chapter 1 - Ideals - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
interrelating with animals - Ideals - University of Illinois at Urbana
Transcript of interrelating with animals - Ideals - University of Illinois at Urbana
INTERRELATINGWITHANIMALS:NONHUMANSELVESINTHELITERARYIMAGINATION
BY
JOANNEMIEREK
THESIS
SubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofScienceinLibraryandInformationScience
intheGraduateCollegeoftheUniversityofIllinoisatUrbana‐Champaign,2010
Urbana,Illinois
Adviser: AssistantProfessorKateWilliams
ii
ABSTRACT
Children’sliteratureisfullofanimalcharacterswidelyunderstoodtobesymbolic
humans.Theyarebelievedtoprovidethereaderwithacombinationofdelightandthe
neutralityandemotionaldistanceconsiderednecessaryfornavigatingvariousstagesof
maturationorcomplexandchargedsocialissues.Inthispaper,Iaskwhetheranimal
charactersmaysometimesbeunderstoodasanimalselves,andnotassymbolic
humans.Interestintheselfhoodofnon‐humananimalshasbeengaininggroundin
academicdebatesinthefieldsofanimalandcognitivescience,philosophyofmind,and
anthropology,resultingintheoreticalworkthatpaintsanintriguingpictureofwhat
animalselvesmightconsistofandhowwemayalreadyknowthoseselves.Asthe
foundationforthisstudyofcontemporarychildren’sbookswithanimalcharacters,
selectedcurrenttheoryisreviewed,beginningwithanintroductionofbasicconcepts
andincludingLeslieIrvine’sCoreSelfelementsandNuritBird‐David’sRelational
Epistemology.Currentthinkingonthefunctionandroleofanimalsinchildren’s
literatureisbrieflydiscussed.Thestudyitselfisdesignedtodistinguishpatternsin
animalcharacterizationinordertobuildonJohnAndrewFisher’sframeworkforthe
disambiguationofanthropomorphism,atermreferringtothecommonpractice,often
consideredacategoricalfallacy,ofattributing‘human‐like’characteristics(including
selfhood)tonon‐humans.Fisherrecognizestwobroadtypesofanthropomorphic
attributionthathecallsInterpretiveandImaginative,thelatterfoundinworksofthe
imagination.Thepresentstudyconsistedofasurveyandanalysisof46contemporary
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children’sbookswithdomesticanimalcharacters,developedusingcriteriafromthe
theoreticalconceptspresentedonanimalselfhood.Significantdifferenceswerefound
inthosecharactersportrayedasclothedand/orbipedalandthosepresentedmore
naturalistically,intheactivitiesengagedin,andinthecharacters’voices,suggestingat
leasttwobroadapproachesbyauthorsandillustratorstoanimalcharacters,here
labeled‘symbolichuman’and‘animalself.’
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
CHAPTER1:WHATAREANIMALSELVESANDHOWDOWEKNOWTHEM?………………….3
CHAPTER2:ANTHROPOMORPHISMANDTHELITERARYIMAGINATION……………………..14
CHAPTER3:CASESTUDY:ANIMALSELVESINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE………………………19
ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHYOFCORESOURCES…………………………………………………………25
APPENDIXA:SURVEYSAMPLE…………………………………………………………………………………….51
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INTRODUCTION
Nonhumananimalsfascinateus.Theyhaveappearedinartandstories
throughouttimeandacrossmosthumancultures(Boyd,2007;DastonandMitman,
2005).Inourstoriesandart,particularlyinchildren’sliterature,fantasy,andfolktales,
weourselvestransformintootheranimals,wecommunicatewiththem;weevenmarry
them,livewiththem,andlearnfromthem.Thereisasenseofalargercommunityof
beingsofwhichweareonepartandinwhichwetakedelight.
Butthereisanothersidetoourrelationshipwithnonhumananimals,especially
inthemodernWesternworld.Overthelast150years,inresponsetoEuro‐American
industrializationpracticesandsomeaspectsofempiricallaboratoryinvestigation,a
steadilygrowingconcernforanimalwelfareandanimalrightshasarisen(Irvine,2004;
Wynne,2004).Increasinglywearecomingtounderstandthatouractionsinpursuitof
perceivedhumangoalshaveresultedinthedevastationofournaturalenvironment,
includingwildanimalhabitatsandpopulations.Animalswehavedomesticatedoften
farenobetter.
Inhisinfluential1967articleforSciencemagazine“TheHistoricalRootsofour
EcologicCrisis,”historianLynnWhite,Jr.tracesthefusionofwesternscienceand
technologyanddiscussestheprofoundinfluenceofChristianaxiomsonthescientists,in
particulartheaxiomthat“noiteminthephysicalcreationhadanypurposesaveto
serveman’spurposes.”(1205)Thesetrendscombined,accordingtoWhite,tocreate
ourmodernecologiccrisis.Heconcludesthatapplyingmoretechnologywillnotsolve
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currentecologicalproblemsoravoidfuturebacklashes.Wemusttracerootcausesby
rethinkingouroldreligionandideasaboutourrelationshipwiththenaturalworld.
Inthispaper,Ihopetocontributetotheefforttorethinkourhumanrelationship
withnonhumancreaturesbyoutliningrelevantscholarshipinthescienceofmind,
philosophy,literature,andinanthropologythatpointtoawayofengagingwithour
environmentandwiththenonhumananimalswhoshareitwithus.Thiswayisoneof
relationship;ithasancientroots,affordsknowledgeandunderstanding,andmaybe
foundintheWestinworksoftheimaginationincludingliteratureandartaswellasin
everydaycommonsense.
Iambeginningfromthepremisethatanimalsareselvesinmanyoftheways
thatweare;thatcapacitiessuchasemotionalexpressionandcognitiveprocessingare
presentinnonhumananimalsinwaysbothsimilartoanddistinctfromourown,and
thatwecanunderstandandrelatewithindividualanimalselvesinwaysthatarenot
dependentonlanguageAspartofmyanalysis,Iwillpresentfindingsfromasurveyof
animalcharactersinasmallsampleofmodernchildren’sfiction,nonfiction,andpoetry.
AsIwillshow,animalcharactersarepresentedintwobroadways,whichIamcalling
‘symbolichuman’and‘animalself’.Theyaredistinguishedbyphysicalpresentation,
charactervoice,andbytheactivitiesengagedin.Theimaginativedevelopmentof
naturalisticanimalprotagonistsmayitselfbeinformedbythedirectexperienceand
knowledgeofanimalselves.
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CHAPTER1
WHATAREANIMALSELVESANDHOWDOWEKNOWTHEM?
Twotheoriesofanimalselfhoodexistingintherealworldareintroducedinthis
chapterafterabriefcontextualdiscussionofevolutionarycontinuity.Thefirst,
sociologistLeslieIrvine’sCoreSelfelements,stemsfromherworkwithdomesticpet
animals,especiallycatsanddogs.Thesecondhasbeendevelopedfromscholarshipin
animism,ananthropologicaldescriptorfor“awayofbeingthatisaliveandopentoa
worldincontinuousbirth.”(Ingold2006,9)
CONTINUITY
CharlesDarwin’stheoryofnaturalselectionimpliescross‐speciescontinuity;that
is,thedifferencesbetweenhumansandotheranimals,andamonganimalspecies,are
ofdegreeandnotkind.Darwinwrotein1871of‘numberlessgradations’separatingall
animals.1Theanimalsoftheearthareunderstoodtobekinduetosharedevolutionary
ancestry.Indeed,biological,physiological,andgeneticcontinuityiswidelyassumed.
Currentunderstandingofanimaltaxonomyandtheapplicationofexperimentalresults
fromanimalstopeoplerelyonthisassumption.
1SeeTheDescentofManandSelectioninRelationtoSex.NewYork:TheModernLibrary,[1936].
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Theassumptionofmentalorpsychologicalcontinuitybetweenhumansand
otheranimals,althoughsimilarlyimpliedbynaturalselection,iscontroversial,justas
biologicalcontinuitywas(andstillis,forsome).Uncomfortablefeelingsaboutspecies
ambiguityandthe‘demotion’ofhumanbeingsareprovoked.Becausementaland
psychologicalcapacitiesaredifficulttomeasureempiricallyeveninverbalhumans,
attemptstodosoinnonverbalanimalsappearsabsurdandimpossibletomany.
Despitetheseobstacles,Darwinhimselfpracticed,inpart,whathascometobe
calledanecdotalcognitivism;hedescribedmanyinstancesoftheexpressionofmental
andemotionalcapacitiesintheanimalsheobserved.Forexample,Dastonquotesfrom
TheDescentofManDarwin’sobservationthatadoghasimagination“asshewnbyhis
dreams”(45)ThoughmorecriticalthanDarwinofanecdotalcognitivism,disciple
GeorgeRomanescollected,classified,andpublishedanecdotes(AllenandBekoff,1997)
inwhichheincludes,forexample,observationsofmaternalandmischievousfeelingsin
monkeys.
Theideaofcontinuitybetweenhumansandotheranimalshasgeneratedan
ongoinginterestanddebateaboutboundariesbetweenspecies,aboutkinship,and
particularlyaboutwhatitisthatmakesushuman.Manyofthetwentiethcentury’s
findingsofanimalstudiesscientistsinbehavior,languageacquisitionanduse,and
geneticshavechallengedspeciesclassificationsandassumptionsaboutthecapacitiesof
nonhumananimals.Chimpanzeesmakeandusetools,elephantsreturnrepeatedlyto
siteswherecloserelativeshavedied,anddolphinscoordinatehuntingactivityand
communicatewitheachotherusingcomplexsystemsofsound.Itisbecomingmore
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apparentthatunderstandingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesamonghumansandother
animalsiscomplicated,dependingontheanimalinquestionandthecapacityunder
investigation.
PsychologistCliveD.L.WynnehasproposedwhathecallstheSimilarity
Sandwichinordertoframetheissueofcross‐speciescontinuityinahelpfulway.Likea
sandwich,therearethreelayers.Thebottom,orbread,layerasksthequestion,whatis
different?Wynneobservesthatallspeciesaredistinguishable,thatspecificsensory
abilities(batsonar,dog’ssenseofsmell,eagle’sfovia)varywidelyacrossspecies
affectingperceptionandexperience.
“Aboveallthiswonderfuldiversity,thewhirring,humming,perceiving,reacting
multiplicityofanimalnature,isanothermorepeacefullayer.”(228—229)Themiddle
layer,thepeanutbutterandjelly,describeswhatisshared.Wynnelistscognitive
capacitieswhichseemtobe“commontoawiderangeofspeciesandtooperatein
similarways.”(6)Theseincludeasenseoftime,number,same‐different,navigation,
learning,somekindsofmemory,andproblemsolving.
Thetoplayeridentifieswhatisnearlyuniqueinhumans.HereWynneincludes
sophisticatedlanguageabilitiesandasenseofindependentself‐awarenessasthose
capacitiesthatdistinguishusmostclearlyfromotheranimals.
ANIMALCORESELFANDINTERSUBJECTIVITY
AccordingtosociologistLeslieIrvine,whohasworkedextensivelywithdomestic
companiondogsandcats,animalshavethecapacityfortheelementsofacoreselfthat
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enablesthemtoparticipateinrelationshipswithus.Interactionswithinallofour
relationshipsconsistoftwosimultaneousprocesses.First,theselfoftheotheris
revealedtousthroughtheiractionsandresponsesandsecond,wereceiveconfirmation
ofourownself.Althoughhumandevelopmentaddsastrongverbaldimensionto
selfhood,thecoreselfthatwesharewithotheranimals,whichdoesnotdependon
language,allowsthisprocesstooccurinrelationshipswiththem.So,forexample,when
potentialadopterscometoananimalshelter,theyoftendecideonaparticularanimal,
whichmaynotbetheanimaltheadopterwasoriginallylookingfor,basedona
‘connection’thatIrvineconcludesisacompatibilityofcoreselves.
IrvineborrowsWilliamJames’fouraspectsof‘I’andrefinedbystudieswith
preverbalinfants.2Theyareagency,orasenseofcontrol,coherence,orindividual
integrity,affectivity,orthecapacityforemotion,andself‐historyormemory.Irvine
describesthislastelementasconnectingtheselftogetherintoanindividualsubjectivity.
Thecoreselfhasafunctionalaspectbasedongoalsandactionsandanexperiential
aspectallowingustoknowandtofeel.Thesecoexistingaspectsinformeachotherand
arepartofthedevelopmentofthespecificcoreselfelementsinindividuals.
Evidenceforagencyindogs,accordingtoIrvine,canbefound,forexample,in
behaviortraininginwhichdogsarebeingtaughttoexerciseself‐control.Theimplication
oftheabilitytocontrolone’sbehavioristhatonemusthaveameasureofvolitionor
2Inparticular,Irvineliststhesesources:James,William.ThePrinciplesofPsychology.[1890]NewYork:Dover,1950;Myers,Gene.ChildrenandAnimals:SocialDevelopmentandOurConnectionstoOtherSpecies.Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1998;Stern,DanielN.TheInterpersonalWorldoftheInfant:AViewFromPsychoanalysisandDevelopmentalPsychology.NewYork:BasicBooks,1985.
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will.Catsinitiateinteractionswithpeopletoachievegoalssuchasfood,companionship,
orplay,oftenbyinterferinginhumanactivities.Indicatorsofasenseofnonverbal
coherenceincludeactionsthatprotectbodilyintegritysuchashiding.Affectivitycanbe
understoodtomeanbothindividualfeelings,likehappinessorgrief,andbodily‘vitality
affects’,throughwhichweoftenrecognizetheindividualfeelingsofothers.Self‐history
turnsinteractionsintorelationships.
Sharingthoughts,intentions,andfeelingswithanimalsdoesnotdependon
language;thatis,althoughtheabilitytotalkabouttherelationshipdoesrelyon
language,theabilitytohaveitdoesn’t.Withanimals,‘thoughts’canbeunderstoodas
thefocusofattentionthroughvocalizingoreyecontact,aswhenadogchecksinor
glancesatthedoorortheleashorthefooddish.Thebestexamplesofsharedintentions
betweenguardiansandanimalscomefromplayactivitieswithdogsandcats(especially
kittens)becausecommunicatingintentioncreatesthenecessarycontextforthe
behavior.AccordingtoAllenandBekoff:
Tosolvetheproblemsthatmightbecausedby,forexampleconfusing
playformatingorfighting,manyspecieshaveevolvedsignalsthat
functiontoestablishandmaintaina‘mood’orcontextforplay.Inmost
speciesinwhichplyhasbeendescribed,play‐solicitingsignalsappearto
fostersomesortofcooperationbetweenplayerssothateachresponds
totheotherinawayconsistentwithplayanddifferentfromthe
responsesthesameactionswouldelicitinothercontexts.(98—99)
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Mostpeoplewhospendtimewithanimalsbelievethemtobesensitivetoemotional
states.IrvinerelatesthefamousexampleofCleverHans,thecelebratedcountinghorse:
CleverHanslivedinBerlinintheearlytwentiethcentury.Hebecamea
celebrityforhispurportedabilitytosolvemathematicalproblems.His
ownerwouldaskhimforthesumoftwonumbers,andHanswouldgive
theanswersbystrokinghishoofontheground.Manypeoplesuspected
fraudandaccusedHans’ownerofgivingthehorsecuesforwhentostop
stompinghishoof...(Arigorousinvestigationdiscovered)thatHanswas
indeedrespondingtocues,butofasortdifferentfromwhatanyone
expected...Hanswaspickingupsubtle,unintentionalcuesfromthe
peoplearoundhim,whoimperceptiblyrelaxedorquietlyexhaledwhen
hereachedthecorrectanswer.(158)
Irvinearguesthattheunderstandingofemotionalstatesobservedinanimalshasboth
aninstinctive‘affectcontagion’aspectandisasocialnecessity.Theinterplayofthese
aspectsacrossspeciesthataremoreorlesssocialmayhelptoexplaindifferences,for
exampleincommunicationstylesandmodes,betweendogsandcats.
Whydowehaveactiverelationshipswithanimals?Irvinereviewsvarious
answerstothissuchasthewilltodominanceorthatanimalsaresurrogatepeople
standinginfordeficienthumanrelationships.Becausetheyrefertosinglecauses,she
findsthem‘lacking.’Animals,accordingtoIrvine,helptoconstructandmaintainwho
weare.Ouridentitiesare‘fluid’and‘interactive.’Wedevelopandultimatelythriving
throughintersubjectiveinteractionswithothersentientbeings.
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ANIMISTPERSONHOODANDRELATIONALEPISTEMOLOGY
EdwardTylor,consideredthefatherofanthropology,coinedtheterm‘animism’
inthelatenineteenthcenturyfromseventeenth‐centuryalchemistGeorgE.Stahl’s
‘anima,’usedtorefertothevitalizingelementoflife.AccordingtoTylor,animismisa
ubiquitousandprimitivedelusion,definitiveofreligion,andacategoryerrorthatcould
stillbefoundinthemodernspiritualismofhisday.Tylorwasinterestedintheoriginsof
religionand,usingsecond‐handaccountsfromnewlycolonizedindigenouslands,
developedhisideasthatreligionandreligiousperspectivesaremythopoeticandlearned
mistakesabouttheworld.3
Definitionsofanimismchangedverylittlethroughmuchofthetwentieth
century,despitericherandbroaderdatasets.Scholarscontinuedtoattributeanimistic
beliefsandpracticestochildisherror,fancifulinterminglingofcorrectrepresentations
ofthingswithmysticaltales,projectionsofinternalprocesses,orasareasonablebut
mistakenperceptualsurvivalstrategy(Bird‐David,1999;Harvey,2006).
However,animistpracticesandconceptionsoftheworldareincreasinglybeing
reexaminedbywesternscholarsinfluencedbychangesinthesovereigntyand
subsequentself‐definitionofindigenouspeopleandby“anewacademictendency
towardsdialogueandagrowingrespectfordiversity...metwithadegreeof
uncertaintyaboutmodernity’spreferenceforobjectivityoversubjectivity(whichhas)
3SeeTylor,EdwardB.PrimitiveCulture:ResearchesintotheDevelopmentofMythology,Philosophy,Religion,Language,ArtandCustoms.NewYork:H.HoltandCo.,1874.
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resultedinahostofnewconversationsbetweenacademicsandothers.”(Harvey,205)
Amongthe‘fruitful’areasofinvestigationarepersonhoodconcepts(Irvine,Bird‐David)
andecologicalperception(Bird‐David,Ingold).
In1960,notedanthropologistA.IrvingHallowellpublished“OjibwaOntology,
Behavior,andWorldView”inwhichhebeginstodescribewhathascometobeknown
asthe‘newanimism.’4Theconceptofpersonhoodiscentraltothisunderstanding.
AccordingtotheOjibwe,theworldisfullofpeople,onlysomeofwhom
arehuman.However,itisamistaketoseethisasaprojectionor
attributionofhuman‐likenessorlife‐likenessonto‘inanimate’objects.
Whiletheydodistinguishbetweenpersonsandobjects,theOjibwealso
challengeEuropeannotionsofwhatapersonis.Tobeapersondoesnot
requirehuman‐likeness,butratherhumansarelikeotherpersons.
Personsisthewidercategory,beneathwhichtheremaybelistedsub‐
groupssuchas‘humanpersons’,‘rockpersons’,‘bearpersons’,and
others.Personsarerelatedbeingsconstitutedbytheirmanyandvarious
interactionswithothers.Personsarewillfulbeingswhogainmeaningand
powerfromtheirinteractions.Personsaresociablebeingswho
communicatewithothers.”(Harvey,17—18)
Hallowellcoinedtheterm‘other‐than‐human‐persons’todescribenon‐human
membersofthislargerpersonhoodcategory.
4SeeDiamond,Stanley.CultureinHistory:EssaysinHonorofPaulRadin.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1960,pp.19—52.
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Theanimismthatinformsthisviewofpersonhoodisfoundmoreofteninthe
eldersofagroupthaninthechildren.Thisisbecauseitmustbetaughtandlearnedasit
involves“developingtheskillsofbeing‐in‐the‐worldwithotherthings,makingone’s
awarenessofone’senvironmentandone’sselffiner,broader,deeper,richer.”(Bird‐
David,S77—78)Attention,openness,interaction,communication,(Bird‐David,Harvey,
Ingold,Brown,1992)andhumility(Brown)aresomeoftheskillsthatmustbedeveloped
overalifetime.
IsraelianthropologistNuritBird‐Davidmadeamorerecentcontributiontothe
conceptof‘new’animismwiththepublication,in1999,of“‘Animism’Revisited:
Personhood,Environment,andRelationalEpistemology.”Afterreviewingthemajor
anthropologicalliteratureonanimism,Bird‐DavidintroducesDevaru,aconcept,
“enigmatictopositivistthought,”usedbySouthIndianNayakapeopletodescribe
beings/personswithwhomtheyregularlyrelate.Devaruisaspecificexample,according
toBird‐David,ofHallowell’s‘other‐than‐human‐persons.’Theyareneitherspiritbeings
norsupernatural(aboveoroutsidenature),butareunderstoodbytheNayakatoreally
existintheworld.
Bird‐Davidborrowstheterm‘dividual’5tocointheverb‘todividuate.’Adividual
isonewhoisacompositeofrelationshipsandisnotaseparateentitysetagainstother
boundedentities.Nonhumanpersonsaresimplyotherdividualsdefinedanddescribed
throughtheirrelationships.
5SeeStrathern,M.TheGenderoftheGift:ProblemswithWomenandProblemswithSocietyinMelanesia.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1988.
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WhenIindividuateahumanbeingIamconsciousofher‘inherself’[asa
single,separateentity],whenIdividuateherIamconsciousofhowshe
relateswithme.ThisisnottosaythatIamconsciousoftherelationship
withher‘initself,’asathing.RatherIamconsciousoftherelatedness
withmyinterlocutorasIengagewithher,attentivetowhatshedoesin
relationtowhatIdo,tohowshetalksandlistenstomeasItalkand
listentoher,towhathappenssimultaneouslyandmutuallytome,toher,
tous.”(S72,emphasisintheoriginal)
Asnotedearlier,Bird‐Davidconsidersecologicalperceptiontobeanimportant
avenuetoinvestigateforscholarsinterestedinanimism.Theanimists’perceptionofthe
worldreliesonthe“trafficofinteractionswiththeirsurroundings”(Ingold,11)from
whichmodernlifeprotectsuswithcars,largeindoorspaces,andothercontrolled
environments.Theworldlyenvironmentisconsidereda‘domainofentanglement’
experiencedmoreorlessdirectlyandnotasaninteriorschematicwithoutward
manifestations.
Bird‐DavidconsidersGibson’secologicalapproachtovisualperception6as
centraltounderstandingtheclaimmadebytheNayakathatdevaruexistintheworld.
ForGibson,ecologicalperceptionseestheworldinecologicalterms,asexistingona
scaleofchangetopermanenceinitsmultiplerespects.Somethingschangerelatively
quicklyandothers,likemountains,persistforaverylongtime.Animistperception
6SeeGibson,J.J.TheEcologicalApproachtoVisualPerception.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,1979.
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affordstheperceiverinformationaboutchange,communication,andrelationship
based,inpart,onwhattheperceiverbringstothesituation.
Relationalaffordancesareunderstoodtomutuallyaffecttheactorsinvolved.
Bird‐Davidgivestheseexamplesofmutualeffects:“ananimal‐avoiding‐meinrelationto
me‐upsetting‐the‐animal,astone‐coming‐towards‐meinrelationtome‐reaching‐for‐
the‐stone,arock‐securing‐meinrelationtome‐seeking‐a‐shelter.”Bird‐Davidcallsthis
typeofinteraction‘two‐wayresponsiverelatedness’so,forinstance,anelephantwho
makeseyecontactwithmeisconsideredDevaru,buttheelephantthatdoesn’tinteract
issimplyanelephant.FortheNayaka,beingsareregardedaspersons,orDevaru,as,
when,andbecausetheyinteract.
TheexamplesgivenbyBird‐DavidarefromherfieldworkexperienceinSouth
India;howevershemakesitclearthatsheconsidersrelationalepistemologytobea
universalhumantendency.Bird‐Davidfurthertheorizesthatrelationalepistemology
enjoys‘authority’asawayofknowinginsomeculturegroups,primarilyhunter‐
gatherers,andissecondaryinothers,suchasthemodernEuro‐Americanculture.The
chapterthatfollowsbuildsonthetheorythatknowingtheworldisadirectresultof
openlyengagingwithit.
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CHAPTER2
ANTHROPOMORPHISMANDTHELITERARYIMAGINATION
INTRODUCTION
Anthropomorphism,generallyspeaking,canbeunderstoodastheattributionof
humancharacteristicstononhumanothersand,althoughbannedinthesciences,itis
ubiquitousinworldmythology,folklore,art,andliterature.(Boyd,DastonandMitman,
Bird‐David,Harvey)Particularlyinliteratureforchildren,anthropomorphictendencies
arepracticeduncriticallyinthecreationofanimalcharactersandstorieswithanimals.
Bothanthropomorphismandthecloselyrelatedfolkpsychologymaybeexpressionsofa
relationalepistemologyintheWest,acommonsenseknowingthatdevelopsfrombeing
inrelationshipwithothersandthatmayinformtheliteraryimaginationofauthorsand
readers.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Theexactmeaningofanthropomorphismiscurrentlyamatterofsomedebate.
It’smeaninghaschangedovertimefromit’soriginalreligiousoneofattributinghuman
characteristicstoGod,somethingthatwasconsideredasin.(DastonandMitman,
Fisher,1996)Manyvariationsofanthropomorphismaredescribedintheliterature.For
example,LorraineDastondescribessociomorphismasanalogiesaremadeatthelevelof
society,generallyhumanandinsect.Gametheoryappliedtoanimalbehavioriscalled
coldanthropomorphismandempathybroughttobearonanalogiesiscalledhot
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anthropomorphism.GordonBurghardt(inRistau,1991)positsa‘critical
anthropomorphism’thatmaybeusefulforgeneratingscientificideasandpredicting
outcomes.Despitebeingwidelypracticed,it’smeaningamongmanyanimalscientistsis
thefalseattributionofhumanlikecharacteristicstoanimalsandtothingslikecarsor
computers.Changingmeaningsimplythattheyarehistoricallyandculturallybound.As
furtherevidenceforthis,Fisherstatesthat,“Japaneseprimatologistsaresingularly
unconcernedaboutissuesofanthropomorphismintheirstudiesofprimates.Cultural
historycannotbeignoredinexplainingthisfact.”(3)
Becausethepracticeofanthropomorphicattributionisunderstood(intheWest)
asauniversal,yetultimatelyfalse,tendency,itisthereforeconsideredanentrenched
probleminwesternscience,adangerouslyunempiricalreturntomysteriouscausesand
unfoundedsuperstition,and“anembarrassmenttobeavoided.”(3)Anychargeof
anthropomorphisminthescientificstudyofanimalsleadstoassumptionsoflaziness,
sloppythinking,orchildishnessinthesenseofnaïveinnocenceandalsointhesenseof
simpleorprimitive.(Irvine,Fisher,DastonandMitman,AllenandBekoff)
PhilosopherJohnFisherhasdevelopedabasicframeworktohelpclarifywhat
maybemeantbyanthropomorphism,andwhetherattributionsarefalseinallcases.He
beginswithtwobroadcategories,whichhelabelsInterpretiveandImaginative
Anthropomorphism.Interpretive,whichismeanttobeexplanatory,describes
inferencesofmentalisticpredicates(M‐predicates)suchasloyal,brave,orsneakyfrom
observedanimalbehavior.FisherarguesthatHardAnthropocentriccritics,whosupport
asharpdivisionbetweenhumansandotheranimals,havenotmadeaconvincingcase
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thatanthropomorphicattributionsarecategoricallyfallaciousbecausetheaccuracyof
theattributionsdependsonthespecificpredicate,situation,andspeciesinquestion.
FisherhasconcentratedhisanalysisonInterpretiveAnthropomorphism,leavingthe
Imaginativehalfoftheframeworkundeveloped.Heconcludesinpartthat,duetothe
hardwirednatureofourperceptionsofothers,innateunderstandingacrossspeciesis
plausibleandthatcommonsense“persistentlyrefusestodrawasharplinebetween
humansandotheranimals,andpersistsinretainingsympatheticfeelingsforanimals
andinunderstandingthemalonghumanlines”(11—12).
FisheragreeswithIrvinethatpeopledonotattributeindiscriminatelybut
insteadresponddifferentlytodifferentanimals.Whenwespendtimewithanimals,we
perceivetheirindividualityandrelatetotheirselveswithourselves.Thiscommonsense
approachissometimescalledfolkpsychologyandisdescribedastheuseofinsightor
self‐knowledgecombinedwithoutwardattentiontodescribeandpredictthebehavior
ofothers.Emotionalintelligenceandtheaccurateinterpretationofbodylanguage,
including‘vitalityaffects,’maycomprisesomeofthenonverbalskillsweuseto
understandanimalselves.AllenandBekoffsuggestthatfolkpsychologyisaprototheory
thatmayprovevaluableindevelopingmorerigoroustheoriesofanimalmind.Ristau
arguesforasimilarapproach;cognitiveethologistsshouldborrowwhatisneededfrom
folkpsychologyandleavetherest.
Anauthor,inordertocreateabelievableliterarycharacter,mustpractice
perspectivity;thatisheorshemustimagineaway,usinginsightsandknowledgegained
throughrelationships,intothesubjectiveexperienceofanotherpersonalitywithwhom
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readerswillrespond.Itislikely,givenevolutionarycontinuity,someformofsharedcore
selfamongEarth’sanimals,andanattitudeofopen,humbleattention,tounderstand
nonhumananimalsenoughtocreatebelievableanimalcharacters,notassymbolic
humans,butasanimalselves.
REALISTICANIMALSINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE
AssociationsbetweenchildrenandanimalsrundeepinEuro‐Americanculture.
Aswehaveseen,originsofanthropomorphictendenciesandanimistattributionsare
sometimessaidtoexistinchildhoodorinchildishunderstandingsoftheworld.(Irvine,
AllenandBekoff,Harvey,Bird‐David,Boyd,Morgenstern,2000)Animalsandchildren
areoftenportrayedtogetherinvisualimages,especiallythoseappealingtonostalgia
andinnocence.Animalsarecentralinchildren’sliteraturetoo,providingsimplicity
(Morgenstern),neutrality(BurkeandCopenhaver,2004),andchallenge(Marchant,
2005).
Animalsinchildren’sstorieswhowalkandtalklikepeopleareconsideredtobe
symbolichumansdelightinguswiththeirsimultaneoussimilaritiestoanddifferences
fromus(Morgenstern).Symbolichumancharactersprovidetheneededemotional
distancethatallowschildrentosafelytryonrolesandwrestlewithdifficultlife
situations(BurkeandCopenhaver).Verylittlehasbeendiscussed,however,aboutthe
realisticportrayalsofanimalsascharacters,althoughtheyhavebeenwithussincethe
Britishchildren’sbookpublishingindustrybegantoflourishinthemid‐eighteenth
century.
18
Animalprotagonistnarratorsmaybeconsideredanimalselvestellingthestory
fromtheirownperspective,justashumannarratorsare.Earlystoriesofthistypewere
oftengenerallifehistories,commentaryonhumanbehavior,oranti‐crueltytales.An
earlyexampleisDorothyKilner’sTheLifeandPerambulationofaMouse,publishedin
1783.AnnaSewellcombinedtheseelementsintoherclassicBlackBeauty(1877).
Towardtheendofthenineteenthcenturyandintothetwentieth,astyleboth
dramaticandrealisticwasbeingdevelopedinNorthAmerica.Examplesofthisnewstyle
includeWildAnimalsIHaveKnownbyCanadianE.T.Seton(1899)andstoriessuchas
CalloftheWild(1903)andWhiteFang(1906)byAmericanJackLondon.Manybooks
werebeingwrittenthatfeaturedanimalrelationships(bothwithandwithouthumans),
dramaticanddangerousplots,andnaturalisticsettings.TheYearling(MarjorieKinnan
Rawlings,1938),MyFriendFlicka(MaryO’Hara,1941),andIncredibleJourney(Sheila
Burnford,1961)areclassicexamples.EnglishmanRichardAdamswroteWatershipDown
(1972),arecentmodernclassicthatappealsequallytochildrenandadults.
Inadditiontotheirnaturalisticcharacterportrayalsandsettings,thesebooks
featurerelationshipsamongtheanimalsorbetweenanimalsandhumansthatarerich,
important,andrecognizablefromtheperspectiveofthereader.Theanimaloranimals
arethecenter,however,andtheconcernsoftheanimalcharactersareanimal
concerns.Assuchtheyarequitedistinctfromstoriesinwhichanimalswalkandtalklike
peoplewehaveknown.
19
CHAPTER3
CASESTUDY:ANIMALSELVESINCHILDREN’SLITERATURE
SURVEYDESCRIPTION
BurkeandCopenhaverdiscussfunctionsofwrittentextsinliterateculture
includingthatofmirroringtheworldaswehaveperceivedit.Howdoauthorsofrecent
children’sliteratureperceiveanimals?Whataresomeofthecharacteristicsofrealistic
portrayalsandoftheinteractionsbetweenhumanandanimalcharacters?Thefollowing
studywasconductedtoexploreanimalcharacterizationinmodernchildren’sliterature.
Iaminterestedinunderstandingwhethertheimaginationmaybeinformedbyaccurate
perceptionsofanimalsintheworldandhowthoseperceptionsaremanifestedin
naturalandrecognizablecharacterizationsofnonhumananimals.
Adescriptiveexploratorysurveyquestionnairewasdevelopedtoassessthe
animalcharactersinasmallsampleofrecentlypublishedchildren’sliterature.Three
bibliographiesofchildren’sbookswithdomesticanimal(usuallypet)characters
publishedbetween2000and2007providedtheinitialsampleof51booksforthecase
study.ThebrieflyannotatedbibliographiesarepublishedonthewebsiteofUniversityof
Illinois’CenterforChildren’sBooks;allthebookshavebeenfavorablyreviewedinthe
prestigiousBulletinoftheCenterforChildren’sBooks.Duplicatetitlesandoneyoung
adultnovelthatfeaturedananimalonlyinthetitlewereremovedfromthefinalsample
of46.(SeeAPPENDIX1)Thewide‐rangingsampleincludesfiction,nonfiction,and
poetryforpreschoolersthroughhighschoolteenagers.
20
Eachbookwasreadandthensurveyedonaseparateform.Descriptive
informationaboutthecharacters,andaboutspecificinteractionsandcommunication
modesbetweenhumanandanimalcharacters,evidenceofIrvine’sselfhoodelements,
andanycognitiveskillsattributedtoordemonstratedbytheanimalswererecorded.A
spreadsheetwasthencreatedtocollecttogetherdemographicdataoneachtitleand
thedescriptivedatagatheredinitially.Thespecificdetailsemergingfromthegeneral
surveywereusedtocreatesomegranularityinthespreadsheet.Patternsin
characterization,activities,species,targetreaderage,wereassessed.Muchmore
rigorousanalysiswithlargersamplesareneededbeforeconclusionscanbedrawnwith
confidence.However,afewinterestingresultsemerged,asshowninthetablesand
discussioninthenextsection.
FINDINGSANDDISCUSSION
Table1comparestwomaintypesofanimalcharacters,bipedal/clothedand
natural,intermsofvoiceandactivity.Talkingvoiceisdefinedasspeakingoutloudin
humanwordsandsentences.Novoiceissilenceorsimplythekindsofsoundsnormally
madebythespeciesinvolvedsuchasbarks,meows,chirps,andsoon.Innarrated
stories,theanimalprotagonisttalksdirectlytothereader;theanimaldoesnottalk
withinthestoryitself.Asshowninthetable,animalcharactersthatareportrayed
naturallyareoverwhelminglynarratorsorhavenovoiceandthosewhoarebipedal,
clothed,orbothspeakoutloudover50percentofthetime.Activitiesengagedinbythe
21
naturalcharactersarerecognizablythoseweseeinanimalsaroundusincontrasttothe
veryhumanactivitiesoftheclothedcharacters.
Bothfictionandnonfictionbooksarenarratedbyanimals.Forexample,Murphy
thedognarratesthefictionalADayintheLifeofMurphy(2003)inwhichhetellsthe
readerabouthisdaywithJohnthehounddogandTomFoolthecat.Thebarnanimals
are“dumb”andthehumanfamilyis“they.”Harry,alonghaireddachshund,introduces
tothereadertheproperwaytogreetdogsinthenonfictionbookMayIPetYourDog?
(2007).
Table 1. Comparing the voice and activities of bipedal/clothed and natural animalcharacters.
Type N Talking NarrationNoVoice
HumanActivitiesNaturalisticActivities
Bipedal/clothes
9 5 1 3
Cooking,dress‐up,goingtoschool,usingcarpenter’stoolsandpaintbrushes,superheroadventuring
Beingheldinlap,climbingatree
Natural 37 6 13 18 Singing
Gettingintostuff,eating,playing,goingtothevet,greeting,working,training,hunting,barking,runningaway,ridingincar
22
ThetwobroadcharacterizationsshowninTable1canbelabeledSymbolic
HumanandAnimalSelf.Animalcharacterswhoaresymbolichumanstendtospeakout
loudusinghumanlanguage.Theyarebipedalandoftenwearclothing.Thesecharacters
engageoverwhelminglyinhumanactivitieslikecooking,usingcarpenter’stools,and
superheroadventuring.AnimalSelfcharactersoftennarratestoriesdirectlytothe
reader,butdonotspeakwithinthem.Theymovewithanaturalgait,don’twear
clothing,andtheiractivitiesarerecognizableasnaturaltotheirspecies.
Table2.Animalnarrationinallbooksandinpicturebooks.
BookSample N AnimalnarrationPercentofbooks
AllBooks 46 14 30%
PictureBooks 24 10 42%
Animalnarratorsappeardemographicallyacrossthesample,although,asshown
inTable2,most(70%)arefoundinpicturebooksforyoungerchildren,includingthe
twoexamplesdescribedabove.OneveryinterestingexampleofanimalnarrationisI,
Jack(2000),afictionaljuvenilechapterbookinwhichaheroicyellowLabradorretriever
tellsacomplexstory.Inan“Interpreter’sNote”attheback,PatriciaFinney
acknowledgestheinfluenceofbothRudyardKipling’sThyServant,ADog(1930)and
booksondogpsychologyincreatingJack’svoice.Finneyusesvariationintextfontto
effectivelyrelaynonverbalcommunicationbetweenJackandhisApedogpack(italic
23
style)andJack’sstrengthoffeeling(fontsize).Thecommunicationitselfisusually,but
notalwayssuccessful;however,itisrecognizableasthatbetweenadogandahuman.
Forinstance,afterJackiscaughtraidingtherefrigeratorforhispregnant‘PackLady’
Petra,thedogsrunawaytofindanearbysafeplaceforPetratohaveherpuppies.On
thewayhome,Jackmeetshishuman‘Packleader’:
Hithere,Packleader!Areyoubetter?Whyareyououtofyournestand
walkingalongthepath,going‘Phhheeeweeet!’betweenyourteeth...
Youshouldberestinginyounest,gettingbetterfromyournastycold.
Oh.That’snice,youwerelookingforme.ShallwegoseePetra?
Sheisveryunfriendly,though.Canyousmellher?ThereisSpecialness
happeninginhertummy.It’sallverystrange...
Packleaderputsmyleashon.Heisbarkinglotsnow,veryquickly.
HeissayingBadBad.Heiscallingmestrangenames.Whatis‘vandal?
Whatis‘fiend’?”(84—85)
InJoyceSidman’sTheWorldAccordingtoDog:PoemsandTeenVoices(2003),
poeticattemptsaremadetodescribetheinteriorworldanddog‐nessofdogs.For
example,in“DogLore”Sidmanwrites,“Patienceandintensity/openthemostdoors.”
(56)Shealsoincludesshortprosenarrativeswrittenbyteensaboutdogstheyhave
known.Manyofthesepiecesdescribeveryimportantrelationshipsbetweenthemselves
ortheirfamilyandanindividualdog.SarahMiller(age13)honorsthememoryofBandy,
anabandonedpuppyfoundbySarah’sunhappyteenagedmother.Bandy“helpedmy
24
motherunderstandtheimportanceoflifeandaffection.Sheguidedmymotherto
appreciatingeverythingandeveryoneasmuchaspossible.”(13)
Inourrelationshipsovertimewithotherselves,whetherthoseselvesarehuman
oranimal,wegrowanddevelop,andintheprocesscometounderstandtheotherself
betteraswell.Theknowledgegainedaboutothersandourselvesisusedbywritersin
imaginativelycreatingcharactersandsituationsforthemtoactin.
CONCLUSION
Recentscholarshipinsociology,anthropology,andcognitiveethologyconverge
topointtodirectrelationshipasawaytoapprehendtothelargestdegreethe
subjectiveselfofnonhumanothers,particularlynonhumananimals.
Anthropomorphism,commonsense,andfolkpsychologymayallbe,moreorless,
expressionsofthisrelationalwayofknowingwhich,inWesterncivilization,enjoysthe
greatestauthorityinworksoftheimagination.
Historically,animalshavebeenportrayedintwobroadwaysinchildren’s
literature.Assymbolichumans,animalsareneutralstand‐inswhohelpyoungreaders
navigatelifeissues.Asrealisticanimalcharacters,animalselves,theyprovideglimpses
intoamore‐than‐humanworld.Authorsmay,inimaginativelydevelopingrealistic
animalcharacters,justastheydowhencreatinghumancharacters,employtheinsights
andknowledgegainedthroughrelationshipand,intheprocess,mirrortheworldaswe
perceiveit.
25
ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHYOFCORESOURCES
Allen,Colin,andMarkBekoff.SpeciesofMind:ThePhilosophyandBiologyofCognitiveEthology.Cambridge:MITPress,1997.
AllenandBekoffbeginbydescribingthisvolumeasasynthesisoftheoreticaland
empiricalapproachestothestudyofnonhumananimalminds.Theydescribecognitive
ethologyasthesystematicstudyoftheinformationprocessing,beliefs,and
consciousnessofanimalsfromcomparative,evolutionary,andecologicalperspectives.
CharlesDarwin’smentalcontinuityconceptiscentral;answerstoquestionsabout
sharedcognitiveandemotionalcharacteristicsacrossspecieswillshedlightonthe
natureandevolutionarydevelopmentofmentalandpsychologicalcapacities.
Animalbehaviorresearchthroughmostofthetwentiethcenturyhasbeen
guidedbythephilosophyofempiricismandpositivisminwhichmeaningisdependent
onreducingobservable,verifiableexperiencestologicalconstructions.Thegoalof
psychologicalbehaviorismistocontrolbehaviorandexplainbehaviorpatternsinaone‐
to‐onecorrespondencewithphysiologicalprocesses.Asanoverviewofthe
developmentofcognitiveethology,AllenandBekoffbroadlydescribethephilosophyof
naturalism,modernneo‐behaviorists,andclassicalethologists,particularlyKonrad
LorenzandNikolaasTinbergen,whosharedthe1973NobelPrize.
DonaldGriffin,whose1976bookTheQuestionofAnimalAwarenesshelpedto
establishthecurrentfieldofcognitiveethology,wasmainlyconcernedwithanimal
consciousnessandwithcreativeandversatilebehaviorinanimalsasevidencefor
cognitiveprocessing.AccordingtoGriffin,consciousnesslogicallyconfersanenormous
26
adaptiveadvantageofbehavioralchoicetoindividuals.Mostcognitiveethologistshave
concentratedtheirresearchonfindingevidenceofanimalintentionalityreasoningthat
behaviorwhichimpliesintentionalityandgoals,forinstanceplayorinjury‐feinting,also
impliessomeformofmemoryorplanning.
Criticismsingeneraldirectedatcognitiveethologyincludetheaccusationof
fallingbackoncausationbyinvisibleagents(the‘religioncard’),thebeliefthatanimal
mindsarepermanentlyclosedtous,andthedenialofevidenceforstimulus‐free
behavior(whichimpliesinternalmotivation).Inresponse,cognitiveethologistsjustify
mentalattributionsbecausetheyareoftenthemostparsimoniousexplanationfor
observations.Theypointtolaboratoryevidenceofstimulus‐freebehavior,especiallyin
observationallearningexperiments.AllenandBekoffclaimthatbehavioristsoften
privilegethegeneraloverthespecificasaconsequenceofthepressureforstatistical
averaging,thusignoringsignificantbehavioralvariations.Thematerialemphasisof
empiricalscienceisconsideredproblematicaswellbecausenaturalselectionactson
functional,notmaterial,properties.
Althoughgenerallyverycontroversial,theconceptoffolkpsychologycanbe
definedinamannerthatisuncontroversial.“Folkpsychologyconsistsofloose
generalizationsaboutmindandbehaviorthatarereflectedinwhatpeoplesayabout
mentalstatesandactions.”(65)Recognizingthatthementalisticterminologyusedin
folkpsychologicalexplanationsisoftennotclearlydefinedandthatnoadequate
frameworkformentalattributionexists,AllenandBekoffproposere‐conceptualizing
folkpsychology.Theyseeitasa‘prototheory’thataddressesconsciousnessandthe
27
semanticpropertiesofitscontentwithanevolutionaryemphasis.Folkpsychology
shareswithallcognitiveapproachestheideathatmentalstateshavepropositional
content.
Casestudiesincanidsocialplaybehaviorandtheanti‐predatorybehaviorof
birdsarediscussedinwhichemphasisisplacedtheimportanceofcommunication,
changeovertime,andthecorrectinterpretationoftheintentionsofothers.
InChapter8,AllenandBekoffdiscussanimalconsciousness.Theauthorsadvise
fellowcognitiveethologiststomoveawayfromThomasNagel’squestion,“Whatisit
liketobe...?”andfocusinsteadonwhichspeciespossessesconsciouscapacitiesby
targetingbehaviorsthatindicateconsciousness.
Bird‐David,Nurit.“‘Animism’Revisited:Personhood,Environment,andRelationalEpistemology.”CurrentAnthropology4(1999):S67—S91.
Bird‐Davidrevisitstheanthropologicalconceptofanimism,notingthatbasic
assumptionshavechangedverylittlesincetheintroductionoftheconceptinthe
nineteenthcenturybyEdwardTylor.Tracingtheideafromitsinception,Bird‐David
discussesTylorandhisinterestintheoriginsofreligion,andsubsequenttreatmentsof
animismbyEmileDurkheim,ClaudeLévi‐Strauss,andS.Guthrie.Aspartofher
reevaluation,Bird‐Davidfocusesontheconceptofpersonhoodandonecological
perception,presentingevidencefromherfieldworkwiththeSouthIndianNayaka
people,inparticulartheirdescriptionof‘devaru’asnonhumanpeoplewhointeractwith
theNayakaindailylifeandduringsocialevents.
28
Inordertodescribewhatdevaruare,Bird‐DavidbuildsonanthropologistA.
IrvingHallowell’sother‐than‐human‐persons(usinginsteadherterm‘superpersons’)
andM.Strathern’s‘dividual’.Other‐than‐human‐personsarepersonswhoarenot
humanbeings;theyareconsideredpersonsasandbecausetheyaresocialandwillful
beings,notbecausetheylookortalklikehumans.Adividualisapersonmadeupof
relationships,andisnotaboundedsingularitysetagainstothers.Duringregularlyheld
festivalsorsocialevents,localdevaruappearthroughNayakaperformerstotalkand
interactwiththeothersthere.Devaruarealsounderstoodtobespecificanimals,plants,
andotherenvironmentalfeatureswhointeractwiththeNayaka.Devaruareunderstood
toexistintheworld.
Inordertomakethismorecomprehensible,Bird‐DaviddrawsonJ.J.Gibson’s
ecologicalapproachtovisualperceptioninwhichthings“areperceivedintermsofwhat
theyaffordtheactor‐perceiverbecauseofwhattheyareforhim.”(Gibson,S74)Forthe
Nayaka,theenvironmentisconstantlychangingasaresultofinteractions.What
happenstoanimals,orotherdevarucharacters“(orhowtheychange)canaffectorbe
affectedbywhathappenstopeople(orhowtheychange).”(S77)Thesechanges
confirmtheexistenceofdevaru.Theskillofattentionmustbedeveloped;inthisway,
theenvironmentaffordsinformationthatcanbe“moreandmoresubtle,elaborate,and
precise.Knowingisdevelopingthisskill.”(Gibson,S78)Bird‐Davidcallscommunication
ofthiskind‘two‐wayresponsiverelatedness.’
Shegoesontotheorizethatrelationalwaysofknowing(knowingconnected
withbeing)isauniversalhumancapacitythatenjoysprimaryauthorityinmosthunter‐
29
gatherersocietiesandoftensecondaryauthorityelsewhere.Asawayofknowing,
relationalepistemologyiscomplementarywithobjectivist;Bird‐Davidconsidersbothto
berealandvalidandbothtohavelimits.
Commentsfromsevenscholarsinanthropologyappearattheendofthearticle
proper,mostinagreementingeneraloronmajorspecificpoints.TimIngoldoffersan
alternativeexplanationtothatofBird‐David’sontheoriginsofrelationalwaysof
knowing.TheoriesoftheevolutionofsocialintelligenceofferedbyBird‐David,according
toIngold,“restfairandsquareonamodernistconceptionofmindandbehavior”
(Ingold,S82)thatfunctionstoundermineanimisticperceptionbydividingtheworldinto
naturalandsocialandbyassumingthatlifeandmindareinteriorpropertiesof
individuals.“Humanbeingseverywhereperceivetheirenvironmentsintheresponsive
modenotbecauseofinnatecognitivepredispositionbutbecausetoperceiveatallthey
mustalreadybesituatedinaworldandcommittedtotherelationshipsthisentails.”
(Ingold,S82)
Boyd,Brian.“TailsWithinTales.”InKnowingAnimals,editedbyLaurenceSimmonsandPhilipArmstrong,217—43.Boston:KoninklijkeBrillNV,2007.
Boydaskswhywearesofascinatedby‘tailswithintales.’Afterlistingwide‐
rangingexamplesofanimalsinartthroughtimeandcurrentlypopularnon‐human
literaryothers,BoydtellsthestoryofGeorgeHerriman’scelebratedcomicKrazyKat.
Originallyoccupyingjustthebottomstripsinthepanelsofa‘plodding’humanstory,
TheDingbats,Krazy,IgnatztheMouse,andOffissaPupp,brokeawaythreeyearslater
tobecome“awildlysurrealandpoeticseriesofscratchynon‐sequiturs...astoryof
30
animalsliberatingtheimagination.”(219)BoydthencomparesthetwoGenesis
accountsintheOldTestamentcallingthefirst“arationalist’saccount”thatreflectsthe
GreatChainofBeingandthesecond“amuchmoreearthyworld”emphasizing
companionshipwithanimalsallaroundthehumancouple.
Employinganevolutionarypsychologicalexplanationforthisfascination,Boyd
notesthatanimals(includinghumans)mustbeabletorecognizeandinterpretother
animalsandfurther,thatmotionisimmediatelyorinitiallyinterpretedasagency,thus
consideredthebasicmodelofcausality.Insupport,Boyddescribesaclassic1944
psychologicalstudyinwhichstudentswereshownashortsilentfilmwithmoving
geometricshapesandaskedtodescribewhattheyhadseen.ResearchersFritzHeidler
andMarianneSimmelreportedthatonlyonerespondentspokeofgeometricshapes;all
theotherrespondents‘anthropomorphized’themovingfigures.Significantly,thistook
theformofstoryinwhich“aimsandmoods”wereassignedaswellasgendersand
voices.
Becausechildrenareoftenconsideredtobegrowingthroughearlierstagesof
humandevelopmentwhen,itissupposed,humanswereclosertootheranimals,they
areespeciallydrawntoanimals.Theyunderstandanimalsasfictitiouslystandinginfor
themandforotherpeople.“Yetwhenamenagerieofabsurdlydifferentspeciesspeak
tooneanother,inDr.SeussorDr.Doolittle,childrenalsoacceptthatasinonesense
perfectlynatural,sincetheycanseethatanimalsdohavetotakeaccountofthe
purposesofothercreaturesaroundthem.”(225)
31
Animalscontinuetoappearsignificantlyinseriousadultfictionaswell.Boyd
describesseveralreasonsforthis:Theyaresimilartoanddifferentfromusandalso
differentfromeachother,stimulatingtheimagination;theyplaymanyrolesinourlives
withthem;andtheyevokemanystrongfeelings.Becauseforustheyaremute“unable
toexplainthemselves...wehaveattributedtothemawholerangeofproperties.”
(227)
IntheWesterntradition,animalshavebeenunderstoodas‘sub‐souls’since
Heraclitus,Plato,andDescartes.“Livingunderamonotheisticandanthropocentric
religionandincitieswherewerelyonmechanicalratherthanbiologicalpower,
Westernershavetendedmoreandmoretostressthedistinctionbetweenhumanand
animal,todefine‘humane’asopposedto‘bestial’...andeven—andinthetwentieth
century,too!—todespise‘savages’fortheirreverencetowardanimals.”(228)
Inthelastseveralpagesofthisarticle,Boyddiscussesmanyexamplesofserious
adultliteratureincludingTheTempest,Joyce’sUlysses,AnnaKarenina,andMobyDick;
authorslikeJonathanSwift,H.G.Wells,FranzKafka,JulioCortázar,AngelaCarter,and
WillSelf;andeventhecomicstripsFarSideandCalvinandHobbestoillustratehow
pervasivelyinliteratureanimalsareusedtohelpusdefinewhoweareandtowrestle
withtheambiguousborderlandbetweenourselvesandotheranimals.
Brown,JosephEpes.AnimalsoftheSoul:SacredAnimalsoftheOglalaSioux.Rockport,MA:Element,Inc.,1992.
BrownfocusesontheimportanceofanimalsfortheLakotainhisdescriptionof
traditionalLakota“metaphysicsofnature.”Brownwritesthatthe‘metaphysics’are
32
definedseparatelybyeachgroupingreatdetailandarespecifictothelocal
geographicalfeaturesandspecies.Responsibilitiesandinterrelationshipsarespelledout
clearly.Relationshipswiththe‘vastwebofbeing’areestablishedandstrengthened
throughspecificritesandprayers,throughtheformandmaterialsofthebuiltlodge,
andthroughtheuseofthepipe.Anymanifestationofthespirit,especiallyanimals,can
teachorotherwisecommunicatewithpeople;theywanttocommunicate,buthuman
beings“mustdothegreaterparttoensureanunderstanding.”(22)
Communicationoftencomesduringdreamsandvisions,whenadifferentlevel
ofcognitionisaccessed,consideredmorerealthanthatofregularwaking
consciousness.Bothsleepingdreamsandwakingvisions,suchasthosereceivedduring
theVisionQuest(Hanblecheyapi)areconsideredequallypowerful.Mostdreamsand
visionsincludeencounterswitharangeofanimalrepresentativesandtutelaryspirits.
Theseareunderstoodas‘hypothetical’animalsorthespiritoftheanimalthatlives
behindthemanifestedworldandispartoftheGreatSpiritofcreation.Onceonehas
receivedavision,thesubjectiveexperienceofthatvisionmustthenberelayedtoaholy
personorhealerwhointerpretsitandprescribesaction.Therecipientisobligedto
sharetheexperience,generallythroughperformance,withtherestofthepeoplein
ordertoactivateanypowertransmitted.
Withtheproperattitudeofhumility,onecanrequestspecificpowersoraskfor
guidanceonaspecificproblemduringaquest.Individualdreamersmayreceivesongs,
rituals,orotherteachings;personalnames;orpowerstoheal,amongothergifts.Much
dependsonthe“persistence,receptivity,orcapabilitiesoftheindividual.”(56)The
33
animalspiritsarenotunderstoodascontrollinghumandestiny,butmoreaswitnesses
toit.
BrowndiscussesLakotaanimalcategoriesandtraditionalsystemsofassociation
thatlinkcertainanimalsandotherpowersorforcestogether,oftenbasedonbehavior
oreffect.Forexample,Whirlwindisassociatedwiththepowertoconfuseordisorient
and,beingtwo‐leggeds,birdsandhumansarecloselyassociated.
Traditionallyanimalsareobservedcloselyindailylife,theirpowersand
behaviorssometimesbecomingmodelsforidealhumanbehavior.Forexample,bison
areobservedtotakegreatcareoftheyoung,andsoprovideamodelforhuman
parenting.Duetothisanimistapproachshapingtheirworldviewovermanycenturies,
manyLakotapeoplehaveaprofoundunderstandingoftheirnaturalenvironmentasa
physicalaswellasspiritreality.
Burke,CarolynA.,andJobyG.Copenhaver.“AnimalsasPeopleinChildren’sLiterature.”LanguageArts81,no.3(January2004):205—13.
BurkeandCopenhaverarguethatchildhoodstories,especiallythose“personally
significant”favoritesthattouchedemotionalchordsandwerereadoverandover,
addressedneedsthatmaynothavebeenclearlyunderstood.Theauthorsare
concernedwithchildren’sliteratureasa‘thinkingdevice,’helpingchildrentomake
sense,understandvalues,andgeneratequestionsaboutlife.‘Thinkingdevice’functions
inchildren’sliteratureareamoderntrend,reflectingmodernconceptionsofthe
meaningofchildhoodasatimeto“adapt,contributetochange,andcriticallyexplore
issuesandoptions.”(211)
34
Thehighfrequencyofanimalcharactersinthesestoriesfunctiontoprovide
somedistance,a‘bufferedengagement’thatallowschildren“tocriticallyexplorethat
which(they)wouldnotbecomfortableexploringdirectly.”(207)
Asahighlyliteraryculture,wemakeuseoftextsregularlytoorganizeour
thoughts,relayvalues,anddialoguewitheachother.Inmanycases,foradultsaswellas
forchildren,animalcharactersaretheretohelpuswrestlewithcomplexand
emotionallydifficultsituations.Theauthorsurgeteachersandparentstoconsiderthis
functionofchildren’sliteratureandtousetheappealing‘anthropomorphicdevice’of
animalcharactersindevelopingcurriculumandopeningdialoguewithchildrenabout
issuesofculturalsignificance.
Burton,Lloyd.WorshipandWilderness:Culture,Religion,andLawinPublicLandsManagement.Madison:UniversityofWisconsinPress,2002.
BurtonexaminesthelargerissueofreligioususeofU.S.publiclandsby
examiningandcomparingreligiouspracticesofNativeAmericansandEuro‐Americans
andhowthepracticesandbeliefsaffectactivism,law,andinterculturalconflict.
Throughout,Burtonfocusesonwildanimals,particularlyBison,connectingthese
animalstolaw,spirituality,andculturalconflictforbothNativepeopleandEuro‐
Americans.Indescribingcurrentconflictsovercontrolofbuffaloherdsonpubliclands,
Burtonstatesthat,“Environmentalconservationgroupsandwesternranchinginterests
experiencepoliticalandlegalconflictinpartbecausetheyareproceedingfrom
profoundlydifferentunderstandingsofwhattheappropriaterelationshipbetween
humankindandotherlivingcreaturesoughttobe.”(183)Euro‐Americanconservation
35
groups,accordingtoBurton,oftenhavemoreincommonwithNativeworldviewsthan
withranching,fishing,loggingoranyotherindustrial‐scaleharvestinginterests.
Inattemptingtoconstructivelyaddressconflict,inwhichoneperspectivemust
winout,Burtondiscussesthepossibilityofmorethanonecorrectperspective.Burton
arguesfor“simultaneouslyoccurring‘realmsofknowing’“(9)andstatesfurtherthat
twometaphors“maycombinetoformaperspectivebroadenoughtomeettheneedsof
bothgroups.”(27)
Burtonlinkshistoricalandmodernreligiousmovementsinthiscountrytoanew
re‐discoveryofthesacred.Duringthewestwardexpansionera,explorersintovast
pristinewildernessareasexperiencedaweandreverence.Theinfluenceofnineteenth‐
centurytranscendentalism,authentictwentieth‐centurytransmissionteachingsofAsian
traditions,andagrowingappreciationandrespectfortraditionalindigenouswayshas
setthestageforaseriousreevaluationand“greening”ofmainstreamChristianand
Jewishpolicyandinterpretation.Sparkedbyconcernsforenvironmentalintegrityand
byLynnWhite’s1967article(seebelow),manydenominationsandcoalitionshave
issuedpolicystatements“producedasaresultoftheologicalinquiry...(inwhich)the
stewardshipinterpretation...seemstohavecarriedtheday.”(259)
Daston,Lorraine,andGreggMitman,ed.ThinkingWithAnimals:NewPerspectivesonAnthropomorphism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2005.
Inthiseditedvolume,anthropologists,philosophers,ethologists,historians,and
artistsexaminehowandwhywethinkwithanimalsandhowhumansandanimalsare
transformedbytheserelationships.Intheintroduction,theeditorsdescribethetitleas
36
ahavinga‘doublemeaning.’Humansboth“assumeacommunityofthoughtand
feelings”withawidevarietyofanimalsand“recruitanimalstosymbolize,dramatize,
andilluminate”experiencesandfantasies.
Citingthewidelyacknowledgedlinkbetweenthe“riseofmodernsciencewith
thewaningofanthropomorphicattitudestowardthenaturalworld”(3),theeditorslist
thetypesofreasonsoftengivenforavoidinganthropomorphicattributionsincluding
methodological(Howcanweknow?),historical(attributionsunsubstantiatedinthelab),
andevenmoral(narcissisticprojectionsorlaziness).Whydowecontinuetouniversally
anthropomorphize?Because,sayDastonandMitman,itisusefulforliterarysymbolism,
forsellingproducts,forwonderingwhatbeingananimalislike.
Inherchapter,“Intelligences,Angelic,Animal,Human,”LorraineDaston
comparesthirteenth‐centuryrationaltheologians’attemptstounderstandthemindsof
nonhumanangelswiththatofanimalbehaviorists’nineteenthcenturyattemptsto
understandnonhumananimalminds.Inbothcasesanthropomorphismisconsidereda
problem,asthescholarsnecessarilyreliedonanalogy.Theterm‘anthropomorphism’
beganasadesignationforfalseattributionofhumancharacteristicstoGodandwas
consideredasin,whichmayhelptoexplainsomeofthemoralcondemnationthatstill
existsinthecharge.Bothtraditionswereprimarilyinterestedinthethoughtsand
feelingsofnonhumanothersandbothattempts,Dastonstates,arguablystretchedthe
understandingof“thenatureandlimitsofthehumanmind.”(39)
AccordingtoPaulWhite,inhiscontributingchapter“TheExperimentalAnimalin
VictorianBritain,”thenineteenthcenturysawadramaticriseinbothmiddleclasspet
37
keepingandinlaboratory‐basedinvestigationofcomparativephysiologyusinglive
animalsubjects.Whitediscussessomeofthetensionsthiscombinationproduced.For
example,althoughtheuseoffrogsinsuchexperimentswentunremarked,theuseof
domesticanimalssuchasdogs,thenpresentinmanyhouseholds,‘triggeredprotests’
andclaimsthatitwas“treacherousandinsensitivetocommitsuchanimals,whohad
beenbredandtrainedupsoastoplacetheirconfidenceinhumanstoscientificuse(and
whosewayswere)morewinning...morereallyandintenselyhuman...thanthe
artificial,coldandselfishcharactersonemeetstoooftenintheguiseofladiesand
gentlemen.”(68)
Manyoftheopponentsofvivisectionandotherpainfulexperimentsworried
aboutthebrutalizingeffectsonthescientiststhemselveswhodesignedandcarriedout
proceduresthatcaused“repeatedandprolongedinflictionofpainonhelplesscreatures
(70)...(witha)disciplineddisregardforthefeelingsorperspectiveoftheanimalunder
study.”(75)
CharlesDarwin,Darwin’sdiscipleGeorgeRomanes,andotherswere,atthis
sametime,collectingandclassifyinganecdotalevidenceformentalandemotional
continuityacrossspecies.Thisevidence,althoughdismissedbyexperimentalscientists
assentimentalnonsense,waseffectivelyusedtogathersupportbyearlyanimalrights
andanticrueltyactivists.
In“PeopleinDisguise:AnthropomorphismandtheHuman‐PetRelationship,”
JamesA.Serpellcomparestheeffectsonpeopleandonanimalsofthehuman‐pet
relationship.Forpeople,thebenefitsarewelldocumented;theyincludeincreased
38
physicalhealthandfeelingsofbeinglovedandofbelonging.Someoftheeffectson
animalsarenotsoclearlybeneficial.Populationsofdomesticanimalshaveboomed(as
theirwildcounterparts’populationshavedwindled)anddogs,cats,andothercommon
petsnowoccupyanovelecologicalniche.Perhapsmoredisturbingare
“anthropomorphicbreedingselection”practicesthatattempttocreateanimalstocater
tohumanwhimsandexpectations.TheEnglishbulldog,forexample,hasbeenbredto
havesuchaflatfacethatbreathingproblemsoccur,oftenresultinginprematuredeath.
Otherexamplesincludedockinganddeclawingprocedures,overdependenceon
humanstosolveproblems,anxietyanddistressonbeingleftalone,andhuman
rejectionoftheanimalforbehaviorthatmaybenatural,butnotinlinewith
expectations.Serpellcommentsthatanthropomorphismmaybeeasy,butthat
appreciating‘dog‐ness’or‘cat‐ness’arespecialskillsthatneedtobelearned.
Fisher,JohnAndrew.“TheMythofAnthropomorphism.”InReadingsinAnimalCognition,editedbyMarcBekoffandDaleJamieson,3—16.Cambridge,Mass:MITPress,1996.
Thechargeofanthropomorphism,withitsimplicationoflaziness,sloppiness,
andsentimentality,isgenerallyregardedasanembarrassmentandanobstacleinthe
studyofanimalconsciousness.Fisherarguesthatthefallacyofanthropomorphism“is
neitherwell‐definednorclearlyfallacious.”(3)Forexample,Fisherasks,whatarethe
uniquelyhumancharacteristicsthataremistakenlyattributedtonon‐humans?There
areindicationstheconceptitselfmaybehistoricallyandculturallybound.Theoriginal
theologicalmeaningofattributinghumancharacteristicstoGodhascometomean
39
attributinghumancharacteristicstononhumananimalsandobjects.Thereisevidence
thatJapaneseprimatologistsareunconcernedaboutanthropomorphicattributions.
Fisherclaimsthattheoristshavedifferentconceptionsofanthropomorphism
withoutbeingawareofit.Asanattempttodisambiguateanthropomorphism,Fisher
outlinesatheoreticalframeworkwithtwobroadcategorieshelabelsInterpretiveand
ImaginativeAnthropomorphism.Interpretiveismeanttobeexplanatory,inferringthat
ananimalisbraveorsweetnatured,forinstance,fromobservingbehavior.This
categoryissubdividedintoCategorical(inferenceiscategoricallyinapplicable)and
Situational(inferenceisinapplicableinthissituation).Afurthersubdivisionof
Categoricaldesignatesaninferenceanthropomorphicdependingonspeciesoron
predicate(quality).
Arangeofpositionscriticaltoanthropomorphismmaybetakenfromthatof
disallowinganyinferencesatalltodisallowingcertainspeciesfromconsiderationor
certainpredicates.Mostcriticsviewtheuniversalhumantendencyto
anthropomorphizeaschildishandoverlyimaginative,evendangerous,areturnto
unfoundedsuperstitionandinvisible,immeasurablecauses.
Fisherrepliesthatpeopledomakedistinctionsamongvariousspeciesandthat
evenchildrenrecognizethefictitiousnatureofhumanizedportrayals.“Commonsense
persistentlyrefusestodrawasharplinebetweenhumansandotheranimals,and
persistsinretainingsympatheticfeelingsforanimalsandinunderstandingthemalong
humanlines.”(11—12)Itisentirelyplausible,accordingtoFisher,thatunderstanding
40
oneanotherusinghardwiredperceptionsisaninnateabilityprovidingaccurate
informationaboutotherhumansandnonhumananimalsatleastsomeofthetime.
Harvey,Graham.Animism.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2006.
AsHarveystates,themainpurposeofhisbookistotakeseriously“intimations
thattheterm‘person’appliesnotonlytohumans...buttoafarwidercommunity”(xii)
whichmayenrichdebatesabouttheenvironmentandaboutconsciousness.Harvey
outlinesanddiscusses‘old’animism,coveringatsomelength“Tylor’sspirits,”
“Durkheim’stotems,”and“Guthrie’santhropomorphism,”beforeintroducing‘new’
animistconcepts.“The‘newanimism,’“accordingtoHarvey,“islessaboutattributing
lifeand/orhuman‐likeness,thanitisaboutseekingbetterformsofpersonhoodin
relationships.”(16)The‘newanimism’beginswithA.IrvingHallowell’sinfluential1960
article“OjibweOntology,Behavior,andWorldView.”
Hallowell’s‘other‐than‐human‐persons,’aconceptbasedonhisfieldworkwith
theOjibwapeople,arethosenonhumansdefinedbytheirinteractions,theirwillfulness,
andtheirsociability,ratherthantheirphysicalorverballikenesstohumanbeings.The
skillsoneneedsinordertoactasaperson,thatisrespectfully,arelearnedovertime
andareseenmoreofteningrownandelderlyhumansthaninchildren.Foraspecific
exampleofthistypeofcategory,HallowellusestheOjibwadesignation‘grandfather,’
whichisreservedforthose,humanandotherwise,whoactlikethegrandfatherideal.
“Grandfathersarethosewhoarelistenedto,whocommunicatemattersofsignificance,
whoinculcaterespectfulliving,andteachskills.Grandfathersarepersonswithpower
41
andgiftstobestow.”(18)ThecategoriesofpersonhooddescribedbyHallowell
challengemodern,Westernnotionsofwhatconstitutesaperson.
Harveypresentsfourcasestudiesthatillustratethediversityofanimist‐type
beliefsandpractices,lookinginturnatOjibwelanguage,Maoriarts,Aboriginallawand
land,andEco‐Paganactivism.Animistissuesregardinglifeevents,ceremonialevents,
andethicsarecoverednext.Ofparticularinterestarethechaptersonpersonhoodand
consciousness.
Asalreadymentioned,animistsconsiderpersonstobesobasedon
communicationandrelationship.Theyarealsosignificantintheirparticularity.Itiswith
particularbeings,whetherasingledeer,badger,rock,ortree,thatengagement
happens.Animistbeliefsandpracticesareparticularaswellfromonesocietytothe
next.
Harveyarguesforthedevelopmentofnewtermstoexpressnewandnewly
discoveredideas.Forexample“knowingbodies”canbeusedtoindicatetheembodied
natureofbrains,selves,andconsciousness.Manyoftheseanimistideasarecurrently
reflectedbymodernWesternsocietyinartandotherworksoftheimagination.The
authorsandreadersofmodernliterarymovementssuchasmagicalrealismandanimist
realism,emanatingfromrecentlycolonizedpartsoftheworld,“resistdis‐enchantment
andcontinuetoenjoylivinginaworldthatisnotreducedtobeingahumanartefact.”
(207)
42
Ingold,Tim.“RethinkingtheAnimate,Re‐AnimatingThought.”Ethnos71,no.1(2006):9—20.
“Animism(is)traditionallyunderstoodas‘theimputationoflifetoinertobjects’
thatdescribesatypicallywesternhabit,thoughusuallyappliedtoindigenouspeoples.
Ingoldarguesthattheconventionalunderstandingis‘misleading’becauseanimismisa
conditionofbeingandnotasystemofbeliefsandthat,duetothefluidnatureofreality,
‘animacy’isalsoaconditionwithrootspriortoanymaterialdifferentiation.Animistic
ontologycanbemoreaccuratelyunderstoodas“awayofbeingthatisaliveandopento
aworldincontinuousbirth.”(9)
IngolddiscussesevidencethatWesternartistssuchasPaulKleeandMerleau‐
Pontyintheirjournalssometimesdescribeasimilaropenness.
Thepainter’srelationtotheworld,Merleau‐Pontywrites,isnota
simple,‘physical‐optical’one.Thatis,hedoesnotgazeuponaworldthat
isfiniteandcomplete,andproceedtofashionarepresentationofit.
Rather,therelationisoneof‘continuedbirth’—theseareMerleau‐
Ponty’sverywords—asthoughateverymomentthepainteropenedhis
eyestotheworldforthefirsttime.Hisvisionisnotofthingsinaworld,
butofthingsbecomingthings,andoftheworldbecomingaworld.(12)
Ingoldgoesontodescribeanimicrelationsasoccurringon“trailalongwhichlife
islived”andnotassomethingthatoccurs“betweentheorganism‘here’andthe
environment‘there’.”(13)Movementinthiscaseisprimary.Knowingisrelatedto
being,embeddedintheveryexperienceofbeingalive.Bywayofcontrast,Ingoldstates
thatempiricalscienceasawayofknowing“restsuponanimpossiblefoundation
43
(becauseitsmethodsattempttoplaceinquiry)aboveandbeyondtheveryworldit
claimstounderstand.”(19)
Irvine,Leslie.IfYouTameMe:UnderstandingOurConnectionWithAnimals.Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,2004.
Irvine’sbookbeginswiththepremisethatanimalsareemotionalandfeeling
beingsandmakestheargumentthatanimalshelpshapeouridentitiesinrelationship
becausetheyhaveselveswithwhichourselvesrelate.Thedimensionsofthisselfhood
aremutuallyapprehendedandstrengthenedduringintersubjectiveinteractionthat
exercisesandchallengesourrelationshipandemotionalskills.Irvinearguesthatanimals
areconsciousindividuals;theyarenotinterchangeableandtheyareself‐awareina
differentwaythanweare.
Irvineborrowsthespecificelementsofacoreselfthatwesharewithother
animalsfromWilliamJames’fourfeaturesof‘I,’refinedwithpreverbalinfantstudies.
Theelementsareagency(selfcontrol),coherence(integrity),affectivity(emotional
capacity),andcontinuity(selfhistory).Thelastelement,continuity,connects,through
memory,theotherthreeintoanindividualsubjectivityorindividualselfthat
intersubjectivelyinteractswithotherselves.Noticethatnoneofthisreliesonspoken
language;ourabilitytotalkaboutitdoes,butnotourabilitytohavetheinteractive
relationships,sharingintentions,feelings,andthoughtswithnonhumanothers.
AccordingtoIrvine,intentionscanbeindividualorshared,feelingsareemotional
states,andthoughtsinthiscontextcanbeunderstoodasthefocusofattention.
44
Irvinediscussesexamplesofthesesharedexperiences.Playbehavior,for
instance,isahighlycomplexandcoordinatedactivityinwhichcommunicating
intentionsandinterpretingtheintentionsofothersiscrucial.Amoodorcontextmust
beestablishedthatcreatesaprotective‘frame,’oftenwithsignalssuchasthecanine
playbow.Thefamous‘counting’horseCleverHanswasdiscoveredtobeaccurately
readingtheemotionalsignalsfromthepeoplewhocametoseehimperform.Inthis
way,he‘knew’whenthecorrectanswerwasreached.Wesharethefocusofattention
withdogswhenwemakeeyecontactinordertocheckin.Dogsguidethefocusof
humanattentiontothedoororafooddish,indicatingclearlywhatisonthedog’smind
orwhatthedoghopeswillhappen.
OthertopicsdiscussedbyIrvineincludeanimaldomestication,thetwentieth‐
centurytransitionfrom‘pet’to‘companion’animal,animalrelationshipsasresources
forhumanself‐construction,andsomeofthedeepimplicationsforsocietyin
consideringanimalsasotherselves.
Marchant,Jennifer.“‘AnAdvocate,aDefender,anIntimate’:Kristeva’sImaginaryFatherinFictionalGirl‐AnimalRelationships.”Children’sLiteratureAssociationQuarterly30.1(2005):3—15.
Inthisarticle,Marchantdiscussesfictionalbondsbetweenadolescentgirl
protagonistsandanimalsasavitalpartofthepsychicdevelopmentforthehuman
protagonist,providingamodelfortheadolescentreadernavigatingthesamecurrents.
Duringthisperiodofadolescentdevelopment,called‘abjection,’boundariesare
45
redefined,astheyounggirlismovingfromtheperiodofunitywithhermotherto
greaterautonomyandintegrationintheadultsocialorder.
AccordingtoMarchant,theanimals(dogs,horses,andadragon)appearingin
hersamplebooksareKristevanImaginaryFatherfigures,father‐motherconglomerates
withwhomadirectandimmediateidentificationismade,whoprovideadeeply
satisfyinglovewithboundaries,andwhoreflectandsupportegoidealsandadult
standards.Althoughaddressingarealneedintheyoungreader’slife,it“seemslikely
that,forsomereaders,atleast,muchoftheattractionisintheprotagonist‐animalbond
itself.”(14)
Morgenstern,John.“ChildrenandOtherTalkingAnimals.”TheLionandtheUnicorn24(2000):110—127.
Children’sliteratureiswidelyconsideredtobesimple.Inordertounderstand
whatconstitutesthissimplicity,MorgensterncomparesC.S.Lewis’useoftalking
animalsinhischildren’sbooks(ChroniclesofNarnia,1950‐‐1956)andhisadultscience
fictionSpaceTrilogyincludingOutoftheSilentPlanet(1938).Heconcludesfromthe
textsandfromLewis’ownstatementsininterviews,thatLewisdeliberatelyremoved
uncomfortableambiguitiesabouttalkinganimalsfromhischildren’sbooks,andthatthis
itselfsimplifiesthestory.Theambiguousfeelingsthemselvesaredescribedasdisgust
aboutembodimentanduneasinessabouttheunclearboundariesbetweenhumansand
animals.
Morgensterndistinguishesbetweenananimalthattalks,aflatcharacterization
thatevokesdelight,andanalientalker,whomoneis‘tempted’tothinkofasaman,and
46
whotherefore‘becomesabominable’.Thedifferencesaresubtle.“Whatisbeing
assertedhereisadifferencethatisnotreallyadifferenceintheanimalthattalksbut,as
Lewispointsout,adifferencein‘thepointofview’oftheobserver.”(112)Lewismakes
another,relatedpoint:ifoneis“‘accustomedtomorethanonerationalspecies’“(112)
thenthereisnoproblem.
Nagel,Thomas.“Whatisitliketobeabat?”ThePhilosophicalReview,LXXXIII,4(October1974):435—450.
Nageldescribesconsciousexperienceasa‘widespreadphenomenon’,
attributingitto‘manylevelsofanimallife’andyet,asheacknowledges,itishardto
knowwhatevidencetocaptureormeasureobjectivelyinsupportofitsexistence.
Certainlyawakingconsciousexperiencethroughanorganism’ssenseperceptions
meansthatitis“somethingitisliketobethatorganism.”Nagelusestheexampleofa
bat;theyaremammalsandyettheirexperienceisverydifferentfromahumanonedue
toitssensoryapparatusanddailyactivities.Thisproblemofaccuratelyapprehending
another’sexperienceappearsintractable;thatis,wecannotcapturetheexperienceof
anotherwithcurrentmethodsofobjectivescience.
Theproblemisnotjustspeciestospecies,butindividualtoindividual.Because
weareunabletoseparateourselvesfromourownsubjectivity,wecannotobjectively
approachanother’s.Every“subjectivephenomenonisessentiallyconnectedwitha
singlepointofview,anditseemsinevitablethatanobjective,physicaltheorywill
abandonthatpointofview.”(38)Nagelconcludeshisinfluentialarticlebypredicting
thatwemayneverbesatisfiedthatweknowanotherorganism’spointofviewfully,and
47
that,sinceweare‘restrictedtotheresourcesofourownmind’,wemustrelyonour
imaginationatpresenttodescribeanother’ssubjectivepointofview.
Ristau,CarolynA.ed.CognitiveEthology:TheMindsofOtherAnimals:essaysinhonorofDonaldR.Griffin.Hillsdale,NewJersey:LawrenceErlbaumAssoc.,1991.
PartofaseriescalledComparativeCognitionandNeuroscience;thepapers
collectedherearefroma1987symposiuminanimalcognition,authoredbyresearchers
andphilosophersincognitiveethology.ColinG.Beeraddressesfolkpsychologicalterms
andconcepts,pointingoutthatthephilosophicaldefinitionofintentionalityisbroader
thanthatusedbycognitiveethologists.Hewondersiflanguage‐basedcriteriaare
anthropocentricandwhethertheycanbetranslatedintononlinguisticterms.Jonathan
Bennettalsodiscussestheintentionalanalysisofbehavior,advocatingmultiple
approachesasawayofdevelopingaricherpicture.GeorgF.Michelcoversmanyofthe
concernsaboutthe‘overrichness’offolkpsychologicalterminologyanditsfailureto
predicthumanbehavior.EchoingThomasNagel,SonjaI.YoergandAlanC.Kamilremind
usthatonecannothavedirectevidenceofanother’sconsciousness.Theauthorsdrawa
lineofinfluencefromCharlesDarwintoDonaldGriffin;bothargueforthelikelihoodof
mentalcontinuityacrossanimalspeciesgiventheevolutionarycontinuityofsomany
otherprocessesandstructures.
Othercontributorsdiscussspecificstudiesofconsciouschimpanzeebehavior
(AllisonJolly),artificiallanguageacquisitioninparrots(IrenePepperberg),andfalse
signalingbehavior(DorothyL.CheneyandRobetM.Seyfarth;PeterMarler,Stephen
Karakashian,andMarcelGyger;W.JohnSmith).CarolynA.RistauandGordonM.
48
Burghardteachapplythefolkpsychologicalterm‘intentionalstance’totheanti‐
predatorfeintingbehaviorofshorebirds(Ristau)andhognosesnakes(Burghardt),
pointingoutthepurposefulorfunctionalqualityofthebehaviorandarguingthat
successfuloutcomesleadtoreinforcementthat,overevolutionarytime,maysupport
morevoluntarycontrol.
DonaldGriffinsurveystheprimarycriticismsofcognitiveethology,includingfluid
termdefinitionsandunevencriticalstandards,thebeliefthatconsciousthinkinghasno
effectonbehavior,thecommondismissalofanyevidenceofconsciousthinkingin
nonhumananimals,andtheaprioriassumptionthatsubjectivitycanneverbeknown.
Thesediscouragingpositionsshouldbeignored,arguesGriffin.Instead,cognitive
ethologistsshouldworktoclarifyelementarydefinitionsofconsciousnessappliedto
animalsbyworkingonsimplecasesandaskingwhatfunctionsareservedbybehaviors.
Inparticular,findingsofcognitivecreativityandenterprisesupporttheviewthat
animalshaveatleastanelementaryconsciousness.
WhiteJr.,Lynn.“TheHistoricalRootsofOurEcologicCrisis.”Science155,no.3767(1967):1203—1207.
Infoursuccinctpages,historianLynnWhitediscussesthetremendousimpact
humanshavehadonthenaturalenvironmentthroughtime,particularlyinNorthern
andWesternEurope.AccordingtoWhite,Christianaxioms,suchasthatof‘dominion,’
createdanattitudeofindifferencetothedestructionofthenaturalworld,and
combinedwiththeIndustrialAgefusionofscienceandtechnology,acceleratedthat
destruction,producingthecurrentenvironmentalcrisis.
49
Fromthemedievalinventionofheavierandmoredestructiveplowsthat
resultedinchanginglanddistributionsystemstothetechnicalsuperioritythatmade
possibletheplunderingoftheknownworldbythe“small,mutuallyhostilenations”of
Europe,Westernskills“inthedevelopmentofpowermachinery,labor‐savingdevices,
andautomation”remainedconsistent,continuingintothepresentday.
Forthesedeeplyentrenchedreasons,Whiteargues,theapplicationofmore
scienceandtechnologywillnotavertfurthercrises;rootcausesforourbeliefsand
actionsmustbeunderstood.WhitedeclaresthatthetriumphofChristianityover
paganismwas“thegreatestpsychicrevolutioninthehistoryofourculture”and
Christianbeliefs,profoundlyconditioningourviewsonhumannatureanddestiny,must
bereexamined.
Wynne,CliveD.L.DoAnimalsThink?Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004.
Wynne’sbookcontainschaptersdetailinganimalstudiesinavarietyofareas,
includingprimatelearning,languageexperiments,andproblemsolving;sensory
perceptionsofbats;insectcommunication;thesymbolicmeaningsandrolesofpigeons
invariouscultures;artificiallanguageacquisitioninbirds;anddolphinperceptionand
intelligence.Heusesmanyexamplesthroughouttosupporthiscontentionthat
nonhumananimalsarenotintelligentorconsciousintheuniquewaythathumansare,
butthatmuchcanbeobjectivelyunderstoodaboutthenatureandrealityofanimals
andthatmuchissharedbetweenhumansandotheranimals.
50
Manyofthedisagreementsaboutanimalawareness,cognition,andintelligence
revolvearoundwhichqualitiesandcapacitiesaresharedandwhichdistinctfrom
speciestospecies,andinparticular,whatcharacteristicsareuniquetohumanbeings.
Tohelpinclarifyingthisimportantquestion,Wynneintroduceswhathecallsthe
SimilaritySandwich,athree‐layerframeworkforunderstandingsimilaritiesand
differences.Thebottom(bread)layerasksthequestion,whatisdifferent?Allspecies
aredifferent,generallybasedonvarietyinanatomyandsenseperceptions.Themiddle,
orfixins,layerasks,whatisshared?Someinstinctsandcertaincognitivecapacitieslike
basicmemoryandconceptformationseemtobesimilaracrossawidespectrumof
animallife.Thetop(bread)asks,whatisnearlyuniqueinhumans?Here,Wynne
suggests,canbeplacedtheuseofcomplexlanguageandanindependentself‐
awareness.
51
APPENDIXA:SURVEYSAMPLE
Thefollowingisachronologicallistofthe46titlessurveyed.TheyweretakenfromthreebibliographiesofrecommendedbooksaboutpetspublishedonthewebsiteoftheUniversityofIllinois’CenterforChildren’sBooks.TheoriginalbibliographieswereaccessedinFebruary2010athttp://ccb.lis.illinois.edu/bibliographies.html.
George,JeanCraighead.HowtoTalktoYourCat.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2000.
George,JeanCraighead.HowtoTalktoYourDog.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2000.
Adoff,Arnold.DaringDogandCaptainCat.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2001.
Cowley,Joy.AgapanthusHumandMajorBark.NewYork:PhilomelBooks,2001.
Graham,Bob.“Let’sGetaPup!”SaidKate.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2001.
Holub,Joan.WhyDoCatsMeow?NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2001.
Holub,Joan.WhyDoDogsBark?NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2001.
Simont,Marc.TheStrayDog.NewYork:HarperCollins,2001.
Harvey,Amanda.DogEared.NewYork:DoubledayBookforYoungReaders,2002.
Collicott,Sharleen.ToestomperandtheBadButterflies.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,2003.
Cullen,Lynn.LittleScragglyHair:ADogonNoah’sArk.NewYork:HolidayHouse,2003.
Farish,Terry.TheCatWhoLikedPotatoSoup.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2003.
Florian,Douglas.BowWowMeowMeow:It’sRhymingCatsandDogs.SanDiego:Harcourt,2003.
Lee,HoBaek.WhileWeWereOut.LaJolla,Calif.:Kane/Miller,2003.
52
Little,Jean.Emma'sStrangePet.NewYork:HarperCollins,2003.
Luthardt,Kevin.Peep!Atlanta:Peachtree,2003.
Palatini,Margie.ThePerfectPet.NewYork:HarperCollinsPublishers,2003.
Provensen,Alice.ADayintheLifeofMurphy.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2003.
Sidman,Joyce.TheWorldaccordingtoDog:PoemsandTeenVoices.Boston,Mass.:HoughtonMifflin,2003.
Finney,Patricia.I,Jack.NewYork:HarperCollins,2004.
Horowitz,Ruth.BigSurpriseintheBugTank.NewYork:DialBooksforYoungReaders,2004.
Joosse,BarbaraM.BadDogSchool.NewYork:ClarionBooks,2004.
Nolan,Lucy.DownGirlandSit:SmarterThanSquirrels.NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2004.
So,Meilo.Gobble,Gobble,Slip,Slop:ATaleofaVeryGreedyCat.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2004.
Turner,PamelaS.Hachiko:TheTrueStoryofaLoyalDog.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,
2004.
Gretz,Susanna.RileyandRoseinthePicture.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2005.
Kuskin,Karla.So,What’sItLiketobeaCat?NewYork:AtheneumBooksforYoungReaders,2005.
Nolan,Lucy.DownGirlandSit:OntheRoad.NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2005.Rodowsky,Colby.TheNext‐DoorDog.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2005.Shyer,MarleneFanta.FleabiscuitSings!NewYork:MarshallCavendish,2005.
Fine,Anne.TheDiaryofaKillerCat.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2006.
Howe,James.HoundsleyandCatinaandtheBirthdaySurprise.Cambridge,Mass.:
CandlewickPress,2006.
53
Kelleher,Victor.Dogboy.Asheville,N.C.:FrontStreet,2006.
MacLachlan,Patricia.OnceIAteaPie.NewYork:Cotler/HarperCollins,2006.
Sidman,Joyce.MeowRuff:AStoryinConcretePoetry.Boston:HoughtonMifflin,2006.
Smith,D.James.ProbablytheWorld'sBestStoryaboutaDogandtheGirlWhoLovedMe.NewYork:AtheneumBooksforYoungReaders,2006.
Calmenson,Stephanie.MayIPetYourDog?TheHow‐to‐GuideforKidsMeetingDogs(andDogsMeetingKids).NewYork:ClarionBooks,2007.
Friend,Catherine.ThePerfectNest.Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2007.Harper,ChariseMericle.FashionKittyversustheFashionQueen.NewYork:Hyperion
PaperbacksforChildren,2007.Hicks,BarbaraJean.TheSecretLifeofWalterKitty.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2007.
Jenkins,Steve.DogsandCats.Boston:HoughtonMifflinCo.,2007.
O'Connor,Barbara.HowtoStealaDog.NewYork:FarrarStrausandGiroux,2007.
Straight,Susan.TheFriskativeDog.NewYork:AlfredA.Knopf,2007.
Umansky,Kaye.IDon'tLikeGloria!Cambridge,Mass.:CandlewickPress,2007.
VanFleet,Matthew.Dog.NewYork:Simon&SchusterBooksforYoungReaders,2007.
Ward,Helen.LittleMoonDog.NewYork:DuttonChildren’sBooks,2007.