ISSN 1041-536X

ACLS OCCASIONAL PAPER, No. 56

American Council of Learned Societies

Internationalization:Rhetoric or Reality?

Sheila Biddle

Sheila Biddle was a program officer in the Ford Foundations Educa-tion and Culture Program from 19821996, working in the field ofhigher education. She was responsible for the Foundations programsin international studies, including the less commonly taught foreignlanguages, and teaching and scholarship in the social sciences at boththe undergraduate and graduate levels. She has served as a consultanton internationalization for a number of universities and organizationsand recently was a member of the Intellectual Review team for the AbeFellowship Program, a review commissioned by the Social ScienceResearch Council on behalf of the Japan Foundation Center forGlobal Partnership, the programs funder. Dr. Biddle received herdoctorate in history from Columbia University and taught inColumbias history department for 13 years. She was a senior researchscholar at Columbia from 19962002 while she was completing theresearch and writing of this project.

2002 by Sheila Biddle

Contents

Foreword by Jane I. Guyer v

Preface by Alison R. Bernstein vii

Acknowledgments ix

I. Introduction 1

II. Why Internationalize? 5

III. The University Context 10

IV. Routes to Internationalization 13

Administrative Reorganization 14Curriculum, Faculty Incentives, Faculty Research 33Foreign Language Instruction: Some Impressions 41Professional Schools: Some Impressions 51

V. Area Studies, Area Centers 67

VI. Intellectual Issues 87

Regional Studies and the Social Sciences 87The Humanities and the Social Sciences 92Interdisciplinary Work in the Research University 101

IV. Observations and Conclusions 110

Foreword

v

Jane I. GuyerProfessor of Anthropology,Johns Hopkins University

Sheila Biddles study is about the craft of university navigation. Mostreviews of fields of scholarship turn towards either the stars ofintellectual history or the basic design of institutional vessels. Here,we are simply trying to find ways forward, mainly by trimming oldsails and tinkering with existing techniques. The post-1989 convic-tionreinforced in new ways post 9/11that the rest of the worlddoes matter fundamentally to American economy and society turnsout to generate treacherous intellectual cross-currents rather than anysimple guiding orientations for university policy about education andresearch for a globalizing future. Internationalization is constantly indanger of running aground on one or another implication of Americasmutating sense of its own uniqueness in the world.

It is to Sheila Biddles enormous credit that she focuses on this level:the complex, labor-intensive struggle to keep the rest of the world onthe horizon and in the discussion as contexts shift. Her sense of thework of programmatic change in the university comes from her longand successful experience as a Ford Foundation program officer. Inthis she was both ambitious and modest: ambitious that backingparticular ideas and individuals could leaven entire new fields, fromAfrican-American studies to agrarian studies; and modest that firmlyestablished outcomes would require something beyond both indi-viduals and funds, namely institutional commitment. Most of us whohave worked in these galleys will recognize the concerns, the costs andthe sense of movement and achievement that Biddle describes, evenif our own programs do not figure explicitly. It is this tangible,experiential sense of various processes (in the plural) of international-ization that makes this report so valuable.

It was in the context of the area studies revival of the mid-1990s that I came to appreciate the accumulated wisdom that isrealized in this study. In it, as in her programmatic work, Biddleexposes the particular permutations and combinations of individuals,funds and institutional commitment that have kept internationaliza-

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tion on university radar screens. Some findings are chastening, suchas the relative lack of attention to the undergraduate curriculum,more or less across the board. Others are enlightening, such as theparticularity of solutions to their own milieux. Others are encouraging,such as the emergence of a younger generation of scholars who crossdisciplinary and regional boundaries with more alacrity than wascharacteristic in the recent past. Yet others are simply noteworthy,such as the vast amount of time and energy that has been spent on theproblem. But the real strength of the study lies in the clarity withwhich Biddle sees all these permutations and the bluntness withwhich she expresses the nature of the challenges. In every section,there are examples of how challenges have been addressed by othersand therefore how ones own horizons of imagination and warningcould be opened up.

There is a particular importance to a study of how things actuallywork. Many of thosefrom center heads to deanswho are called onto head up new programs are quite inexperienced on this whole rangeof issues. As leadership becomes even more of a revolving door thanin the past, new incumbents can have no idea of the possibilities anddifficulties ahead. Those who master the techniques of interdiscipli-nary faculty appointments may be in the dark about the theoreticalcurrents that one or another appointment would join. And vice versa.Knowing a field is a necessary but not a sufficient preparation formaking a center function. For all of us then, this report on thepragmatics of internationalization is a goldmine of information andinsight, gleaned not only from the study itself but from a career ofattempting to make innovative programs work.

July 14, 2003

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Preface

Alison R. Bernstein, Vice President,The Program on Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom,

The Ford Foundation

For more than half a century, The Ford Foundation has fundedcurricular efforts to help American university students know andunderstand key parts of the developing world. From the early 1950sthrough the end of the 1990s, Ford played a critical role in thedevelopment of a field which has been called area or internationalstudies. This phrase gained legitimacy especially during the ColdWar period, since it was used as a shorthand for university-basedprograms that examined the culture, economics, and social andpolitical landscapes of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, including EastAsia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Thus, long before the relativelyrecent call to internationalize the teaching and research agendas ofAmerican colleges and universities, the Foundation was deeplyengaged in supporting area or international studies projects.

Examining the presence, quality, and impact of area and interna-tional studies efforts at five distinguished American universities in the1990s is the focus of my former colleague, Sheila Biddles, stimulatingand thoughtful report. Biddle, a historian by training, was, for morethan 15 years, responsible for Fords grantmaking in area andinternational studies. This responsibility enabled her to acquire abreadth of knowledge and experience about this interdisciplinaryfield that could not be gained by working on any single campus. Herreport is full of useful and often surprising observations, and, happily,it reads more like an essay for a monthly magazine than a dryfoundation-commissioned study. It should find a wide audienceamong teachers, scholars, students, and administrators.

The timing for this publication could not be more propitious. Itcomes at a moment when the need for a deeper and more nuancedunderstanding of the world outside the United States could not begreater. It is also a time of shrinking budgets for most universities, andhard choices must be made. Biddle eschews simple solutions. Whensome among us think that more funding for area studies willautomatically solve the problems of U.S. parochialism, Biddle knowsbetter. Her view is that a bland internationalist approach at the

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university level is not likely to result in a more educated citizenryunless it is backed up by rigorous research and a certain humilityabout ones own biases. We all do well to remember that.

Acknowledgments

I have incurred obligations to a great many people in the course ofcompleting this project. I am indebted, first and last, to the admin-istrators, faculty, and staff of the five universities in the studywithout their cooperation, there would have been no project. I amespecially grateful to the individuals on each campus who set up thesite visits, put together the appointment schedules, and made thearrangements for my stay. I found out just how frustrating and time-consuming this could be when I had to do it myself. The faculty andadministrators I interviewed were unfailingly generous with theirideas and their time, the second a scarce commodity during theacademic term; I talked to many of them more than once, and I thankthem for their good will in welcoming me back each and every time.I have not listed them individually for fear of leaving out names thatshould be included, and also because Im not sure that all of the peopleI talked to would want to be implicated in what I have written. ButI do thank them, one and all.

The individuals who offered advice and commented on sections ofthe text are too numerous to mention by name, but I am grateful toall of them. I am particularly indebted to Lisa Anderson, Jane Guyer,Charles Keyes, and Jim Scott, who watched over the project, and readsubstantially all of the manuscript along the way. Their substantivecomments and suggestions were enormously helpful to me in think-ing through the issues I was writing about, and while many of theircontributions are reflected in the text, it goes without saying thatresponsibility for the final product rests entirely with me. Thanks aredue also, in chronological order, to Lailee Moghtader, my researchassistant for 18 months when the project was based at ColumbiaUniversity, and Sue Laizik, who put the manuscript into its final form.I thank them for their labors, and also for their good cheer andencouragement when my spirits were flagging.

Finally, I owe thanks to several institutions: to the Ford Founda-tion, which provided funding for the project; the School of Interna-tional and Public Affairs at Columbia University, where the projectwas housed for the first several years; and the American Council ofLearned Societies (ACLS), the projects home during the final phase.Special thanks are due to Steve Wheatley of ACLS, who orchestratedthe transition.

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1I. Introduction

The idea for this project took shape in the mid-1990s, when I was atthe Ford Foundation, working in the higher education division ofwhat was then the Education and Culture Program, and responsiblefor programming in international studies. A steady stream of presi-dents, provosts, and deans came through my office every week, andfrom them I gained a sense of the changing educational landscapethough I found that visiting campuses and talking to faculty andadministrators, unchaperoned by their development officers, wasessential to discovering what was really going on. At some point in theearly 1990s, I began to hear increasingly about the need to interna-tionalize the curriculum or, alternatively, the college or universityitself. The idea was not new, the frequency of its mention was. As themonths went by, I heard numerous iterations of internationaliza-tion, but in practical terms, it was often difficult to pin down whatthe word meant, and my visitors did not always provide muchenlightenment.

At about the same time, I started to hear from college and universityfaculty around the country, saying they had been asked to serve oncommittees or task forces or working groups to draft plans forinternationalizing their institutions. The mandate had come fromthe president or chancellor, but without further direction; theywerent sure what they were being asked to do, or how best toproceedcould I help? I could not, I was as puzzled as they were.Eventually, these committees did produce reports and strategic plans,many of which called for restructuring the universitys internationalprograms; these were subsequently implemented to a greater or lesserextent, and with varying degrees of success.

Internationalization became a buzzword in academic circles, therhetoric surrounding it ubiquitous. Given the significant amount oftime and money invested in efforts to realize the goal, it seemed to meworth trying to understand what that goal was: what faculty andadministrators meant by the term, what the principal issues were, andhow the process of internationalizing the university worked on theground. Moreover, I hoped that an account of the experiences of asubset of institutionswhat worked and what didnt work in a givenset of circumstances, whether there were demonstrably better or worse

2ways to resolve a given set of problemsmight prove useful to otherinstitutions embarked on the same enterprise. Thus the presentproject. I chose to focus on five research universities that had recentlyrestructured their international programs or were in the process ofreviewing them as part of the internationalization effort. The five wereColumbia University, Duke University, the University of Iowa, theUniversity of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and the University of Washing-ton. Though the group was geographically diverse and reflected abalance between public and private institutions, it was, obviously, nota scientific sample, nor was it intended to be. As of the mid-1990s,Duke, the University of Iowa (UI), and the University of Michigan(UM) had plans for internationalization in place, and at the Univer-sity of Washington (UW), a task force on international education hadrecently submitted its report to the president. Columbias adminis-tration had decided against drafting a comprehensive plan, choosingrather to proceed on a project-by-project basis. Columbia is nonethe-less part of the study because it seemed important to include an EastCoast institution that could profit from its location, within easy reachof the nations political and financial capitals, to strengthen itsinternational profile.

In carrying out the project, I visited each campus two or threetimes, occasionally more, for two or three days each visit. I intervieweduniversity administrators, directors of area and other internationalprograms, faculty with international interests, chairs of disciplinarydepartments, administrators and faculty of schools of internationalaffairs and, to the extent possible, other professional schools. I did notalways find all the people I wanted to see, but in cases where I missedkey individuals, more often than not I was able to interview them bytelephone at a later date. In preparation for the site visits, I readwhatever background materials were available, including annualreports, committee reports and strategic plans for internationalizingthe university, and along the way collected program descriptions,course listings, and assorted brochures, catalogues, and bulletins. Allthese were important in providing the university context; the reportsand strategic plans in particular were essential in setting out therationale for the initiative and what it was intended to accomplish. Forthe most part, the site visits were conducted from 1997 to 1999,though in some cases they were supplemented by follow-up inter-views both on site and by telephone. Because the study has taken farlonger than I anticipated, and on every campus much has happened

3since, throughout the text I have given dates for site visits and specificinterviews I refer to.

The length of time it has taken to complete the study has had atleast one positive advantage: it has allowed me to gain some perspec-tive on the decade of the 1990s. In retrospect, it is apparent that anumber of developments converged in those years to make the perioda difficult one for international studies. The collapse of the SovietUnion and the end of the Cold War brought shifts in politicalalignments around the world that required a reexamination of existingparadigms of international studies. These events had an immediateand far-reaching impact on area studies, on Russian studies inparticular, where the end of the Soviet system signaled the instantobsolescence of Sovietology and of the scholars who worked in thatfield. For area studies more broadly, the end of the communistmenace raised fears of severe reductions, or even termination, offederal funding, since government support for regional programs waslargely tied to the needs of national security. At roughly the sametime, the early 1990s, the long-running debate between area studiesand the social sciences erupted in a series of overheated exchanges thatunduly polarized the issues and produced a significant amount of illwill before passions and rhetoric cooled. But the flare-up exacerbatedexisting tensions and drew attention to the problems area programsfaced on a practical level, particularly in making appointments inregional fields. For all these reasons, the 1990s were an unsettling andchallenging time for area and international studies.

The new century brought further challenges, though they are notdealt with here. I have made no attempt to revise the text to take intoaccount the events of September 11, 2001, and their implications forinternational studies. At that time, I had not finished writing, but theinterviews were completed earlier, and since they form the basis of thestudy, it did not seem feasible, or desirable, to try to update myconclusions. Several other options and omissions deserve some elabora-tion. This is a study of internationalization in research universities. Ichose to focus on a subset of these institutions because they set thepace in American higher education, they have the broadest array ofinternational programs, and they are responsible for graduate andprofessional training. The results would almost certainly have beendifferent had I looked at liberal arts colleges, whose relatively small sizeand greater cohesiveness make it easier for them to make an institu-

4tional commitment, whether to internationalization or some otherpurpose. Moreover, since liberal arts colleges are concerned withundergraduate education, their chances of success in developingcurriculum that will produce students aware of, and sensitive to, othercultures and societies are far greater than those of research universities.Finally, except in specific contexts, I have not dealt with the impactof technology, and especially of the Internet, in the internationaliza-tion project. The issue here would not be the extraordinary benefitsto research and teaching of new modes of communication and accessto resources around the world, but whether, over time, the Internetwill ultimately internationalize students by putting them in touchwith individuals and events in other parts of the world. Because thepoint came up only once in the course of the interviews I did for theproject, and in the context of another questionIs internationaliza-tion happening anyway?I have not attempted to take the discus-sion further.

Though I have not addressed the challenges of the new century andwhat they may mean for universities and for international studies,debate on these questions has already begun. The position paperdrafted for a seminar convened in the summer of 2000 by theUniversity of Michigans International Institute, on the impact of theevents of September 11 on the internationalizing project of theNorth American university, proposes that the decade-long interna-tionalization of American higher education toward recognition ofglobal interests and universal values seems now to have been a passingmoment, threatened by renewed focus on national interest.1 Thismay turn out to be so. But institutions change slowly, none moreslowly than universities; administrative structures and practices donot change with the calendar, new initiatives must build on thosealready in place. Whatever new demands the twenty-first centuryplaces on research universities, they will necessarily respond, at leastinitially, with the institutional resources developed in the last decadesof the twentieth; however the international studies communityregroups and reinvents itself to deal with new global realities, it willstart from the point it had reached at the close of the 1990s. Infocusing on the decade of the 1990s, the study provides a baseline forwhatever changes follow.

1 David William Cohen and Michael D. Kennedy, The North AmericanUniversity and the World: Sacred Spaces and Heretical Knowledge, Journal of theInternational Institute 10.1 (2002): 8.

5 II. Why Internationalize?

Over the last 15 years, large numbers of university faculty andadministrators have spent a great many hours on task forces, workinggroups, and committees charged with devising plans to internation-alize or globalize their institutions. Typically, these committeeswere convened at the behest of the president, the chancellor, or theprovost, and more often than not their work resulted in a report anda set of recommendations. The reports shared the common fate of thegenre: in some cases, the recommendations were implemented to onedegree or another; in others, the plan was put on hold for futureconsideration, with future unspecified; or, in the worst case sce-nario, report and recommendations simply disappeared from view.(In the circumstances, it is not surprising that at many institutions aseries of reports addressing the same set of issues stretches back over20 to 25 years.) But irrespective of the ultimate fate of these docu-ments, they provide some answers to the question why internation-alize, or at least why leading academic administrators believe inter-nationalization is important. They provide fewer answers to the priorquestion: in the university setting, what does internationalizationmean?

The rationale for internationalization laid out in these reportsfollowed a common pattern and employed a common rhetorictheintroductory sections were more or less interchangeable. In thecontext of an increasingly interdependent world characterized by theemergence of a global economy, the rapid development of globalcommunications and technology, and the shifting political align-ments of states and the regions and ethnic groups formerly withintheir borders, universities have both an obligation and an opportunityto play a significant role. To begin with, they must educate theirstudents to be globally literate citizens prepared to live and work inthe new international world. Globally literate was defined as havinga global consciousness and a critical understanding of how nationaland international issues intersect. Alternatively, the goal was topromote in students an awareness of their role in an interdependentworld and how as citizens and professionals they could contributeto and shape it. The universitys further responsibility was to providethem with the knowledge and skills to do this, in part by ensuring that

6they had a wide range of opportunities for learning about the worldoutside the United States. One administrator put it well when he saidthat knowledge of and interaction with different peoples and cultureswere critical to [students] development as human beings, to theirprofessional lives, and to their capacity to fulfill their responsibilitiesnot just as citizens of countries where they happen to be born, but ascitizens of an increasingly global society. From a practical point ofview, familiarity with other peoples and cultures was necessary sincegraduates were likely to spend increasing amounts of time abroad aspart of their working lives.2

A second point was the need for universities to keep pace with localand national economic developments in order to better serve the largercommunity and be positioned to take advantage of the opportunitiesthese developments presented. A University of Washington reportcited the universitys location at the edge of the Pacific Rim in a regionwhose economy is heavily dependent on international trade (aseparate appendix was devoted to the states trade figures).3 Theuniversity must internationalize in order to be a better resource for theregion and the nation. (Implicit here was the hope that the statelegislature, notoriously tightfisted with respect to university funding,might come to regard UW as deserving more support. This pointwould hold true for virtually all state universities.) Dukes reporttalked about Dukes role in the Research Triangle area, an increas-ingly international center for industrial and technological develop-ment, and North Carolinas growing participation in internationalmarkets. Here again, the language spoke to the reality of economicinternationalization, the universitys need to contribute more to theinternational scene, and the opportunities that would be lost if itfailed to internationalize in timely fashion. The same message camethrough at the University of Iowa, less in its restructuring plan, whichwas largely concerned with administrative reorganization, but inconversations with university administrators.4 The presidents speeches

2 Bruce Kuniholm, Mission, Vision and Goals for Internationalization, TheFaculty Forum (Duke University), March 1999, 6.

3 Report of the Task Force on International Education, submitted to PresidentRichard McCormick, October 15, 1996, University of Washington, 1996,Appendix B, 5.

4 Strategic Plan: International Programs, Progress Report, University of Iowa,November 11, 1997. See below for references to the reports of Duke Universityand the University of Michigan.

7emphasized the global economy and the need for students to developa global perspective; and both she and other administrators alludedto the states increasingly international economic base. In spring1998, an associate provost reported that even though the Board ofRegents had mandated level, and possibly decreased, funding for thenext five years, additional targeted funds might be forthcoming if theuniversity attended more to the needs of the state and its diversifyingeconomy. He hoped that the medical sciences, engineering, andbusiness might be able to contribute on this front.

Reputation, both national and international, was a third elementof the rationale. At home, the university must keep pace with its peers,many of whom had already put in place new international programsand institutional structures. There was an ever-present fear of fallingbehind. If the university was to remain a great university in thetwenty-first century, it must move to meet the challenge of interna-tionalization. In so doing, it would enhance its visibility and statureinternationally, and this in turn would put it in a stronger positionto recruit international students and faculty, and develop collabora-tive partnerships with overseas universities. The university, then,must strengthen its international profile at home and establish orenhance its presence internationally. The two efforts were interdepen-dent: without them, opportunities would be lost, not least fundingopportunities for programs and research but also for making asignificant contribution to policy. An aspect of the search for greatervisibility was the hope that the university would become a player inthe policy arena.

In summary, universities must internationalize in order to educatetheir students for global citizenship, to keep pace with their peers, tobetter serve the national and international community, and to remaingreat universities. Moreover, beneath the rhetoric, the subtext wasclear: universities must internationalize in order to raise money. Thethread ran throughout the rationale, in the repeated references toopportunities that might otherwise be lost; the concern with main-taining a competitive edge to attract more students at home andincrease recruitment abroad; and in the mention of establishingconnections with international alumni, which translated into broad-ening the base of alumni donors. Irrespective of other considerations,the financial imperative was reason enough for administrators to pushfor internationalization. The subtext revealed as well that a second

8reading of reputation was to be where the action was nationally, tokeep up with the buzz on the university circuit, and without anyquestion the buzz in the last 15 years has been internationalizationand globalization for the new millennium.

Two further points are worth noting. The obligation to educatestudents to live and work in the new international world assumedpride of place in the rationale for internationalization, but it was byno means clear how, exactly, students would be transformed intoglobal citizens or what skills were required to enable them to moveeasily across cultures in their personal and professional lives. To saythat students must have some knowledge of the world beyond U.S.borders, including familiarity with another culture, was easy enough;to make the leap to global consciousness was more problematic.What, one might ask, was meant by global consciousness, and howwas it created or taught? A second question relates to student demandfor a more international education, which did not receive much spacein the rationale. Unquestionably, student demand varies from cam-pus to campus and among different groups of students; but given thedifficult challenge of producing global citizens and the fact thatstudents have the most direct stake in learning to compete in a newlyinternationalized world, one would have expected the student con-stituency to receive more attention.

What, then, does internationalization mean? By and large, thereports were not much concerned with definition, and this may havebeen partly because the presidents and chancellors who commis-sioned them were not always clear what they meantthe commit-ment was rhetorical rather than substantive. A few reports did attemptto articulate the goal. The University of Michigans report took apragmatic approach, defining internationalization as expanding theinternational dimension of both curriculum and research throughoutthe university, with international meaning matters and concernsthat reach beyond the borders of the United States.5 This meantenhancing programs that were already international and building aninternational perspective into courses and research agendas where itdid not currently exist. Dukes report followed a more visionarycourse. Internationalization meant ensuring that knowledge of the

5 John H. Jackson, A Michigan Vision: International Studies at the Universityof Michigan, September 1989, 1112.

9cultures, arts, histories, and contemporary affairs of peoples andnations throughout the world was central to the experience ofmembership in the Duke University community.6 Further, it meantindividual and institutional participation in academic, professional,and cultural experiences across national boundaries; and familiaritywith the best scholarship, learning, and professional activities irre-spective of national boundaries or cultural differences. Acknowledgingthat this was a vision for internationalization, the report proposeda set of more specific goals, including the provision of stronginternational library collections and foreign language training. (Lestit be thought that vision and goals were entirely, or largely, rhetorical,it should be noted that Duke reinstituted a foreign language require-ment as part of a major curriculum revision in January 1999.)

Absent an attempt to define the end in view, the rationale laid outin the reports became the definition. What does internationalizationmean? It means producing global citizens, remaining competitivewith other U.S. universities, and achieving a stronger presenceinternationally. In any case, the attempt to define the vision forinternationalization was probably more important than the result: itrequired task forces and committees to think about what internation-alization meant for their campuses and what, specifically, they hopedto accomplish.

6 Duke University in an Interdependent World: Opportunities and Chal-lenges, The Provosts Executive Committee for International Affairs, September1995, 2.

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Translating the rhetoric of internationalization into reality is acomplex enterprise, and it can be an expensive one. Recommenda-tions for new structures and programs are a beginning; implementingthem entails negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. Ultimately,the plan put in place must reflect the universitys particular historyand culture; failure to respect the institutional context puts theinitiative at risk. A number of factors may influence, even dictate, theform the effort takes. The most obvious of these include size;resources, both financial and human; whether the institution ispublic or private; and if it is public, how tightly the state controls itsday-to-day operations. The structure of the administration is key,particularly the division of power and responsibility between theoffice of the provost and the college or faculty of arts and sciences. Theprincipal questions here concern resources and appointments, andwhether there is a history of tension between the two administrativecenters. Tensions can arise from the nature of the structure and thecompeting needs of the units, from a poor relationship between theprovost and the dean, from lack of communication, or from acombination of all of these. In any case, the relationship between thetwo units is a major consideration in locating the initiative within theuniversity.

The administrative context includes as well anomalous unitswithin the university, and there is usually at least one of these. TheJackson School of International Studies at the University of Washing-ton, for example, is a department within the College of Arts andSciences, despite its designation as a school; it houses 13 degreeprograms and 6 federally-funded National Resource Centers (NRCs),and has over 100 faculty members teaching in its programs, inaddition to its own faculty of 3035, many of whom hold jointappointments with other departments.7 The head of this large andcomplex unit, which is a principal locus of international programs andresearch in the university, holds the title of director, though he isde facto a department chair who reports to the Divisional Dean for theSocial Sciences in the College of Arts and Sciences. Columbia

III. The University Context

7 The number of NRCs increased to seven in the 200306 funding cycle.

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Universitys School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) is onlysomewhat less anomalous. A professional school that awards MAs inboth international affairs and public affairs, SIPA is one of fourseparate schools in the division of Arts and Sciences. But it is also adepartment of Arts and Sciences (DIPA), since only departments canmake appointments, and SIPA now has a faculty of some 35 full-timepositions and 70 adjuncts. Moreover, it houses a large number ofcenters and institutes, including five NRCs. By its very nature, it isa focus of international activity and its relationships to other depart-ments and schools within the university are many and varied.

The peculiar structures of the Jackson School and SIPA areaccidents of history, and they draw attention to two other key aspectsof institutional context: the history of international programs at theuniversity and, more specifically, the particular history of areaprograms and their present place in the spectrum of internationalactivities. Of the universities included in this study, at Columbia, theUniversity of Michigan, and UW international studies, broadlydefined, has a long history, dating back at least to the beginning of thetwentieth century. At those universities, the first area centers wereestablished in the 1940s, following the end of World War II, and atall three they remain a significant presence. International programshave developed much more recently at Duke, which only assumed itspresent institutional identity in 1924. Dukes first vice provost forinternational studies was appointed in the mid-1960s, signaling aneffort to expand the universitys international dimension, but most,though not all, of Dukes area programs have been established since1980. At the University of Iowa, most international programs datefrom the 1970s. There is not a strong tradition of area studies, but overthe last 30 years efforts to expand international activities and to givethe university a stronger international presence have resulted in thecreation of a number of interdisciplinary programs, including severalwith a regional focus. In terms of internationalization, the historicalcontext is essential to understanding the nature of present and pastinternational strengths, what there is to build on, what skeletons lieburied. Related and equally important, the historical context shedslight on the needs and demands of established units and how these canbe met within a workable new structure or new initiative. The secondpoint has particular relevance to area centers.

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These elements of the university context contribute to defining itsinstitutional culture. The ethos of the university, its affect, is moreelusive and more difficult to characterize. It subsumes history,tradition and custom, and the institutions sense of its own identity.Duke is conscious of its youth and the need to catch up with its peers,Michigan of its long tradition as a world-class university in the middleof the country, with some slight ambivalence about its distance fromthe coastal centers of power. UW looks west from its perch on thePacific Rim, speaks with pride of its Asia tilt and the excellence ofa faculty it does not deserve, given the level of its salaries; Iowa presentsitself as a modest place despite its many excellences and a talentedfaculty that believes the university should push harder to extend itsreach. Columbia is urban, fragmented, an agglomeration of schoolsand colleges each with its own identity, and thinks of itself as alreadyan international university. The precise nature of these characteriza-tions is less important than that they be taken into account. No twouniversities are alike. The scheme that works for one will notnecessarily work for the other, even though they resemble one anothergenerically and in some details. Recognition of the particular cultureof the institution is essential to the success of the internationalizationinitiative.

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Most universities pursue a variety of routes to internationalization,depending on what the initiative is designed to accomplish. Several ofthese are discussed below, with two notable exceptions: study abroadprograms and foreign exchanges. Study abroad is not included for anumber of reasons. First, there is already an extensive literaturedealing with the subject, and it seemed unlikely that a discussion ofprograms in the five universities under consideration here would addto it significantly; second, methods of collecting and interpreting thedata on student participation differ, and it would have been difficultto extract comparable figures across campuses from the materialsprovided by study abroad offices; third, and most important for thepurposes of this study, in the course of interviewing faculty andadministrators, I did not hear much about study abroad, except fromthose administratorsand there were severalwho believed thatincreasing the number of students going abroad was the surest,sometimes the only, route to internationalization. In conversationswith faculty, overseas study was mentioned largely in the context ofspecific international programs. In the case of student and facultyexchanges, again the difficulty of discovering what the numbersmeant and of finding figures that were comparable across campuseswere the major obstacles. In some instances, the data consisted of a listof international institutions with which the university had exchangeagreements, a beginning perhaps, but ultimately not very helpful intrying to assess the extent and impact of de facto exchanges. Here too,I heard about formal exchange programs and informally arrangedexchanges largely in the context of specific initiatives.

In considering approaches to internationalization, two generalobservations are in order. First, the matter of purpose is crucial, andit subsumes a number of subsidiary questions. Is the effort intendedprimarily to reorganize existing programs and bring them into a moreeffective relationship with one another or to spread an internationalfocus across the university, or both? Does the effort deal explicitly withcurriculum, including language? Is there reasonable consensus on thedefinition of internationalization? Presumably questions of definitionand purpose have been dealt with in reports and recommendations,but there is often a disconnect between prose and practice. Second,

IV. Routes to Internationalization

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failure to confront these issues at the outset can lead to a further,potentially disastrous, disconnect between the educational and intel-lectual objectives of the initiative and its organizational dimensions.Substance and structure are not separable: how the practical problemsare solved, how the university organizes its international programs,both reflects and shapes the intellectual agenda and in consequencethe allocation of resources. These aspects of the enterprise areinterconnected.

Administrative Reorganization

Administrative reorganization can be minimal or far-reaching, againdepending on why it was undertaken. The decision to restructureoften follows from the perception that while a universitys interna-tional resources are considerable, they are widely dispersed acrossschools and colleges so that the whole is less than the sum of its parts.Absent a unifying structure, the presence of first-rate faculty andprograms has failed to give the university the international reputationit deserves. Reorganizing these programs under a single umbrella willstrengthen international activities across the board and at the sametime give the institution a stronger international profile. A second,related reason for restructuring is the desire to bring a diverse groupof quasi-independent centers and programs into a more rationaladministrative structure. However the rationale may be framed, thisusually represents an attempt to exercise greater control over theseunits and, in the process, save money by eliminating overlappingfunctions and administrative costs. Such efforts tend to target areacenters and small international programs, and inevitably they raisecontentious political issues. Irrespective of motivation, the structuremost often chosen consists of a central administrative office headed byan associate provost or dean, sometimes a director. This individualmay be primarily a facilitator, with responsibility for coordinating theinternational initiative, and ideally with some money to spend; or shemay preside over a new or revitalized structurean institute orcenterintended to house international programs. Designing such ascheme is relatively easy; putting it in place on the ground is not.

Restructuring encounters a number of obstacles, and it raises anumber of questions. A first question relates to the mandate of the newadministrative office, and its reach. Who and what will be brought

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under the umbrella? And to what extent is the initiative designed tospread an international focus across the university, or as one report putit, to integrate an international perspective into the fabric of theuniversity as a whole? If the emphasis is on internationalizing theuniversity, it becomes necessary to consider how best to buildrelationships between arts and sciences divisions and professionalschools; and within the arts and sciences, how to bring the physicaland natural sciences into the enterprise. A further challenge is toidentify faculty with international interests who have no connectionwith, indeed are unaware of the existence of colleagues working inrelated fields, and do not define themselves as part of the internationalcommunity. Reports often call for an inventory of faculty that willenable the institution to gain a clearer sense of its internationalresources and at the same time facilitate contact between individualresearchers. The results of these efforts appear to be mixed: the censustends to be imperfect and, even if a list of scholars and their researchareas is compiled, it does not necessarily follow that other faculty willuse it to identify and seek out new colleagues. As one veteranadministrator pointed out, there is no natural reason why peopleworking in diverse international fields need or want to collaborate.The vertical organization of universities by schools, colleges, anddepartments, which bear primary responsibility for appointmentsand promotions, teaching and research, works against the horizontalcoordination and collaboration called for by efforts to internationalizethe university.8 This is one obstacle in the path to reorganization, onethat a central administrative office is intended to remedy.

The typical administrative organization of universities is oneobstacle in the path to restructuring. The innate conservatism ofacademic culture is another. University communities tend to regardwith suspicion new structures and programs, because they threatenexisting entitlements and traditional lines of authority. The Michiganreport, for example, made clear that any proposal to further interna-tionalization must respect the universitys tradition of decentraliza-tion. A detailed plan for change was rejected in favor of an evolutionaryprocess that would allow the university to move ahead withoutthreatening already excellent programs. The report did recommend

8 Stephen Arum, International Education at the UI, presentation, Universityof Iowa, October 16, 1991.

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a new structure as a vehicle for change, and intentionally or not, thiswas the Trojan horse in the scheme. Duke was equally wary of anoverly centralized, highly structured plan; its report spoke of interna-tionalization as a diffuse, incremental process. Incremental turned upfrequently in reports and recommendations: it was the term of choiceto describe acceptable change.

The creation of a central administrative office is manifestly not thesilver bullet that will internationalize the university. But if thedecision is to go forward, three issues are critical to the initiativessuccess: its location, the title of the administrator, and if there is a newstructure, what it should look like. In terms of location, the questionis whether the initiative should be placed in the office of the provostor in the division of arts and sciences. In general, linkages betweenschools and across units of the university fall under the jurisdiction ofthe provost, or at least fit more comfortably there; but the appoint-ments, and the allegiance, of large numbers of faculty teaching ininternational programs are in the arts and sciences. The issues arewhere faculty will teach, what they will teach, and who will pay.Difficulties can arise, for example, when a faculty member appointedto an arts and sciences department wants to teach in an interdiscipli-nary center or program that does not count in departmental termsand that may require dropping a departmental course. If the dean ofarts and sciences has to find a replacement, who will pay? (Here, itshould be noted that the pressures are quite different for a deanresponsible for ensuring adequate course offerings for 20,000 under-graduates and one who tends to the needs of perhaps 5,000.) This isa budgetary issue, but it is also a matter of turf. It can be resolved moreor less easily if there is a good working relationship between dean andprovost and if some general agreement on cost-sharing has alreadybeen worked out. But it is worth pointing out that ownership of theinitiative counts for something and can be the key to unlockingresources. More generally, it cannot be stated too often that the strongsupport of the administration, either through the provost or the deanof arts and sciences, is essential to the initiatives success.

Two further points. Wherever the initiative is located, it is amistake to bypass already existing centers of international activity inthe effort to create something new or to diffuse international interestsmore widely across the university. These centers and the programsthey house are effectively in place, and ultimately they will have to be

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incorporated into the new scheme; including them to begin with willavoid resentments and recriminations that could undermine theenterprise. Moreover, any new structure will have a better chance ofsuccess if it bears a generic resemblance to other units currentlyexisting in the university or that have existed in the past. Ideally, itshould fit into a recognized niche. But to create something entirelynew that is perceived as alien and an anomaly in the system courtsrejection: faculty will be wary, and they are likely to stay away. Asecond consideration is the title of the administrative officer who willpreside over the new initiative. It is generally argued that the newappointment should be at the level of vice provost or dean to guaranteeaccess to the top circles of university administration. Having a seatat the table is essential to being an effective advocate for internationalprograms and the resources to support them. Director is a moreambiguous title: it carries no guarantees of access to power andresources, and can represent an effort to limit the scope of the position.The title of the position also bears on the kind of person who will fillit. The job description most often calls for a tenured scholar who cancommand the respect of the faculty: the search for such an individualis likely to be easier for a relatively high-level appointment. Examplesof three differing approaches to restructuring follow.

Duke University

Administrative reorganization was one component of Dukes plan forinternationalization and though an essential one, it could best bedescribed as minimal. Following the recommendation of Dukesreport, the Office of the Vice Provost for Academic and InternationalAffairs was created, with responsibility for coordinating the interna-tional initiative across the university. The new vice provost wascharged with serving as a leader and advocate for international studiesand with developing new sources of funding for international pro-grams and projects. The report specified that he must do this withinthe universitys existing decentralized administrative structure, andfurther that he must have sufficient resources to promote interna-tional initiatives. Moreover, it made clear that his success, indeed thesuccess of the entire initiative, was dependent on the support of thepresident and the provost.

The new office was set up and the vice provost appointed in 1994.When I visited the campus in 1998, the office was well established,

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though both the vice provost and other members of the administra-tion agreed that the shape of the new structure was still evolving. Thevice provost described his role as that of a facilitator; he said the keyissue he faced was how to work within the existing decentralizedstructure. He presided over a substantial budget, which he used bothto initiate projects and to respond to requests, a combination of top-down/bottom-up support. He provided small amounts of money,with the expectation that the recipients would raise additional fundson their own. Beyond these functions, he dealt with internationalissues and concerns across the university and served as liaison with thedeans of the professional schools.

In general, response to the new office seemed positive. Notsurprisingly, faculty liked the fact that the vice provost had money tospend, and further, that he had influence with the provost in seekingadditional funds for international programs. They appreciated hisrole as an advocate and supporter and as someone who could makethings happen. Several faculty members were particularly pleased bythe appointment of a new staff member in the development officewhose primary responsibilities included international affairs andcredited the vice provost with lobbying successfully for the position.Predictably, the naysayers tended to be people who had lost out in thecompetition for funds and regarded the decision-making process asinherently unfair.

It is worth pointing out that the creation of the Office of Academicand International Affairs followed from the decision to make interna-tionalization a university-wide initiative. This in turn meant notlocating the new office in Dukes Center for International Studies(CIS); it also meant not designating a building to house internationalprograms on the grounds that this would isolate people doinginternational work from the rest of the university. (I was told that thebuilding issue had come up at intervals over the years.) CIS had longbeen an undergraduate NRC, and a focus of international activity; butby the late 1980s its broader mission had become unclear, and effortsto redefine its role ended in political disaster. The new administrativestructure bypassed CIS, its status was downgraded, and in 1997 it lostits federal support. But in 2000, with the support of the vice provost,who assumed the title of director, CIS successfully reapplied forfederal funding, this time as a comprehensive NRC. In fall 2000 itmoved into a new building where it shared space with the recently

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established John Hope Franklin Institute for Interdisciplinary Stud-iesit appeared that the building issue was not entirely laid to rest.Several area and international programs relocated with it, and othershave followed. CIS now resembled its former self, but with at least twosignificant differences. First, it was a center of international activity,but not the center; second, since its director was the vice provost, CISwas set firmly in the broader internationalization initiative. All thiswas consistent with Dukes restructuring plan.

When I last visited Duke in 1999, the new administrative structurewas functioning effectively and seemed generally accepted across theuniversity. What accounted for its success? To begin with, thelocation of the international initiative was not an issue. The office ofthe vice provost was an expanded and newly defined version of aposition within the provosts office, and it slid into that niche. Beyondthat, tension between the office of the provost and the college of artsand sciences seemed largely absent, perhaps in part because at Dukethere was no dean of arts and sciences but rather a dean of the facultywith responsibility for the arts and sciences. Titles do make adifference. It was also true that though the new office added an extralayer of bureaucracy, it was a thin layer, and it functioned in largelypositive ways, providing moral and financial support for internationalprojects. Resources are, of course, key. The fact that the vice provosthad funds to disburse and was an effective lobbyist for additionalfunding both inside and outside the university was alone sufficient togain faculty approval.

University of Iowa

In contrast to Duke, administrative reorganization was the core of UIsinternational initiative. A series of reports dating back to the early1980s had repeatedly recommended the creation of a centralizedadministrative structure to coordinate the universitys growing num-ber of international activities, but no action had been taken until1997, when the Strategic Plan for International Programs wasimplemented. Drawn up in 1995, the plan was designed to strengthenand extend international programs at UI, to increase their visibility,and to infuse international activities into all aspects of the teaching,research and service missions of the university. It was approved byIowas Board of Regents in July 1997, and put into effect shortlythereafter. The plan called for abolishing the two largest international

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programming units, the Center for International and ComparativeStudies (CICS), which housed a large number of internationalprograms, and the Office of International Education and Services(OIES), the umbrella for the offices of study abroad and internationalstudents and scholars; the core support services of the two units weremerged. The offices and programs formerly within these two unitsnow reported to a new administrative hierarchy consisting of anassociate provost and dean for international programs, an associatedean for international programs, and an assistant dean for interna-tional programs, the last two taking over the responsibilities of theformer directors of CICS and OIES. This, in its essentials, was the newstructure. Its goal was to promote cooperation and collaborationamong international programs, departments, and colleges on cam-pusin the view of several administrators, to break out of existingprograms and units, which tended to isolate the internationalandspread an international perspective across the university. By eliminat-ing overlap and duplication in support services, it was also an attemptto save money. And intentionally or not, it had intellectual as well asadministrative and financial consequences.

Response to the new structure must be viewed in the context ofinternational activities at UI, and here perhaps two points are key.First, there was not much international activity at Iowa until the1970s, when several programs were established and, at the same time,a group of three or four faculty members began to push for space andmoney for international programs and research. Their efforts resultedin a building that ultimately became home to the CICS, the umbrellafor most international centers and programs and a federally fundedNRC in its own right. CICS was, in effect, the nursery of internationalstudies at UI. Second, even though the number of internationalprograms had grown in the decades since, the international facultyremained relatively small, and they felt they had been waging anuphill struggle to gain the attention and support of the administra-tion. One faculty member spoke of the guerilla operation carried onby himself and his colleagues to build and maintain internationalprograms. The international faculty agreed to the restructuring planbecause it seemed like a reasonable idea and because they thought itwould translate into additional resources for program purposes. Theyalso thought there would be new money.

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When I first visited the Iowa campus in spring 1998, the newstructure had been in place since the previous fall. As is often the casewith administrative reorganizations, there was a good deal of confu-sion about redefined responsibilities and lines of reportingit wasnot always clear who was in charge of what. The grand design was inplace, said one administrator, but the details had not been workedout. Proponents of the new scheme were optimistic that the kinkswould be worked out. The associate provost and dean, who had heldan earlier version of the position on an interim basis since 1993,believed that by removing an extra layer of bureaucracythe directorsof CICS and OIESthe new structure benefited the heads ofindividual programs, who now reported directly to him. He alsothought that consolidating support services would make them moreeffective. And though CICS had feared the loss of an internationalplace, this had not happened. In general, those who supported thereorganization believed it gave greater visibility to internationalprograms; moreover, the associate provosts position gave interna-tional initiatives a seat at the table in the central administration.

But a number of faculty and staff members were unhappy with thenew scheme. Their concerns centered on four sets of issues. First,faculty complained that the dissolution of CICS had resulted in a lossof collegiality and intellectual vitality. The centers former space,renamed the International Center, was now a building that housed asupport staff rather than a programmatic unit that had been a forumfor intellectual exchange. Program faculty did feel they had lost aninternational place. Second, both faculty and staff found the newadministrative system cumbersome and difficult to navigate: a rela-tively simple organizational structure had been replaced with a top-heavy, unwieldy bureaucracy. Third, communication was inadequateat all levels, but especially between the associate provosts office andthe centers and programs. Finally, there was a sense that resourceswere fewer as a consequence of the reorganization, and this raised ahost of financial and budgetary questions.

The core international faculty represented their dissatisfactions tothe associate provost at the end of the academic year, but when I nextvisited UI in December 1998, their concerns had not abated. Notsurprisingly, budgetary and financial issues had come to the fore. Thefaculty had agreed to the breakup of CICS in part because they hadbeen told the centers resources would go back to international

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programsin any case, this is what they understood. But in fact,there seemed to be less money than before, and the anticipated newfunds had not been seen. Program heads spoke of a lack of financialtransparency: it was unclear how much money was available, where itwas going, and how the decisions were being made. They knew thatsome of the money CICS had used for a university-wide grantscompetition had been reallocated to matches for outside grants (a newNRC, for example) and to support the new administrative unit. Butsince there was no new money, it was a zero-sum game. The associateprovost had urged program heads to seek external funding, whichmany of them were already doing; but they thought there should beinternal funds for essential program activitiesconferences, speakers,and films. Ultimately, the expectations created by the restructuringplan had not been met, there was resentment of the cost of the newadministrative apparatus, and the reallocation of existing funds lefteveryone feeling poorer.

The associate provost acknowledged that he had used funds fromthe CICS competition as matches for outside grants, though thecompetition was still going on. This seemed to him reasonable,particularly since the competition created winners and losers, and thelosers had always been unhappy. And he had allocated some funds tothe new administrative office, which he said had a modest budget.He thought that once the budgets of CICS and OIES were effectivelycombined, it would be possible to reallocate resources on a morerational basis and at the same time request additional funds from thecentral administration. He agreed that there was not enough moneythe current budget was inadequate. In the past there had been arecurring allocation from state funds for programs and another forstaff, but these allocations were now smaller and the demands on themgreater. He recognized that restructuring had raised expectations forincreased funding and commented, as had many others, that thepresidents speeches urging the university to become more interna-tional had further heightened anticipation. But he and his staffbelieved the financial issues could be satisfactorily addressed and thatover time the new system would settle into place.

In fact, the restructuring effort, at least in this first phase, did notend well. Faced with a stalemate, the senior international faculty tooktheir case to the provost; the associate provost resigned to go back toteaching and research. At the end of December 1999 a new associate

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provost and dean for international programs was appointed and givena free hand to revise the administrative structure. What went wrongwith the initiative in the first two years? Some speculations follow.Though personalities are not germane to the purpose of this study, itwould be foolish to suggest they did not play a significant role in thedebaclethey did. But a number of other factors worked against thesuccess of the restructuring plan. To begin with, the dissolution ofCICS in particular appears to have created more problems than itsolved. Diffusing an international perspective across the universitywas certainly not the only or even the primary reason to reorganize thecenter out of existence. One account held that the principal motive forrestructuring was to save money, another that CICS was growingstronger and more influential, and was ripe for an administrative take-over. It is likely that all these elements entered into the decision, thatthe issues at stake were financial and bureaucratic rather thanintellectual. But whatever the course of the deliberations, not enoughweight was given to the fact that the center worked. It may have hadproblems, but it was nonetheless a focal point for intellectualexchange, a space where faculty could discuss research agendas andprogram issues: it was an international place. The faculty agreed tothe dissolution of CICS, but once it was gone, they wanted to recreatethe old centers spirit in the new one, even though it had beenredefined as a physical plant rather than an intellectual space. Thelarger point is that CICS had a history; it had evolved over two decadesand could not be rebuilt in a day.

The nature of the new administrative structure was another factorworking against the reorganization. It was top-heavy, and its troika ofdeans, together with their support staff, appeared to be expensiveirrespective of how much it really cost. It asked to be resented. Failureto develop effective lines of communication between internationalprogram faculty and staff and the new set of administrators com-pounded an already difficult situation. So did the fact that newlyestablished bureaucratic procedures were by all accounts slow andinefficient. But in the end, money issues were decisive. A long-timeUI administrator commented that so much depends on budgets, notjust the amount but how its allocated, and this is a crucial point. Allsides agreed the current budget was inadequate; they differed on howit should be spent. Whatever the reality in terms of total budget, mostprogram heads believed there was less money for programs than underthe old structure, and calculated in terms of prior allocations, they

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were probably right. From the associate provosts point of view, thereallocation of existing budgets had been a principal purpose ofrestructuring and the necessary basis for asking for more money. Buthe did not move fast enough to allay the fears of the faculty.

Looking back over these events, one must ask whether the disputecame down to a confrontation between a small group of facultyjealously guarding their prerogatives and privileges and an adminis-trative reorganization designed to serve a broader constituency. Giventhe circumstances, this would, I think, be a mistaken reading of therecord, and for two reasons in particular. First, the faculty were the defacto custodians of UIs international enterprise, and they wereunderstandably afraid of losing what they had built over severaldecades. Second, there was no indication of support from the centraladministration, other than rhetorical, and thus no guarantee thatmore resources would be forthcoming. The further point here is thatno high-level administrator owned the initiative and was commit-ted to lobbying for it. Ultimately, it was the associate provosts plan,and he was not in a position to unlock new resources. At the end ofthe day, it was clear that a seat at the table in the central administrationwas in itself not enough to secure additional resources for UIs growinginternational programs. It was equally clear that without the financialsupport of the president and provost, the initiative had little chanceof success.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The International Institute (II) at the University of Michigan origi-nated with President Jim Duderstadts State of the Universityaddress in October 1988, which set forth as one of the three principalgoals of his presidency internationalizing the university to keep pacewith the internationalization of American life. President Duderstadtsubsequently commissioned John H. Jackson, professor of law andassociate vice president for international affairs, to prepare a report onhow best to accomplish this goal. The report, which was issued thefollowing year, reviewed the history of international studies at UM,identified the problems that needed to be addressed, and recom-mended that a major new unit, an institute for international studies,be established.9 It found that overall, though there were many

9 John H. Jackson, A Michigan Vision: International Studies at the Universityof Michigan, September, 1989.

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excellent international programs at UM, there was little connectionor crossover between them: the whole was less than the sum of itsparts. The universitys international strengths lacked visibility bothlocally and nationally, in part because there was no institutionalstructure to provide leadership and advocacy for international studies.Furthermore, much of UMs international activity had been centeredin the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LS&A), but therewas now a need to extend the role of international studies and linkthem to the interests of other colleges and schools. The creation of aninternational institute would be a significant first step toward solvingthese problems. The institute would be charged with assisting allunits on campus in enhancing their international activities and withsheltering and supervising certain existing international units andprograms, notably the area centers. It would be an intellectual centerwith a role in developing programs and curriculum, though it wouldnot be an instructional unit, and it would undertake a major effort toseek external funding. It would be headed by a dean, who wouldreport to the provost, and would also be a university officer with a rankat least equal to associate vice provost for academic affairs or viceprovost, to signal her university-wide role in facilitating, encouraging,and coordinating international studies across all units on campus.The institute would be provided with the financial resources neces-sary to carry out its task. These would consist of funds currentlyallocated to international studies and, initially at least, additional newfunds from internally generated sources. Finally, in recommendingthat an institute be established, the report observed that it will likelybe a decade after it is created before we feel comfortable with itsachievement.10

The immediate origin of the II was the Jackson report, but itsprovenance can be traced through a series of earlier reports dating backto the 1970s, which proposed that some kind of umbrella structurebe created to bring together and build on the universitys resources ininternational and area studies. The problem of the area centers runsthrough all these documents. This was compounded of long-runninghostilities within and between the half dozen or so centers (a formeradministrator commented that the area centers rarely spoke to eachother except in anger); inefficiency in their administrative opera-tions; and inadequate leadershipsince directors served limited

10 Jackson, 67.

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terms and traditionally were tenured associate professors or higher,the pool of candidates was necessarily small. These persistent difficul-ties were a strong motivation for establishing an administrative unitthat would assume responsibility for the centers.

No action was taken on the Jackson report until the early 1990s,when a group of high-level administrators proposed the plan thatresulted in the International Institute. The II, which was establishedby Michigans Board of Regents in September 1993, was a compro-mise among differing views of what the new unit should look like, andits structure departed in significant ways from the recommendationsof the Jackson report. The institute was located within LS&A and wascharged with serving the entire university, with the sheltering ofmost but not all area centers and programs, and with administeringboth existing and new resources in a single governance structure. Itwas headed by a director, and operated under the oversight of auniversity-wide governing board and a smaller executive committeewith representation from LS&A and the professional schools. Just asthe governing board, and more particularly the executive committee,were intended to link the II to units across the university, the directorhad reporting responsibilities to the provost, who represented theuniversity-wide constituency.

As established, the II had four principal roles. It housed pre-existing centers and programs previously located within LS&A.Program and center directors were appointed by the director of theinstitute, who was expected to provide oversight and support forprogram activities; but these units retained their distinctive identitiesand agendas and for the most part managed their own governance,including the disposition of specific resources, such as grants, gifts,and endowments. However, all centers and programs were now askedto extend their reach beyond LS&A to serve the entire university. Theinstitute also operated as a small foundation making grants, generallyup to $30,000, in support of international activities anywhere withinthe university. Funds for these grants were provided largely by thedean of LS&A and the provost, but they might also come from specialgrants and endowments. In a third role, the II was responsible forsome 42 faculty lines. These included 27 so-called FASAC positionslocated within LS&A and designed to secure research and teachingexpertise in area studies, with each position linked to an academic

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department and a center within or affiliated to the II.11 Another 15positions were made available for joint appointments between aprofessional school and an academic department within LS&A. Theinstitutes executive committee was responsible for recommendinghow these positions would be used; vacant positions returned to theII for reallocation. Finally, the institute was assigned responsibility forproviding coordination and leadership for the universitys interna-tionalization effort.

When I visited UM in October 1997 and again in February 1998,the II was gearing up for an internal and external review by LS&A andthe provost. The institute was in its fifth year of operation, and thedean of LS&A, the provost, and the director of the II agreed that thiswas an appropriate time to take stock of its progress and consider itsfuture. The review was routine in that all units within LS&A werereviewed periodically, but in this instance there was more at stake,both because the institute had not been reviewed before and becauseopinions about its accomplishments varied widely. Those who weremost negative, and most hostile, had opposed the institute from thebeginning and questioned its long-term viability; but virtuallyeveryone I talked to, including the director, thought some changeswere necessary to enable it to function effectively. The criticismstouched every aspect of the II, from the way it was created to itsstructure to how it was funded and how the money was spent. Therewas, to begin with, resentment of the fact that the institute was a top-down creation, set up by a small group of administrators and imposedon the faculty. According to this view, its structure put the IIsdirector in a position to set the intellectual agenda, which properlyshould come from the faculty. A related complaint focused on theextra layer of bureaucracy the II brought with it. A number of facultymembers in language and culture departments and attached to areacenters regarded the institute as an alien body, an intrusion on asystem that had worked well enough without it. Whereas formerly theschool of graduate studies, the provosts office, and LS&A had beenseparate sources of funding, now all funds were funneled through theII. A department chair conceded that departments and centers had

11 The FASAC positions were designated in the early 1980s as a means ofprotecting the universitys traditional strength in area studies. The acronym comesfrom Foreign Area Studies Advisory Committee, the body that recommended theircreation.

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not lost because of this, but in his view they had not gained either: theII had added a cumbersome administrative structure, but it had notmade any positive difference. Area centers and language and culturedepartments had other concerns as well. Centers were understandablywary, since the IIs director now appointed center directors and wascharged with their oversight. Departmental faculty worried about thedisposition of the FASAC positions, now controlled by the II, andfeared their priorities would not be respected. Many felt that thefunds committed to joint appointments should have gone directly todepartments, where the need was greatest; more generally, theyresented the investment of substantial funds in a new internationalinstitute when their units were already international. One chair saidhe felt his department had been marginalized, as had the humanitiesin general, by the new administrative scheme.

This last point illustrates the extent to which divisions between thehumanities and social sciences were reflected in attitudes to the II.Though humanities faculty could feel marginalized and on occasioncomplained that internationalization seemed to be regarded as a socialscience enterprise, many in the social sciences, particularly thoseworking in more theoretical fields, believed the institute had ahumanities tilt that made it impossible for them to feel comfortablethere. A comparable division characterized the relationship betweenLS&A and the professional schools, which resented the fact that theII was located in LS&A. In their view, LS&As predominant roleundermined the institutes university-wide focus and made themwary of cooperative ventures. A faculty member in a social sciencediscipline, who was also a center director, commented that the IIslocation was a big problemprofessional schools wont play.

The IIs location was one of the compromises negotiated when thenew unit was established, and it embodied a degree of contradiction.The institute was located in LS&A, but it was to serve the wholeuniversity; the director had reporting responsibilities to the provostas well as to the dean of LS&A. The Jackson report had recommendedthat the head of the institute should report to the provost, and this wasthe structure many would have preferred, particularly given theinstitutes mandate to coordinate and facilitate international activitiesacross the university. A number of different reasons were offered forthe dual reporting structure. According to the dean of LS&A, the IIwas placed under LS&A and the provost principally because of the

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large amount of money put into it, though she acknowledged thatLS&A was criticized for getting too much of the pie. It was also truethat the faculty members involved in the institute were largely fromLS&A, and from this point of view the arrangement made sense. Somecritics said the dean insisted that the II be housed in LS&A forbudgetary reasons and to ensure that the faculty and programsattached to the institute remain within the collegein other words,to guard her turf. Others claimed that LS&A administrators hadsupported the creation of the II primarily as a mechanism for solvingthe problem of the area centers: they were unwilling to deal with theseparate centers any longer. However much weight one assigns tothese justifications and speculations, it was clear that the IIs structurewas a source of major problems.

Two other points were frequently raised by both critics andsupporters of the institute. First, it was said that the II had beencharged with responsibilities it could not possibly fulfill: it wasunrealistic to suppose that the institute, or for that matter any othersingle unit, could coordinate and lead the internationalization effortacross the university. Second, the title and status of the director werequestioned. The Jackson report had recommended that the interna-tional institute should be headed by a dean who would also hold anappointment as a university officer; this would make clear theimportance attached to the international initiative and ensure that itsleader had access to the top levels of university administration. But thehead of the II was given the title of director, his position was not fulltime, and he sat on no policymaking bodies within LS&A or theuniversity other than those of the II. Defined in these terms, thedirectors position was severely circumscribed and, as one administra-tor observed, there was no one speaking for the international agendaat the center.

On the positive side, several administrators credited the II withmaking a space for people with international interests who were notnecessarily area specialists and with bringing them together, at leastto some extent. It had been successful in raising funds for newprograms, Korean studies for example; in leveraging money elsewherein the university; and increasing the funds available for graduatestudent support and for faculty doing international work. The IIsmandate had been to transform the area centers, and the director feltthat this was happening: most centers were reshaping their activities

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to reach more broadly across the university. By fall 1997, every centerdirector had been replaced; the new people were younger, and twowere from professional schools. In part because of the turnover, theintra and inter-center wars had quieted, and some faculty who hadinitially opposed the II now thought it had turned out to be a goodthing. Perhaps most significantly, there was general agreement thatsome good appointments had been made, both at the departmentallevel and to fill the joint positions authorized when the II wasestablished. Several administrators thought channeling appoint-ments through the institute had reduced feuding within the centers,and at least one center director said it had been helpful to go throughthe II in filling new positions.

As of spring 1998, 14 joint appointments had been authorizedand 10 had been filled, most of them between a department of LS&Aand a professional school but several within LS&A. Among others,appointments had been made with the School of Natural Resourcesand Environment and both biology and anthropology; the School ofPublic Policy and sociology and history; the School of Social Work andanthropology; the School of Public Health and biology; the School ofMusic and Asian Languages and Cultures; and within LS&A, withAsian Languages and Cultures and film and video. Others with lawand business were pending. In general, these appointments wereproposed to the II by an LS&A department or a professional schooland the II then proposed them to LS&A. LS&A administrators agreedit was preferable to hire tenured scholars for these positionsto avoidthe difficulties inherent in gaining tenure in two departmentsbutin fact most were junior. On the other hand, those who applied wereself-selected, and as the II director pointed out, if you take this kindof a position, its necessary to take risks.

Though some appointments were described as very good or evenbrilliant, they were not without their critics, and interestinglyenough, these spanned the humanities and social sciences as well asthe professional schools. Several faculty members in social sciencedepartments objected to joint appointments because they were toohard to fill, even when potential positions had been agreed upon; thehumanist orientation of the II was mentioned here. Humanitiesfaculty felt the positions diverted funds from more pressing depart-mental needs and at the same time, they resented the fact that, at leastinitially, more appointments had been made with social science than

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humanities departments. On this point, both the dean of LS&A andthe IIs director said they had tried hard to suggest possible proposalsfor humanities departments, since not many had come from thedepartments themselves. The schools of architecture, art, and musicwere the most natural partners for the humanities, but for a variety ofreasons, including the cultural studies tilt of a number of humanitiesdepartments, making the connection was difficult. Professional schoolfaculty and administrators tended to think that the IIs suggestions forpositions were not what they wantedthe IIs humanist orientationwas cited by way of explanationand shared the view that thepositions were too hard to fill. They were unhappy with LS&As rolein the process, though LS&As dean pointed out that those schoolswhere appointments had been made took a more positive view. Itappeared that the obstacles to joint appointments were greatest in thelaw and business schools, presumably because those schools werefocused on their own needs and had the resources to hire accordingly.As a law school administrator put it, the school didnt need themoney and wasnt waiting for the II to make international hires. Butat least one faculty member in the law school felt that his colleaguesshould be less rigid in setting the criteria for joint appointments, andpresumably he was not alone. The point was phrased more generallyby a university administrator who said that on the matter of jointappointments, people were not willing to try as hard as they might.

Sorting through the questions raised by the IIs critics and by theinstitute itself as it prepared for the five-year review, two problemsstood out. One was the complex of issues arising from the IIs locationwithin LS&A and the dual reporting structure. The second related tothe IIs mission, which seemed to have been unclear from the start.Was it intended to be primarily an administrative umbrella for agroup of international centers and programs? Alternatively, if it wasindeed expected to coordinate and lead the university-wide interna-tionalization effort, how was it to do this, given its structure and theresources available to it? And however broad its reach, should it playmore of an intellectual role in shaping the international agenda? Theprovost thought the question really was what the II was supposed to do;in her view, it could not carry out its charge to oversee the areaprograms and also serve as a clearinghouse for international projectsacross the university. There was too much international activityuniversity-wide, internationalization was too broad a concept to fitwithin a single institute.

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The internal and external reviews of the II were completed in thesummer of 1998. In the fall, the provost appointed a committeewhose members were drawn from schools and colleges across theuniversity to look more broadly at UMs international programs,including the II. The plan that emerged from these several reviewscalled for the creation of a vice provost for international affairs anddirector of the II, a new full-time position, and the appointment of apart-time associate director. One of the positions would be filled bya faculty member from LS&A, the other by one from a professionalschool. The dual reporting structure was continued, but according tothe provost, the new vice provost would be firmly in the provostsoffice. Moreover, development would be shifted from LS&A to theoffice of the provost, signaling a greater commitment from theprovost. The joint appointments would remain under the jurisdictionof the vice provost, but they would no longer have to be joint withLS&A.

When I visited UM again in March 1999, the new administrativestructure had been announced, though the details had not been filledin. Two significant changes in personnel were pending as well: thedean of LS&A had resigned the previous year and a search for herreplacement was nearing completion; and since the director of the II,by prior agreement, was returning to teaching, the search for the newposition of vice provost and director was just beginning. Response tothe new plan was generally positive. The director was particularlypleased that the leadership of the institute had been upgraded to thelevel of vice provost, moving the II up in the universitys organiza-tional chart and increasing its visibility. Moreover, he welcomed themove to the office of the provost, which brought with it the possibilityof additional funding. But no new resources were forthcoming, otherthan for the two new administrative positions, and faculty andadministrators were concerned that the IIs current budget would notbe adequate to sustain its