1

PRINCIPLESOFINTERNATIONALLAW

INTRODUCTION

PartAof this paperbeginswith a brief overviewof the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) and the law governing it. In Part B, the authorwill endeavour to

answer the question by evaluating the development of specific areas in

internationallawbytheICJ.PartCcontainsananalysisoftheinherentnatureof

the ICJ whilst Part D deals with the enforcement of ICJ judgments before

concludingwhether the ICJ is capable of being a credible champion of human

rights(HR).

PARTA

LAW

TheICJistheprincipaljudicialorganoftheUnitedNations(UN).Unlikenational

courts,theICJdoesnothaveautomaticjurisdiction.

JURISDICTION

TheICJ’sjurisdictioncanbesplitintotwodistinctparts:

1) Capacitytodecidedisputesbetweenstates

2) Capacitytogiveadvisoryopinionswhenrequestedsotodobyparticular

qualifiedentities.

PARTIESTOTHEICJ

Article 34 of the Statute of the ICJ declares that only statesmay be parties in

casesbeforetheICJ.Article93oftheUNCharterprovidesthatallUNmembers

areipsofactopartiestotheStatuteoftheICJ.

ARTICLE36(1)STATUTEOFTHEICJ

ThejurisdictionoftheICJcomprisesofallcasesthatthepartiesrefertoitandall

matters specially provided for in the Charter of the UN or in treaties and

conventionsinforce.

ARTICLE36(2)STATUTEOFTHEICJ

2

The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they

recogniseascompulsoryipsofactoandwithoutspecialagreement,inrelationto

any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the ICJ in all

legaldisputesconcerning:

a) Theinterpretationofatreaty;

b) Anyquestionofinternationallaw;

c) Theexistenceofanyfactwhich,ifestablished,wouldconstituteabreach

ofaninternationalobligation;

d) Thenature or extent of the reparation to bemade for the breach of an

internationalobligation.

In the instance that these declarations are conditional, the ICJ will only have

jurisdiction underArticle 36(2) to the extent that both the declarations of the

twopartiesindisputecoverthesameissueorissues.

PARTB

ICJ’SCONTRIBUTIONTOTHEDEVELOPMENTOFHRLAW

Firstly, inCorfuChannel1and later theNicaragua2, the ICJ interpretedcommon

Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to cover both internal and international

armedconflicts.ThesignificanceofthisisthatcommonArticle3wassetupwith

theintentiontocreateaminimumhumanitarianstandardapplicableexclusively

tointernalarmedconflicts.However,theICJexpandeditsapplicabilitytocover

internationalarmedconflicts3.

In 1996, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) requested an advisory

opinion (AO) on the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons under

Article6InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)4.Although

theICJdidnottakeastandontheissue,BrunoSimmaopinesthatalthoughthe1(UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandv.Albania)(1949)< http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=cd&case=1>accessed25thApril20142MilitaryandParamilitaryActivitiesinandagainstNicaragua(Nicaraguav.UnitedStatesofAmerica),1984ICJREP.392June27,1986 3FabianO.Raimondo,‘TheInternationalCourtofJusticeasaGuardianoftheUnityofHumanitarianLaw’,(2007)LeidenJournalofInternationalLaw,20,593-611,p598-5994LegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,InternationalCourtofJustice,AdvisoryOpinionof8July1996,GeneralListNo.95)

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replytothequestionwasnotparticularlygroundbreaking,whatisremarkable

isthatforthefirsttimetheICJ issquarelyfacinganddevelopingaviewonthe

humanrightsquestion5.

In the PalestineWall AO6, the ICJ found that the construction of a barrier by

Israeloutside its internationallyrecognisedborderstobeaviolationofHR.On

topofthat,theICJalsoconcludedthatHRinstrumentsareapplicable‘inrespect

of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own

territory’ 7 . This extraterritorial applicability of HR instruments was later

affirmedinthecaseofCongovUganda8.Inaddition,thiscasealsomarksthefirst

time in the ICJ’s history that a finding of human rights and humanitarian law

violationswereincludedinthedispositive9.

Lastly, in Diallo10whose noteworthiness stems from the fact that although

allegationsofviolationsunderinternationaleconomiclawwereprioritisedover

Diallo’s human rights in Guinea’s original application, once the Court declined

jurisdiction on the economic law claims, ‘the human rights aspects rose like a

phoenix from the ashes of the case’ and was given precedence in the final

judgmentoftheCourt11.

ThisdemonstratesthewillingnessoftheICJtoadjudicateonHRmatters,evenin

the instancewhere theparties to thecasehadnotprioritised it in theoriginal

application.ThismarksastarkcontrastfromthecoyapproachtheICJadoptedin

itsearlierdays.

5BrunoSimma,‘MainstreamingHumanRights:TheContributionoftheInternationalCourtofJustice’,JInt.Disp.Settlement(2012)3(1):7-29,196AdvisoryOpinionConcerningLegalConsequencesoftheConstructionofaWallintheOccupiedPalestinianTerritory,ICJReports,2004<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm>accessed30thApril2014 7ibid,paragraph1118ArmedActivitiesontheTerritoryoftheCongo(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongovUganda),Judgment,ICJRep2005,1689ibid5,1910CaseConcerningAhmadouSadioDiallo,RepublicofGuineavDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,GeneralListNo10311Ibid5,21

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Another reason why Diallo’s case is noteworthy is because when assessing

Diallo’s individualhumanrights, the ICJmadenoattemptofreconciling itwith

therightsofDiallo’shomestate.Theauthoropinesthatthisisamilestoneasit

indicates thewillingnessof the ICJ todecideon the individual’sHR, insteadof

makingitsubservienttotherightsofthehomestates.12

PARTC

THEDEVELOPMENTOFSPECIFICAREASOFINTERNATIONALLAW

EXTRATERRITORIALAPPLICATIONOFHRTREATIES

From the aforementioned Congo v Uganda and the Wall AO, the ICJ in the

Namibia AO13stated ‘the lack of any title to administer a territory does not

releaseastatefromitsobligationsunderinternationallawasthebasisofState

liabilityforactsaffectingotherStatesisthephysicalcontroloftheterritory’14.

RalphWildesubmits that thesignificanceof this is that itestablishedthebasic

underpinning of extraterritorial applicability, namely, that state responsibility

should not be limited to situations where a State enjoys title. Secondly, the

requirementof ‘physicalcontrolover territory’asabasisofdeterminingwhen

shouldobligations arisehasbeenadoptedby theECHR in its interpretationof

themeaningof‘jurisdiction’.15

Thesedecisionsforegroundapproachesadoptedbyhumanrightstreatybodies

(HRTB) themselves, so it canbe said that theground-breakingdecisionon the

extraterritorialapplicationofHRlawcamefromtheICJ,notfromaHRTB.16

12ibid5,2113LegalConsequencesforStatesoftheContinuedPresenceofSouthAfricainNamibia(SouthWestAfrica)notwithstandingSecurityCouncilResolution276(1970)AdvisoryOpinionof21June1971,[1971]ICJRep.16,at5714Ibid,para118.15RalphWilde,‘HumanRightsBeyondBordersattheWorldCourt:TheSignificanceoftheInternationalCourtofJustice'sJurisprudenceontheExtraterritorialApplicationofInternationalHumanRightsLawTreaties’,(2013)ChineseJournalofInternationalLaw,12(3):639-677,66316Ibid,page664

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Inaddition,beforetheICJruledontheseissues,theextraterritorialapplicability

oftheterm‘jurisdiction’whenusedinHRtreatieswaslimitedtoaffirmationby

the UNHRC and the Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), whose

interpretationscouldberejected,astheyarenon-judicialandnon-binding17.

One can draw inspiration from the ECHR case of Bankovic18to illustrate a

potentialproblemwiththeapplicabilityofHRtreaties.Thisiswhereaparticular

actiontakenbyaStateintheterritoryofanotherStatewouldnotbegovernedby

theConventionobligationsofthefirstStateifthesecondStateisnotpartytothe

Convention, even if it fallswithin the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the treaty.

This loopholeprovedcostly in theECHRas itdecided that theapplicationwas

inadmissible as the actwas committed outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR19.

However,whenasimilarsituationpresenteditselfbeforetheICJinthePalestine

Wall AO, the ICJ rejected the view of the ECHR in Bankovic and held Israel

accountableforitsbreachesofitsHRobligations20.

PROVISIONALMEASURES

In theApplicationof theConventionon thePreventionandPunishmentof the

CrimeofGenocide(BosniaandHerzegovinav.SerbiaandMontenegro)21,theICJ

only awarded provisionalmeasures to ‘prevent the commission of genocide’22

while refusing todoso inmattersoutside its jurisdiction.The ICJ justified this

refusalbyclaimingthatthepurposeofprovisionalmeasuresareonlytoprotect

therightsthataresubjecttothedispute23.

InLaGrand24,twoGermanbrothersweresubjectedtocapitalpunishmentinthe

United States (US). Germany alleges that the US had been in breach of its

17Ibid15,pages664-66618BankovicandOthersvBelgiumandOthers,App.No.52207/99,Eur.Ct.H.R.(2001) 19ibid15,page671-67220ibid15,page67321GeneralListNo.9122ibid,paragraph5223RosalynHiggins,‘TheInternationalCourtofJusticeandHumanRights’,inThemesandTheories-SelectedEssays,SpeechesandWritingsinInternationalLaw(Oxford2009)Volume1,page65124(Germanyv.UnitedStatesofAmerica),ICJ,27June2001

6

obligationstoinformthebrothersoftheirrighttoconsularnotificationswithout

delay25.PendingthejudgmentoftheICJ,theUShadexecutedoneoftheLaGrand

brothers.Asaresultofthis,theICJruledthatitsprovisionalmeasuresconstitute

legallybindingobligationsunderinternationallaw26.

ThisissignificantbecausetheICJheredepartedfromitsinter-Statenatureand

providedaremedy(albeitaprovisionalone)toanamedindividual.

STATE’SIMMUNITY

IntheArrestWarrant27case,theICJheldthattheissuanceofthearrestwarrant

for the former Foreign Minister of Congo on the grounds of crimes against

humanitytobeinbreachofBelgium’sinternationalobligationstowardsCongo28.

ThiswaslateraffirmedintheJurisdictionalImmunitiesofTheState29casethat

involved war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Third

Reich’s armed forces during the SecondWorldWar30. In its decision, although

the ICJ admitted that there ‘was a serious violation of the international law of

armedconflict’,31itconcludedthat‘aStateisnotdeprivedofimmunitybyreason

of the fact that it isaccusedof seriousviolationsof internationalhumanrights

lawortheinternationallawofarmedconflict’.32

TheICJwentontostatethat ‘immunityisgovernedbyinternationallawandis

notamerematterofcomity’33.Subsequently,theICJsubmittedthatjuscogensis

a substantive rule while State’s immunity is procedural in character. The

consequenceofthisdistinctionisthatintheeventjuscogensisviolated,itdoes

notaffecttheoperationofState’simmunity34.

25Article36(1)(b)oftheViennaConventionofConsularRelations26ibid24,paragraph11527CaseConcerningtheArrestWarrantof11April2000(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongov.Belgium),ICJREP3,14February200228ibid,paragraph7029(Germanyv.Italy:Greeceintervening),2012<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=143&p3=4>accessed1stMay201430ibid5,2531ibid29,paragraph5232ibid29,paragraph9133ibid29,paragraph5334ibid29,paragraph97

7

AnunfavourableeffectoftheJurisdictionalImmunitiesoftheStatecaseisthatit

impedestheprovisionofreparationtothevictimsofcrimes.JudgeYusufopines

that‘stateimmunityshouldnotbeusedasascreentoavoidreparationstowhich

victims of crimes are entitled’35, while Judge Trindade similarly stressed the

point that State immunity should not be blindly upheld in amanner thatmay

lead to a denial of justice for the victims of international crimes.36 These

dissentingopinionsarenotwithoutmeritastheItalianandGreeknationalswere

left uncompensated for their suffering. Judge Lauterpacht argues that

internationalcrimescommittedbyStatesshouldnotgounpunishedinthename

of realpolitik, comity, dignity of States, or good relations between nations, in

completedisregardforjusticeandotherconsiderations.37.38

PARTD

THEINHERENTNATUREOFTHEICJ

CONSENTBASEDJURISDICTION

Right out of the starting block, the ICJ’s credibility to champion HR is held

hostagetotheparties’wishestoincludeorexcludeHRclaimsintheirlitigation.39

This problem was evidenced in the Armed Activities on the Territory of the

Congo40, where the most horrendous post-Second World War genocide had

occurred.However,theICJhadnojurisdictiontoprosecuteRwandaasRwanda

hadexcludedbywayofreservationthelegaleffectoftheGenocideConvention.

Situationslikethisleavethevictim-Stateswithoutanyrecourseintheeventthe

otherStatehasareservationagainsttheICJ’sjurisdiction41.

35ibid29,DissentingOpinionofJudgeYusuf,paragraph5036ibid29,DissentingOpinionofJudgeTrindade,paragraph21237HerschLauterpacht,‘TheProblemofJurisdictionalImmunitiesofForeignStates’(1951)28BritishYearbookofInternationalLaw220,at23138OnderBakircioglu,‘GermanyvItaly:TheTriumphofSovereignImmunityoverHumanRightsLaw’(2012)InternationalHumanRightsLawReview,Volume1,Issue1,pages93-10939ibid5,page1840(DemocraticRepublicoftheCongovUganda)(2005)<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=51&case=116&>accessed29thApril201441ibid5,page20

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On the other hand, due to the consent-based jurisdiction, the ICJ views HR

violationsasamatterofStateresponsibility,or‘lawbystatesforstates’42.This

meanstheindividualvictimwillremaininvisiblebeforetheeyesoftheICJ.Soin

the instance where the State decides to espouse their claims, the spirit of

Mavrommatiswillprevailandessentiallycharacterisethecase43.Thisplacesthe

ICJinastructurallydeficientpositioncomparedtotheHRTBinpromotingHR44.

However,theauthorsubmitsthatthishasnotpreventedtheICJfromawarding

individualremediestovictimsasseeninthecasesofLaGrandandDiallo.

On top of that, Bruno Simma opines that due to the ICJ’s consent based

jurisdiction,itmightbeproblematicifitassumesabiggerroleinthefieldofHR.

This,hesubmits, isduetoStates ‘all toooftenbehavinglikefoxesguardingthe

well-beingofchickensinhumanrightsmatters’, thusmakingthemreluctantto

submit before the ICJ’s adjudication. For example, a State might receive an

unpleasant surprise when it wholly consents to the ICJ’s jurisdiction with the

expectationof traditional litigationcases,only to findout thatotherStatesare

submittingapplicationsforittoupholditsHRobligations45.

This factor might prove irrelevant for HRTB, but not for the ICJ as it has

adjudicatoryobligationsinotherareasoflawaswell,soitcannotaffordtotake

the risk of losing its clients. However, the ICJ did not balk when deciding the

QuestionsConcerning theObligation toProsecuteorExtradite46case thatdealt

withthe1984UNConventionAgainstTorture(CAT).ThepositionofBelgiumas

an applicant in this case is unique as itwas a non-injured State as none of its

citizenswerevictimsoftorture. Instead,claimedasa ‘speciallyaffected’47State

asnon-performanceoftheCATobligationswillaffectitsrightsasapartytothe

CAT48.

42RobertMcCorquodale,‘ImpactonStateResponsibility,in:MennoT.KammingaandMartinScheinin,‘TheImpactofHumanRightsLawonGeneralInternationalLaw’(OUP2009),235,236.43ibid5,page1644ibid15,page64945ibid5,pages27-2846(BelgiumvSenegal)<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=144>accessed2ndMay201447Article42oftheILC's1981DraftArticles48ibid5,page24

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TheresultofthiscaseisinterestingastheICJhadallowedapartywhichhadnot

been injured by the respondents to submit a claim before it, and might be a

precursortowhatistocomewherenon-injuredStatescanupholdotherStates

toitsTreatyobligationsthroughthe‘speciallyaffected’stateargument.

THEICJASAGENERALISTINTERNATIONALCOURT

Asmentionedabove,theICJviewsHRissuesasamatterofStateresponsibility.

ThisarguablyaffectstheICJ’swillingnesstogointodetailwhenapplyingthelaw

tothefactsinHRcases.JudgeHigginsconcurswiththisviewandexpressesher

reservations towards the quality of the ICJ’s substantive determination in

applying the law to the facts49. This situation is contrasted with those of the

HRTBwhosefunctionistoexamineindetailtheconductofStatespartiestoeach

oftheHRtreaties.

InspiteofthesecommentsaboutthevalueoftheICJinapplyingHRlawwhena

HRTBalreadyperformsthefunction,itisarguedthatthepotentialroleoftheICJ

on the issue of the meaning and interpretation of the law (distinct from its

applicationof the law to the facts) isofadifferentcharacter50.This isbecause

questions of the law requires considerable intellectual deliberation, something

whichtheICJisinnoworsepositionthanthespecialistbodiestodealwith.51

RalphWildearguesthattheICJdiffersfromspecialisttribunalsinthepotential

breadthof applicable lawat itsdisposal52. Furthermore, the ICJ as a generalist

body also has a long-standing practice of applying different areas of laws

simultaneously,thussettingitapartfromtheTreaty-specificHRTB.Thisisvital

as States are bound by multiple HR treaties, and besides the reviews by the

UNHRC,theICJ is inauniquepositionas ithas jurisdictiontoadjudicateonall

HR treaties. Consequently, the author opines that the ICJ adds value in this

instance to the championing of HR as it is able to examine the entire legal

49ibid4,SeparateOpinionofJudgeHiggins,paragraph950ibid28,page64951ibid28,page651-65252ibid28,page652

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picture,andnotmerelyasubsetofittoofferacompleteapplicationofHRtothe

partiestothecase.53

Another way the ICJ is championing human rights is when the ICJ adopts

decisions or interpretations of treaty bodies, and vice versa which improves

consistency,thusstrengtheningtheprotectionofHR.5455

However, the question that begs to be answered is whether the ICJ ismerely

followingthedecisionsofHRTBorisitmakingitsowninroadsintothefieldof

HR? The answer to this was provided in Part C of this paper where it was

established that the ICJ had developed two areas of international law, namely,

theextraterritorialapplicabilityofHRobligationsandprovisionalmeasures.

MartinScheininforwardsaninterestingpropositioninwhichtheICJcanplaya

complimentary role with the HRTB. This is because it is ultimately the UNGA

whoconsiderstheannualreportsofthesebodies56,andintheinstanceofnon-

complianceofdecisions,theUNGAcanrequestforanadvisoryopinionfromthe

ICJ. This in a sense makes the ICJ a sort of ‘appeal court’ for the HRTB to

strengthen theHRdecisions57.This forexamplewasdemonstrated in theWall

AOcasewheretheICJaffirmedtheUNHRC’sinterpretationofICCPRArticle2.58

JUDICIALCONSERVATISM

Firstly, the author considers the ICJ’s decision in the Bosnia-Herzegovina v

Yugoslaviacase,whichJudgeHigginsarguesisevidenceofjudicialconservatism

in the field of HR. The case here concerned the continuing obligation to the

Genocide Convention after a State party to that Convention disintegrates. In

coming to its decision, the ICJ ignored the UNHCR’s continuing obligation

53ibid28,page67754SandeshSivakumaran,‘TheInternationalCourtofJusticeandHumanRights’,in:SarahJosephandAdamMcBeth,‘ResearchHandbookonInternationalHumanRightsLaw’(EdwardElgarPress2010),299,pages303-305.55ibid15,page65156Article45ICCPR57MartinScheinin,TheICJandtheIndividual',9Int'lComm.L.Rev.1232007,page13558ibid6,paragraphs110-111

11

argumentandcontemporaryStatepracticeofthattime59atoptednottodecide

on whether previous Convention obligations extend to the new territory

formed.60

More recently, in the NuclearWeapons AO, the ICJ again opted to not take a

standonthelegalityofthethreatanduseofnuclearweapons61.

PARTD

ENFORCEMENTOFTHEICJDECISIONS

Article94(1)oftheCharteroftheICJsetsoutthateveryUNmemberundertakes

tocomplywiththedecisionoftheICJinanycasewhichitisparty.Accordingto

ShabtaiRosenne,thereasonwhythisprovisionisabsentintheStatuteoftheICJ

is because non-compliancemay give rise to new political tensions62. To avoid

this, thepost-adjudication responsibilitywasmandated to theSecurityCouncil

(SC)63.However,theproblemthatstemsfromthisisthattheSCappearstohave

discretion as towhether it shall act to enforce at all, and if so,what concrete

measuresitdecidestotake.

This problem manifested in the Nicaragua case, where Nicaragua sought for

recourse from the SC under Article 94(2) for the non-compliance of the ICJ

judgmentdated27thJune1986.Subsequentlywhenitwasputtothevote,itwas

notadoptedowingtothenegativevetoofaSCPermanentMember, theUnited

StatesofAmerica(US).

Thosewhoabstained fromvoting, (France,ThailandandUK)didnotobject to

the validity of the ICJ’s decision but instead, abstained due to purely political

considerationsoftheramificationsoftheICJ’sdecision.64.Itistonotethathereit

59MennoKamminga,‘StateSuccessioninRespectofHumanRightsTreaties’,(1996)7EJIL469,page48260ibid23,pages645-64661ibid23,pages643-64462ShabtaiRosenne,‘TheLawandPracticeoftheInternationalCourt1920–1996’,(1997)24963Article94(2)UNCharter64AttilaTanzi,‘ProblemsofEnforcementofDecisionsoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeandtheLawoftheUnitedNations’,(1995)6EJIL1-572,pages6-7

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wasalsodecidedthatapartytothedisputedecideduponbytheICJiseligibleto

voteonthedraftresolutionunderArticle94(2).65

PARTE

CONCLUSION

Theauthorinthisessayhasprovidedacomprehensiveviewonbothdecisionsof

the ICJ and also the areas of HR law it has developed. With regards to the

approachtocases,thisauthorsubmitsthatiftherewaseveratimewheretheICJ

washesitanttowardsHRaspectsofacase,thiselementhasdisappearednowas

proveninthecaseofDiallo66.

TheICJhasalsosuccessfullycontributedtothedevelopmentofinternationallaw

to protect HR as seen in its decisions in PalestineWall AO and Namibia that

expanded the obligations under HR instruments’ to apply extraterritorially.

Furthermore, the ICJ can also award internationally binding provisional

measures on HR grounds to protect rights of individuals. However, the

effectivenessofthisisstillrestrainedbythejurisdictionconferredtotheICJby

theStates.

TheinherentnatureoftheICJasageneralistinternationaladjudicatorybodyhas

notprevented it fromcommanding the respect of the ‘droitsde l'hommistes’ in

the way it has handled HR cases. Additionally, it is submitted that even with

HRTB, the ICJ can adopt a role in ‘mainstreaming’ HR law into general

international law thus making it more readily acceptable to international law

generalists.BrunoSimmaopinesthattheICJ isarguablymoresuitedtodothis

thantheHRTBwhosereadingsaretoooften‘markedbyadearthofproperlegal

analysiscompensatedbyanoverdoseofwishfulthinking’.67Also,asageneralist

court,theICJhasitsdisposaltheabilitytoapplymultipletreatiestoitscases.

Ontheotherhand,theproblemwiththeinherentnatureoftheICJisitsconsent-

basedjurisdictionthatwasexposedinCongovRwanda.Additionally,thereare65ibid,page1666ibid5,page2667ibid5,page28

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alsoworriesthatitmightputoffsomeStatesiftheICJadoptsabiggerroleinthe

promotion of HR. Nonetheless, the ICJ allowed Belgium’s application as a

‘specially-affected’Statethatdemonstratesitwillingnesstoallowmoreclaims.

However, it has also been shown in the past that when the opportunity had

presented itself, the ICJ had not taken the opportunity to develop the law to

protect HR as seen in the Nuclear Weapons AO and Bosnia-Herzegovina v

Yugoslavia.

Despitealloftheabove,‘thegrimrealitystandsthatsomeoftheworstabusesof

HRmaygounpunisheddue to theshieldofState’s immunity’68.On topof that,

thepossibilityforasituationwherebyaPermanentMemberoftheUNSCbeing

abletovetoaSC’sresolutiontoenforcethejudgmentoftheICJcastsadarkcloud

ontheaspirationoftheICJtobeacrediblechampionofHR.

Considering all the arguments above, this author in conclusion submits that

althoughtheICJ’sroleincontemporarylegaldiscoursehasbeenrevivedandits

contributionto internationalHRlawcannotbe ignored,theICJwillnevertruly

be a complete champion of HR as long as States are allowed to invoke the

argument of immunity and political factors continue to meddle with the

enforcementofitsdecisions.

68ibid38,page107