InterpretationInterpretationand and

ActionActioninin

ContextContextVarol AkmanVarol Akman

December 21, 2000December 21, 2000

AnkaraAnkara

Relationship?Relationship?

• In our daily life, we can’t use In our daily life, we can’t use language without acting.language without acting.

• We’re always in contact with things We’re always in contact with things about which we can make about which we can make statements.statements.

• Thus, language use and everyday Thus, language use and everyday practices are intertwined.practices are intertwined.

Philosophical rootsPhilosophical roots

• P. F. Strawson: the early 70’s. P. F. Strawson: the early 70’s.

• M. E. Bratman: the late 80’s.M. E. Bratman: the late 80’s.

Being context-boundBeing context-bound

• ““I meant that …” = I assumed that the I meant that …” = I assumed that the context was …context was …

• Meaning is context-bound but context Meaning is context-bound but context is boundless. Derrida: “Context is is boundless. Derrida: “Context is never absolutely determinable.” (Its never absolutely determinable.” (Its determination can never be entirely determination can never be entirely certain or saturated.)certain or saturated.)

Part I / Part I / InterpretationInterpretation

• A sentence S of a natural language L A sentence S of a natural language L is is seriouslyseriously uttered on some uttered on some occasion.occasion.

• X (the hearer) possesses only that X (the hearer) possesses only that much information. X knows nothing much information. X knows nothing about the identity of Y (the speaker) about the identity of Y (the speaker) or the nature or date of the occasion.or the nature or date of the occasion.

Interpretation (cont’d)Interpretation (cont’d)

• Grant X complete mastery of the Grant X complete mastery of the lexicon and grammar of L.lexicon and grammar of L.

QuestionQuestion

• Is there any sense in which X can be Is there any sense in which X can be said to know the meaning of said to know the meaning of precisely precisely what is saidwhat is said on this on this occasion?occasion?

Strawson’s schemeStrawson’s scheme

• Investigate this problem by Investigate this problem by proposing three progressively proposing three progressively richer senses of meaning:richer senses of meaning:

– sense-a-meaningsense-a-meaning

– sense-b-meaningsense-b-meaning

– sense-c-meaningsense-c-meaning

Sense-a-meaningSense-a-meaning

• Suppose S is free of syntactic Suppose S is free of syntactic ambiguity (or X is informed which ambiguity (or X is informed which of the alternative readings of S to of the alternative readings of S to choose). Then X knows the sense-choose). Then X knows the sense-a-meaning of what is said.a-meaning of what is said.

– “ “The dynamiting of the bank The dynamiting of the bank …”…”

Mock eqn. #1Mock eqn. #1

sense-a (linguistic) meaning =sense-a (linguistic) meaning =

S + a-knowledge + disambiguating S + a-knowledge + disambiguating knowledgeknowledge

where a-knowledge is the ideally where a-knowledge is the ideally complete knowledge of the complete knowledge of the lexicon and grammar of L.lexicon and grammar of L.

Sense-b-meaningSense-b-meaning

• X learns the sense-b-meaning of S if X learns the sense-b-meaning of S if X has access to knowledge of the X has access to knowledge of the references of proper names and references of proper names and indexicals that may be contained in indexicals that may be contained in S.S.

– “ “George W. is the new president.”George W. is the new president.”

– “ “He is here today.”He is here today.”

Mock eqn. #2Mock eqn. #2

sense-b (linguistic-cum-referential) sense-b (linguistic-cum-referential) meaning =meaning =

sense-a-meaning + b-knowledgesense-a-meaning + b-knowledge

where b-knowledge includes -- in where b-knowledge includes -- in addition to a-knowledge -- references addition to a-knowledge -- references of proper names and indexicals in S.of proper names and indexicals in S.

Sense-c-meaningSense-c-meaning

• Obtained by adding to sense-b-Obtained by adding to sense-b-meaning the illocutionary force of meaning the illocutionary force of what was said, together with a what was said, together with a complete grasp of how what was said complete grasp of how what was said is intended to be understood (Austin).is intended to be understood (Austin).

– “ “Don’t look.” (request?, order?)Don’t look.” (request?, order?)– “ “The ideal candidate must be …”The ideal candidate must be …”

Mock eqn. #3Mock eqn. #3

sense-c (complete) meaning =sense-c (complete) meaning =

sense-b-meaning + c-knowledgesense-b-meaning + c-knowledge

where c-knowledge consists of -- in where c-knowledge consists of -- in addition to b-knowledge -- the addition to b-knowledge -- the illocutionary force of S plus the illocutionary force of S plus the true intent of Y.true intent of Y.

Contribution ofContribution ofc-knowledgec-knowledge

• Can its additional contribution be null Can its additional contribution be null sometimes? (In which case the move sometimes? (In which case the move from b to c might still be regarded as from b to c might still be regarded as a minimal addition: there is nothing a minimal addition: there is nothing to be added to the b-meaning.)to be added to the b-meaning.)

– “ “I warn you that …” (explicitly I warn you that …” (explicitly performative, hence sense-a?)performative, hence sense-a?)

Mock inequalityMock inequality

sense-a-meaningsense-a-meaning

< sense-b-meaning< sense-b-meaning

< sense-c-meaning< sense-c-meaning

where progressively richer senses where progressively richer senses of meaning are obtained by of meaning are obtained by moving from left to right.moving from left to right.

Dependence on contextDependence on context

• What specific differences are What specific differences are there in the ways in which the there in the ways in which the meaning of meaning of what is saidwhat is said depends depends on context in the three cases?on context in the three cases?

Determination ofDetermination ofsense-a-meaningsense-a-meaning

• Context bears on determination of Context bears on determination of sense-a-meaning in just those sense-a-meaning in just those situations where S suffers from situations where S suffers from syntactic and/or lexical ambiguity.syntactic and/or lexical ambiguity.

• Disambiguation at this level isn’t a Disambiguation at this level isn’t a matter of linguistic rule. (Rather, a matter of linguistic rule. (Rather, a matter of general relevance.)matter of general relevance.)

Determination ofDetermination ofsense-b-meaningsense-b-meaning

• Context bears on the determination of Context bears on the determination of sense-b-meaning in all cases except sense-b-meaning in all cases except those where b-knowledge adds nothing those where b-knowledge adds nothing to a-knowledge.to a-knowledge.

• There are semantic rules moderating There are semantic rules moderating this dependence. Still, b-knowledge this dependence. Still, b-knowledge isn’t wholly under the governance of isn’t wholly under the governance of language rules.language rules.

Determination ofDetermination ofsense-c-meaningsense-c-meaning

• There is no special class of rules-There is no special class of rules-of-the-natural-language in closing of-the-natural-language in closing the gap between sense-b and the gap between sense-b and sense-c meanings.sense-c meanings.

– “ “She’s extremely careful.” She’s extremely careful.” (praise?, condemnation?)(praise?, condemnation?)

Semantic creativitySemantic creativity

• According to the inequality given According to the inequality given earlier, some sense-a-meaning is earlier, some sense-a-meaning is always included in the complete always included in the complete meaning of meaning of what is saidwhat is said..

• Isn’t it unrealistic to suppose that Isn’t it unrealistic to suppose that all meanings of a particular word all meanings of a particular word are listed in X’s ideal lexicon?are listed in X’s ideal lexicon?

IronyIrony

• Recall a precondition in our original Recall a precondition in our original formulation, i.e. that a certain formulation, i.e. that a certain sentence S must be seriously sentence S must be seriously uttered. Thus, an uttered. Thus, an ironicalironical utterance utterance of S is regarded as non-serious.of S is regarded as non-serious.

A declarative S uttered ironically may expressA declarative S uttered ironically may expressan idea that contradicts the idea whichan idea that contradicts the idea which

it professes to express.it professes to express.

ReferenceReference

• Sometimes a given S admits different Sometimes a given S admits different interpretations where in one interpretations where in one interpretation a certain constituent of interpretation a certain constituent of S has a referential use whereas in S has a referential use whereas in some other interpretation it doesn’t.some other interpretation it doesn’t.

– “ “The next meeting will resolve the The next meeting will resolve the issue.”issue.”

Contextualization cueContextualization cue

• An aspect of linguistic behavior An aspect of linguistic behavior (lexical, prosodic, phonological, etc.) (lexical, prosodic, phonological, etc.) indicating those portions of context indicating those portions of context which are to be taken into account to which are to be taken into account to interpret what is said by Y: interpret what is said by Y: – Hints at the social context (via particular codes, Hints at the social context (via particular codes,

styles, and dialects), and enables Y and X to styles, and dialects), and enables Y and X to reason about their communicative intentions.reason about their communicative intentions.

Part II / ActionPart II / Action

• I have a soccer game tomorrow. I have a soccer game tomorrow. My plan for today includes buying My plan for today includes buying new shoes. Do I buy them right new shoes. Do I buy them right after my talk or later this after my talk or later this afternoon or … ?afternoon or … ?

– Game tomorrow. --> ‘accepted’Game tomorrow. --> ‘accepted’– Don’t have shoes. --> dittoDon’t have shoes. --> ditto

Background of Background of deliberationdeliberation

• There are assorted practical There are assorted practical pressures for accepting a given pressures for accepting a given proposition in the cognitive proposition in the cognitive background of one’s deliberation.background of one’s deliberation.

• These pressures are context-relative.These pressures are context-relative.--> --> Accept something in one context, reject it or Accept something in one context, reject it or

suspend judgment in another context.suspend judgment in another context.

Simplification of Simplification of reasoningreasoning

• I simply take it for granted that I simply take it for granted that there’s a game tomorrow. (Assume there’s a game tomorrow. (Assume that in case of rain no game will be that in case of rain no game will be played.)played.)

• Consider a betting situation:Consider a betting situation:

– At what odds must I accept a bet At what odds must I accept a bet from you from you rere the weather? the weather?

Cost asymmetriesCost asymmetries

• I have two cars, one brand new I have two cars, one brand new and one somewhat old. I think that and one somewhat old. I think that they’re both in good condition.they’re both in good condition.– When I lend my old car to a distant relative, When I lend my old car to a distant relative,

I simply take it for granted that it’s in I simply take it for granted that it’s in working order.working order.

– When I lend it to my daughter I don’t take When I lend it to my daughter I don’t take this for granted.this for granted.

Social pressuresSocial pressures

• Several funding agencies need Several funding agencies need jointly to decide whether to fund jointly to decide whether to fund a space station together.a space station together.– Assume that the total cost of the project = Assume that the total cost of the project =

top of the estimated range offered by each top of the estimated range offered by each project milestone.project milestone.

• X is accused of a crime but insists X is accused of a crime but insists on his innocence. (Dinner? Jury?)on his innocence. (Dinner? Jury?)

Conclusion (Part I)Conclusion (Part I)

• Y (the originator of S) assumes Y (the originator of S) assumes quite a bit of background quite a bit of background knowledge on the part of X (the knowledge on the part of X (the addressee).addressee).

• X narrows down the list of X narrows down the list of meanings available to reach the meanings available to reach the intended meaning.intended meaning.

Conclusion (Part II)Conclusion (Part II)

• One might reasonably accept a One might reasonably accept a proposition relative to a context proposition relative to a context but not relative to another but not relative to another context.context.

• Such acceptance is driven by Such acceptance is driven by practical considerations and leads practical considerations and leads to one’s cognitive background.to one’s cognitive background.