International Conference on Building Security Capacity

> www.acmc.gov.au

International Conference on Building Security Capacity6–8 September 2011 National Defense University, Washington DC

COMPLEX OPERATIONSC E N T E R F O R

D I P L O M A C Y • D E F E N S E • D E V E L O P M E N T

2 ACMC Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP)

Executive SummaryThe International Conference Building Security Capacity was held in Washington DC from 6-8 September 2011. Co-sponsored by the Australian Government’s Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) and the US Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the two day conference highlighted issues, lessons learned and initiatives for strengthening security capacity in peace and stabilisation operations as well as in state building. Drawing on international academic, practitioner and policy expertise, the conference sought to enhance understanding of the role of security forces in these efforts and to explore lessons from state and society transformation, drawing on activities such as institutional and police capacity building and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR).

Conference participants were in general agreement on the need for robust civil-military approaches to peace and stabilisation operations. At the same time, a clear message from the majority of presentations is that ‘no one size fits all’. Whether speaking of police strengthening, institutional capacity building or counter insurgency operations, strategies and approaches must be tailored to fit context and be situationally specific and appropriate. Further, there must be a balance between military and civilian efforts in building security capacity. In this, experience has demonstrated that the absence of a robust military intervention to create security can lead to protracted conflict and loss of any political, economic or social gains made and further, that it is civilian effort that makes peace durable. Without political and economic development, security and peace dividends can quickly be reversed and result in a return to conflict.

Key conclusions and findings also included the following:

> Building security sector capacity is not only about the military. Instead it is a collective civilian, military and police effort.

> The record on capacity building—whether of institutions (e.g. ministerial bodies) or entities (the police)—has been mixed. Failure may be a function of imposing models and structures inappropriate to context, focusing on inputs rather than outcomes, looking at simple solutions for extremely complex processes or condensing long term solutions into short term fixes. Further, there is the tendency to undervalue the role and centrality of the host country in defining its own inputs and building its own capacities.

> A key lesson is to not ‘do to or for’ but rather to empower people to ‘do for themselves’ and to be the drivers of their own development. Effective SSR must accommodate the needs and expectations of the host country and its communities. Interventions should focus on long term capability building in line with agreed priorities by and for the host country.

> As the international fiscal climate tightens, ongoing requirements for peace and stabilisation operations will require enhanced multiagency collaboration, improved joint planning and less stove piping in decision-making. Strategic objectives and operational plans need to be matched and benchmarked to ensure achievable measures of effectiveness, requiring robust monitoring and evaluation.

> The persistence of peace and stabilisation operations highlights the essential need for effective civil-military partnerships at the national, regional and multinational levels. The effectiveness of such partnerships rests on improved knowledge and understanding of peace and stabilisation operations; on a common understanding of complex problems, strategic goals and responsibilities; and on an agreed commitment for the long haul.


Introduction

The International Conference, Building Security Capacity, was hosted jointly by the Australian Government’s Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) and the US Center for Complex Operations (CCO) in Washington DC. Held from 7-8 September 2011, the purpose of the conference was to examine the role of security capacity development in international peace and stabilisation operations and state formation.

The conference had two objectives, specifically:

> To promote an understanding of the role of security actors, including the role of security forces (i.e. armed services, law enforcement actors and civilian oversight institutions) in peace and stabilisation operations.

> To explore lessons from state and society transformation through specific end-of-conflict and transition activities, including Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) and capacity building.

The conference was organised according to thematic areas, with Day 1 focusing on Transforming Conflict and Institutionalising Peace and Day 2 on Building Security Sector Capacity. Each session began with a keynote address and was then followed by a panel discussion and Q&A. The conference agenda is attached at Annex 1.

The conference summary is presented below, followed by concluding remarks where key themes emerging from individual sessions and issues for future consideration are highlighted.


Day 1: Transforming Conflict and Institutionalising Peace

Opening AddressesIn the opening address Ambassador (Ret) John Herbst1 called for the US to stay focused on stabilisation and nation-building efforts. He reflected on how the US had the capacity to run complex operations involving military and civilian agencies, citing Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, as an example. However, this focus was lost after Vietnam and the lessons of the 1960s and 1970s were ‘unlearned’.

Herbst made particular note of post 9/11 responses to political and military challenges abroad, reflecting on how interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan floundered during the early days of intervention. It was only in 2004 that the US and other countries began developing more comprehensive response capabilities, including the development of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the UK Stabilisation Unit and the ACMC, as well as think tanks such as the CCO to preserve lessons learned from the past and to inform on-going operations. Although the US is currently debating the notion of nation building, he stressed the need to learn from past mistakes and maintain capacities and capabilities to address the challenges of failed or failing states—particularly those ‘on our doorstep now’, such as Haiti, and those that may be on our doorstep in the future.

The second opening address, provided by Major-General (Ret) Michael G. Smith2 commented on how the ACMC and other Australian whole-of-government efforts are a reflection on the growing need to enhance civilian and military capabilities to respond more effectively and in an integrated fashion to disasters and complex emergencies. Smith noted that since the end of the Cold War, Australia and the international community have been involved almost continuously in complex peace and stabilisation operations. In this, the collective objective has been to transform conflict and promote security and peace. Yet at the same time, the greatest challenge has been to build a viable peace.

Smith reminded participants that capacity building in the security sector, the theme of the conference, was not only about the military, but also about socio-cultural, political, environmental and civilian factors. Many issues at play in the notion of security are inherently civil-military, for example, the protection of civilians. Practical approaches to peace and security building need to be considered and as part of this effort, the challenge is to take what has been learned from the past and apply these lessons to current and future operations.

1 Director, Center for Complex Operations (CCO)

2 Executive Director, Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC)


Session 1: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation

Keynote Address: State Building in Conflicted EnvironmentsThe keynote address, delivered by Ambassador (Ret) James Dobbins, stressed that while development and democracy are important, they are the tools rather than the purpose of nation building. The purpose of nation building is, instead, peace. Security is a prerequisite for economic and political development and while civilians make peace durable, it is a robust military strategy—for example counterinsurgency (COIN)—that is critical to stabilisation. He also cautioned however, that without political and economic development, security becomes only temporary with a high likelihood of reversion back to conflict.

Ineffectual efforts at nation building in the past have largely been due to a lack of military capacities, clear mandates and objectives rather than to a lack of civilian input. The Balkans in the early 1990s had insufficient numbers of soldiers and no defined mission. Similarly, Iraq from 2003–2007 lacked sufficient military presence and doctrine appropriate to the situation. In the early days of intervention, the failure in Afghanistan was a result of insufficient capacities and no clear mandates. Conversely, with Iraq in 2007, Dobbins noted that it was the military with its surge capacity and a clearly defined military strategy that made the difference to stabilisation; similarly, it is the current surge of the military that is now making a difference in Afghanistan.

Reflecting on past stabilisation efforts undertaken by the US, the record has been mixed. Haiti, for example, was a textbook operation but ultimately a failure for the US. While two key principles were applied—specifically, avoid mission creep and have an exit strategy—strict adherence to these principles failed to deliver the desired results as political benchmarks, while achieved initially, were not enduring and they lacked realistic time frames. Conversely, Dobbins highlighted Kosovo as the smoothest of recent nation building and stabilisation efforts because the Clinton administration applied a number of key principles, specifically: deploy a large capable force; accept responsibility for public safety; and involve neighbouring states to help transform the host country. For Dobbins there are three key lessons that can be drawn from stabilisation operations under the Clinton administration. First is the need for unity of command; unity of command is as important in stabilisation operations as it is in conventional operations. Second, it is important to remember that the lack of [non-military] post-conflict stabilisation efforts will reverse security gains. Third is that the scale of operations and the scope of ambitions need to be aligned.

While these are important lessons, they were not institutionalised or taken on board by the Bush administration. Nation building was not perceived as viable or of interest; it was also viewed as too


costly. Following September 11, there was the emergence of the ‘small footprint’ approach to nation building, which aimed to minimise funding and the number of troop deployments. This approach was made more problematic, as was seen in Iraq, when state building and more broadly non-military aspects of nation-building was transferred from USAID—an agency with years of experience behind it to support such efforts—to Department of Defence—a department that had no experience in this area since the early 1950s.

However, by the second term of the Bush Administration, policies were revisited, with the institutionalisation of COIN and stability operations. Stabilisation operations were now seen as core to the overall mission goal. This also created opportunity for lessons to be learned and for the development of a cadre of expertise and doctrine.

Dobbins suggested that a failure of sufficient resourcing, policy and security presence in the early days of intervention in Afghanistan—in fact, the least resourced American intervention since 1995—resulted in a failure of early stabilisation operations. This failure necessitated the military surge and implementation of COIN strategy. As a result, Afghanistan today paints a more optimistic picture. Referencing a number of polls and independent reviews, Dobbins suggested that empirical evidence, rather than anecdotal evidence, indicated that the situation in Afghanistan has improved, with support for the president high and that for the Taliban low. For example, he provided statistics that indicated 59% of the population believes the country is moving in the right direction; the Karzai government has a 60-80% approval rating; and there is general confidence in security forces. Dobbins suggested that these figures are very encouraging and also a reminder that success should be based on what the host country may view as indicators of change and progress.

In closing Dobbins acknowledged that while the US is learning lessons from the past and has developed cadres of individuals who can support stabilisation operations, there is also the danger of reverting to post-Vietnam thinking and believing that future threats lie in more conventional military response and conventional definitions of how soldiers should be equipped and trained.

In response to questions posed after the presentation, Dobbins highlighted the following:

> Appropriate doctrine to address stabilisation operations is required. COIN is not the only strategy as it is circumstantially dependent.

> The concept of nation building is again being received with scepticism within the US Congress.

> Conflict prevention can only be pushed so far although efforts to build indigenous capacity are important. However, efforts into building partners’ capacities and support for security sector reform (SSR) are limited by the willingness of the host country to cooperate in this regard.

> In many situations, the most effective way of marginalising extremists is through support for insurgents.

> An effective stablisation operation will avoid the need for a COIN strategy or a reinfusion of military presence, as was the case in Afghanistan. If there is an effective stability operation, the emergence of violent resistance can be prevented which would obviate the need for counterinsurgency. It was in fact the early failures in Iraq and Afghanistan that led to the need for COIN operations.

> Regarding the present and future role of private security companies (PSCs) in stabilisation operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, while effective oversight is problematic, they will likely continue to be important to stabilisation efforts.


Panel Discussion: Key lessons from DDRR programs and the lessons for future DDRR efforts in support of lasting conflict transformationThe Chair of the Panel, Mr Michael Miklaucic3 introduced the panel session noting that countries emerging from conflict are also the most likely to return to conflict. Further, those most likely to take up arms are former combatants. With these considerations in mind, DDRR is extremely important and is an effective tool to capture or recapture the monopoly of force. Yet within the US there is little if any focus on DDRR.

Mr John Sanbrailo4 noted that all too often, successful Central American examples are forgotten as past interventions from which important lessons can be learned. He suggested that El Salvador was a successful effort in conflict transformation in part because of DDRR. The 1992 peace accords, which included comprehensive reforms including restructuring of the military, the development of a national police force under civilian command, judicial reforms, strengthening of the independent judiciary and human rights, electoral reforms, agrarian reforms and national reconstruction have held since they were signed.

The acceleration of the peace process and its durability can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

1. The fall of the Berlin Wall followed by the breakup of the former Soviet Union which resulted in a significant funding loss for opposition forces;

2. Presidential leadership, and the willingness of the leadership to negotiate with opposition forces;

3. Local leadership;

4. The comprehensive reform package proposed that was negotiated with opposition forces (FMLN);

5. Substantial funding given for DDRR programs which included design input by the FMLN;

6. FMLN participation in elections; and

7. Market reforms that ensured FMLN inclusion.

Mr James (Jock) Covey5, reflecting on the situation in Kosovo, noted that originally, there was no vision of DDRR. Yet early on, it became clear that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—an effective insurgency group with strong clan support—needed to be absorbed into society if stabilisation was

3 Director of Research, PRISM Editor, CCO

4 USAID Mission Director El Salvador (Ret) and Executive Director, Pan American Development Foundation (PADF)

5 Former US Deputy Administrator for Kosovo


to be enduring. The KLA saw themselves as the victors of war against Serbia, deserving of being a standing army with a central role in government. The UN mission instead encouraged civilian and political leadership over military leadership, noting that while the military are important, they need instead to be viewed as part of an active partnership.

While mandated to carry out DDRR, how this was to be achieved was not prescribed. Instead, it was clear that a minimal framework agreed upon by the KLA was required. Such an agreement would need to give the KLA respect and openly recognise their aspirations to play a role in the security architecture of Kosovo in the future. To support transitioning, half of the KLA applied for the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) providing much needed infrastructure support and since then, some have further transitioned to the internal police force.

The process of transitioning to the KPC has been relatively smooth. Key lessons to be learned from the Kosovo experience include the following: engage combatants in their own DDRR process; ensure that there is follow through with the ‘RR’; mission leadership is critical to successful DDRR efforts; and the need for flexible and ambiguous terms of reference.

Colonel (Ret) Tom Dempsey6 reflected on his experiences in Liberia, noting that within the framework of DDRR, the international community focuses too much attention of disarmament, less on reintegration and even less on demobilisation, although demobilisation is, in a recovering failed state, the most important component. Disarmament is predominantly a military undertaking and reintegration is a civilian undertaking. However, demobilisation—which is “messy controversial and expensive” and difficult to do—requires a combination of military and civilian effort.

Liberia—as an example of a failed African state—went through two efforts at DDRR. The first was a failure while the second was a success. The lessons to be learned from these two efforts include the following:

> In failed African states, disarmament will fail unless it is coercive rather than voluntary.

> There must be a successful transition to demobilisation and reintegration or else re-armament can quickly occur.

> Demobilisation is central but means different things to different people. For example, to the military, it means cantonment of weapons while to civilians it may mean registration. It is important to have a robust and comprehensive approach to demobilisation.

> In Liberia, a civilian conservation corps was created. This project organised thousands of ex-combatants into civilian groups, paid them a wage, and in negotiations with local command leaders, identified infrastructure projects for them to undertake. This model was highly effective and represents a feasible, affordable and effective alternative to traditional demobilisation efforts.

> Demobilisation is not only an organisational process but one that looks at demilitarising and defactionalising a combatant society. It also requires changing the culture of conflict and dealing with the trauma and socialisation issues of the individual combatant.

Looking at DDRR in relation to Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG) in the Pacific, Mr Fred Smith7 stressed the importance of local communities and local norms to help shape the peace and bring insurgents into the negotiation process. Reflecting on the three phase peace process between 1997–2005 which sought to establish peace, undertake DDRR and address the issue of autonomy for Bougainville through referendum, Smith made a number of comments. First, disarmament, motivated by the promise for a referendum for independence, was led and enforced by ex-combatant leaders,

6 Specialist Master, Deloitte Consulting, LLP

7 Executive Officer, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia


facilitated by the Peace Monitoring Group. Unfortunately, it was ill-conceived and badly managed. The result was that this enhanced the role of ex-combatants and unsustainable expectations were created. Further, in this scheme, demobilisation, reintegration and rehabilitation were not emphasised. Most combatants were not formally demobilised and development programs gave preference to hiring ex-combatants. Lessons to be learned are that disarmament needs to be well conceptualised and should not be over-emphasised. Smith added that efforts to develop community based policing in an already decentralised society and where “the locus of trust is not in the state, but in the community” has facilitated reintegration and reconciliation.

Following individual presentations, the panel was asked to comment on how DDRR is used to reinforce the peace process. In El Salvador, the peace process drove DDRR and it was comprehensive and concrete. In Kosovo, it was clear at the time that the KLA could not be part of the peace process. Their exclusion could not be by force which necessitated instead mutual dialogue. In Liberia, there was a robust bridge to the local community leadership, needs and organisations. Comprehensive peace agreements are critical as is attention to security issues. For Bougainville, a sense of local ownership over the peace process was critical to success.

Responding to the question of ambiguity in peace agreements and the balance between international input and local partner input into the design of DDRR programs, responses from panelists focused on a number of points but highlighted two key themes: the political commitment of the parties to reach a genuine resolution as a precondition to successful transition; and the importance of diplomacy and the role of diplomacy in the peace process.


Keynote Address: The Opportunity Cost of SecurityThe Honorable Dov Zakheim8 highlighted that the opportunity costs of engaging in state building efforts must be kept in mind as these efforts have costs that affect other areas of national policy, such as diverting limited military resources from the core mission of war-fighting. Suggesting that nation building is really a euphemism for state building, he reflected on the US response to state building in the 1990s. During this time, the US focused on two questions. First, should the country be involved in nation building at all given a mixed record and generally poor response? Although there have been successes, none are analogous to today’s conflicts. Second, how heavily should the US be involved in nation building/peacebuilding?

After September 11, the debate clearly shifted away from thinking in terms of nation building to a focus on state building. With this focus came an emphasis on development within conflict settings. Concomitantly, the US Department of Defense tended to dominate in all aspects of state building. In Afghanistan and Iraq, there was insufficient civilian presence in capacity building; instead, because of the level of insecurity in the environment, the military or contractors were filling the ‘civilian’ gaps.

The question of ‘how much to become involved’ in state building is in part a function of Congressional decision-making around resource allocation. The core question that needs to be asked is, should the military continue with non-military tasks when funding is an issue? In fact, unlike what occurred in Afghanistan, funding cannot be minimalistic in the early days of state building. This approach in Afghanistan essentially “invited the Taliban back in” because the military was under-resourced.

If the US is to engage in state building, it does not always need to lead this effort. The US needs to work with others as the country cannot do it alone. And to help support state building, there is a need to build civilian capacity and understand the culture where we deploy. The use of contractors is not appropriate as they do not replace civilian presence. We must first measure the risk factors of deployment and if we determine they are too high, we should not default to contractors. If the environment is not secure enough for civilians to deploy, do not engage.

Zakheim stressed the need for a cadre of civilians who can deploy when and if needed in contingency operations, noting for example that USAID tends to focus on long-term development rather than contingency operations. Additionally, he suggested that:

1. The US should have a permanent Inspector General to reinforce accountability of state-building efforts.

8 Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Senior Fellow, CNA Corporation

Session 2: Building Security Sector Capacity


2. Congress should appoint a Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for contingency operations.

3. Senior level officials in the State Department and USAID should be overseeing contingency operations.

4. The US should have a deployable cadre of acquisition personnel.

5. State building is not only the concern of the State Department or USAID, but of, for example, Justice, Commerce and Agriculture, which requires enhanced operational preparedness.

A key message of the keynote address was that the role of the Department of Defense and the military in state building should be limited. Military presence can push away civilians and aid agencies find that military presence undermines their successes. Further, the size of Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects should be limited as they often overlap with the work of aid agencies doing similar work, if not the same work, in the same place. Zakheim added that neither the military nor contractors should be the primary sources for reconstruction. The military are not experts in state building and in fact there is greater value for money through civilian led efforts.

In closing, Zakheim stressed that reconstruction projects should be sustainable. By example, he noted that schools are being built without knowing where teachers will be sourced. Any effort on our own or with others must be sustainable in the longer term. To this end, we need a coherent approach to state building.

During the question and answer session, and commenting on the role of sub-national partnerships/engagements such as those fostered by the US National Guard Zakheim acknowledged they could have a role to play in certain circumstances. To the question posed as to what is inherently ‘governmental’ versus ‘military’ and how contractors can be used in these settings, Zakheim responded that the issue of risk must be assessed and that the question that needs asking is, ‘what is the primary task of the military’? The military are trained to shoot and kill and they are trained to fight and to win the nation’s wars. In this light, he raised the basic question, is the military then the most cost effective way of doing ‘non-military’ tasks?


Panel Discussion: Security Sector Capacity and the Transition from Conflict to PeaceMr Pascal Budge9 presented on Building the Iraqi Police, noting the challenges in Iraq of establishing a monopoly of force, eliminating or removing the military structure that was in place, and establishing SSR as well as rule of law (RoL) and the criminal justice system. Reflecting on the challenges/obstacles of police training missions since the 1990s, Budge highlighted the following:

1. Language, level of education and life experience. In this, education and life experience are usually moulded by the level and type of repression.

2. While a democratic style of policing is viewed as what is good and desirable, what happens when interventions are made in a country that has no understanding of this system, either in relation to philosophy or in practice? The key question and challenge then becomes how to change their behaviour so that they will take this system on?

3. When law enforcement, corrections and the judiciary are all out of balance, one can do all the law enforcement training there is to do but if other aspects of the ‘system’ are dysfunctional or not functioning, then what or ‘so what’?

4. Warlords and/or paramilitary leaders often emerge as future leaders; while one may want to remove them, to do so could actually lead to greater destabilisation.

Ambassador Patricia Haslach10, speaking on The Iraq Transition, reinforced the points made in the keynote presentation that sustainability of efforts is critical and that the US does not always have to take the lead. Reflecting on where the US began and where the country has moved to in relation to Iraq, Haslach noted that in 2005, there was a realisation of the need to re-engage and re-integrate security personnel that were dismissed in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Currently there are approximately 650,000 Iraqi security personnel, with some being integrated into the police and the military.

One of the more significant challenges in the years ahead for the Iraqi Security Forces will be moving from a military-led to police-led internal security force. The military is still the primary form of domestic policing, in part because of the lack of attention to police in the early days of intervention. Further, the civilian population tended to feel more comfortable around the military than the police. Efforts have been made to professionalise the police force. One of the main priorities of the US Government through the Department of State Police Deployment Program will be working with

9 Vice President, Training and Mentoring Business Area, DynCorp International

10 Iraq Transition Coordinator, US Department of State


the mid to senior level police officials to increase capacity of the Iraqi police and to improve their management structures.

The newly created Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq will manage a number of programs, including training and assistance programs to the military. Continuing cooperation with the Iraqi Security Forces is just one part of the broader Strategic Framework Agreement that will govern cooperative relations between the two countries in the future.

Mr Agio Pereira11, reflecting on the Timor-Leste Experience, highlighted that stability and security are necessary pre-conditions to social and economic development. A long-term perspective to stability and security is required, as is the need for civilian oversight of these efforts.

Although the situation in Timor-Leste has improved since the 2006 conflict, the environment is more complex. The last four years have seen increased stability compared to the initial, post-independence (1999) phase. Government and security forces have expanded their roles, and the relationship between the police (PNTL) and the military has strengthened. In this, SSR has a number of objectives including: developing effective oversight, governance and accountability mechanisms; enhancing local leadership and ownership of the security sector development process; improving delivery and sustainability of security and justice services; and ensuring viable economic and social development.

Pereira noted that the state must have—as all legitimate states require—a monopoly on the use of force in its territory. Further, in order for state institutions to be perceived as legitimate, Timor-Leste must pursue inclusionary policies and reconciliation. Otherwise, “if we have a divided nation, the laws do not work”. At the same time, inclusionary policies must also be balanced with security needs. Examples of inclusionary policies and initiatives include a new electoral law, business development plans and legal reforms. In closing Pereira reminded participants that “to build a nation, you must take care of the nation”.

Mr James Shear12, speaking on the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Advisor Program, focused on institution building within the context of why ministerial capacity building is important, what approach (es) to use and how to successfully carry out capacity building.

In relation to ‘why is ministerial capacity building important’, Shear stressed that: 1) this will improve tactical proficiency of security forces; 2) tactical proficiency must be sustained by institutional competencies; 3) traditional approaches to capacity building tend not to address core capacities; 4) there is a need to promote transparency, accountability, RoL and democratic governance; 5) this helps to build self reliance; 6) capacity building will assist partners to become respected suppliers of security and stability; and 7) such an effort supports broader SSR in fragile or post-conflict venues.

In relation to what approach (es) to use, Shear stressed that ‘no one size fits all’. For US security assistance however, force planning and strategy development capacity are central, as are human capital and national-level logistics. Shear touched on two specific programs—the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the Ministry of Defense Advisors Program. In discussion of the Advisors Program, he highlighted the need to: promote local ownership, develop sustainable solutions and a do no harm approach.

In conclusion, Shear highlighted the challenges of institution building, noting synchronisation with other stakeholders, prioritisation and the transformation of civilian culture to a more expeditionary culture.

In response to a question regarding where monitoring and evaluation fits within the discussion, panel members noted this was a real challenge, partly due to the fact that outputs are difficult to measure.

11 Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers, Timor-Leste

12 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership and Stability Operations


Day 2: Capacity Building and Contemporary Roles and Challenges for Armed Forces

Session 3: The Opportunities and Limits of Capacity Building

Keynote Address: State Governance and the Military: A Comparative Worldwide Empirical PerspectiveIn his keynote address, Dr Daniel Kaufmann13 defined governance as a set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, specifically into three clusters: the political, the economic and the institutional. The political cluster represents processes by which those in authority are selected and replaced. The economic cluster reflects the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies and provide public services. The institutional cluster refers to the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern interactions amongst them.

Kaufmann noted that while difficult to quantify, there has been progress in measuring the quality of state governance. From the “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Methodology and Analytical Issues”14 he identified two indicators within each cluster to assess governance. The indicators were developed through a study covering 213 countries from 1996—2009 and took into account a number of information sources. Within the political cluster he highlighted first, the extent to which a country subscribes to voice and accountability and second, political stability and absence of [major] violence and terrorism. Indicators within the economic cluster are government effectiveness (efficiency of public sector) and regulatory quality. RoL (including the judiciary) and control over corruption are the two key indicators under the institutional cluster.

Applying these indicators to the military and state governance, Kaufmann noted that, for example, higher military expenditure, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is not associated with improved political stability or lack of violence. In some Asian countries the experience of military involvement with governance has been mixed; the military can provide order, but does not do well in building the economy or exercising economic power. In many Asian countries the military failed to extend political rights to citizens or accept full accountability to the civilian government. In Africa, experience with the military has been largely negative. Historically, there were many coups although

13 Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development Program, Brookings Institution

14 Available at www.govindicators.org


more recently, for example in Ghana, and now North Africa (Tunisia and Egypt) events suggest a more positive role of the professional military.

When the pluses and minuses of military spending are considered, it can be argued that ‘more is not always better’. First, higher military spending diverts resources that could go, for example, into public services, infrastructure and lower taxes. Higher military spending also creates economic distortions in that the concentration of resources to the military can deter private sector competition and growth. Moreover, the military are not policy makers and nor do they deter internal strife. Further, human rights, as well as democratic accountability, often suffer.

On the positive side, the military can contribute to development, mitigate violence and insecurity, address emergency needs in natural disasters, bring stability and RoL during transitions from autocratic to democratic regimes, provide institution building and infrastructure support in post conflict societies and help forge a national identity.

Kaufmann concluded by highlighting the following:

> While there are positive aspects in relation to the military and governance, there are also risks, such as mission creep, which in this instance is the monopolistic control over politics and human rights.

> There needs to be a cost benefit analysis to best tailor the role of the military to the circumstances existing in a particular country as no one size fits all.

> One must take a ‘do no harm approach’ and ask how the involvement of the military will impact on governance—is it helping or harming?

> Higher military expenditure is not critical for success.

> Sufficient attention must be paid to economics and economic policy making.

> A neutral military in transitions is important.

When asked to comment on do no harm versus ‘help’ and how to predict which strategy is best, Kaufmann noted that it is difficult to predict a correct strategy but there are core principles to follow including studying the country—do a country diagnostic and be more selective in aid.

In relation to a question regarding working with corrupt power brokers/elites particularly when there is little opportunity to manoeuvre with the government Kaufmann acknowledged that for some pragmatics, in some countries, this is the only way to function. At the same time, the question needs to be asked, is this working? If not, what are alternatives? What are other options?


Panel Discussion: Operationalizing Capacity Building: Methods, Priorities, Opportunities and ChallengesMr John Buchanan15 in his presentation, Problems in Building Police Capacity, defined police capacity as “putting honest police officers in the right place at the right time to deliver good service to people”. To achieve this objective, there is a need to focus on three key themes.

First, assistance must begin with an endpoint in mind. There is the tendency not to have agreed upon end states, perhaps because it is unclear what that end state may be. The question must be asked, how do the goals that are set relate to service delivery? Is progress being made towards an end state? In this regard, we tend not to be effective or good at internal auditing and evaluating our systems. Ultimately, a thoughtful end state should be developed that includes systems to measure change.

Second is the issue of sustainability. The difficulty and complexity of police capacity building tends to be undervalued. How do you determine if the model is appropriate? Are the models of policing being used (e.g. democratic style) situationally appropriate? Sustainability and success, which are directly related to core competencies, are difficult to measure. The ability of an institution to deliver good service over the long term relies on staff and support for core competences. If this exists, then operational success will follow. This is the substructure of a police organisation: leadership, supervision, audits, monitoring, budget, planning—all the things that make up staff and support. Some of these may be included in our programs, but this is not done consistently.

Third is the challenge of political will and the need to coalesce public momentum for change.

Professor Kimberly Marten16 spoke to the issue of Militias into Militaries, focusing on how new security systems can be designed to overcome old patronage ties and move towards rule-based systems. Marten noted that within a patronage system, security (and society) operates on the basis of personal ties, where the ‘spoils’ are used by power brokers to gain authority. Patronage networks are exclusionary, the system is unstable and there are no rules for ‘succession’. Is patronage a good thing? It is in fact exclusionary and can lead to resentment, violence and terrorism.

How do you transform patronage to rule-based systems? How are new security institutions formed? Taking an historical perspective, strong external threats lead to rule-based security. Only merit-based organisations tend to survive. Nationalism leads to rule-based security transformation.

Policy recommendations for transforming patronage systems into rule-based security systems included the following:

15 Deputy Director, International Criminal Investigations and Training Assistance Program, US Department of Justice

16 Professor of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University


> Promote literacy, education, communication, transportation and infrastructure to encourage the spread of new ideas which is a catalyst/source of change.

> Economic delinking is the best measure of a rebel group’s integration. In relation to DDRR, if militia groups are isolated from society, this reinforces the power of commanders. A way forward is to get people to realise their economic future is not dependent on commanders.

> Geographically disperse old militia into new security forces; as part of this, hire individuals, not units. A lesson to be learned is that rebellions are easily restarted when paramilitary groups return to their old neighbourhoods.

> Deny security forces access to lootable resources. Rebel forces with access to economic endowment are much more likely to loot. Those without it rely on social endowments.

> Put new security forces on the front lines to help them build cohesion and create a sense of shared sacrifice.

Mr Greg Mills17, in his presentation The Case for Capacity Building: the Stabilisation Dilemma, put forth a peace and development template, which included a number of components: a political agreement; external facilitation and guarantees; DDRR (and reduction of weaponry); elections and the advent of a representative government; humanitarian assistance transferring into development aid; restoration of the drivers of growth, such as agriculture and mining; reduction/elimination in inherited debt; and managing short term expectations with long term economic drivers.

Mills stressed that there are a number of dilemmas for stabilisation and they include stabilisation versus development; military versus long-term governance; humanitarian versus development expenditure; backstopping versus allowing for failure; justice versus reconciliation; elite prosperity versus government; democracy versus stabilisation; space for private sector growth versus elites; urban versus rural spending; and short term versus long term expectations and development expenditure.

Essential to peacebuilding efforts is the economic dimension and the need to build a diversified private sector. What are the inputs required for private sector growth and diversification? The focus has been, for example, on predictable policy, access to markets, RoL, electricity, transport/infrastructure, access to finance and the reduction of corruption. Yet donor funding for these efforts has been mixed and results often poor. As a result, it is difficult to assume or know the critical and essential inputs for private sector growth.

Drawing on current literature, Mills suggested that good preparation, supervision, reasonable government and overlapping priorities between the private sector and government are requirements for private sector growth. Further, he suggested that in transitioning from liberation to statehood, a number of challenges need to be considered and/or addressed:

> The transition demands a shift in mentalities, moving from a position of exclusiveness to inclusiveness.

> Running an army does not translate into skills for running a government.

> Relationships with neighbours and neighbouring countries need to change.

> Elections do not equal democracy; it is extremely difficult to consolidate democracy in a post-election era.

> Disarmament is essential but this needs to be balanced against the need for security.

17 Director, Brenthurst Foundation


> Money needs to be spent wisely, which in part requires a need to establish mutually beneficial relationships between donors and the government.

> Guard against confusion over liberation myths with government realities.

Dr Michael Woolcock’s18 presentation, The Capacity Building Trap, looked at why there is a failure to attain capability in capacity building efforts.19 He drew attention to the following themes, specifically:

1. The tendency to conflate form with function, assuming that if the form is changed, this will improve the function.

2. An inadequate theory of change is held, with the notion that the transfer of best practice will result in change. In this, there is the tendency to take a ‘one size fits all’ approach.

3. Excessively great or unrealistic expectations tend to be held with the persistent belief that change is linear.

4. “We ask too much, too soon, too often and too far”.

In relation to form versus function, Woolcock argued that there is the tendency to assume functionality will automatically follow form. Thus, when we find something that works, we attempt to duplicate this in other systems, assuming that in the duplication, the same results (functions) will be generated. He highlighted RoL as one such example. This thinking is reinforced in that there is too often a tendency to measure inputs rather than outputs.

Theories of change that seek to transplant best practice from one environment to another do not take into consideration context and the historical realities that preceded their introduction.

In relation to the trajectory of change, Woolcock stressed that nothing is linear. Nevertheless and as currently designed, ‘development is history in a hurry’. Further, he argued that we need to be more explicit on our theories of change which will, in turn, assist in developing monitoring and evaluation systems, as well as accountability frameworks.

In conclusion, Woolcock stressed the need to shift focus from inputs to outcomes. As part of this shift, there is a need to move away from micromanaging inputs towards empowering countries to decide on the inputs needed to achieve outcomes.

Asked to comment on approaches towards integrating structures that may lead to behaviour change, Buchanan stressed that policy plus doctrine does not equal behaviour. Changing behaviour cannot be imposed from the outside or through training but rather from within the host country itself.

In relation to a question on diminishing the power of warlords, Marten suggested that one way to diminish their influence was to use their own networks to isolate and marginalise. In her opinion, attempts to integrate them or to follow a policy of inclusiveness does not work, it only makes them stronger. Mills noted people tend to react similarly to incentives. If the nature of incentives are changed, the leadership needs to send out strong signals that the ‘rules’ have changed. Woolcock added that local systems evolved to deal with existing issues but that they are not necessarily adept at dealing with 21st century issues. The challenge is that as change occurs, traditional power blocks are seeing an erosion of their authority. Putting in place a new system is extremely complex and unlikely to work well, particularly in a volatile environment.

18 Lead Social Development Specialist, Development Research Group, The World Bank

19 See: Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews, Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure, The Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 234, December 2010.


Session 4: Contemporary Roles and Challenges for Armed Forces

Keynote Address: The Delicate Security BalanceMs Claire Lockhart20 reflected on the lingering belief that the international liberal sector needs to be protected from security. In reality, without security, there cannot be a liberal sector—there cannot be aid. At the same time, she highlighted that there is often a misunderstanding amongst the security sector on what civilians do, as well as a perception that more development is good and that development equals aid. In fact, the questions that should be asked are what are the drivers of a development process and within that, what is/are the role of aid (if any) in this process? To the latter question, perhaps there may be other actors such as academia or the private sector more suited. To respond to these questions, there is the need to move away from a whole-of-government thinking to a whole-of-nation or whole-of-society perspective.

Lockhart argued that more money does not necessarily equate with more outcomes. As a result, there is a need to look at alternative [multilateral] instruments that allow for burden sharing. In fragile states, the roles of international financial institutions such as the World Bank should be explored. In this effort, much greater attention needs to be paid to market institutions that underpin economic growth.

Working on the premise that “it is not about what we do, but what they do”, Lockhart drew from examples in the field noting that a lesson of successful SSR is where leadership cohered around a vision. This leadership is most often a team across multiple sectors with a shared vision and a flexible plan. Further, there is soundness of concept in instruments, tools and approaches that are developed within leadership as well as with leadership and others, including donors. As important is the notion that to develop the security architecture—the laws, organisations, structures and proper roles of leadership—manuals and security guides should be written from within and through the lens of the host country. This should be done prior to looking at external support and/or interventions in support of SSR.

Lockhart suggested that there are 10 functions of a state and in insecure environments the highest function is that of security. Once law and order is established, it is the other nine functions that are critical in order for people to maintain trust in the state.

20 Executive Director, Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE)


To restore law and maintain order in transitional contexts, Lockhart referred to the example of Singapore21 where housing was the key to stability. To provide housing, a functioning procurement system in government was needed as was the need to identify ways of removing internal constraints to capacity. By dismissing foreign contractors and creating a domestic construction industry, Singapore generated internal investment in the state and built capacity from within.

What is the right balance between society, the market and civil society? Programs such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) in Afghanistan and other similar initiatives in Pakistan and Indonesia have enormous scale and coverage. In these programs, villages create their own community fora which become vehicles for interacting with the market and governance. These processes are driven internally and are local capacities for peace. The World Bank fosters and funds aspects of these programs, as do USAID and the Ford Foundation. It is a different way of doing business in that instead of being driven by outsiders, the programs make people the drivers of their own development.

What can development learn from SSR? First is that a systematic approach to development is required. Instead, there is a tendency to see ‘individual projects’. Second, as a country the US relies far too heavily on its ability to intimidate rather than to inspire. Third is the need to move away from western principles to universal principles and concepts around issues such as state building, establishing law and order, and developing accountable institutions.

During the question and answer session, when asked to comment on the need to have a vision before a plan and how this is done for security, Lockhart suggested this is a design challenge best addressed according to context and based on internal aspirations. This will then move into joint planning with internal and external actors. It is important to have the right internal consultative processes, then finding a way for the leadership team to interact with external processes. In this, one needs to have monitoring and evaluation systems in place to allow for changes to the plan as circumstances change.

Reflecting on how local power brokers were excluded from programs such as the NSP, Lockhart noted that funding amounts were too small to be of interest to the power brokers. Further, using village level social institutions also created additional social pressure to ensure proper project implementation.

In relation to a question regarding the appropriateness of a single paradigm versus a number of paradigms applicable to specific context, Lockhart stated that a collection of approaches to stabilisation, built upon two key principles: citizenship and accountability are required. For example, the NSP set up a framework to assist villages to come together. It did not set up plans but created opportunities. Further, it devolved decision making to the lowest levels and trusted that people know how to best manage their own lives. This is empowerment. In this, we need to ask questions such as, how does the village link up to other levels? What is the right balance between systemic planning and a framework that allows for self-government at the lowest level? A challenge is how to allocate between national/provincial and local levels.

Asked how to get businesses more involved, Lockhart stressed the need to distinguish between capital business formation and foreign business investments. There is a need to promote value chains and to identify domestic financing options for development. In this, there is a need to look at how to maximise private sector investment and determine where it is best placed. Finally is the need to look at the potential of regional economic integration—how can countries support their own development? Where can the private sector play a role?

21 See: Lee Kwan Yew, From Third World to First (HarperCollins Publishers, 2000)


Panel: Roles and Challenges Facing Armed Forces and their role in helping build effective and legitimate statesDr Arturo Contreras22 spoke on the challenges of multi-dimensional security, complex operations and the military based on the Latin American experience. He noted that the state is the principal actor and the basis of society. There are three components of security that all states address: internal, external and catastrophes/disasters. As such, a multi-dimensional approach to security is required.

Within complex environments, the military may provide a number of services including addressing threats against democracy and peace as well as dealing with human trafficking, drugs, pandemics and terrorism. Their roles are diverse and multi-dimensional and they are used either as a principal, secondary or co-adjunct tool. Contextually the military in the security architecture requires a political definition of the security problem and consequently an integrated and functional strategy.

There are a number of considerations in relation to the role of the military. First, is the need to avoid their politicalisation. Second is the need to materialise functional relations between the civil administration and the armed forces. Third is that the armed forces is not the main tool but one of many tools the state has at its disposal to deal with non-military matters. Fourth is the need for armed forces to transform and address multi-dimensional threats. Ultimately, the state must strengthen its role to lead all its capacities—including the armed forces and inputs from the international community.

Dr Dencio Acop23 in his presentation on The Expanded Role of the Armed Forces in the Philippines (AFP): a Re-Assessment noted that traditionally the armed forces were involved in national defence, warfare and counterinsurgency. Their role in COIN has led to an assumption of non-traditional roles including lending support to state building, law enforcement, disaster response, economic development and infrastructure.

The root causes of insurgency require the full spectrum of approaches and responses. As a result, the use of the armed forces in non-traditional roles has had positive results but there are also negatives. For example, participation in regime changes—some have been successful, some have not been; some have been legitimate and others have not. Some failed regime changes have also led to an erosion of military values.

Currently, there are a number of national security challenges, specifically communist insurgency and secessionist insurgencies. Secondary challenges include lack of resources for development,

22 Professor of Defense and Security Studies, the Inter-American Defense College

23 (Ret) Philippines Armed Forces


graft, corruption and weak service delivery. There is a public expectation that the armed forces will undertake non-traditional roles and that they are partners in development. However, the risk of continuing in these non-traditional roles is the loss of core competencies and more exposure to corruption. Mitigating actions would be for civilian agencies to take on the development agenda, to depoliticise the armed forces, to increase core strengths of the armed forces and to limit their development assistance.

Dr Assis Malaquias24 in his presentation African Security Resources as Defence Tools: Assessing Costs and Benefits stated that the use of military/security sector assets as a development tool in Africa is not surprising because of two key African challenges: security and development. Insecurity exists because of dysfunctional nation-states. How regimes seek to protect themselves is often problematic because they lack legitimacy. How do regimes seek to ensure security as a public good?

African countries tended to believe that liberation from colonial powers would lead to economic/development liberation. This has proven not to be case. The challenge becomes how to transform the immense resource base/wealth in Africa into services and assets that people want and need. African states are generally poor in both capacity and security. Many institutions are poorly budgeted and the budgets themselves are poorly managed. However, the exception is the security sector. Often this sector is well financed, relatively strong institutionally with emphasis on training and education. Therefore it is unsurprising that the security sector is seen as a viable tool for deployment to respond to African security challenges. Through this, threats and challenges—including development challenges—are handled by the security sector.

Malquias argued that the use of the military should be complimentary to civilian efforts. Societal resources and challenges are currently not proportional, leading to skewed allocations in resources to one sector over another. Deployment of the military to address development challenges should be short term at best. He added that African states lack strategic imagination. There has been too much continuity between colonial regimes and post-colonial regimes. Colonial regimes were set up to extract wealth. Since independence, many states have retained the wealth-extraction character of the colonial era.

Malaquias closed by noting that African states are unstable because they cannot deliver development. As a result, they invest in the security sector to make incursions into politics.

Colonel Birame Diop25 presenting on Sub-Saharan African Military Development Activities highlighted a number of contemporary security challenges:

1. Individual countries have their territorial integrity threatened by another country. The threat is always there.

2. Since the Cold War, there have been more internal challenges to stability, including ethnically based conflict and political rebellions.

3. Human insecurity issues, including health pandemics and epidemics, food insecurity, poverty, community based insecurity and individual insecurity.

4. Humanitarian crises.

5. Radicalisation and extremism is gaining strength.

6. A poorly resourced public sector, compounded by a private sector that is not producing. Both suffer from lack of resources and are dependent on external investment.

24 Academic Chair for Defense Economics, The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

25 Director, African Institute for Security Sector Transformation


Diop suggested a number of ways forward to address these challenges. First is the need to mobilise African resources. Second, although this will take time to achieve, the capacity in the public and private sectors needs to be increased. Third, he affirmed that the military has the expertise to respond and therefore needs to respond in non-traditional roles. If the military is not used, it may lose its operational military capacities.

Diop added that there is some fear that diverting military to non-traditional activities can leave the state vulnerable. A number of safeguards could be put in place to address this concern including: maintaining a discrete presence; civilian leadership deciding mobilisation and demobilisation of the military; and institutionalising the use of the military through a normative legal framework that defines their responsibilities and the parameters of the engagement. With these safeguards in place, the military can engage in development activities such as agricultural infrastructure and general infrastructure.

In closing, Diop highlighted a number of lessons learned for the military, including the need for: civilian oversight; the military to be institutionalised; the population to be sensitised; time limitations to be placed on military efforts in non-core activities; response to civilian demands; and planning, programming and coordination mechanisms to be put in place to insure collaboration with other sectors. The military can be part of the solution if sufficient safeguards are put in place.

During the question and answer session, panel members were asked to comment on if the creation of a reserve force, similar to what one might find in the US, could be a means of overcoming concerns of the role of the military in development. It was suggested that legitimacy can come through such a mechanism and that drawing members from the community would give greater traction for the concept.

Regarding regional threats and the impact of regional entities in addressing these threats, the distinction was made between collective defiance and collective security. Ultimately what you wish to achieve through regional entities is collective security. With that said, regional organisations will reflect the weaknesses of the member states so even if there are plans in place to support collective security, one should not put too much faith in these entities to actually achieve this aim.


Rapporteur’s SummaryMs Ginger Cruz26 commented on the two-day conference, noting the following points:

> The presentations were largely drawn from a western American perspective. While we tend to stay in our comfort groups, we need to reach out and communicate with others. There are groups intervening in the ‘stabilisation’ space that we do not reach out to; we also do not speak to the recipients of our efforts, with the exception of a select few who speak English. We need to expand our horizons and to consider innovative ways to refresh our thinking.

> Monitoring and evaluation is not used sufficiently. Lessons learned are not based on analysis but anecdotal evidence. The risks and the unintended consequences of stabilisation and SSR efforts must be better understood. Further, the use of empirical processes must be expanded. In this, indigenous data sources should be used and there must be greater outreach to more non-traditional data sources.

> Incentive structures are needed to keep programs on line and accountable.

> We need to be open to dramatic change within our own bureaucracies.

> There is often too much ‘push’ on stabilisation. We need to have patience and listen, rather than charge ahead with proposed solutions.

> There is the need to unpack the challenges and threats to better understand how to create solutions. ‘Security’ is a loaded term and can mean so many things. We must understand the various elements within and address each one separately before we roll-up into broad approaches.

Closing SessionMajor-General (Ret) Smith commented on the ‘strategic takeaways’ from the conference, focusing on three themes: first, the need to look at global realities in relation to stabilisation. Currently, we tend to place too much focus on Afghanistan and Iraq—countries that may in fact be exceptions rather than the norms. Second, he called for the need to have a common understanding on the issues—how do we achieve this?

Third, he stressed the need to identify the civil-military gaps and priorities.

26 Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)


Key ThemesInternational peace and stabilisation operations are increasingly becoming the norm rather than the exception. Since the 1990s, there are numerous examples of fragile states emerging from conflict, of states that are failing or failed and of states in formation following conflict. These situations have challenged collective assumptions regarding state building, peacebuilding, the role of the international community supporting peace and stabilisation operations, civil-military interactions in these environments, and how, as an international community, we learn from past successes and failures and promote positive state transitions and transformations.

The conference Building Security Capacity brought together speakers from a number of disciplines and sectors—including the military, academia, development practitioners, police and diplomats—to look at the role of security in peace and stabilisation operations. It represented a unique opportunity to not only share perspectives and knowledge, but to draw out lessons—some learned and some still to be learned—on how to build security capacity in these very complex and challenging environments.

A number of key themes and issues emerged from the conference and they include the following:

> Whether speaking about approaches to stabilisation, the role of the military in security, models of policing or capacity building, one size does not fit all. Models and approaches need to be contextualised and be both situation-specific and appropriate.

> Security is a prerequisite for economic and political development. Without security, economic and political development cannot proceed. Conversely, the lack of political and economic development in fragile states will likely undo any peace and security dividends already achieved.

> Building security sector capacity is not only about the military. Instead it is a collective effort of civilian, military and police inputs.

> Stabilisation efforts must be sufficiently resourced, accompanied by a robust military presence that has a sound mandate and strategy as well as clear objectives.

> DDRR can be a powerful and effective tool to promote stabilisation and an enduring peace. However, lessons from the past suggest a number of preconditions to promote stabilisation and an enduring peace such as: engage combatants in their own DDRR processes; greater attention to and focus on demobilisation; consideration of how ex-combatants may or may not fit into a future security architecture; local engagement and inclusion on reintegration efforts and, where possible, local ownership over the peace process within which DDRR is embedded.

> When military assets are directed towards state building and governance, we should ask ourselves about impact and whether these interventions hold the potential to either help or harm. Further, how do we assess the costs and benefits and respond accordingly? In the absence of a secure environment, is the military really the most efficient, effective and viable alternative for state building? What tools are there to better assess impact? We have for example the World Governance Indicators. How can we capitalise on these tools?

> The international community must stay focussed on and committed to state building efforts in fragile environments. To do less potentially threatens regional or international security and can lead to a reversal or loss of any political, peace and economic gains made within fragile states.

> Support for peace and stabilisation operations is not a go alone effort. No one nation needs to continuously take the lead and nor does one nation need to always intervene. These operations require a collective response and a collective commitment.


> The challenges of police capacity building can be exacerbated when western standards or pre-conceived standards of policing are imposed on existing systems. In the spirit of ‘one size does not fit all’, how might customary systems of policing be better integrated into the security architecture? In situations where the military (external or internal) have been providing domestic security, how can transitioning from military-led security to police led-security be best achieved?

> Essential to peacebuilding efforts is the economic dimension and the need to build a diversified private sector. Often the economic dimension is thought of in relation to aid and development inputs without giving sufficient attention to how alternative inputs, such as those into the private sector and market institutions can encourage development and growth.

> Recovery from conflict and crisis is predicated on the existence of security, and by extension on the legitimacy of the security sector. Sustainable development and effective governance can only take root in a secure environment. In states recovering from conflict, SSR is a quintessential civil-military activity. In this regard, the international community must look beyond the mere creation of local military and police forces and place higher priority on the national security apparatus. To this end, a number of questions need to be asked, including what is the legislative control of these security forces? How do they come together at the national level? How effectively have ex-combatants been disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into society?

> The record on capacity building—whether of institutions (e.g. ministerial bodies) or entities (the police)—is mixed. Failure may be a function of imposing models and structures inappropriate to context; focusing on inputs rather than outcomes, looking at simple solutions for extremely complex processes or condensing long term solutions into short term fixes. In this, the role and centrality of the host country in defining its own inputs and building its own capacities is undervalued.

> Do not ‘do to’ but rather empower people to ‘do for themselves’ and to be the drivers of their own development. Within this, effective SSR must accommodate the needs and expectations of communities themselves.

> Significant budget constraints will continue to shape priorities. While humanitarian assistance and development aid are likely to be maintained, defence, policing and diplomatic budgets will continue to be constrained. In a tighter fiscal climate, the persistence of peace and stabilisation operations should lead logically to enhanced multiagency collaboration, improved joint planning, and less stove piping of decision-making.

> The persistence of peace and stabilisation operations highlights the essential need for effective partnerships at the national, regional and multinational levels. The effectiveness of such partnerships rests on improved knowledge and understanding of peace and stabilisation operations; on a common understanding of strategic goals and responsibilities; and on an agreed commitment for the long haul.

> While conferences are important in addressing key issues, more needs to be done in the area of civil-military training, education and research.

27 ACMC Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP)ACMC Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP)27

Annex 1: Conference Agenda

DAY 1: Transforming Conflict and Institutionalising Peace—Wednesday, 7 September 2011

8:30 a.m. Tea and coffee

8:55 a.m. Administrative announcements

9:00 a.m. Opening Session/Welcome

Ambassador (Ret.) John Herbst Director of the Center for Complex Operations

Major-General (Ret.) Michael G. Smith Executive Director Australian Civil-Military Centre

SESSION 1: Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR)

9:30 a.m. Keynote AddressAmbassador (Ret.) James Dobbins Director, RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, ‘State Building in Conflicted Environments’

10:30 a.m. Tea break and Official Photograph

10:50 a.m.− Panel

11:50 a.m. Focus: What are the key lessons from various experiences of implementing DDRR programs about the centrality of effective DDRR to lasting conflict transformation? What do these lessons mean for future DDRR efforts?

Chair: Mr. Michael Miklaucic Director of Research, PRISM Editor, the Center for Complex Operations

Mr. James (Jock) Covey former US Deputy Administrator for Kosovo, ‘Kosovo’

Colonel (Ret.) Tom Dempsey Deloitte Consulting, LLP, ‘Liberia’

Iain (Fred) Smith Executive Officer, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, ‘Bougainville (Papua New Guinea)’

Mr. John Sanbrailo USAID Mission Director El Salvador (Ret.), ‘El Salvador’

11:50 a.m. Questions and Plenary Discussion

12:30 a.m. Lunch


SESSION 2: Building Security Sector Capacity

1:30 p.m. Keynote AddressHon. Dov Zakheim, Commissioner Commission on Wartime Contracting, ‘The Opportunity Cost of Security’

2:30 p.m. Tea break

2:45 p.m.− Panel

3:45 p.m. Focus: What do our experiences of building security sector capacity tell us about the transition from conflict to peace? How can security sector capacity either support or undermine lasting peace and stability? What effective practices have emerged that can guide future security sector capacity building efforts?

Chair: Ms. Rebecca Shrimpton Manager Peace and Stabilisation Operations, Australian Civil-Military Centre

Mr. Pascal Budge Vice President and Business Area Director for Training and Mentoring, Dyncorp International, ‘Building the Iraqi Police’

Ambassador Patricia Haslach Iraq Transition Coordinator, US Department of State, ‘The Iraq Transition’

Mr. Agio Pereira Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers, Timor-Leste Government, ‘Timor-Leste’

Dr. James Schear Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, ‘Afghanistan Ministry of Defense Advisor Program’

3:45 p.m. Questions and Plenary Discussion

4:15 p.m. Close

6:30 p.m. Conference Dinner Hosted by His Excellency Ambassador Kim Beazley, ac


Day 2: Capacity Building and Contemporary Roles and Challenges for Armed Forces— Thursday, 8 September 2011

8:30 a.m. Tea and coffee

8:55 a.m. Administrative announcements

SESSION 3: The Opportunities and Limits of Capacity Building

9:00 a.m. Keynote AddressDr. Daniel Kaufmann Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, ‘Secure States or Military States: A Worldwide Governance Perspective’

10:00 a.m. Tea break

10:20 a.m.−11:20 a.m. Focus: An exploration of some examples of how the objective of ‘capacity building’ is ‘operationalised’; understanding why capacity building is important in peace and stabilization operations; methods and priorities for capacity building in peacebuilding and stabilization efforts; and the challenges and limits of capacity building.”

Chair: Ms. Rebecca Shrimpton Manager Peace and Stabilisation Operations, Australian Civil-Military Centre

Mr. John Buchanan Deputy Director, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, US Department of Justice, ‘Problems in Building Police Capacity’

Professor Kimberly Marten Department of Political Science, Barnard College, Columbia University, ‘Militias into Militaries’

Dr. Greg Mills Head of the Brenthurst Foundation, ‘The Case for Capacity Building’

Dr. Michael Woolcock Lead Social Development Specialist, Development Research Group, World Bank, ‘The Capacity Building Trap’

11:20 a.m. Questions and Plenary Discussion

12:00 p.m. Lunch


SESSION 4: Contemporary Roles and Challenges for Armed Forces

1:00 p.m. Keynote AddressMs. Clare Lockhart Executive Director, Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE), ‘The Delicate Security Balance’

2:00 p.m. Tea break

2:15 p.m.− 3:15 p.m. Focus: An examination of the roles and challenges facing armed forces, the. skills and capacities required to meet new security responsibilities, the risks related to empowering armed services, and processes through which these institutions are used to build effective and legitimate states.

Chair: Mr. Michael Miklaucic Director of Research, PRISM Editor, The Center for Complex Operations

Colonel (Ret.) Dencio Acop Philippines Armed Forces, ‘The Expanded Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines—Revisited’

Dr. Assis Malaquias Academic Chair for Defense Economics, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘African Security Resources as Development Tools: Assessing Costs and Benefits’

Colonel Birame Diop Director, African Institute for Security Sector Transformation ‘New Challenges and Roles for Armed Forces in Senegal’

Dr Arturo Contreras Professor of Defense and Security Studies, the Inter-American Defense College

3:15 p.m. Questions and Plenary Discussion

3:45 p.m. Rapporteur’s Summary Ms. Ginger Cruz, Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

4:15 p.m. Closing SessionMajor-General (Ret.) Michael G. Smith Executive Director Australian Civil-Military Centre

Ambassador (Ret.) John Herbst Director of the Center for Complex Operations

4:45 p.m. End of day

International Conference on Building Security Capacity

Documents

Transcript of International Conference on Building Security Capacity