International Accounting Standard Setting: A Network Approach

International Accounting Standard Setting: A

Network Approach∗

James Perry and Andreas Noelke

Abstract

The article takes a political economy perspective on the current harmonization ofaccounting standards. It argues that the process not only signals a major shift in themode of governance (towards private authority), but also in the substance of what is beinggoverned. In political-economic terms, the most significant change which the InternationalAccounting Standards Board (IASB) brings to accounting is an increased reliance onmarket values in the form of so-called Fair Value Accounting (FVA). The FVA paradigmrepresents a financial perspective on business operations. This perspective is matched bythe process and structure of the institutions that govern international accounting standardsetting, particularly the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Groupwhich advises the Commission of the European Union on the adoption of IASB standards.A network analysis of the different committees and working groups of these two institutionsdemonstrates that financial sector actors wield substantially more influence than othercategories of business actors within the governance of international accounting standardsetting.

KEYWORDS: accounting, standards, harmonization, network analysis

∗Research funding from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) isgratefully acknowledged by the authors.

1. Introduction According to a leading financial newspaper, January 2005 marked ‘the greatest revolution in financial reporting for a generation’1. The reference being made was to the endorsement, by the European Union (EU) and many other countries around the world2, of accounting standards written by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In the European Union alone, more than 7000 companies have started using these standards. Our fellow contributors to this special issue explain why it has been possible for a private body such as the IASB to play such a prominent role, after several failures of earlier attempts to harmonize accounting standards, and against opposition from the U.S. This article complements these studies by analyzing important aspects of how the IASB – the focus of this special issue – actually works. To do this the article maps the IASB’s network of linkages with other organizations, public and private, and analyses this network in the context of the substantive changes which the IASB brings to the accounting standards themselves. In section 2 we first place the key change which the IASB is introducing to accounting standards within the context of changes in corporate governance. We explain why the gradual replacement of the historic-cost accounting paradigm by the fair value accounting (FVA) paradigm is a move towards to a financial perspective on the economy. From a corporate governance perspective, the extended use of the FVA paradigm can be expected to contribute to increased pressures on the productive sector and on workers within this sector. In the main part of the article we address the governance of international accounting standards by considering both the comment letter process (section 3) and the composition of the various committees and working groups of the IASB and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) which advises the European Commission on the adoption of IASB standards (section 4). A systematic network analysis of the representation of different constituencies within these institutions (sections 5) reveals the predominance of financial sector actors in the governance of the IASB-EFRAG network. Section 6 concludes by linking the governance and substance of accounting standard setting. We surmise that the empowerment of the IASB has contributed to the increased influence of the financial sector within corporate governance regulation and, in view of broader political economic changes, that this financial perspective can be expected to disadvantage certain production-oriented sectors and labor. 1 Financial Times (2004) 2 See Tweedie and Seidenstein (2005) for a full list of countries which use IASB standards

1Perry and Nöelke: International Accounting Standard Setting: A Network Approach

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

2. The substance of international accounting standard setting: the rise of fair value accounting In this section we wish to emphasize how the paradigm shift in accounting which the IASB has launched can be expected to impact existing social arrangements which surround the modern corporation. Because of their key role in corporate governance, accounting standards have long been the subject of intense lobbying by certain business groups, particularly in the U.S. More recently the IASB standard setting process has become the target of numerous attempts to change the content of individual standards both via heated debate in the business media and via the official comment letter process described in the next section. Still, most of these interventions remain very specific, calling for special consideration of particular elements and practices of individual companies or sectors. However, from a wider perspective one can discern a consistent change in the substance of accounting standards as promulgated by the IASB. The impact of this change in substance is not limited to a narrow range of companies in specific sectors, but rather has the potential to impact much broader constituencies. The change to which we refer is the rising importance of market values in IASB accounting standards, a move most clearly visible in the shift from historic-cost accounting towards fair-value accounting (FVA)3. With the IASB now setting standards for ninety-two countries, the FVA paradigm is rapidly advancing its coverage both in terms of the corporate balance sheet4 and geographically5. For many accounting scholars and practitioners, the substantial work of the IASB is synonymous with the introduction of FVA. At the same time, the introduction of FVA to new areas of accounting is also the most controversial aspect of the IASB’s recent standards. Under traditional historic-cost accounting, the values of corporate assets (or liabilities) are directly linked to what was originally paid (or received) by a firm. Under an FVA accounting standard, that link with a past transaction is broken. Instead these critical values on corporate balance sheets are determined by reference to market prices, or models thereof. Fair-value is defined by the IASB as ‘… the amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction’6.Thus, in parallel to the shareholder value concept as originally developed in management consulting7, FVA modifies traditional, historic-cost based, accounts 3 House (2004), Williams (2002), IASB (2005) 4 Barlev & Haddad (2003), Accounting Technology 2004 5 Tweedie and Seidenstein (2005) 6 IASB (2004) – IAS19, section 7: definitions 7 Williams (2000)

2 Business and Politics Vol. 7 [2005], No. 3, Article 5

http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss3/art5

with the addition of market price-based assessments which are intended to serve as a better basis for predicting future income streams and therefore improve the efficiency of economic resource allocation. Both FVA and the shareholder value concepts directly include asset values in measures of corporate performance in contrast to the traditional practice of matching sales against cost-of-sales and then subtracting one from the other. In the perspective of its proponents, FVA directs shareholders’ attention (or that of their agents) to changes in the value of their investment, and “causes a basic and substantial change in managers’ perception of their duties to shareholders”8. FVA encourages investors to look beyond a single earnings figure, and instead consider the fair value of a firm’s underlying assets, their perceived contribution to earnings and their expected future contribution9. The accounting paradigm thus plays a significant part in constructing a framework in which both managers and investors begin to regard the firm as a collection of assets, each with its expected future cash flow, and each with its own implied (or actual) market price. As such, FVA increases the pressure on managers to constantly reconfigure and rationalize the portfolio of assets they control in order to maximize shareholder value. The shift from historic cost to FVA is of political-economic significance precisely because FVA underwrites, and deepens, the impact of the shareholder value paradigm in corporate governance. The drive to increase shareholder value has become the primary stated objective of corporate managers in recent decades, as several studies in political economy have demonstrated10. This drive is further validated by the most recent intergovernmental agreement on corporate governance principles11. The most enthusiastic proponents of the shareholder value concept are to be found among financial sector actors, including investment funds, their fund managers, and the analysts which support them. Sitting at the hub of the financial markets, these actors allocate financial resources by calculating and comparing the value created by each firm against benchmarks set by the best performers across all industrial sectors. The values used in such comparisons are those which are realizable during the time horizon of the individual financial actors – either through capital gains or income receipts. As such this ‘value creation’ for shareholders does not necessarily correspond to longer-term economic efficiency. Indeed, quantitative

8 Barlev & Haddad (2003: 384) 9 Damant (2001), Damant (2003) 10 Froud et al (2000), Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) 11 OECD (2004)



economic studies have shown that an excessive focus on shareholder value can reduce the rate of capital accumulation over the longer term12.

While maximizing shareholder value may serve the interests of investors in the short-term, it is far from proven that the shareholder value approach is the most efficient solution for companies and their wider assembly of stakeholders over the longer term, especially where companies have grown and evolved under more consensual corporate governance arrangements such as those found in continental Europe13. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that large parts of German business are very critical of the introduction of FVA14. In contrast to the traditional German accounting regulation as contained in the “Handelsgesetzbuch”, the introduction of FVA makes the familiar practice of hiding revenues in the balance sheet far more difficult – and thereby undermines the practice of building internal hidden reserves for long-term strategies. With FVA accounting values in annual reports, financial analysts and fund managers can exert more pressure on enterprise managers to put such reserves to profitable use and raise short-term returns on investment. This, it is claimed, will endanger the long-term investments in human capital that are integral to the German model for producing high quality and high value-added products using skilled labor. Although this particular effect of FVA may be especially obvious in the case of the German model, the way in which FVA strengthens the grip of the shareholder value paradigm can be expected to negatively affect employees in a wider sense because, by focusing investor attention on short term market-price changes, it intensifies incentives to make short-term cost savings while also providing apparent justification for doing so. With the incursion of market-values into company accounts having the potential to disrupt corporate governance arrangements in a range of settings, perhaps the most obvious question from a governance perspective is where is the opposition? Given the controversial character of FVA, and its orientation towards a financial perspective, why has there apparently been no successful opposition from, for example, the productive sector? Are the public institutions that are supposed to protect the broader social groups impacted, albeit indirectly, by accounting regulation represented anywhere in the standard setting process? Other contributions within this special issue have provided historical explanations for the rise of the IASB and its perspective on accounting. Complementing these dynamic accounts, we will now present a more detailed ‘snapshot’ of the current governance of the IASB. There are two formalized 12 Stockhammer (2004) 13 Ball (2004) in C. Leuz, D. Pfaff and A. Hopwood (2004) 14 For example see Küting (2005)



routes by which social actors can feed directly into the standard-setting process of the IASB. The first is through the IASB exposure draft comment process; the second is through voting-membership of the IASB-EFRAG committees and working groups. Each route will next be discussed in turn. 3. The IASB Comment Letter Process The IASB publishes, for public comment, consultative documents such as Discussion Papers and Exposure Drafts of its proposed standards and interpretations. The usual comment period is ninety days, during which time anyone can submit an official comment letter which is then taken account of in their deliberative process. In this section we use data collected from the public records of IASB comment letters to identify broad patterns within this process, particularly regarding the type of organizations that participate, whether they are private or public, business or non-business, financial or productive sector. We have compiled data from comment letters on 16 different exposure drafts from 1 April 2002, when the IASB assumed its current role and structure, until 5 August 2004. During this period 1910 comment letters were submitted by 900 companies, organizations and individuals. It is noteworthy that there is a significant concentration of comment letter sources, with over half of them (939 letters) coming from the top 120 sources, and 68% (1300 letters) coming from the

top 280 sources. This is shown graphically in figure 1. The organizations which submitted the most comment letters are listed in table 1, using a cut-off point of ten or more letters in the survey period. Out of 38 organizations the top six are all private. The European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) is joint top commenter, but this is a special case due to EFRAG’s role in the European Commission’s endorsement mechanism for International Accounting Standards (see below). The French business association, Association pour la Participation des Entreprises Françaises à l'Harmonisation Comptable Internationale (ACTEO), shares first place with EFRAG.

IASB Comment Letter Concentration

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

0 200 400 600 800

No. of sources

%of

Com

men

tLett

ers

Figure 1. IASB Comment Letter Concentration (drawn using data compiled from www.iasb.org)



In terms of actor groupings, the Big Four accountancy firms, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG International, are the most prominent group, each being ranked 2nd, 3rd, 10th and 11th respectively - although only one comment letter separates them. Professional accounting associations (all private) comprise the next most highly ranked group with ten of them having submitted enough comment letters to be included in the table. Organization Type Comment

Letters European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) Business Association 16 Association pour la participation des entreprises françaises à l'harmonisation comptable internationale (ACTEO) (France)

Business Association 16

Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu (International) Accountancy 15 Ernst & Young (International) Accountancy 15 Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) (Japan) Profession Accountants 15 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) (UK) Profession Accountants 15 Council for Annual Reporting (CAR) (Netherlands) Standard Setter 15 Conseil National de la Comptabilité (CNC) (France) Standard Setter 15 German Accounting Standards Committee (DRSC) (Germany) Standard Setter 15 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (International) Accountancy 14 KPMG International Accountancy 14 London Society of Chartered Accountants (LSCA) UK Profession Accountants 14 South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) Profession Accountants 14 Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF) (France) Business Association 13 International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Financial Regulator 13 F Hoffmann La Roche (Switzerland) Non-Financial Corp 13 Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (IDW) (Institute of Chartered Accountants in Germany)

Profession Accountants 13

Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer (FAR) (Swedish Institute of State Authourized Public Accountants) (Sweden)


Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) (Ireland) Profession Accountants 13 Group of 100 (CFOs in Australia) Profession Financial Executives 13 Australian Accounting Standards Board (Austraila) Standard Setter 13 UBS (Switzerland) Bank or Fund 12 Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) (UK) Profession Accountants 12 Accounting Standards Board (ASB) (UK) Standard Setter 12 Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) (Malaysia) Standard Setter 12 London Investment Banking Association (LIBA) (UK) Bank or Fund Association 11 Industrie-Holding (Switzerland) Non-Financial Corp 11 Foreningen af Statsautoriserede Revisorer (FSR) (The Danish Institute of State Authourized Public Accountants) (Denmark)


Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) (UK) Profession Accountants 11 Council on Corporate Disclosure and Governance (CCDG) (Singapore) Standard Setter 11 International Accounting Standards Review Committee (IASRC) of the Korea Accounting Institute (KAI) (Korea)

Standard Setter 11

BNP Paribas (France) Bank or Fund 10 Société Générale (France) Bank or Fund 10 Bundesverband Deutscher Banken (Assocaition of German Banks) (Germany) Bank or Fund Association 10 Association of British Insurers (UK) Insurance Association 10 Nestle (Switzerland) Non-Financial Corp 10 Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ) (Japan) Standard Setter 10 Swedish Financial Accounting Standards Council (Sweden) Standard Setter 10 Table 1. Organizations submitting more than 10 official IASB comment letters (compiled using data from www.iasb.org and from individual company/organization websites).



National accounting standard setters only rank slightly lower with also ten of them being included in the table, but with slightly fewer comment letters (an average of 12 each as opposed to 13 from the professional accounting associations). There are only three non-financial corporations in the table, notably all Swiss-based firms (the Swiss being among the first to endorse IAS). Of roughly equal ranking are three international banks and two private banking associations. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the international securities regulator is also highly ranked, as is the Australian Association of Chief Financial Officers (Group 100) and the (private) London Investment Banking Association. 72% of the comment letters in table 1 were submitted by purely private organizations, with a further 26% from national standard setters – some of which are private, and all of which are relatively independent of government. The only explicitly governmental organization in the table is IOSCO. A good indicator for the societal isolation of current accounting standard setting is the non-participation of organizations outside the commercial sector within the IASB comment letter process. This process can be seen to be dominated by professional associations and business interests. This is despite the fact that, during the period surveyed, the IASB issued exposure drafts relating to labor-sensitive issues such as share-based payments, pensions and other employee benefits. Among all comment letters submitted (i.e. the full 1910, not just those represented in table 1), there is absolutely no participation of labor unions or any other broad social interest groups. The same is true for EFRAG, as is shown in section 5 below. 4. The institutional set-up of IASB and EFRAG The second route though which actors can feed into the standard setting process is through membership of the IASB’s four primary committees and three working groups, and EFRAG’s two primary committees and working groups. In our analysis we assume that members of these committees and working groups can be expected to maintain the perspective of their current employment (or in a few cases their previous employment). Given that the IASB and EFRAG both place detailed employment information about committee members prominently on their websites as the chief means of demonstrating the committees’ expertise, this assumption does not seem to be an unreasonable one – although it should be noted that membership is officially granted on an individual basis. In much of the analysis a weaker assumption is anyway sufficient. Since we group actors by business sector, committee members are taken to represent broadly the



perspective of the business sector of which their employer is a part, and in which these individuals in many cases have developed their careers and expertise15.

International accounting standards are written by the IASB, but in the EU these standards do not automatically become binding; they must first be endorsed by the European Commission (EC)16. Advising the EC in this matter are the private European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the public Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), a body composed of representatives of the governments of the EU member states. In contrast to normal legislation, the endorsement process neither involves the Council of Ministers of the European Union, nor the European Parliament. Of particular importance during the EU endorsement process is EFRAG, an institution created to provide technical expertise on accounting matters to the EC. Given that the global importance of the IASB standards is primarily based on its validity for all publicly listed companies within 25 member states of the European Union, EFRAG’s committees and working groups have to be taken into account in any analysis of the governance of the IASB standard setting process. The IASB has four primary committees and three working groups; EFRAG has two primary committees and two working groups17. This section provides an overview of these eleven committees and working groups, their roles, and how they are related to each other. The next section (5) presents and interprets data compiled on their membership.

15 By highlighting the organizational affiliations and professional background of committee members our approach shares some assumptions with the “epistemic community” approach applied by Martinez-Diaz in this special issue. 16 Cf van Hulle (2004: 366-371) 17 Data on IASB/EFRAG committees and working groups was compiled in February 2005 from the organisations’ websites.



IASB Primary Committees A schematic of these four committees, taken from the IASB website, is presented below.

Figure 2. Structure of the IASB (from www.iasb.org)

International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF)The governance of the IASB and its related bodies is ultimately in the hands of the Trustees of the IASCF. They appoint members of the other three committees, namely the IASB board, the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IASB IFRIC) and the Standards Advisory Council (IASB SAC). In addition they oversee the IASB’s strategy, control its budget, review its strategy and establish its operating procedures. Decisions are normally cast by simple majorities18. Besides Chairman Paul Volcker (formerly chairman of the US Federal Reserve) there were 18 trustees of the IASCF at the start of 200519.Trustees are recruited by co-optation of the existing trustees, based on a broad 18 IASCF constitution (IASCF 2005a), paragraph 14. 19 The committee and working groups presented here were those prevailing at the time of introduction of IASB standards in the European Union (January 2005). Subsequent to this, some IASB committees have been enlarged by up to three additional members. However, in line with presenting a consistent and detailed ‘snapshot’ of the governance structure at a single point in time, we have not included these changes in our data.



geographical representation and, in part, on consultations with specific constituents such as the International Federation of Accountants. Table 2 below shows which organizations the trustees are drawn from and for whom, except where indicated with an F, they continue to work. Most trustees come from the financial sector, with only few representatives from non-financial corporations or public organizations. If compared with its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), the IASCF has a far more limited representation by professional associations, and a strongly increased representation by preparers and, in particular, users of accounting information20.

IASCF TRUSTEES Current Employer Type Ernst & Young (International) (F) Accountancy PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (International) Accountancy Capital International Bank or Fund Deutsche Bank (Germany) Bank or Fund JP Morgan Chase (F) Bank or Fund Murray and Roberts Holdings Bank or Fund Omega Capital Bank or Fund Association Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP) (France) Business Association Bank for International Settlements Central Bank Brazilian Securities & Exchange Commission Financial Regulator Securities and Exchange Commission (US) Financial Regulator Ogilvy Renault Law Firm BASF Aktiengesellschaft (Germany) Non-Financial Corp Shell International Limited (F) Non-Financial Corp Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) (Japan) Profession Accountants Accounting Standards Board (ASB) (UK) (F) Standard Setter Australian Stock Exchange (F) Stock exchange Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd Stock exchange

Table 2. (compiled from www.iasb.org and the websites of organizations listed). International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).At the start of 2005, the Board comprised twelve members. According to the IASB constitution, selection of board members is based on technical expertise and explicitly not on geographical representation21. All members are full-time, besides one academic from Stanford University who is part-time. Table 3 lists the board members’ former employers before they joined the IASB.

20 Botzem and Quack, forthcoming. 21 IASCF constitution (IASCF 2005a), paragraphs 19 and 20.



IASB BOARD MEMBERS Previous Employer Type Cambridge University Academic Stanford University Academic Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu (International) Accountancy KPMG International Accountancy PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (International) Accountancy Stevenson McGregor Accountancy Wellington Management Company Bank or Fund Anglo American Non-Financial Corp Daimler Chrysler AG (Germany) Non-Financial Corp Volvo Group Non-Financial Corp Canadian Accounting Standards Board (Canada) Standard Setter US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Standard Setter

Table 3. (compiled from www.iasb.org and the websites of organizations listed) All other committees and working groups of EFRAG and the IASB have part-time members who all maintain full-time employment with other organizations. The IASB board is responsible for managing all activities of the IASB, except those reserved for the IASCF as described above. This includes ‘technical matters’ relating to accounting standards (i.e. the standard-setting process), the comment letter process, special working groups on accounting standards, IASB publications, meetings and public hearings. To make binding decisions on major issues such as exposure drafts or standards a majority of 9 out of 14 board members is required22. This makes it highly unlikely that a qualified majority can be formed against the votes of the IASB members coming from the major accounting firms, the largest group on the IASB board. The IASB has the ability to set its own agenda in terms of which accounting issues to address next, a process overseen by the IASCF. However, the IASB’s handbook of operating procedures clearly privileges a certain group of users of financial statements above all others: “As investors are providers of risk capital to the entity, the provision of financial statements that meet their needs will also meet most of the needs of other users. The Board therefore evaluates the merits of adding a potential item to its agenda mainly by reference to the needs of investors.”23

22 IASCF constitution (IASCF 2005a), paragraph 30 23 IASCF (2005b: 5)



IASB Standards Advisory Council (IASB-SAC)Advising the IASB board on agenda decisions and priorities is the IASB Standards Advisory Council (IASB-SAC). It is via membership of IASB-SAC that organizations and individuals communicate their views on major standard-setting projects to the IASB24. The group with the greatest representation on IASB-SAC is that of the Big Four accountancy firms, two of which have not one but three employees on the council. IASB International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IASB-IFRIC).IASB-IFRIC reviews accounting issues of widespread importance that are likely to receive divergent or unacceptable treatment in the absence of authoritative guidance. In such cases, IASB-IFRIC establishes consensus on the appropriate accounting treatment, working closely with similar national committees. IASB Working Groups In addition to the comment letter process and membership of the IASB’s primary committees, actors can also take part in the standard-setting process through specialized IASB working groups which advise the board and its committees on specific accounting issues. At the time of data collection there were three working groups:

1. The Working Group on Insurance analyses accounting issues relating to insurance contracts, and more generally is taking a fresh look at financial reporting by insurers.

2. The Working Group on Financial Instruments is reviewing the controversial accounting standard IAS3925, as well as analyzing other issues related to the reporting of financial instruments.

3. The Working Group on Performance Reporting was established jointly with the US accounting standards setter, the FASB. It is establishing standards for the format of financial statements so as to make it easier to judge the financial performance of non-financial firms.

The IASB has also announced that it would shortly form a working group on Comprehensive Income. Full data for IASB Working Group members is presented in section 5 24 IASCF constitution (IASCF 2005a), paragraph 37 25 See Dewing & Russell (2004) for a detailed analysis of the politics surrounding this standard.



EFRAG Primary Committees As previously indicated, EFRAG is (jointly) the most active contributor of comment letters on IASB standards. This is perhaps not surprising since one of EFRAG’s two official roles is to proactively contribute to the IASB standard setting process.26 EFRAG’s second role is to advise the European Commission (EC) on the endorsement of International Accounting Standards. It is important to emphasize that IASB standards do not become binding in the EU until endorsed by the European Commission. This implies that EFRAG’s comments to IASB are taken particularly seriously since it is EU endorsement which has propelled the IASB to its current prominence in international accounting. 27

EFRAG is a private organization, funded by its members, and set-up in 2002 at the bequest of the European Commission. As the schematic below shows, EFRAG is comprised of two primary committees – the Technical Expert Group, and a Supervisory Board – both of which advise the European Commission, alongside the (intergovernmental) Accounting Regulatory Committee.

Figure 3 (Source www.efrag.org)

26 EFRAG Due Process (2002), paragraph 1 27 cf. Dewing & Russel (2004)



While the EFRAG Supervisory Board assembles the ‘founding fathers’ of the institution, the Technical Expert Group meets on a monthly basis. In addition, EFRAG regularly convenes the Consultative Forum of all European (accounting-related) standard setters28.EFRAG Working Groups Like the IASB, EFRAG also has a number of working groups to give advice on specific accounting issues. Currently two working groups are fully established: One on Financial Instruments, and another on Insurance Accounting. Two further working groups are planned on Accounting Measurement and on Revenue Recognition. Membership data on the EFRAG primary committees and working groups is presented in the appendix. 5. Mapping the IASB-EFRAG committee network This section maps the membership of IASB and EFRAG committees and working groups, presenting the results in diagrammatic form using network analysis techniques. These results indicate why, despite arguments over precise implementation of the FVA in some specific areas, there appears to be such a large degree of consensus on the broader paradigm shift. Whereas section 2 outlined how the FVA paradigm supports a financial sector perspective of economic activity, this section now shows how the governance arrangements which accompany this paradigm privilege the perspective of the financial sector. To map the IASB-EFRAG committee network, data was gathered on the employers of each member of the four primary IASB committees, the two EFRAG committees, and the five working groups of these two organizations. This data was assembled from the websites of the individual employers as well as those of the IASB and EFRAG. To this was added information on which organizations provide funding to the IASB, and at what level, taken from the IASB’s published statutory accounts for the financial year 2003. The resulting dataset is quite large, comprising 266 different private- and public-sector organizations, of which 131 have employees (or in a few cases, former employees) on IASB-EFRAG committees, 176 provide IASB funding, and 41 both. To make sense of this data we have applied two cut-offs to leave only those organizations that fund the IASB and have at least two ties to IASB-EFRAG committees or working groups. This reduces their number to just fourteen which can be said to represent the core of the IASB-EFRAG committee network. 28 van Hulle (2004: 367)



Organization Type

Publi

c/Priv

ate

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu (International) Accountancy Private 3 12 1 2 3 2 1 1 2PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (International) Accountancy Private 3 10 1 1 3 1 1 2 1KPMG International Accountancy Private 3 6 1 1 1 1 1 1Ernst & Young (International) Accountancy Private 3 5 1 1 1 1 1Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A (Italy) Insurance Private 1 4 1 1 1 1UBS (Switzerland) Bank or Fund Private 2 3 1 1 1Aegon (Netherlands) Insurance Private 1 2 1 1AXA Insurance Private 1 2 1 1Dresdner Bank AG Bank or Fund Private 1 2 1 1General Electric Company (USA) NFC Private 1 2 1 1HSBC Holdings Plc (UK) Bank or Fund Private 2 2 1 1Morgan Stanley Bank or Fund Private 2 2 1 1Philips (Netherlands) NFC Private 2 2 1 1Shell International Limited NFC Private 2 2 1 1

Table 4. Organisations which fund the IASB and have two or more ties to the IASB/EFRAG committees (Compiled from www.iasb.org , individual company websites and the IASCF Annual Accounts 2003). The IASC Foundation depends largely on financial contributions from public and, in particular, private sources. In table 4 the column headed ‘IASB Funding’ shows the level of funding which each actor provides to the IASB. There are three levels: Each of the Big Four accounting firms pays $1m per year (level 3). Level 2 is what the IASB describes as an ‘underwriter company’ which pays between $100,000 and $200,000 per year with a commitment of five years. Level 1 is referred to by the IASB ‘supporter’, with no figure given. The column headed ‘Total Ties’ shows the number of IASB-EFRAG committees populated by



employees of each organization. The remaining eleven columns give the breakdown by committee. The data in table 4 is presented in figure 4 as a graph, visualized using NetDraw29. The IASB and EFRAG committees are square, the accountants are triangular, and all other actors are circular. Financial sector actors are colored light grey, non-financial corporations are black. Line thickness indicates tie strength. Abbreviations are used to label nodes. A full list of these can be found in the appendix.

Figure 4. A representation of the IASB-EFRAG network: Organizations which fund the IASB and have at least two ties to IASB/EFRAG committees and working groups. Actor attributes are shown by node color (grey for Financials, black for Non-Financials, white for neither) and shape (square for IASB-EFRAG, triangle for the accountants, circle for all others). Line thickness indicates tie strength. See appendix for key to abbreviations.

29 Borgatti (2002)



From table 4 and figure 4, three characteristics of the core of the IASB-EFRAG committee network stand out. First, and most obviously, it is dominated by the Big Four accounting firms. Of these, Deloitte & Touche and PWC appear by far the most influential with twice as many committee ties respectively as KPMG and Ernst & Young. These top two accounting firms also each have three employees on the IASB Standards Advisory Council. The second characteristic revealed by the data is the disproportionate influence of the financial-sector, especially when contrasted with its share of GNP or employment. Using the US Federal Reserve’s definition30, financial-sector actors occupy all but three of the positions in table 3 not taken by accountants. Furthermore, it is notable that the highest ranked non-financial corporation, General Electric, is well known for its financial divisions. The full dataset of IASB-EFRAG committee members, as shown in figure 5, also follows the same pattern with almost twice the number of financial ties as non-financial. Lastly, all of the actors in figure 4 are from the private-sector, and there is absolutely no participation of labor unions or any other broad social interest groups31. Likewise in the full dataset (figure 5), although there are more than fifty public actors, they are outnumbered four-to-one by private actors and account for only one eighth as many committee ties. In conclusion, our survey of the IASB-EFRAG network matches the findings for the IASB comment letter process as discussed in section 3 above. The governance network of the IASB and its EU counterpart EFRAG is much more strongly connected to financial sector actors than any other category. Public actors have retreated and broad social constituencies are not represented at all.

30 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE). Also used by Krippner 2005 31 This is in line with the very selective pattern of representation within the International Accounting Standards Committee, the predecessor to the IASB, cf. Martinez-Diaz (2005)



Figure 5. A representation of the IASB-EFRAG network: All organizations with ties to IASB/EFRAG committee and working groups. Node color and shape as per figure 4. See appendix for key to abbreviations.



6. Conclusion As the other articles in this special issue make clear, the public authorities who chose to delegate the setting of accounting standards to the IASB were not consciously choosing FVA. Rather they were choosing an institutional structure which left such ‘technical’ decisions to the ‘experts’. Our network analysis of the governance of the IASB demonstrates how this delegation of authority to the experts is characterized by a shift from public to private so that what was previously, in many countries, public regulation of accounting standards has now been replaced by regulation through a private, and predominantly privately funded, body. The governance of this private body is supported by a network of committees and working groups in which public actors are substantially outnumbered by private ones, and in which financial sector actors wield significantly more influence than other categories of business actor. This composition of the IASB-EFRAG network has, at the very least, smoothed the introduction of accounting standards which take a financial-sector perspective. However, on this note, it should be emphasized that the IASB did not invent the FVA paradigm – it has advanced and retreated from accounting standards several times in the history of modern accounting32. Nevertheless, the fact that the IASB’s current application of FVA, and the increased use of market values more generally, coincides with the continuing rise of the shareholder value paradigm should be seen as highly significant. Since shareholder value also gives primacy to market values it is clear that – to a significant degree – the two paradigms are mutually reinforcing. Our mapping of IASB-EFRAG working groups and committees raises some important issues about the democratic legitimacy of this form of private authority: Non-business oriented actors have no formalized role within the governance structure of the IASB. Given that wider social constituencies such as labor are (indirectly) affected by accounting, this is not unproblematic in itself. Furthermore, at present it seems there are few routes by which public authorities can be held accountable for their involvement in accounting standard-setting. The EU endorsement process does not do much to cure this democratic deficit, since it is the Commission (together with the ARC and EFRAG committees) which endorses accounting standards, not the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers. Thus, while the goal of global accounting standard harmonization may be underway with the rise of the IASB, this has not been achieved without political costs.

32 Richard (forthcoming)



Colophon James Perry and Andreas Nölke Amsterdam Research Centre for Corporate Governance Regulation Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam De Boelelaan 1081c 1081 HV Amsterdam The Netherlands [email protected] Research funding from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged, as are the comments and criticisms from three anonymous reviewers.



Appendix Ab

brevia

tion Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

AbLab Abbott Laboratories(USA) 1 0 ABN ABN Amro 1 0

ACTEO Association pour la participation des entreprises françaises à l'harmonisation comptable internationale (ACTEO) (France)

2 1 1

Aego Aegon (Netherlands) 1 2 1 1 AFEP Association Française des Entreprises Privées

(AFEP) (France) 1 1 Ahol Ahold NV 1 0 AIG American International Group Inc 1 1 1 AIMR Association for Investment Management and

Research (AIMR) (USA) 1 0Alcn Alcan Inc (Canada) 1 0 Alctl Alcatel 1 0 Alnz Allianz (Germany) 2 1 1 Alta Altana AG 1 0 Amco Amcor 1 1 AMF Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France) 1 1 Amve Amverscap (LGT Capital Partners) 2 0 Angl Anglo American 1 1 1 Asah Asahi Mutual Life Insurance Company (Japan) 1 0 ASB Accounting Standards Board (ASB) (UK) 2 1 1 ASBJ Accounting Standards Board of Japan (ASBJ)

(Japan) 1 1 AstrZ AstraZeneca PLC (UK) 1 0 ATT AT & T 1 0 AusX Austrailian Stock Exchange 1 1 Aven Aventis 2 0 Aviv Aviva Plc (UK) 1 1 1 AXA AXA 1 2 1 1 BankAm Bank of America Corporation 2 0 Barl Barloworld Ltd 1 0 BASF BASF Aktiengesellschaft (Germany) 2 1 1



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

Basl Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1 1 BAWAG Bank fur Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG (BAWAG)

(Austria) 1 1 Baye Bayer (Germany) 2 0 BBSA Banco Bradesco SA 2 0 BBVA Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Spain) 1 1 BCLY Barclays Bank (UK) (Group, incl Barclays Capital) 1 1 BdF Banque de France (France) 1 0 Bear Bear Stearns & Co 2 1 1 BESP Banco de Espana 1 0 BHP BHP Billiton (Australia) 1 0 BIS Bank for International Settlements 1 1 1 BITA Banco Itau SA 2 0 BITL Banca d'Italia 1 0 BMEX Banco de Mexico 1 0 BMW BMW Group 2 0 BNM Bank Negara Malaysia 1 0 BNP BNP Paribas (France) 2 1 1 BoC Bank of Canada 1 0 BoE Bank of England 1 0 Boei Boeing 1 0 BoG Bank of Greece 1 0 BoI Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of

Ireland 1 0BoJ Bank of Japan 1 0 BoK Bank of Korea 1 0 Bomb Bombardier Inc 1 0 BoR Central Bank of Russian Federation (Bank of

Russia) (Russia) 1 0Bouy Bouygues 1 1 BP BP Plc (UK) 2 0 BSEC Brazilian Securities & Exchange Commission 1 1 Bund Deutsche Bundesbank (Germany) 1 0



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

CA Credit Agricole S.A (France) 1 1 Cais Caisse d'Epargne 1 1 Camb Cambridge University 1 1 Cano Canon Inc 1 0 CAPI Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Israel

(Israel) 1 1 Capit Capital Strategy Research 1 1 Capl Capital International 1 1 CASB Canadian Accounting Standards Board (Canada) 1 1 CBD Companhia Brasiliera de Distribucao 1 0 CEA Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) 2 1 1 Ceme Cemex 1 0 CFA CFA Institute 1 1 Citi Citigroup (USA) 2 0 Clon Corporation of London 1 0 CMF Chinese Ministry of Finance 1 0 CMOB China Mobile (HK) Ltd 1 0 Cmrz Commerzbank AG 1 0 CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Company Ltd 1 0 COSFIC Canadian Office of the Superintendent of Financial

Institutions of Canada 1 0CSFB Credit Suisse Group (Switzerland) 1 1 CUNI China Unicom Ltd 1 0 CVRD Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 1 0 CzNB Czech National Bank (Czech Republic) 1 0 DB Deutsche Bank (Germany) 2 1 1 Dmlr Daimler Chrysler AG (Germany) 2 1 1 Dres Dresdner Bank AG 1 2 1 1 DSM DSM NV 1 0 DT Deloitte & Touche Tohmatsu (International) 4 12 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 Dtel Deutsche Telecom AG 1 1 1 DZ B DZ Bank AG 2 1 1



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

EACB European Association of Co-operative Banks (EACB) 1 1

EACSM European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 1 1

ECB European Central Bank 1 0 EFFAS European Federation of Financial Analysts

Societies 1 1 Enxt Euronext 1 0 EON EON AG 2 0 ESBG European Savings Banks Group (ESBG) 1 1 Exxo Exxon Mobil Corp 1 0 EY Ernst & Young (International) 4 5 1 1 1 1 1 FBE Fédération Bancaire de l'Union Europeenne (FBE) 1 1 FEE Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens

(European Federation of Accountants) (FEE) 5 5 FESE Federation of European Securities Exchanges 1 1 FIAT FIAT SpA 1 0 Fitc Fitch Ratings Ltd 1 1 Fort Fortis (Belgium/ Netherlands) 2 0 FRCA Financial Reporting Council of Australia 1 0 FRSB Financial Reporting Standards Board (FRSB)

(New Zealand) 1 1 Fuji Fujitsu 1 0 GAZ GA Zimmerman Associates 1 1 GE General Electric Company (USA) 1 2 1 1 Glax Glaxosmithkline (UK) 1 0 GM General Motors 1 1 1 GNLI Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A (Italy) 1 4 1 1 1 1 Gold Goldman Sachs 2 0 GoUni Johan Wolfgang Goethe University 1 1 GPC Georgia-Pacific Corporation 1 0 GtTh Grant Thornton Chartered Accountants 1 1 Herb Herbert Smith 1 1 Hita Hitachi 1 1 1



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

HKEC Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd 1 1 1 HKMA Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1 0 Hose Hosei University Faculty of Business

Administration (Japan) 1 1 HSBC HSBC Holdings Plc (UK) 2 2 1 1 Hung Hungarian Central Bank 1 0 Hypo HypoVereinsbank (HVB) AG 1 0 IAA International Actuarial Association (IAA) 2 1 1 IAG IAG (Insurance Australia Group) 1 1 IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors

(IAIS) 1 1

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1 0

ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW) (UK) 1 1

IFAC International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) 1 1 IFC International Finance Corporation (World Bank

Group) 2 1 1 IMF International Monetary Fund 1 1 1 ING ING Group (Netherlands) 2 1 1 Invtc Investec PLC 1 0 IOSCO International Organization of Securities

Commission (IOSCO) 2 2 Ito- Ito-Yokado Co Ltd 1 0 ITOC ITOCHU Corp 1 0 JBA Japanese Bankers Association (Japan) 1 1 JBF Japan Business Federation (Japan) 1 1 JICPA Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants

(JICPA) (Japan) 1 1 1JJ Johnson & Johnson (USA) 1 1 1 JPM JP Morgan Chase 2 1 1 JSDA Japan Securities Dealers Association 1 0 JTEL Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp 1 0 Kans Kansai Electric Power Co Inc 1 0 Koma Komatsu Ltd 1 0



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

KPMG KPMG International 4 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lafa Lafarge Coppée (France) 2 1 1 LeGen Legal and General (UK) 1 0 Lehm Lehman Brothers Inc 2 0 LIAJ Life Insurance Association of Japan (Japan) 1 0 Lock Lockheed Martin (USA) 1 0 L'Or L'Oreal 2 0 LSE London Stock Exchange (LSE) PLC 1 0 Mari Marine and Fire Insurance Association of Japan 1 0 Maru Marubeni Corp 1 0 Mats Matsushita Electric 1 1 1 Maza Mazars 2 1 1 McCo McCormick & Co 1 1 Mell Mellon Financial 1 0 Merk Merck and Co Inc (USA) 1 0 Merr Merrill Lynch 2 1 1 MitsC Mitsubishi Corporation 1 0 MitsE Mitsubishi Electric Corp 1 0 MitsH Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 0 Mitsui Mitsui Mutual Life Insurance Association (Japan) 1 0 Mood Moody’s Investor Service (USA) 1 1 Morg Morgan Stanley 2 2 1 1 Muni Munich Re (Germany) 1 1 Murr Murray and Roberts Holdings 1 1 NASD NASD Regulation 1 0 NASDAQ Nasdaq (USA) 1 0 NEC NEC Corp 1 0 Nede Nederlandsche Bank (Central Bank) 1 1 1 Nest Nestle (Switzerland) 2 1 1 Nipp Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) 1 0 Niss Nissan Motor Corp 1 0



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

NLIC Nippon Life Insurance Company (Japan) 1 1 Noki Nokia Corporation (Finland) 1 1 Nort Nortel Networks Corp 1 0 NSC Nippon Steel Corp 1 0 NUH Nippon Unipac Holding 1 0 Nvts Novartis International AG (Switzerland) 1 1 NYSE New York Stock Exchange 2 0 Ogil Ogilvy Renault 1 1 OldM Old Mutual (UK) 1 0 Omeg Omega Capital 1 1 Onta Ontario Securities Commission 1 1 Osak Osaka Securities Exchange Inc 1 0 PetBr Petroleo Brasileiro SA 1 0 PetCh PetroChina Company Ltd 1 0 Pfiz Pfizer (USA) 2 0 Phil Philips (Netherlands) 2 2 1 1 Pire Pirelli (Italy) 1 1 1 Poli Polish National Bank 1 0 Prud Prudential (UK) 2 1 1 PWC PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (International) 4 10 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 RBA Reserve Bank of Australia 1 0 RBC Royal Bank of Canada 1 0 RBI Reserve Bank of India 1 0 Reps Repsol YPF (Spain) 1 1 RFRC Russian Finance Reporting Council (Russia) 1 1 RicDu Richard Dupont (USA) 1 1 0 Rio Rio Tinto Plc (UK) 1 0 RTL RTL Group 1 1 RWE RWE AG (Germany) 2 0 SAAJ Security Analysts Association of Japan 1 0 SABM SABMiller PLC 1 0



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

SAP SAP AG 1 0 SARB South African Reserve Bank 1 0 Saud Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 1 0 SBFA SBFA Investment Research 1 1 SBFS SwedBank FöreningsSparbanken AB (Sweden) 1 1 SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (US) 1 1 SFASC Swedish Financial Accounting Standards Council 1 1 SFIC State Farm Insurance Companies 2 0 Shell Shell International Limited 2 2 1 1 Shin Shin Nihon & Co (Ernst & Young) 1 0 Shis Shiseido Co Ltd 1 0 Siem Siemens AG 2 1 1 Sing Singapore Monetary Authority 1 0 Slov Slovak Central Bank 1 0 SNB Swiss National Bank 1 0 SnP Standard & Poor's 2 1 1 Somp Sompo Japan 1 1 SP Scottish Power (Scotland) 1 1 SS State Street (USA) 1 0 Stanf Stanford University 1 1 Stev Stevenson McGregor 1 1 Stoc Stockholm School of Economics 1 1 Stor Stora Enso Financial Services S.A (Belgium) 1 1 Sumi Sumitomo Group (Life Insurance) (Japan) 1 0 SwRe Swiss Re (Switzerland) 2 1 1 Tama Tama University, Tokyo 1 1 TBA Tokyo Bankers Association 1 0 TD B TD Bank Financial Group Ltd 1 0 TELITL Telecom Italia SpA 2 0 TEP Tokyo Electric Power Co 1 0 TIAA TIAA – CREF (USA) 2 0



Abbre

viatio

n Organization

IASBF

undin

gTo

taltie

s(IAS

B&EF

RAG)

IASB

IASB-I

FRIC

IASB-S

ACIAS

B-WG-F

IASB-W

G-IIAS

B-WG-P

IASCF

EFRA

GFin

EFRA

GIns

EFRA

GSup

erEF

RAGT

EG

Tosh Toshiba 1 0 Total Total Fina Elf (France) 2 0 Toyo Toyota Motor Corp 1 0 TrSE Toronto Stock Exchange Inc 1 0 Trus Trust Companies Association of Japan 1 0 TSA Telkom South Africa 1 0 TSE Tokyo Stock Exchange 1 0 UBS UBS (Switzerland) 2 3 1 1 1 UIT Unitec Institute of Technology (New Zealand) 1 1 UKSIP UK Society of Investment Professionals 1 1 UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 1 1

UniB UniBanco 1 0 UNICE Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations

of Europe (UNICE) 4 4 Unil Unilever 1 1 1 USFed US Federal Reserve Bank Board of Governors 1 0 USFEI Financial Executives International (FEI) (USA) 1 0 USP Universidade de São Paulo 1 1 UVAL University of Valencia (Spain) 1 1 Voda Vodafone (UK) 1 0 Volv Volvo Group 1 1 Wase Waseda University, Japan 1 1 Well Wellington Management Company 1 1 WestLB Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB) (Germany) 1 1 XLC XL Capital 1 1



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International Accounting Standard Setting: A Network Approach

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