International International Association of Association of

Oil and Gas Oil and Gas ProducersProducers

Formerly E & P Forum

Helicopter Risk

Mitigation

Presentation to Regional IHST Meeting in New Delhi, 12 June 2006By Bob Sheffield, representing OGP’s Aviation Subcommittee

Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already• What remains to achieve the goal• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation

measures• Conclusions and summing up

Three Main Points• The risk of flying in a helicopter is an order of

magnitude greater than in an airliner– we have a problem

• Helicopter safety can be improved significantly – we can fix it:– Proven risk mitigations are available for helicopters.– We need new helicopters built to the latest design

standards.• To be effective at lowest possible cost requires a

combined effort from:– Regulators– Manufacturers– Operators– Their customers - we need your help

Oversight and Safety Go Hand In Hand

• The best safety records come from those operations where either regulatory oversight or corporate care is highest.

• Corporate care is more expensive and less effective when the operators serve customers with different standards.

• If everyone in the industry (manufacturers, operators, regulators, and their customers) works together to implement the known, cost-effective solutions, these risk mitigations will be more effective and less costly.

Oversight and Air Safety Performance Currently Vary Greatly

with the Type of Operation

Fatal Accidents/million hrs• Commercial airline 0.6• Commuter airline 2.0• Offshore helicopter transportation 6.4• Helicopter support for seismic operations 23.0

… and across operators within a given type of operation

While this chart shows helicopter accident rates for the U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) the same trend holds worldwide – the rate is getting worse.

GOM Offshore Accident Rate/100K Hours with 3 Year Moving Average

0.000.501.001.502.002.503.003.504.00

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004Ove

rall

Accidents 3 year moving average)

While airline safety trends are improving,

Helicopter safety trends are getting worse.

We know we have a problem, and we are confident that we know how to fix it.

Opportunities for Safety Improvements

• The airline industry has made significant improvements in its safety record over the last 30 yrs through the introduction of: – Damage tolerant design; system redundancy; improved

reliability/crashworthiness– Modern flight simulators– Engine and vibration monitoring systems to identify incipient

failures– Safety Management Systems and Quality Assurance to reduce

human errors– Flight data monitoring programs (FOQA)– Disciplined take-off and landing profiles (e.g. stabilised

approach)– EGPWS/TAWS; TCAS

• All of these are available today for helicopter operations and are being implemented in some parts of the helicopter industry.

• However some helicopter industry segments have adopted few of these measures.

• We need to apply all these risk reduction measures to all helicopter operations.

The Helicopter Safety Goal

• OGP Safety Commitment: “The individual risk per period of flying exposure for an individual flying on OGP contracted business should be no greater than on the average global airline.”

• This goal coincides with IHST’s goal of reducing the current helicopter accident rate by 80%.

• This presentation will show you how this goal can be achieved.

Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already• What remains to achieve the goal• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation

measures• Conclusions and summing up

Shell Group Fatality Distribution - 1992

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Road Aircraft Fire /Exposion

Fall FallingObject

Drowning Other Crush Electrical Assault

5 year average1992

In 1992, aircraft accidents were the second most common cause of Shell Group fatalities.

Shell Aircraft Responded With:• Development of safety targets and focussed programme• Shell Group Standards for Aircraft Operations

– Aviation Safety Management System (SMS)– Aircraft performance standards– Pilot, maintenance and passenger training– Equipment fit – items that could have prevented half the GoM fatalities

since 1992– Quality-based maintenance

• Approval of aircraft operators and aircraft types• More than $1.5million on a range of research programmes

– Health & Usage Monitoring Systems (HUMS)– Helicopter Operations Monitoring Program (HOMP)– Underwater escapability trials that led to Helicopter Underwater

Escape Training (HUET)– Safety management and safety case concept for aircraft operators– Mathematical modelling of enhanced Performance Class 2

• Influenced industry and regulatory bodies via– OGP, UKOOA, EHOC, CAA, FAA, NTSB, FSF/IFA, IAGSA, HAI, HSAC

0

Audit/Advice

Safety SystemSupport

Safety Perform an c eAir Co ntracto rs

ResearchA irw orth ine ss - H um a n

F actors - S ec ondary S afety

StandardsDevelopm ent

IndustryInfluence

STRATEG ICSAFETY TARG ETS

0

42

15.113.2

5.8

11.313.7

2.95

24 4

04

812

1620

90-9

4

91-9

5

92-9

6

93-9

7

94-9

8

95-9

9

96-

00

97-0

1

98-0

2

99-0

3

00-0

4

01-

05

Targ

et '0

8

Fata

l Acc

iden

t Rat

e pe

r mill

ion

flyin

g hr

s

5 Year Moving AverageLog. (5 Year Moving Average)

Target 2000 Target

2005

Resultant Shell Fatal Accident Rate

Target2008

Despite this Improvement, the Industry Trend in 2003 was Unacceptable

• International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (1998 – 2003)

• If the 2003 rate applied to typical major oil company contracts:– Almost 3 accidents per year– One fatal accident every 13 months– Unacceptable

• Cost? Lives; Material; Reputation• Concerns? Duty of care; Litigation; Corporate liability; Insurance

premiums

Average 2003Accident rate (per million flying hrs)

17.8 34.7

Fatal accident rate (per million flying hrs)

6.4 11.6

Accidents per year 16.5 33Fatalities per year 23.7 51

Shell Aircraft Analysed Accident Data to Evaluate Potential Risk Mitigations

• OGP published data on offshore accidents – GOM and Worldwide• NASA/TM – 2000-209579 – US Civil Helicopter Accidents 1963 – 1997• Individual NTSB/AAIB Accident Reports• Annual Business Turbine Accident Review 1993 through 2003 –

Breiling Associates• Design Reviews• FAA Final Rules – 14CFR Parts 27 and 29 and associated NPRMs

– Amendments 12 through 47 (Part 29)– Amendments 11 though 40 (Part 27)

• Type Certificate Data Sheets for offshore helicopters• Design certification reviews with Sikorsky and Eurocopter specialists

on S76 and AS332• CAA Paper 2003/1 – Helicopter Tail Rotor Failures• UKCAA MORs for S76 and AS332• SINTEF Helicopter Safety Study 2 – Dec 99

Fuel Quality Control

2%

Mid Air5%

Unknown2%

Passenger /HLO

Training & Control

2%

Pilot Procedure

50%

Weather Related, Not

CFITW8%

Total Technical

31%

OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003 (121 Total)

Engine Related

46%

Component Failure

54%

OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003 Technical Related (31% of Total)

Unknown10% Bird Strike,

Damage to Control Rods

5%

Main Rotor or Transmission

Component30%

Tail Rotor Failure

45%

Other Equipment

Failure10%

OGP Offshore Accident Causes 1995-2003 Component Failure - Technical Related

CAA – HUMS Cost Benefit Analysis

• HUMS can detect 69% of mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure.

• Identifying incipient failures before they are manifest prevents in-flight failures and accidents.

Tail RotorSystem

Tail RotorDriveGearbox

Oil Cooler

Planetary System

Main RotorSystem

RotorBrake

FailureEvidentSuccess

CAA Data: Distribution of arisings

Engine to gearbox

Risk Mitigation – Technical Failures

• Improved design requirements (FAR 27/29)• Quality Assurance (QA) in Maintenance (enhanced Part 135)• Duplicate inspections (Required Inspection Item)• Enhanced training

– Human factors training for maintenance staff– Flight simulator training/CRM/LOFT pilot training for emergency

procedures• Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems such as

HUMS/VHM/EVMS• Shell and others in the oil industry have:

– Funded early development of HUMS in North Sea– Supported research to enhance analysis of HUMS data– Committed to the installation of HUMS/VHM/EVMS systems– Accepted costs of such systems and developed a minimum

specification for HUMS/VHM/EVMS– Recognised the need for minimum system management and

serviceability requirement (FAA AC29-2C MG15, CAP693 + OGP Aircraft Mgmt. Guide)

>10~ 2

From about eight per million flying hoursto only one technical accident cause in nine years.

Technical Failures

Pre and Post HUMS:

Flight dataHOMP

OPERATOR:Data

Replay,Analysis andVerification

ConfidentialCrew Feedback

SAFETY OFFICER:Review Meeting

Reporting ofTrend informationto Management

and Staff

Changes toHOMP,

InvestigationsHOMP

MANAGER (PILOT):

Assessment

Changes toProcedures,

Manuals,Training

etc.

• 45% to 65% of all accidents involve human error.• HOMP enables trend analysis and problem identification before they result in accidents.• HOMP can help assure compliance with standard operating procedures; e.g., take-off and

landing profile compliance.• HOMP can help assess training effectiveness and troubleshoot operational problems.

HOMP/FOQA Management Process

Risk Mitigation – Pilot Human Factors• Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM• Improved aircraft performance and disciplined helideck take-off

and landing profiles to standardised helidecks • Enhanced management controls within a structured safety

management system, including improved helideck management, adequate weather forecasting and communications

• Defensive aids such as EGPWS (or AVAD) and TCAS• Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP)• Shell and others in the oil industry have :

– Funded initial HOMP feasibility studies and development in UK– Deployed HOMP on UK North Sea operations on AS332L and S76A++– Committed to the installation of HOMP systems on contracted helicopters– Accepted the costs of such systems and are developing a minimum specification– Recognised the need for minimum system management and serviceability

requirement (CAP 739 and CAA Papers 2002/02 and 2004/12)– Strongly endorsed initiatives of the ICAO HTSG to add HOMP to ICAO Annex 6 as a

Recommended Practice for all helicopters equipped with flight data recorders

In Sum - What Have We Learned?• Essential Pre-requisites for Safe Operations

– Safety culture supported by Quality and Safety Management systems• Equipment fit

– Appropriate to the operation– HUMS/EGPWS/TCAS and cabin egress modifications

• Pilot procedures– Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM, also known as HOMP or FOQA)– Flight simulator training in LOFT scenarios emphasising CRM– Helideck performance profiles

• Helideck management– Helicopter Landing Officer and Helideck Assistant training– Helideck procedures

• System failure management– HUMS/VHM/EVMS– Engine monitoring– Flight Simulator training

• Human error in maintenance– Human factors training– Duplicate inspections/RIIs– HUMS/VHM/EVMS

• All these items are addressed in OGP’s Aircraft Management Guide, and will mitigate risk, but they are unlikely to achieve the long term safety goal.

Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already• What remains to achieve the goal• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation

measures• Conclusions and summing up

All But The Latest Helicopters Have Significant

Design Gaps• “Most important issues would be to improve helicopter

design and continuous airworthiness” - SINTEF• “The evidence that tail rotors were … not meeting the spirit

of airworthiness requirements, was stark and compelling” – UK CAA

• “ ..This means that the helicopter is not considered airworthy without HUMS installed and in function.” – Norwegian Committee for Review of Helicopter Safety

• Typical aircraft in common use today - AS-332 Super Puma, Bell 412, and S-76 were designed to requirements that are now over 25 years old

• Latest design requirements offer:– Improved performance with one engine inoperative– Redundant systems with flaw tolerance– Fail safe designs– Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload, improve

situational awareness, and help cope with emergencies– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats

Old Cars & Vans

• How many of you are driving vehicles like these with:– No seat belts or shoulder harnesses– No anti-skid braking system (ABS)– No airbags– Low power engines with normally aspirated carburettors

• How many companies would use such vehicles to transport their workers?

Old Helicopters

• Yet many helicopter operations still use aircraft such as B212 and AS350 that were designed in a similar era (1960/70’s) and to equivalent safety standards.

• Whilst certification standards for new design aircraft have changed, these models have continued to be built to old certification standards under “grandfather rights.”

Design Requirements and Airworthiness

• Latest design requirements offer:– Improved performance with one engine inoperative– Redundant systems with flaw tolerance– Fail safe designs– Digital flight management systems to reduce pilot workload,

improve situational awareness, and help cope with emergencies– Crashworthy airframe, fuel cells, and passenger/crew seats

• FAR29/27 design requirements were reviewed to determine:– How design requirements have changed over the years– Potential safety improvements offered– How far short of the ideal requirements are the helicopters in

current use– What impact this has on the achieved safety record of these

types

Type Certification BasisModel FAR 27/29 AL Except Plus DateAS350B 1 - 10 Oct 77EC155B 1 - 40 AL 29-38 (Occupant

Protection)29.952/562/631/561/571/785/901/903/963/973/975/1305

Dec 00

S-76A 1 – 11; parts of 12, 13

29.173 Equiv Safety Findings

Jan 79

S-76C+ 1 – 11; parts of 12, 13, 24, 26, 30, 34

29.173 Equiv Safety Findings

Apr 91

Bell 212 1 – 2: parts of 3, 12

Oct 70

Bell 412EP

1 – 2; parts of 3, 6, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32

Oct 94

AS332L/L1

1 – 16 29.397 Rotor brake Nov 87

AS332L2 1 – 16 29.397 Rotor brake HIRF30 sec contingency

May 93FAR 29 is now at AL 47

Key Design Improvements• FAR 29.67 Climb: One engine inoperative Amendment 29-26 (Oct 88)

– New continuous OEI rating• FAR 29.547/29.917 Main & Tail Rotor Drive System Amendment 29-40 (Aug 96)

– Design assessment and failure analysis of Rotor/drive system• FAR 29.571 Fatigue Evaluation of Structure Amendment 29-28 (Nov 89)

– Tolerance to flaws and damage• FAR 29.610 Lightning and static electricity protection Amendment 29-40 (Aug 96)

– Improved protection• FAR 29.863 Flammable fluid fire protection Amendment 29-17 (Dec 78)

– New requirements• FAR 29. 901/903 Engines Amendment 29-36 (Jan 96)

– Design consideration of effects of uncontained engine rotor burst– Containment and redundancy of key flight essential systems in the burst zone

• FAR 29.1309 Equipment, Systems and Installations Amendment 29-24 (Dec 84)– Safety analysis with consideration of system interactions and multiple failures

• FAR 29.1529 Instructions for continued airworthiness Amendment 29-20 (Oct 80)– Requires substantiation via lightning tests

New Types

EC 135 Agusta Bell 139

EC 225

Sikorsky S92

Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already• What remains to achieve the goal• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation

measures• Conclusions and summing up

In flight Collision

Loss of Control

Other ops

Loss of Power

Main Rotor

Tail Rotor

Other airframe

Rotor contact -person

Misc/ other

To Quantify the Potential Safety Benefit of New Design TypesTogether with the Best Operating Practices, Shell Aircraft Focused on a 2002 NASA Study of Accident Causes for Twin Engine Helicopters

.

We used the Dec 2000 NASA study as our baseline for accident causes

0.651 Pilot related (in air) %

In flight collision with object 14.3 Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 Wire 4.3 Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3Loss of control 14.6 Handling 6.3 Loss of reference/disorientation3.0 System deficiency 2.3 Misc/undetermined 3.0In flight collision with terrain 5.7Weather 4.0On ground/water collision with object3.3Hard landing 2.7Mid air collision 2.0Rollover/Noseover 1.3Subtotal % 48.0%

2 TechnicalLoss of engine power 13.0 Engine structure 5.0 Fuel system related 5.7 Other 2.3Airframe component/system 29.5 Main rotor 6.3 Main rotor drive train 4.3 Main rotor control system 3.7 Tail rotor 3.3 Tail rotor drive train 6.3 Tail rotor control system 2.3 Other airframe 3.3Fire/explosion 1.7Gear collapsed 2.0Subtotal % 46.3%

3 OtherRotor contact -person 2.7Misc/other 3.0Subtotal % 5.7

Accident Analysis – NASA Data for Generic Twin

We listed these causes with all the detail available.

Risk Mitigation Measures

Assigned Effectiveness of mitigation measures % KeyDR Late FAR 29 50% DR Design requirements - late amendt FAR/JAR 29DR/HQ Late FAR + HQ 60% DR/HQ Handling qualities/advanced cockpit design + late FAR 29Training - 12 monthly Sim/CRM/LOFT 45% Training FFS level C/D + CRM + LOFTHUMS Incl effective mgt 65% HUMS Health & Usage Monitoring SystemSMS/QA/OC/Helideck Enhanced SMS/QA 55% SMS/QA/OC JAR Ops 3 /SMS/QA/CAP 437 helideck managementHOMP Incl effective mgt 50% HOMP Helicopter Operational Monitoring ProgrammeEGPWS/TCAS 75% EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System

TCAS Traffic Alert & Collision Avoidance SystemPC1/2e Incl 1D decks 65% PC1/2e Perf Class 1 or enhanced Perf Class 2IW New design 50% IW Impact warning system

CRM Crew Resource ManagementLOFT Line oriented flight trainingSMS Safety Management System

As we analysed the accidents, we evaluated risk mitigation measures and a panel of experts assigned potential effectiveness levels for each of these risk mitigation measures against the applicable hazards

Mitigation Potential – NASA Data for Generic Twin

1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 Mitigation

MF1 Level 2 Mitigation

MF2 Level 3 Mitigation

MF3 Overall MF

Accidents prevented

In flight collision with object 14.3 % Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.82 4.65 Wire 4.3 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.91 3.94 Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 IW 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 3.92Loss of control 14.7 Handling 6.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.85 5.37 Loss of reference/disorientation3.0 Training 0.45 DR/HQ 0.51 HOMP 0.38 0.83 2.49 System deficiency 2.3 DR 0.50 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.89 Misc/undetermined 3.0 Training 0.45 HOMP 0.43 PC 1/2e 0.49 0.84 2.51In flight collision with terrain 5.7 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 5.12Weather 4.0 Training 0.45 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 PC 1/2e 0.49 0.84 3.35On ground/water collision with object3.3 IW 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.70Hard landing 2.7 Training 0.45 PC 1/2e 0.55 DR/HQ 0.45 0.86 2.30Mid air collision 2.0 EGPWS/TCAS 0.75 Training 0.38 HOMP 0.38 0.90 1.81Rollover/Noseover 1.3 HOMP 0.50 DR/HQ 0.51 Training 0.34 0.84 1.11Subtotal % 48.0 % 41.160.00

2 TechnicalLoss of engine power 13.0 Engine structure 5.0 DR 0.50 PC 1/2e 0.55 HUMS 0.49 0.89 4.43 Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1/2e 0.65 DR 0.43 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.87 4.95 Other 2.3 PC 1/2e 0.65 DR 0.43 HUMS 0.49 0.90 2.09Airframe component/system 29.6 Main rotor 6.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.86 5.44 Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.69 Main rotor control system3.7 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.12 Tail rotor 3.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.89 2.96 Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 5.58 Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 2.05 Other airframe 3.3 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.70Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.34Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.62Subtotal % 46.3 % 38.36

3 OtherRotor contact -person 2.7 SMS/QA/OC 0.50 SMS/QA/OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.16Misc/other 3.0 HOMP 0.50 Training 0.38 SMS/QA/OC 0.38 0.81 2.42Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58

Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 84.10

Effectiveness of mitigation measures % Key

Risk mitigation measures applied to accident causes with 3 levels of diminishing efficacy.

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0

Tail Rotor Impact Warning

EGPWS/TCAS

Perf Class 1/2e

HOMP/FOQA

HUMS/VHM

OC/QA/SMS

FFS Training + CRM/LOFT

Late FAR 29/Enhanced Handling

Mea

sure

s

Percentage acidents prevented

Seven KeyInitiatives

Requires development work

Percentage of Accidents Reported in NASA Study Preventable by Individual Mitigation

Measures

We Have Applied the Same Methodology to Seismic

Accidents• Study looked at 57 reported seismic support accidents 1990 – 2005.• Data and accident details taken from OGP, Transport Canada & U.S.

NTSB• Summary:

– 52 single engine accidents (6 fatal)– 5 twin engine accidents (2 fatal)

• Location:– USA 44%– Canada 32%– S America 19%– Rest of World 5%

• Seismic accident rate 114 per million flying hrs• Seismic fatal accident rate 16 per million flying hrs

– For 2000 – 2004 Fatal accident rate 23 per million fly hrs

OGP Seismic Accidents 1990 - 2005

Engine Failure25%

Tail Rotor5%

Component Failure

7%Pilot Proc

26%

Obstacle strike14%

Sling Load16%

CFIT2%

Other5%

Mitigation Measures% Effectiveness of mitigation measures

Radalt/AVAD 0.5 Radar altimeter/Auto voice alertingDR 0.5 Late FAR 27/29 design certification2P 0.5 2 pilot operationsEM 0.5 Engine monitoringVHM 0.6 Vibration Health MonitoringHOMP 0.5 Helicopter Ops Monitoring Program/HFDMTR/Training 0.45 Enhanced line training + annual simulator trainingOC/QA 0.5 Enhanced Op controls, SMS, QA, site proceduresPC1/2 0.65 Twin engine helicopter

Accident Mitigation Analysis

Overall accident mitigation achieved by applying each of the Identified measures - 78.6%

Percentage accidents prevented by individual mitigation measures

0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35

Enhanced Training + sim

Ops Controls, QA, SMS

Late FAR27/29

Two pilots

Twin engine (PC1/2)

Engine monitoring

VHM

HOMP

Rad Alt/Avad

Percentage accidents prevented

Risk Mitigation Options

OPTION A – Baseline NASAFAR Part 135/Part 91 Twin Engine –

early FAR 29OPTION B – Typical global offshore

(OGP)Baseline/early FAR 29 + Limited

SMS/QA and Ops Controls + part HUMS + CRM, part simulator, LOFT

OPTION C – New aircraft – early/mid FAROption B + full SMS/QA + full HUMS

+ full simulator training + Perf Class 2 + HOMP + TCAS/EGPWS

OPTION D - New aircraft - late FAR 29 Option C + enhanced cockpit/HQ +

enhanced Perf Class 2/Class 1 + Impact Warning System

Cost assumes no action taken to reduce costs through efficiencies; e.g., smart procurement, higher utilisation, sharing etc

0

5

10

15

20

25

A BaselineNASA

B Typical

Current OGP

C New Aircraftearly FAR

D New Aircraft- late FAR

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7Accident Rate/million hrsFatal Accident RateCost - $million per year (1000 hrs)

Variable depending on procurement, finance and depreciation policy

Proving That Risk Reduction Measures are Justified

• Use the layered defence model in Microsoft Excel as a predictive tool to calculate the incremental risk reduction for a given measure.

• Apply the risk reduction in question to the expected exposure; i.e., number of helicopters, flying hours per year, and number of passengers per flight.

• Use the incremental cost to calculate the implied cost of avoiding a fatality (ICAF) and the individual risk of fatality per annum (IRPA).

• Compare these outcomes to your company’s risk management guidelines; e.g., maximum ICAF of $50 million, maximum IRPA of 1 in 10,000.

Example: Old vs. New Design1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 Mitigation MF1 Level 2

MitigationMF2 Level 3

MitigationMF3 Overall

MFAccidents prevented

In flight collision w ith object14.3 % Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.64 3.63 Wire 4.3 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.91 3.94 Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 IW 0.00 Training 0.34 0.83 3.61Loss of control 14.7 Handling 6.3 DR/ HQ 0.60 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.85 5.37 Loss of reference/disorientation3.0 Training 0.45 DR/ HQ 0.51 HOMP 0.38 0.83 2.49 System deficiency 2.3 DR 0.50 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.89 Misc/undetermined 3.0 Training 0.45 HOMP 0.43 PC 1/ 2e 0.49 0.84 2.51In flight collision w ith terrain5.7 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 5.12Weather 4.0 Training 0.45 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 PC 1/ 2e 0.49 0.84 3.35On ground/ w ater collision w ith object3.3 IW 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 2.06Hard landing 2.7 Training 0.45 PC 1/ 2e 0.55 DR/ HQ 0.45 0.86 2.30Mid air collision 2.0 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 Training 0.38 HOMP 0.38 0.90 1.81Rollover/ Noseover 1.3 HOMP 0.50 DR/ HQ 0.51 Training 0.34 0.84 1.11Subtotal % 48.0 % 39.200.00

2 TechnicalLoss of engine pow er 13.0 Engine structure 5.0 DR 0.50 PC 1/ 2e 0.55 HUMS 0.49 0.89 4.43 Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1/ 2e 0.65 DR 0.43 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.87 4.95 Other 2.3 PC 1/ 2e 0.65 DR 0.43 HUMS 0.49 0.90 2.09Airframe component/ system29.6 Main rotor 6.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.86 5.44 Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.69 Main rotor control system 3.7 DR 0.50 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.85 3.12 Tail rotor 3.3 DR/ HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.89 2.96 Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/ HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 5.58 Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ 0.60 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.88 2.05 Other airframe 3.3 DR 0.50 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.70Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0.50 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.34Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0.50 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 1.62Subtotal % 46.3 % 38.36

3 OtherRotor contact -person 2.7 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.50 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.16Misc/other 3.0 HOMP 0.50 Training 0.38 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.81 2.42Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58

Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 82.14

1 Pilot related (in air) % Level 1 Mitigation MF1 Level 2 Mitigation

MF2 Level 3 Mitigation

MF3 Overall MF

Accidents prevented

In flight collision w ith object14.3 % Airport/helipad/fence 5.7 IW 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.64 3.63 Wire 4.3 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 HOMP 0.38 0.91 3.94 Other-trees, brush, acft 4.3 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 IW 0.00 Training 0.34 0.83 3.61Loss of control 14.7 Handling 6.3 DR/ HQ 0.00 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 3.92 Loss of reference/disorientation3.0 Training 0.45 DR/ HQ 0.00 HOMP 0.38 0.66 1.97 System deficiency 2.3 DR 0.00 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 1.44 Misc/undetermined 3.0 Training 0.45 HOMP 0.43 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 0.68 2.05In flight collision w ith terrain5.7 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 HOMP 0.43 Training 0.34 0.90 5.12Weather 4.0 Training 0.45 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 0.68 2.74On ground/ w ater collision w ith object3.3 IW 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 2.06Hard landing 2.7 Training 0.45 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 DR/ HQ 0.00 0.45 1.20Mid air collision 2.0 EGPWS/ TCAS 0.75 Training 0.38 HOMP 0.38 0.90 1.81Rollover/ Noseover 1.3 HOMP 0.50 DR/ HQ 0.00 Training 0.34 0.67 0.89Subtotal % 48.0 % 34.380.00

2 TechnicalLoss of engine pow er 13.0 Engine structure 5.0 DR 0.00 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 HUMS 0.49 0.49 2.44 Fuel system related 5.7 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 DR 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.38 2.13 Other 2.3 PC 1/ 2e 0.00 DR 0.00 HUMS 0.49 0.49 1.14Airframe component/ system29.6 Main rotor 6.3 DR 0.00 HUMS 0.55 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.72 4.56 Main rotor drive train 4.3 DR 0.00 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.70 3.05 Main rotor control system 3.7 DR 0.00 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.70 2.58 Tail rotor 3.3 DR/ HQ 0.00 HUMS 0.55 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.72 2.40 Tail rotor drive train 6.3 DR/ HQ 0.00 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.70 4.45 Tail rotor control system 2.3 DR/ HQ 0.00 HUMS 0.55 Training 0.34 0.70 1.64 Other airframe 3.3 DR 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 2.06Fire/explosion 1.7 DR 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 1.03Gear collapsed 2.0 DR 0.00 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.62 1.24Subtotal % 46.3 % 27.46

3 OtherRotor contact -person 2.7 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.50 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.43 Training 0.34 0.81 2.16Misc/other 3.0 HOMP 0.50 Training 0.38 SMS/ QA/ OC 0.38 0.81 2.42Subtotal % 5.7 % 4.58

Factor 0.85 Factor 0.75Total accidents prevented (= % effectivity of mitigation measures) 66.43

Expected FAR = 2.35 permillion flying hours

Expected FAR = 1.25 permillion flying hours

ICAF and IRPA

• ICAF = Incremental Cost per Annum divided by the Incremental Lives Saved per Annum– Incremental Lives Saved per Annum =

(Incremental Reduction in Fatal Accident Rate) * (Flying Hours per Annum) * (Average Number of Occupants) * (Average Percentage of Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)

• IRPA = (Fatal Accident Rate) * (Individual Flying Hours per Annum) * (Average Percentage of Occupants Killed in Fatal Accidents)

Overview

• The current problem and the goal for improvement

• What’s been proven already• What remains to achieve the goal• Justifying the necessary risk mitigation

measures• Conclusions and summing up

How To Achieve the Air Safety Goal• Customers must commit to the goal and contract for higher standards.• Manufacturers must support HUMS/VHM/EVMS, the latest design standards

(FAR 29 - 47) and provide affordable solutions for legacy aircraft.• Operators must adopt proven global best practices as their minimum

standard• Regulators must support proven global best practices.• All stakeholders must support these initiatives:

– Transition to new aircraft built to the latest design standards on new contracts.– Require annual training in flight simulators to practice crew coordination during

emergency procedures.– Equip all helicopters with Vibration & Health and Engine Monitoring Systems

such as HUMS/VHM/EVMS – Require operators to implement quality and safety management systems.– Require operators to implement HFDM (HOMP).– Require operators to fly profiles that minimize the risks of engine failure.– Equip all helicopters with EGPWS or TAWS and TCAS

We have many imperatives to make these improvements!

• Respect for people – the disparity between helicopter safety and airline safety

• ALARP – we know what can be done and that the cost is not disproportionate to the benefits to be gained

• The Ford Pinto story• The “Red Face” test• Good business sense – safer operations will

attract more customers.

Here Is The Difference the OGP Can Make

• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations– Fatal accident rate – 6.4 per 1 million hrs– 51 fatal accidents– 250 fatalities

• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations– Fatal accident rate – 2.0 per 1 million hrs – Average commuter

airline– 18 fatal accidents and North Sea helicopters– 78 fatalities Lives saved - 172

• 10 year accident record for offshore helicopter operations– Fatal accident rate – 1.0 per 1 million hrs – Average global airline*– 9 fatal accidents– 39 fatalities Lives saved - 211

* the best of the Western airlines average about 0.2 per million hrs

• Please join the IHST and contribute your knowledge and data to the process.

• Please “raise the bar” for all helicopter operators.– Helicopter operators who want to make these

improvements suffer from competition from the low cost operators who barely meet standards.

• Support IHST goal of reducing helicopter accidents by 80% and by implementing the risk reduction measures featured in this presentation.– Use the process I’ve described to identify the most

effective risk reduction measures for your business.

– Use the quantitative risk assessments tools I’ve described to justify these measures.

Questions?

Accident Mitigation - Training• Land support pilots typically receive only 1- 2 hrs training per year,

which includes annual check rides. Minimum regulatory requirements.

• Few companies provide dedicated operational line training (e.g. for long line, helirig operations).

• Simulator training is very rarely undertaken by land support pilots.• Most operations are conducted single pilot in complex aircraft. • The ability of a single pilot to respond successfully to an

emergency, whilst simultaneously conducting vertical lift ops is limited.

• Many emergencies can only be effectively trained for in a simulator.

• Simulators or flight training devices (FTD) are available for most helicopter types (S76, B212), but not readily available for many of the numerous light helicopter types (AS350, B206).

• Simulator training should focus on line orientated flight training and crew resource management/pilot decision making.

Accident Mitigation -Operational Controls, SMS, QA.

• An effective safety management system that systematically identifies and assesses the hazards associated with a specific operation and identifies controls to manage those hazards.

• Well defined operational procedures that include the controls identified above and would include:– Operational controls to manage pilot fatigue and crew duty hours. – Oversight of maintenance and control of deferred defects.– Weather minimums related to the task, including emergency

response.• A quality assurance program that checks that the controls

are in place and working.• The implementation of SMS, QA and company procedures

at remote sites is a challenge - what procedures do you have in place to assure this?

Accident Mitigation -Twin Engine

• Engine failures account for 25% of seismic accidents• Single engine passenger flights should only be flown

over terrain that allows a safe forced landing in the event of an engine failure.

• Forested areas and mountainous terrain does not allow this, but is often the environment in which seismic and geophysical ops take place.

Accident Mitigation -Engine and Vibration Health

Monitoring• First generation HUMS has been proven to detect 69% of

mechanical defects in critical rotating parts before failure. Later generation systems are more effective.

• Engine monitoring systems and HUMS are now available for all aircraft types and are becoming widely accepted within the helicopter industry. The more enlightened helicopter manufacturers are fitting them as standard to new designs.

• However, no seismic, geophysical operators have yet equipped with HUMS.

• HUMS not only provides a safety benefit, but also delivers cost savings through pre-emptive maintenance, component life management and reduced down time.

Accident Mitigation -Two Pilot

• Pilot fatigue issues are exacerbated by environmental factors and living conditions.

• Monitoring of engine and aircraft instruments is very limited during hi line and vertical lift ops.

• Emergency require flying of the aircraft and taking immediate actions.

• 2 pilots = 2 sets of eyes + 4 hands + 2 brains.• Operational impact of the weight penalties of the additional pilot

can be offset by the longer crew duty days.

Engine Failure25%

Tail Rotor5%

Component Failure

7%Pilot Proc

26%

Obstacle strike14%

Sling Load16%

CFIT2%

Other5% •Over 56% of the accidents are

directly related to pilot human factor issues.•Seismic and geophysical support operations are pilot intensive, with short legs and many landings/take offs or lifts, often into confined areas.