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International Relations

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Volume 7, Number 5, May 2019 (Serial Number 68)

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process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.

International Relations

and Diplomacy

Volume 7, Number 5, May 2019 (Serial Number 68)

Contents

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

An Assessment of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the African Union Security Architecture:

Neo-conservative Perspectives 189

Olukayode Bakare

Public Diplomacy

Palestinian Nation Branding via Public Diplomacy 202

Dalal Iriqat

Regulation

The Politics of Local Regulation in Tanzania: The Quest for Multilevel Regulatory

Governance 217

Beatrice Mkunde

German Group 47

From Rhode Island to Bavaria: Launch and Sinking of the Group 47’s Founders 224

Francesca Somenzari

Power Relations

Big Power Relations under the Framework of the IOR-ARC 230

SHU Meng

International Relations and Diplomacy, May 2019, Vol. 7, No. 05, 189-201

doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.05.001

An Assessment of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the African

Union Security Architecture: Neo-conservative Perspectives

Olukayode Bakare

University of Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a strategic shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy. After the return of Nigeria

to civilian rule in 1999, new multilateral diplomacy had to be embarked upon towards the promotion of democracy,

peace, and security in Africa. One notable and distinctive feature of the country’s foreign policy from the inception

of the Fourth Republic (1999) has been its promotion of African stability through the democratisation process.

Nigeria has consistently used the African Union (AU) to pursue an agenda which can be described as

neo-conservative, in restoring democracy, peace, and security, in Africa. Given this, this paper examines the

neo-conservative foreign policy objectives and the role of the Nigerian state within the African Union security

architecture towards the nurturing and advancement of democracy, peace, and security since the return to the

civilian rule in 1999.

Keywords: Nigeria, national interests, neo-conservatism foreign policy, democracy, security, democratic peace

theory

Introduction

Following the return to civilian government in 1999, Nigeria has undertaken its foreign policy measures

consistent with the policy objectives of the African Union (AU). The policy ramifications of Nigeria’s role in

the AU since 1999 include her commitment to peace, security, integration, and sustainable democracy in Africa

(Okereke, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, the West African sub-region as Nigeria’s sphere of influence, gives the

country a place as a natural leader in Africa, underscored by its enormous contribution to Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), AU, and peace in the region, and strongly affirms that

Nigeria’s continued stability, economic resources, and active role will be unmatched and central to African

peace and security (Obi, 2011, p. 63). Nigeria’s neo-conservatism and commitment to promoting a democratic

ethos in Africa have been subsumed under certain guidelines, under the Constitutive Act of the AU. Among

these are, on the one hand, a strong repudiation of unconstitutional changes of governments, and, on the other

hand, financial and technical assistance to transitional states, and a commitment to peace and conflict

management in Africa (Omotola, 2008, p. 38).

Nigeria has associated itself closely with this agenda—neo-conservative foreign policy. For example, in

May 2000, Nigeria hosted the first Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and

Co-operation in Africa (CSCDCA), which provided a forum for the development of policies aimed at

Olukayode Bakare, Dr., Department of Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of Aberdeen,

Aberdeen, Scotland, UK.

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NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE AFRICAN UNION SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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promoting the common values of the AU and the African Economic Community (AEC) in the areas of

democracy, peace, and security (Europa Publications, 2004, p. 1311). Accordingly, on July 9-10 2002, the

African Heads of State, meeting in Durban, South Africa, inaugurated and adopted the Protocol Relating to the

Establishment of Peace and Security Council (PSC). On December 26, 2003, Nigeria became the 27th AU state

to endorse its instruments for ratification, thereby bringing the Protocol into operation (Lansford, 2017, p.

1738). However, this paper examines the role of Nigeria in the AU’s security architecture towards the nurturing

and promotion of democracy, security, and peace in Africa since 1999. Furthermore, given the West African

region as a traditional sphere of Nigeria’s influence, the paper looks at Nigeria’s foreign policy and the

implications of the AU’s Constitutive Act on its national security towards the promotion of its national interests

in Africa, following the return to civilian rule in 1999.

Conceptual Discourse

Neo-conservatism

The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a strategic shift in Nigeria’s foreign policy and its quest to

democratise sub-Saharan Africa. This strategic shift in its foreign policy approach, after the return to the

civilian government in 1999 (Fourth Republic), was underpinned by the need to reposition itself and re-affirm

its commitment to the advancement of democracy, peace, and security on the African continent. This paper

draws on the neo-conservative principles of Irving Kristol (2011), to investigate the character of Nigeria’s

foreign policy and related security policy behaviour since 1999, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The

principle of neo-conservatism “emphasizes strong commitment to Western democratic values” (Acar &

Altunok, 2013, p. 14). In other words, neo-conservatism is an offshoot of both the liberal institutionalist and

democratic peace theories of IR. It is a political ideology that developed as an outgrowth of the radicalism of

the Sixties, following the civil rights and anti-war movements targeted at making the liberal society cease to act

illiberally (Steinfels, 2013, p. 3). Bradley Thompson (2010, p. 173) stressed that neo-conservatism is a political

idea that focuses on political formalism against the criticisms dominated by the foreign policy “realism” of the

1990s. Neo-conservatives argue that foreign policy “realism” is imbued with a narrow description of national

interest, “in which only tangible, immediate threats to American security warranted military action” (Thompson,

2010, p. 173).

In Thompson’s view, neoconservatives believe that realism cannot predict long-range disasters and the

appeasement to deter future real threats that may culminate into full-fledged global threats or catastrophe

(Thompson, 2010, p. 173). For example, in place of realism, neo-conservatism advocates what is called

“benevolent hegemony”. Benevolent hegemony in the realm of foreign policy has two goals. First, to provide a

state with security (a realist foreign policy rooted in self-interest), second, to propagate democracy across the

world (idealist foreign policy objective rooted in altruism) (Thompson, 2010, p. 174) through democratic

internationalism. Hegemonic neo-conservatives believe that the world can be made peaceful through the

democratisation of undemocratic regimes and denuclearization of regimes that are possessing Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, p. 145). Similarly, Clarke and Halper observed that for the US to

advance its national interest in exporting democracy and making the world a safer place, “neo-conservatives

advocate active measures and actions with other states to achieve the fundamental objective of spreading and

advancing democracy, peace and security” (Clarke and Halper, cited in Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, p. 145).


191

Hegemonic neo-conservatives, like realists, believe that the use of military power is vital to America’s

foreign policy and national security, and argue that the US foreign policy must be imbued with total military

statecraft and possibly, the alignment or coalition of states to advance democracy and fight dictatorial regimes

(Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, p. 145). For example, the pressure that led to the removal of Saddam Hussain in Iraq

was underpinned by the enduring principles of neo-conservatism to advance democracy, peace, and security in

the Middle East (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, pp. 146-147). This regime change was based on neo-conservative

idea of “go it alone” (Pearson, 2008, p. 242) and was described by Francis Fukuyama as “American

exceptionalism—the implicit judgement that the U.S. is different from other countries and can be trusted to use

its military power justly and wisely in the ways that others could not” (Fukuyama, cited in Pearson, 2008, p.

242). Ultimately, the U.S. national interest in ensuring global democracy and security is underlined by its

global military capability. Furthermore, neo-conservatism stresses that advancement of democracy abroad is

possible via a purposeful foreign policy action (Ritchie & Rogers, 2007, p. 145).

Conversely, Nigeria’s national interest in the advancement of democracy, peace, and security in Africa,

through its military power and diplomacy following its return to democracy since 1999, may be compared with

the US military statecraft towards the spread of global democracy. Therefore, drawing upon the idea of Bradley

Thompson’s conception of neo-conservatism as “benevolent hegemony”, which seeks to pursue security and

promote democracy through democratic formalism or institutionalism (Thompson, 2010, p. 173), the focus of

this paper will be on African neo-conservatism as exhibited in Nigerian foreign policy and the strategies it has

adopted in the promotion of democracy, peace, and security in sub-Saharan Africa since 1999.

Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic peace theory is an offshoot of a liberal theory of international relations, which aims at

promoting peace and security through an established democratic and institutional order (neo-conservatism).

Immanuel Kant’s liberal political ideal of the Perpetual Peace of a just world order highlighted his theoretical

exposition of democratic peace on the assumption that democratic states do not wage war against one another.

Kant’s democratic ideals demonstrate that a condition of harmony among humans based on political facts is an

indispensable condition of lasting peace (Kant, 1992, p. vii). International reforms are imperative to ensuring

justice qua justice in a global political environment inhabited by infinite human beings and imperfect sovereign

states (Franceschet, 2002, p. 3). The main objective of foreign policy is to help create a democratic society and

well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and abide by the rules and regulations of the

international political system (Rice, 2005, p. 2). For Kant, the need to achieve democratic government and

well-governed states required a total transformation of human consciousness, republican constitutionalism, and

federal contracts between states to eradicate war rather than regulate it as argued by the realist scholars (Dunne,

2008, p. 112). However, Kant’s democratic ideals for perpetual peace based on the eradication of conflicts and

war among nations as explained above is good, but unrealistic as conflicts and war will continue to reflect the

deep national interest of states in the international system.

Foreign Policy and National Interest

Joseph Frankel conceives of foreign policy as a unique interplay between domestic and foreign

environments. The persons involved in this interplay usually occupy certain official positions of trust and

importance that empower them to act on behalf of their society (Frankel, 1969, p. 81). Frankel’s assertion on


192

foreign policy depicts a critical illustration of state leadership in the management of a country’s foreign policy

in a manner that reflects an objective reality of societal interest. In short, foreign policy is a decision made on

behalf of the masses by a state actor aimed at achieving specified national interests. The national interests serve

as guiding principles in the conduct of foreign policy in the international environment. Ultimately, this paper

examines the objectives of Nigerian foreign policy and national interests since its return to democracy in 1999.

The analysis is concerned with the projection of Nigeria’s foreign policy in the promotion of peace, security,

and democracy through its membership in the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS), and participation in and interaction with multilateral institutional bodies such as the United

Nations, the European Union, and the Commonwealth.

National Security

Security is an important concept used both in domestic and international politics. The logic of security

rests on how states or individuals relate to each other regarding threats and vulnerabilities. From the perspective

of this paper, security is based on the realist notion of traditional military power in international politics. Arnold

Wolfers reminds us that “security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threat to acquired values,

and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such value will be attacked” (Wolfers, 2001, p. 6). Given this,

the levels of response to threats to an individual or state depending on the objective sense that such threats pose

a danger to their security. Wolfers goes on to say that “security rises and falls with the ability of a nation to

deter attack or to defeat it” (Wolfers, 2001, p. 6). Also, in the view of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de

Wilde, security is about state survival and the ability of a state to mobilise power or resources to deter

existential threats (Buzan, Wavers, & Wilde, 1998, p. 21). They noted that an issue becomes an international

security issue when such a reference object traditionally poses threats to the state (Buzan, Wavers, & Wilde,

1998, p. 21). For example, the incessant and continuous attacks posed by the Islamist terrorist group, popularly

known as the “Boko Haram”, in Northeast Nigeria, could be described as existential threats, and which

continue to pose serious danger to the Nigeria’s territorial integrity and the international community,

particularly its neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Similarly, the activities and attacks by the militants in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region constitute

other security threats, which have adversely affected its oil production’s levels and the GDP. The core objective

of every state in the international system, therefore, is for the protection of their national interests against any

existential threats that may thwart their survival. After the end of the Cold War, however, security issues have

expanded to a whole gamut of economic, social, ecological, and demographic issues which now confront us.

After this period, it is no longer possible to limit security discourse to only traditional military threats to the

territorial integrity of a state (Garnett, 1996, p. 12). Economic instability, climate change, social problems, and

population explosion may also constitute threats to a state’s security or survival.

As we can deduce from this discussion of competing claims of security, and despite the different

perspectives of security issues as outlined above, it remains logical that the combination of traditional and

non-traditional security issues have direct implications for the role of the nation-state in the realm of security.

This paper focuses, however, on how national security impacts on a state’s foreign policy behaviour and its

survival in the international system. As noted by Barry Buzan, “at the system level the state is also central to

security, and its domestic characteristics cannot be disentangled from the character of the security problem in

the international system as a whole” (Buzan, 1991, p. 57). Given this, the security of a state in the international


193

system is dependent on the relative national powers (military and economical) it possesses and how these

national powers are maneuvered for its survival in the anarchical system. In the view of John Garnett, national

security is about a state’s vital interests, particularly the physical survival of the state and its people, including

their wellbeing (Garnett, 1996, p. 13). National security is central to a sovereign state which is the ultimate

unitary actor in the international system and the defender of the security of the people (Booth, 2007, p. 34).

Ultimately, for a state to achieve its vital or national interests, military and economic powers are crucial.

Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the AU Security Architecture: Promotion of Democracy, Peace,

and Security

The Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, became the first Chairman of the AU (Okereke, 2012, p. 8).

In this capacity, in July 2006, Nigeria initiated and submitted a comprehensive blueprint entitled “A Study of

African Union Government: Towards the United States of Africa” to the 7th Ordinary Assembly in Banjul, the

Gambia (Biswaro, 2012, p. 347). The central theme of the report was the fact that Africa is over-dependent on

the north, especially with regards to technicians, expatriates, and technology. Other themes of the report include

continental integration, education, peace, and security (Biswaro, 2012, p. 347). Furthermore, in a personal

interview with the author, the Director of Policy and Planning Division at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, noted: “Nigeria hosted two African countries—Western Sahara and Morocco—that have constantly

opposed each other in relations to the AU membership”1. The respondent noted that although Nigeria had

fought for and achieved decolonisation of Africa before the return to civilian government in 1999, Western

Sahara is yet to be fully decolonised and Nigeria, in partnership with the AU, is trying to achieve this

objective.2

On the other hand, in an interview with the Director of the African Union Division, the Ministry of

Nigerian Foreign Affairs, it was noted that the democratisation process within the African Union constitutes the

basic objective of the Union’s Charter and this remains the core foreign policy objective of the Federal

Government of Nigeria. Consequently, after the return to a civilian government in 1999, Nigeria realigned its

foreign policy in support of democratic transition in other African states by resisting coups and ordering

elections to be conducted.3 Similarly, in an interview with one of the staff at the West African Division, the

Ministry of Nigerian Foreign Affairs, it was noted that it has consistently championed the need to broker peace

between warring parties and assisted in the conduct of presidential elections,4 especially in the West African

region, its traditional area of influence.

Nevertheless, to understand Nigeria’s power projection and neo-conservative high foreign policy in the

AU since the return to civilian rule in 1999, a critical demonstration and examination of its neo-conservative

leadership towards democratisation, peace, and security across some key countries in sub-Saharan Africa is

essential. The next section looks at Nigeria’s power projection in nurturing and advancing democratisation,

peace, and security in partnership with the AU in West Africa from 1999.

1 Interview with the Director of Policy and Planning Division, at the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21st February 2017,

Abuja. 2 Ibid. 3 Interview with the Director of the African Union Division, the Ministry of Nigerian Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian Ministry of

Foreign Affairs on 21st February 2017, Abuja. 4 Interview with a Staff at the West African Division, the Ministry of Nigerian Foreign Affairs, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs on 21st February 2017, Abuja.


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The West African Sub-region

Among West African states, Nigeria appears to be the local superpower. Socio-economic stability and the

quest for political stability in West African nations depend largely on Nigeria’s effective leadership. Nigeria’s

effective contributions and commitment to regional political order, peace, and security regarding workforce,

economic resources, and military capability, cannot be over-emphasised (Abegunrin, 2009, p. 41). Nigeria was

one of the strong advocates for the criminalisation of forceful seizure of power during the 35th summit of the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU), held in Algiers, Algeria in July 1999 (Omotola, 2008, p. 38). Below

selected case studies discuss Nigeria’s neo-conservative foreign policy in the West African region.

The Côte d’Ivoire (2010/11)

Arising from the West African sub-region and and in reference to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of

the AU, the first litmus test that Nigeria battled with under its nascent democracy (Omotola, 2008, p. 38) was

the 2010/11 constitutional crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (Hartman, 2017, p. 86). Furthermore, the Ivorian conflict is

unique in that it represents a test case for Nigeria’s diplomatic and military engagements with ECOWAS and

the AU in dealing with conflicts, peace and security, democracy and good governance in Africa (Kode, 2016, p.

6). As earlier stated, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act stated “the right of the Union to intervene in a

Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes,

genocide and crimes against humanity” (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000, Article 4(h)), thus

presented an opportunity for the AU to intervene on humanitarian in the crisis that erupted after the 2010

elections in Côte d’Ivoire (Ella & Yolanda, 2016, p. 22), which marked new security and democratic challenges

for Nigeria’s neo-conservativism leadership under the ECOWAS and the AU (Yabi, 2012, p. 1). Endorsing the

legitimate authority after the election, on 7 December 2010, an Extraordinary Session of the Summit of Heads

of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in Abuja,

Nigeria, issued a communiqué on Côte d’Ivoire recognizing the result by Independent Electoral Commission

(CEI) and Mr. Alassane Ouattara as the President‐Elect of Côte d’Ivoire (African Union, 2010, Para. 3).

Similarly, relevant to the AU instruments, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), on 9

December 2010, also adopted the decision to suspend Cote d’Ivoire from all AU activities, until the

democratically‐elected President effectively assumed the state’s power (African Union, 2010, Para. 4).

ECOWAS, under the leadership of the Nigerian state, had intervened to shape the international community’s

perception of the winner of the 2010 presidential election (Hartmann, 2017, p. 86). The AU rose to the

challenge, however; it was, in accordance to Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act and the subsidiarity stipulations

of the global Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework, the most suitable political actor to take leadership in

the crisis. Indeed, it failed; the wider international community, specifically France with UN Security Council

(UNSC) backing, was at the forefront of the 2011 humanitarian intervention that ended the conflict (Ella &

Yolanda, 2016, p. 23). On the other hand, it has been noted that ECOWAS, championed by Nigeria, took a

stance and clear position on the issue of declaring who had won the election in December 2010 (Yabi, 2012, p.

4).

Besides ECOWAS’s clear response to the crisis, certain factors accounted for undermining Nigeria’s

strategic interests in the AU’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. First, both the AU and the UN had subscribed to


195

the possibility of power-sharing in early 2011 between Gbagbo and Ouattara. Second, the UN Security

Council’s tenacity was hampered by opposition from Russia, South Africa, and Brazil for much of the crisis

(Yabi, 2012, p. 4). Third, the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire betrayed a lack of coherent strategy within the rank and file

of the AU Panel. The AU sent Thabo Mbeki for conflict mediation between Gbagbo and Ouattara, who did not

support and combine efforts with ECOWAS (Africa Briefing Report Brussels, 2011). Ultimately, this

underlines Nigeria’s role as a corporate representative of the AU, with regards to upholding the AU Charter on

Democracy, Governance, and Election in West Africa.

The Gambia (2016-2017)

Following the disputed December 2016 presidential elections in the Gambia, the AU and ECOWAS,

backed by Nigeria, managed to restore democracy in the country through the threat of force but without

resorting to direct physical violence (Hartmann, 2017, p. 86). Reaffirming Nigeria’s commitments to

democratic norms, the United Nations Security Council at its 7866th meeting, on 19 January 2017, adopted

“Article 23(4) of the AU’s Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. The resolution also included to

the adoption of the provisions of the Supplementary Protocol of the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) on Democracy and Good Governance”5. The adoption was to promote a peaceful and

transparent transfer of power after the presidential election on 1 December 2016.6 The United Nations Security

Council promptly authorised Senegal, on behalf of ECOWAS, to intervene in the crisis; thus the decision of the

UNSC invoked authorisation of ECOWAS’s supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance,

which affirms “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means” (Nantulya, 2017, p.

1). It also invoked Article 25 of ECOWAS’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,

Peacekeeping, and Security, which authorizes military intervention in the event that “democracy is abruptly

brought to an end by any means or where there is a massive violation of human rights in a member state”

(Nantulya, 2017, p. 1 ). As part of ECOWAS’s decision to uphold the result of the election, held in the Gambia

on December 1, 2016, Nigeria deployed military personnel to the Gambia as part of an AU and ECOWAS

Standby Force to protect the people and maintain sub-regional peace and security (Dan-Ali, 2017).

Four main factors account for the behaviour and success of ECOWAS in the Gambia. The first factor

stresses that ECOWAS’ success in the restoration of democracy in the Gambia was dependent on ECOWAS’

clear legal mandate to enforce its will and actions, with the use of force and sanctions. The second factor

emphasises the relatively small size of the Gambian army, compared with the ECOWAS force. Third, the

failure by the Gambian president to secure alliance from the West African sub-region and other powerful

countries outside Africa. Fourth, Nigeria and Senegal’s stance repudiating an unconstitutional change of

government (Hartman, 2017, p. 68), which is sacrosanct as enshrined in the AU Constitute Act.

Togo (2005)

In the Togolese political impasse of 2005, Nigeria’s neo-conservative strategic approach, under the

framework of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), remains very significant in the

promotion of democracy in Africa. When President Gnassingbe Eyadema died in February 2005, after 38 years

of autocratic rule, his son, Faure, was installed as the new president by the Togolese army generals (El-Khawas

& Ndumbe, 2007, p. 58). Nigeria stood firm as a regional leader in West Africa (Abegunrin, 2009, p. 41),

5 United Nations’ S/RES/2337 (2017) at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53304 [accessed 11/01/2017]. 6 Ibid.


196

opposing the government of Faure, and demanded that a democratic election must be held to return the country

back to constitutional rule. Former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, then Chairman of the African

Union (AU), advised very strongly that the Togolese army “retrace their steps to the positions of the

constitution, to hold a free and fair election” (Abegunrin, 2009, p. 41), following the decision of the National

Assembly to remove from the constitution any clauses for the speaker becoming an interim president prior to

the conduct of elections in 60 days (Abegunrin, 2009, p. 41). Under the weight of international pressure against

the succession of Faure (Omotola, 2008, p. 39), Nigeria effectively invoked ECOWAS economic sanctions,

with the support of the African Union, UN, European Union, and the United States of America, to make Togo

submit (Abegunrin, 2009, p. 41) to the PSC Protocol signed by Togo in February 2004 (Omorogbe, 2011, p.

140). Nigeria remained unbending and stressed that the AU and ECOWAS were determined to restore

constitutional government to Togo within 60 days (Omotola, 2008, p. 40). It may be argued that the political

impasse that befell Togo after its general election has since given a general reflection to the global community

that elections in Africa are a mere shadow of democratic exercise devoid of legitimacy (Omotola, 2008, p. 41).

Overall, Nigeria has also been committed to conflict management and peace-building in some volatile

places in Africa. Some of these countries include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan (Darfur), Burundi, and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (Omotola, 2008, p. 41). For example, Nigeria not only championed but

single-handedly bore the huge cost of ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia that led to the restoration of “peace” to

the war-torn country after nearly two decades of civil war. Meanwhile, as part of Nigeria’s neo-conservative

foreign policy objective towards democratic peace and security in Africa, it bore the costs of Charles Taylor’s

exit from Liberia, a scenario and development that led to success in the transition to democracy in 2005, which

ushered in President Helen Johnson-Sirleaf (Omotola, 2008, p. 41), as the first female president elected in

Africa.

The Case of Sudan (Darfur Region)

Darfur is a region in South Western Sudan. The crisis in Darfur began in February 2003, when two militia

groups emerged to challenge the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan. During the upsurge of this

great calamity in Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

alleged that the government of Sudan discriminated against Muslim African ethnic groups in Darfur (Ted,

2005). The crisis has claimed roughly 300,000 lives, with an estimated figure of 1.9 million people being

displaced and dispersed across neighbouring countries (Ted, 2005). For example, Chad had hosted roughly

110,000 refugees from Darfur (Refugees International Reports, 2004). Following the refusal of the international

community to protect civilian population and bring peace to the Darfur region (Nick, 2006, pp. 621-631),

however, the African Union in 2004 took the challenge upon itself and created a Cease-Fire Monitoring force in

the region, comprising 60 observers and 300 troops at the initial stage (Nick, 2006, pp. 621-631).

That said, two factors account for Nigeria’s strategic role in the Darfur crisis: first, the primary national

and secondary national interests (Ngwube, 2013, pp. 83-84); the primary national interest of Nigeria’s role in

Darfur peace mediation and military intervention was based on state survival, security, power, and economic

reasons (Ngwube, 2013, p. 83). For example, the primary national interest of Nigeria in Darfur was premised

on the possible threat to its survival and security of its territorial integrity caused by the influx of refugees from

Darfur into Nigeria (Ray, 2009, p. 173; Ngwube, 2013, p. 83). The invasion of Chad, one of Nigeria’s

neighbours, by the anti-government rebels whose intention was to overthrow the government of Idris Deby and


197

the possibility of the Democratic Republic of the Congo backing the Government of Sudan to attack Chad

(Ngwube, 2013, p. 83), posed serious threats to Nigeria, which shares a border with Chad to the southwest,

hence the need for Nigerian intervention in the Darfur region. For example, The BBC noted that during the

crisis, over 20,000 refugees had crossed Darfur into Chad and 3,000 sought refuge in Nigeria (The BCC, 2008).

The secondary national interest relates to Nigeria as a guarantor of peace and security in Africa (Ngwube,

2013, p. 83). Nigeria’s peace engagements in Darfur could be categorised under two initiatives: the Abuja

peace talks (2004-2005) held between the Government of Sudan and SLM/A and the deployment of Nigerian

troops as part of an AU force in the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur in 2005 (Ray, 2009, p. 173). The

formidable task to bring peace to the Darfur region at the initial stage of the crisis was a challenge to Nigeria,

both as a regional hegemon and a power to be reckoned with in Africa and beyond the continent. On the other

hand, the international community was still undecided about the nature of the crisis in Darfur, Nigeria, having

been signatory to the Constitutive Act of AU, Article 4(h), in 2003, which affirms the “right of the Union to

intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely:

war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (The Constitutive Act of the AU, 2000, Article 4(h))

waded into the Darfur crisis using the African Union as a credible platform in search of peace between the

warring parties in the region (Ebegbulem, 2012, p. 20). Also, Nigeria, having been a signatory to the ECOWAS

treaty on democracy and good governance in 2002, provided the normative and legal basis as well as the locus

standing for it to demonstrate its neo-conservative role towards the promotion of peace and security in Darfur

(Ngwube, 2013, p. 84). Having realised the dynamics of the civil war and its negative impacts on international

peace and security, especially on the African continent, the United Nations Peace and Security Council, through

its resolution 1590, later established the United Nations Mission (UNMIS) on 24 March 2005 to facilitate the

enforcement of the Peace Agreement signed between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Langholtz, Kondoch, & Wells, 2006, p. 317), which served to

complement Nigerian/AU efforts in the enforcement of peace and security in Darfur.

In July 2005, Nigerian President and then Chairman of the AU, Olusegun Obasanjo, hosted peace talks in

Abuja between the rebels and Sudan Government.7 The Peace Agreement hosted by the Federal Government

of Nigeria between the two warring parties, which was supported and embraced by international organizations,

such as the United Nations, led to the endorsement of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the rebels and the

Sudan Government on 5 May 2006 (Engel & Porto, 2010, p. 23). The August agreement later facilitated the

emergence of the Addis Ababa of 22 August 2011, which subsequently led to the Cease-Fire Monitoring

Commission in Darfur (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 207).

Finally, Nigeria took the lead in the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur. For example, the deployment of

the AU Standby Force was initiated by Nigeria, followed by Rwanda, with about 300 troops (Ngwube, 2013, p.

82). The most prominent supporter of AU military intervention in Darfur was the Nigerian state, under the

former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, and the former AU chairman respectively. Obasanjo sought to

attract and impress the US and picture Nigeria as a sub-imperial power in Africa (Funk & Fake, 2009, p. 132).

Nigeria had championed the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, but the process was marred by a dispute over

who should lead the operation. This position was maintained between Nigeria and Rwanda, which contributed

7 Sudan: Obasanjo meets with Darfur rebels to try to unblock peace talks. At:

https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-obasanjo-meets-darfur-rebels-try-unblock-peace-talks [09/06/2018].


198

the largest number of troops to the peacekeeping mission.

The second problem was how the Peace Security Council of the AU would deal with the protection of the

civilian population (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 208). Third, in respect to human rights in Darfur, it

is valid to argue that, Nigeria as a pivotal state and regional power in the AU seems to have been incapable of

enforcing compliance and thus gives an erroneous signal to the international community about the AU’s

commitment to the protection of human rights under international laws. For example, the Constitutive Act of

the AU as stipulated in Article 3(h) strongly affirms the commitment of the AU to the protection of human

rights; however, the situation in Darfur has put this mandate into the test, and the results have been

accompanied with mixed results (Keith, 2007, p. 154).

Though African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been given some credit for improving a grim

security situation in Darfur, AMIS’s peace efforts have fallen short of expectations in stopping the carnage and

abuse of human rights (Keith, 2007, p. 154). In respect to the AU’s commitment to the enforcement of and

compliance with human rights in Darfur, the International Federation for Human Rights (IFHR) noted that the

African Heads of State and Government at the conference of the African Union, held in Sirte on 3 July 2009,

took a unanimous decision to prevent the arrest of President al-Bashir who has been accused of a war crime by

the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Worldwide Movements for Human Rights, 2009). The African Union

had accused the International Criminal Court (ICC) of interfering in the peace efforts in the region, as well as

unfairly targeting African leaders (The BBC, 2013) within the ambit of the ICC’s watch. Also, Nigeria, as an

advocate of peace efforts in Darfur, also hosted al-Bashir in 2013 during the African Union Heads of State

summit in Abuja after the AU decision in 2009 that no member state should enforce any sanctions issued by the

ICC against the Government of Sudan (The BBC, 2013). Ultimately, if Nigeria has failed to ensure compliance

to arrest al-Bashir by the ICC during his visit to Nigeria, then it is valid to assert that Nigeria has compromised

its commitment to strengthen the AU’s Constitutive Act and its African neo-conservative foreign policy.

Overall, Nigeria initiated and facilitated peacekeeping and the peace agreement in Sudan, the United

Nations Peace and Security Council, through its mandate of resolution 1590, and later established the United

Nations Mission (UNMIS) in 24 March 2005 to facilitate the enforcement of the Peace Agreement signed

between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Langholtz,

Kondoch, & Wells, 2006, p. 377), which served to complement Nigeria/AU efforts in the enforcement of peace

and security in Darfur.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the African Union (AU) security architecture vis-a-vis Nigeria’s strategic role in

the promotion of regional security, peace, and democracy since the return of Nigeria to civilian rule in 1999.

The paper has shown that Nigeria is a strategic actor in the African Union and one whose constructive

neo-conservative foreign policy cannot be over emphasised. Nigeria’s commitment to the AU is visible in the

areas of financial responsibility, the pursuit of peace and security, promotion of democracy and regional

integration on the continent. It has provided leadership at the level of ECOWAS in critical situations such as

conflict resolution and restoration of democracy in the West African sub-region.

Nigeria’s neo-conservative leadership role is also a clear statement about the capability of African states to

solve African problems through the AU’s collective security framework. Nigeria’s role is so fundamental,

however, because it both determines the direction of security policy and provides the backbone for its


199

implementation. For example, the successful interventions of the AU and ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire’s political

impasse (2010-2011), the Gambia (2016-2017), and Togo (2005) under Nigerian leadership have shown that,

given the necessary political support, African states can successfully manage their security challenges.

The general commitment of Nigeria to regional stability since 1999 was informed by a broadly defined

foreign policy objective, anchored in its national role conception as a regional leader and a pivotal state,

documented in its National Defence Policy, and underscored by informed conventional perspectives of threats.

Based on this perspective, through the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, Nigeria has shown a great deal of

commitment through its military capability in various peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Nigeria’s domestic security situation, arising from the terrorist activities in the north-east of Nigeria, thus

raises doubts about its commitment to the African Union in regional security management. Boko Haram has

continued to unleash terror and catastrophe on the Nigerian state, claiming thousands of lives and displacing

millions. The Nigerian military has not been able successfully to address and tackle the Boko Haram

insurgency, but rather depends on external and regional actors through the Multinational Joint Task Force

(MJTF) combining Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Mali.

On the other hand, the optimists affirm that leadership in Africa is Nigeria’s first role and it should

continue to give direction in the conduct and management of inter-African affairs at the AU. Beyond this

argument, certain facts remain salient. First, Nigeria is a strategic actor in the AU. Second, the AU constitutes a

credible institutional platform for Nigeria’s neo-conservatism and diplomatic activities in Africa. It also

constitutes a strategic platform for Nigeria to advance and promote democracy, peace, and security in Africa.

This is because the African Union objectives are consistent with Nigeria’s African foreign policy objectives

that emphasise the sovereign equality of all African states, commitment to functional co-operation as a means

of promoting African unity, and respect for independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all African

states (Agbu, 2011, p. 25). Nigeria’s commitment to functional co-operation as a means of promoting African

unity is, arguably, central to its various roles in the AU in the promotion of democracy in Africa since the

return to civilian rule in 1999. Third, Nigeria’s continuous commitment to the African Union’s security

architecture will continue to determine the future direction of the continental organization.

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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.05.002

Palestinian Nation Branding via Public Diplomacy

Dalal Iriqat

Arab American University, Ramallah, Palestine

The term “branding” is still contested when linked to nations; colleagues in Palestine would argue that the term

“promotion” could be of a more positive impact; in fact, this paper will examine this issue as scholars automatically

link “branding” to products, business, and trade. It is not easy to imagine the nation as a brand; a nation cannot

re-make itself, like a company launching a new product. Branding a nation is inspired by its national identity which

started to evolve with the evolution of the nation states; it heavily relies on people’s attachment to a shared land,

shared history, shared language, shared culture, religion, clothing, behaviours, values, attitudes, or positions in

dealing with internal and external variables. It is crucial to distinguish the identity for a nation which is usually

done through studying the elements depending on which a nation promotes itself using public diplomacy. Public

diplomacy is a soft power’s key instrument which we cannot ignore; in soft power, the narrative and the reality

have to reflect each other. A nation’s identity is partly inherited from history and partly a continuing construction;

there are aspects of national reputation which can be altered, for better or worse, by choice of actions, words, and

images. Even the inherited parts of national reputation are open to revision as time goes by, states have gun a long

way in their nation branding and Palestine cannot remain indifferent. This paper aims to address the importance of

Palestinian national branding and to further shed light on how this could be done. Based on examples of other

successful countries―case studies, the paper shall introduce a number of elements that shape a national identity;

those elements are expected to inspire scholars and policy-makers in determining what is worth promoting in

Palestine that would lead to successful branding of Palestine as a nation. In branding for Portugal, Cristiano

Ronaldo, the soccer player was determined to be a national brand; the Portuguese chose to brand themselves with

his initials CR7. Today, if you read, hear, or visit Portugal, you will find a lot related to CR7, whether we like

soccer or not, CR became an attractive brand for his country. For their nation branding, Portuguese chose tourism,

cuisine, culture, and sports rather than their history of conquering the world, and this paper will be inspired by this

example and others. In Palestine, not much work had been put on nation branding; therefore, this paper will

introduce the concepts and will try to examine how important it is for serving the national cause and the strategic

national goals, in doing so, the paper will try to answer the following questions: What is nation branding? How is

public diplomacy related to nation branding? Can public diplomacy replace nation branding? What is the image of

Palestine and Palestinians abroad? How are we seen by others vs. how do we wish to be seen? Does Israel play a

role in branding Palestine and Palestinians internationally? Is it important to consider a national brand/s for

Palestine? What is the Palestine that we aspire to promote?

Keywords: Diplomacy, Nation Branding, Public Diplomacy, Palestine, Soft Power, National Identity, Narrative

Dalal Iriqat, Ph.D., assistant professor, Graduate Studies Faculty, Arab American University, Ramallah, Palestine.

DAVID PUBLISHING

D

PALESTINIAN NATION BRANDING VIA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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Introduction

Chapter 1: A Theoretical Framework

This chapter will introduce the reader to the concept of branding of a nation; moreover, light will be shed

on public diplomacy, a key instrument as soft power, then a discussion will be presented on the relationship of

the two terms and how they could serve each other in finally influencing the foreign policy and positively

changing the image of one’s nation and specifically for Palestine.

Nation Branding

The concept consists of two words: “nation”, here we are talking about the people (citizens, outsiders,

refugees, etc.) and “branding”, which is a purely business term that was later introduced to the area of politics

and diplomacy; by applying this concept, we try to answer the questions: What do we want to promote? And

what do nations promote?

In this paper, the theoretical framework will heavily rely on the work of the pioneers of nation branding

naming (Szondi, 2009):

Simon Anholt;

Wally Olins;

Tom Fletcher;

Joseph Nye.

As mentioned earlier in the abstract, branding a nation is inspired by its national identity. Yes, national

identity is largely a matter of stereotypes, familiar images, and associations. Most national identities are very

static. Simon Anholt, who is often referred to as the originator of nation branding, lists six channels of

influence as the main elements of national identity, or as he calls it, competitive identity. Those are: (1) people;

(2) culture; (3) investments; (4) policy; (5) brands; and (6) tourism.

Anholt’s list leaves out at least one important element of national reputation, and that is history. A

country’s political history is a major factor, the big things that the nation has done or failed to do and the things

that it has stood for or perhaps betrayed (Anholt, 2007).

The above list explains why Italy, for example, ranks high in nation branding surveys, given its strengths

in culture, tourism, brands, and the bright image of its people. However, nation branding is controversial, a

British marketing guru; Wally Olins is one of the first to use the term “branding” for promoting a national

identity. Olins believed that it is wise to adopt business terms to politics and diplomacy; nevertheless, some

prefer to refer to it as public diplomacy; instead, those were offended by the term as it reflected that the nation

was a PRODUCT! When the author first talked about branding, the Palestinian nation, and the nation as a brand,

a number of colleagues disagreed and suggested the use of other political terms; the term is still contested

among scholars in Palestine and resistance to the term is huge because of its business dimension; despite the

differences, we cannot deny that the term is catchy and attractive, and accommodates today’s needs and trends;

Palestine cannot remain indifferent! The following quote reflects the Palestinian situation.

When I first talked and wrote about branding the nation and the nation as a brand in the 1980s, most commentators

could barely conceal their bile [hostility]. The idea they had was that branding the nation was the equivalent of treating the

nation like a washing-up liquid in a supermarket. There is in reality nothing new about national branding, except the word


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“brand” and the techniques that are now used, which derive from mainstream marketing and branding techniques. (Wally

Olins)1

For the late Wally Olins, nation branding was key to economic growth in a globalized world; Olins argued

that just as Bismarck invented the values that define modern Germany (“efficiency”, “engineering excellence”,

and “hard work”), so nations that want to escape from historic stereotypes can do so, if they take their brands

seriously. New Zealand’s shift from post-colonial to service and tourism hub is a good example of this. This is

an unusual way of looking at history; liberty, equality, and fraternity are arguably one of the most attractive

meta-messages ever written, where Olins also saw the importance of the French national brand in politics and

not only in perfumes. As John Williams elaborates: Nations are fighting for influence, fighting for political

power, fighting for cultural power, and fighting for all kinds of spaces in people’s minds (Williams, 2012).

Tom Fletcher puts the national story at the heart of what he describes as magnetic power, which is close in

meaning to Joseph Nye’s attractive power on which we will shed light later in this paper. The question here is

what does a nation need in order to be positively branded, imaged, or seen by others. Generally speaking, a

nation needs:

1. Attractive national story.

2. Narrative, which encourages others to support, or not to obstruct its strategic objectives.

3. Soft power (it is about international politics and the power to influence what happens).

In a process of nation branding, it is wise to go back to the manageable elements on which we could rely

and are subject to change: Leadership, culture, cuisine, individual accomplishments, fashion, and design →

embroidery, agriculture, and products.

Significance of National Branding (National Image)

In the recent years, the debate on systematic national image building has become an important topic of

interest among academics and policy-makers, inferring the awareness among the national governments on the

significance of national image in a globalized world. The demand for national image has led to different

activities leading to systematic construction of national image by national governments. The concern with

national image building can serve dual purpose if conducted effectively, creating domestic political support and

improving one country’s international influence. The current preoccupation with systematic construction of

national image seems to serve the latter purpose, in a world where nation states desire to integrate with global

markets, to participate in global affairs than ever and to improve the country’s status on the world stage. This

surge in the demand for national image; that is, how a country is perceived has become a significant variable in

defining a country’s international relations and is as a result of the changes in the nature and conduct of

international relations.

The conception of an image means not only the conception of the image at present, but also aspects of its

past and future expectations. National image, then, can be defined as the cognitive representation that a person

holds of a given country, what a person believes to be true about a nation and its people. On the discussion of

the national image building, primarily two levels of analysis are possible on the grounds for whom the image is

constructed; the first is for the domestic population and the second is for the “foreign” audience; however, both

1 Quote from William, John, Strategic Communications course at BZU at Abu Lughod Institute for International Studies

2014-2015.


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are linked to each other.2

As argued by Nye, in the age of information technology and communication revolution, the way in which

power in the international politics is understood and defined has undergone drastic change. The power of

persuasion or attraction which Nye defined as “soft power” is equally important as hard power resources of

military and economy. According to him, in the information age dominated by global information and

communication, story wins are equally or even more important than army wins, hence to emphasize on the

importance of national narratives. The understanding of Nye on soft power is of general attitude, perception, or

image that a country’s citizens have on a foreign country, mainly conceptions of favorability and positives

toward a foreign country (Nye, 2004).

Some might argue that nations have always engaged in branding activities, although the phenomenon has

not always been labelled as such. Though the term “nation branding” is a recent introduction, the concept is

quite old as an idea on nation argued by Wally Olins (2002). Olins observed nations are already de facto brands,

as they reflect their assets, attributes, and liabilities to a public at large, whether intentionally or not. Nation

branding is largely perceived as a rhetorical equivalent to national identity, hence there is nothing particularly

novel about the concept of branding the nation. According to Olins, just only the word “brand” is new. National

image, national identity, and national reputations are all words traditionally used in this arena and they do not

seem to provoke the same hostility as the word “brand”.

Nation branding has received some scholarly interest lately; those writings on the subject are also heavily

involved in the practice of nation branding, most notably Simon Anholt and his Nation Brand Index.3 Nation

branding is concerned with a country’s whole image on the international stage covering political, economic,

and cultural dimensions. As an emerging area of interest, nation branding is driven largely by practitioners and

is yet to be clearly conceptualized. The following definition demonstrates nation branding as the mere

application of branding strategies and tools for nation states: “Nation branding concerns applying branding and

marketing communications techniques to promote a nation’s image” (Fan, 2006, pp. 5-14). This definition also

highlights that nation branding is concerned with image promotion; Gudjonsson, an Icelandic brand practitioner

defines nation branding in a similar way but he identifies the government as the initiator of branding,

acknowledging its indirect involvement and influence: Nation branding occurs when a government or a private

company uses its power to persuade whoever has the ability to change a nation’s image. Nation branding uses

the tools of branding to alter or change the behaviour, attitudes, identity, or image of a nation in a positive way.

Fan provided a definition of nation branding which encapsulates the relationship between nation branding and

national image management; nation branding is a process by which a nation’s images can be created, monitored,

evaluated, and proactively managed in order to improve or enhance the country’s reputation among a target

international audience (Gudjonsson, 2005).

A close examination of some major definitions4 of the nation branding concept shows significant

differences in the focus and purpose or outcome of branding the nation:

2 Jojin, John. “Theory and Practice of ‘Nation Branding’―Revisiting Public Diplomacy: Reflections from Australian and Indian

Experience”. Academia, 2. 3 It is an index based on the concept of measuring the global perception of a country in several spheres developed by Simon

Anholt, now called The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index. For more information, see

http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/nbi_index/index.en.html. 4 Cited in Ying Fan, Branding the nation: Towards a better understanding, Brunel Business School Brunel University Uxbridge,

London, p. 4, available online at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/336086.pdf.


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To remold national identities (Olins, 2005);

To embrace political, cultural, business, and sport activities (Jaffe & Nebenzahl, 2001);

To promote economic and political interests locally and internationally (Rendon, 2003; Szondi, 2007);

To alter, improve, and enhance a nation’s image or reputation (Gudjosson, 2005; Fan, 2006, 2008b, 2009);

To enhance one nation’s competitiveness (Anholt, 2007).

Public Diplomacy: A Soft Power

Public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments, the big difference between public diplomacy and

commercial branding is that it is much easier for companies, simply because they are offering something those

audiences actually want to buy and they are offering products not symbols and ideas. A nation cannot re-make

itself, like a company launching a new product. In soft power, as in all forms of strategic communication, the

narrative and the reality have to reflect each other (Williams, 2012). Soft power is using national identity as an

instrument of strategy. A nation’s identity or reputation is about the country as a whole, individuals and groups

not restricted on its government’s actions and personalities.

The term “soft power” was invented by Joseph Nye, a distinguished political scientist at Harvard, who first

used it in this phrase in 1990: “When one country gets other countries to want what it wants―[that] might be

called co-optive or soft power”.5

Had he chosen the term co-optive power, it would not have attracted much attention; the strength of the

idea is in the neatness of the phrase “soft power” and means the ability to get the outcomes one wants. It is

important to attract others and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic

sanctions; soft power is about shaping the preferences of others.6

So, soft power is a form of strategic communication, which verb, to shape, is relevant for this paper:

shaping the narrative, shaping the way the situation is understood, shaping the way the strategic choices are

framed, and shaping the way others see us. If we can achieve these things, then we have soft power. John

Williams, a former senior consultant on the British Support Team in Palestine for a number of years explained

that the British team knows from polling in Palestine that Britain is associated with high quality education,

including through Chevening Scholarships; education is a great force of soft power. The thousands of students

who come to Britain every year and take home good impressions are a source of good national reputation.7

Marsh and Williams explain how Nye expresses his idea in five words: Soft power is attractive power. In

more detail, he says that “soft power grows out of our culture, out of our domestic values and out of our foreign

policy”. So, it is grounded in the same place as strategy: in values. Perhaps the greatest modern battle of soft

power was the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1990. It was a contest of

military and economic hard power, but it was also a battle of values; Communism attracted the West, more so

in Europe than in the United States; on the other hand, American and European values of freedom were

5 Kevin Marsh & Williams John. Strategic communication, bound to lead: The changing nature of american power. Available

online at:

https://books.google.ps/books?id=ZARMDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA101&lpg=PA101&dq=%E2%80%A2+Kevin+Marsh,+Williams+J

ohn.+Strategic+Communication,+Bound+to+Lead:+The+Changing+Nature+of+American+Power.&source=bl&ots=67JSAfTwo

V&sig=ACfU3U0xiUAwdVlt0vFy60gsKjcJEv17Sg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiD342guZzgAhUBEVAKHZfYBoIQ6AEw

AHoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q=%E2%80%A2%20Kevin%20Marsh%2C%20Williams%20John.%20Strategic%20Communicati

on%2C%20Bound%20to%20Lead%3A%20The%20Changing%20Nature%20of%20American%20Power.&f=false. 6 Ibid. 7 Cited in Williams lectures, BZU, ibid.


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attractive to many in the Soviet empire.8

Public Diplomacy Vs Nation Branding

Public diplomacy can be influenced by the history and culture of the particular country; public

diplomacy’s aim is to inform and engage individuals and organizations overseas, in order to improve

understanding of, and influence for, their country in a manner consistent with governmental medium- and long-

term goals, so basically, it is not the role of the government; but rather the role of individuals who can through

their talents, skills, or connections, and to help in changing the public opinion in their respective hosting

countries which will automatically influence the foreign policy of that given country.9

Table 1

Traditional Public Diplomacy Vs Contemporary Public Diplomacy

Traditional public diplomacy 21st century public diplomacy

Conditions Conflict, tensions between states Peace

Goals To achieve political change in target countries by

changing behavior

Political and economic interest promotion to

create receptive environment and positive

reputation of the country abroad

Strategies Persuasion managing publics Building and maintaining relationships Engaging

with publics

Direction of communication One-way communication (monologue) Two-way communication (dialogue)

Research Very little, if any PD based on scientific research where feedback

is also important

Message context Ideologies interests information Ideas values collaboration

Target audiences (publics) “general” public of the target nation; sender and

receivers of messages

Segmented, well-defined publics + domestic

publics; Participants

Channels Traditional mass media Old and new media; often personalized

Budget Sponsored by government Public and private partnership

Nation branding occurs when an official and governmental body or a private company works to persuade

whoever has the ability to change a nation’s image, it could be done in a campaign style. Nation branding uses

the tools of branding to alter or change the behavior, attitudes, identity, or image of a nation in a positive way

(Szondi, 2009). Nation branding concerns applying branding and marketing communications techniques to

promote a nation’s image abroad.

The following table introduced by Szondi to compare nation branding and public diplomacy.

8 Cited in Kevin & Williams, ibid. 9 See Table 1, highlighting that nation branding is concerned with image promotion by comparing between traditional and

modern public diplomacy. The table compares traditional public diplomacy and the 21st century public diplomacy; many

countries are still following the traditional public diplomacy model. The European Union’s emerging public diplomacy is an

example of the 21st century public diplomacy.


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Table 2

Public Diplomacy Vs Nation Branding

Public diplomacy Nation branding

Goal Promoting political interest Promoting (mostly) economic interest

Context

Politicised, focus, and priorities may change with

change of government

De-politicised, general agreement among actors and

political parties (but in some cases it is politicised)

Identity driven Image driven

Driven by international relations and culture Driven by marketing and consumerism

Targeted at

Publics/stakeholders who are active Mass/consumers who are passive

Citizens Consumers (of images, products, and places)

Targeted at key geopolitical countries Applicable to any countries, more universal

Direction Foreign publics Both foreign and domestic audiences. Without the

consent of domestic audiences it is doomed to fail

Role of

government

Initiator as well as sender of messages, government has

more control over message

Government could be the initiator but rarely the sender

(danger of propaganda) less or no government control

Actors

State and non-state actors government, governmental

organizations, embassies, Ministry of Culture; Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Cultural Institutions, NGOs,

diasporas

National tourist boards, travel agencies; investment

promotion and export agencies; trade boards, chambers

of commerce, multinational organisations, which are all

multipliers

Strategies

Relationship building and maintaining

Image management

Trust building

Emphasis on substance and content Emphasis on visual and symbolic elements

Decentralised approach, in different target countries

different strategies and activities tailored towards local

audiences

Centralised approach, driven by the brand essence

(one-size-fits all) tailored towards a global and

homogenous audience

Focus on both positive and negative elements that can

connect people and cultures

Focus exclusively on positive and “marketable”

elements of a country’s culture and people

Tactics

Exhibitions, international film festivals, exchange

programmes, language learning promotion, networking,

anniversaries, PMs, foreign affairs ministers’ and other

politicians’ articles in foreign daily newspapers, genuine

events

Logo and slogan; country advertisements in leading

international TV channels, sponsored pages in leading

international magazines; e-marketing, web portals; and

press tours, brochures, pseudo-events

Media

Mass media are less significant, their main role is in

presenting and interpreting information. Social media

are getting more important

Relies heavily on mass media as the main channel.

Media are passive, usually carrying paid advertisements

Budget Sponsored by government Public and private partnership

Time frame On-going, continuous Ad hoc, campaign-driven

Evaluation Short-, middle- and long- term Mostly long-term

To emphasize on the efficacy of practical aspects of public diplomacy and nation branding, Szondi offers

five different views concerning the relationship between these two concepts as follows:


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(1) Public diplomacy and nation branding are distinct fields;

(2) Public diplomacy is a part of nation branding;

(3) Nation branding is a part of public diplomacy;

(4) Public diplomacy and nation branding are distinct but overlapping concepts;

(5) Public diplomacy and nation branding are the synonyms for the same concepts.

Figure 1. Five views on relationship between NB and PD.

We agree with Szondi in his argument that nation branding and public diplomacy are not isolated concepts

rather interlinked and mutually exclusive strategies of broader concept of national image management.

Therefore, the conceptual aspects of nation branding and its conceptual linkages with public diplomacy are very

close and go in parallel.

Chaker Khazal, Palestinian writer, is trying to market the story of the Palestinian refugees in an attractive

way, through his recently released “Tale of Tala”. During our interview, Khazal explained: The Palestinian

refugees are totally forgotten and they live dire conditions, so he believes his story will refocus attention

towards those refugees. When asked what we need to better brand Palestine, Chaker answered we need a nice

story, younger people, diplomacy, and technology to represent the Palestinian cause.10

Chaker is an example of

public diplomacy which the governmental bodies can employ to better brand the nation, echoing the story of

Palestinian refugees through the eyes of a writer is normally much more convincing than the official story

delivered by diplomats.

10 Recorded Interview conducted in Ramallah on Saturday the 22nd September 2018, with Chaker Khazal.


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Chapter 2: Case Studies to Inspire the Palestinian Case

This chapter will introduce some examples from different countries to illustrate how focusing on certain

areas in nation branding might be less harmful and more strategic than others. To better understand branding,

let us look at different examples; in branding for Portugal, Cristiano Ronaldo, the soccer player was determined

to be a national brand, the Portuguese chose to brand themselves with his initials CR7. Today, if you read, hear,

or visit Portugal, you will find a lot related to CR7; clothing, hotels, restaurants, toys, and games all under his

initials. Whether we like soccer or not, CR became an attractive brand for his country. For their nation branding,

Portuguese chose tourism, cuisine, culture, and sports rather than their history of conquering the world.

Let us take Italy as another example: What comes to mind at the mention of Italy, well, most of us will

think of: Pasta, Juventus and AC Milan, Leonardo da Vinci and Michaelangelo, Venice, Vivaldi and Verdi,

Pizza and Parmesan cheese, basil and tomatoes and mozzarella, Julius Caesar, the Coliseum, ice cream, the

Mafia, Rome, Islands, and Lamborghini. Some might think of Italian clothing brands depending on personal

interests but it is not likely that any of us will think of Italian politics, for example, Italy has a wonderful

national reputation for its culture, from renaissance painting to modern cuisine, but a very poor political

reputation.

The way nation branding is done is the same as in all strategic communication by narrative. Tom Fletcher

puts the national story at the heart of what he describes as magnetic power, which is close in meaning to Joseph

Nye’s attractive power: So, how do nation states use their magnetic power in the digital age? As introduced

earlier, three ideas should be considered here: having a strong national story; knowing how to tell it, knowing

how and when to mix the tools, and making full use of social media in public diplomacy. To have soft power, a

nation needs an attractive national story, a narrative which encourages others to support, or not to obstruct, your

strategic objectives. Soft power is not about marketing the nation’s products or pulling in tourists, it is about

international politics and the power to influence what happens. There is a difference between, on the one hand,

national inventions that are used and admired, and which are elements of national reputation, and on the other

hand, soft power: the ability to set the agenda and achieve your objectives without using force. The national

reputation of the United States as the source of Apple, Facebook, Google, and other Silicon Valley style

modern miracles, and the slogan “I have a dream”, reflects America’s cultural influence, exercised through

products that almost define modern living, is what matters for a successful American nation branding, the

cultural and commercial aspects of national reputation must be kept in perspective.

The astonishing success of Harry Potter, or the Royal Shakespeare Company, makes Britain a soft power

superpower. Like Italy, the UK has many national assets; the Premier League and the Monarchy, which are

important elements in shaping the nation brand of Britain and how it is perceived by others. If we think of two

or three countries that might be described as soft power superpowers, we can start with Germany, which

national reputation may be static year by year, but the transformation of Germany’s over the decades has been

heroic. This change has been founded on a self-aware national decision by millions of individuals acting to

break with the past by accepting guilt, the “moral burden” of the barbarity of the Nazi era, it is remarkable after

WWII how the guilt is internalized and becomes part of the German national identity. To a certain extent, this

is the case with Poland that was stuck with the Holocaust narrative for a while. Germany is now the 2nd most

admired country in the world after Canada, according to a BBC “country ratings” poll conducted by


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Globescan.11

The elements in building that reputation include the success of Germany’s national brands,

especially the cars which give Germany a strong association with positive qualities, like engineering excellence,

reliability, and style. There was a turning point in Germany’s reputation when Audi used a German language

slogan which raises the “German-ness”. In other words, German-ness was negative but they decided to put the

German-ness back into the brand, it worked―the German-ness of Audi helped to sell the car. It cannot be

contested nowadays that Audi as a German company is indeed the national identity of Germany, the whole idea

and image of Germany became positive.

In the famous soft power or nation branding indexes, there is little movement year by year. In the best

known of them, the US replaced Germany as No. 1 the previous year. That was the only change in the top 10,

which is by the way: No. 3 Britain, No. 4 France, No. 5 Canada, No. 6 Japan, No. 7 Italy, No. 8 Switzerland,

No. 9 Australia, and No. 10 Sweden. No Arab countries, nor African, nor South American. Of course, it all

depends on what you are measuring. So, Germany has a positive national identity, perhaps the best in the world,

linked to strong national brands that help define the country, and founded in an admirable way of dealing with

historic national guilt. But what has this power of attraction given Germany in terms of soft power to achieve

national objectives? Germany could not have become the dominant country in the European Union without this

transformation of its national reputation. Obviously, the size and strength of Germany’s economy are hard

power factors in dominating the Union. It is not only the hard power of Germany’s economy that gives it the

leading role, but the soft power of its economic ideas. The deep admiration for Germany’s economic

record―as reliable and well-engineered as an Audi or BMW―gave Germany the soft power to persuade

European nations and global financial institutions to want what Germany wanted. Israel is indeed following in

the footsteps, by the fact that Israel is now seen as the Silicon valley of the Middle East, Israel succeeded in

refocusing world attention from its occupation and military image into a more industrial and best service

provider and excellent IT applications provider that the world needs. This explains how Israel succeeded in

penetrating different regimes and especially those in the Arab or Islamic world.

11 A total of 17,910 citizens across 19 countries were interviewed face-to-face or by telephone between December 26, 2016 and

April 27, 2017. Polling was conducted for BBC World Service by the international polling firm GlobeScan and its research

partners in each country, together with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) at the University of Maryland, see

http://www.globescan.com.


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Figure 2. Views of different countries’ influence.

There is no point in trying to separate hard and soft power, George Szondi elaborates they are usually both

in play, they are “inextricably linked” , public diplomacy is one of soft power’s key instruments. The big

difference between public diplomacy by governments and commercial branding is that companies find it easier

to be popular with their audiences simply because they are offering something those audiences actually want to

buy (Szondi, 2009).

A nation cannot re-make itself, like a company launching a new product. In soft power, as in all forms of

strategic communication, the narrative, and the reality have to reflect each other. Joseph Nye gave China as an

example, while the 2008 Olympics was a success abroad, but shortly afterward China’s domestic crackdown on

human rights activists undercut its soft-power gains. The Shanghai Expo was also a great success, but it was

followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo. And for all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China

Central Television into competitors for CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience. According to a

recent global poll by Pew Research,

perceptions of China are negative in most of the nations surveyed. Ratings for China have slipped in France, Spain,

India, Italy, the UK, and Germany. Just 37% of Americans express a favorable opinion of China, essentially unchanged

from last year’s 38%. Only 11% of Japanese see China positively, little changed from the 9% registered in 2015.12

As for America, Pew surveys throughout the Obama era have found largely positive attitudes toward the U.S.

12 BBC global poll on country ranking index, Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/27685494.


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around the world, although there are notable exceptions, especially in the Middle East, according to the

company’s commentary on its latest polling. In Europe, the U.S. is seen favorably by 74% in Poland, 72% in

Italy, 63% in France and the Netherlands, 61% in the UK, and 57% in Germany―positive in all European

countries surveyed except Greece, with only 38% favorable and a majority (58%) unfavorable. So, although

America’s influence in the world rests on hard power, it has formidable soft power assets in its national

reputation, as well as in its leader’s favorability, though that could be about to change. In Europe, 77% had

confidence in President Obama, 59% in Hillary Clinton, and 9% in Donald Trump. We can be clear that

American soft power had been affected after Trump came into the White House.

Does soft power matter, or is it an illusion in a world dominated by hard military and economic power?

Yes, the author thinks soft power is fundamentally important. The best example in recent history, in which soft

power was decisive, was the choice of countries of Eastern Europe to join the EU after the break-up of the

Soviet Union. Any of them might have become a fascist dictatorship; Hungary and Poland are examples to see

that the risk remains but instead they turned west and joined the EU. There was no military force involved

though there was some economic power exerted, but more than anything this was a triumph of attractive power

as those countries were drawn to the freedom and prosperity of Western Europe. It was a historic period in

which the big strategic choice proved the wisdom of Joseph Nye’s five-word definition: “Soft power is

attractive power”.

To conclude, from the cases studied here, the application model for nation branding adopted varies from

country to country. As argued by Anholt the brand guru, it would be a mistake for a country not brand itself in a

world of competing identities.

National Identity & Propositions for Palestine

Before we conclude that it is important to try to answer the question on what the Palestinian nation should

promote. Generally, we found it is common that nations try to shed light on one or more of the elements that

shape a nation’s identity―history, religion, national movements, regional belonging, culture, grassroots,

individuals, human capital & leadership, cuisine, fashion & embroidery, industry, agriculture, and

manufacturing & products.

Starting with history & religion: Some countries consider history for promoting their nation, in the

Palestinian/Israeli context, we would argue that the historical argument is very sensitive, if we try to adopt

history and religion as areas of focus to promote for Palestine, we will be met with the religious argument of

who was here first!13

To further explain this point, it is important to remember the widely shared video

produced by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) supporting Golda Maiir’s narrative that there were

never Palestinians on this land! This narrative deepens differences and feeds violence in the region and it is

wise to avoid it. When it comes to religion, Palestinian scholars who had tried to work on narrative naming Dr.

Ghassan Khatib, for example, would argue that part of the Palestinian identity is the religious holy identity.

Christianity and Islam are rooted in this land and are a source of pride to a big majority of the Palestinian

people; nevertheless, we think this element could have a counterproductive argument if we prioritize the

13 Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Foreign. “Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. Welcome to the Home of the Jewish People. No

matter who came knocking at the door, the Jews stayed put in their home-sweet-home, the Land of Israel, for 3,000 years,

Retrieved from

http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/IsraelExperience/VideoLibrary/Pages/Welcome-to-the-home-of-the-Jewish-people-6-October-20161006-1

06.aspx.


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historical or the religious narrative as to strengthen our argument. It is realistic to admit that there exist two

narratives for religion and history, the question is: Do we want to focus on history? Who will win the historical

argument? The author is using the Israeli ministry of FA campaign as an eye opener in order to understand

Israel’s role in branding for Palestinians abroad and how risky it could be for us if we choose to heavily rely on

the historical narrative when we embark on working on Palestinian national branding. Talking about the

elements of focus in promoting for one’s nation, it is crucial to note that History and Religion are elements

which are not easy to change or manage, but other elements, like leadership, culture, cuisine, accomplishments,

fashion, embroidery, industry, agriculture, and products are always changing and those can be manageable in

branding for nations.

Let us focus on the Palestinian identity, shedding light on the components of identity to try to answer if the

Palestinian identity is a national, religious, regional, cultural, educational, or even social. The Palestinian

national identity did not emerge with the PLO or after the Balfour declaration, the Palestinian identity existed

long before as it has always been the holy land. Belonging to a city, the power of belonging to a city has

gradually led to a collective identity. And this automatically leads us to the regional belonging, the question we

need to address here is how others view us or how we are seen by others decide or shape our identity. Arab

states have played a major role in shaping the Palestinian identity through the different strategies that each

country has adopted towards the Palestinians, the question here is what the role of the Palestinians is in

directing the Arab policies. Arab regional role in shaping Palestinian identity has led to introducing the

Palestinians as refugees, victims, guerrilla fighters, stone throwers, poor, and beggars to the regional and

international world. Whether we like it or not, the image of a Palestinian abroad is that of a stateless, ID less,

and jobless.

If we look at the Anholt six elements: people, culture, investments, policy, brands, and tourism, we will

easily discover that Identity for Palestinians is not only about the nation’s image but about the political image

of its leader and the human capital of its heroes. Some nations have seen major change in national identity

under radical leadership, both for good and ill. For Palestine, maybe it is important to study the personality of

Yasser Arafat as an icon and a symbol that presents a positive image of the Palestinian national narrative that

symbolized resistance and perseverance, Arafat’s name succeeded to be linked to the Palestinian struggle

worldwide. Leaders or personalities are a human capital for Palestine, those include poets, artists, and the

figures who managed to penetrate the international borders with the soft skill they are gifted; in order to counter

the image of a victim, why not introduce the heroes? Palestinians are perceived poorly and with sympathy, in

Palestine’s nation branding, there exist a number of already established brands naming: Trio Joubran, three

brothers musicians who have taken Oud to world class music; DAM, young Palestinian brothers who focus on

conflict and poverty; Reem Bana, a singer, another icon in Palestinian music that went worldwide and managed

to gather the love of millions around the globe; Athletes like Twin Skaters & The Speed Sisters, the first ladies

only speeding race group not only in the Arab world but also in the Middle East; poets and here it is not

contested that Mahmoud Darwish, Ghassan Kanafani, and others had already brought Palestine to the world in

different languages; a new kind of art is cartoons, Palestine is rich, Naji Ali, Mohamed Sabaaneh, and many

others, their cartoons and posters that gained the attention and inspiration of the world; artists like Nabil Anani,

Bashar Hroub, Tayseer Barakat, Laila Shawa, etc. who participate in famous world galleries, scholars like

Edward Said, children heroes like Ahed Tamimi or Shadi, Ahmad, and the photographer Arine Rinawi, a young

woman who managed to reshape the field of photography not only in Palestine and many others, those are


215

humble examples of personalities that make Palestine unique and they are established brands which Palestine

can utilize in its nation branding by introducing those talents and skills that Palestine can put on the

international scene, things that other nations do not have a copy of, Palestinian human capital is a major

investment in building a national brand for Palestine.

Tourism is another aspect especially the old cities, registered old cities or listed cities in the UNESCO

world heritage record can be a good focus, in Palestine, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Batir, and Bethelehem

have great significance in tourism, culture, history, and religion, for Palestine to consider branding itself with

focus on those cities and what makes them unique is much needed to attract attention and to show that Palestine

that we wish to promote.

Culture for Palestine is nothing but a treasure, the traditional dress “Thobe” that is hand embroidered; the

Dabka dance, the cuisine, delicious food, and amazing hospitality are among other things that make Palestinian

culture very attractive.

Education is unique in Palestine, Palestinians excelled in educational fields and have proved their

proficiency in different countries and mainly inside Palestine, it can’t be contested that higher education is a

positive image of the Palestinian people hosting 13 universities in this turbulent atmosphere and providing state

of the art academic and educational services is something to promote for Palestine.

For a nation to change its image, it needs first to change its behaviour. Then, equally important, it needs to

tell the people in the world about the changes, images of a nation will not automatically change after the changes

in reality, the way for a nation to gain a better reputation is to communicate to the international audience that how

good you are, this practice is called nation branding. The government needs to focus on the treasures of talents

that Palestine hosts, and communicate their stories in their own touchy tools which will positively influence the

image of Palestine.

Conclusion

Public diplomacy and nation branding are becoming increasingly a la mode and it is crucial to note that

there is a shift towards privatization with availability of experts and consultants who provide this service for

governments, it is now being argued that a “brand attaché” or maybe a “Brand Unit” might become an essential

part of organizational structures at embassies. Both fields of public diplomacy and nation branding are evolving

rapidly; they can change instantly according to political, cultural, and social developments. With the growing

dynamics of both fields, more cooperation is needed between practitioners and scholars. Public diplomacy and

nation branding complete each other and neither can replace the other; public diplomacy was always referred to

as “an old art, but a new profession”, differentiation is an inseparable feature of branding, as a strong brand

identity can differentiate the actual product or company from its competitors. It is widely agreed among nation

branding scholars and practitioners that countries and their governments should engage in nation branding to

differentiate their countries from others to gain competitive advantages. It is of crucial importance to shed light

on the core idea of nation branding that distinguishes it from public diplomacy and that is to identify the

“uniqueness” of the country, its people, culture or landscape to identify and draw on features that differentiate

“us” from “them”, what distinguishes us, as opposed to public diplomacy, which often tries to identify those

elements of the history, culture, or people that unite, rather than separate, “us”. In nation branding, therefore,

the appeal factor (the soft power) is the difference, the otherness, the unique but in public diplomacy it is what

is common and shared.


216

What is needed to manage our reputation and to better brand for ourselves? We would argue that the

following values and criteria are crucial for branding one’s nation: credibility, collective work, objectives,

investments, and human capital.

It is time for Palestine to tackle the issue of nation branding scientifically and practically to help shape the

Palestinian narrative in favor of the Palestinian rights and to avoid a stronger counter narrative. It is time to

promote the bright side of Palestine and to bring to the world what makes Palestine unique and attractive, to tell

the story that Palestinian nation aspire to tell and not what others have chosen for us for years.

References

Anholt, S. (2007). Competitive identity: The new brand management for nations, cities and regions. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Gudjonsson, H. (2005). Place brand public diplomacy. Nation Branding. Retrieved from

https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.5990029

Jaffe, E. D., & Nebenzahl, I. D. (2001). National image and competitive advantage the theory and practice of country-of-origin

effect. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.

Nye, J. S. (2004). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. New York, NY: Public Affairs.

Olins, W. (2002). Branding the nation―The historical context. Journal of Brand Management, 9(4-5), 241-248.

Szondi, G. (2009). Discussion papers in diplomacy, public diplomacy and nation branding: Conceptual similarities and difference.

Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Williams, J. (2012). Williams on diplomacy, studies in strategy and communication. London: Indie Books.

Ying, F. (2006). Nation branding: What is being branded? Journal of Vacation Marketing, 12(1), 5-14.


doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.05.003

The Politics of Local Regulation in Tanzania: The Quest for

Multilevel Regulatory Governance

Beatrice Mkunde

The Mwalimu Nyerere Memorial Academy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Regulation is currently perceived as an art and craft of governance where the regulatory processes are an outcome

of interdependences between political actors, bureaucrats, business community, and the public at large. However, it

is now extensively recognized that this interdependency is beyond one level of government particularly in the era of

decentralization where regulatory outcomes are a result of a complex set of interacting levels. This study concedes

that regulatory processes are intrinsically political endeavor. Principally, local government regulatory processes are

characterized by multiple actors at different levels of governance, i.e., the local government itself and stakeholders

within its jurisdiction and the central government. In fact power dispersion has a vertical direction consisting of

actors stemming from different governmental levels as a consequence of decentralization. The complexities of the

relationships of multiple actors at different levels of government and across the same level of government create a

number of risks that jeopardize quality local regulation that need to be managed calling for multilevel regulatory

governance anchored on effective stakeholder engagement and coordination. Particularly, engagement with local

government during the design of new regulations is largely poor resulting in a missed opportunity to have informed

decisions that enhance quality local regulation. To augment multilevel governance, it is imperative to improve the

interface between central and local government with local authorities recognized as “co-producers” of regulatory

outcomes. Effective implementation of Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) that safeguards proper analysis of

proposed and existing regulation is of paramount importance to ensure evidenced based regulations, analysis of cost

implications for the local government, the capacity of LGAs in to implement as well as legitimacy of regulations.

Therefore this study examines the political tradeoffs between the central and local government and among other

stakeholders.

Keywords: regulation, local regulation, multilevel regulatory governance

For this study, regulation is defined to comprise both legal and informal instruments through which central

government, local government, and the community seeks to manage the behavior of citizens and business in

order to achieve socio-economic and environmental outcomes. Regulation includes primary legislation,

subordinated legislation (delegated law making, including the bylaws and planning instruments for which local

government has responsibility), licenses, codes and consents, rules, informal instruments and agreements.

Regulation is perceived as an art and craft of governance where the regulatory processes are an outcome of

interdependences between political actors, bureaucrats, business community, and the public at large

Beatrice Mkunde, lecturer and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Dar es Salaam, Department of Social Studies, The Mwalimu

Nyerere Memorial Academy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

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(Gourevitch, 1978; Tsebelis, 1990). Regulation is formulated to achieve specific objectives and is thus one

form of governance.

It is well established that there is interdependency in the regulatory process that goes beyond one level of

government particularly in the era of decentralization where regulatory outcomes are a result of a complex set

of interacting levels (Aubin & Verhoest, 2014; Black, 2008; Coen & Héritier, 2005; Jordana & Sancho, 2004).

As a mode of governance, regulations ought to be of good quality, i.e., be proportionate; accountable;

consistent; transparent; and targeted (UK’s Better Regulation Taskforce, 2003) to create a predictable

regulatory environment and ensure responsive consultation. Indeed, the overarching objective of regulatory

policy is to ensure that regulation works effectively, and is in the public interest (OECD, 2011). However, if

regulation is used when it is not needed, or is poorly designed and executed, it can fail to achieve policy

objectives and have negative consequences that harm the wellbeing of citizens of Tanzania particularly at the

local level.

Of particular significance in this study is the fact that regulatory processes are inherently political

endeavor. Principally, local government regulatory processes are characterized by multiple actors at different

levels of governance, i.e., the local government itself and stakeholders within its jurisdiction and the central

government. In fact, power dispersion has a vertical direction, consisting in the involvement of actors stemming

from different governmental levels, as a consequence of decentralization (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The

regulation of a given field most generally involves various governmental levels as well as various types of

actors on a single governmental level (Aubin & Verhoest, 2014). Such arrangements of multilevel regulatory

arrangements involving multiple regulatory actors may run into a series of problems such as rule duplication,

overlapping and low quality regulations, uneven enforcements or complex administrative demands with

negative impact on economic activity (Rodrigo et al., 2009).

Due to the complexities of the relationships, multiple actors at different levels of government, and across

the same level of government create a number of risks for good regulatory governance and effective regulation

that need to be managed to safeguard quality regulation at the local level. Firstly, there is information gap

characterized by information asymmetries between levels of government when designing, implementing

regulations as local governments are likely to have more information about local needs, preferences, and

implementation costs. Secondly, capacity gap is created when there is a lack of human, knowledge (skill-based),

or infrastructural resources available to implement and from central government. Thirdly, an accountability gap

may occur where there are unclear or overlapping responsibilities across and between levels of government for

regulatory decisions. The absence of clear accountabilities has direct implications for incentives on actors

within the regulatory system and incentives for performance (OECD, 2009). There is also a tendency that

central government agencies do not take full account of the impact of new regulations on local government by

adequately consulting with local government prior to introducing new regulations. Central government

agencies too quickly decentralize enforcement responsibilities to local authorities without understanding the

financial and capability constrain that may limit their ability to undertake enforcement.

These relationship complexities call for the growing importance of multilevel regulatory governance

founded on the interaction between the interplay of regulatory actors to influence regulatory outcomes. The

interaction is both vertical and horizontal, with the former describing interactions between actors from local

government and the latter with between the central and local government. Particularly, multilevel regulatory

governance put emphasis on effective engagement of both vertical and horizontal partners and co-ordination in


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the regulatory processes. This paper examines the political tradeoffs between the central, local government and

among other stakeholders within the jurisdiction of local government such as the business community and the

citizens bearing in mind that regulatory outputs depend on power of influence. The study assumes that for

quality regulations that facilitate multilevel governance, Tanzanian regulatory regime needs effective

engagement and co-ordination between the two levels of government and effective participation of local

stakeholders. Questions in this study revolve around who shapes local regulations and whether there are

governance issues which impede the efficiency of local government regulation outcomes. The data used for the

study is based on the analysis of the legislations that prescribes procedures for making regulatory decisions at

the local level and some interviews from legal officers in the local government authorities.

Regulatory Processes at the Local Government: The Legal Framework

The laws that are made by persons or authorities under the provisions of Article 97(5) of the URT

constitution are often referred to as subsidiary (delegated) legislation. Subsidiary (delegated) legislation could

take the form of regulations, rules, or by-laws. Other than from the Constitution, other main legislations that

govern the by-law making process by local government authorities (Cities and District Councils, townships,

municipalities, and villages) generally are the following: The Interpretation of Laws Act, Cap. 1 R.E. 2002; The

Local Government (District Authorities) Act, Cap. 287, R.E. 2002; and The Local Government (Urban

Authorities) Act, Cap. 288 R.E. 2002. As conceived by Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill (2011), local

governments are machineries that facilitate and articulate the local “voice”. By-laws serve as a useful tool in

realizing the decentralization process particularly, empowering local communities to determine the manner in

which the resources in their areas should be utilized. Indeed, local government is primarily a form of

representative democracy.

Section 150 of the Local Government (District Authority) Act stipulates that before by-laws are submitted

to the respective minister for consent the local government authority should give a notice to all inhabitants

within the local government calling upon all the interested and affected parties to lodge their objection in

writing. The Local Government (Urban Authorities) provides duration of two weeks’ notice. Additionally,

publication of draft village by-laws is to be effected in an open place that people usually frequent before they

come into operation. This could be at the market place, local government (village leader’s) offices and places of

worship. Village by-laws come into operation after being approved by the District Council.

Ministerial Level Regulatory Processes

The respective minister for local government authorities is empowered by both the Local Government

Authorities (local and urban) to make regulations to be administered by the local government. For instance,

Section 112(1-3) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act stipulates that:

For the purpose of ensuring the better performance by local government authorities of their general functions in

accordance with the objects, purposes and provisions of this Act the responsible minister makes regulations more

particularly specifying the powers and duties to be exercised by any local government authority, or by any category of

local government authorities, or by all local government authorities.

Sub-section (3) emphasizes that:

It shall be the duty of every local government authority in relation to which regulations are made under this section, to

exercise the powers and discharge the duties conferred or imposed by the regulations to the best of its ability and resources.


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However, Section 113 states that where a minister other than the respective minister makes regulations to

be administered by the local government, consultation has to be sought from the respective minister. For

instance, the minister responsible for natural resources may make regulations for the management of forest

resources. He may also make model forest management by-laws for local government authorities to consider for

adoption. Section 147 confers powers to the respective minister to make uniform by-laws where in his opinion

such by-laws are necessary or desirable, for the purposes of the better development and fostering of the system

of local government. With regards to governance procedure particularly participation, the Act requires

publications of the by-laws before their operation. The act requires the minister to give a two months’ notice in

the gazette or any other newspaper accessible to the intended locality indicating the purpose of the by-law. The

particular local authority and affected persons may lodge objections in writing to the minister.

Findings: Multilevel Governance Issues

A multilevel perspective enhancing governance requires clear responsibilities, engagement, coordination,

and accountability at both levels as high-quality regulation in one level of government can be undermined by

poor regulatory policies and practices at other levels. Regulatory processes at the local level should be

responsive to governance principles (Ruffing, 2015). This can be safeguarded by involving elected councilors,

general involvement of local government in regulatory process that are to be enforced by the local government

and public participation that engages all affected stakeholders. The intention of publicizing these is to provide an

opportunity for people to air their views on the by-laws, avoid conflicts, and facilitate a smooth implementation

and enforcement mechanism (OECD, 2013).

Interviews with the legal officers at the local government indicate that regulations that are made by the

local government largely adhere to governance principals particularly stakeholder engagement. One legal

officer from Hai District stated that:

The legal draft is taken to stakeholders from the levels of village and ward including other government and private

institutions who are given a period of not less than 30 days to give their views. The Council Management Team then

discusses the draft to amend views before proceeding to full council meeting. The draft with attached lower level minutes

is submitted to the Regional Commissioner for presentation to the respective minister. The minister submits the daft to the

Attorney General for certification before submitting to government printers for editing and finally to government Gazette.

These findings suggest that local government largely upholds to the principal of governance. Particularly,

it can be observed that stakeholders are given ample time to air their views. Nonetheless, neither the Act nor are

there guidelines that give councils guidance as to the most effective way to consult their communities on the

content of a proposed local regulation. The lack of guideline on consultation provides room for stronger groups

or politicians to sway regulatory decisions to their advantage. The guidelines would assist in assessing the

potential costs to council in implementing and enforcing the proposed regulation and better ways of

consultation. Effective consultation provides the potential impact on affected groups, particularly small

business, in meeting the requirements of the proposed local regulation; how affected groups will be informed of

the impact of the regulation including any planned education and publicity campaigns. Similarly, the question

of feedback is not given importance. Once stakeholders give their views that there is no feedback informing

them whether or not their views were taken into account. The lack of feedback may discourage stakeholders

from airing their views.

At the same time, one would expect that since councilors are citizens’ representatives they would ensure


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that regulations are citizen centered. This is based on the assumption that elected members of the local

government make decisions while local bureaucrats implement those decisions. Nonetheless, some regulatory

outcomes at the local government are largely ineffective due to marginal representation of the councilors. It

was found by Kessy (1999) in his research of two district councils (Moshi and Lushoto) that, most of the

decision making process from agenda setting to the implementation stage, is mainly controlled by local

bureaucrats. This phenomenon, according to the study, is attributed to the central government’s reluctance in

emphasizing high quality councillorship. Instead, the outdated provision of someone who can read and write is

the criteria used to elect councilors. The level of interaction between councilors and council officers in the

decision making process is minimal. It is legitimate for councils to respond to community needs and to achieve

key strategic policy objectives through the use of local laws.

Thus, poorly considered or poorly designed regulation by the local government can place undue burdens

on business and the community and impede business growth and development. It can also increase the

enforcement costs to council and produce unintended side-effects. In the worst case the costs and risks of

regulation can outweigh the benefits.

With regards to regulations from the central government, findings show that some of these regulations are

not effectively implemented. This is due lack of proper analysis of the proposed regulation to determine the

capacity of local authorities to implement. For instance one legal officer notes that:

Some of these regulations cannot be implemented. There is a regulation from the ministry of Agriculture and

livestock development which we felt we could not implement. The ministry did not do proper analysis to determine

contextual differences among districts. As such we had to reject the regulation by filing our complaints to the Attorney

General for further actions.

Besides, local governments are either not consulted or given very few days to give their inputs. One legal

officer lamented:

There are occasions that there are intentional technical delays and we are only given three day to read and give our

comments…with those few days there is apparently nothing to be done.

The level and quality of engagement with the local government in the design of new regulations is

generally poor and, as such, is undermining the quality of local regulation. The inadequacy of engagement with

local government by central government was a recurring theme emerging from this study suggesting that some

of these regulations are politically influenced at the ministerial level. They claimed that central government

imposes regulatory responsibilities and obligations on councils without fully considering their impacts and

costs. Considerations include whether or not implementation requirements are likely to vary from region to

region. As reveled from legal officers from the local governments there is often limited analysis of local

government’s capability or capacity to implement regulations prior to the allocation of additional regulatory

functions (or changes to existing functions). Respondents emphasized the benefits for involving local

governments early in the policy development process and providing guidance on how meaningful engagement

can be achieved. Effective engagement would consequently reduce information asymmetry between the local

and central government to enhance informed decision making.

Nonetheless, as one legal officer noted, there seem to be some hope for early engagement in future

regulatory processes by the central government. He claims that at least for the first time years legal officers in

all councils have been invited by the respective ministers regarding regulatory processes.


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Conclusions and Way Forward

It can be concluded that complexities of the relationships of multiple actors at different levels of

government and across the same level of government create a number of risks that jeopardize quality local

regulation. As seen in the findings, local governments produce their own regulations as enshrined in the local

government Act. In respect to governance at the level of local government, the principle of participation by

stakeholders is adhered to albeit challenges. One of these challenges is the lack of guidelines on how well to

engage stakeholders. Another is inadequate qualitative and quantitative analysis of regulations to determine

their positive and negative impacts to affected groups.

Indeed, local government regulation is mostly shaped by central government empowered by legislations.

However, there are challenging governance issues that constrain quality regulations and effective

implementation. Findings indicate that there is poor engagement of the local level in the designing of

regulations. Particularly, poor analysis of the capacity of local government to implement these regulations

constrains effective implementation and thereby inhibits the overall achievement of local policy goals.

To improve multilevel regulatory governance the study suggests the interface between central and local

government to be improved with local authorities recognized as “co-producers” of regulatory outcomes.

Meaningful engagement and effective dialogue with local government needs to occur early in the policy

process. The regulatory processes should follow Regulatory Impact assessment (RIA) framework that is vital in

providing informed decision-making. RIA assists in problem definition through to option selection,

identification, and assessment of likely impacts, implementation and ongoing monitoring and review of the

existing regulation. Such assessment and engagement are an important reality check on regulatory proposals

ensuring that regulatory outcomes are achieved at least cost and minimum impact to affected groups. There is

also a need to establish institutional mechanisms for multilevel co-ordination and dialogue.

References

Aubin, D., & Verhoest, K. (Eds.). (2014). Multi-level regulation in the telecommunications sector. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan. The New Zealand Productivity Commission (2012) Local Government Regulatory Performance.

Baldwin, R. (2010). Better regulation: The search and the struggle. In R. Baldwin, M. Cave, and M. Lodge (Eds.), The Oxford

handbook of regulation (Ch. 12). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Black, J. (2008). Constructing and contesting legitimacy and accountability in polycentric regulatory regimes. Regulation &

Governance, 2(2), 137-164.

Coen, D., & Héritier, A. (Eds.). (2005). Refining regulatory regimes: Utilities in Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Gourevitch, P. (1978). The second image reversed: The international sources of domestic politics. International Organization, 32,

881-911.

Hooghe, L. G., & Marks, G. (2003). Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of multi-level governance. American Political

Science Review, 9(2), 233-243.

Jordana, J. S., & Sancho, D. (2004). Regulatory designs, institutional constellations and the study of the regulatory state. In J.

Jordana and D. Levi-Faur (Eds.), The politics of regulation: Institutions and regulatory reforms for the age of governance

(pp. 296-319). Cheltenham: Edwar Elgar.

Kessy, A. T. (1999). The dynamics of decision making in local government in Tanzania. The case of Moshi and Lushoto

District-Councils (MA Thesis).

Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. (1982). Retrieved from

https://www.policyforum-tz.org/sites/default/files/LocalGovtDistrictAuthoritiesAct71982.pdf

Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982. (1982). Retrieved from

http://tanzania.eregulations.org/media/The_local_government_urban_authorities_act_8-1982.pdf

OECD. (2004, April 2). Multi-level regulatory governance. Paris: OECD publishing.


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OECD. (2009). Improving the Quality of Regulations‖, Policy Brief, November. Paris: OECD publishing.

OECD. (2011). Regulatory policy and governance: Supporting economic growth and serving the public interest. Paris: OECD

publishing.

OECD. (2013). Principles for the governance of regulators. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Rodrigo, D., Allio, L., & Andres-Amo, P. (2009). Multilevel Regulatory Governance: Politics, Institutions and tools for regulatory

quality and policy coherence. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Ruffing, E. (2015). Agencies between two worlds: Information asymmetry in multilevel policy-making. Journal of European

Public Policy, 22(8), 1109-1126.

Tsebelis, G. (1990). Nested games: Rational choice in comparative politics. California: University of California Press.

UK’s Better Regulation Task Force. (2003). Principles of Good Regulation.


doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.05.004

From Rhode Island to Bavaria: Launch and Sinking

of the Group 47’s Founders

Francesca Somenzari

University of Turin, Turin, Italy

In 1946, after a two-year imprisonment in Rhode Island, Alfred Andersch and Werner Richter (Group 47’s future

founders) came back to Germany as selected German citizens as a result of their cooperation with the American

military authorities. In a short time, Andersch and Richter obtained a publishing license for their newspaper and so

they started to act as journalists and writers within the U.S. zone of occupation. Nevertheless, American

consideration and support for both of them vanished when they assumed autonomous stances concerning the future

of Germany.

Keywords: Group 47, Germany, U.S. occupation, postwar, culture

Introduction

During and after WWII, the United States of America is the country permitting Europe to get rid of the

totalitarian regimes and to recover from war’s moral and material ashes.

How were transatlantic relationships sketched out in the postwar period? In other words, did the United

States—as champions of democracy and heirs of the Wilsonianism—always give freedom to Europe, mainly to

Germany (which was the core of a real reconstruction)? Or did they impose their vision and points of view by

frozing some cultural initiatives? Der Ruf’s experience was an impressive example of a wide system of control

implemented by the Americans. Indeed culture and information became the two sectors of society more subject

to check and censorship.

Trusted Men

In 1944 Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter—future founders of the famous Group 47 (that is a

German group gathering the postwar’s main writers1)—were chosen by the American military authorities as

representatives among those German soldiers captured and carried to prisoners camps in the United States.

After being submitted to numerous interrogations useful to test their political reliability and anti-Nazi attitudes,

Andersch and Richter became, in U.S. Army’s eyes, trusted men to which they assign important tasks, such as

the composition and coordination of an editorial staff for a newspaper printed in Rhode Island: The Call.

According to Horton,

U.S. officials were keen to determine whether Andersch might be of some special use to the Allied war effort. The

earliest available documentation of interrogation results can be found in Basic Personnel Record, a standardized form used

Francesca Somenzari, Ph.D., lecturer, Department of Foreign Languages, University of Turin, Turin, Italy.

1 Heinrich Böll, Paul Celan, Günter Grass, Marcel Reich-Ranicki, and Martin Walser are the most well-known members.

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by American intelligence officers to catalog “special” prisoners. Several items from Andersch’s record are of interest. On

the first page of the document, which lists basic information such as height, weight, hometown, and date of capture,

Andersch’s spouse is listed as “Angelika (sic) Andersch”, the half-Jewish women he divorced in 1943 […]. Authorities

recognized quickly that Andersch might be useful to the war effort, as reflected in the note describing him as “talkative,

sincere and intelligent”. (Horton, 2011, pp. 68-69)

The newspaper was founded with the accurate aim of informing the German prisoners in the United States

of what was really happening in Europe, especially the Nazi defeat. Let us read a Provost Marshal General’s

report concerning the paper’s objectives: “a. to create a prisoner of war magazine for the broadest audience

possible; b. to provide exact news of all important military and political events; c. to print news from the

homeland, good reading material and entertainment” (March 17, 1945, in Records of the Office of the Provost

Marshal g. 389/b. 1597, NARA, College Park).

As The Call’s organizers and editors Andersch and Richter proved to be very active.

Two years later in 1946, thanks to their appreciated service in Rhode Island, Andersh and Richter were

released by the U.S. Army and repatriated to Germany with a special pass guaranteeing their moral integrity:

They were explicitly defined “selected citizens” (Reinhardt, 1971, p. 129).

Nevertheless, American consideration for both of them vanished when they assumed autonomous stances

concerning the future of Germany.

An Independent Newspaper in Bavaria

Once arrived in Germany, at the end of 1946, Andersch and Richter received in Frankfurt a discharge card

with 40 marks and some ration badges. On their identity cards the specified profession was “writer”.

After a short time, thanks to American backings (Jendricke, 1988), Andersch started to write for Die Neue

Zeitung/The New Journal.

According to Harold Zink, “Die Neue Zeitung/The New Journal was really not a good example of an

‘overt’ publication, since it was started as late as October 18, 1945, to represent American military government

directly” (Zink, 1957, p. 235).

Since April 1946, together with other former prisoners of war, Andersch and Richter planned the

foundation of an independent newspaper: The Call. Independent Sheets for the Young Generation. Under a

regime of occupation, obtaining a license was not simple; as Jessica Gienow-Hecht reports,

According to Directive No. 4 of the military government, only people who had openly opposed the Hitler regime were

to be employed in the postwar press. Journalistic abilities did not constitute a qualification. Former party members,

promoters of racism or militarism, and those who had supported the NSDAP morally or materially were banned from the

profession. (Gienow-Hecht, 1999, p. 38)

As trusted men of the American military authorities, in 1946 Andersch and Richter were considered

journalists worth of respect and attention and so they obtained the publishing license for their The Call.

Independent Sheets for the Young Generation.

Aims and Topics of the Call. Independent Sheets for the Young Generation

In spite of their above-mentioned initial collaboration with Die Neue Zeitung (The New Journal), Andersch

and Richter decided to deviate from the ideological approach of that newspaper.



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The Call. Independent Sheets is a description meant to distinguish the publication from “Die Neue Zeitung/The New

Journal” and other official occupation newspapers by making potential readers aware that this new publication was not an

instrument of the occupation regime. (Horton, 2011, pp. 125-126)

Andersch and Richter wanted their newspaper to be completely independent of any political control; topics

such as unconditional surrender, German collective guilt, reeducation, socialism and market economy,

Germany’s occupation… had to be openly discussed by the media and by the German intelligentsia. On this

specific point, Ladislao Mittner clarifies: “Right after the unconditional surrender of Germany, mainly in

Richter’s opinion the priority was understanding the role of the ‘defeated generation’, whose rebirth depended

on a deep soul-searching and on a fair analysis of the situation and events” (Mittner, 1978, p. 1581).

As for the organization and the operational level, The Call. Independent Sheets was funded by the

Nymphenburger Publishing House and had its office in Munich. Besides Andersch and Richter, the editorial

staff was composed by journalists and writers such as Walter Kolbenhoff, Kurt Vinz, Julian Ritter, Walter

Mannzen, Gustav Renè Hocke, Georg Faber, Carl-Hermann Ebbinghaus, Henry Herrmann, Horst Lange, Peter

Donner, Siegfried Heldwein, Anna Maria Sora, Friedrich Minssen, Nicolaus Sombart, Walter Maria

Guggenheimer, Walter Bauer, Ernst Kreuder, Heinz Friedrich, Dietrich Warnesius, Friedrich Stampfer, Walter

Heist, Klaus Kulkies, Hildegard Brücher, and Frank Wischnewski. The history of German literature includes

most of them under the so called “Inner Emigration” that is a large group of intellectuals who decided to remain

in Germany during the Nazism and to criticize the regime in subtle ways, allegorically or by implication. As

Clinefelter observes, “inner emigration was possible only for a very few artists and extremely difficult to

negotiate. If their critique of the regime was too hidden, too cryptic, then their message would fail to be heard”

(Clinefelter, 2014, p. 671).

The term Inner Emigration was attributed to Frank Thiess in a controversy with Thomas Mann, who

suggested that any literature produced within Nazi Germany should be destroyed. In 1945, in the defense of the

authors who hadn’t run away from Germany, Thiess stated that “the inner emigrants did not abandon their sick

mother Germany” (Thiess, 1946, p. 3).

As regards the newspaper’s structure, the first eight pages were dedicated to political issues, whereas the

last five ones dealt with culture and literature. The first issue appeared on August 15, 1946.

One of the most important and famous Andersch’s articles was written in that first issue with the

suggestive title “The Young Europe Shapes Its Face”: It is an introductory manifesto for the journal. In his

article, Andersch promoted the so called “social humanism” that is a moral and political philosophy at the basis

of the social democracy. In his opinion, the Allied Powers of World War II should have adopted, all over the

Europe, a strong policy of social reforms, such as a centralized economy and a control over industrial

production against the excesses of Capitalism.

In reference to German society, Andersch stressed the need for a cooperation between Allied soldiers and

German population (especially the young generations).

At the end of his reflections, he wrote “the young Europe cannot exist without a young Germany”

(Neunzig, 1976, p. 19).

On the same issue of the newspaper, Andersch published a second article entitled “Essential Remarks

Concerning the Nuremberg Trial”: Here the author took part in a heated debate about the question of German

guilt. In Andersch’s vision, by fault of the decisions and political choices of the German old generation, his

generation—the young one—was paying a very high prize in terms of consequences. In this regard, it’s


227

necessary to remember that both Andersch and Richter had been communist sympathizers before Hitler’s

scramble for power. Their position was definitely above suspicion.

Two months later, on October 15, 1946, in “German Prisoners of War. Lights and Shadows. A Final

Outcome”, Andersch recalled his experience in the United States, especially the reeducation program: In the

author’s opinion, local military authorities in charge of the task of reeducation had sincerely believed in its

ethical aims, whereas the War Department in Washington D.C. had used the program for propaganda purposes.

In this case, Andersch openly critized American policy.

Even Richter’s articles had an “explosive charge”, he addressed the issue of the young generations in

Germany and he didn’t agree with the U.S. choices. In the second issue of the newspaper, Richter published

“Why Are Young Generations Silent?”; in this article, which is primarily a deep psychological analysis, the

author explained that his generation had grown between the two world wars “in the hell of need and hate”

(Neunzig, 1976, p. 60). As Richter wrote, “In Germany the old generation talks, whereas the young generation

is silent […]. The young generation is silent! It is silent because it doesn’t want to understand and cannot

understand” (Neunzig, 1976, p. 60).

Nevertheless, in Germany the end of World War II could maybe be an opportunity for the young

generation’s redemption by assuming a cultural and political role; the destruction of the old generation (that is

the ruling class) was one of the most important achievements of the war.

In the seventh issue, on November 15, 1946, Richter openly endorsed the political program of the Social

Democratic Party, whose congress had been held in Cologne two months before: Progressive taxation,

socialization of production and agricultural reform were the new keywords for an effective reorganization of

society.


Drawing from his communist past, Richter further defined his vision of the young generation and its role in

establishing a radically different society […]. Richter develops his idea of a new socialist society. Speaking of the young

generation as one monolithic entity, much like his colleague Andersch, Richter claimed that they know that socialism has

become for them a vital question. (Horton, 2011, p. 149)

Conclusion

On April 1947, Andersch and Richter were kicked out of the newspaper staff and of the editorship by

decision of the American authorities in Germany. The reason given was “an excess of Nationalism” in the

authors’ articles.

The Call. Independent Sheets stopped permanently its publication shortly afterwards.

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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.05.005

Big Power Relations under the Framework of the IOR-ARC

SHU Meng

Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China

The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) has been highlighted in recent years by

the Indian Ocean region’s growing in strategic and economic importance and the impetus from the participation of

the Middle Eastern countries. Many powers, including the U.S., China, Iran, and India, are involved in this

organization as members or dialogue partners, which expand the influence of the organization on the one hand, and

stand in the way of the integration of the region under the framework of IOR-ARC due to complex contradiction

among them on the other. The role of IOR-ARC in diplomacy of different powers is various from an economic

platform for expanding market to a political tool for pursuing regional dominance without a common strategic

focus. The IOR-ARC provides a shared public platform of geopolitics for stakeholders to prevent overlapping

interests from causing conflicts, and the stumbled cooperation process after initial general enthusiasm also reflects

diverging interests inside it. In this regard, powers are both driving and dragging force to the organization. The

IOR-ARC is of great potential as it includes many emerging economics and fastest-growing markets. However, the

future development and efficiency of it still depends on the relationships among global and regional powers under

its framework.

Keywords: IOR-ARC, Indian Ocean, powers relationship

Introduction

The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) has been highlighted in recent

years by the Indian Ocean region’s growing in strategic and economic importance and the impetus from the

participation of the Middle Eastern countries. Proposed by Mauritius in 1995 and established in 1997, the

IOR-ARC has 21 member states and seven dialogue partners till November 2017, with the aim to promote the

continuous and even development of the whole region. The role of IOR-ARC is without doubt worth to be

attached importance, for several reasons: From the economic perspective, the trade involving member states of

the association plays a vital part in global economy currently. The IOR-ARC aggregates the comparative

advantages in technology, resources, capital, and labor of member states with different development levels in

the area to achieve complementary advantages and promote blue economy. From the political perspective, due

to the rising importance of the region in the world, powers eager to exert influence and protect or obtain

interests in the Indian Ocean region, in which the IOR-ARC provides a shared public platform of geopolitics

for members to prevent overlapping interests from causing conflicts or confrontations. From the security

perspective, the maritime trade routes in the India Ocean are among the key areas in global economy, while

Acknowledgement: This article is supported by 2016 Chinese National Social Science Fund project (16ZDA096).

Shu Meng, Ph.D. in diplomacy, assistant researcher at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies

University, Shanghai, China.

DAVID PUBLISHING

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BIG POWER RELATIONS UNDER THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IOR-ARC

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areas where the extremism problems are relative serious―Arabian Peninsula and Somali Peninsula―are all

located in the India Ocean region. Therefore, the IOR-ARC is worth focusing upon as a basis for the future

peaceful development and stability of the region. In recent years, many global and regional powers, including

the U.S., China, Iran, Australia, and India, are involved in this association as members or dialogue partners,

which expand the influence of the association, on the one hand, and stand in the way of the integration of the

region under the framework of IOR-ARC due to complex contradiction among them on the other. Against such

backdrop, this chapter aims to analyze the development and problems ahead of the IOR-ARC from the

perspective of big power relations.

Importance, Achievements, and Challenges of the IOR-ARC

Importance of the IOR-ARC

The IOR-ARC has drawn increasing global attention present days, the importance of which is mainly

based on the importance of the Indian Ocean, as follows:

First, the geopolitical location of the Indian Ocean and the Indian Ocean Rim region: The unique location

of the Indian Ocean has drawn interests of the powers and led to intensified game among major countries of the

world. The ocean has long coastal line and some waterways in throat positions. The Indian Ocean Rim covers

the most extensive waters over the world and includes 45 coastal countries from the Asian continent, the

African continent, and the Australian continent. The IOR-ARC across Asia, Africa, and Oceania has wide

market and convenient transportation. The Suez Canal, Cape of Good Hope, Gulf of Aden, and Oman Bay are

all important maritime routes inside, and the Mande Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Straits of Malacca in

the region are also important in global trade. There are as many as 40 percent of the global trade traverses

through Indian Ocean.1

As the bridge connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific, Asia, and Europe, the Indian Ocean plays a role as

the sea lifeline of many countries. To countries within the association, maritime trade routes in the Indian

Ocean are key to their national, regional, and even global trade. With the growth in Asian economics, its energy

and trade exchanges with countries along the Indian Ocean have been increasing. The strategic importance of

the region has drawn wide attention, and the unique geopolitical location makes it possible for the geo-values of

this association.

Second, the rich natural resources in the Indian Ocean Rim: The mineral and energy resources are very

diversified in this region. The famous regions for energy reserves, the Persian Gulf, is located in this area, in

which the oil reserves account for more than a half of the world and the natural gas reserves account for almost

a half. Many countries in this region are rich in different resources. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia are

rich in natural gas; Australia, India, and countries in South Africa have huge coal storage; and Australia and

South Africa are rich in mineable uranium. In the previous century, energy has played a vital role in

geopolitical games among powers. In a foreseeable future, energy will remain very much important in global

geopolitics.

Hence, the importance of the Indian Ocean has always been highlighted. Since the new century, with the

rise of emerging countries, the prosperity of maritime trade, the turbulence in the Middle East, and the fully

1 AIR spotlight summary on “First Indian Ocean Rim Association Summit”, Insights, last modified March 10, 2017,

http://www.insightsonindia.com/2017/03/10/air-spotlight-summary-first-indian-ocean-Rim-association-summit/.


232

carrying out of anti-non-traditional security problems, big powers have intensified their competition on this

region. Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer and historian from the 19th and 20th centuries, said

that “whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This ocean is the key to the seven seas in the 21st

century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters”. Also, similar, as the former Chief of Indian

Naval Staff Arun Prakash said, the Indian Ocean Region is set to become the economic and geo-political

fulcrum of the 21st century.2

Located in such a key area, the importance of the IOR-ARC goes without detailed analysis. Besides the

geopolitical importance, the economic role of this association is also notable. The IOR-ARC is the first big

regional economic cooperative organization in the Indian Ocean Rim area, and the only economic cooperative

organization that includes the whole Indian Ocean region. After the EU, North American Free Trade Area

(NAFTA), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the IOR-ARC is the fourth economic group in the

world. The economic development level of the IOR-ARC not only determines the level of economic

cooperation in the Indian Ocean in future, but also affects the recovery and growth of global economy.

Achievements Made by IOR-ARC

After 20 years’ development, the IOR-ARC has mainly made several achievements (Shi, 2014):

First, members of the association have increased. Established in 1997, the IOR-ARC had only 14 member

states. This number climbed to 21 after two decades. Many major countries in the world have become the

dialogue partners of the association, including the U.S., China, Japan, Egypt, the UK, France, and Germany.

The involvement of these big powers has greatly expanded the influence of the association.

Second, level of economic and trade cooperation within the region has been improved.

The IORA’s vast coastline holds two thirds of the world’s oil reserves, carries half of the world’s container ships and

one third of the bulk cargo traffic and produces goods and services worth over US$1 trillion, with intra-IORA trade

amounting to some US$777 billion.3

The association advocates the four principles on trade and economic cooperation, to promote free trade,

investment facilitation, economic and technology cooperation, and trade and investment dialogues. In March 6,

2017, the summit of the IOR-ARC was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, during which members reaffirmed to

promote cooperation and promote regional prosperity. The blue economy, which is the unique advantage of the

association with great potential, has been highlighted frequently in summits of the association these years.

Third, scope of cooperation of the IOR-ARC has been expanded from economic and trade cooperation to

cooperation in various fields, including non-tradition security cooperation in particular. Of course, till now, the

emphasis was more on economic integration and economic collaboration. However, it has already shown the

momentum to focus more on security issues. According to the Insights, in the spotlight summary on “First

Indian Ocean Rim Association Summit”, members agreed to

focus more on security issues in Indian Ocean Region and make sure that there is no entry of foreign navy in a

manner which can disturb the peace and tranquillity of the region; otherwise, they will be opening the region for

competition which will eventually harm all the countries.

2 Importance of Indian Ocean-Rim region stressed, World News.com, accessed April 20, 2017,

http://article.wn.com/view/2016/10/15/Importance_of_Indian_OceanRim_region_stressed/. 3 President Zuma arrives in Indonesia for Indian Ocean Rim Association Summit and State Visit, Africa Newswire, accessed November

29, 2017, https://africanewswire.za.com/president-zuma-arrives-in-indonesia-for-indian-ocean-Rim-association-summit-and-state-visit/.


233

And reached the consensus that how to secure the maritime sea routes is a difficult task but doable if all the

IORA countries cooperate.

Admittedly, the IOR-ARC has made many achievements in the previous 20 years. However, it is also

notable that the achievements are disproportionate with the huge population and the large area that the region

accounts for in the whole world. This is mainly because of the problems and challenges of the association.

Challenges of the IOR-ARC

The challenges of the IOR-ARC are mainly from following aspects:

First, unstable social environment: Across Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and East Africa, the

politics, population, culture, economy, and religion of the countries in the Indian Ocean Rim area are

diversified. The Indian Ocean Rim region has always been the security problem-prone region. There are many

failed countries, from the Middle East, Africa East Coast to South Asian and Southeast Asia. Many countries

face complex domestic problems, such as poverty, extremism, political unrest, ethnic separatist forces, and

religious extremism and terrorism threats. Political situation is very unstable in some countries, including

Somalia, Yemen, Iraq, etc., which greatly affects the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean region. This region

contains many potential conflict zones, such as the areas around Afghanistan, border areas between India and

Pakistan. The Indian Ocean Rim region is the also a region prone to meet natural disasters, such as tsunami or

strong tropical storm. The natural disasters worsen the livelihood of the people in countries along the ocean,

coupled with domestic problems, producing non-traditional security threats.

Second, impacts from external forces: Military interventionism, interference with local politics, military

aid, and arms supply of external forces areas have largely contributed to the instability of the Indian Ocean Rim

area. Intervention from the external forces has induced or intensified internal problems, such as weak

governance ability of some countries, competition for recourses, cultural intolerance, and extremism ideologies.

Third, overlapped associations around the Indian Ocean Rim region: Although the IOR-ARC is the first

big regional economic cooperative organization in the Indian Ocean Rim area and the only economic

cooperative organization that includes the whole Indian Ocean region, it is not unique to its member states.

Many countries participate in regional or global organizations, expecting to maximize their benefits through

transferring a part of their national sovereignty. However, the part of national sovereignty that they could

transfer is not infinite, which determines that these countries should prioritize the regional or global

organizations they participate in. In areas surrounding the Indian Ocean Rim region, there have been many

regional or global organizations. There are 14 international or regional organizations that overlap with the

IOR-ARC (see Table 1). There organizations have played important role in regional cooperation and economic

integration, while members of these organizations are overlapped with members of the IOR-ARC. How to

coordinate with other regional organizations and play its unique role is the question ahead of the IOR-ARC.


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Table 1

Regional or International Organizations Overlapped With the IOR-ARC

Organization Headquarters Focuses Members

1 South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation Kathmandu

Economic cooperation;

Topics with common concern 8

2 ASEAN Jakarta Comprehensive cooperation 10

3 African Union Addis Ababa Comprehensive cooperation 54

4 ASEAN Regional Forum Kathmandu Comprehensive cooperation 27

5 African Development Bank Abidjan Development 78

6 Asian Development Bank Manila Development 67

7 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral

Technical and Economic Cooperation Dhaka Multi-field cooperation 7

8 Southern African Development Community Gaborone Comprehensive cooperation 15

9 Gulf Cooperation Council Riyadh Comprehensive cooperation 6

10 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Singapore Comprehensive cooperation 21 countries

and regions

11 Arab League Caro Comprehensive cooperation 22

12 Asian Cooperation Dialogue Thailand Economic cooperation 31

13 Colombo Plan Colombo Economic and social development;

Human recourses 27

14 South West Indian Ocean Fisheries

Commission Maputo Fisheries management 9

Note. Source: Liu (2015).

Fourth, the low efficiency of the association: To avoid unnecessary trouble, the association insists the

principle of consensus in making decisions and does not discuss issues that may arouse controversy or

undermine bilateral relationships in regional economic cooperation (Sugandha, 2008). Such non-intrusive

cooperation sometime led to a problem that the cooperation within the framework of IOR-ARC is often

bilateral instead of multilateral. The IOR-ARC has not worked as a whole, which greatly undermined its

efficiency (Vines & Oruitemeka, 2008).

On the one hand, such principle has prevented some controversial trouble from taking place, while on the

other hand, the efficiency of the association has also been undermined, since so many countries are included in

the association without widely accepted leaders.


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The challenges of the IOR-ARC are deep-rooted in two problems: Firstly, the integration level is still not

deep enough to integrate the resources in the region; countries in different development levels with diversified

conditions still develop in their own ways. Secondly, the cooperation level among the countries is not enough;

hence, the role of the association has been repressed. To promote the integration and cooperation level, the

cooperation among big major countries in or involved in this association is urgent required.

Major power relations are quite complex in this region. In 1991, the U.S. military forces withdraw from

the Subic Bay in the Philippines, and one year later, the Soviet Union withdraws most of its military forces

from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay. After then, the region has been in power vacuum relatively. Due the

phenomenon that there is no effective international institution or organization in the Indian Ocean Rim region

to restrict competition among powers, the powers’ competition has been intensified. More and more big powers

all over the world get interests to this region and try to get more right to speak in making rules of procedures of

this region, which complex the big-power relations around the Indian Ocean Rim region. Based on this, this

chapter will next analyze the major power relations in the framework of the IOR-ARC and try to predict the

future development of this association based on the interaction of the major powers.

Major Contradictions among Countries in the IOR-ARC

The IOR-ARC is an association involving many emerging economies and markets with the fastest growth.

Against the backdrop of the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean Rim region, especially with the

constraints of land resources and the development of the oceanic recourses, countries in this region and outside

power all expand its presence and face the competition on marine space, resources, routes, trade and influence

with others, and contradictions are therefore produced. Generally speaking, contradictions of the countries in

the IOR-ARC can be divided to several types―historical contradictions among countries in the IOR-ARC,

represented by historical dispute between India and Pakistan, contradictions among emerging powers,

represented by the competition between China and India and contradictions between traditional powers and

emerging powers, proved by divergence between the U.S. and India. Among the contradictions, the

contradiction between China and India is most worth noting.

Contradictions between China and India

There are many emerging markets among the members and dialogue partners of the IOR-ARC, such as

China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, and the most represented contradictions among emerging

powers are the cooperative and competitive relationship between China and India.

The rise of China and India is among the biggest changes in geopolitics in the 21st century, which has also

affected the geopolitical pattern around the Indian Ocean. Both China and India are putting efforts in

integrating into the global economics and expanding their overseas market. With the attractive market potential

and broad investment opportunities, Indian Ocean Rim region has been focuses by both. Against such

background, some scholars predict that there is doom to have conflicts between China and India around the

Indian Ocean. A book entitled Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, written by Indian strategist C. Raja

Mohan (2014) is a representative. In the book, Mohan holds that China has shifted its focus to the Indian Ocean,

and India begins to focus on the Pacific, which leads to the upgrade of the security dilemma between two

powers. He also holds that the two sides have all attached more importance to compete for regional dominance

in the Indian Ocean Rim area (Kaplan, 2011; Brewster, 2015; Unjhawala, 2015). India’s policy has transformed


236

from “Look East” to “Act East”, reflecting its longing for the dominance role in the Indian Ocean.

Economically, China and India are interdependence in trade and economic exchanges. Two countries have

already tried to deal with the imbalance in bilateral trade. Politically, however, due to the historical unsolved

territorial dispute, the mutual trust between China and Indian has been lacked.

Both the two sides are quite active in the IOR-ARC.

From the Indian perspective, it is a major power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. The Indian

Ocean has been a fulcrum of Indian diplomacy. It has great strategic, political, and economic interests in this

region. India wants to take full use of such advantage to play an important role in the IOR-ARC to expand its

regional and even global influence and improve its international status. The establishment of the IOR-ARC has

promoted the economic exchanges between India and countries along the coastal countries in West Asia and

Africa, and even countries in European countries and Southeastern and South Asian countries. The association

could also provide a healthy surrounding environment for India to promote its global strategies. Through the

IOR-ARC, India wants to integrate the comparative advantage of countries in the association on technology,

resources, capital, and labor to achieve complementary advantages, create more trade opportunities, so as to

form an influential regional group that could contend with other regional organizations. Hence, India’s

participation in the IOR-ARC is not only aimed for economic interests, but also aimed to play a dominant role

in the association, in order to further play a dominant role in the whole Indian Ocean Rim region. India has long

worried that China may make use of its status as a dialogue partner to improve its influence in the association,

and further expand its presence in the region.

On the other side, China has been the important factor that could influence the economic exchange

between India and countries in the Indian Ocean. The southwest frontier of China is closed to the Indian Ocean;

hence, the stability of the north shore of the Indian Ocean is directly related to China’s geo-security. Besides,

the Indian Ocean and straits in the Indian Ocean Rim area are important channels for China’s trade

transportation, making it possible for the international trade between China and other countries in Asia, Africa,

and the Europe. Besides, from the energy perspective, China’s dependence on the Persian Gulf has been

growing serious. The Indian Ocean, connecting the Persian Gulf and the South China Sea, is an important

channel for China’s energy imports. Therefore, although China locates outside the Indian Ocean region, it is a

country with significant interest concerns, since the Indian Ocean is related to political stability and economic

sustainable development of China. Based on such considerations, as early as 2000, no more than three years

after the establishment of the association, China became a dialogue partner of the IOR-ARC. The dialogue

partner is different from members, they have not voting rights; what they could do is just to give suggestions to

member states. However, China has long been the important element in development of Indian Ocean

economic cooperation and the IOR-ARC. The trade between China and the members and partners of IOR-ARC

accounts for the majority of China’s international trade. During the 9th ministerial meeting of the IOR-ARC

held in Yemen, Chinese ambassador to Yemen Luo Xiaoguang said that China will expand its participation in

the IOR-ARC through carrying out substantive cooperation to jointly cope with international financial crisis,

deepening regional cooperation and launching dialogues, as well as improving trade and investment facilitation

in the Indian Ocean Rim region.4 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed the building of “21st century

4 IOR-ARC conference was held in Yemen, Chinese Ministry of Commerce, last modified June 27, 2009,

http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20090627/852880.shtml.


237

Maritime Silk Road”, which is closed related to the IOR’s “blue economy” plan. As an official from South

Africa, which holds the vice rotating presidency of the association, said during the Blue Economy Seminar of

the IOR-ARC held in Qingdao in 2016, South African Deputy Director-General of the Department of

International Relations and Cooperation Anil Sooklal expressed that the proposal of the “21st century Maritime

Silk Road” has brought opportunities to member states of the IOR-ARC; members of the IOR-ARC need the

huge market and advanced technologies of China, and China also need complementary products and markets.

It can be found that as an external power, China’s participation in the IOR-ARC is mainly limited in

economic area. Currently, problems have already emerged in its economic relationship with India with the trade

expansion of China in the Indian Ocean area, while it is still controllable and cannot reverse the big picture of

the increasing trade cooperation. However, with the shift of the focus of the association from economics to

security issues, China’s involvement in the region will be overlapped with India’s sphere of influence. Coupled

with the historical dispute between the two and the lack of mutual trust, the relationship between China and

India may stand in the way of the development of the IOR-ARC.

Economic imbalance between the two is easier to be dealt with, since there is still great potential of

cooperative space for the two. Both sides indeed have common interests, which is the foundation for

cooperation, in aspects, such as maritime energy and trade channels guarantee and maintaining regional

stability and peace. However, strategic rivalry between the two on the Indian Ocean will be more difficult to

manage. In such a case, a highly effective platform is needed to coordinate the bilateral relations on Indian

Ocean related issues and prevent potential conflicts from happening from the very beginning, which should be

among the development directions of the IOR-ARC.

Contradiction between Traditional Power and Emerging Powers

The contradictions between traditional powers and emerging powers within the framework of the

IOR-ARC are mainly reflected in the contradiction between the U.S. and India and China. Since the Indian

Ocean is not the main stage for the contradiction between the U.S. and China, the chapter will focus more on

the contradiction between the U.S. and India.

Although the U.S. and India has intensive interaction and cooperation over the Indian Ocean, there are still

divergence and disagreements between the two sides. In 2012, during then Secretary of the State Hillary’s visit

to South Asia, as the Times Now, a TV program based Mumbai, Hillary wanted to dispatch fleet in Mumbai,

which has caused huge oppositions from India. Later, the news was proved to the fake, while it has reflected the

mistrust and sensitive feeling between the U.S. and India.5 Increasingly, India maintains its strategic

interdependence, which led to its different opinion from the U.S. on issues including climate change, reform of

international economic system, and Middle East hotspots. For instance, on the issue of Afghanistan, the U.S. is

reducing its forces in Afghanistan, while India still worries about this country due to the consideration on

Pakistan and the expand of terrorism. Many policies of India are made from the perspective of developing

countries, which doomed to be different from some of the U.S.

In the framework of the IOR-ARC, India actively promotes to develop the U.S. as the dialogue partner of

the association, which is mainly aimed to balance the expanding of Chinese influence. However, if the U.S. is

deeply involved in the association, India’s dominant role will be undermined. With the expanding of the

5 No Plan on US Base in Chitagong, The Daily Star, June 4, 2012, accessed April 20, 2017, htp://www.thedailystar.net/newDe-

sign/news-details.php?nid=236906.


238

cooperative fields of the association and with the security issues get more concerns from the association, the

U.S. and India, standing on the different level of the world, will without doubt have growing divergence. Due

to its interdependent principle, India has been maintained its political sensitivity in U.S.-led associations in

Indian Ocean. Although the defense cooperation between the U.S. and India has been heating, interdependence

policy has always been the cornerstone of India’s foreign policies. India has to make a balance between its

pursuit for dominant role in the region and its cooperation with the U.S.

Contradictions Brought by Divergence in the Development Level of Countries

Both rich countries and poor countries are included in this region. According to the World Development

Indicators, more than a half countries located in the Indian Ocean Rim area are countries with medium or low

income. Most countries with low income are from Africa, including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and

Mozambique. The economies in Bangladesh from South Asia and Myanmar from Southeast Asia, are also

relative undeveloped. Per capita income in Egypt, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Yemen is a little bit better,

ranging between $1280 to $3,570, while the per capita GDP in Thailand, South Africa, Maldives, Mauritius,

and Malaysia ranging from $4,351 to $7,624. Countries from the Gulf, Oman, and Singapore are ranked in

countries with high-level income.6 The GDP of India was $2.264 trillion, while it was 1.427 billion in

Seychelles, differing by almost 158.6 times.7

The imbalance of the development level is the precondition for economic complementarity on the one

hand; it is also an unfavorable factor to regional development on the other hand. The divergence in

development level may lead to uneven sharing of the benefits made by economic cooperation, and

contradictions may be aroused then. Hence, it will be difficult for members of the IOR-ARC to take unified

pace in economic cooperation.

Most countries are undeveloped countries in the IOR-ARC, except for Australia. Because the majority of

the members of the association are undeveloped, these countries share common condition with weak economic

foundation, poor trade complementarity and competition for exporting products. Although Australia is a

developed country, the products it exports also give priority to agricultural products, which may have conflict

with some other member states. Also, industrial structures of the member states are quite similar in the

IOR-ARC. Due to historical reasons, many countries in the Indian Ocean were places of the raw material

supply and dumping of manufactured goods. Similar of the industrial structures in this region stands in the way

of commodity exchanges among regional countries and reasonable industrial division.

Historical Contradictions between Countries

Historical contradictions have always been the stumbling blocks of the regional organizations, same as the

IOR-ARC. For instance, the territory dispute between India and Pakistan has been affecting the cooperation

between the two countries for years. Also, traditional religious problems, such as the contradiction between

Hinduism and the Islam, are all undermine the unity of the association.

6 Adjusted net national income per capita (current US$), the World Bank, accessed November 29, 2017,

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.ADJ.NNTY.PC.CD. 7 GDP (current US$), the World Bank, accessed November 25, 2017,

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=IN-SC; Seychelles, the World Bank, accessed November 25,

2017, https://data.worldbank.org/country/seychelles; India, the World Bank, accessed November 25, 2017,

https://data.worldbank.org/country/india.

https://data.worldbank.org/country/seychelles

https://data.worldbank.org/country/india


239

Take the contradiction between India and Pakistan as example. Located also in the Indian Ocean area,

Pakistan is not a member of the IOR-ARC. The Pakistan side accused that India has obstructed Pakistan to join

region trade groups, making it cannot enjoy preferential trade treatment from neighboring countries. According

to the India’s Financial News, Pakistan’s expectation on joining the IOR-ARC was opposed by India.8

Moreover, the dispute between India and Pakistan also affects India’s attitude to China, even the latter is only a

dialogue partner of the IOR-ARC. Due to the building of the China and Pakistan Economic Corridor, after

several conferences have been among members and dialogue partners on the docking of the IOR-ARC’s blue

economy with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, India becomes the only South-Asian country do not attend the

“Belt One Road Forum” in 2007, for the reason that, as the External Affairs Ministry Spokesman Gopal Baglay

said, “We are all for promoting connectivity…but on the B&R, our position is that since the so-called CPEC

forms a part of B&R, and it passes through Indian territory, that is where our difficulty lie”, according to the

reports of the Indian Express.9

Stalled in historical disputes will be conducive to nothing but create a lose-lose situation. Since the

disputes cannot be solved overnight, the only way forward is to put the disputes aside and focus more on

development and regional cooperation. The role of the IOR-ARC will be unique among other regional

organizations if it could play a role in providing a platform for contradiction shelving and resolving in the

future.

Major Power Relations and the Prospect of the IOR-ARC

Based on the analysis on the contradictions among countries in the framework of the IOR-ARC, it can be

found that there are mainly three types of countries in the association:

The first type is the countries who view the IOR-ARC as a political tool to compete for regional

dominances or expand their regional influence. The U.S. and India are typical two countries in or involved in

this association. Guided by such driving force, these countries’ participation in the association is targeted.

These countries are always in a very positive position of the association and try to play the leading role of the

major events of the association, which, to a certain extent, is conductive to the association on the one hand,

because the development of the IOR-ARC cannot be achieved without the promoting of such kind of countries.

On the other hand, however, these countries’ participation in the building and agenda setting of the association

has always been exclusive when came to issues related to their strategic interests, due to their pursuit for

regional dominance which most of the times cannot be shared. It will affect the future expansion and

development of the association, and will also undermine the in-depth cooperation within the association.

Besides, such kind of countries, most of the times, participate in many other similar regional or global

organizations. As long as the efficiency of the association has not been largely improved or the association is

dominated by countries with divergence, the focus of these countries may shift to other organizations.

The second type is the countries that view the IOR-ARC as an economic platform for regional cooperation.

Australia and South Africa are two countries in this type. To these countries, the IOR-ARC is a mean for them

8 Pakistan is skeptical about the resumption of trade between India and Pakistan, India’s Financial News, May 27, 2003. Cited by

Economic and Commercial Counselor’s office of the embassy of China in India, last modified May 29, 2003,

http://in.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200305/20030500094854.html. 9 What is China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) project?, The Indian Express, May 14, 2017, accessed April 5, 2017,

http://indianexpress.com/article/what-is/china-one-belt-one-road-project-obor-4653564/.


240

to open to the outside and expand their targeted markets. Besides economic issues, these countries expect that

the association could guarantee the security of their trade, which is also out of the consideration of their

economic interests. They are active in participating in the economic cooperation in the association, while they

cannot greatly promote the deep cooperation among the members. Also, with the development of the

association, the fields covered by the association has been expanded, not only include economic cooperation,

but also security maintaining. Against such backdrop, these countries’ attitude toward the association still has

uncertainties. In short, the participation of these countries cannot exert great impacts on the future development

of the association.

The third type is other countries left in the association. These countries are relatively passive in the

association. They enjoy the benefits of brought by the cooperation among the association members, while they

cannot affect, or have no will to affect the future development of the association. For them, the IOR-ARC is not

as important as a useful tool politically, nor an efficient platform economically due to the still existing tariff

barriers among the members. Through data analysis on the trade of the members of the IOR-ARC, a Chinese

scholar finds that the gap between the member of IOR-ARC with the highest trade volume and the member

with the lowest has increased in the past two decades since the founding of the association. Hence, he holds that

the role of the IOR-ARC has played little role in economic development of the India Ocean Rim (Liu, 2015). If

it is the case, the IOR-ARC’s role for these countries is very tiny.

In future, no country in the IOR-ARC is likely to play a dominant role: As for India, its ambition over the

Indian Ocean has already aroused the suspicious from small countries in this area; they do not want the India

Ocean to change into India’s Ocean. Coupled with the presence of other major powers of the world and its

disputes with neighbors and its domestic problems, India cannot become the strong regional leader in a seeable

future. As for Australia, although it is a developed country in the IOR-ARC, neither could it play a dominant

role because it is not an Indian Ocean country in the traditional sense. As for influential dialogue partners,

China faces the similar phenomenon as Australia does in this regard. Besides, China has not enough will to

compete with India for reginal dominance over the Indian Ocean; its participation in the IOR-ARC is mainly

driven by its overseas interests, especially economic interests. Actually, China’s military presence in the Indian

Ocean is limited. Besides, China’s strategic focus has been in East Asian-West Pacific, instead of the Indian

Ocean. The U.S. has had presence and influence over the Indian Ocean, while the influence and efficiency of

the association dooms that the association is not the focus of the U.S. Also, after the taking power of the Trump

administration, the U.S. may shrink its presence overseas.

Therefore, in a seeable future, major power relations in the IOR-ARC will remain co-existing and mutual

balanced. In general, the IOR-ARC has play a dual role: On the one hand, the IOR-ARC has provided a new

platform for regional countries and surrounding countries, to have more opportunities of communication,

cooperation and mutual understanding, which could adjust the relations of the countries in it, prevent some

conflicts from taking place. On the other hand, on some occasions, it could also be used as the tools of the

major countries for their pursuits for political goals. In this regard, powers are both driving and dragging force

to the association.

In future, based on the analysis above, the development of the IOR-ARC will be as follows in different

areas:

On economic level, for a long period of time in future, economic cooperation will still be key to the

development of the IOR-ARC for mainly two reasons. Firstly, cooperation in other fields is much more


241

difficult to be carried out. Secondly, economic development has been among the few achievements that the

IOR-ARC has made in previous years; it will become the strongest driving force of the development of the

IOR-ARC. However, the economic development is not in isolation; it is also limited by the development of the

cooperation among countries in other fields. If the contradictions among countries in IOR-ARC long exist, the

region will remain in a fragmented environment, the problems, such as the tariff barriers, still cannot be solved,

and the economic development will be groundless then. Therefore, the economic development of the

association relies on the higher level of integration and cooperation among members and partners of the

association. The accomplishment of this goal calls for efforts from all countries involved in. To big countries,

they need to have a tolerant attitude and promote the regional economic cooperation. To small countries, they

should be active in upgrading industrial structure, and play their advantage and development economy with

their unique advantage, such as blue economy.

On the level of traditional security, the role of the IOR-ARC depends on whether it could maintain the

stability of the Indian Ocean region. In present stage, the stability of the Indian Ocean region depends mainly

on the balance between the U.S., China, and India, which are the dialogue partners and the member of the

IOR-ARC respectively. Viewing from the balance of power, the U.S., China, and India has become three major

important forces in the Indian Ocean area. In this triangle structure, the U.S. plays a leading role, and India

follows. In such a case, the presence of the IOR-ARC has provided a shared public platform of geopolitics for

these stakeholders to prevent overlapping interests from causing conflicts or confrontations. If their overlapping

interests and divergence can be solved in the framework of the association, the IOR-ARC will become the

important booster for regional stability.

On the level of non-traditional security, issues related to non-traditional security will become another

focus of the association. Due to the lack of internal governance in some countries, the expanding of religious

extremism forces coupled that it is easily to be affected by changes in international pattern, many

non-traditional security problems have emerged in this region. On March 7, 2017, the IORA Leaders’ Summit

was held in Indonesia’s capital city of Jakarta, and proposed to adopt strategic outcome documents entitled

“IORA Declaration on Countering Violent Extremism leading to Terrorism”, in which “Acknowledging that

terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes a serious threat to regional and international peace and

security, undermining economic development and social cohesion” and “Recognizing terrorism and violent

extremism is not bound by national boundaries and requires cooperation at all levels, local, national, regional,

and international to effectively counter, prevent and address conditions conducive to terrorism and violent

extremism”.10

According to the IORA Action Plan 2017-2021, priority area of the association was divided into

two parts, maritime security and trade and investment facilitation. The short-term goals of the former are much

more detailed than the latter.11

Given the conditions that the non-traditional security problems have already

been the common challenges ahead of the countries in the IOR-ARC, the cooperation in this regard will

continue to develop in next a few years. However, on the other hand, it should be noticed that consideration on

self-interests and contradiction among countries will still challenge the cooperation. Besides, in surrounding

10 “Indian Ocean Rim Association Declaration on Preventing and Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” IORA

Secretariat Jakarta in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of IORA Documents for the Council of Ministers’ (COM) Meeting,

Indonesia, March 6, 2017, IOR/COM/20ANNIV/17/DOC3.2. 11 “IORA Action Plan 2017-2021,” IORA Secretariat Jakarta in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of IORA Documents

for the Council of Ministers’ (COM) Meeting, Indonesia, 6 March 2017, 2017, IOR/COM/20ANNIV/17/DOC3.1.


242

areas, there have already had several regional organizations with the non-traditional security problems as their

important tasks. Compared with these organizations, besides its uniqueness that it views the Indian Ocean as

the key region, the IOR-ARC has not more advantages.

Comprehensively speaking, the future development of the association will still be driven by economic

issues, and gradually shift focus to security cooperation. To solve the negative impact of the big power relations

on the IOR-ARC, countries should further deepen economic and trade cooperation, enhance the correlation of

their national interests, and deduce trade frictions. Members should get together to deal with the challenges, and

explore new institutional cooperation in the framework of the association, so as to coordinate with each other to

reduce contradictions.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean blocks the surrounding countries geographically, while connects them strategically. To

bring the sea neighbors together, the role of the IOR-ARC cannot be ignored. In previous years, the IOR-ARC

has already made big progress, but challenges are still ahead of the association in its integration and internal

cooperation. To promote the integration and cooperation within the IOR-ARC, the cooperation among Global

powers and regional powers in or involved in this association is urgent required. In this regard, the roles of the

powers are dual.

Global powers and regional powers’ involvement in the IOR-ARC as members or dialogue partners

expand the influence of the association on the one hand, and stand in the way of the integration of the region

under the framework of IOR-ARC due to complex contradiction among them on the other. They are both

driving and dragging force to the association.

The IOR-ARC is of great potential as it includes many emerging economics and fastest-growing markets.

However, the future development and efficiency of it still depends on the relationships among global and

regional powers. Given that the inherent differences among the powers cannot be easily bridged, the powers

within the region should attach more importance to the common interests instead of historical disputes, so as to

promote the development of the association toward an efficient cooperative platform and prevent it from

becoming a tool for powers’ competition. The framework of the association has already been established.

Powers within are expected to make full use of the platform that the association created and joint together to

contribute to the peaceful development of the Indian Ocean Rim Region.

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Kaplan, R. D. (2011). Monsoons: The Indian Ocean and the future of the America. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Liu, P. (2015). Evaluation on international systems in Indian Ocean (Ph.D. dissertation, Jinan University).

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