“DogLore”Sidmanwrites,“Patienceandintensity/openthemostdoors.”

(56)Shealsoincludesshortprosenarrativeswrittenbyteensaboutdogstheyhave

known.Manyofthesepiecesdescribeveryimportantrelationshipsbetweenthemselves

ortheirfamilyandanindividualdog.SarahMiller(age13)honorsthememoryofBandy,

anabandonedpuppyfoundbySarah’sunhappyteenagedmother.Bandy“helpedmy

24

motherunderstandtheimportanceoflifeandaffection.Sheguidedmymotherto

appreciatingeverythingandeveryoneasmuchaspossible.”(13)

Inourrelationshipsovertimewithotherselves,whetherthoseselvesarehuman

oranimal,wegrowanddevelop,andintheprocesscometounderstandtheotherself

betteraswell.Theknowledgegainedaboutothersandourselvesisusedbywritersin

imaginativelycreatingcharactersandsituationsforthemtoactin.

CONCLUSION

Recentscholarshipinsociology,anthropology,andcognitiveethologyconverge

topointtodirectrelationshipasawaytoapprehendtothelargestdegreethe

subjectiveselfofnonhumanothers,particularlynonhumananimals.

Anthropomorphism,commonsense,andfolkpsychologymayallbe,moreorless,

expressionsofthisrelationalwayofknowingwhich,inWesterncivilization,enjoysthe

greatestauthorityinworksoftheimagination.

Historically,animalshavebeenportrayedintwobroadwaysinchildren’s

literature.Assymbolichumans,animalsareneutralstand‐inswhohelpyoungreaders

navigatelifeissues.Asrealisticanimalcharacters,animalselves,theyprovideglimpses

intoamore‐than‐humanworld.Authorsmay,inimaginativelydevelopingrealistic

animalcharacters,justastheydowhencreatinghumancharacters,employtheinsights

andknowledgegainedthroughrelationshipand,intheprocess,mirrortheworldaswe

perceiveit.

25

ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHYOFCORESOURCES

Allen,Colin,andMarkBekoff.SpeciesofMind:ThePhilosophyandBiologyofCognitiveEthology.Cambridge:MITPress,1997.

AllenandBekoffbeginbydescribingthisvolumeasasynthesisoftheoreticaland

empiricalapproachestothestudyofnonhumananimalminds.Theydescribecognitive

ethologyasthesystematicstudyoftheinformationprocessing,beliefs,and

consciousnessofanimalsfromcomparative,evolutionary,andecologicalperspectives.

CharlesDarwin’smentalcontinuityconceptiscentral;answerstoquestionsabout

sharedcognitiveandemotionalcharacteristicsacrossspecieswillshedlightonthe

natureandevolutionarydevelopmentofmentalandpsychologicalcapacities.

Animalbehaviorresearchthroughmostofthetwentiethcenturyhasbeen

guidedbythephilosophyofempiricismandpositivisminwhichmeaningisdependent

onreducingobservable,verifiableexperiencestologicalconstructions.Thegoalof

psychologicalbehaviorismistocontrolbehaviorandexplainbehaviorpatternsinaone‐

to‐onecorrespondencewithphysiologicalprocesses.Asanoverviewofthe

developmentofcognitiveethology,AllenandBekoffbroadlydescribethephilosophyof

naturalism,modernneo‐behaviorists,andclassicalethologists,particularlyKonrad

LorenzandNikolaasTinbergen,whosharedthe1973NobelPrize.

DonaldGriffin,whose1976bookTheQuestionofAnimalAwarenesshelpedto

establishthecurrentfieldofcognitiveethology,wasmainlyconcernedwithanimal

consciousnessandwithcreativeandversatilebehaviorinanimalsasevidencefor

cognitiveprocessing.AccordingtoGriffin,consciousnesslogicallyconfersanenormous

26

adaptiveadvantageofbehavioralchoicetoindividuals.Mostcognitiveethologistshave

concentratedtheirresearchonfindingevidenceofanimalintentionalityreasoningthat

behaviorwhichimpliesintentionalityandgoals,forinstanceplayorinjury‐feinting,also

impliessomeformofmemoryorplanning.

Criticismsingeneraldirectedatcognitiveethologyincludetheaccusationof

fallingbackoncausationbyinvisibleagents(the‘religioncard’),thebeliefthatanimal

mindsarepermanentlyclosedtous,andthedenialofevidenceforstimulus‐free

behavior(whichimpliesinternalmotivation).Inresponse,cognitiveethologistsjustify

mentalattributionsbecausetheyareoftenthemostparsimoniousexplanationfor

observations.Theypointtolaboratoryevidenceofstimulus‐freebehavior,especiallyin

observationallearningexperiments.AllenandBekoffclaimthatbehavioristsoften

privilegethegeneraloverthespecificasaconsequenceofthepressureforstatistical

averaging,thusignoringsignificantbehavioralvariations.Thematerialemphasisof

empiricalscienceisconsideredproblematicaswellbecausenaturalselectionactson

functional,notmaterial,properties.

Althoughgenerallyverycontroversial,theconceptoffolkpsychologycanbe

definedinamannerthatisuncontroversial.“Folkpsychologyconsistsofloose

generalizationsaboutmindandbehaviorthatarereflectedinwhatpeoplesayabout

mentalstatesandactions.”(65)Recognizingthatthementalisticterminologyusedin

folkpsychologicalexplanationsisoftennotclearlydefinedandthatnoadequate

frameworkformentalattributionexists,AllenandBekoffproposere‐conceptualizing

folkpsychology.Theyseeitasa‘prototheory’thataddressesconsciousnessandthe

27

semanticpropertiesofitscontentwithanevolutionaryemphasis.Folkpsychology

shareswithallcognitiveapproachestheideathatmentalstateshavepropositional

content.

Casestudiesincanidsocialplaybehaviorandtheanti‐predatorybehaviorof

birdsarediscussedinwhichemphasisisplacedtheimportanceofcommunication,

changeovertime,andthecorrectinterpretationoftheintentionsofothers.

InChapter8,AllenandBekoffdiscussanimalconsciousness.Theauthorsadvise

fellowcognitiveethologiststomoveawayfromThomasNagel’squestion,“Whatisit

liketobe...?”andfocusinsteadonwhichspeciespossessesconsciouscapacitiesby

targetingbehaviorsthatindicateconsciousness.

Bird‐David,Nurit.“‘Animism’Revisited:Personhood,Environment,andRelationalEpistemology.”CurrentAnthropology4(1999):S67—S91.

Bird‐Davidrevisitstheanthropologicalconceptofanimism,notingthatbasic

assumptionshavechangedverylittlesincetheintroductionoftheconceptinthe

nineteenthcenturybyEdwardTylor.Tracingtheideafromitsinception,Bird‐David

discussesTylorandhisinterestintheoriginsofreligion,andsubsequenttreatmentsof

animismbyEmileDurkheim,ClaudeLévi‐Strauss,andS.Guthrie.Aspartofher

reevaluation,Bird‐Davidfocusesontheconceptofpersonhoodandonecological

perception,presentingevidencefromherfieldworkwiththeSouthIndianNayaka

people,inparticulartheirdescriptionof‘devaru’asnonhumanpeoplewhointeractwith

theNayakaindailylifeandduringsocialevents.

28

Inordertodescribewhatdevaruare,Bird‐DavidbuildsonanthropologistA.

IrvingHallowell’sother‐than‐human‐persons(usinginsteadherterm‘superpersons’)

andM.Strathern’s‘dividual’.Other‐than‐human‐personsarepersonswhoarenot

humanbeings;theyareconsideredpersonsasandbecausetheyaresocialandwillful

beings,notbecausetheylookortalklikehumans.Adividualisapersonmadeupof

relationships,andisnotaboundedsingularitysetagainstothers.Duringregularlyheld

festivalsorsocialevents,localdevaruappearthroughNayakaperformerstotalkand

interactwiththeothersthere.Devaruarealsounderstoodtobespecificanimals,plants,

andotherenvironmentalfeatureswhointeractwiththeNayaka.Devaruareunderstood

toexistintheworld.

Inordertomakethismorecomprehensible,Bird‐DaviddrawsonJ.J.Gibson’s

ecologicalapproachtovisualperceptioninwhichthings“areperceivedintermsofwhat

theyaffordtheactor‐perceiverbecauseofwhattheyareforhim.”(Gibson,S74)Forthe

Nayaka,theenvironmentisconstantlychangingasaresultofinteractions.What

happenstoanimals,orotherdevarucharacters“(orhowtheychange)canaffectorbe

affectedbywhathappenstopeople(orhowtheychange).”(S77)Thesechanges

confirmtheexistenceofdevaru.Theskillofattentionmustbedeveloped;inthisway,

theenvironmentaffordsinformationthatcanbe“moreandmoresubtle,elaborate,and

precise.Knowingisdevelopingthisskill.”(Gibson,S78)Bird‐Davidcallscommunication

ofthiskind‘two‐wayresponsiverelatedness.’

Shegoesontotheorizethatrelationalwaysofknowing(knowingconnected

withbeing)isauniversalhumancapacitythatenjoysprimaryauthorityinmosthunter‐

29

gatherersocietiesandoftensecondaryauthorityelsewhere.Asawayofknowing,

relationalepistemologyiscomplementarywithobjectivist;Bird‐Davidconsidersbothto

berealandvalidandbothtohavelimits.

Commentsfromsevenscholarsinanthropologyappearattheendofthearticle

proper,mostinagreementingeneraloronmajorspecificpoints.TimIngoldoffersan

alternativeexplanationtothatofBird‐David’sontheoriginsofrelationalwaysof

knowing.TheoriesoftheevolutionofsocialintelligenceofferedbyBird‐David,according

toIngold,“restfairandsquareonamodernistconceptionofmindandbehavior”

(Ingold,S82)thatfunctionstoundermineanimisticperceptionbydividingtheworldinto

naturalandsocialandbyassumingthatlifeandmindareinteriorpropertiesof

individuals.“Humanbeingseverywhereperceivetheirenvironmentsintheresponsive

modenotbecauseofinnatecognitivepredispositionbutbecausetoperceiveatallthey

mustalreadybesituatedinaworldandcommittedtotherelationshipsthisentails.”

(Ingold,S82)

Boyd,Brian.“TailsWithinTales.”InKnowingAnimals,editedbyLaurenceSimmonsandPhilipArmstrong,217—43.Boston:KoninklijkeBrillNV,2007.

Boydaskswhywearesofascinatedby‘tailswithintales.’Afterlistingwide‐

rangingexamplesofanimalsinartthroughtimeandcurrentlypopularnon‐human

literaryothers,BoydtellsthestoryofGeorgeHerriman’scelebratedcomicKrazyKat.

Originallyoccupyingjustthebottomstripsinthepanelsofa‘plodding’humanstory,

TheDingbats,Krazy,IgnatztheMouse,andOffissaPupp,brokeawaythreeyearslater

tobecome“awildlysurrealandpoeticseriesofscratchynon‐sequiturs...astoryof

30

animalsliberatingtheimagination.”(219)BoydthencomparesthetwoGenesis

accountsintheOldTestamentcallingthefirst“arationalist’saccount”thatreflectsthe

GreatChainofBeingandthesecond“amuchmoreearthyworld”emphasizing

companionshipwithanimalsallaroundthehumancouple.

Employinganevolutionarypsychologicalexplanationforthisfascination,Boyd

notesthatanimals(includinghumans)mustbeabletorecognizeandinterpretother

animalsandfurther,thatmotionisimmediatelyorinitiallyinterpretedasagency,thus

consideredthebasicmodelofcausality.Insupport,Boyddescribesaclassic1944

psychologicalstudyinwhichstudentswereshownashortsilentfilmwithmoving

geometricshapesandaskedtodescribewhattheyhadseen.ResearchersFritzHeidler

andMarianneSimmelreportedthatonlyonerespondentspokeofgeometricshapes;all

theotherrespondents‘anthropomorphized’themovingfigures.Significantly,thistook

theformofstoryinwhich“aimsandmoods”wereassignedaswellasgendersand

voices.

Becausechildrenareoftenconsideredtobegrowingthroughearlierstagesof

humandevelopmentwhen,itissupposed,humanswereclosertootheranimals,they

areespeciallydrawntoanimals.Theyunderstandanimalsasfictitiouslystandinginfor

themandforotherpeople.“Yetwhenamenagerieofabsurdlydifferentspeciesspeak

tooneanother,inDr.SeussorDr.Doolittle,childrenalsoacceptthatasinonesense

perfectlynatural,sincetheycanseethatanimalsdohavetotakeaccountofthe

purposesofothercreaturesaroundthem.”(225)

31

Animalscontinuetoappearsignificantlyinseriousadultfictionaswell.Boyd

describesseveralreasonsforthis:Theyaresimilartoanddifferentfromusandalso

differentfromeachother,stimulatingtheimagination;theyplaymanyrolesinourlives

withthem;andtheyevokemanystrongfeelings.Becauseforustheyaremute“unable

toexplainthemselves...wehaveattributedtothemawholerangeofproperties.”

(227)

IntheWesterntradition,animalshavebeenunderstoodas‘sub‐souls’since

Heraclitus,Plato,andDescartes.“Livingunderamonotheisticandanthropocentric

religionandincitieswherewerelyonmechanicalratherthanbiologicalpower,

Westernershavetendedmoreandmoretostressthedistinctionbetweenhumanand

animal,todefine‘humane’asopposedto‘bestial’...andeven—andinthetwentieth

century,too!—todespise‘savages’fortheirreverencetowardanimals.”(228)

Inthelastseveralpagesofthisarticle,Boyddiscussesmanyexamplesofserious

adultliteratureincludingTheTempest,Joyce’sUlysses,AnnaKarenina,andMobyDick;

authorslikeJonathanSwift,H.G.Wells,FranzKafka,JulioCortázar,AngelaCarter,and

WillSelf;andeventhecomicstripsFarSideandCalvinandHobbestoillustratehow

pervasivelyinliteratureanimalsareusedtohelpusdefinewhoweareandtowrestle

withtheambiguousborderlandbetweenourselvesandotheranimals.

Brown,JosephEpes.AnimalsoftheSoul:SacredAnimalsoftheOglalaSioux.Rockport,MA:Element,Inc.,1992.

BrownfocusesontheimportanceofanimalsfortheLakotainhisdescriptionof

traditionalLakota“metaphysicsofnature.”Brownwritesthatthe‘metaphysics’are

32

definedseparatelybyeachgroupingreatdetailandarespecifictothelocal

geographicalfeaturesandspecies.Responsibilitiesandinterrelationshipsarespelledout

clearly.Relationshipswiththe‘vastwebofbeing’areestablishedandstrengthened

throughspecificritesandprayers,throughtheformandmaterialsofthebuiltlodge,

andthroughtheuseofthepipe.Anymanifestationofthespirit,especiallyanimals,can

teachorotherwisecommunicatewithpeople;theywanttocommunicate,buthuman

beings“mustdothegreaterparttoensureanunderstanding.”(22)

Communicationoftencomesduringdreamsandvisions,whenadifferentlevel

ofcognitionisaccessed,consideredmorerealthanthatofregularwaking

consciousness.Bothsleepingdreamsandwakingvisions,suchasthosereceivedduring

theVisionQuest(Hanblecheyapi)areconsideredequallypowerful.Mostdreamsand

visionsincludeencounterswitharangeofanimalrepresentativesandtutelaryspirits.

Theseareunderstoodas‘hypothetical’animalsorthespiritoftheanimalthatlives

behindthemanifestedworldandispartoftheGreatSpiritofcreation.Onceonehas

receivedavision,thesubjectiveexperienceofthatvisionmustthenberelayedtoaholy

personorhealerwhointerpretsitandprescribesaction.Therecipientisobligedto

sharetheexperience,generallythroughperformance,withtherestofthepeoplein

ordertoactivateanypowertransmitted.

Withtheproperattitudeofhumility,onecanrequestspecificpowersoraskfor

guidanceonaspecificproblemduringaquest.Individualdreamersmayreceivesongs,

rituals,orotherteachings;personalnames;orpowerstoheal,amongothergifts.Much

dependsonthe“persistence,receptivity,orcapabilitiesoftheindividual.”(56)The

33

animalspiritsarenotunderstoodascontrollinghumandestiny,butmoreaswitnesses

toit.

BrowndiscussesLakotaanimalcategoriesandtraditionalsystemsofassociation

thatlinkcertainanimalsandotherpowersorforcestogether,oftenbasedonbehavior

oreffect.Forexample,Whirlwindisassociatedwiththepowertoconfuseordisorient

and,beingtwo‐leggeds,birdsandhumansarecloselyassociated.

Traditionallyanimalsareobservedcloselyindailylife,theirpowersand

behaviorssometimesbecomingmodelsforidealhumanbehavior.Forexample,bison

areobservedtotakegreatcareoftheyoung,andsoprovideamodelforhuman

parenting.Duetothisanimistapproachshapingtheirworldviewovermanycenturies,

manyLakotapeoplehaveaprofoundunderstandingoftheirnaturalenvironmentasa

physicalaswellasspiritreality.

Burke,CarolynA.,andJobyG.Copenhaver.“AnimalsasPeopleinChildren’sLiterature.”LanguageArts81,no.3(January2004):205—13.

BurkeandCopenhaverarguethatchildhoodstories,especiallythose“personally

significant”favoritesthattouchedemotionalchordsandwerereadoverandover,

addressedneedsthatmaynothavebeenclearlyunderstood.Theauthorsare

concernedwithchildren’sliteratureasa‘thinkingdevice,’helpingchildrentomake

sense,understandvalues,andgeneratequestionsaboutlife.‘Thinkingdevice’functions

inchildren’sliteratureareamoderntrend,reflectingmodernconceptionsofthe

meaningofchildhoodasatimeto“adapt,contributetochange,andcriticallyexplore

issuesandoptions.”(211)

34

Thehighfrequencyofanimalcharactersinthesestoriesfunctiontoprovide

somedistance,a‘bufferedengagement’thatallowschildren“tocriticallyexplorethat

which(they)wouldnotbecomfortableexploringdirectly.”(207)

Asahighlyliteraryculture,wemakeuseoftextsregularlytoorganizeour

thoughts,relayvalues,anddialoguewitheachother.Inmanycases,foradultsaswellas

forchildren,animalcharactersaretheretohelpuswrestlewithcomplexand

emotionallydifficultsituations.Theauthorsurgeteachersandparentstoconsiderthis

functionofchildren’sliteratureandtousetheappealing‘anthropomorphicdevice’of

animalcharactersindevelopingcurriculumandopeningdialoguewithchildrenabout

issuesofculturalsignificance.

Burton,Lloyd.WorshipandWilderness:Culture,Religion,andLawinPublicLandsManagement.Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,2002.

BurtonexaminesthelargerissueofreligioususeofU.S.publiclandsby

examiningandcomparingreligiouspracticesofNativeAmericansandEuro‐Americans

andhowthepracticesandbeliefsaffectactivism,law,andinterculturalconflict.

Throughout,Burtonfocusesonwildanimals,particularlyBison,connectingthese

animalstolaw,spirituality,andculturalconflictforbothNativepeopleandEuro‐

Americans.Indescribingcurrentconflictsovercontrolofbuffaloherdsonpubliclands,

Burtonstatesthat,“Environmentalconservationgroupsandwesternranchinginterests

experiencepoliticalandlegalconflictinpartbecausetheyareproceedingfrom

profoundlydifferentunderstandingsofwhattheappropriaterelationshipbetween

humankindandotherlivingcreaturesoughttobe.”(183)Euro‐Americanconservation

35

groups,accordingtoBurton,oftenhavemoreincommonwithNativeworldviewsthan

withranching,fishing,loggingoranyotherindustrial‐scaleharvestinginterests.

Inattemptingtoconstructivelyaddressconflict,inwhichoneperspectivemust

winout,Burtondiscussesthepossibilityofmorethanonecorrectperspective.Burton

arguesfor“simultaneouslyoccurring‘realmsofknowing’“(9)andstatesfurtherthat

twometaphors“maycombinetoformaperspectivebroadenoughtomeettheneedsof

bothgroups.”(27)

Burtonlinkshistoricalandmodernreligiousmovementsinthiscountrytoanew

re‐discoveryofthesacred.Duringthewestwardexpansionera,explorersintovast

pristinewildernessareasexperiencedaweandreverence.Theinfluenceofnineteenth‐

centurytranscendentalism,authentictwentieth‐centurytransmissionteachingsofAsian

traditions,andagrowingappreciationandrespectfortraditionalindigenouswayshas

setthestageforaseriousreevaluationand“greening”ofmainstreamChristianand

Jewishpolicyandinterpretation.Sparkedbyconcernsforenvironmentalintegrityand

byLynnWhite’s1967article(seebelow),manydenominationsandcoalitionshave

issuedpolicystatements“producedasaresultoftheologicalinquiry...(inwhich)the

stewardshipinterpretation...seemstohavecarriedtheday.”(259)

Daston,Lorraine,andGreggMitman,ed.ThinkingWithAnimals:NewPerspectivesonAnthropomorphism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2005.

Inthiseditedvolume,anthropologists,philosophers,ethologists,historians,and

artistsexaminehowandwhywethinkwithanimalsandhowhumansandanimalsare

transformedbytheserelationships.Intheintroduction,theeditorsdescribethetitleas

36

ahavinga‘doublemeaning.’Humansboth“assumeacommunityofthoughtand

feelings”withawidevarietyofanimalsand“recruitanimalstosymbolize,dramatize,

andilluminate”experiencesandfantasies.

Citingthewidelyacknowledgedlinkbetweenthe“riseofmodernsciencewith

thewaningofanthropomorphicattitudestowardthenaturalworld”(3),theeditorslist

thetypesofreasonsoftengivenforavoidinganthropomorphicattributionsincluding

methodological(Howcanweknow?),historical(attributionsunsubstantiatedinthelab),

andevenmoral(narcissisticprojectionsorlaziness).Whydowecontinuetouniversally

anthropomorphize?Because,sayDastonandMitman,itisusefulforliterarysymbolism,

forsellingproducts,forwonderingwhatbeingananimalislike.

Inherchapter,“Intelligences,Angelic,Animal,Human,”LorraineDaston

comparesthirteenth‐centuryrationaltheologians’attemptstounderstandthemindsof

nonhumanangelswiththatofanimalbehaviorists’nineteenthcenturyattemptsto

understandnonhumananimalminds.Inbothcasesanthropomorphismisconsidereda

problem,asthescholarsnecessarilyreliedonanalogy.Theterm‘anthropomorphism’

beganasadesignationforfalseattributionofhumancharacteristicstoGodandwas

consideredasin,whichmayhelptoexplainsomeofthemoralcondemnationthatstill

existsinthecharge.Bothtraditionswereprimarilyinterestedinthethoughtsand

feelingsofnonhumanothersandbothattempts,Dastonstates,arguablystretchedthe

understandingof“thenatureandlimitsofthehumanmind.”(39)

AccordingtoPaulWhite,inhiscontributingchapter“TheExperimentalAnimalin

VictorianBritain,”thenineteenthcenturysawadramaticriseinbothmiddleclasspet

37

keepingandinlaboratory‐basedinvestigationofcomparativephysiologyusinglive

animalsubjects.Whitediscussessomeofthetensionsthiscombinationproduced.For

example,althoughtheuseoffrogsinsuchexperimentswentunremarked,theuseof

domesticanimalssuchasdogs,thenpresentinmanyhouseholds,‘triggeredprotests’

andclaimsthatitwas“treacherousandinsensitivetocommitsuchanimals,whohad

beenbredandtrainedupsoastoplacetheirconfidenceinhumanstoscientificuse(and

whosewayswere)morewinning...morereallyandintenselyhuman...thanthe

artificial,coldandselfishcharactersonemeetstoooftenintheguiseofladiesand

gentlemen.”(68)

Manyoftheopponentsofvivisectionandotherpainfulexperimentsworried

aboutthebrutalizingeffectsonthescientiststhemselveswhodesignedandcarriedout

proceduresthatcaused“repeatedandprolongedinflictionofpainonhelplesscreatures

(70)...(witha)disciplineddisregardforthefeelingsorperspectiveoftheanimalunder

study.”(75)

CharlesDarwin,Darwin’sdiscipleGeorgeRomanes,andotherswere,atthis

sametime,collectingandclassifyinganecdotalevidenceformentalandemotional

continuityacrossspecies.Thisevidence,althoughdismissedbyexperimentalscientists

assentimentalnonsense,waseffectivelyusedtogathersupportbyearlyanimalrights

andanticrueltyactivists.

In“PeopleinDisguise:AnthropomorphismandtheHuman‐PetRelationship,”

JamesA.Serpellcomparestheeffectsonpeopleandonanimalsofthehuman‐pet

relationship.Forpeople,thebenefitsarewelldocumented;theyincludeincreased

38

physicalhealthandfeelingsofbeinglovedandofbelonging.Someoftheeffectson

animalsarenotsoclearlybeneficial.Populationsofdomesticanimalshaveboomed(as

theirwildcounterparts’populationshavedwindled)anddogs,cats,andothercommon

petsnowoccupyanovelecologicalniche.Perhapsmoredisturbingare

“anthropomorphicbreedingselection”practicesthatattempttocreateanimalstocater

tohumanwhimsandexpectations.TheEnglishbulldog,forexample,hasbeenbredto

havesuchaflatfacethatbreathingproblemsoccur,oftenresultinginprematuredeath.

Otherexamplesincludedockinganddeclawingprocedures,overdependenceon

humanstosolveproblems,anxietyanddistressonbeingleftalone,andhuman

rejectionoftheanimalforbehaviorthatmaybenatural,butnotinlinewith

expectations.Serpellcommentsthatanthropomorphismmaybeeasy,butthat

appreciating‘dog‐ness’or‘cat‐ness’arespecialskillsthatneedtobelearned.

Fisher,JohnAndrew.“TheMythofAnthropomorphism.”InReadingsinAnimalCognition,editedbyMarcBekoffandDaleJamieson,3—16.Cambridge,Mass:MITPress,1996.

Thechargeofanthropomorphism,withitsimplicationoflaziness,sloppiness,

andsentimentality,isgenerallyregardedasanembarrassmentandanobstacleinthe

studyofanimalconsciousness.Fisherarguesthatthefallacyofanthropomorphism“is

neitherwell‐definednorclearlyfallacious.”(3)Forexample,Fisherasks,whatarethe

uniquelyhumancharacteristicsthataremistakenlyattributedtonon‐humans?There

areindicationstheconceptitselfmaybehistoricallyandculturallybound.Theoriginal

theologicalmeaningofattributinghumancharacteristicstoGodhascometomean

39

attributinghumancharacteristicstononhumananimalsandobjects.Thereisevidence

thatJapaneseprimatologistsareunconcernedaboutanthropomorphicattributions.

Fisherclaimsthattheoristshavedifferentconceptionsofanthropomorphism

withoutbeingawareofit.Asanattempttodisambiguateanthropomorphism,Fisher

outlinesatheoreticalframeworkwithtwobroadcategorieshelabelsInterpretiveand

ImaginativeAnthropomorphism.Interpretiveismeanttobeexplanatory,inferringthat

ananimalisbraveorsweetnatured,forinstance,fromobservingbehavior.This

categoryissubdividedintoCategorical(inferenceiscategoricallyinapplicable)and

Situational(inferenceisinapplicableinthissituation).Afurthersubdivisionof

Categoricaldesignatesaninferenceanthropomorphicdependingonspeciesoron

predicate(quality).

Arangeofpositionscriticaltoanthropomorphismmaybetakenfromthatof

disallowinganyinferencesatalltodisallowingcertainspeciesfromconsiderationor

certainpredicates.Mostcriticsviewtheuniversalhumantendencyto

anthropomorphizeaschildishandoverlyimaginative,evendangerous,areturnto

unfoundedsuperstitionandinvisible,immeasurablecauses.

Fisherrepliesthatpeopledomakedistinctionsamongvariousspeciesandthat

evenchildrenrecognizethefictitiousnatureofhumanizedportrayals.“Commonsense

persistentlyrefusestodrawasharplinebetweenhumansandotheranimals,and

persistsinretainingsympatheticfeelingsforanimalsandinunderstandingthemalong

humanlines.”(11—12)Itisentirelyplausible,accordingtoFisher,thatunderstanding

40

oneanotherusinghardwiredperceptionsisaninnateabilityprovidingaccurate

informationaboutotherhumansandnonhumananimalsatleastsomeofthetime.

Harvey,Graham.Animism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2006.

AsHarveystates,themainpurposeofhisbookistotakeseriously“intimations

thattheterm‘person’appliesnotonlytohumans...buttoafarwidercommunity”(xii)

whichmayenrichdebatesabouttheenvironmentandaboutconsciousness.Harvey

outlinesanddiscusses‘old’animism,coveringatsomelength“Tylor’sspirits,”

“Durkheim’stotems,”and“Guthrie’santhropomorphism,”beforeintroducing‘new’

animistconcepts.“The‘newanimism,’“accordingtoHarvey,“islessaboutattributing

lifeand/orhuman‐likeness,thanitisaboutseekingbetterformsofpersonhoodin

relationships.”(16)The‘newanimism’beginswithA.IrvingHallowell’sinfluential1960

article“OjibweOntology,Behavior,andWorldView.”

Hallowell’s‘other‐than‐human‐persons,’aconceptbasedonhisfieldworkwith

theOjibwapeople,arethosenonhumansdefinedbytheirinteractions,theirwillfulness,

andtheirsociability,ratherthantheirphysicalorverballikenesstohumanbeings.The

skillsoneneedsinordertoactasaperson,thatisrespectfully,arelearnedovertime

andareseenmoreofteningrownandelderlyhumansthaninchildren.Foraspecific

exampleofthistypeofcategory,HallowellusestheOjibwadesignation‘grandfather,’

whichisreservedforthose,humanandotherwise,whoactlikethegrandfatherideal.

“Grandfathersarethosewhoarelistenedto,whocommunicatemattersofsignificance,

whoinculcaterespectfulliving,andteachskills.Grandfathersarepersonswithpower

41

andgiftstobestow.”(18)ThecategoriesofpersonhooddescribedbyHallowell

challengemodern,Westernnotionsofwhatconstitutesaperson.

Harveypresentsfourcasestudiesthatillustratethediversityofanimist‐type

beliefsandpractices,lookinginturnatOjibwelanguage,Maoriarts,Aboriginallawand

land,andEco‐Paganactivism.Animistissuesregardinglifeevents,ceremonialevents,

andethicsarecoverednext.Ofparticularinterestarethechaptersonpersonhoodand

consciousness.

Asalreadymentioned,animistsconsiderpersonstobesobasedon

communicationandrelationship.Theyarealsosignificantintheirparticularity.Itiswith

particularbeings,whetherasingledeer,badger,rock,ortree,thatengagement

happens.Animistbeliefsandpracticesareparticularaswellfromonesocietytothe

next.

Harveyarguesforthedevelopmentofnewtermstoexpressnewandnewly

discoveredideas.Forexample“knowingbodies”canbeusedtoindicatetheembodied

natureofbrains,selves,andconsciousness.Manyoftheseanimistideasarecurrently

reflectedbymodernWesternsocietyinartandotherworksoftheimagination.The

authorsandreadersofmodernliterarymovementssuchasmagicalrealismandanimist

realism,emanatingfromrecentlycolonizedpartsoftheworld,“resistdis‐enchantment

andcontinuetoenjoylivinginaworldthatisnotreducedtobeingahumanartefact.”

(207)

42

Ingold,Tim.“RethinkingtheAnimate,Re‐AnimatingThought.”Ethnos71,no.1(2006):9—20.

“Animism(is)traditionallyunderstoodas‘theimputationoflifetoinertobjects’

thatdescribesatypicallywesternhabit,thoughusuallyappliedtoindigenouspeoples.

Ingoldarguesthattheconventionalunderstandingis‘misleading’becauseanimismisa

conditionofbeingandnotasystemofbeliefsandthat,duetothefluidnatureofreality,

‘animacy’isalsoaconditionwithrootspriortoanymaterialdifferentiation.Animistic

ontologycanbemoreaccuratelyunderstoodas“awayofbeingthatisaliveandopento

aworldincontinuousbirth.”(9)

IngolddiscussesevidencethatWesternartistssuchasPaulKleeandMerleau‐

Pontyintheirjournalssometimesdescribeasimilaropenness.

Thepainter’srelationtotheworld,Merleau‐Pontywrites,isnota

simple,‘physical‐optical’one.Thatis,hedoesnotgazeuponaworldthat

isfiniteandcomplete,andproceedtofashionarepresentationofit.

Rather,therelationisoneof‘continuedbirth’—theseareMerleau‐

Ponty’sverywords—asthoughateverymomentthepainteropenedhis

eyestotheworldforthefirsttime.Hisvisionisnotofthingsinaworld,

butofthingsbecomingthings,andoftheworldbecomingaworld.(12)

Ingoldgoesontodescribeanimicrelationsasoccurringon“trailalongwhichlife

islived”andnotassomethingthatoccurs“betweentheorganism‘here’andthe

environment‘there’.”(13)Movementinthiscaseisprimary.Knowingisrelatedto

being,embeddedintheveryexperienceofbeingalive.Bywayofcontrast,Ingoldstates

thatempiricalscienceasawayofknowing“restsuponanimpossiblefoundation

43

(becauseitsmethodsattempttoplaceinquiry)aboveandbeyondtheveryworldit

claimstounderstand.”(19)

Irvine,Leslie.IfYouTameMe:UnderstandingOurConnectionWithAnimals.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,2004.

Irvine’sbookbeginswiththepremisethatanimalsareemotionalandfeeling

beingsandmakestheargumentthatanimalshelpshapeouridentitiesinrelationship

becausetheyhaveselveswithwhichourselvesrelate.Thedimensionsofthisselfhood

aremutuallyapprehendedandstrengthenedduringintersubjectiveinteractionthat

exercisesandchallengesourrelationshipandemotionalskills.Irvinearguesthatanimals

areconsciousindividuals;theyarenotinterchangeableandtheyareself‐awareina

differentwaythanweare.

Irvineborrowsthespecificelementsofacoreselfthatwesharewithother

animalsfromWilliamJames’fourfeaturesof‘I,’refinedwithpreverbalinfantstudies.

Theelementsareagency(selfcontrol),coherence(integrity),affectivity(emotional

capacity),andcontinuity(selfhistory).Thelastelement,continuity,connects,through

memory,theotherthreeintoanindividualsubjectivityorindividualselfthat

intersubjectivelyinteractswithotherselves.Noticethatnoneofthisreliesonspoken

language;ourabilitytotalkaboutitdoes,butnotourabilitytohavetheinteractive

relationships,sharingintentions,feelings,andthoughtswithnonhumanothers.

AccordingtoIrvine,intentionscanbeindividualorshared,feelingsareemotional

states,andthoughtsinthiscontextcanbeunderstoodasthefocusofattention.

44

Irvinediscussesexamplesofthesesharedexperiences.Playbehavior,for

instance,isahighlycomplexandcoordinatedactivityinwhichcommunicating

intentionsandinterpretingtheintentionsofothersiscrucial.Amoodorcontextmust

beestablishedthatcreatesaprotective‘frame,’oftenwithsignalssuchasthecanine

playbow.Thefamous‘counting’horseCleverHanswasdiscoveredtobeaccurately

readingtheemotionalsignalsfromthepeoplewhocametoseehimperform.Inthis

way,he‘knew’whenthecorrectanswerwasreached.Wesharethefocusofattention

withdogswhenwemakeeyecontactinordertocheckin.Dogsguidethefocusof

humanattentiontothedoororafooddish,indicatingclearlywhatisonthedog’smind

orwhatthedoghopeswillhappen.

OthertopicsdiscussedbyIrvineincludeanimaldomestication,thetwentieth‐

centurytransitionfrom‘pet’to‘companion’animal,animalrelationshipsasresources

forhumanself‐construction,andsomeofthedeepimplicationsforsocietyin

consideringanimalsasotherselves.

Marchant,Jennifer.“‘AnAdvocate,aDefender,anIntimate’:Kristeva’sImaginaryFatherinFictionalGirl‐AnimalRelationships.”Children’sLiteratureAssociationQuarterly30.1(2005):3—15.

Inthisarticle,Marchantdiscussesfictionalbondsbetweenadolescentgirl

protagonistsandanimalsasavitalpartofthepsychicdevelopmentforthehuman

protagonist,providingamodelfortheadolescentreadernavigatingthesamecurrents.

Duringthisperiodofadolescentdevelopment,called‘abjection,’boundariesare

45

redefined,astheyounggirlismovingfromtheperiodofunitywithhermotherto

greaterautonomyandintegrationintheadultsocialorder.

AccordingtoMarchant,theanimals(dogs,horses,andadragon)appearingin

hersamplebooksareKristevanImaginaryFatherfigures,father‐motherconglomerates

withwhomadirectandimmediateidentificationismade,whoprovideadeeply

satisfyinglovewithboundaries,andwhoreflectandsupportegoidealsandadult

standards.Althoughaddressingarealneedintheyoungreader’slife,it“seemslikely

that,forsomereaders,atleast,muchoftheattractionisintheprotagonist‐animalbond

itself.”(14)

Morgenstern,John.“ChildrenandOtherTalkingAnimals.”TheLionandtheUnicorn24(2000):110—127.

Children’sliteratureiswidelyconsideredtobesimple.Inordertounderstand

whatconstitutesthissimplicity,MorgensterncomparesC.S.Lewis’useoftalking

animalsinhischildren’sbooks(ChroniclesofNarnia,1950‐‐1956)andhisadultscience

fictionSpaceTrilogyincludingOutoftheSilentPlanet(1938).Heconcludesfromthe

textsandfromLewis’ownstatementsininterviews,thatLewisdeliberatelyremoved

uncomfortableambiguitiesabouttalkinganimalsfromhischildren’sbooks,andthatthis

itselfsimplifiesthestory.Theambiguousfeelingsthemselvesaredescribedasdisgust

aboutembodimentanduneasinessabouttheunclearboundariesbetweenhumansand

animals.

Morgensterndistinguishesbetweenananimalthattalks,aflatcharacterization

thatevokesdelight,andanalientalker,whomoneis‘tempted’tothinkofasaman,and

46

whotherefore‘becomesabominable’.Thedifferencesaresubtle.“Whatisbeing

assertedhereisadifferencethatisnotreallyadifferenceintheanimalthattalksbut,as

Lewispointsout,adifferencein‘thepointofview’oftheobserver.”(112)Lewismakes

another,relatedpoint:ifoneis“‘accustomedtomorethanonerationalspecies’“(112)

thenthereisnoproblem.

Nagel,Thomas.“Whatisitliketobeabat?”ThePhilosophicalReview,LXXXIII,4(October1974):435—450.

Nageldescribesconsciousexperienceasa‘widespreadphenomenon’,

attributingitto‘manylevelsofanimallife’andyet,asheacknowledges,itishardto

knowwhatevidencetocaptureormeasureobjectivelyinsupportofitsexistence.

Certainlyawakingconsciousexperiencethroughanorganism’ssenseperceptions

meansthatitis“somethingitisliketobethatorganism.”Nagelusestheexampleofa

bat;theyaremammalsandyettheirexperienceisverydifferentfromahumanonedue

toitssensoryapparatusanddailyactivities.Thisproblemofaccuratelyapprehending

another’sexperienceappearsintractable;thatis,wecannotcapturetheexperienceof

anotherwithcurrentmethodsofobjectivescience.

Theproblemisnotjustspeciestospecies,butindividualtoindividual.Because

weareunabletoseparateourselvesfromourownsubjectivity,wecannotobjectively

approachanother’s.Every“subjectivephenomenonisessentiallyconnectedwitha

singlepointofview,anditseemsinevitablethatanobjective,physicaltheorywill

abandonthatpointofview.”(38)Nagelconcludeshisinfluentialarticlebypredicting

thatwemayneverbesatisfiedthatweknowanotherorganism’spointofviewfully,and

47

that,sinceweare‘restrictedtotheresourcesofourownmind’,wemustrelyonour

imaginationatpresenttodescribeanother’ssubjectivepointofview.

Ristau,CarolynA.ed.CognitiveEthology:TheMindsofOtherAnimals:essaysinhonorofDonaldR.Griffin.Hillsdale,NewJersey:LawrenceErlbaumAssoc.,1991.

PartofaseriescalledComparativeCognitionandNeuroscience;thepapers

collectedherearefroma1987symposiuminanimalcognition,authoredbyresearchers

andphilosophersincognitiveethology.ColinG.Beeraddressesfolkpsychologicalterms

andconcepts,pointingoutthatthephilosophicaldefinitionofintentionalityisbroader

thanthatusedbycognitiveethologists.Hewondersiflanguage‐basedcriteriaare

anthropocentricandwhethertheycanbetranslatedintononlinguisticterms.Jonathan

Bennettalsodiscussestheintentionalanalysisofbehavior,advocatingmultiple

approachesasawayofdevelopingaricherpicture.GeorgF.Michelcoversmanyofthe

concernsaboutthe‘overrichness’offolkpsychologicalterminologyanditsfailureto

predicthumanbehavior.EchoingThomasNagel,SonjaI.YoergandAlanC.Kamilremind

usthatonecannothavedirectevidenceofanother’sconsciousness.Theauthorsdrawa

lineofinfluencefromCharlesDarwintoDonaldGriffin;bothargueforthelikelihoodof

mentalcontinuityacrossanimalspeciesgiventheevolutionarycontinuityofsomany

otherprocessesandstructures.

Othercontributorsdiscussspecificstudiesofconsciouschimpanzeebehavior

(AllisonJolly),artificiallanguageacquisitioninparrots(IrenePepperberg),andfalse

signalingbehavior(DorothyL.CheneyandRobetM.Seyfarth;PeterMarler,Stephen

Karakashian,andMarcelGyger;W.JohnSmith).CarolynA.RistauandGordonM.

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Burghardteachapplythefolkpsychologicalterm‘intentionalstance’totheanti‐

predatorfeintingbehaviorofshorebirds(Ristau)andhognosesnakes(Burghardt),

pointingoutthepurposefulorfunctionalqualityofthebehaviorandarguingthat

successfuloutcomesleadtoreinforcementthat,overevolutionarytime,maysupport

morevoluntarycontrol.

DonaldGriffinsurveystheprimarycriticismsofcognitiveethology,includingfluid

termdefinitionsandunevencriticalstandards,thebeliefthatconsciousthinkinghasno

effectonbehavior,thecommondismissalofanyevidenceofconsciousthinkingin

nonhumananimals,andtheaprioriassumptionthatsubjectivitycanneverbeknown.

Thesediscouragingpositionsshouldbeignored,arguesGriffin.Instead,cognitive

ethologistsshouldworktoclarifyelementarydefinitionsofconsciousnessappliedto

animalsbyworkingonsimplecasesandaskingwhatfunctionsareservedbybehaviors.

Inparticular,findingsofcognitivecreativityandenterprisesupporttheviewthat

animalshaveatleastanelementaryconsciousness.

WhiteJr.,Lynn.“TheHistoricalRootsofOurEcologicCrisis.”Science155,no.3767(1967):1203—1207.

Infoursuccinctpages,historianLynnWhitediscussesthetremendousimpact

humanshavehadonthenaturalenvironmentthroughtime,particularlyinNorthern

andWesternEurope.AccordingtoWhite,Christianaxioms,suchasthatof‘dominion,’

createdanattitudeofindifferencetothedestructionofthenaturalworld,and

combinedwiththeIndustrialAgefusionofscienceandtechnology,acceleratedthat

destruction,producingthecurrentenvironmentalcrisis.

49

Fromthemedievalinventionofheavierandmoredestructiveplowsthat

resultedinchanginglanddistributionsystemstothetechnicalsuperioritythatmade

possibletheplunderingoftheknownworldbythe“small,mutuallyhostilenations”of

Europe,Westernskills“inthedevelopmentofpowermachinery,labor‐savingdevices,

andautomation”remainedconsistent,continuingintothepresentday.

Forthesedeeplyentrenchedreasons,Whiteargues,theapplicationofmore

scienceandtechnologywillnotavertfurthercrises;rootcausesforourbeliefsand

actionsmustbeunderstood.WhitedeclaresthatthetriumphofChristianityover

paganismwas“thegreatestpsychicrevolutioninthehistoryofourculture”and

Christianbeliefs,profoundlyconditioningourviewsonhumannatureanddestiny,must

bereexamined.

Wynne,CliveD.L.DoAnimalsThink?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004.

Wynne’sbookcontainschaptersdetailinganimalstudiesinavarietyofareas,

includingprimatelearning,languageexperiments,andproblemsolving;sensory

perceptionsofbats;insectcommunication;thesymbolicmeaningsandrolesofpigeons

invariouscultures;artificiallanguageacquisitioninbirds;anddolphinperceptionand

intelligence.Heusesmanyexamplesthroughouttosupporthiscontentionthat

nonhumananimalsarenotintelligentorconsciousintheuniquewaythathumansare,

butthatmuchcanbeobjectivelyunderstoodaboutthenatureandrealityofanimals

andthatmuchissharedbetweenhumansandotheranimals.

50

Manyofthedisagreementsaboutanimalawareness,cognition,andintelligence

revolvearoundwhichqualitiesandcapacitiesaresharedandwhichdistinctfrom

speciestospecies,andinparticular,whatcharacteristicsareuniquetohumanbeings.

Tohelpinclarifyingthisimportantquestion,Wynneintroduceswhathecallsthe

SimilaritySandwich,athree‐layerframeworkforunderstandingsimilaritiesand

differences.Thebottom(bread)layerasksthequestion,whatisdifferent?Allspecies

aredifferent,generallybasedonvarietyinanatomyandsenseperceptions.Themiddle,

orfixins,layerasks,whatisshared?Someinstinctsandcertaincognitivecapacitieslike

basicmemoryandconceptformationseemtobesimilaracrossawidespectrumof

animallife.Thetop(bread)asks,whatisnearlyuniqueinhumans?Here,Wynne

suggests,canbeplacedtheuseofcomplexlanguageandanindependentself‐

awareness.

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APPENDIXA:SURVEYSAMPLE

Thefollowingisachronologicallistofthe46titlessurveyed.TheyweretakenfromthreebibliographiesofrecommendedbooksaboutpetspublishedonthewebsiteoftheUniversityofIllinois’CenterforChildren’sBooks.TheoriginalbibliographieswereaccessedinFebruary2010athttp://ccb.lis.illinois.edu/bibliographies.html.

George,JeanCraighead.HowtoTalktoYourCat.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2000.

George,JeanCraighead.HowtoTalktoYourDog.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2000.

Adoff,Arnold.DaringDogandCaptainCat.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2001.

Cowley,Joy.AgapanthusHumandMajorBark.NewYork:PhilomelBooks,2001.

Graham,Bob.“Let’sGetaPup!”SaidKate.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2001.

Holub,Joan.WhyDoCatsMeow?NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2001.

Holub,Joan.WhyDoDogsBark?NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2001.

Simont,Marc.TheStrayDog.NewYork:HarperCollins,2001.

Harvey,Amanda.DogEared.NewYork:DoubledayBookforYoungReaders,2002.

Collicott,Sharleen.ToestomperandtheBadButterflies.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,2003.

Cullen,Lynn.LittleScragglyHair:ADogonNoah’sArk.NewYork:HolidayHouse,2003.

Farish,Terry.TheCatWhoLikedPotatoSoup.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2003.

Florian,Douglas.BowWowMeowMeow:It’sRhymingCatsandDogs.SanDiego:Harcourt,2003.

Lee,HoBaek.WhileWeWereOut.LaJolla,Calif.:Kane/Miller,2003.

52

Little,Jean.Emma'sStrangePet.NewYork:HarperCollins,2003.

Luthardt,Kevin.Peep!Atlanta:Peachtree,2003.

Palatini,Margie.ThePerfectPet.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2003.

Provensen,Alice.ADayintheLifeofMurphy.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2003.

Sidman,Joyce.TheWorldaccordingtoDog:PoemsandTeenVoices.Boston,Mass.:HoughtonMifflin,2003.

Finney,Patricia.I,Jack.NewYork:HarperCollins,2004.

Horowitz,Ruth.BigSurpriseintheBugTank.NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2004.

Joosse,BarbaraM.BadDogSchool.NewYork:ClarionBooks,2004.

Nolan,Lucy.DownGirlandSit:SmarterThanSquirrels.NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2004.

So,Meilo.Gobble,Gobble,Slip,Slop:ATaleofaVeryGreedyCat.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2004.

Turner,PamelaS.Hachiko:TheTrueStoryofaLoyalDog.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,

2004.

Gretz,Susanna.RileyandRoseinthePicture.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2005.

Kuskin,Karla.So,What’sItLiketobeaCat?NewYork:AtheneumBooksforYoungReaders,2005.

Nolan,Lucy.DownGirlandSit:OntheRoad.NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2005.Rodowsky,Colby.TheNext‐DoorDog.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2005.Shyer,MarleneFanta.FleabiscuitSings!NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2005.

Fine,Anne.TheDiaryofaKillerCat.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2006.

Howe,James.HoundsleyandCatinaandtheBirthdaySurprise.Cambridge,Mass.:

CandlewickPress,2006.

53

Kelleher,Victor.Dogboy.Asheville,N.C.:FrontStreet,2006.

MacLachlan,Patricia.OnceIAteaPie.NewYork:Cotler/HarperCollins,2006.

Sidman,Joyce.MeowRuff:AStoryinConcretePoetry.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,2006.

Smith,D.James.ProbablytheWorld'sBestStoryaboutaDogandtheGirlWhoLovedMe.NewYork:AtheneumBooksforYoungReaders,2006.

Calmenson,Stephanie.MayIPetYourDog?TheHow‐to‐GuideforKidsMeetingDogs(andDogsMeetingKids).NewYork:ClarionBooks,2007.

Friend,Catherine.ThePerfectNest.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2007.Harper,ChariseMericle.FashionKittyversustheFashionQueen.NewYork:Hyperion

PaperbacksforChildren,2007.Hicks,BarbaraJean.TheSecretLifeofWalterKitty.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2007.

Jenkins,Steve.DogsandCats.Boston:HoughtonMifflinCo.,2007.

O'Connor,Barbara.HowtoStealaDog.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2007.

Straight,Susan.TheFriskativeDog.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2007.

Umansky,Kaye.IDon'tLikeGloria!Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2007.

VanFleet,Matthew.Dog.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2007.

Ward,Helen.LittleMoonDog.NewYork:DuttonChildren’sBooks,2007.