international politics

WWI (1914-1918)Power Transition Theory

POL130 Intro to International RelationsWeek Seven (7.2/updated:20150224)

February 26, 2015

POL130 Intro to International Relations


Outline

1 WWI (1914-1918)

2 Power Transition Theory



The Allies versus The Central Powers

Participants in WWI:

The Allies: UK, France, Russia, Belgium, Italy, United States,Serbia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, China, Greece, Guatemala,Honduras, Panama, Portugal, Siam, etc.

The Central Powers: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,Ottoman Empire, etc.



July 14, 2014 France

Image Source:http://www.statesmanjournal.com/picture-gallery/news/2014/07/14/bastille-day-ceremony-on-the-champs-elyses/12634437/POL130 Intro to International Relations

http://www.statesmanjournal.com/picture-gallery/news/2014/07/14/bastille-day-ceremony-on-the-champs-elyses/12634437/



Image Source:http://www.statesmanjournal.com/picture-gallery/news/2014/07/14/bastille-day-ceremony-on-the-champs-elyses/12634437/POL130 Intro to International Relations




Image Source: http://www.nbcnews.com/news/europe/happy-bastille-day-celebrations-take-place-across-france-n155961


http://www.nbcnews.com/news/europe/happy-bastille-day-celebrations-take-place-across-france-n155961

http://www.nbcnews.com/news/europe/happy-bastille-day-celebrations-take-place-across-france-n155961


The Triple Entente (1907) versusThe Triple Alliance (1882-1915)



Pre-1914 Alliances: the Triple Alliance

The Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary(1879-1918)

“Germany and Austria-Hungary pledged assistance if oneparty was attacked by Russia and at least neutrality ifattacked by another power.” (Conybeare and Sandler 1990)

Italy joined in 1882 –> the Triple Alliance (1882-1915)

“The triple alliance treaty reuiqred aid by the other twoparties if one of them were attacked by France or becameinvolved in a war with two or more other great powers andneutrality if one member initiated war with a nonmember.”(Conybeare and Sandler 1990)



Pre-1914 Alliances: the Triple Entente (Conybeare andSandler 1990)

The Franco-Russia military convention (1893)

Both pledged support for the other if one party wasattacked by a Triple Alliance power as long as Germanywas involved either directly or in a supportive role.The Anglo-French Entente (1904)

UK and France settled colonia disputes.The Anglo-Russian Entente (1907)



UK-Germany Antagonism (Chong and Hall 2014)

Germany’s WeltpolitikNaval Law (1898) –> shipbuilding program

Britain launched 29 capital ships and Germany 17Germany’s naval budget doubled, and Britain’s navalestimates increased by over 40%.



Germany’s Weltpolitik (cont.)In 1897, Bernhard von Bulow announced, “We definitely donot feel the need to have a finger in every pie. But webelieve it is inadvisable, from the outset, to excludeGermany from competition with other nations in lands witha rich and promising future. The days when Germansgranted one neighbor the earth, the other the sea, andreserved for themselves the sky, where pure doctrinereigns–those days are over... In short, we do not want toput anyone in our shadow, but we also demand our place inthe sun.”



Paul Kennedy: “An assassination in the Balkans may haveprovided the ‘spark’ for war... Yet, so far as the British andGermany government were concerned, the 1914-1918 conflictwas essentially entered into because the former power wished topreserve the existing status quo whereas the latter... was takingsteps to alter it.”



The Shifting Balance in the World

Iron/Steel Production of the Powers, 1890-1938(millions of tons; pig-iron production for 1890, steel thereafter)(Kennedy 1987, 200)

1890 1900 1910 1913 1920 1930 1938United States 9.3 10.3 26.5 31.8 42.3 41.3 28.8Britain 8.0 5.0 6.5 7.7 9.2 7.4 10.5Germany 4.1 6.3 13.6 17.6 7.6 11.3 23.2France 1.9 1.5 3.4 4.6 2.7 9.4 6.1Austria-Hungary 0.97 1.1 2.1 2.6 - - -Russia 0.95 2.2 3.5 4.8 0.16 5.7 18.0Japan 0.02 - 0.16 0.25 0.84 2.3 7.0Italy 0.01 0.11 0.73 0.93 0.73 1.7 2.3




Energy Consumption of the Powers, 1890-1938(in millions of metric tons of coal equivalent)(Kennedy 1987,201)

1890 1900 1910 1913 1920 1930 1938United States 147 248 483 541 694 762 697Britain 145 171 185 195 212 184 196Germany 71 112 158 187 159 177 228France 36 47.9 55 62.5 65 97.5 84Austria-Hungary 19.7 29 40 49.4 - - -Russia 10.9 30 41 54 14.3 65 177Japan 4.6 4.6 15.4 23 34 55.8 96.5Italy 4.5 5 9.6 11 14.3 24 27.8




Total Industrial Potential of the Powers in Relative Perspective,1880-1938 (Kennedy 1987, 201)

1880 1900 1913 1928 1938United States 46.9 127.8 298.1 533 528Britain 73.3 [100] 127.2 135 181Germany 27.4 71.2 137.7 158 214France 25.1 36.8 57.3 82 74Austria-Hungary 14 25.6 40.7 - -Russia 24.5 47.5 76.6 72 152Japan 7.6 13 25.1 45 88Italy 8.1 13.6 25.1 45 88




Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output, 1880-1938(Kennedy 1987, 202)

1880 1900 1913 1928 1938United States 14.7 23.6 32.0 39.3 31.4Britain 22.9 18.5 13.6 9.9 10.7Germany 8.5 13.2 14.8 11.6 12.7France 7.8 6.8 6.1 6.0 4.4Austria-Hungary 4.4 4.7 4.4 - -Russia 7.6 8.8 8.2 5.3 9.0Italy 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.7 2.8



Great powers in different periods (1820-1989)

Periods Great Powers1820-39 UK, FRN, GMY, AUH, RUS1840-59 UK, FRN, GMY, AUH, RUS1860-79 UK, FRN, GMY, AUH, RUS, ITA1880-99 UK, FRN, GMY, AUH, RUS, ITA1990-13 UK, FRN, GMY, AUH, RUS, ITA, USA, JAP1919-39 UK, FRN, GMY, RUS, ITA, USA, JAP1946-55 UK, FRN, RUS, USA1956-89 UK, FRN, RUS, USA, CHN



Balance-of-Power Theory

Pre-1914



Balance-of-Power Theory (cont.)

Power equilibrium preserves peace.Power preponderance precipitates war.



Power Transition TheoryMain Argument

Organski (1958)

Parity leads to war whereas preponderance leads to peace.

Or more accurately, “The combination of power paritybetween challenger and dominant state combined with thechallenger’s negative evaluation of the status quo providedthe necessary condition for war.”



Power Transition TheorySeveral Assumptions

HierarchyStatus quo states & Revisionist statesDifferential growth ratesRational expectationsAlliance ties are relatively rigid.War fixes the outcome for the remainder of the transition.



Key questions

To use force or not?

When? (The timing of war)



The Logic of Overtaking (Morrow 1998)Decision Tree



This one is a lot better!RS & DS’s expected utilities for war

URS(Status quo)

E(utilities)

Time

Declining State (DS)

Rising State (RS)

Fig.1



DS’s expected utilities for war

E(utilities)

Time

Declining State (DS)

Fig.2



RS’s expected utilities for war

URS(Status quo)

E(utilities)

Time

Rising State (RS)

Fig.3



DS’s decision during a power transition

E(utilities)

t

DS

Figure 4. DS’s value forresisting a challenge (inyellow)

E(utilities)

t

DS)

Figure 5. DS’s value foracquiescing to a challenge (inorange)



What can we conclude from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5?

Costs of War < Yellow Area - Orange Area,DS then resists.

Costs of War > Yellow Area - Orange Area,DS then submits.

Cost of War = Yellow Area - Orange Area,tcrit



DS’s decision during a power transition

t1

E(utilities)

t0

DS

Figure 6. DS’s expected utilities for acquiescing now (t0) andresisting a challenge later (t1)



Let’s look at Fig.4 & Fig.6

E(utilities)

t

DS

Figure 4. DS’s value forresisting a challenge

t1

E(utilities)

t0

DS

Figure 6. DS’s value foracquiescing now and resistinga challenge later



Conclusion: DS prefers resiting now to acuiqescing now &fighting later.



We have already discussed DS’s decision during a powertransition, let’s begin to talk about RS’s decision.



URS(SQ)

E(utilities)

t tcrit

RS

Fig.7 RS’s expected value for waiting until the critical time tochallenge (in yellow)



URS(SQ)

E(utilities)

t

RS

Fig.8 RS’s expected value for war now (in orange)



Let’s put Fig.7 & Fig.8 side by side.

URS(SQ)

E(utilities)

t tcrit

RS

Fig.7 RS’s expected value forwaiting until the critical timeto challenge (in yellow)

URS(SQ)

E(utilities)

t

RS

Fig.8 RS’s expected value forwar now (in orange)



RS’s expected value for war

URS(SQ)

E(utilities)

t tcrit

RS

Figure 9. RS’s value for war now (in orange) and RS’s value forwaiting (in yellow)



Conclusion

Orange Area < Yellow Area, RS prefers waiting to war attime t.

Orange Area - Yellow Area > Costs of War, RS prefers warto waiting.



A question still remains.

When does RS strikes if it prefers war?



What are the problems in this model?


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