International Cooperation and the Study of International Institutions

IIR – Graduate Institute

2 March 2010

Realism

• Use international law for the promotion of national interests (Morgenthau 1948); “arenas for acting our power relations” (Evans and Wilson 1992)

• International institutions are epiphenomenal to state power and interest (Carr 1964)

• Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996): Deep cooperation requires enforcement

• International Institutions leading to pareto-inefficient outcomes (Gruber 2000) / “go-it-alone” power

Liberalism

Rational Functionalism (Neo-Liberal Institutionalism)

Early Work

Puzzle: Cooperation is possible in an anarchic system

Question: What is the role of IOs?

Answer: Institutions help overcome collective action problems, high transaction costs, tackle information asymmetries and help enforce contracts (Keohane 1984)

The analogy: used car market

• Inspiration: Georg Akerlof

• The market for lemons (1970)

• Market of used cars without car-dealer

• Asymmetric information

• Deals possible, but do not materialize

• Consumers’ mistrust, “good cars” don’t enter the market…

• Institution (car-dealer) is beneficial for seller and buyer…

Discussion questions 3 and 4

Is the market analogy of supply and demand a good entry point into the discussion on the emergence of institutions?

How has the liberal approach to international institutions changed over time?

From the British School to Social Constructivism

• International society: a group of states that have established by dialog and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements (Bull and Watson 1984).

• Shared goals (Bull) vs cultural unity (Wight)

• International institutions define who the players are in a particular situation and how they define their roles (Onuf 1989)

• Analysis of international institutions that takes nothing for granted

Discussion question 1

• Are there situations in which international institutions could “spontaneously” emerge?

Discussion question 2

• How can game theory help understand or predict policy outcomes in international politics?

Free riding temptation: the PD

Inhibiting fear: assurance games

Where to meet: co-ordination games

Mixed situations: e.g. chicken, called bluff

A realist using game theory (Drezner)

Great powers and the rest of the world

Do we need institutions?

• Axelrod • Cooperation strategies (Tit-for-Tat) • PD with indefinite rounds • Cooperation opportunities increase with the

shadow of the future

The role of institutions?

Discussion question 5

What are the difficulties in thinking about institutional effects?