Political Science 111 Spring, 2007 Professor Hopkins

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ECONOMIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

This seminar attempts to blend theory and contemporary policy choices. We shall seek explanations and prescriptions for activities that cross “national” borders. Particular attention will be paid to two problems: creating economic and social gains through exchanges and the role of institutions via regimes and distinctive political agents—from terrorists to states to IGOs--in facilitating gains [or the reverse]. In our explorations we will assess how well various concepts, approaches and theories explain empirical events and how well individual humans are carrying out tasks within various “institutional”, i. e. position derived roles. In most weeks we will focus on specific cases. Students will be expected to complete core reading each week [marked with *], glean understanding from other literature, doing so thoroughly in weeks in which they prepare papers for seminar discussion. Grades will be based on evaluation of papers, seminar discussion, and a final exam (each weighed equally). Feel free to substitute materials you uncover; let the seminar members and myself know in advance if these are important to our discussion. The politics of the 21st Century involve a globalized world. Increasingly effective governance at all levels, and certainly global governance, as well as economic well-being are affected by actions within states elsewhere. Even more so, cross border actions and their effects make it important to consider who is doing what to whom, how and why for a vast array of human actions. We will, therefore, consider “within border” activities among people [for example civil wars or human rights violations] as well as cross border actions among governments of nation-states, and among various other “actors” in the world [NGOs, multinational firms, the UN and IFIs]. We will also consider the growth of informal and illegal activities in world affairs over the last 20 years, the prospect for institutional remedies, and balance between public and private, economic and political theory as aides to problems. Books. It is difficult to recommend books worth purchasing. The following books (all in paperback) should be available in the Swarthmore bookstore. You should find it serviceable to purchase the three “required” books and some of the others. Readings marked with an asterisk [*] are assigned for that week. They are readings in common. I expect these will be read! Many are in journals available on line and/or are in BB. A few may require library services. Browse the seminar shelf for PS 111 and also check on items on PS 113 [the companion IP seminar]. Required: Richard K. Betts, Conflict after the Cold War (2004) Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004) Suggested List Regina Axelrod, et. al. The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy (CQ: 2000) Robert Bates Prosperity and Violence (Norton, 2001) Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. Rules For The World: International Organizations In Global Politics (2004) John Baylis and Steve Smith, 3rd ed. (2004) The Globalization of World Politics Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (1998) Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (1996) Martha Finnemore, The Purpose Of Intervention (2004) Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000) Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (2006) Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism (2000) Hart, Jeffrey and Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations (6th ed.,2003) Robert Jervis, System Effects (1997) Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds. Governance in a Global Economy (2003) Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987)

2 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (1984) Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (1983) Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security (1996) Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (2004), 2nd ed. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World, (2003) Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath, (2005) Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, eds., Governance in a Globalizing World (2000) Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. (2006) Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, (2004) Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979) Journals. In preparing papers review recent (since 1995) journal publications, looking beyond those suggested in the syllabus. Here is a list of relevant journals with which you should become familiar: Most of these are accessible via Blackboard and the Swarthmore College library. Look under Links. For our first meeting, week one, for example, skim FP and FA for vol. 80, no. 6 and after for 9/11 essays. American Political Science Review (APSR) Foreign Affairs (FA) Foreign Policy (FP) Global Governance (GG) Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) International Organization (IO) World Development (WD) World Politics (WP) Syllabus. I have shaped the syllabus in two ways. First, each week I propose that we read some core material, where possible a book, or at least major portions of it. These are indicated with an asterisk *. Secondly, except for week two and three, I have picked “case” topics, ones useful for illuminating several issues, and hence ones to which we can return. One goal during the semester is for our discussions to be cumulative, so we can reuse concepts and cases to strengthen analyses of subsequent cases and the issues they pose. In addition to the readings on the syllabus, you will find it helpful to read beyond the syllabus. Three sources of additional readings, especially for paper writers are suggested. First, journals [recommended above] should be perused for articles not listed, but ones helpful to your topic. Second, bring into our discussions current issues discussed in the NYTimes, the Economist, or elsewhere. Finally browse some web sites for information on organizations and/or data about issues. In particular, UN, World Bank, OECD and various other IGO as well as INGO web sites are helpful. In BB various such sites are found under “External Links.” Each week I have suggested questions and/or topics for papers. For week one and two everyone is asked to write a “short” paper. In addition plan to prepare four “long” papers, of 4 to 5 single-spaced pages during the semester. As the semester progresses these should build on earlier weeks’ work. This will make a total of six papers for the seminar. Each week’s papers should be posted on the Blackboard folder for that week, under the “Paper Exchange” section. Read the papers for each week before seminar and arrive prepared to introduce your paper succinctly.

Part I: Introduction: Theoretical Perspectives

1. Introduction: Theory and Events: Framing our Seminar—from the Melian Dialogue to 9/11

2. Approaches, Concepts and Theories in International Politics

3. Globalization: Historical Processes and Consequences for a Global Arena

3Part II: Institutions, Organizations and Agents

4. International Intergovernmental Organizations: Origins and Historical Evolution 5. The United Nations’ System: Feudal, Futile, and/or Indispensable? 6. The Global Profit and Not-for-Profits—NGOs and MNCs in Environment and Human Rights

Part III: Problems and Policies of Economic Cooperation and Global Governance

7. Failed States, Post-Modern Imperialism, and the Challenge of State-Building in “Sovereign” Anarchy

8. Europe: Integration, Security Communities and Economic Gain: the EU plus NATO and the OSCE 9. Colloquium Review: What theory does for practice of IP

10. Trade and the WTO: Doha, Agriculture and Two-Level Bargaining 11. Economic Development: industrialized and emerging countries: G-8, OECD, and rapidly growing states—

India and China 12. Economic Development: less developed and weak countries, ODA, the World Bank and Africa 13. Financial Crises and the IMF: Asian and Latin American Debt Crises

14. Oil and the Future: Current Policies and Diplomacy [esp. Russia, China, US, Saudi Arabia, OPEC] and

implications for the future of development, economic stability, conflict, and environmental issues. Also think of “blue skies” projections [see CIA, week one] for concerns about weak states and other domestic politics factors for “Global Policy and Human Security”. And do not forget refugees and terrorism concerns.

Part I: Introduction—Theoretical Perspectives

Week 1. Introduction: The Melian Dialogue, 9/11 and Major Questions-- Framing our Seminar Readings:

*Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedelus, 1964, pp. 881-909, in Phil Williams, et. al.,eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 62-68.

*John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in Phil Williams, et. al.,eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 477-490 or in Michael Brown, et. al., Theories of War and Peace, pp. 3-54.

*Thucydides, “Reflections on the Peloponnesian Wars,” in Phil Williams, et. al.,eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 183-189.

*Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, February, 1994, pp. 44-56. *Michael Mandelbaum, “Goliath,” in FP, Jan/Feb, 2006.

*Robert Keohane, “Governance in a Parially Globalized World," APSR, March, 2001.

4Niall Ferguson, “9/11’s Minor Place in History,” New York Times Magazine, December 2, 2001, pp. 77-79.

Jack Snyder, “Theory in IP”, FP, November/December, 2004. Robert Jervis, Presidential Address, APSR, 2002 UN, Kofi Annan’s reform agenda [March, 2005] and the Human Security report of November, 2004 [on BB].

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” Foreign Policy No. 98, Spring, 1995, pp. 159-177.

In addition, peruse articles about September 11—some are on Blackboard –and articles on trade [Doha collapse], developments in Asia, Africa, etc., and disputes over human rights, such as Darfur. Familiarize yourself with a few key web sites: World Bank [WDRs], UN {UNDP’s HDR, etc reports for other agencies], IMF, WTO, CIAO. Topics on which to write Each student should write a one-page double-spaced paper (max 250 words). Choose a paper topic below. 1. Are the Melians or the Athenians right? 2. What are the consequence(s) of the end of the Cold War for IP? 3. What is [are] the most important problem [s] in current international politics? The first seminar will be focused on identifying and sharpening major policy concerns facing contemporary world leaders. It will begin with a discussion of the case of the Athens/Melos conflict and conclude with a survey of 21st century problems, with some attention to the implications of September 11, the Iraq war, and to recent debates over environment, trade and development policies. Week 2. Approaches, Concepts and Theories in International Politics Overview Reading: * Betts, pp. 86-104; 128-145; 181-201; 291-306 [essays by Waltz, Gilpin, Bull, Wendt, Doyle, Keohane and Nye]. *John Ikenberry, After Victory, pp. 10-79, chs. 1-3. *Jack Snyder, “Theory in IP”, FP November/December, 2004. on BB *Robert Jervis, Presidential Address, APSR, 2001 on BB *`Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), ch. 1, pp. 3-24. *Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (1984), pp. 5-46.

*Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” IO, Summer 1988, pp. 427-460.

*John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics (2nd ed, 2001), pp. 141-249. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace Democracy and Free Markets in the 21st Century (2002)--passim, esp., chs. 1-3; 8 and conclusion.

Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds. Governance in a Globalizing World, (2000), chs. 1-6. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981) entire

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Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds. New Thinking in International Relations Theory (1997).

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), chs. 1, 4-6.

Kenneth Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy,” WP, October 1985, pp.1-24, and in Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (1988).

Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987), chs. 6-8. Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (1983), pp. 195-232, 315-316.

Peter J. Katzenstein, et. al., eds., Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, (1999), a special issue of International Organization, Autumn, 1998. Read, glance through it, esp. Ch. 1 and chapters by Martin and Simmons, Ruggie, Jervis and Eichengreen.

T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds. International Order and the Future of World Politics (1999).

Realism *Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981), pp. 211-230. *Stephan Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” FP, Spring, 1998. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th or later edition, chs. 1-7.

Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” in IO, Autumn, 1998, pp. 971-993. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (1979), chs. 4-8.

John Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in International Politics,” in WP, January 1983, pp. 261-285.

Economic Determinism Betts, ed. pp, 219-286. SKIM Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, Politics of International Economic Relations, (1997 or 2003 editions, sections on Marxism/Dependency.

Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Demise of the World Capitalist System,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, September 1974, pp. 387-415. This essay is found in John Vasquez, Classics, ch. 47.

I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (1974). I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (1979).

James Kurth, “The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle,” IO, Winter 1979, pp. 1-34. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, chs. 1,2. Liberalism

*Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization, Autumn 1997, pp. 513-554.

6 Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (1997).

Stanley Hoffmann, “The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism,” Foreign Policy No. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 159-177.

Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review Vol.80, No. 4, December 1986, pp. 1151-1169.

Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism,” IO 42, 3, Summer 1988, pp. 485-507.

David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” APSR, Vol. 86, No. 1, March 1992, pp. 24-37.

Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, ch. 1. Mark Zacher, Governing Global Networks, (1996) pp. 12-35. Constructivism

*Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring, 1992, pp. 391-425. (Note this is abstracted in the Betts volume).

John Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, (1998), pp. 1-39, 199-202. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (1999) Jutta Weldes, et. al., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in Cultures of Insecurity, edited by Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, et. al. (1999), pp. 1-34 and 35-62 [case of Cuban Missile Crisis]

Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity (1935), chs. 1-3.

Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (1991) Jutta Weldes, “The Cultural Production of Crises,” in Cultures of Insecurity, Weldes, et. al., eds. (1999), pp. 35-62. Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols and War (1999) pp. 63-81. Also peruse the book’s argument, esp. pp. 9-44, 241-49.

Level of Analysis *Joseph Nye and John D. Donahue, eds. Governance in a Globalizing World, Ch. 1, pp. 1-41. Robert Jervis, System Effects, (1997) pp. 92-124.

J. David Singer, “The Level of Analysis Problem,” in Phil Williams, et. al.,eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 86-96. Richard Mansbach, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Global Politics,” in Phil Williams, et. al., eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 155-164.

Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (1984), pp. 25-30.

Raymond Hopkins and Richard Mansbach, Structure and Process in International Politics (1973), chs. 1,2.

Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (1959).

7 Anarchy Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Also excerpted in Art and Jervis, above). Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” IO, Spring 1995, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 229-52. Oran Young, “Anarchy and Social Choice,” World Politics, January 1978, pp. 241-263. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State and War, chs. 6, 7. Power and Influence

Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power,” International Organization, Col. 47, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 443-478.

David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics,” in World Politics, January,1979.

Hans Morganthau et.al. in Phil Williams, et. al.,eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 34-38, 203-209; or in Art and Jervis, pp. 116-126.

Harold Lasswell, Politics; Who Gets What, When, How (1936). Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, ch. 3. Nation-State and Nationalism and Identity Betts, ed., Ernest Gellner, “Nations and Nationalism, pp. 307-317.

Donald J. Puchala, “The Integration Theorists,” in Phil Williams, et. al., eds. Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 260-273. Raymond Hopkins, Richard Mansbach and Ed Rhodes, “Identity and the Decline of the Nation-State, paper at Congress of Turkic Peoples, September, 2006.

Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity, (1999) pp. 3-25, 279-300. Yoel Tamir, “The Enigma of Nationalism,” World Politics, April 1995, pp. 418-440.

Arend Liphardt, “Karl W. Deutsch and The New Paradigm in International Relations,” in Richard Merritt and Bruce M. Russett, eds., From National Development to Global Community (1981).

Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (1966), pp. 1-106.

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” in World Politics, October 1982, pp. 1-24.

Michael Doyle, Empires (1986). Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983). Basil Davidson, Black Man’s Burden (1992). Interests, Preferences, Wants [and associated demands] Amartya Sen, “Identity”.. Essay from Washington Post, March, ’06. On BB. For more elaboration on this concept, and particularly how we might talk about a “national interest” or what is a global good next week, the paper writer should draw on work by Walt, Waltz, Doyle, Wendt, Lasswell [Power and Society]. Think about how a notion of “interest” is formed and used in theory and practice [i.e. the real world].

8Recall it is assumed in rational choice and game theoretical models. Finally note how Morgenthau as realist uses national interest [and as a relevant aside note that it is used by Lancaster in week 11--on aid, development and the World Bank. And think how the term is related to the “prudence” or rightness of a policy demand as in the Melian dialog. Such statements occur widely to justify action, whether by a state, or another social formation, or an ego system [person]. Topics For this week each student should write a one-page single-spaced paper on a concept, applying it to concrete examples. For example, on the idea of a nation, after defining it, a paper might review the elements that make up a nation and then raise questions about sub-national identities and the break-up of Yugoslavia or the Congo (DROC). It could also ask about dangers of nationalities fragmenting states as in the case of the USSR. Is this a problem elsewhere, e.g. the U.S.? Why; why not? And it should distinguish a nation from a state and raise questions about how these two concepts relate empirically. Week 3. Globalization: Historical Processes and Consequences for a Global Arena Readings: *Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies (1997) passim, esp. chs. 4-6, 11-13 (section on BB is enough). *Robert O. Keohane, “”Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” APSR, March, 2001, pp.1-13. +Betts, ed. pp. pp. 5-16; 291-306; 608-627. [Skim for sure] *Kwame Appiah, “The Case for Contamination,” New York Times Magazine, Jan. 2006. Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism, pp. 3-51, 293-324. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, chs. 2, 9; 10-13, passim. *Moses Naim, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” FP, 2003. *Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds. Governance (2000), pp. 45-135. Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, (2001), chs. 4-7, 14. *Kenneth N. Waltz, “Globalization and Governance”, PS, December, 1999, pp.693-700

*Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999) chs. 1, 7, 8 and/or his essay in FP, January/February, 2001, pp. 20-29. KOF, Globalization Index, 2007 on BB—short essay on results of a “measurement.” CF to one in FP magazine. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works. Chs 1-3, 7-8, 12, 14 (pp. 3-39, 95-134, 249-277, and 307-320). Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. Chs 1-3, 15 (pp. 3-35, 221-227).

Inge Kaul, et. al., Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (2003) Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey Hart, eds., Globalization and Governance (1999).

9 Miles Kahler and David Lake, eds. Governance in a Global Economy: Political Authority in Transition (2003) Passim, esp. chapters 1 + Gourevitch) Anthony Giddens, Runway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives (2000).

A. T. Kearney, “Globalization Index,” FP, March/April, 2004. Stephen Walt, “Fads, Fevers and Firestorms”, FP, November/December, 2000, pp. 34-41.

John Gray, False Dawn (1998)

John G. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transition and Change,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 195-232. Also, re read Ruggie’s essay on territoriality in IO and think about the issue of property rights—does globalization now require all property be owned.

David Held, et. Al., Global Transformations, (1999) chs. 1, 2 and 6. Also use a search engine, best “Google” and Google Scholar, etc. for essays and arguments written since 2000 about globalization. The literature is growing. Topics: 1. How has globalization altered, if it has, public authority at the international level? Assess arguments about this issue. Freidman, Rodrik and others see a largely benign spread of liberal economic and political practices. Others view globalization with alarm. They see excessive privatization and distrust of politics leading to various threats to culture, economic justice, and the environment. Migration, epidemics, and international criminal activity, especially the drug trade, have been cited as collective bads—international problems for which governments are incapable of effective action. Where do you stand? Are additional institutions or authority needed to manage or regulate the “global” economy? How well do transnational networks of government officials manage these problems? 2. Who controls the world today—states, tribes, MNCs, transnational movements, Diaspora organizations and firms such as the Lippo Group [observe the large family based MNCs from Asia, including Chinese and Indian giants as well Japan, etc.]? What bargaining power do they have in international affairs? Is Vernon [among others] correct in seeing a balance between markets and state authority continuing to check global economic activity? Should we be concerned that multinationals may be providing typical public sector functions, such as coercion, order, and taxes? What about outsourcing of coercion and taxation at the international level—is it happening; is it good? 3. Has globalization changed in any fundamental way causal practices or sources of danger in international politics? If so, how; if not, why not. You may wish to distinguish several aspects of globalization, and indicate different effects. What aspects of globalization are policy choices, e.g. debordering measures that can be reversed? What aspects of it are irreversible, operating to shape outcomes independent of human preference, and more akin to the weather? In particular, does globalization require change in governance structures, laws [e.g. regarding sovereignty] or policies? 4. Some argue that global public goods [and bads] have been expanded as a result of globalization. Review this argument [see Kaul, Hopkins and Hopkins, Naim, etc.] and indicate what implications result, if any, for provision of these goods. What consequences flow from more or less provision, and from public or private provision? Compare and assess competing views [vide inter alia Wolf, Bhagwati, Greider, Giddens, Gray, Freidman and Gilpin].

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Part II: Institutions, Organizations and Agents

Week 4. International Intergovernmental Organizations: Origins and Historical Evolution

Readings:

*Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939 (1973), skim, plus read chs. 1, 13, 14. *Betts, pp. 69-85; 121-145.

*John Ikenberry, After Victory, ch. 6, pp. 163-214. *G. John Ikenberry, “A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Post-War Settlement,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 289-321. (Also in Peter Haas, Edited volume, 1993)

*Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (1983), ch. 1. *John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (1983), pp. 195-231.

*Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), chs 2-3, pp. 25-76. *Douglas C. North, “Economic Performance Through Time,” or other key writings of North.

*Ernest Haas, “Turbulent Fields and the Theory Regional Integration,” IO, Spring, 1976, 173- 212 or his earlier work read chapters passim in Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and

International Organization. (1964). Esp. chs. 1, 4, 13.

Michael Mandelbaum. The Ideas that Conquered the World, (2003), passim. esp. on post WWII [less on Wilson/League and more on UN, liberal and collective action views]. P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (1986), pp. 127-162. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (1987), pp.127-151.

Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation. (2003), chs. 2-5, pp.17-84; 13-16, pp. 189-235. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works. Chs. 4-6 (pp. 40-94). Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. Chs. 8-9 (pp. 93-121).

Jeffrey Frieden and David Lake, eds. International Political Economy, chapters on agency in IPE. Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (1994).

Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations (2003 or 1997), Chs. 1-3, passim.

Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System (1996).

Barry Eichengreen and Peter Kenen, “Managing the World Economy Under the Bretton Woods System,” in Peter Kenen, ed., Managing the World Economy (1994).

11James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation,” IO, Vol. 48, No. 3, Summer, 1994, pp. 387-423.

Kenneth Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange (1992). Benjamin Cohen, “Balance-of-Payments Financing: Evolution of a Regime,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (1983), pp. 315-336. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” IO, Summer 1988, pp.427-460. Michael C. Webb, The Political Economy of Policy Coordination (1995) Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty (1977), see sections on pre-WWII. John K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929 (1955). Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes (1978). Topics 1. The “Great Depression” was an global disaster, bad of all states and peoples. Its legacy includes motivations and policy lessons for political leaders, ones upon which they acted most fully at the end of World War II. Pick what you consider to be one or two important “lessons” that saturated the views of policy-makers in the early 1940s. Discuss what role (if any) these ideas [e.g. MNF, collective security, stable/fixed exchange rates] played in IP of that time. The underlying question is what role did ideas play in trying to create institutions and why was such great virtue attached to having fixed-exchange rates. Relate your answer to specific features of the Bretton Woods institutions. Ikenberry, Peter Haas, Mandelbaum and Ruggie are particularly helpful in identifying “lessons.” The rle of ideas [as well as epistemic communities soaked in them] are said to be key elements in the historical processes by which the UN, WB, IMF, ITO, and other organizations—OECD, NATO, were constructed at this time. Make a case for this claim; then suggest what realists would say about this claim and the power of hegemony in creating order and organizational façade by which the powerful to what they will. Pose questions for the seminar in which you consider Keohane’s “After” claim for global order with that of classic realists such as Mearsheimer or Walt. 2. What IGOs deserve to be included in an analysis of the institutional building of “regimes” in the post-war and in the early Cold War era? Why? Which would you exclude? The the Comintern? Why? Are these economic and collective security organizations actually new, or are they largely follow-on organizations from earlier ones? Explain. Remember we will examine contemporary functions of these very organizations during later weeks. So help us here to look at founding features and processes—and the lessons you draw about institutional features and aspects of them that occurred during this “founding era” even if they later changed, failed or proved in need of reform [put yourself a bit in the place of Acheson in his memoirs….]. 3. “Economics determines what we need from politics, and unfortunately politics often fails.” My quotation, and yet this may be Kindleberger’s view. Lay out his argument for how the expansion of a stock market crash led into the Great Depression. Does it make sense to blame the US for failure of the international system because US political leaders failed to fulfill “regime” requirements? What makes a hegemon and did the US qualify? Read Ernest Haas on the functionalist diagnosis and indicate if you see it as correct. Assuming the US failed to fulfill its duties as a hegemon, what explains this US failure (domestic politics, personalities, and/or structural factors)? Could different US state action [taken when] have prevented the 1930s’ depression? Clarify the level of analysis to which you assign causality—for example inside out explanations. Take a position on whether there are others countries actions to consider when assigning “blame for the Great depression and WWII? Finally, tie up your analysis by relating it to hegemonic stability “theory” as argued by Gilpin, Krasner, and others.

12 4. Consider what material or non-idea factors explain the formation and performance of the UN and Bretton Woods Institutions in the post-WWII international economy (1945-1971). Krasner and others point to the power and interests of the US as state in the global system--a form of hegemonic stability argument. Others look to domestic economic interests that shaped politics and defined terms such as “national interests.” So we have this great explosion of inclusive multilateral organizations in 1944-47. Can you these as a result of the structural of capabilities in this era, with countries such as those in Europe, Latin American and Asia, especially Japan acting upon material requirements of the their role in IP of that era? Week 5. The United Nations System: Futile, Feudal and/or Indispensible? Readings: *Betts, pp. 583-617; review 537-582

*Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, ch 15, pp. 377-402. *Read selected items for this week placed on Blackboard, e.g. Kapur essay on "Who runs the World" [* below] and peruse UN and related web sites for understanding of the UN system and its resources and components. Here is some basic information from a “related” web site to illustrate sort of information you should glean: [http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm or http://www.globalissues.org/ ]

“The United Nations and all its agencies and funds spend about $10 billion each year or about $1.70 for each of the world's inhabitants. This is a very small sum compared to most government budgets and it is just a tiny fraction of the world's military spending. Yet for nearly two decades, the UN has faced a debilitating financial crisis and it has been forced to cut back on important programs in all areas. Many member states have not paid their full dues and have cut their donations to the UN's voluntary funds. As of November 30, 2005, members’ arrears to the Regular Budget topped $695 million, of which the United States alone owed $587 million (84% of the regular budget).” *glance over the Stedman report, Nov. 2004 on BB. *James Ingram, Bread and Stones (2006), passim. Glance over the arguments about this FAO/WFP “wars” and the obligations of agencies that work together yet have different resources and bases of support. *Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares (1971), Peruse this classic text. See esp. chs. 1-6, pp. 3-110. *John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 561-598. *John Gerard Ruggie, “Reconstituting the Global Public Domain,” European Journal of International Affairs, 2004 [on BB]. * Linda Fasulo, Ax Insider's Guide to the UN, 2005—peruse for sense of UN work. *Paul F. Diehl, ed. The Politics of Global Governance, (2005, 3rd ed.), esp. chs. 1-7, 19. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: Organizations in Global Politics (2004). Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst, eds. International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance (2004).

13*Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, 1992. A key UN document declaring that new era for UN system to be used had emerged. *Devesh Kapur, “Who Gets to Run the World?,” Foreign Policy, November/December, 2000, pp. 44-50. *Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Virtual Visibility,” Foreign Policy, November/December, 2000, pp. 84-85. *J. Martin Rochester, Between Two Epochs, (2002), Chapter 8, pp. 230-256. on BB Boutros Boutros-Ghali. UNVanguished. (1999). Easy to read insider view of his years. Andrew Cooper, et. al., eds. Enhancing Global Governance. (2002), chs. 1-3, 8, 12. Reuben Mendez, “Financing the UN,” in Global Governance, September-December, 1997, pp. 283-310. Ohara Otunnu and Michael Doyle, eds. Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (1998) Intro, chs. 1, 3-7, 9-10. Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., International Organization: A Reader (1994). Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds. Governance in a Globalizing World, (2000), chs, 1, 3, 5, 11-15, esp. look at chapter 13. T. V. Paul and John A. Hall, eds. International Order and the Future of World Politics (1999) chs. 18-19. Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and International Organizations: States, Sovereignty, and the International Community,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., International Organization: A Reader (1994), pp. 202-219.

World Bank, World Development Report 2002, and also 1997 on the state. Paul Kennedy and Bruce Russett, “Reforming the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1995, pp. 56-71. Raymond F. Hopkins,” Anomie, System Reform and Challenges to the UN System,” in Esman and Telhami, eds. International Organizations and Ethnic Conflict, pp. 72-97. Bruce Russett, “A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations in Building Security Communities,” in Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, ch. 11. Phil Williams, et. al., eds., Classic Readings of International Relations, pp. 155-175 (Richard Mansbach; Oran R. Young). Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics (1998). Craig N. Murphy, International Organization and Industrial Change (1994), chs. 5, 6 (pp. 153-224). Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, chs. 1-7, 11, pp. 5-132; 243-259. Thomas Risse, et. al. The Power of Human Rights: International Norms (1999). Three older but still useful books: Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity. (1934) Robert Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International. (1972) Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law (1960).

14Topics: 1. The UN has been called a feudal system with a bloated bureaucracy. Is this a fair claim? Did John Bolton as US Ambassador 2004-2006 affect the way the UN works? Why might this not be case? Illustrate your answer in two ways—one look at the role of the US in UN affairs, and at how particular UN organizational bureaucracies relate to each other within in the system. What is the process for harmonization and coordination? Does it work? Focus on the SG and one organization—UNICEF, the General Assembly, UNDP, WHO, the FAO. Suggest what is feudal, futile and pregnant in their intercourse. Read via a search specialized material on this nexus to learn who acts in a feudal way, and what, if anything, is futile or productive from the interaction of these two parts of the system. Contrast ways that personal and institutional forces in the work in the life of multilateral bodies. Ruggie and others give some hint of this. What reforms [for “your” agency] would you suggest [voting, personnel recruitment, transparency, etc.]? What role would be best for this agency to play in the next 10-15 years? Why? 2. The “environment” for the UN has changed in the last fifteen years. This change includes the end of the cold war, the rise of internal disorder and/or economic decline in weak states, and growing global issues such as terrorism, AIDs, environmental threats. Has this had any real effects on the UN system? On other multilateral institutions [e.g. G-8, NATO]? What changes in the UN are desirable and/or possible to adapt to changes in world challenges? 3. Is there an undersupply of international public goods? If so, which goods, if any, (environmental protection, termination of civil war and/or genocide, nuclear non-proliferation, food and poverty safety nets, MNC financial regulations, etc.) are most susceptible to provision by the UN? Use the web to see what the World Bank and UNDP has written about global public goods. Which ones are most and least likely to be resolved without change in international institutions? Why? Where the UN seems feckless, can unilateral action work or is some form of multilateralism essential (see Ruggie)? 4. Pick one or more UN specialized agencies working in a common issue area [e.g. governance of food by the three Rome based agencies or of childhood illness by WHO, UNICEF] and consider the advantages and liabilities for these multilateral agencies to engage in “governance” compared to other agents, public and private, national and supra-national. Consider allocation for highest payoff, capacity to mobilize resources, technical skills, and commitment acceptance by those in whose jurisdiction work would occur. If you see benefits from UN agencies taking leadership in managing a common issue explain what these agencies do [at least one of them] in order to get resources from donor states and carry out a program. Does the aphorism “whoever pays the Piper calls the tune” apply to the UN and how it acts? 5. How is the UN system really run? How would you describe the set of norms, institutions and roles [and the people recruited to act within these] that makes authoritative decisions over the appointments and spending by UN organizations. How much influence on these norms and specific actions is attributable: to UN leaders? To national government foreign ministries or heads of state? To social movements or large private enterprises? Look at the essays by Krasner, Kapur and Anne-Marie Slaughter in recent FP editions. Suggest your map of power in the UN’s arena. How would earlier writers, such as Lasswell or Claude, interpret current trends and power circumstances given their perspectives? 6. Discuss the evolution of the WFP to an independent agency in the 1980s. What does the story told by James Ingram show us about how the UN works? Focus on the role of foreign ministries, UN protocols, legal rules [how binding] and how agency interests have a role independent of agency missions. 7. What will be the highpoints of Sec-General Ban Ki-moon’s first year? Why? Week 6. The Rise of Global Profit and Not-for-Profits—NGOs and MNCs in International Politics and their Role in Making Environment and Human Rights Rules The purpose of this week is to explore the bases and significance of non-state [public sector] actors in IP. This involves a wide array of entities. We want to explore them from the constitutive and legal foundations,

15as well as analyzing their resource bases and influence. Finally we will want to assess claims about their role and trends in this within global politics. Readings:

*Helen Milner, et. al. “International Trade and Environmental Policy in the Postcommunist World,” Comparative Political Studies, July, 2007 (forthcoming). See me or BB. *Jessica Matthews, “The Age of Non-State Actors,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 1997, pp. 50-66.

*Peter Gourevitch, “Corporate Governance,” in Kahler and Lake, eds., Governance in a Global Economy. (2003), pp. 305-331. [Also review arguments of Vernon]. *Betts, pp. 357-444. *Paul F. Diehl, ed. The Politics of Global Governance, (2005, 3rd ed.), chs. 15-18.

*Regina Axelrod, David Downie, and Norman Vig, eds. The Global Environment (2005) Chs. 2-5, 11. *Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” FA, July August, 2003, pp. 27-40. *Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security (1996). *James Samuel Coleman. Power and the Structure of Society. (1974). SKIM these lectures on the legal origins on non-state “persons” including religious orders, NGOs for profit firms. David Morton, “Gunning for the World,” FP, Jan. Feb, 2006, pp. 58-67. This provides a nice contrast for issues of globalizing of NGO influence and spread of protections for “rights.” Jim Schultz, “Follow the Money” (2005) an Open Society study advocating greater transparency, especially in resource rents. SKIM. This is on BB. Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Power of Human Rights:International Norms and Domestic Change (1999). Ch. 1 and country cases of HR Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, eds. Transnational Protest and Global Activism (2005). Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: the New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (2005). Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and International Organizations: States, Sovereignty, and the International Community,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., International Organization: A Reader (1994), pp. 202-219. Robert Matthews, et. al., eds. Landmines and Human Security (2004). Chs., 4, 18-20. Elizabeth Desombre, The Global Environment and World Politics (2002), esp. ch. 5 Natsios, Andrew S. ‘NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?’ in NGOs, the UN, & Global Governance, Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Peruse the whole volume. Natsios resigned as USAID administrator in January, 2006; he served in this post for five years of the Bush Adm.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (2000).

16 Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (1997), chs. 1-5, 11-13.

Christopher Clapham Africa and the International System. (1996). [Focuses on weak African states and heavy influence of NGOs therefore]. Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State,” in World Politics, October 1997, pp. 62-88. A review of literature on the “state” as an entity. *Search the web and the honors shelf for other pertinent readings on the role on multinational firms and NGOs in world politics. These might include actual actions as agents—from the Red Cross helping Biafra in the Nigerian civil war to Doctors w/ Border [MSF] in Darfur or Afghanistan today and Bechtel in Iraq. Compile information about their role in international affairs, and their discretion as policy shapers in national and international arenas. These might include lobbying for favorable treatment, for escape from HR and labor rules, and from minimum responsibility on environment. Discover their size and role in global trade and product standardization. Look at the role of social movements to affect their behavior, e.g. on Nestle for baby supplement sales in poor countries or drug firms regarding AIDS’ drug pricing. One website for Nestle with links to controversy and WHO brokered settlement is http://www.knowmore.org/index.php/Nestl%E9_S.A. [or NGO that acts as watch dog--http://www.babymilkaction.org/]. Also look at other social movements or campaigns to influence values and culture—Slow Food/McDonalds and GM/Toyota struggle in different ways to enjoy commodities. Not all firms are public, and not all profits are transparent. Look at Cargill: http://www.cargill.com/worldwide/switzerland.htm starting here. This is a family owned firm, with sales of almost $90 billion, 120,000 employees world wide, and branches in Switzerland for trade management and in Cayman Islands to keep profits in low tax jurisdictions. Is this a wise arrangement for government and private sector relations? If you see tensions over values and institutions in international arenas, how will this be played out with respect to law and enforceable rules about behavior that affects HR and environment issues? What role in global governance do these groups play and how are they exercising influence in ways that can be empirically assessed. Discussion Questions: 1. What is the basis of authority and influence of non-profit NGOs in global politics? Has their influence over outcomes has increased? Do you agree with Jessica Matthews and others about the shift in power to new non-state agencies for shaping international politics? Why? If potent, are these actors able to achieve positive outcomes in the global arena, and if so, how? Are they not subject to the Prisoner’s Dilemma with a resulting failure to reach better outcomes thanks to lack of cooperation? In your appraisal and analysis use the case of one or more NGOs and its role in affecting policy, e.g. WWF, Oxfam, the Catholic Church, the Gates Foundation, the Davos WEF, and Greenpeace. Focus on effects upon environment or human rights. Keep in mind that during waves of colonization and globalization in the 16-19th centuries churches and social movements were active. 2. How do MNCs exercise power, for example over environmental policy or human rights? Explore some cases such as mining in Indonesia, grain pricing for import firms, or oil pipelines in Myanmar which have led to international controversy involving MNCs. What triggers social movements that demand that public sector regulations be enhanced? How do MNCs relate to a government’s role in their activities; book-keeping, taxes, product safety, and contract enforcement might be areas on which to comment? What rules [OECD codes of conduct ideas; Sarbanes-Oxley] govern or limit their actions? What changes, if any, in these would you recommend for governance inside or outside of corporations? How could such governance rules be created and enforced? 3. Consider the role of non-state actors in a recent case of cross border provision of public goods, e.g. Iraq state-building, the fight against AIDs. How would you assess their role, and impact upon the goals identified and pursued.

17 4. What is the role of transnational government networks in providing norms and policies that regulate international commerce, including issues such as crime [drugs, money laundering, MNC regulation], migration and refugees, environmental regulation]? Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that transgovernmental networks make international law and provide a surrogate for global governance. Is there a substance to this view? Cite examples. 5. Pick a case in which global governance outcomes [i.e. rules binding peoples’ actions flowing across borders] seem to have been caused in some significant degree by decisions/actions of non-state actors. After describing the case empirically and analytically, assess what trend is occurring in this type of influence within world politics based on this case.

Part III: Problems and Policies of Economic Cooperation and Global Governance

Week 7. Failed States, Post-Modern Imperialism, and the Challenge of State-Building in “Sovereign” Anarchy Readings: Please review articles in recent journals and newspapers on developments since 1990 in states where governments are weak or non-existent, e.g., North Korea, Bosnia, Congo, Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, etc.

*Francis Fukuyama, State-Building (2004). *Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6,November/December 1997, pp. 22-43.

*Stewart Patrick, Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers” (2006) Working Paper, CDG [on BB].

*James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State, skim plus read his conclusion and one case such as USSR or Tanzania (1998). *P. J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds. Managing Global Issues, chs. 2,3, pp.75-150. *David Laitin and James Fearon, "Post-Modern Imperialism," (Stanford, 2003), and published in International Security, Summer, 2004 as slightly different title. *Robert Rotberg, ed. Failed States, Collapsed States (2003), passim, esp. his essay pp. 1-26. *Jeremy Weinstein, “Report” on failing states (at CDG website—skim esp. intro) and/or his essay with others in FA, Nov/Dec, 2004. *Stephen Krasner and Carlos Pascual, “Addressing State Failure,” FA, July/August, 2005, pp. 153-163. *Paul Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” in Oxford Economic Papers, 2004. [on BB] *Larry Diamond, Lessons from Iraq,” Journal of Democracy, Jan. 2005 [on BB]. “Chester Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” FA, September/October, 2003.

18Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis (2005). James Dobbins and Edward Luttwak, two essay on Iraq, Winning and Getting Out, in FA, Jan/Feb. 2005, pp. 16-36. Helen Jintjens, “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” Journal of Modern African Studies, June, 1999, pp. 241-286. Mohammed Ayoob, “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure,” and Ted Robert Gurr, “Minorities, Nationalists, and Ethnopolitical Conflict,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds. Managing Global Chaos: sources of and responses to international conflict (1996), pp. 37-52 and 53-77.

William Reno, Warlord Politics (1999). James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and Social Construction of Identity,” IO, Autumn, 2000, pp. 845-877. And Fearon and Laitin, APSR, March, 2003 essay on Ethnicity and Violence. Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist,” in World Politics, October 1982, pp. 1-24.

Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilization,” in FA, Summer 1993,[Re-read] Stephen Walt, “Building Up New Bogeymen,” review essay on Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Policy, No. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 177-189.

Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” in FA, July/August, 1999, pp. 36-44. Michael C. Desch, “War and strong states, peace and weak states?” IO, Vol. 50, No.2, Spring

1996, pp. 237-268. Basil Davidson, The Black Man’s Burden, chs. 4-7. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (1966), pp. 1-106. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985).

Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, “Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, pp. 70-85.

Saul Newman, “Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political Conflict?” WP, Vol. 43, No. 3, April 1991, pp. 451-478.

Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (1960). Rodney Hall, National Collective Identity (1999). Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (1983). Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State (1993). Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (1992). Charles Gati, “From Sarajevo to Sarajevo,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992, pp. 64-78.

Martin van Heuven, “Understanding the Balkan Breakup,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1996, pp. 175-188.

19Abdi Samatar, “Destruction of State and Society,” Journal of Modern African Studies, December 1992, pp. 625-642.

Paul B. Rich, ed. Warlords in International Relations (1999) Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World (1999) Websites on drugs, diamonds, and illicit international transactions shaping states, e.g. http://www.diamonds.net/conflictdiamonds

Alan J. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2000, pp. 94-118,

Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1991).

Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” APSR, December, 2000, pp. 779-801. Stephen M. Saideman, “Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts,” International Organization, Autumn 1997, pp. 721-753.

Topics: 1. Since World War II the number of “nation-states” has grown from over fifty to nearly two hundred. What consequences for international peace and security have resulted? Why? How many nation-states are effective actors as contrasted to “false” or shadow states? Discuss problems for international politics that you see arising from transactions with shadow state situations and propose solutions that might improve peace and economic gain. 2. What causes states to be weak or even “fail?” Consider nationality, race, and religion are as basic identities around which competing demands and expectations may converge. What trends in identity in the 1990s do you see? How do others see trends in state “failures”? What conclusions should we discuss about the likely future of world politics? Consider the views of writers on nationalism and on cultural conflict, in particular, those of Samuel Huntington (see his recent co-edited book on culture), Donald Horowitz, and Rodney Hall in this regard. Compare this with those who discount culture/ethnicity such as Laitin and Collier. 3. Why are ethnic tensions transcended or contained in some states (plural societies), while they become the basis of civil and international conflict in others? Cite examples from Africa, the Middle East or elsewhere. What should other states do about internal ethnic wars and collapse of state authority? While Kaplan may offer an extreme viewpoint, the rise of ethnic conflict has provoked considerable demand for outside intervention to prevent anarchy. Has this been helpful in the cases you examine, and why? Are there political formulas, such as consociational democracy, that should be recommended or imposed by others? 4. Pick one conflict rooted in nationalism (as you define it). Analyze its roots, force and promise of peaceful resolution. Possible cases include the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda-Burundi, various conflicts in the Balkans and Middle East, and the Tamil-Sinhalese conflict in Sri Lanka. 5. What is at stake in Iraq? Is it similar to what happened in Yugoslavia or different? Should the US or NATO or some outside force provide order and rebuild public infrastructure for a long time –

20say the next 5 or 10 years? Will this be helpful to state-building? Or is Luttwak’s advice [1999; 2005] to let war burn convincing? 6. Why did Somalia fall into anarchy? What lessons about sovereignty and great power politics are revealed in this case? Describe the most likely future you see for Somalia. Do some reading about what has happened in the last few years. What fell apart—state and/or nation? 7. Should doctrines of sovereignty be changed? Have they been in fact? Consider the arguments about states and sovereignty of Wendt, Ruggie and Krasner in light of events in Somalia and Bosnia. Comment on the importance or meaning of territoriality in these cases.

Week 8. Europe: Integration, Security Communities and Economic Gain: the EU plus NATO and the OSCE

*Browse articles in the Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000 and after. Check for essays and studies by Andrew Moravcsik, Thomas Wilson, Sara Berglund, others. Look especially for articles on the intersection of organizations and the “European Project.” Browse the Economist for the last 18 months for articles on the European constitution, entry of Turkey, absorption and expansion from 15 to 27 members. *Kalypso Nicolaidis, ch. in he co-authored book on People of Europe—BB *Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2004—essays by Nicolaidis and Cimbala, pp. 97-120.

*Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001) ch 13, pp. 341-376. *Timothy Garten Ash, Free World, 2004; review by Ikenberry in FA, Nov/Dec, 2004 *Blackboard essays: Europe & Euro; Arms,–peruse these: Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO After the Cold War,” IO, Autumn, 2000, pp. 705-735. Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (1996) esp Part III. Kathleen McNamara. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary politics in the European Union (1998). Jack Rakove, “Europe’s Floundering Fathers”, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct, 2003, pp. 28-38

Timothy Garten Ash, “Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order,” In FA, March/April, 1998, pp. 51-65. Look for his more recent essays in journals.

Joe Grieco and John Ikenberry, State Power and World Markets (2003) ch. 5

John Mearsheimer, “Why we will soon miss the Cold War, “in Williams, et. al. eds, pp. 477-499. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (1999), chs. 2-4.

Barry Eichengreen and Jeff Frieden, eds. Forging an Integrated Europe (1998), ch. 1 and passim.

“NATO at Fifty,” essays in FA, May/June, 1999, pp. 164-218. Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6,

November/December 1997, pp. 60-73.

21Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” IO, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 19-56. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (1958). A classic, good background on 50’s and integration forecasts.

Geoffrey Garrett, “Institutional cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community’s internal market,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 533-560; and Geoffrey Garrett vs. Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Debate on Law and Politics in the European Union,” IO, Vol. 49, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 171-190.

Charles Kupchan, “Regionalizing Europe’s Security: The Case for Mitteleuropa,” in The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (1997).

Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral

Recognition of Croatia,” World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 4, July 1996, pp. 482-521. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (1996), chs. 8, 10. Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s persistence after the cold war,” IO, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 445-475. Topics: 1. What future do you see for Europe? In particular, consider the role of Germany in the EU and in NATO. “Integration” -- both economic and political -- is said to have been underway in Europe, albeit erratically, since the 1950s. Develop an argument in support of or against the “inevitability” of continuing and deepening integration in Europe. Include economic, legal, cultural and political forces at work. Spell out how the European institutions work to constrain states—the Commission, its committees, the parliament and courts. 2. How have European institutions and member states responded to requests to join them from other states? Why? Will the Europe of the 15 truly be a Europe of 25 or 27 by 2011? What are forces leading to the integration of Europe? What do they tell us about the process of integration generally? Is Turkey really a problem? Why? What about Ukraine and even Russia? 3. How safe is Europe from war? Why? (Consider whether the international use of coercive power is less fungible since World War II.) What factors constrain or facilitate the ability of European states to use coercion? Will an independent European peace force be created and how will this affect NATO? What are the bases of European security at present—contrast a Mearsheimer versus a Katzenstein or institutionalist position. 4. States and markets are mechanisms for allocating resources. How do these mechanisms, expressed in institutional form, work in Europe? Consider the Single Act and Maasstricht agreements—under these how does control work? Do economic problems they have created undermine political stability of Europe? Are such factors relevant to the demise for now of the European constitution? 5. Assess the impacts of the “Euro.” Do the disciplines and advantages it provides provide a deepening for Europe? What lessons does this suggest about the interplay of politics and economics in Europe? What are the advantages and disadvantages of its acting as a major foreign exchange reserve currency; and will this lead to conflicts with the US? Given the alleged imbalance for European governance between a strong central bank and no strong fiscal or public authority to complement it, do you see it as driver for a shift of fiscal power and stronger central authority toward a European level apparatus, or the reverse?

22 Week 9: Review of Arguments from Visiting International Politics Scholars on March 30/31. Each seminar member prepares a 2-3 page paper reporting one or two key arguments presented by the scholar, some background that will help explain why they take that position drawing on earlier writings and/or experience in government, and counter arguments [interpretations] which may include ones that are voiced at the conference. Week 10: Trade and the WTO: Doha, Agriculture and Two-Level Bargaining Readings:

*Review newspaper and journal essay, esp. the Economist, coverage of the Doha WTO meetings from November, 2001 to Hong Kong Ministerial of December, 2005. Especially we will follow debates over agriculture and the bargaining that it reflects. What are the major issues in dispute? How do these issues relate to one another and to other sectors under discussion, for example intellectual property right rules, TRIPS, and demands that LDCs assistance and environmental standards be included in the trade negotiations.

*World Bank, Entering the 21st Century, (1999) ch. 2. *Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism (2000), pp. 88-113; 227-264. *Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), ch. 8, pp. 196-233.

*Nancy Birdsall, “Life is Unfair,” FP, Summer, 1998, pp. 76-93.OR MORE RECENT ESSAY ON INEQUALITY AT CGD WEB SITE OR IN FP. *Beth Simmons, “Territoriality and Trade”, APSA paper, 2003. On BB—peruse to see her approach and use of data. *Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, The Politics of International Economic Cooperation, 5th ed., chs. 3, 7-10.

*Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes, (1983) pp. 233-314. Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (1985). Joe Grieco and John Ikenberry, State Power and World Markets (2003) esp. ch. 2. Peter Evans, et. al., eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (1993). [Relevant to the next two weeks also]. Review: Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” IO, Summer 1988, also reprinted as essay in above collection.

*Robert Paarlberg, “Agricultural Policy, Reform and the Uruguay Round,” International Organization, Summer 1997, pp. 413-444. Christina Davis, “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agriculture Trade Liberalization,” APSR, Vol. 98, Feb., 2004, pp. 153-169. *Blackboard materials on Doha Round AA negotiations—peruse these as specified.

Jeffrey Frieden and David Lake, International Political Economy (3rd edition), passim

Edward Clay and Olav Stokke, Food Aid and Human Security (2000), esp. chapters 1, 3, 9-11, 15.

23Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Economics: International Trade,” in Managing Global Issues, P. J. Simmons and Chantal Oudraat, eds. (2001), pp. 234-279. [This is on the web site of BB]. Frieden and Lake, International Political Economy, (2000) , chs. 1,20, 21. Wayne Moyer and Tim Josling, Agricultural Policy Reform, (unpublished manuscript, 2002), chapters 1, 10, 11. [ on BB website]. Robert L. Paarlberg, The Politics of Precaution, (2001) good on GM issue [note WTO found against the EU in 2006—follow on various web sites and journals]. Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Ebbe Schioler, Seeds of Contention, (2001). This and book above deal with GMO politics issues. Robert F. Keohane, “Problematic Lucidity,” WP, October, 1997, pp. 150-70. Lee Ann Patterson, “EC Agricultural Policy Reform,” International Organization, Winter 1997, pp. 145-165.

Gilpin, The Political Economy, ch. 5, passim.

Robert Staiger, “International Rules and Institutions for Trade,” pp. 1495-1551, Handbook for International Economics, Vol. 3 (1995). Marcus Noland, “Learning to Love the WTO,” Foreign Affairs, September/October, 1999, pp. 78-92.

John Jackson, The World Trading System (1997), This is the most classic law book on trade, widely used. Peruse, esp. chs. 2, 3. Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (1988).

John S. Odell, “Understanding International Trade Policies: An Emerging Synthesis,” WP, Vol. 43, No. 1, October 1990, pp. 139-167.

The Political Economy of Regionalism, edited by Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner (1997).

Timothy Josling, Agricultural Trade Reform: Completing the Reform (1998) Raymond F. Hopkins, “Reform in the International Food Aid Regime,” IO, Winter 1992, Vol. 46,

No. 1, pp. 225-264.

Benjamin S. Cohen, “The Political Economy of International Trade,” IO, Spring 1990, pp. 261-281.

Robert Rothstein, Global Bargaining, chs. 4, 7.

William P. Avery, ed., World Agriculture and the GATT (Westview: 1993), chs. by Paarlberg, Hopkins.

William J. Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 37-100.

Robert Paarlberg, Food Trade and Foreign Policy (1985), pp. 15-99, 143-218. Aksoy, M. Ataman and John C. Beghin, eds. Global Agricultural Trade and Developing Countries. Washington: World Bank, 2005.

Barrett, Christopher B. and David E. Sahn, “Food Policy in Crisis Management,” World Bank, 2001.

24 Barrett, Christopher B and Daniel G. Maxwell, “Recasting Food Aid’s Role,” USAID Policy Brief, August, 2004. Benson, Charlotte, and Edward J. Clay, “Additionality or Diversion? Food Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for Developing Countries,’ World Development, 1998 vol. 26. No. 1, pp. 31-44. Ezekiel, Mordecai, “Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Under-Developed Countries”, 1955, published in vol. of reprints, Food Aid for Development: Three Studies by Ezekiel, et. al., Rome: FAO, 1985 Hoddinott. John, Marc J. Cohen and María Soledad Bos, “Re-defining the role of food aid, “ IFPRI Working Paper, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 7 January 2004. Hopkins, Raymond F. and Donald J. Puchala. The Global Political Economy of Food. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978. Raymond F. Hopkins, "The Evolution of Food Aid," Food Policy 9, 4 (November 1984), pp. 345-362. ____________________"Food Security, Policy Options and the Evolution of State Responsibility," in Food, the State and International Political Economy, F. LaMond Tullis and Ladd Hollist, Eds., (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), pp. 3-36. ___________________“Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of Consensual Knowledge," in Peter Haas, Ed., International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 225-264. Krasner, Stephen D., 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences”, in Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Kaul, Inge,et. al., eds. Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Johnson, Michael, Stanley Wood, John Hoddinott, Peter Hazell, and J. Lamb. Strategic analysis and knowledge support system (SAKSS) for small farmer led agricultural growth, U.S. Agency for International Development Washington: USAID, 2003 Ruttan, Vernon W., editor, Why Food Aid? Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993. Puchala, Donald J. and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, 1983. Prichett, Lane, “The Political Economy of Targeted Safety Nets,” Washington: World Bank, Social Protection Paper No. 0501, January 2005. Shaw, David John and Hans W. Singer, “A Future Food Aid Regime: Implications of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,” Food Policy, Nos. 4.5, 1996. Timmer, C. Peter, ed., Agriculture and the State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. ---------------------- “The Road to Pro-Poor Growth: The Indonesia Experience in Regional Perspective” Washington: Center for Global Development, Working paper No. 38, April, 2004. World Food Program, “WFP and Food-Based Safety Nets: Concepts, Experiences and Future Programming Opportunities.” Policy Issues, Agenda 4. October 2004.

25 World Trade Organization, “General Council’s Decision on the Doha Agenda Package,” Geneva: August 1, 2004.

Topics: 1. How do the international negotiating positions of states on trade issues relate to domestic politics inside and outside state bureaucracies? Consider how issues, such as ones debated at the Uruguay Round of GATT, the Doha Round under WTO and/or regional negotiations such as CAFTA or NAFTA agreements, reflect “state” and “domestic” interests. Are there different patterns in the post 1990s era compared to positions taken at the Bretton Woods conference? Why? 2. What role do multilateral governmental organizations (WTO, UN, UNCTAD, WB, IMF) play in world trade? How do the various organizations relate to each other and to underlying institution [a la North]. Is there forum shopping among various “states” for locating negotiations within one or another locale? For example, in North-South economic relations what forums are preferred and why? Have institutions made any discernable differences in the IPE of trade? 3. Consider Krasner’s argument (in Structural Conflict) that political sovereignty not economic growth is the principal aim of states, notably LDC or G-77 claimants, in international politics. Does his argument fit East-West disputes equally well? Do mercantilist (realist) theories explain bargaining over new trade items? Compare “new” trade issues (movies, banking services, Singapore rules) with earlier issues over primary product (sugar, coffee, copper, wheat) or manufactured goods. 4. Examine the bargaining over agriculture 1986-2005. Sketch out succinctly who did what and why? What does the agricultural area of trade rule-making tell us about the role of ideas in “free trade” agreements? What does it tell us about domestic interests and problems of collective action in making international economic policy? Should relative gains ever dictate a country’s decision on protectionism? Illustrate from agriculture or any sector. 5. “Agricultural productivity explains unequal development in two ways. First, low productivity (per acre) in some countries causes poverty. Second, food imports by countries with large populations and low caloric availability creates debt or reduces productive investment.” Consider the validity of these claims and suggest political steps that might be supported by most states to address global inequality. Does trade inevitably amplify uneven development among states; does it perhaps also explain growing inequality within them? Using the evidence from Birdsall and others on inequality and trade, address the issue of the effects of trade on equality among states. 6. Food aid is a controversial subject. “Bona fide” food aid was accepted under the Uruguay Round. However, it is also still seen as a poor way to help people because critics claim it is driven by efforts to dump surpluses rather than development criteria. Review works by Ruttan and others and propose your evaluation of its utility and morality. Should food aid be discontinued? React to the decisions at Hong Kong about re-shaping rules for food aid; what is driving these and how do appraise such legitimacy as the AA may give dumping food into poor countries? Is it another case of imbedded liberalism or better seen as an exception like GSP, meant for humanitarian norms to be upheld? Week 11. Economic Development: industrialized and emerging countries: G-8, OECD, and rapidly growing states—India and China This week we will look at issues among industrialized countries that relate to national development objectives and projection of a good model for other “states”. Qualities of industrial state models, particularly the US, Europe, Russia and Japan include issues of social insurance, health and

26safety rules, efforts to strengthen democracy and to secure trade and finance exchanges that promote growth. We will want to identify security community and joint economic policy considerations among these countries. Also relevant is the issue of diffusion of techniques, norms and identities, and the evaluation of these by others [as in the forthcoming work assigned from Keohane and Katzenstein]. While protection and advancement of national values of wealth, security, health, etc. is a state responsibility among these countries, our task will be to appraise how well states are steering themselves toward these goals in the globalized world. This will include how well they collaborative or are forced to compete on core issues.

*Douglas C. North. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. (2005), chs. 1-2. *Harold Lasswell, “The Policy Sciences of Development,” WP, 1965, pp. 286-309. on BB *Helen Milner, Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,” IO, Winter, 2005. *Alexnder Hicks and Christoper Zorn, “Economic Globalization, the Marcro Economy, and Reversals of Welfare,” IO, Summer, 2005

* *Robert Keohane and Peter Katzanstein, eds. Anti-Americanism (forthcoming, 2006), chs. 1, 10-11. ON BB

*Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999), chs.1-5. Joeseph Nye. Power in a Global Information Age (2004). Arnold Rogow, ed. Politics, Personality and the Social Sciences. (1971), chs. by Fox and McDougal. Harold Lasswell, et. al., eds. A Pluralizing World in Formation (1980), Vol. 3, Ch. 14 by Lasswell. [Compare Lasswell’s formulation of the future with that of Nye’s]

Joanne Gowa and Edward Mansfield, “Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade,” IO. Fall, 2004, pp. 775-805. Lee Wolosky, “Putin’s Plutocrat Problem,” FA, March/April, 2000, pp. 18-31.

Helen Milner, Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes, “Russia’s Virtual Economy,” FA, Sept. /October, 1998, pp. 53-67.

Anders Aslund, “Russia’s Collapse,” FA, Sept. /October, 1999, pp. 64-77. Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s Taxing Problem, FP, Fall, 1998, pp. 55-66. Grigory Yavlinsky, “Russia’s Phony Capitalism,” FA, May/June, 1998, pp. 67-79. Peter Rutland, ed. Business and state in contemporary Russia (2001). David Woodruff. Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism. (1999)

Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, “Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence,” IO, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 265-287.

Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? (1994) also search for recent essays relevant to diffusion, OECD effects on internal and external politics [trade and conflict]. Joanne Gowa sees trade as following security alliances, Simmons does not. Understand a “gravity” model approach; newer version of Deutsch’s RA models. Topics:

27 1. What are the dimensions of development? Have welfare states traded off some economic growth in exchange for safety nets? If so, how does this work, and what international problems arise? For example, do protections for the well being of citizens lead to harm to others, or loss of purely economic [wealth] values? One example might be slow growth in Japan, perhaps reflecting corporate welfare, that brings harm to Asian neighbors Another might be the question of whether insurance agencies that are global, e.g. AIG, Lloyds, create moral hazard problems that are most acute for some developed countries? 2. Why was the OECD founded in 1960? And why the G-8 [in 1975 started as G-7]? How well do these organizations work? What forces within countries are affected by these international bodies, if any, and how does domestic level politics within members affect economic stalemate or actual harm experienced by other countries within these two groupings of states? 3. Consider the example of the Soros coup in betting against the British pound in 1992: what lessons for vulnerabilities do you see here? Or pick another case of cross-border economic clash among OECD countries and analyze it for lessons. Are risks such as these growing or shrinking? Compare trends you see with one or more views about what makes development complete [such as Sen, Lasswell, others] 4. Policy coordination and cooperation among the wealthiest countries since the Marshall Plan has been said to have improved growth rates among them. Portions of this argument rests on the effects on growth from trade and investment, another part rests on the movement of labor [migration and guest workers], a third part on improved harmonization of regulations. The third part presumes that if technical advance and diffusion of goods/services are more predictable and safe, this has general value enhancing results. A final part of the argument rests on the proposition that “peace” provided among states enhances efficiency and growth. How would you assess these arguments? 5. What are the roles of freedom, democracy and the open dissemination of ideas to the process of development, especially in industrialized societies? How much does lateral influence of democratic societies affect changes inside others through the model of rights—human rights: civic, social and economic ones? How would you model the process of change over time, initiated within the most powerful states, as related to and constrained by the circulation of ideas and the shaping of institutions, such as elections, public safety nets, and protection of individual property? Week 12. Economic Development: less developed and weak countries, ODA, the World Bank and Africa Readings:

*Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence (2000). *World Bank, World Development Report, 1997-2006 era. Esp. 2002, ch. 5. *Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid (2006), ch 1.

*Robert Gilpin, The Challenge, (2000) pp. 163-192. *Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy (2001), chs. 11-12, pp. 278-340. *Sebastain Mallaby, “Saving the World Bank,” FA, May/June, 2005. on BB *Jessica Einhorn, “Reforming the World Bank”, FA, January/February, 2006 on BB *Peruse literature on development banks on the web; look at regional banks and the IFAD. Also check on ODA at the OECD website, and read about aid issues in Economist, etc. Look at CAS and PRSP for one African country. Also focus on this country with respect to issues of development.

Easterly, William. The Elusive Quest for Growth. ( 2001).

Eric Helleiner, States and the Emergence of Global Finance (1994).

28 Devesh Kapur, John Lewis and Richard Webb, The World Bank: its First Half Century (1998), Especially chapters on Africa within these two volumes. Raymond F. Hopkins, "Political Economy of Foreign Aid." in Finn Tarp, ed.

Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons of Experience and Directions on the Future (2000) [available on BB].

Sayre P. Schatz, “The World Bank’s Fundamental Misconception in Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 34, 2, June 1996, pp. 239-247. World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: reform, results, and the road ahead (1994) and Africa's experience with structural adjustment (1995) edited by Kapil Kapoor.

Carol Lancaster, Aid to Africa (1999), chs. 2-3, 8-9. Paul Mosley, Aid and Power : the World Bank and policy-based lending in the 1980s (1991). World Bank, World Development Report. Check issues for 1997 [on role of state], for 1999, 200/2001 and 2002, 2004 and 2006 [on inequality]. For 1999, Entering the 21st Century (1999), chs. 5, 8.

Benno J. Ndulu. and Stephen A. O’Connell, “Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1999.

James Fearon, “International Financial Institutions and Economy Policy Reform,”Journal of Modern African Studies, March 1988, pp. 113-138.

John Williamson, ed., The Political Economy of Policy Reform (1994). Clemens, Michael, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, “Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The short-term effect of aid on growth,” Center for Global Development, Working Paper 44, July, 2004. Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In (1993). Edward Clay and John Shaw, eds., Poverty, Development and Food (1987). Topics: 1. There are a number of “Development Banks.” Discuss the architecture of these banks, and look at its role. How central is the World Bank to the system. Has it, or the banks generally become the dominant economic agent for poor country investment and policies. Some argue that WB controls Africa both through its role as negotiator for investment, for advice for IMF lending, and for managing debt reduction. Much of this in done through its CG management opportunity, even after Wolfenshon’s “reforms that pressed for decentralization and local ownership of policy. Discuss this claim. Is this a new form of colonialism? Has it helped or hurt Africa? 2. Why? Look at Africa compared to Asia and Latin America regarding investment, especially FDI, ODA receipts, and technical advice. Where is the power of the system of development Banks largest and why? Where do private banks fit it? What is the formal rationale for flows from public sector agencies that create sovereign debt? What do you think is the reality of this system, especially with respect to who benefits? 3. Capitalist economic policies have been on the ascent in Russia, East Europe, Africa, and Latin America in the last decade. Why? What role has the IMF/World Bank played, especially via lending conditioned upon structural adjustment and the neo-classical demands of the Washington

29consensus as reformed? Is the WB an autonomous agent in international politics in this role? How does Bates analysis and that of Fukuyama [reading from earlier week] relate to capitalist reform policy prescriptions and the core public good of state institutions? If the WB is able to effect change inside borrowers’ states, how would you weigh the role of ideas in this exercise of influence as contrasted to that of the role of money? Given the current advice given the focus on poverty alleviation, what consequences do you foresee -- for future world economic relations, for internal order and external threats in Africa? 4. Analyze the bargaining involved in structural adjustment and debt negotiations between the World Bank and an African country. Does domestic weakness help African leaders resist unwelcome conditions? What relative power do the Bank and national government officials have in their negotiations? Is the bank a “democratic” institution, and, to the extent it is not, how can it demand democratization from its “customers”? 5. Are development banks agents for development? Where do Banks get their money? How does this affect their operation? Who really runs a bank—i.e. decides policy and chooses staff? Do formal rationale for policy decisions on loans and releases of money correspond to “real” reasons? This topic is asking you to explore the Bank as an actor/agent in IP, and decompose it into the processes by which its outputs are determined. Week 13. Financial Crises and the IMF: Asian and Latin American Debt Crises *Paul Krugman, “The Return of Depression Economics,” FA, January/February, 1999, pp. 56-74. *Devesh Kapur, “The IMF: A cure or a Cause?” FP, Summer, 1998, pp.114-129. *Joan Spero and Jeffrey Hart, ch. 2 *Frieden and Lake, International Political Economy, Chs. 14-16. *Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy, (2000) chs. 9-10, pp. 234-277 *C. Fred Bergsten, “The Empire Strikes Back,” The International Economy, May/June, 2000. *Global Information Network, “G-24” on BB (2005) Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (2002) chs. 5-8. Joseph Nye and John Donahue, eds. Governance (2000), pp. 347-366. Ricardo Hausman, “Should there be Five Currencies or One Hundred and Five,” FP, Fall, 1999, pp. 65- 79 and Beddoes, pp. 16-27, and Sachs and Larrain, pp. 80-92. World Bank, WDR: Entering the 21st Century, ch. 3 Jonathon Kirshner, “The Study of Money,” in WP, April 2000, pp. 407-436. Martin Feldstein, “The IMF’s Errors,” in FA, March/April, 1998. Thomas Freedman, The Lexus, ch. 3 Jeffrey A. Frieden, “Invested Interests: the politics of national economic policies,” IO, Autumn 1991. John Odell, “The U.S. and the Emergence of Flexible Exchange Rates,” IO, Winter, 1979, pp. 57-81.

30 John C. Edmunds, “Securities: The New World Wealth Machine,” FP, Fall 1996, pp. 118-133. Benjamin Cohen, Organizing the World’s Money (1979). Anthony Sampson, The Money Lenders (1981), chs. 1-10, 12-15, 17, 20, 21. Joanne Gowa, Closing the Gold Window (1983). John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy (1982). Vinod Agarwal, Debt Games (1996). Susan George, A Fate Worse than Debt (1988). Howard P. Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, “The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations,” WP, Vol. 44, No. 4, pp. 600-644. Mitchell Berhard and John Ravenhill, “Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese,” WP, Vol. 47, No. 2, January 1995, pp. 171-209. Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, “The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World,” IO, Vol. 50, No. 1, Winter 1996, pp. 35-68. Graham Bird, “The International Monetary Fund and Developing Countries,” IO, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 477-511. Topics: This week we have three issues: exchange rate regimes, debt crises, and institutional arrangements to control banking and money. With the rapid rise of currency movements, and the collapse of both banks and countries’ economies in the last two decades, arrangements for public sector oversight, either by national or international laws and interventions, have been debated. This week we want to understand the political issues arising from international finance. 1. Discuss the problems of international liquidity and inflation. How should international monetary policy be set? Do we [the world] need fewer international currencies? Have SDRs failed? Is the dollar adequate for world financial needs? Why or why not? Examine the diplomacy of a key case, e.g. who closed the gold window in August 1971 or who organized the 1995 Mexican bailout and consider the lessons of its aftermath. How are exchange rate regime rules enforced, and is this good practice? 2. What problems does debt cause? Who or what can solve them? Consider both US and LDC debt. Have we learned from the results of past debt crises, e.g. the August 1982 Mexican crisis? The Asian crisis and its aftermath in Latin America, Russia and LTCM during 1997-98? Option: Have various efforts to realign or adjust debt, such as the Baker and Brady plans proven useful? Assess the value of the Paris and London “clubs,” and compare their work with the debt adjustment mechanisms for highly indebted rich states such as the US. 3. Consider the role of the IMF in international politics. Is it useful or fair for LDCs? For industrial states? What lessons do you draw regarding IMF power and accountability from specific cases, e.g. the S. Korea case of 1997? 4. Do we need new financial architecture? If so what should be done? Look at the Council on Foreign Relations study, “Safeguarding Prosperity.” Compare recommendations there on the web [http://www.foreignrelations.org/public/cpub.html#cpi] with those of Barry Eichengreen’s IIE study

31(May, 1999). Why have discussions of such reform declined since 2000? Were enough changes made so the system is fixed, or did a change in leadership in Washington and/or a change in ideas about the way the IMF and other bodies [Basel, G-10 coordination] should work [see the Meltzer report views and discussion by Bergsten]. Week 14. Oil and the Future. Current policies and diplomacy [esp. among Russia, China, US, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and OPEC] raise major concerns for global stability, both of markets, growth and violence. Think about these in broad terms with regard to their implications for the future. Focus principally on one “dependent variable” in your analyses and argument constructions. These could be outcomes for economic development, economic stability, conflict, and/or the environment [natural resource constraints and regulations needed]. Also think partially in terms of “blue skies” projections [see CIA, week one-- NIE study "2020"] for concerns about weak states and other domestic politics factors that affect global policy and human security. Do not forget refugees and terrorism concerns as dependent upon oil or other global resource and management factors. Paper writers and each seminar member should be prepared to advocate at least one policy position designed to improvement a global good in light of relevant trends, projections and predictions. Policy requires an agent: how and where will your preferred international policy be supplied in coming years? In specifying your answer to this consider three options in particular: 1) a continuation of hegemonic leadership [benign some say and possibly resting on the neo-con doctrine of preventative war], 2) a return to some kind of balancing system [with its multilateral implications but also a high potential for rivalry and conflict] and 3) a deepening of international institutional capacity [so that IGOs and informal norms constrain national governments and their licensees, such NGOs, MNCs, etc]. Based on your analysis of trends, ranging from environmental pollution to spread of nuclear capacity to ideas and norms of anti-Americanism, propose your policy recommendation to shape a better future. Have US national policies been helpful? If not, could they be changed? In summary: with respect to oil in particular and broad issues of IP in general, are there any bases in domestic politics [anywhere] for optimism regarding better global policy on issues of Human Security—particularly policy options to respond to the spread of WMD, global warming, health epidemics, human rights violations, refugees, and incentives shaping terrorism.. Readings: *NIS, CIA, 2020 Report (2004), with attention to scenarios proposed [on BB] *John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond,” IO, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 139-174. *Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” FA, March/April, 1999, pp. 35-49. *Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era (2002), chs. 1-3, 8. **See the film “Syriana” if possible. *Re-read the chapters from Keohane and Katzenstein (forthcoming). *Robert McNamara, “Apocalypse Soon,” FP, May/June, 2005. on BB *Daniel Yergin, The Prize, (1991) passim.

32 Open Society Institute, “Covering Oil” (2005) peruse. John Ikenberry, “Market Solutions for State Problems,” IO, Winter, 1988. On BB. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984), chs 8-10 David Lake, Entangling Relations, (1999), pp.198-298. Bernard Mommer, “The Governance of International Oil,” Oxford Papers (2000). [on BB]. Michael Klare, Blood and Oil; The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum. (2004). John Blair. The Control of Oil (1978). Sampson, Anthony The Seven Sisters (1975)—along with Blair’s book this a fine background to oil politics and the role of multinationals and governments in shaping world markets and supplies. Gawdat Bahgat , “Oil and Terrorism: Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Fall, 2005, pp. 265-284 Toyin Falola and Ann Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry (2005) George Philip. The Political Economy of International Oil (1994). Toby Shelley, Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet (2005). Oxford Oil Review (2000) on BB. Jim Schultz, “Follow the Money” (2005) Open Society study advocating greater transparency. On BB. Review Oil background at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9484/global_oil_trends.html Terry Karl, The Paradox of Plenty. (1997). Anthony Cordesman. Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: the Military and International Security Dimensions. (2003) Human Rights Watch. The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities (1999). Online at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/nigeria/ Sam Fletcher, "Former CPA advisor's hopes high for Iraqi oil industry," Oil and Gas Journal, June, 2004. John Ikenberry, “Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacity of American Government” IO (1988). Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (1996), ch. 5, 9. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and IOs (2001). Stephen Walt, Taming American Power (2005). Tony Saich, “Globalization and China,” in Nye and Donahue, eds. Ch. 9. Barry O'Neill, Honors, Symbols and War, (1999) ch. 13 Proliferation issues are found in a diverse array of sources. Here are a few below. Likewise, environmental sustainability issues can be found at a wide array of locations from journals to advocacy group web sites. Some are below:.

33 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (1996), chs. 2, 4. Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," IO, Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 101-145. John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” FA, January/February 2005 Ashton B. Carter, “How to Counter WMD, FA, September/October 2004 Graham Allison, “How to Stop Nuclear Terror, FA, January/February 2004 Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Duty to Prevent,” FA, January/February, 2004. Michael A. Levi, Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Future of Arms Control, (2005) reviewed in FA, Jan/Feb, 2006. Audie Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests,” IO, Vol. 49, No. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 451-478. Jonathon Schell, "The Folly of Arms Control," FA, September/October, 2000, 22-46. Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," FA, January/February, 1998. George Perkovich, "Nuclear Proliferation," Foreign Policy, Fall, 1998, pp. 12-23. Selig S. Harrison, Did North Korea Cheat?” FA, January/February 2005 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (1981). Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution (1981).

Topics:

1. Track a specific contemporary challenge, e.g. long term natural resources depletion, struggles over contol of oil markets, migration, and the diffusion of WMD. Highlight the “hot spots” that the challenge presents to global interests. Having explained how trends in the area are a challenge, indicate what policies would be most appropriate. Do these vary between ones aimed to serve the interests of the most powerful states and peoples and ones for global interests? What policies are likely to occur/continue? Why? Are there any elements in the trends you foresee in this issue are that are self-correcting or which should issues become overheated and dangerous might self-regulate or give us hope that adjustments can occur to shocks without depending on key leaders and states? 2. Take an environmentalist and conservationist perspective with respect to current burning of hydrocarbons; from this perspective offer a critique of what practices are most dangerous and what practices are most readily changed toward better outcomes for the environment and sustainability. What are the weak links in the current system that offer promise for policy reform, and what are the “tough nuts” to crack regarding reform, and why?

3. Imagine you are asked to prescribe conditions for strengthening or creating governance institutions to

deal with “global problems.” What would you include as priority conditions? Would you recommend military conflict in the next 15 years as a way to secure this outcome? What “peaceful” path [s] can you trace by which such an outcome would occur? Is the US an “essential” state for delivering “peaceful” outcomes in this project? Use the US role in Iraq after March, 2003 to illustrate.

4. Reconsider the democratic peace argument. Reread Doyle, the Russett and Oneal book, etc. What

further changes inside states, if any, are important to achieve the heralded “end of history?” Will social and political liberties, social capital, and open economies continue to spread? Did the Clinton and Bush administration believe in the democratic peace theory? Why? What effects do you see resulting? What changes in the “theory” do you recommend to enhance its accuracy?

345. Consider the future relations among regions of states—Asia, Islamic, Hispanic, African, etc. Consider

the ease with which anger is mobilized over issues such as Japanese atrocities in WWII or cartoons of Mohammed. How likely will cultural and historical understandings that mobilize anger prevent further integration and/or development of institutions that accommodate cultural/religious/historical differences? Are there paths toward greater harmony of perspectives among global residents? What are these or why do none exist?

Questions to consider by all—in your one page thought paper preparation [esp. for nono-writers]---

1) Study one of the Arab oil-producing countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United

Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar) and link your analysis of the IPE of oil to domestic stability and contributions of the jurisdiction to global governance stability and its behavior as an oil supplier to goals for the international market in oil. What conclusions does this case yield?

2) Study one of the major non-Arab exporters: Norway, Iran, Russia, Nigeria, Indonesia, Venezuela, and

Mexico. What are the strategies of this country in its policies on production and its use of income from this? How does this compare with the historic and current strategies of multinational companies, such as Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, British Petroleum, or Royal Dutch Shell or one of the newer companies founded by the oil exporters, such as Saudi Aramco and the Kuwait Petroleum Company? In the relation of state versus corporate management of supply and markets, which type agency best serves global interests of price stability and rational use of a scarce resource?

3) Why was OPEC founded? Why was IAE founded? From the writings of Keohane and others about

this, what lessons about international institutions and their limitations would you propose? Is OPEC a monopoly or what kind of entity is it from an economic standpoint? From a political standpoint? How successful will collaboration on oil pricing, production, and investment of earnings prove to be with respect to the goals of the principals in OPEC? How would you organize the world with respect to this limited and important natural resource?

4) Are we facing an “oil shock” in 2006? Why are current conditions similar or different than in the 1971-74

era? Or the 1979-80 and 1990-91 eras when price spikes occurred. Is the current practices in oil markets—prices, earnings, use of these—a blessing or danger for international goals such as peace and prosperity? Why; and what do you forecast will happen as a result of current high prices for oil?

5) How should we describe the emerging world system? Do terms such as unipolar, multi-polar, uni-multi or imperial apply? Write an essay summarizing your views about the analysis of uneven growth and changing political strategy that builds upon and corrects the work of earlier scholars, e.g. Gilpin, Huntington [Lonely Superpower] and others such as Walt, Kupchan, Keohane and Nye. Is a stable equilibrium possible in a world without a hegemonic state?

6) What systemic level forces threaten peace in the 21st century? Discuss various threats to stability from

uneven development, resource scarcity, migration, and the like. Draw on week 13 arguments by authors such as Michael Klare and assess how persuasive you find the notion of resource scarcity politics.

7) What inside-the-state forces are a threat to the values of people and the natural resources of the planet

in the decade ahead? Consider such factors as a failure of US “leadership,” including the continued role of US military; a rise of political entrepreneurship in regional powers that rests on aggression for internal power; the growth of power of non-state actors, including terrorists and uncontrolled for profit enterprises [Mafia or Pharmaceuticals as described in LeCarre’s novel].