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International Relations: One World, Many TheoriesAuthor(s): Stephen M. WaltReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29-32+34-46Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 .
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nternational
Relations
n e
World
Man y
heories
byStephenM. Walt
h y
should policymakers
and practitioners
care
about the
scholarly
study
of interna-
tional
affairs?Those who
conduct
foreign
policy
often
dismiss academic
theorists
(frequently,
one
must
admit,
with
good
reason),
but there
is an
inescapable
ink
between
he
abstract orld
of
theory
and the
real
worldof
policy.
We
need theories o
makesenseof
the blizzard
f
information
hat bom-
bardsus
daily.
Even
policymakers
ho
are
contemptuous
f
"theory"
must
rely
on
their own
(often
unstated)
deas
about
how the world
works
n
order
o decidewhat
to do.
It is hard o
make
goodpolicy
f
one'sbasic
organizing
rinciples
re
lawed,
ust
as it is
hard
o
construct
good heorieswithout nowing lotabout herealworld.Everyoneses
theories-whether
e orshe
knows
t
ornot-and
disagreements
bout
policy
usually
est
on more
undamental
isagreements
bout he
basic
forces
hat
shape
nternationalutcomes.
Take,
or
example,
he current ebateon how to
respond
o China.
Fromone
perspective,
hina's
scent s the latest
example
f the
ten-
STEPH
EN
M. WALT sprofessorfpoliticalciencendmasterfthe ocialcienceolle-
giate
ivisiontthe
University
f
Chicago.
e isamember
f
FOREIGN
POLICY'S
ditorialoard.
SPRING 1998 29
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International
elations
dency
or
risingpowers
o alter he
global
balance
of
power
n
poten-
tiallydangerous ays,
specially
s their
growing
nfluencemakes
hem
moreambitious.
romanother
perspective,
he
key
to China's
uture
conduct
s
whether
ts behavior
will
be modified
y
its
integration
nto
world
markets nd
by
the
(inevitable?)
pread
f democratic
rinciples.
From
yet
another
iewpoint,
elations etweenChina
and the rest
of
the worldwill be shapedbyissues f culture ndidentity:WillChina
see
itself
and
be seen
by
others)
s a normalmember f
the
world
om-
munity
r a
singular
ociety
hat
deserves
pecial
reatment?
In
the same
way,
he debateover
NATO
expansion
ooksdifferent
depending
n which
theory
one
employs.
rom
"realist"
erspective,
NATO
expansion
s aneffort o
extend
Western
nfluence-well
beyond
the traditional
phere
f
U.S. vital
interests-during period
f Russ-
ian weakness
nd is
likely
o
provoke
harsh
response
rom
Moscow.
Froma liberalperspective, owever,expansionwill reinforce he
nascentdemocracies
f
Central
Europe
nd
extend
NATO'S
conflict-
management
mechanisms
o
a
potentially
urbulent
egion.
A
third
view
might
tress he
value
of
incorporating
he Czech
Republic,
Hun-
gary,
ndPolandwithin he
Western
ecurity ommunity,
hose
mem-
bers hare common
dentity
hathasmade
war
argely
nthinkable.
No
single
approach
an
capture
ll
the
complexity
f
contemporary
world
politics.Therefore,
e are
betteroffwitha
diverse
rray
f com-
peting
deasrather han a
single
theoretical
rthodoxy.
ompetition
between
theories
helps
reveal their
strengths
and
weaknesses nd
spurs ubsequent
efinements,
while
revealing
laws n
conventional
wisdom.
Although
we
shouldtake care
to
emphasize
nventiveness
over
invective,
we
should
welcomeand
encourage
he
heterogeneity
of
contemporary
cholarship.
WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?
The
study
f
internationalffairss
best
understood
s
a
protracted
om-
petition
etweenhe
realist,iberal,
nd adical
raditions.
ealism
mpha-
sizes
the
enduring
ropensity
or conflict
between
states;
iberalism
identifies
everal
ways
o
mitigate
hese
conflictive
endencies;
nd
the
radicalradition
escribesow heentire ystemf state elations ight e
transformed. he
boundaries
etween
these
traditions
re
somewhat
uzzy
and a numberof
important
worksdo not fit
neatly
into
any
of
them,
but
debates
within
and
among
hem
have
largely
efined
he
discipline.
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International
elations
principle
earwas hat
t
might quander
tsfavorable
osition
y
adopt-
ing
an
overly ggressive
oreign
olicy.
Thus,
by
theendof the
Cold
War,
realism admoved
away
rom
Morgenthau's
ark
rooding
bout
uman
nature nd aken
on a
slightly
more
optimistic
one.
Liberalism
Theprincipalhallengeo realism ame romabroadamilyof liber-
al theories.
One strand
f liberal
houghtargued
hat economic nter-
dependence
would
discourage
tates
from
using
force
against
each
otherbecausewarfare ould hreaten ach
side's
rosperity.
second
strand,
often
associatedwith President
Woodrow
Wilson,
saw
the
spread
f
democracy
sthe
key
to world
peace,
based n the claim hat
democratic
tateswere
inherently
more
peaceful
han
authoritarian
states. A
third,
more
recent
theory
argued
that
international
institutions uch as the International nergyAgencyand the Inter-
national
Monetary
undcould
help
overcome elfishstate
behavior,
mainly
by encouraging
tates o
forego
mmediate
ains
orthe
greater
benefitsof
enduring
ooperation.
Although
ome iberals
lirtedwith the
ideathat new
transnational
actors,
especially
the multinational
corporation,
were
gradually
encroaching
n
the
power
f
states,
iberalism
enerally
aw
tates
sthe
centralplayersn internationalffairs. ll liberal heoriesmpliedhat
cooperation
as
more
pervasive
haneventhe
defensive
ersion
f
real-
ism
allowed,
uteach
viewoffered
different
ecipe
or
promoting
t.
Radical
Approaches
Until
the
1980s,
marxism as
the main
alternative
o the
mainstream
realistand liberal
raditions.
Where
realism
and liberalism
ook
the
state
system
or
granted,
marxism
ffered oth a
different
xplanation
forinternationalonflictanda blueprintorfundamentallyransform-
ing
the
existing
nternational
rder.
Orthodoxmarxist
heory
aw
capitalism
sthe
central
auseof inter-
national
onflict.
Capitalist
tates
battled
achotheras a
consequence
of
their
ncessant
truggle
or
profits
ndbattled
ocialist
tates
because
they
saw
in
them
the seeds of
their own
destruction.
Neomarxist
"dependency"
theory,
by
contrast,
focused on
relations
between
advanced
capitalist
powers
and less
developed
states
and
argued
hat
the
former-aided
by
an
unholy
alliance with
the
ruling
classes
of the
developing
world-had
grown
rich
by exploiting
the
latter.
The
solu-
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International
elations
tion was
to overthrowhese
parasitic
lites and installa
revolutionary
government
ommitted
o autonomous
evelopment.
Both
of thesetheorieswere
argely
iscredited efore he Cold
War
even ended.
The extensive
history
f economicand
military oopera-
tion
among
he advancedndustrial
owers
howed
hat
capitalism
id
not
inevitably
ead to conflict.
The bitterschisms hat
divided he
communistworld howed hat socialism idnot always romote ar-
mony.
Dependency heory
suffered
imilar
empirical
etbacksas it
became
ncreasingly
lear
hat,first,
active
participation
n
the world
economy
was
a
betterroute
to
prosperity
han autonomous
ocialist
development;
nd, second,
many
developing
ountries
roved
hem-
selves
quitecapable
f
bargaining
uccessfully
ith
multinationalor-
porations
ndother
capitalist
nstitutions.
As marxism
uccumbed
o
its various
ailings,
its
mantle was
assumed ya group f theoristswhoborrowedeavily rom he wave
of
postmodern
writings
n
literary
riticism
and social
theory.
This
"deconstructionist"
pproach
was
openly skeptical
of the
effort to
devise
general
or
universal heoriessuch as
realismor liberalism.
Indeed,
ts
proponents
mphasized
he
importance
f
language
nd
discourse
n
shaping
ocial
outcomes.
However,
ecause hesescholars
focused
nitially
on
criticizing
he mainstream
aradigms
ut did not
offerpositivealternativeso them,theyremained self-consciously
dissident
minority
ormost
of the 1980s.
DomesticPolitics
Not all
ColdWar
cholarship
n
international
ffairsit
neatly
ntothe
realist, iberal,
r
marxist
aradigms.
n
particular,
number f
impor-
tant works
ocused
n
the
characteristicsf
states,
governmental
rga-
nizations,
r
individual
eaders. he
democratic
trand f
liberal
heory
fitsunder hisheading,asdo the effortsof scholarsuchasGraham
Allison
and
John
Steinbrunero use
organization
heory
and
bureau-
cratic
politics
o
explain
oreign
policy
behavior,
nd those
of
Jervis,
Irving
anis,
and
others,
which
applied
ocial
and
cognitive
psycholo-
gy.
For
he most
part,
hese
efforts
id
not
seek o
provide
general
he-
ory
of
international
ehavior ut
to
identify
ther
actors
hat
might
lead states
to behave
contrary
o
the
predictions
of
the
realistor
liber-
al
approaches.
Thus,
much of
this
literature
should be
regarded
as a
complement
to the
three main
paradigms
rather than
as a
rival
approach
or
analysis
of
the
international
ystem
as a
whole.
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Walt
NEW
WRINKLES IN
OLD
PARADIGMS
Scholarship
on
internationalaffairshas
diversified
ignificantly
since
the end of
the
Cold War.
Non-Americanvoices are more
prominent,
a
wider
range
of
methods and theories
are seen as
legitimate,
and
new
issuessuch as
ethnic
conflict,
the
environment,
and the
future
of
the
state have been placedon the agendaof scholarseverywhere.
Yet he
sense
of
deja
vuis
equally triking.
nstead f
resolving
he
strug-
gle
between
competing
heoretical
raditions,
he end of the
Cold War
has
merely
auncheda
new seriesof
debates.
ronically,
ven
as
many
societies
embrace
imilar dealsof
democracy,
ree
markets,
nd human
rights,
he
scholarswho
study
hese
developments
remore
divided han
ever.
Realism Redux
Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that
realism
was
destined for
the
academic
scrapheap,
umors
of
its demise
have
been
largely
exaggerated.
A recent
contributionof
realist
heory
s
its
attention
to the
problem
of
relativeand
absolute
gains.
Responding
o
the
institutionalists'
laim
that
international
nstitutions
would
enable states
to
forego
short-term
advantages
or the
sakeof
greater
ong-term
gains,
realists
uch as
Joseph
Grieco and
Stephen
Krasner
point out that anarchyforces states to
worry
aboutboth
the
absolute
gains
from
cooperation
and
the
way
that
gains
are
distributed
mong
participants.
The
logic
is
straightforward:
f
one
state
reaps
largergains
than
its
partners,
t will
gradually
ecome
stronger,
nd its
partners
will
eventually
become more
vulnerable.
Realistshave
also been
quick
to
explore
a
variety
of new
issues.
Barry
Posen
offers a
realist
explanation
for
ethnic
conflict,
noting
that the
breakup
f
multiethnic
statescould
place
rival
ethnic
groups
n
an
anar-
chic setting,thereby riggeringntensefearsandtemptingeachgroup o
use
force to
improve
ts
relative
position.
This
problem
would be
par-
ticularly
evere
when
each
group's
erritory
ontained
enclaves
inhabit-
ed
by
their
ethnic
rivals-as
in
the
former
Yugoslavia-because
each
side
would
be
tempted
to
"cleanse"
preemptively)
hese alien
minori-
ties
and
expand
to
incorporate
ny
others from
their
ethnic
group
hat
lay
outside
their
borders.
Realists
have
also
cautioned
that
NATO,
absent a
clear
enemy,
would
likely
face
increasing
strains and
that
expanding
ts
presence
eastward
would
jeopardize
elations
with
Russia.
Finally,
scholarssuch
as
Michael
Mastanduno
have
argued
hat U.S.
SPRING
1998
35
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International
elations
a i t i n g
f o r
M r
The
post-Cold
War
world till awaits ts"X" rticle.
Althoughmany
have
tried,
no one
has
managed
o
pen
the sortof
compelling nalysis
that
George
Kennan
rovided
or
an
earlier
ra,
whenhe articulatedhe
theory f containment.nsteadf a singlenewvision, he most mpor-
tant
development
n
post-Cold
War
writings
n world ffairss the
con-
tinuing
lashbetween
hosewho believe
world
politics
hasbeen
(or
is
being) undamentally
ransformed
nd hose
who
believe
hat he future
will looka lot like
the
past.
Scholars
hoseethe end
of
the ColdWar s
a
watershed
all
nto
two
distinct
roups.
Many xperts
till
see
the
state
as
the
main
actor
butbelieve hatthe
agenda
f states s
shifting
rom
militaryompeti-
tion to economicompetitiveness,omesticwelfare,ndenvironmen-
tal
protection.
Thus,
President
ill
Clintonhas embracedhe view
that
"enlightened
elf-interest
and]
hared
values..,
will
compel
sto
cooperate
n
more constructive
ways."
Some
writers ttribute his
change
o the
spread
f
democracy,
thers
o the nuclear
talemate,
and
stillothers
o
changes
n
internationalorms.
An even more
adical
erspective
uestions
hether
he
state s
still the most
mportant
nternationalctor.
essica
Mathews elieves
that "theabsolutes f the Westphalianystem of]territoriallyixed
states
. .
are
all
dissolving,"
nd
John
Ruggie rgues
hat we do
not
even have a
vocabulary
hat can
adequately
escribe
he
new forces
that
(he
believes)
are
transforming
ontemporary
orld
politics.
Although
here s still no
consensus
n
the causes f this
trend,
he
view that states
are
of
decreasing
elevance
s
surprisingly
ommon
among
cademics,
ournalists,
nd
policy
wonks.
Prominent
ealistsuchas
Christopherayne
ndKenneth
Waltz
continue o
give
he state
pride
f
place
and
predict
return
o
familiar
patterns
f
great
power ompetition.
imilarly,
obertKeohane
nd
other
nstitutionalistslso
emphasize
he
central oleof the state
and
argue
hat institutions
uch
as
the
European
nion
and
NATO
are
important
recisely
ecause
heyprovide
ontinuity
n the
midst
f dra-
matic
political
hifts.
Theseauthors ll
regard
he
end
of
the ColdWar
as
a
far-reaching
hift n
the
global
alance f
power
utdo
not see
t
as
a
qualitative
ransformationn
the basic
nature f
world
olitics.
Who is
right?
Too soon
to
tell,
but the
debatebears
watching
in the
years
o come.
-S.W.
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Walt
foreign olicy
s
generally
onsistentwith
realist
rinciples,
nsofar
s
its
actionsarestill
designed
o
preserve
.S.
predominance
ndto
shape
a
postwar
rder hatadvances
American
nterests.
The
most
nteresting
onceptual
evelopment
ithin he realist
ar-
adigm
hasbeenthe
emerging
plit
between
he "defensive"nd"offen-
sive" trands
f
thought.
Defensive
ealists uch as
Waltz,
Van
Evera,
andJackSnyder ssumedhatstateshad ittle ntrinsicnterestnmili-
tary
conquest
and
argued
hat the
costs
of
expansion enerally
ut-
weighed
he benefits.
Accordingly,hey
maintainedhat
great
power
wars ccurred
argely
ecause
omestic
roups
ostered
xaggerated
er-
ceptions
f
threat ndan
excessive
aith n the
efficacy
f
military
orce.
This
view
s now
being
challenged long
everalronts.
First,
sRan-
dall
Schweller
otes,
he neorealist
ssumption
hat states
merely
eek
to
survive
stackedhe deck" n favorof the status
quo
because
t
pre-
cluded hethreatof
predatory
evisionisttates-nationssuchas Adolf
Hitler's
Germany
r
NapoleonBonaparte's
rance hat
"valuewhat
they
covet
ar
more hanwhat
heypossess"
ndare
willing
o
riskanni-
hilationto achievetheir aims.
Second,
Peter
Liberman,
n
his
book
Does
Conquest
ay?,
ses
a number f
historical ases-such
as the Nazi
occupation
of
Western
Europe
and
Soviet
hegemony
over Eastern
Europe-to
show hat the benefits
f
conquest
ftenexceed he
costs,
therebyasting oubton the claim hatmilitaryxpansions no longer
cost-effective.
Third,
offensive realists such as Eric
Labs,
John
Mearsheimer,
nd FareedZakaria
rgue
hat
anarchy
ncourages
ll
states o
try
o maximizeheirrelative
trength
imply
ecause
o state
can
everbe
surewhena
truly
evisionist
ower
mightemerge.
Thesedifferences
elp
explainwhy
realists
isagree
ver ssues uch
as the
future f
Europe.
or
defensive ealists uchas
Van
Evera,
war
s
rarely
rofitable
nd
usually
esults rom
militarism,
ypemrnationalism,
or someother
distorting
omestic actor.BecauseVanEverabelieves
such
forcesare
argely
bsent n
post-Cold
War
Europe,
e
concludes
that
the
region
s
"primed
or
peace."
By
contrast,
Mearsheimernd
otheroffensive
ealists elieve hat
anarchy
orces
reat
powers
o
com-
pete
irrespective
f their
nternal
haracteristicsndthat
security
om-
petition
will return
o
Europe
s
soon
as the
U.S.
pacifier
s withdrawn.
New LifeforLiberalism
The
defeat of
communism
parked
roundof
self-congratulation
n the
West,
best
exemplified
by
Francis
Fukuyama's
nfamous claim that
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International
elations
COMPETING
PARADIGMS
REALISM
LIBERALISM
CONSTRUCTIVISMI
Main
heoretical
Self-interestedtates
Concern
or
ower
Stateehavior
haped
Proposition
compete
onstantly
or
overridden
y
conomic/
by
61ite
eliefs,
power
r
ecurity
political
onsiderations
collective
orms,
(desire
or
rosperity,
and
ocial
dentities
commitmento
liberalalues)
Main
nits f
Analysis
States
States
Individuals
(especially
61ites)
Main
nstruments
Economicnd
Varies
international
Ideasnd
especiallyilitary institutions,
conomic
discourse
power
exchange,romotion
of
democracy)
Modern
heorists
Hans
orgenthau,
Michael
oyle,
Alexander
endt,
Kennethaltz
Robert
eohane
John
uggie
Representative
Waltz,
heory
f
Keohane,
Wendt,
Anarchy
s
Modern orks
International
olitics
After
egemony
What
tates
akefIt"
Mearsheimer,
Backo
Fukuyama,
Thend
f
(International
the
Future:
nstability
History?"
National
Organization,992);
in
Europe
fter
Interest,
989)
Koslowski
the
Cold
ar"
Kratochwil,
Under-
(International
ecurity,
standing
hanges
n
1990)
International
olitics"
(International
Organization,
994)
Post-Cold ar
Resurgence
f
Increased
ooperation
Agnostic
ecause
t
Prediction
overt
reatower
as iberal
alues,
ree
cannot
redict
he
competition markets,
ndnterna-
contentf deas
tionalnstitutionsspreac
Main
imitation Does
ot ccountor
Tendso
gnore
he
Bettert
describing
he
international
hange
role
f
power
past
han
nticipating
theuture
38
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Walt
humankind adnow reached he "endof
history." istory
as
paid
it-
tle
attention
o
this
boast,
but
the
triumph
f the West did
give
a
notableboost o
all
three trands
f
liberal
hought.
By
far
he most
nteresting
nd
mportant evelopment
asbeen
the
lively
debateon the
"democratic
eace."
Although
he
most recent
phase
of
thisdebatehad
begun
ven
before he SovietUnion
collapsed,
it becamemoreinfluential s the numberof democracieseganto
increase
nd
as evidence f this
relationshipegan
o accumulate.
Democratic
eace
theory
s a
refinement
f
the earlier laim
that
democracies
ere
nherently
ore
peaceful
hanautocratictates. t
rests
on
the
belief hat
although
emocracieseemto
fight
warsas
often
as
other
states,
hey
rarely,
f
ever,
fight
one
another.Scholars
uch as
Michael
Doyle,
ames
Lee
Ray,
ndBruce
Russett
ave
offered number
of
explanations
or his
tendency,
he most
popular eing
hat
democra-
cies embrace ormsof
compromise
hat barthe use of force
against
groups
spousing
imilar
rinciples.
t is
hard o thinkof
a
more
nfluen-
tial,
recent cademic
ebate,
nsofar
s
the
belief hat
"democracies
on't
fight
each
other"has been an
importantustification
or
the
Clinton
administration'sfforts
o
enlarge
he
sphere
f
democratic
ule.
It is
thereforeronic
hat aith n the
"democratic
eace"
ecame he
basis orU.S.
policy ust
as additional
esearch
as
beginning
o
identify
severalqualifierso this theory.First,SnyderandEdwardMansfield
pointed
out
thatstates
may
be more
prone
o warwhen
they
are n
the
midstof a
democratic
ransition,
hich
implies
hat efforts
o
export
democracymight
actually
make
things
worse.
Second,
critics
uch as
Joanne
Gowa
andDavid
Spiro
have
argued
hat he
apparent
bsence f
war
between
democraciess
due to the
way
that
democracy
as
been
defined nd o
the
relative
earth f
democratictates
especially
efore
1945).
In
addition,
Christopher
ayne
has
pointed
out
that when
democraciesavecomeclose o war n thepast heirdecisionoremain
at
peace
ultimately
ad
ittle
do
withtheir
hared
emocratic
haracter.
Third,
learcut
vidence
hat
democracieso
not
fight
ach
other scon-
fined o
the
post-1945
ra,
and,
as
Gowahas
emphasized,
he absence f
conflict n
this
period
may
be
duemore
o their
ommon
nterestn
con-
taining
he
Soviet
Unionthanto
shared
emocratic
rinciples.
Liberal
nstitutionalists
ikewise
have
continued to
adapt
their own
theories.On
the
one
hand,
the
core claims
of
institutionalist
heory
have
become
more
modest over
time.
Institutionsare
now
said to
facilitate
cooperation
when it
is
in
each
state's
nterestto
do
so,
but
it is
widely
SPRING
1998
39
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International
elations
agreed
hat
they
cannot
orce tates
o behave n
ways
hat
are
contrary
to the states'
own
selfish nterests.
For
urther
iscussion,
lease
see
Robert
Keohane's
rticle.]
On the
other
hand,
nstitutionalists
uchas
John
Duffield
ndRobert
McCalla
aveextended he
theory
ntonew
substantive
reas,
most
notably
he
study
of NATO.For hese
scholars,
NATO'S
ighly
nstitutionalized
haracter
elpsexplainwhy
it has
been
able osurvivendadapt, espitehedisappearancefitsmainadversary.
The economic trand
f liberal
heory
s
still
nfluential
s
well.In
par-
ticular,
number f scholars ave
recently
uggested
hatthe
"globaliza-
tion" of world
markets,
he
rise of
transnational etworksand
nongovernmental
rganizations,
nd
he
rapid pread
f
global
ommu-
nications
echnology
re
undermining
he
power
of
statesand
shifting
attention
way
rom
militaryecurity
oward conomics
nd
social
wel-
fare.The detailsarenovel but the basic
ogic
is familiar: s
societies
aroundhe
globe
becomeenmeshedn a web of economicand social
connections,
he costsof
disrupting
heseties will
effectively reclude
unilateral
tate
actions,
specially
he useof
force.
This
perspectivemplies
hat warwill remain
a remote
possibility
among
he
advanced
ndustrial
emocracies.t also
suggests
hat
bring-
ing
China
and
Russianto
the relentless
mbrace
f
world
apitalism
s
the best
way
to
promote
oth
prosperity
nd
peace,particularly
f
this
processreates strongmiddle lass n thesestatesandreinforcesres-
sures o
democratize. et
thesesocieties
ooked n
prosperity
ndcom-
petition
will
be confined o the economic
ealm.
Thisview
hasbeen
challenged
y
scholars
who
argue
hatthe actu-
al
scope
of
"globalization"
s
modest nd
that
thesevarious
ransactions
still
take
place
n
environmentshat
are
shaped
nd
regulated y
states.
Nonetheless,
he belief
hat
economic orces
re
superseding
radition-
al
greatpower
politics
enjoyswidespread
cceptance
mong
cholars,
pundits, ndpolicymakers,nd the role of the state is likely o be an
important
opic
or
uture
cademic
nquiry.
Constructivist
heories
Whereas
ealism nd
iberalismend
o
focuson material
actors
uch
as
power
r
trade,
onstructivist
pproaches
mphasize
he
impact
f
ideas.
Insteadof
taking
the
state
for
granted
and
assuming
hat it
simply
seeks
to
survive,
constructivists
egard
he
interests
and identitiesof
states as
a
highly
malleable
product
of
specific
historical
processes.
They
pay
close
attention to
the
prevailing
discourse(s)
in
society
because
dis-
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Walt
course eflects nd
shapes
eliefs nd
nterests,
ndestablishes
ccepted
norms f behavior.
onsequently,
onstructivisms
especially
ttentive
to
the
sources f
change,
andthis
approach
as
largely eplaced
marx-
ism
as the
preeminent
adical
erspective
n
international
ffairs.
The
end of the Cold
War
played
an
important
ole in
legitimating
constructivistheoriesbecause ealism
and liberalism oth failed
to
anticipatehis event and had sometrouble xplainingt. Construc-
tivists had
an
explanation:
Specifically,
ormer
president
Mikhail
Gorbachev evolutionizedoviet
foreign
policy
because e
embraced
new ideas uch
as "common
ecurity."
Moreover,
iven
that
we live in an era
whereold norms
are
being
challenged,
nce
clear
boundariesre
dissolving,
nd issues f identi-
ty
are
becoming
more
alient,
t is
hardly
urprising
hat
scholars ave
been drawn o
approaches
hat
place
these
issues ront and
center.
Froma constructivist erspective,n fact, the central ssue in the
post-Cold
Warworld
s how
different
roups
onceive heir
dentities
and
interests.
Although power
is not
irrelevant,
constructivism
emphasizes
ow ideas
and dentities re
created,
ow
they
evolve,
and
how
they
shape
he
way
states
understandnd
respond
o their
situa-
tion.
Therefore,
t
matterswhether
Europeans
efine
hemselves
ri-
marily
n
national
or
continental
erms;
whether
Germany
nd
Japan
redefineheirpasts nways hatencourageheiradoptingmoreactive
international
oles;
nd
whether
he
UnitedStates
embracesr
rejects
its
identity
as
"global
oliceman."
Constructivist
heories re
quite
diverse
nd
do not offer
a
unified
set
of
predictions
n
any
of
these ssues.
At a
purely
onceptual
evel,
Alexander
Wendt
has
argued
hat
the
realist
conception
of
anarchy
does
not
adequately
xplain
why
conflictoccurs
between tates.
The
real ssue s
how
anarchy
s
understood-in
Wendt's
words,
Anarchy
iswhatstatesmakeof it."Another trand fconstructivistheoryhas
focused
on
the
futureof
the
territorial
tate,
suggesting
hat
transna-
tional
communication
nd
shared
ivic
values
are
undermining
radi-
tional
national
oyalties
nd
creating
adically
ewforms
of
political
association.
Other
constructivists
ocus
on the
role of
norms,
arguing
that
nternational
aw
and
other
normative
rinciples
ave
eroded
ar-
lier
notions
of
sovereignty
and
altered
the
legitimate
purposes
for
which state
powermay
be
employed.
The
common
theme
in
each of
these
strands
s
the
capacity
of
discourse
o
shape
how
political
actors
define
themselves and
their
interests,
and
thus
modify
their
behavior.
SPRING
1998
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Internationalelations
DomesticPoliticsReconsidered
As
in
the Cold
War,
cholars ontinue o
explore
he
impact
f
domes-
tic
politics
on the behavior f
states.Domestic
politics
are
obviously
central
o
the
debate
on
the democratic
eace,
and scholars
uch
as
Snyder, effrey
rieden,
ndHelenMilnerhave
examined ow
domes-
tic interest
roups
andistort he formation
f
state
preferences
nd ead
to suboptimalnternational ehavior.GeorgeDowns,DavidRocke,
andothershave
also
explored
ow
domesticnstitutions
an
help
states
deal
with
the
perennial roblem
f
uncertainty,
hile
students f
psy-
chology
have
applied
prospectheory
and othernew
tools to
explain
why
decisionmakersail to
act
in a
rational
ashion.
For
urther is-
cussion
about
oreignpolicy
decision
making,
lease
ee
the article
by
Margaret
ermann
nd
Joe
Hagan.]
The
past
decadehas also
witnessed
n
explosion
f
interest n
the
conceptofculture, developmenthatoverlaps iththeconstructivist
emphasis
n
the
importance
f
ideasand
norms.
Thus,
Thomas
Berger
andPeter
Katzenstein
aveused
cultural
ariableso
explain
why
Ger-
many
and
Japan
ave
thus ar
eschewedmore
elf-reliant
ilitary oli-
cies;
ElizabethKier
has
offered
cultural
nterpretation
f
British
nd
French
military
octrinesn
the
interwar
eriod;
nd
ain
Johnston
as
traced ontinuities
n Chinese
oreign
olicy
o
a
deeply
ooted
ormof
"culturalealism."amuelHuntington'sirewarningsboutan immi-
nent
"clash f
civilizations"
re
symptomatic
f
this
trendas
well,
nso-
faras his
argument
ests
on
the claim
hat
broad
ultural
ffinities
re
now
supplanting
ational
oyalties.
Though
these
and
other
works
defineculture n
widely
varying
ways
and
have
yet
to
provide
a
full
explanation
f
how it works
r how
enduring
ts
effects
might
be,
cul-
tural
perspectives
ave
been
very
much n
vogue
during
he
past
five
years.
This
trend s
partly
reflection
f the
broader
nterest
n
cultural
issues ntheacademic orld andwithin hepublicdebate swell)and
partly
response
o the
upsurge
n
ethnic,
nationalist,
nd
cultural on-
flicts
sincethe
demise
f the
Soviet
Union.
TOMORROW'S
CONCEPTUAL
TOOLBOX
While
these
debates
reflect he
diversity
f
contemporary
cholarship
n
international
ffairs,
hereare
also
obvious
igns
of
convergence.
Most
real-
ists
recognize
hat
nationalism,
militarism,
ethnicity,
and
other
domestic
factors
are
important;
iberals
cknowledge
hat
power
s
central
o
inter-
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Walt
national
behavior;
nd some
constructivistsdmit hat
ideas
will
have
greatermpact
whenbacked
y
powerful
tates ndreinforced
yenduring
materialorces.The
boundaries
f
each
paradigm
resomewhat
erme-
able,
and
here s
ample
pportunity
or
ntellectual
rbitrage.
Which
of
thesebroad
erspectives
heds
he most
ight
on
contem-
porary
nternational
ffairs,
nd
which
should
policymakerseep
most
firmly n mind when chartingour course into the next century?
Althoughmany
academics
and
morethan a few
policymakers)
re
loathe o admit
t,
realism emainshe
most
compelling eneral
rame-
work or
understanding
nternational
elations.
tatescontinue o
pay
close
attention o the balanceof
power
and to
worry
bout he
possi-
bility
of
major
onflict.
Among
other
hings,
his
enduring reoccupa-
tion
with
power
nd
security
xplains
whymany
Asiansand
Europeans
are now
eager
o
preserve-and
possibly
xpand-the
U.S.
military
presence n their regions.As Czech
president
Vaiclav
Havel has
warned,
f
NATO
ails o
expand,
we
might
be
heading
ora new
glob-
al
catastrophe
..
[which]
ouldcost
us
all
muchmore
han the two
worldwars."
hesearenot
the words f a man
who
believes hat
great
power
ivalry
as been
banishedorever.
As
for
he
United
States,
he
past
decade
as
shown
how
much
t
likes
being
"number
ne"
nd
how
determinedt is to
remain
n
a
predominant
position.TheUnitedStateshastakenadvantagef itscurrentuperiori-
ty
to
impose
ts
preferences
herever
ossible,
venat
the riskof
irritat-
ingmany
f its
ong-standing
llies. t
has orced
series f
one-sidedrms
control
greements
n
Russia,
ominatedhe
problematic
eace
ffortn
Bosnia,
aken
teps
o
expand
ATO nto
Russia's
ackyard,
ndbecome
increasingly
oncerned
bout
he
rising
power
of China.
It
has called
repeatedly
or
greater
eliance n
multilateralism
nd a
larger
ole for
international
nstitutions,
ut has
treated
gencies
uch as
the
United
Nationsand heWorldTradeOrganizationithdisdainwheneverheir
actions
idnot
conform
o U.S.
interests.t
refusedo
join
the rest
of
the
world
n
outlawing
he
production
f
landmines ndwas
politely
unco-
operative
t
the
Kyoto
nvironmental
ummit.
lthough
U.S.
leaders re
adept
t
cloaking
heir
actionsn
the
ofty
hetoric
f
"world
rder,"
aked
self-interesties
behindmostof
them.
Thus,
he
endof
the
Cold
Wardid
not
bring
he
end
of
power
politics,
and
realism s
likely
to remain
he sin-
gle
most
useful
nstrument n
our
intellectual
oolbox.
Yet
realism
does not
explain
everything,
and
a
wise
leader
would
also
keep
insights
from
the rival
paradigms
n
mind.
Liberal
theories
SPRING
1998
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Internationalelations
identify
the instrumentsthat states
can
use to
achieve shared
inter-
ests,
highlight
the
powerful
economic forces
with
which states
and
societies must now
contend,
and
help
us understand
why
states
may
differ
in
their basic
preferences.Paradoxically,
because
U.S.
protec-
tion reduces
the
danger
of
regional
rivalriesand reinforces he
"liber-
al
peace"
that
emerged
after
1945,
these factors
may
become
relatively
more important,as long as the United States continues to provide
security
and
stability
in
many parts
of the
world.
Meanwhile,
constructivist
heories are best
suited to
the
analysis
of
how identities
and interests
can
change
over
time,
thereby
producing
subtle shifts in
the
behavior of
states and
occasionally
triggering
ar-
reaching
but
unexpected
shifts
in
international
affairs.It matters if
political
identity
in
Europe
continues
to shift
from
the nation-state
to
more local
regions
or to
a broader
ense of
European
dentity, ust
as
it
mattersif nationalism is
gradually
upplanted
by
the sort of "civiliza-
tional"
affinities
emphasizedby
Huntington.
Realism has
little to
say
about these
prospects,
and
policymakers
could be
blind-sided
by
change
if
they ignore
these
possibilities
entirely.
In
short,
each
of these
competing
perspectives
captures
mportant
aspects
of world
politics.
Our
understanding
would
be
impoverished
were our
thinking
confined to
only
one of them.
The
"compleatdiplo-
mat"of the future houldremaincognizantof realism'smphasison the
inescapable
ole of
power,keep
liberalism's
wareness
f
domestic
orces
in
mind,
and
occasionally
reflecton
constructivism's
ision of
change.
WANT TO
KNOW
MORE?
For a
fair-minded
urvey
of
the
realist,
iberal,
and
marxist
paradigms,
see MichaelDoyle'sWays of Warand Peace (New York,NY:Norton,
1997).
A
guide
to
some recent
developments
n
international
political
thought
is
Doyle
&
G.
John
Ikenberry,
ds.,
New
Thinking
in
Inter-
national
Relations
Theory
(Boulder,
CO:
Westview,
1997).
Those
interested
n
realism
hould
examine The
Perils
of
Anarchy:
Contemporary
Realism
and
International
Security
(Cambridge,
MA:
MIT
Press,
1995)
by
Michael
Brown,
Sean
Lynn-Jones,
& Steven
Miller,
eds.;
"Offensive
Realism and
Why
States
Expand
Their
War
Aims"
(Security
tudies,
ummer
1997)
by
Eric
Labs;
and
"Dueling
Realisms"
(International
rganization,
ummer
1997)
by
Stephen
Brooks.
Foralter-
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Walt
native realistassessments
f
contemporary
orld
politics,
see
John
Mearsheimer's
Back
to the Future:
Instability
n
Europe
afterthe
Cold War"
(International
ecurity,
ummer
1990)
and Robert
Jervis'
"TheFuture
of
WorldPolitics:
Will It Resemble
he
Past?"
Interna-
tional
ecurity,
Winter
1991-92).
A realist
xplanation
f ethnic
con-
flict
is
Barry
Posen's
"The
Security
Dilemmaand Ethnic
Conflict"
(Survival,pring1993);anup-to-dateurvey f offense-defenseheory
can be
found
n "The
Security
DilemmaRevisited"
y
CharlesGlaser
(WorldPolitics,
October
1997);
and recent U.S.
foreignpolicy
is
explained
in Michael
Mastanduno's
Preserving
the
Unipolar
Moment:RealistTheories
and
U.S.
Grand
Strategy
fterthe
Cold
War"
International
ecurity,
pring
1997).
The
liberal
approach
o
international ffairs s summarizedn
Andrew
Moravcsik's
Taking
references
eriously:
A
LiberalTheo-
ry of InternationalPolitics" (Internationalrganization,utumn
1997).
Many
of the
leading
ontributorso the debate n the
democra-
tic
peace
can be
found
n Brown
&
Lynn-Jones,
ds.,
Debating
he
Democratic
Peace
(Cambridge,
MA: MIT
Press,
1996)
and Miriam
Elman,
d.,
Paths to Peace: Is
Democracy
he
Answer?
Cambridge,
MA:
MIT
Press,
997).
The
contributions
f
institutionalist
heory
nd
the
debate n relative
ains
are
ummarized
n
David
Baldwin,d.,
Neo-
realismand Neoliberalism: he Contemporaryebate(New York,
NY:
Columbia
University
Press,1993).
An
important
ritique
f
the
institutionalistiterature
s
Mearsheimer'sThe
FalsePromise
f Inter-
national
nstitutions"
(Intemrnational
ecurity,
Winter
1994-95),
but
one
should lsoexamine he
responses
n the Summer
995 ssue.For
appli-
cations
of
institutionalist
heory
o
NATO,
see
John
Duffield'sNATO's
Functionsafter the
Cold
War"
(Political
cience
Quarterly,
Winter
1994-95)
and
Robert
McCalla's NATO's
ersistence
fterthe Cold
War" Internationalrganization,ummer 996).
Authors
questioning
he role of
the
state nclude
Susan
Strange
n
The
Retreat
of
the
State:
The
Diffusion f
Power
n the
WorldEcon-
omy
Cambridge:
ambridge
niversity
ress, 996);
and
Jessica
Math-
ews in
"Power
Shift"
(Foreign
ffairs,
anuary/February
997).
The
emergence
f the
state s
analyzed
y
Hendrik
pruyt
n
The
Sovereign
Stateand
Its
Competitors
Princeton, J:PrincetonUniversity ress,
1994),
and its
continued
importance
s
defended
in
Globalization
n
Question:
The
International
Economy
and the
Possibilities
of
Gover-
nance
(Cambridge:Polity,
1996)
by
Paul
Hirst and
Grahame
Thomp-
SPRING
1998
45
8/11/2019 International Relations One World, Many Theories.pdf
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/international-relations-one-world-many-theoriespdf 18/18
International
ffairs
son,
and
Governing
he
GlobalEconomy:
nternational inance
and
the State
(Cambridge,
A:
Harvard
niversity
ress,
994)
by
Ethan
Kapstein.
notherdefense
from
a
somewhat
nlikely
ource)
s "The
World
Economy:
The Futureof the State"
The
Economist,
eptem-
ber
20, 1997),
and
a more
academic iscussion
f these issues s
Peter
Evans' The
Eclipse
of
the State?Reflections n
Stateness
n
an
Era
of Globalization"
World olitics,
ctober
1997).
Readersnterestedn constructivistpproacheshouldbeginwith
Alexander
Wendt's
Anarchy
s
WhatStates
Makeof It: The
Social
Constructionof Power
Politics"
(International
rganization,
pring
1992),
while
awaiting
his Social
Theory of
InternationalPolitics
(Cambridge: ambridge
University
Press,
orthcoming).
A diverse
array
f cultural nd
constructivist
pproaches
may
also be
found n
Peter
Katzenstein,
d.,
The
Culture
of
National
Security
New York,
NY:
Columbia
University
Press,
1996)
and
Yosef
Lapid
&
Friedrich
Kratochwil,ds.,
The
Return
of
Culture
and
Identity
n
IR
Theory
(Boulder:
O:
Lynne
Rienner,
996).
For inks
o relevantWeb
sites,
as well as
a
comprehensive
ndex
of
related
rticles,
ccess
www.foreignpolicy.com.
aheanwaaetl
g
place
o
ah
fregng
gg
icyCmuiy
http://wwwfore
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