Internally displaced persons - UNHCR · internally displaced persons. Since the end of the Cold...

Internally displacedpersons

They have been forced from their homes for many of the same reasons as refugees, buthave not crossed an international border. Often persecuted or under attack by theirown governments, they are frequently in a more desperate situation than refugees.They also outnumber refugees two to one. No international agency has a formalmandate to aid them. But they are increasingly at the forefront of the humanitarianagenda. They are sometimes called ‘internal refugees’, but are more often known asinternally displaced persons.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of people uprooted by conflict, ethnicstrife and human rights violations has soared. In 2004 there were between 20–25million internally displaced persons (see Figure 7.1). By then the number ofrefugees—those who fled or had been pushed out of their own countries—haddeclined to 9.2 million from 9.6 million in 2003. This trend was already apparent in2001 during the war in Afghanistan, when the number of internally displaced personsin the country stood at 2 million. However, in the same year only 200,000 Afghanscrossed into Pakistan as refugees.

In 2003, during the war in Iraq, hundreds of thousands of displaced peopleremained at risk inside the country; only a very small number were able to flee abroad.In some African humanitarian crises, there can be ten internally displaced persons forevery refugee. Currently there are an estimated 1.4 million people displaced byconflict in Uganda, at least 1.5 million in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)and 6 million in Sudan. But only 30,000 displaced people from Uganda have gone onto become refugees, while the numbers for the DRC and Sudan are 469,000 and703,000, respectively.

Sometimes, mountains and rivers impede flight across borders, or people may fleeto other parts of their own country to remain in relatively familiar surroundings. Evenwhen they do manage to cross national frontiers, however, the displaced rarely find awelcome. Hostility to refugees and asylum seekers has grown since the end of the ColdWar, with many countries seeing it as too costly or destabilizing to admit them. Inseveral recent emergencies, states have closed their borders to refugees or adoptedrestrictive admission policies. As a result, there is an inverse relationship between therising number of internally displaced persons and the declining figure for refugees.

The statistics on internally displaced persons generally count only those who aredisplaced by conflict and persecution.1 But millions more have been uprooted withintheir own countries by natural disasters. Indeed, UNHCR helped some of the survivors

7

Internally displaced women in Seliah camp, West Darfur informing UNHCR about their living conditions.(UNHCR/H. Caux/2004)

Internally displacedpersons

7

Internally displaced women in Seliah camp, West Darfur informing UNHCR about their living conditions.(UNHCR/H. Caux/2004)

0

5

25

75

95

100

10_SWR_05_Chapter7.prnC:\Lavori\UNHCR\World’s_Refugees\SWR_05_Chapter7.vp10 February 2006 17:54:40l 3 f 8

p p pBlack 150 lpi at 45 degrees

10_SWR_05_Chapter7.prnC:\Lavori\UNHCR\World’s_Refugees\SWR_05_Chapter7.vp10 February 2006 17:54:40l f 8

p p pPANTONE 1535 CV 150 lpi at 45 degrees

http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/template?page=publ&src=static/sowr2006/toceng.htm

of the Asian tsunami of 2004. By doing so, the agency went beyond its core mandateof assisting refugees. However, it only aided victims in countries where its staff werealready present, and then only if it were asked to help.

Even development projects can cause internal displacement. Poor, indigenous andmarginalized groups are frequently displaced without consultation to make way forgrand national projects. Not only are the rights of such people ignored, they are rarelyoffered resettlement or adequate compensation.2 According to the World Bank, 10million people are forcibly displaced by development projects each year, promptingthe Bank and other donors to set standards for the treatment of the ‘involuntarilyresettled’.

Though displacement has many causes, it is those uprooted by conflict and humanrights violations who generally arouse the most concern. The overwhelming need ofthese people for protection from their own governments draws international attentionto their plight. Like refugees, they cannot obtain the security and well-being they needin their own countries, and therefore turn to the international community. According tothe Global IDP Survey, there are more than 13 million internally displaced persons inAfrica, 5–6 million in Asia (including the Middle East), 3 million in Europe and 3–4million in the Americas.3

154

The State of the World's RefugeesThe State of the World's Refugees

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Mill

ions

IDPs RefugeesYear

Figure 7.1 Global number of refugees and internally displacedpersons (IDPs), 1990-2004

Note: Includes Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency forPalestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). All figures as at 31 December of each year.Sources: UNHCR; UNRWA; US Committee for Refugees (1990-2000); The Global IDP Project/NorwegianRefugee Council (2001-2004).

Figure 7.1 Global number of refugees and internally displacedpersons (IDPs), 1990-2004

0

5

25

75

95

100





A special category?

The plight of the internally displaced has been well documented over the past decade.But there is still debate over whether they should be recognized as a special categoryof persons for humanitarian purposes. The International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), for example, provides assistance and protection to all civilian victims of armedconflict and prefers to target assistance on the basis of vulnerability, not category. Thefear is that singling out one group could lead to discrimination against others,fostering inequity and conflict. Making a distinct category of the displaced, a 2005donor evaluation warns, could lead to their becoming ‘privileged’.4

Nonetheless, the displaced do have special needs. Displacement breaks up familiesand severs community ties. It leads to unemployment and limits access to land,education, food and shelter. The displaced are particularly vulnerable to violence. Asan official of ICRC observes: ‘It goes without saying that, deprived of shelter and theirhabitual sources of food, water, medicine and money’, internally displaced persons‘have different, and often more urgent, material needs’.5

These special needs have often been ignored in ‘situational approaches’. As aconsequence, the internally displaced frequently suffer the highest mortality rates inhumanitarian emergencies.6 In Uganda, the HIV/AIDS rate among the internallydisplaced is six times higher than in the general population.7 Even when the internally

155

Internally displaced persons

A special category?


0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Mill

ions

Year

Figure 7.2 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) of concern toUNHCR, 1995-2004

Note: All figures are as at 31 December of each year.Source: UNHCR.

Figure 7.2 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) of concern toUNHCR, 1995-2004

0

5

25

75

95

100





displaced and other vulnerable groups such as refugees face the same problems andare in similar circumstances they are not treated the same. For instance, tensionsarise when UNHCR gives returning refugees seeds and tools but internally displacedpersons returning to the same area receive none. In protracted situations, manyinternally displaced persons remain in near-destitute conditions.8

The purpose of formally identifying internally displaced persons as a category forhumanitarian action is not to confer privileged status on them, but to ensure that theirunique needs are addressed. Sometimes, approaches that target all affectedpopulations may be the most practical means of reaching the internally displaced.Nonetheless, experience has shown that special attention to particular disadvantagedgroups—whether refugees, internally displaced persons, minorities or women—hasenhanced their protection. Singling out the internally displaced makes it easier to callupon governments to assume responsibility for them and to press for internationalaction on their behalf.

Internally displaced persons are often intentionally uprooted by their governmentson ethnic, religious or political grounds, or as part of counterinsurgency campaigns. Incivil wars along racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious lines, the displaced are oftenperceived as the enemy (see Box 7.1, Box 7.2). They may be associated with aninsurgent group or an opposing political party or ideology, or be considered inferior orthreatening. In other cases the displaced may be trapped between opposing sides incivil wars or come under direct attack by insurgents, as in Colombia, the DRC andNepal. Competition over scarce resources or land often aggravates such conflicts, withthe displaced bearing the brunt of the violence. When states disintegrate into anarchy,as in Sierra Leone and Somalia, some of the worst atrocities have been inflicted on theinternally displaced.

Internal displacement disrupts the lives not only of the individuals and familiesconcerned but of whole communities and societies. Both the areas left behind by thedisplaced and the areas to which they flee can suffer extensive damage.Socio-economic systems and community structures often break down, impedingreconstruction and development for decades. Conflict and displacement also spill overinto neighbouring countries, as has been seen in Central America, the Balkans andWest Africa. Clearly, both humanitarian and geo-political reasons prompted UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan’s call to the international community to strengthensupport for national efforts to assist and protect internally displaced persons.

Sovereignty: barrier or responsibility?

Because internally displaced persons reside within the borders of their own countriesand in most cases under the jurisdiction of their own governments, primaryresponsibility for them rests with their national authorities. As Roberta Cohen andFrancis Deng point out in their study, Masses in Flight, ‘Since there is no adequatereplacement in sight for the system of state sovereignty, primary responsibility for

156

The State of the World's Refugees

Sovereignty: barrier or responsibility?


0

5

25

75

95

100





157

Internally displaced personsInternally displaced persons

Lessons from Bosnia and HerzegovinaThe brutal campaign of ‘ethniccleansing’ waged in Bosnia andHerzegovina during the Balkan warscaused the largest uprooting ofpopulations in Europe since theSecond World War. Three monthsfollowing Bosnia and Herzegovina’sdeclaration of independence in1992, the number of Bosnianrefugees and internally displacedpersons soared to 2.6 million. Whilemedia coverage was extensive andhumanitarian assistance quick toreach needy populations, theinternational community provedreluctant to address the root causesof the problem or to act militarily tostem the fighting. Instead, itconcentrated on sustaining anenormous emergency-relief operation,led by UNHCR. This emphasis onmaterial relief undoubtedly savedmany lives. But it did not preventthe forcible uprooting of people fromtheir homes, mass murder and massrape; nor did it thwart theestablishment of concentrationcamps in which displaced men werestarved and beaten as a prelude to‘ethnic cleansing’.

The Bosnia operation was one of thelargest relief initiatives everundertaken. Between 1992 and1995, UNHCR and its partner NGOsdelivered approximately 950,000metric tons of humanitarianassistance to 2.7 millionbeneficiaries. UNHCR’s roleexpanded from that of an agencywhose sole purpose was to secureasylum for refugees and preventinvoluntary return to one of providinghumanitarian assistance to largenumbers of internally displacedpersons and other war-affectedpeople. For the first time, it wascalled upon to operate in an activewar zone where its staff facedunprecedented security risks. Theeffectiveness with which UNHCRhandled this role prompted manysubsequent calls for it to enlarge itsmandate and take on the protectionand assistance of both refugees andinternally displaced persons inemergencies (see Box 7.3).

But UNHCR also came under heavycriticism. The organization thought

that if it maintained a ‘presence’, itwould be able to effectively monitorhuman rights abuses and offerprotection to vulnerable populations.While it did manage to take anumber of steps to protect thecivilian population, its presence didnot, and could not, stop theatrocities. Moreover, when it helpedevacuate people from life-threateningcircumstances it was accused ofbeing an accomplice to ‘ethniccleansing’. Critics also charged thatUNHCR’s involvement within-country protection was enablingneighbouring states to stem refugeemovements into their countries,although hundreds of thousands ofBosnians were given temporaryrefuge in European nations.

The humanitarian relief effort wasalso seen as an alibi and excuse forthe international community,allowing it to be seen as doingsomething without actually having toconfront those carrying out ethniccleansing. Security Councilresolutions on Bosnia andHerzegovina—all 46 of them—failedto address the underlying causes ofthe conflict, concentrating instead onsustaining the humanitarianoperation and on creatingUN-protected safe areas—without,however, giving the UN ProtectionForce (UNPROFOR) the mandate,equipment or resources to defendadequately the six Muslim enclavescreated. The failure to protectdisplaced persons in the safe areaswas epitomized at Srebrenica, whenUNPROFOR stood by as Serb forcesoverran the safe area and marchedoff and murdered at least 7,000Muslim men and boys.

This horrific event became a rallyingcry for those opposed to the notionof ‘helping people where they are’and who rejected out-of-hand thecreation of safe areas in subsequentwars in Kosovo and Afghanistan.Ironically, in those wars safe areasmight have been better defendedand saved many lives.

It was not until July 1995 that theinternational community finallyundertook the type of decisive

military action that was required inthe Balkans. When the Dayton PeaceAccords were signed in November ofthat year, approximately 1.3 millionBosnians remained internallydisplaced. Since that time, anexceptional international effort toimplement the right of displacedpeople and refugees to return totheir homes has resulted in 1 millionreturns. However, the plight of asignificant number of internallydisplaced persons remainsunresolved, in particular those whowould be minorities in areas ofreturn.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was acauldron of experience from whichfour lessons can be learned. Thefirst is that a humanitarian effortshould never be allowed to serve asa substitute for political or militarysolutions. Protection should be aprerequisite for assistance, since itmakes little sense to provideemergency relief to besiegedpopulations only for them to bekilled by belligerents. The second isthat the trauma of Srebrenica shouldnot be allowed to paralyse all futureinitiatives to try to protect people intheir own countries. Safe areasshould be considered for displacedpersons when military forces havethe capability to protect them. Thevast majority of people in mostemergencies cannot get out of theircountries and need internationalprotection as badly as, if not morethan, refugees. Third, a leadhumanitarian agency to take chargein an emergency could be useful indealing with displaced populations.That UNHCR was able to act swiftlyand deal comprehensively with allaffected populations, whetherrefugees, internally displaced personsor others, has been thoroughlydocumented. The fourth and finallesson is that far greater attentionmust be paid to preventivemeasures. If the internationalcommunity had spent as much timedevising a plan to stop the war as itspent distributing aid, fewer peoplewould have been uprooted and manymore lives could have been saved.

Box 7.1

0

5

25

75

95

100





158


Map 7.1 Internally displaced persons, 1 January 2005

Statistical data sources: The Global IDP Project / Norwegian Refugee Council.The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement oracceptance by the United Nations.Geographical data sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

Internally displaced persons, 1 January 2005

0

5

25

75

95

100





159


Statistical data sources: UNHCR, Governments. Compiled by: UNHCR

0

5

25

75

95

100





promoting the security, welfare, and liberty of populations must remain with thestate’.9 Yet, when asked why the United Nations had not been able to do more forinternally displaced persons, former High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogatareplied: ‘The problem is sovereignty’.10

Indeed, many countries use sovereignty as a justification for resisting or obstructinginternational aid efforts. In Myanmar, the government has barred access to thecountry’s internally displaced ethnic minorities, with which it is at war. For many yearsduring the insurgency by the Kurdish PKK group, Turkey barred access to hundreds ofthousands of displaced Kurds. In Algeria, no one knows for sure how many internallydisplaced people there are, or what their needs might be; the government has deniedaccess to them.

Sometimes governments categorize internally displaced persons as ‘migrants’ or‘terrorists’ to avoid responsibility for them, or they fail to develop policies and laws tohelp the displaced. Getting states to assume their responsibilities can be a challengefor the international community (see Box 7.2). This is particularly so in civil wars,where governments fear that aid to the displaced could strengthen insurgent groups.International efforts to negotiate with insurgents are often obstructed by nationalgovernments fearful that such engagement could legitimize the rebels. During theAngolan civil war, the government objected to UN agencies negotiating with the rebelUNITA group. As a result the United Nations had no access to large numbers ofdisplaced persons in insurgent areas. Only in 2002, with a ceasefire, did thewidespread starvation and disease plaguing these people come to light.

Nonetheless, over the past 15 years a perceptible shift has occurred in internationalthinking about the internally displaced. It is now widely recognized that people in needof aid and protection in their own countries have claims on the internationalcommunity when their governments do not fulfil their responsibilities, or where thereis a disintegration of the nation-state. While reaffirming respect for sovereignty,United Nations resolutions have authorized the establishment of relief corridors andcross-border operations to reach people in need. UN Security Council resolutions havedemanded access for the delivery of relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darfur (Sudan),northern Iraq, Mozambique, Somalia and Timor Leste, among other places. Inexceptional cases the United Nations has authorized the use of force to ensure thedelivery of relief and to provide protection.

Today, many governments allow some form of access to their displaced populations.The Government of Sri Lanka has set up welfare centres to provide material assistanceto displaced populations in both government- and rebel-held areas. It has alsoaccepted UNHCR’s establishment of relief centres on government territory that areopen to all groups. Following the 2004 tsunami, the government signed an agreementwith the Tamil-separatist leadership to share reconstruction funds for the displaced.

The Turkish government is cooperating with the United Nations and the World Bankin the return and reintegration of its displaced population. In the South Caucasus, theGeorgian government encourages international access to its displaced and provides asmall allowance for them. Similarly, the Government of Azerbaijan has welcomed

160


0

5

25

75

95

100





international assistance for its large population of internally displaced and considersthe phase-down of international aid to have been premature. Many other governmentshave also welcomed international aid for the internally displaced, among themColombia, DRC and Uganda. In response to international pressure, the Khartoumgovernment agreed to Operation Lifeline Sudan to allow international aid to reachdisplaced people under insurgent control in the south.11

The former Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally DisplacedPersons, Francis Deng, believes that while governments have the primaryresponsibility to care for their displaced populations, when they are unable to do sothey must request and accept outside help. If they refuse, or deliberately obstructaccess to the displaced, the international community has a right, even a responsibility,to become involved. International engagement could range from diplomatic dialogueand negotiation of access for relief supplies to political pressure. In exceptional cases,it could lead to sanctions or military action.

While no government has explicitly challenged this concept, states such as China,Egypt, India and Sudan have expressed fears that international humanitarian actioncould be a pretext for interference by powerful states in the affairs of weaker ones.Nonetheless, the concept of ‘a collective responsibility to protect’ the displaced whentheir national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so has gained ground. Indeed, itwas most recently upheld in the World Summit document adopted by heads ofgovernment in September 2005.12

To provide guidance to governments, the Brookings–Bern Project on InternalDisplacement has identified the main indicators of national responsibility.13

� To begin with, governments are expected to prevent or mitigate displacement.When displacement is unavoidable, they are expected to raise national awarenessof the problem, collect data on the numbers, locations and conditions of thedisplaced and facilitate access to populations at risk, including those underinsurgent control.

� Governments are expected to adopt laws and policies to protect displacedpopulations; train their officials, military and police in the rights of the displaced;and designate an institutional focal point for coordination within the governmentand with local and international partners.

� Allocating resources in the national budget for the displaced, or creating specialfunds from oil and other revenues, is another indicator of national responsibility.So too is finding solutions to the plight of the displaced, for instance by givingthem the choice to return voluntarily to their homes or to resettle in another part ofthe country. The displaced should also be assisted to reintegrate and recover, orreceive compensation for, lost property.

� Finally, governments are expected to cooperate with international and regionalorganizations when national capacity is insufficient.

The current Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights ofInternally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, has been using the framework of national

161


0

5

25

75

95

100





162


Darfur: the challenge of protecting the internally displacedThe Darfur emergency has beencalled the world’s ‘worsthumanitarian disaster’ by UNUnder-Secretary-General forHumanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland. Itis a case study of how difficult it isto protect internally displacedpersons when their own governmenthas caused the displacement andfails to comply with UN resolutionsto provide security. As in Bosnia andHerzegovina a decade earlier (seeBox 7.1), the international responsein Darfur has largely focused onproviding emergency relief. There aremore than 11,000 humanitarianworkers on the ground in Darfur, butfewer than 100 staff with protectionresponsibilities, and only a fewthousand lightly armed African Uniontroops with a weak mandate forprotection. Recalling how in Bosniaand Herzegovina civilians watchedthe aid trucks roll in while theirneighbours were gunned down,Secretary-General Annan in April2005 asked: ‘Are we now going tostand by and watch a replay inDarfur?’

The crisis in Sudan’s western regionbegan in 2003 with an attack ongovernment military outposts byinsurgents of the Fur, Masselit andZaghawa tribes. Their immediategrievance was governmentfavouritism toward Arab herdsmenwho were increasingly encroachingon black African farmlands. Morefundamentally, the rebels saw anopportunity in the ongoingnorth–south peace process in Sudanto demand for Darfur the samepower and wealth sharingarrangements that black Africantribes in the south and centre of thecountry were obtaining from theSudanese national authorities.

The government response was swiftand brutal. With helicopters andtroops supported by Arab militias(the Janjaweed) on the ground, themilitary set upon the three blackAfrican communities, killed up to70,000 men and deliberately drovefrom their homes more than 2million people, most of whom becameinternally displaced, while 200,000became refugees in neighbouringChad. Janjaweed militias thenburned their villages, poisoned the

wells and killed animals in ascorched-earth campaign reminiscentof the tactics used in earlier yearsagainst the black African tribes ofthe south.

From 2003 to the present, thenumber of deaths from starvation,disease and violence in Darfur isestimated at more than 350,000.Almost 2 million people live insqualid camps, totally dependent oninternational aid and with little or noprospect of returning home due tothe insecurity and destruction intheir homeland areas. Althoughoverall violence has decreased,military and Janjaweed attacks onblack African farming communitiesand camps of internally displacedpeople still continue.

International assistance with littleprotectionThe main international achievementto date has been to assure thedelivery of humanitarian relief. InJuly 2004, the UN Security Councildemanded an end to thegovernment’s obstruction ofhumanitarian organizations. In anunprecedented move, the UNSecretary-General and otherinternational leaders travelled to thearea to reinforce the point. As aresult the government lifted most ofits restrictions on humanitarianorganizations and signed anagreement with the United Nations.By the end of 2004, large-scalefamine had been avoided, epidemicscontained and malnutrition reducedamong many of those in the campsfor displaced persons. Fooddistribution and healthcare were alsoenhanced. Humanitarianorganizations were criticized forbeing slow to react to theemergency, but by mid-2005 thenumber of people receivinginternational food aid exceeded 2million. However, aid agenciescontinue to lack access to hundredsof thousands in rural areas underinsurgent control.

Far less progress has been made inthe area of protection. When thegovernment refused to comply withSecurity Council requests to stopattacks on the civilian population,little or no effort was made to

enforce the resolutions. Thegovernment failed to disarm theJanjaweed, cease helicopter assaultson villages or end the forciblereturns of internally displacedpersons to their home areas. Inaddition, some armed groups havebeen actively seeking to hinder reliefand monitoring activities. Yet theSecurity Council failed to agree onsanctions other than symbolic onessuch as travel bans and assetfreezes. A no-fly zone was notintroduced, nor was a UN protectionforce created. Arab and Islamicgovernments opposed pressure onthe Sudanese government, whileChina, the main foreign investor inSudan’s oil industry, threatened touse its veto. Russia, a key supplierof arms, also opposed strong action.Even the United States andEuropean Union did not wish topress the Sudanese government toofar, fearing that doing so couldjeopardize the signing andimplementation of the peaceagreement between north and southending two decades of civil war.

A regional solution

In the absence of internationalwillingness to act, the African Unioncame forward to try to stop theviolence. Indeed, ‘African solutionsfor African problems’ became arallying cry and also proved moreacceptable to the Sudanesegovernment. Initially, the Union sentin several hundred unarmedobservers under the banner of theAfrican Mission to Sudan, or AMIS,to monitor the April 2004 ceasefirebetween the Darfur rebels and thegovernment. But it also expanded itsforces and mandate in response tothe violence against the civilianpopulation. Specifically, it sent introops and police to contribute toenhancing security throughoutDarfur. It indicated that it wouldmonitor and verify security aroundcamps of displaced persons and inareas of their return, protect civiliansunder imminent threat, protecthumanitarian operations and, throughits visible military presence, try todeter armed groups from committinghostile acts against the population.

Box 7.2

0

5

25

75

95

100





163


But the language was couched incaveats. AMIS was supposed toprotect civilians, but only if it hadthe resources and the militarycapability. In fact, it was able tofield only 2,700 military observers,troops and police to Darfur (an areathe size of France) and could deploypolice in only one camp. It has fewaircraft or vehicles to transport itspolice and troops, and insufficientcommunication facilities and otherbasic equipment. It has plans toexpand its forces to 7,700 bySeptember 2005 and to 12,300 bythe spring of 2006, and Westerncountries have pledged funds andlogistical support. But the process isslow, the numbers are small, and themandate far from robust.

Nonetheless, where AMIS has beenpresent Janjaweed forays into campsof displaced persons havediminished, as have militia attackson villages and sexual assaultsagainst women gathering firewoodand water. AMIS has also enlargedhumanitarian access by escorting aidconvoys, which in 2005 came underincreasing attack, and plans toaccompany international humanrights observers on their monitoringmissions.

International protection mecha-nisms

In July 2004, the Security Councilcalled for the deployment of humanrights observers to Darfur to reporton violations, provide assistance tovictims and work with localauthorities and other actors toenhance the security of civilians. Butby March 2005, only 16 werereported to be on the ground,together with 26 international staffwith protection responsibilities. Bythe end of June, the number hadrisen to 41, but many were reportedto have little experience in protectionwork, were not deployed around thecountry and often could not travel toareas of conflict where seriousviolations were occurring. All thesefactors highlighted the need toreinforce the capacity of the UNHigh Commissioner for HumanRights to respond rapidly andeffectively in humanitarianemergencies.

Since no UN agency had aprotection responsibility for internallydisplaced persons, none cameforward to take the overall lead inthe area of protection in all threeprovinces in Darfur. When theUnited Kingdom’s Secretary of Statefor International Development, HilaryBenn, visited the area in June 2004,he found ‘confusion and poor delivery’and observed that ‘even now [aftermore than a year], internallydisplaced persons are not beingprotected adequately.’ Similarly, UNevaluations acknowledged the failureof the collaborative approach tobring protection to internallydisplaced persons in Darfur. Onenotorious example was themanagement of the camps ofdisplaced persons. The Office for theCoordination for Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA) was unable to find anyagency ready to manage the campsin Darfur. OCHA therefore had toturn the responsibility over to NGOswith little prior experience in campmanagement or protection andinsufficient staff.

The Representative of theSecretary-General on the HumanRights of Internally DisplacedPersons, Walter Kälin, wrote in theForced Migration Review of May2005 that ‘it is obvious that UNHCRis the organization with the mostexperience and capacity to protectand assist persons displaced byarmed conflict who are in camps orto organize IDP returns . . . Indeed,it is difficult to understand whythere should not be at least apresumption that the HighCommissioner for Refugees shouldassume responsibility in suchsituations.’ Today, UNHCR is thelead agency for the protection andreturn of some 700,000 internallydisplaced persons in West Darfur,while IOM was given responsibilityfor North and South Darfur. ButIOM’s lack of a protection mandateand experience has led some tosuggest that UNHCR should assumethe entire responsibility.

Human rights advocates believe thatthe Security Council’s decision torefer individual perpetrators ofcrimes against humanity and acts ofgenocide in Darfur to the

International Criminal Court will helpdeter violence against civilians.However, the Sudanese governmenthas rejected the Security Councildecision and at the moment there isno assurance that perpetrators ofgenocide will actually be prosecutedby the court.

Opportunities

Despite the absence of stronginternational mechanisms to relyupon in internal crises such asDarfur’s, there are still positivedevelopments to build upon. One isthe North–South peace agreement ofJanuary 2005, which offers thepossibility of a political resolution ofthe crisis. The accord provides forthe sharing of power and wealthbetween the Arab government inKhartoum and the black Africantribes of the south as well as withother ethnic groups at war with thegovernment. Were the African Unionand the United Nations to persuadethe government and rebels to extendthis agreement to Darfur, it couldhelp resolve the issues at the root ofthe conflict. Sudan’s new unitygovernment, installed in July 2005,has promised to promote a fair andjust settlement in Darfur. Thedesignation of Salim Ahmed Salim,former Secretary-General of theOrganization of African Unity, as theAfrican Union’s Special Envoy toSouth Sudan has also raised theprospects for peace.

Strengthening the African Union’sprotection role offers anotheropportunity to address the crisis.Expanding its forces and mandatecould not only enhance security forthe displaced but also make possibletheir return; it would enable them toplant and grow crops and therebyreduce their dependency oninternational aid. This will requiresubstantial resources and technicalsupport from major donors, butwithout such steps, the Darfur crisiscould become, in the words ofSuliman Baldo of the InternationalCrisis Group, ‘another never-endingconflict in which donors spend largesums feeding the displaced butotherwise fail to protect civilians andto address the underlying politicalcauses.’

0

5

25

75

95

100





responsibility in his dealings with governments. The Commonwealth too hasemphasized national responsibility and drawn up ‘best practice guidelines’ for itsmember states.14 But the efforts of donor governments, regional bodies and the UnitedNations to encourage states to assume their responsibilities need to be strengthened.So too do initiatives to get rebel armed groups to adhere to international standards intheir treatment of those under their control.15

164


Statistical data source: OCHA - Humanitarian Profile, November 2004The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the UnitedNations. Geographical data sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd.

Map 7.2 Internal Displacement in Darfur, November 2004Internal Displacement in Darfur, November 2004

0

5

25

75

95

100





Applying the Guiding Principles

Among the more effective tools for addressing situations of internal displacement arethe Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The principles constitute acomprehensive minimum standard for the treatment of the internally displaced. Theyset forth the rights of the displaced and the obligations of governments, insurgentgroups and other actors toward these populations. The principles are not legallybinding but are derived from international human rights treaties and humanitarianlaw. Since their presentation to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 byDeng, a growing number of governments, regional bodies, UN agencies and NGOshave begun to use them. Resolutions of the Commission and General Assemblyregularly refer to them as ‘an important tool’ and ‘standard’ for dealing with situationsof internal displacement.16 In the World Summit document of 2005, heads ofgovernment recognized the Guiding Principles as ‘an important internationalframework for the protection of internally displaced persons.’17 United NationsSecretary-General Kofi Annan has called upon states to promote their adoptionthrough national legislation.18

Over the past five years, governments have begun to make the Guiding Principles abasis for their policies and laws on internal displacement. Angola based its 2001 lawrelating to the resettlement of displaced persons on the principles, and Peru usedthem when developing its 2004 law providing benefits to the internally displaced.Colombia’s Constitutional Court based three decisions in support of aid to thedisplaced on the principles, and Georgia amended its laws and improved its practiceson the voting rights of internally displaced persons to conform to them. Burundi, thePhilippines, Sri Lanka and Uganda have also based national policies on the principles,and Liberia’s president has announced his government’s adoption of them.19

Regional inter-governmental bodies use the Guiding Principles as a monitoring toolwhen measuring conditions on the ground and as a framework for their programmesand activities. UN agencies and NGOs provide training in the principles, while localgroups in different countries have produced handbooks and illustrated materials toadapt them to conditions on the ground. In Sri Lanka, the Consortium of HumanitarianAgencies published a Toolkit based on the principles in three national languages,while lawyers in the South Caucasus and the Russian Federation have evaluated thelaws of their countries in terms of the principles.20 To date, the Guiding Principles havebeen translated into more than 40 languages.

The Guiding Principles have empowered internally displaced persons and theirrepresentatives. In Sierra Leone, displaced persons used the principles to call on UNagencies to provide education in camps. In Sri Lanka, representatives of the internallydisplaced used the principles to make their concerns known to camp commanders.Even armed rebel groups have acknowledged the value of the Guiding Principles: thesouthern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A), in collaborationwith the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN

165


Applying the Guiding Principles


0

5

25

75

95

100





Children’s Fund (UNICEF), has drafted a policy on internal displacement based onthem.

But are the Guiding Principles actually improving conditions on the ground? Nocomprehensive study has yet been undertaken to evaluate their impact. Governmentsmay announce laws and policies based on the principles but not necessarilyimplement them. As Deng observed in 2002, ‘while the Guiding Principles have beenwell received at the rhetorical level, their implementation remains problematic, andoften rudimentary.’21 Much is needed in the way of monitoring, advocacy and theengagement of international and local actors to promote their implementation.

It is frequently asked whether compliance would be greater if there were a legallybinding treaty on internal displacement. Egypt, India and Sudan have pointed out thatthe Guiding Principles were not negotiated by governments or formally adopted by theUN General Assembly. Those who favour a treaty argue that it would hold statesaccountable if they disregarded its provisions. However, others point out that the

166


Should UNHCR become a ‘displacement agency’?For more than a decade, influentialvoices have been calling for theenlargement of UNHCR’s mandate toencompass internally displacedpersons. In 1993, the Government ofthe Netherlands proposed at ameeting of UNHCR’s ExecutiveCommittee that the United Nationsassign ‘a general competence’ forthe internally displaced to UNHCR.In 1997, prior to the announcementof the Secretary-General’s reformprogramme, his senior adviserMaurice Strong sounded out UNHCRabout becoming the premierassistance agency of the UnitedNations and assuming responsibilityfor internally displaced persons. In2000, after visiting Angola andfinding UN agencies in disarray, theUS Ambassador to the UnitedNations at the time, RichardHolbrooke, made a publicrecommendation: ‘The primarymandate for internal refugees shouldbe given to a single agency,presumably the UNHCR.’

In 2004, following a visit to campsfor internally displaced persons inDarfur, the UK’s Secretary of Statefor International Development, HilaryBenn, posed the question: ‘Is it really

sensible that we have differentsystems for dealing with peoplefleeing their homes dependent onwhether they happen to have crossedan international border? I have mydoubts.’ In 2005 in the UnitedStates, a Congressionally-mandatedbipartisan task force on the UnitedNations recommended ‘redefining’ themandate of UNHCR to ensure thedelivery of aid to refugees, internallydisplaced persons and those affectedby natural disasters. Similarly, areport of the US Institute of Peacecalled upon the United Nations todesignate UNHCR the lead agency forinternally displaced persons.

UNHCR’s long experience withrefugees and its comprehensivemandate, encompassing bothprotection and assistance, makes it anobvious candidate for dealing with theinternally displaced. Advocates of alarger role for the organization point toits involvement with the internallydisplaced since the 1960s, and itsmore substantial engagement since the1990s, when a surge in civil conflictsfollowing the Cold War began toproduce more internally displacedpersons than refugees. Currently,UNHCR is engaged in helping some

5 million internally displaced persons,one-fifth of the world’s total. Thisnumber includes 1 million people inAfrica, the continent most ravaged byconflict and displacement. Those infavour of a ‘UNHCR solution’ alsoargue that current institutionalarrangements—namely thecollaborative approach under theEmergency Relief Coordinator—havefailed the internally displaced,especially in protection. As no otheragency has the background orexperience when it comes to uprootedpopulations, they see UNHCR as theonly realistic alternative for dealingwith the problem.

Nonetheless, strong objections toUNHCR assuming the primaryresponsibility for the internallydisplaced have been expressed.Indeed, UNHCR itself has long beendivided on the issue. Some fear thatthe agency would be overwhelmed bythe magnitude of the problem ofinternal displacement, and in theprocess undercut refugee protection.Others point to a conflict of interestbetween protecting people in theirown countries and defending the rightof people to leave and seek asylumabroad. In the former Yugoslavia, for

Box 7.3

0

5

25

75

95

100





Guiding Principles do have ‘legal significance’ and are being applied internationally bya growing number of states.22

Human rights treaty-making at the international level can take decades, with noguarantee that states will ratify instruments or observe their obligations. The processcould also lead to watering-down of the accepted provisions of international law onwhich the principles are based. Until the international community is ready to adopt abinding instrument that accords with the protection level set forth in the GuidingPrinciples, the majority opinion is that the best approach is to expand the applicationof the principles at the national level.23 Nonetheless, at the regional level the AfricanUnion is using the principles to develop a treaty on internal displacement for thecontinent.

Whatever the outcome of this debate, for the time being the Guiding Principles fill amajor gap in the international protection system for internally displaced persons. Theyprovide the displaced with a document to turn to when they are denied their rights. For

167


example, UNHCR was criticized forpaying too little attention to gainingasylum and resettlement for victimsof violations while at the same timefailing to provide effective in-countryprotection. States have also usedUNHCR’s in-country protectionactivities as a pretext for refusing togrant asylum. Moreover, the prospectof UNHCR taking on responsibility forthe internally displaced has triggeredfears that other UN agencies wouldbe sidelined and their rolesdiminished. Finally, many donorgovernments continue to favour thecollaborative approach despitecriticisms that it is ineffective when itcomes to the internally displaced.

The debate need not be framed as azero sum game, however. UNHCRcould not possibly take on allinternally displaced persons, millionsof whom are displaced by naturaldisasters and millions more bydevelopment projects. Moreover,many of those displaced by conflictare integrated into cities, may be inprotracted situations for decades andmay not be able to avail themselvesof the kind of support UNHCR canprovide. The more pertinent questionis whether UNHCR can enlarge its

role. In 2005, OCHA’s InternalDisplacement Division proposed thatUNHCR carve out areas ofresponsibility for which it could berelied upon in emergencies. Forexample, drawing upon its expertise,it could take the lead in designingprotection strategies and managingcamps. By assuming responsibilityfor specific functions, it could helpmake the overall UN response morepredictable and the collaborativeapproach work better. UNHCR’sgreater involvement, moreover, wouldnot diminish other agencies’ rolessince it and they would have to worktogether, just as they do now whenprotecting refugees.

In 2005, senior UNHCR officialsarticulated a more expansive outlook,speaking of the organization’s‘predisposition’ to help the internallydisplaced and ‘a generous and moreflexible application of UNHCR policycriteria’ in deciding when to becomeinvolved with those uprooted in theirown countries. In support of anenlarged role, the positive conse-quences of UNHCR’s involvementhave been pointed out. Countries ofasylum might be more inclined tomaintain their asylum policies if

something is being done to alleviatethe suffering of the internallydisplaced, reduce their need to seekasylum and create conditionsconducive to their return. Moreover,UNHCR could expand its rolegradually to enable it to monitor theimpact of its actions on refugeeprotection and to assure otheragencies of their continued roles.

UNHCR’s 12 September 2005agreement to assume leadresponsibility for protection, campmanagement and emergency shelterfor internally displaced persons,endorsed by the Inter-AgencyStanding Committee, marks amilestone in the evolution of UNpolicy on this issue. Beginning inJanuary 2006, UNHCR will take onthis role in two or three countries. Ifit performs effectively, calls toexpand its mandate will no doubtcontinue, and so will the debate onthe best way to deal institutionallywith the needs of internallydisplaced persons.

0

5

25

75

95

100





their part, governments and other actors have guidelines to follow in designingnational policies and laws on behalf of the displaced. Indeed, some experts arebuilding upon the Guiding Principles to spell out issues related to restitution,compensation and land use for the displaced in more detail.24

Institutional arrangements: the ‘collaborative approach’

A multitude of international organizations offer protection to internally displacedpersons and help them with aid for reintegration and development. First come thevarious UN agencies, ranging from UNHCR to UNICEF to OCHA. Others in the field arethe ICRC, the International Organization for Migration and many NGOs. The overallUN response is the responsibility of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, who headsOCHA. Since 1997 he has served as the United Nations’ ‘focal point’ for internallydisplaced persons. In addition, the Representative of the Secretary-General on theHuman Rights of Internally Displaced Persons serves as principal ‘advocate’ for theinternally displaced.

Under this ‘collaborative approach’, all agencies share the responsibility forresponding to situations of internal displacement. The system was decided upon bydefault. Neither the political will nor the resources existed to create a new agency toaddress the needs of the internally displaced. Such a new entity, it was feared, wouldduplicate the work of other agencies and almost certainly meet with opposition fromgovernments that object to international involvement with their displaced populations.A second, frequently suggested option—the enlargement of UNHCR’s mandate toenable it to assume the responsibility—was also rejected (see Box 7.3). The scale ofthe problem, it was argued, was too large for one agency. Even the ‘lead agency’option, in which one agency assumes the main role in the field (see Box 7.1), waslargely sidelined by the collaborative approach, which substituted coordination bythe Emergency Relief Coordinator at headquarters and by Resident/HumanitarianCoordinators (RC/HCs) in the field.

Most UN and independent evaluations have found the collaborative approachinadequate to the task and difficult to implement.25 Critics charge that UN agenciesregularly resist coordination and that there is no real centre of responsibility for thedisplaced in the field. ‘Co-heads are no-heads,’ quipped Richard Holbrooke, formerUS Ambassador to the United Nations, after visiting camps for internally displacedpersons in Angola.26 Critics also point to the lack of predictability, since the differentagencies basically pick and choose the situations in which they wish to becomeinvolved on the basis of their mandates, resources and interests. For instance, mostagencies rushed to South and Southeast Asia to help those displaced by the 2004tsunami, but only a limited international presence could be mobilized for northernUganda, where tens of thousands of children are at risk each night of abduction ormaiming. The Humanitarian Coordinator lacks both the authority and resources toassign responsibilities. His only tool is persuasion. But can ‘persuasion without

168


Institutional arrangements: the ‘collaborative approach’


0

5

25

75

95

100





authority over budgets and operations’ be sufficient, asks Georgetown University’sSusan Martin.27

In response to these widely publicized deficiencies, a special office was created inOCHA in 2002, devoted exclusively to internal displacement. Upgraded to a divisionin 2004—the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD)—and with stafflargely drawn from the different international agencies, it has sought to ensure thatUN agencies in the field, under the leadership of RC/HCs, develop and implement astrategic action plan to meet the needs of internally displaced persons. To help withthis, the IDD put together a policy package on the internally displaced which all themajor agencies and NGOs agreed to.28

But ensuring the implementation of action plans around the world soon proved to bebeyond the capacity of one small non-operational office. The cooperation of thepowerful operational agencies was needed to develop and carry out the plans. Yetthere was no agreed division of labour among agencies, so that at the beginning ofeach new emergency it was unclear which agency or combination of agencies wouldbecome involved and which responsibilities they would assume.

To rectify this, the IDD came up with a proposal for a ‘sectoral’ approach, wherebyagencies would be expected to carve out areas of responsibility (e.g. protection, campcoordination and management, emergency shelter, nutrition, water and sanitation)based on their expertise, and fulfil them in emergencies.

The most challenging sector by far is protection. While agencies regularly providefood, medicine and shelter to internally displaced persons, they are not wellequipped to defend the physical safety and human rights of those endangered.Providing material aid while ignoring the fact that the displaced are being beaten,raped or killed too often leads to the tragic description of the victims as the ‘well-feddead’ (see Box 7.1). Where national protection does not exist, international agenciesmay be called upon to set up early warning systems, negotiate access withgovernments and insurgent groups, deploy staff among threatened communities andprotect women and children from rape and abduction. They may also be called on toarrange relocations and evacuations, intercede with authorities to assure that thedisplaced are not forcibly returned to conditions of danger, or accompany thedisplaced home.

These initiatives go beyond the mandates and expertise of most international fieldstaff. Still, many are trying to enhance protection by reporting protection problems,becoming more engaged with the displaced and designing assistance programmes inways that reinforce protection. They have also been working more closely withdisplaced communities to build the latter’s coping skills. But the dangers areconsiderable. In some emergencies in recent years more aid workers have beenattacked or killed than peacekeepers. This has sometimes led to assistance by ‘remotecontrol’ (i.e., through local organizations) which has diminished protection, whether inChechnya, Iraq or Somalia.29

Only two agencies, the ICRC and UNHCR, have a specific legal mandate to carry outprotection work. But even here there are limits. ICRC cannot always become involved

169


0

5

25

75

95

100





170


Internal displacement in ColombiaWith 2 to 3 million displacedpersons, Colombia presents thehighest number of internallydisplaced people in the westernhemisphere, and the second largestdisplaced population in the worldafter Sudan. Most of thedisplacement is related to thecountry's four-decade-long internalarmed conflict, the most protractedin Latin America. This 'dirty war' is acomplex conflict fought primarilybetween left-wing guerrillas,right-wing paramilitaries andColombian armed forces. But it alsoinvolves drug traffickers, landowners,and other legal and illegal interests.

More than 40,000 people, most ofthem civilians, have been killed inColombia as a result of the armedconflict since 1990 alone. In recentyears, Colombians have been fleeingover the country’s borders inincreasing numbers, most notably toCosta Rica and Ecuador (but alsoPanama and Venezuela) in theregion, as well as to the UnitedStates and Europe. Since 2000,more than 100,000 Colombians havesought asylum abroad. But since 11September 2001, states haveadopted increasingly restrictiveasylum policies, making it harder forColombians to claim asylum.Although over 250,000 Colombiansare thought to be currently seekingasylum abroad, many others havesought refuge abroad without seekingasylum.

However, the vast majority of thoseforced to flee are civilians who donot cross an international border, butbecome displaced within their owncountry. More than 1.5 milliondisplaced persons are registered withthe Colombian government, butNGOs estimate that the real figure ismore than double this. Many

displaced people within Colombia donot register for fear of beingattacked, stigmatized or displacedagain. Official sources claim that 74per cent of the internally displacedare women and children. TheConsultancy for Human Rights andDisplacement estimated that288,000 Colombians were newlydisplaced during 2004, 39 per centmore than in 2003.

The vast majority of those displacedare dispersed rather than living inorganized camps, and many seekanonymity in the country’s big cities.Almost 40 per cent of the internallydisplaced have settled in and aroundthe ten largest cities. Without officialregistration and proper identitydocuments, internally displacedpersons often face difficulty inaccessing basic governmentassistance, employment, healthcareand education. It has been estimatedthat only one in eight internallydisplaced pupils have returned toschool after having been displaced.Displaced girls are more vulnerableto sexual exploitation and pregnancythan other teenagers.

Displacement has often been an endin itself rather than just a by-productof Colombia’s conflict. For manyyears, both guerrillas andparamilitaries have depopulated ruralareas and appropriated the land forpolitical, economic and strategicgain. Upon seizing control of anarea, armed groups often kill ordisplace civilians they suspect ofsupporting the opposing side. Humanrights defenders frequently suffer asimilar fate.

In recent years, indigenouscommunities and their leaders haveincreasingly been targeted by theirregular armed groups, who favour

action against the civilian populationover direct military confrontation.Although indigenous people representonly 2 to 3 per cent of Colombia’stotal inhabitants, they make up asmuch as 8 per cent of the county’sinternally displaced population. Ifthe current trend persists, there iseven concern that some of thesmaller and more vulnerable groupsmay disappear altogether.

And the story does not end withinitial displacement. In some areas,there have been reports of internallydisplaced young men being forciblyrecruited into irregular armed groups.In the cities, large sections of thepopulation are increasingly beingdrawn into gang warfare whichreplicates war allegiances anddivisions at the national level,bringing with it intra-urbandisplacements. Internally displacedpersons are becoming displaced asecond and even a third time.

Colombia’s legislation on internaldisplacement is among the mostadvanced in the world. The country’s1997 Law on Internal Displacement(Law 387) is consistent with the UNGuiding Principles on InternalDisplacement, requiring the state tocreate policies and adopt measuresfor displacement prevention,attention and protection. But theproblem is implementation, and inFebruary 2004, Colombia’sConstitutional Court issued alandmark judgement, which deemedgovernment policy in this regardinadequate and unconstitutional.

The government does not register orrecognize in official statistics thosedisplaced by the fumigationcampaign, those unwilling or unableto apply for assistance and thoserejected under its strict criteria. The

Box 7.4

0

5

25

75

95

100





171


return of internally displacedpersons, a priority for theadministration of President AlvaroUribe, has sometimes taken placedespite the fact that the conditionswhich caused the displacementsremain unchanged. Many returnareas continue to be under thecontrol of at least one irregulararmed group and numerous returnedinternally displaced persons havebeen killed in recent years.

UNHCR established a permanentpresence in Colombia in 1998.Uniquely, the organization’s mandatein the country is concerned with the

protection of internally displacedpeople, as well as with refugees andothers of concern. UNHCR’s workfocuses on capacity-buildingactivities, notably in strengtheningthe protection regime throughdocumentation campaigns, humanrights training, pedagogy projectsand integration initiatives. Ratherthan provide emergency assistancefor internally displaced personsitself, UNHCR reinforces civil societyorganizations that address theseneeds. In particular, NGOs andchurch groups have long played acrucial role in assisting internallydisplaced persons in Colombia.

UNHCR follows a collaborativeresponse to internal displacement bychairing the UN Thematic Group onDisplacement. Partnerships have alsobeen established with ECHO, ICRC,IOM, UNIFEM, several governmentdepartments including the one withresponsibility for assisting theinternally displaced (the SocialSolidarity Network), and numerousNGOs. UNHCR’s overall objective inrelation to internally displacedpersons in Colombia is to promote acomprehensive and coordinatedresponse to the humanitarian crisis.

Many of Colombia's internally displaced people look for anonymity in the country's big cities. Of the 90,000 peopleliving in Comuna 2 in northwest Medellín, up to 15 per cent are estimated to be displaced. (UNHCR/S. Loughna/2005)

0

5

25

75

95

100





in situations below the threshold of armed conflict—and sometimes is denied entryinto conflict areas. UNHCR’s mandate focuses primarily on refugees and restricts itsinvolvement with the internally displaced under criteria which can range from aspecific request from the Secretary-General and the agreement of the state concernedto adequate resources or a ‘link factor’ to refugees.

Given UNHCR’s long experience in protecting uprooted populations (see Box 7.3),on 12 September 2005 the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee assigned it leadresponsibility for the protection of the internally displaced (as well as responsibility forcamp management and emergency shelter). Its enlarged protection role will require itto ensure that joint steps are taken by all agencies in the field to enhance the securityof the displaced. Special partnerships will be needed with the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has largely stayed clear ofoperational engagement with internally displaced persons, and UNICEF, whoseprotection role with internally displaced children could be strengthened. A protectionpolicy paper adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee sets forth in detail theprotection steps international agencies can take.30 Currently under discussion areideas for ‘protection coalitions’, ‘interagency mobile protection advisory teams’ as wellas a ‘protection standby force’.31

UNHCR will also have to navigate a collaborative system that often resistsinvolvement with the security and human rights of internally displaced persons. As theBrookings–OCHA study, Protect or Neglect, found, the majority of RC/HCs, who directthe collaborative response in the field, are reluctant ‘to advocate for the rights of thedisplaced in an effective and assertive manner’.32 Many fear that doing so couldcompromise their relationships with governments, threaten relief programmes or evenlead to their expulsion. Moreover, RC/HCs in many countries report to SpecialRepresentatives of the Secretary-General who often put political concerns overhumanitarian and human rights objectives.33

Despite the obvious limits on the role outsiders can play in providing protection,how the humanitarian community deals with this major gap in the internationalresponse system will in large measure determine whether the collaborative approachwill be successful or whether alternative arrangements will be needed.

The effectiveness of the collaborative approach will also depend on adequateresources. The UN’s Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for emergencies now targetsinternally displaced persons. But the amounts allotted are often insufficient, andwhen it comes to protection and human rights initiatives, woefully inadequate.34

Donors often lavish aid on areas of the world in which they have strategic interests,such as Afghanistan, the Balkans or Iraq, but seriously underfund humanitariancrises, especially in Africa, where the needs of vulnerable populations may be fargreater.35 Calls for international trust funds for emergency action and post-conflictreconstruction continue to be under discussion. In 2005 the World Summit approvedthe expansion of the UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) to enable UNhumanitarian organizations to receive ‘instant’ funds when a new disaster strikes andto inject ‘equity’ into the system.36

172


0

5

25

75

95

100





The role of the military

In her book The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s,Sadako Ogata describes UNHCR’s initial hesitance to accept military cover for itshumanitarian activities and its subsequent recognition of the importance of suchsupport. Without it, UNHCR would not have been able to get supplies to displacedpeople in central Bosnia, undertake the Sarajevo airlift or make airdrops to besiegedtowns and villages.37 Similarly, in Afghanistan in 2001, relief agencies found thatworking with the military benefited displaced populations: the WFP was able toposition millions of metric tons of food in surrounding countries, truck them insideAfghanistan and thereby avert widespread famine. In Liberia in 2003, UN troopshelped UNHCR to relocate thousands of internally displaced persons from publicbuildings in Monrovia to proper camps or settlements.

But humanitarian involvement with the military comes at a price. For the ICRC thecardinal principles of impartiality and neutrality, which aid agencies are bound touphold, are compromised by ‘blending’ humanitarian action with military operations.NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières have pointed out that unless military andhumanitarian action are separate, humanitarian workers can become identified withone side to the conflict, endangering both aid deliveries and humanitarian staff.Reportedly, camps of displaced persons in Macedonia became military targets whenNATO involved itself in setting up tents and providing camp security. In Afghanistan,humanitarian workers were put in danger when Western military forces, wearingcivilian clothes, did humanitarian and development work.

Nonetheless, it has become clear that the complete independence of humanitarianand military action is not possible in most emergencies, and may even prove perilousto the displaced populations the international community is trying to protect. In thewords of Major-General William Nash, a veteran of the Balkan wars, ‘Although thedemand for independent humanitarian action is admirable, more important is aneffective strategy to assist those who are in need’.38 The importance of humanitarian,development and military actors working together has led UN agencies and a numberof NGOs to call for better communication with military actors, including sharing ofinformation and joint planning and strategizing. Currently, the United Nations isstudying how best to organize ‘integrated missions’.39

Since the 1990s, UN Security Council resolutions have called upon peacekeepers toundertake a variety of protection responsibilities for the internally displaced, rangingfrom facilitating the delivery of relief and establishing and maintaining securehumanitarian areas to ensuring protection in camps, monitoring and reporting theconditions of the displaced and enabling their safe return home. Whether in theBalkans, the DRC, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone or Timor Leste,peacekeepers have been specifically charged with providing assistance or protection tointernally displaced persons. Most recently, African Union troops have been called uponto enhance security for internally displaced persons in Darfur, Sudan (see Box 7.2).

173


The role of the military


0

5

25

75

95

100





But the record has been mixed. Whereas peacekeeping forces have generally beeneffective in preventing mass starvation by ensuring delivery and distribution of foodthrough logistical support, they have been less effective when it comes to protectingthe physical security of the internally displaced and other affected populations. Inmost cases, UN forces have not had enough troops to provide adequate protection,clear mandates to allow them to engage in robust action or the necessary training andequipment to do their jobs adequately. The lack of political will in the Security Counciloften contributed to this outcome.

An outstanding exception was Iraq in 1991, where multinational forces succeededin creating a safe haven for internally displaced Kurds under attack in the wake of theGulf War. This refuge existed for more than a decade. But in Bosnia and Herzegovina,the overrunning of the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica in 1995 stands as one of the mostignominious examples of the international failure to provide protection to internallydisplaced persons. So too is what happened in Kibeho, Rwanda that same year, whenUN forces stood by while several thousand internally displaced persons in camps werekilled by the Rwandan army. Worse yet, earlier in this decade UN peacekeepers in theDRC and Sierra Leone were raping and sexually exploiting internally displaced womenand children they were supposed to protect—using humanitarian supplies as bait.

Despite these well-publicized failures, there remain many instances wherepeacekeepers have provided security for displaced populations in internal conflictsituations. East Timor, where a multinational force saved many lives and enabled thereturn of tens of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons, is a goodexample. In Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique and Rwanda, peacekeeping troopseffectively facilitated the return of displaced persons. A 2004 report on the role ofpeacekeepers with internally displaced persons identified impressive ‘best practices’in different countries in protecting the internally displaced.40 In particular, militarytraining has begun to focus on how to protect internally displaced persons, greaterefforts are being made to deploy civilian police, protection mandates have beenstrengthened, and in some instances peacekeepers have taken a bolder approachtoward protecting civilians. The United Nations also has begun to implement its ‘zerotolerance’ policy toward sexual exploitation.

But fundamental problems remain. Most internally displaced persons in need ofprotection are in Africa, yet most of the UN peacekeeping missions deployed there areunderstaffed and without sufficient resources. Even in the DRC, where 16,700 troopsare on the ground, the mission is reported to have insufficient resources to fulfil itsmandate, which includes protecting internally displaced persons in camps. Moreover,developed countries with well-trained, experienced and heavily-armed troops havebeen proving increasingly unwilling to offer their forces or resources to UN operationswhen their national interests are not at stake—currently less than 10 per cent ofpeacekeepers come from Western armies.41 Nor is there agreement among the majorpowers on creating a standing UN force that could be rapidly deployed in emergenciesboth for prevention and protection. Heads of government at the World Summit urgedonly the ‘further development of proposals’ to build up reserves for rapid deployment,

174


0

5

25

75

95

100





although they endorsed a standing police capacity which could prove valuable inprotection.42

Military intervention and humanitarian relief alone, however, are but stopgapmeasures. They can never substitute for the political settlements needed to resolvethe conflicts that produce internal displacement. When peacekeepers andhumanitarian workers are left on the front lines without efforts to resolve theseconflicts, they can even unwittingly prolong them. Therefore, strong leadership isneeded both from UN headquarters and from the international community to manageand mediate disputes and lay the foundation for transitions out of conflict.

The road ahead

Over the past fifteen years, international involvement with internally displaced personshas become an increasingly accepted course of action when governments are unableor unwilling to provide for the welfare and security of their displaced populations. Oneof the reasons for this change has been evolving notions of sovereignty. Although theWorld Summit in September 2005 did not go so far as to affirm automaticinternational protection of populations at risk, it did posit a collective ‘responsibility toprotect’ when civilians are subject to ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity orgenocide.43 This can be built upon to reinforce both national and internationalresponsibility for internally displaced persons.

Similarly, the legal framework contained in the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement has increasingly been guiding governments and internationalorganizations in addressing situations of displacement, influencing how the displacedare perceived and treated at the national and international levels.

Less effective have been the institutional arrangements developed, but here tooprogress is discernible. The UN’s decision to assign responsibilities to specificagencies has the potential to bring predictability and clarity to the internationalresponse system for the displaced. UNHCR’s role in the new division of labour ispivotal because it is focused on protection, the biggest gap in the system. Indeed,UNHCR is at a critical juncture in its 55-year history, having agreed to substantiallyexpand its role to encompass the internally displaced. For the first time since the endof the Second World War, a comprehensive regime is being designed to address theneeds of forced migrants on both sides of the border. As High Commissioner AntónioGuterres put it, the international community has finally awakened to its ‘biggestfailure in terms of humanitarian action’ and decided to act in defence of those who‘have not crossed a frontier’.44

175


The road ahead


0

5

25

75

95

100





Chapter 7

1 See the database of the Global IDP Project of theNorwegian Refugee Council (www.IDPProject.org) andthe World Refugee Survey of the US Committee forRefugees and Immigrants.

2 W. C. Robinson, Risks and Rights: the Causes,Consequences and Challenges of Development-InducedDisplacement, Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement, May 2003.

3 See www.IDPProject.org. The figures are largely‘guesstimates’. They include both people who are in astate of vulnerability and need international attentionand those who may be well integrated, even well-off, intheir countries, but who cannot return to the areas ofthe country from which they originally came and wherethey have property claims. These figures may alsoinclude children and grandchildren of originallydisplaced persons. Criteria for deciding whendisplacement ends are currently being developed by theRepresentative of the Secretary-General on the HumanRights of Internally Displaced Persons in response to arequest from the Emergency Relief Coordinator.

4 J. Borton, M. Buchanan-Smith and R. Otto, Support toInternally Displaced Persons – Learning fromEvaluations, Swedish International DevelopmentCooperation Agency, 2005, pp. 14–15.

5 J-D. Tauxe, ‘We Should Have Humanitarian Access toDisplaced Civilians,’ International Herald Tribune, 1March 2000. For a full discussion of internallydisplaced persons as a special category, see E. Mooney,

‘The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case forInternally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern,’Refugee Survey Quarterly, September 2005.

6 R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight: the GlobalCrisis of Internal Displacement, Brookings Institution,1998, pp. 2, 27.

7 ‘HIV Prevalence among IDPs Stands at 35 Percent’,The Monitor, Africa News, 30 June, 2005.

8 S. B. Holtzman and T. Nezam, Living in Limbo,The World Bank, 2004.

9 R. Cohen and F. M. Deng, Masses in Flight, p. 275.10 D. A. Korn, Exodus within Borders, Brookings

Institution, 1999, p. 49.11 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

Internal Displacement Unit, No Refuge: The Challengeof Internal Displacement, United Nations, 2003,pp. 68–9.

12 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World SummitOutcome Resolution A/RES/60/1, 15 September 2005,para. 139.

13 Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework forNational Responsibility, Brookings Institution–Universityof Bern Project on Internal Displacement, April 2005.

14 Report of the Expert Group Meeting on InternalDisplacement in the Commonwealth: Common Themesand Best Practice Guidelines, CommonwealthSecretariat, 12–21 May 2003.

15 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,No Refuge: The Challenge of Internal Displacement,pp. 64–7.

16 See UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution2003/51, 23 April 2003, and General AssemblyResolution 58/177, 22 December 2003.

17 United Nations, 2005 World Summit OutcomeResolution, para. 132.

18 K. Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,Security and Human Rights for All, United Nations,New York, 2005, para. 210.

19 R. Cohen, ‘The Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement: An innovation in International StandardSetting’, Global Governance, vol. 10, no. 4,October–December 2004, pp. 459–80. For Georgia, seeE. Mooney and B. Jarrah, Internally Displaced Persons’Voting Rights in the OSCE Region, BrookingsInstitution, 2004, pp. 32–41.

20 See R. Cohen, W. Kälin and E. Mooney, The Law of theSouth Caucasus and the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement, American Society of International Lawand Brookings Institution, 2004, and Memorial,Annotations to the Guiding Principles, Moscow, 2005.

21 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Reportof the Representative of the Secretary-General onInternally Displaced Persons, F. M. Deng, UN Doc.E/CN.4/2002/95, 16 January 2002, para. 98.

199

EndnotesEndnotes

0

5

25

75

95

100

12_SWR_05_Endnotes_9.prnC:\Lavori\UNHCR\World’s_Refugees\SWR_05_Endnotes_9.vp10 February 2006 18:17:53l 19 f 26




22 See W. Kälin, ‘How Hard is Soft Law?’ in RecentCommentaries about the Nature and Application of theGuiding Principles on Internal Displacement,Brookings–CUNY Project on Internal Displacement,April 2002.

23 International Symposium on the Mandate of theRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General on InternallyDisplaced Persons: Taking Stock and Charting theFuture, hosted by the governments of Austria andNorway, Brookings Institution–SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement, Vienna, Austria, 12–13 December 2002,pp. 8–ll, 21.

24 United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion andProtection of Human Rights, Principles on Housing andProperty Restitution for Refugees and Displaced People,E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17, 28 June 2005.

25 See United Nations, Commission on Human Rights,Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General onInternally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng, whichreports on the results of four major studies on thecollaborative approach, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/77,4 March 2004, paras. 24–33.

26 R. Holbrooke, ‘Forgotten people: a borderlinedifference’, The Washington Post, 8 May, 2000.

27 S. Martin, Refugee Women, 2nd edition, LexingtonBooks, pp. 154–5.

28 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Implementing theCollaborative Response to Situations of InternalDisplacement: Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/orResident Coordinators and Country Teams, September2004.

29 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,No Refuge, pp. 42–3.

30 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Protection ofInternally Displaced Persons, Policy Paper Series, No. 2,New York, United Nations, 2000.

31 S. Bagshaw and D. Paul, Protect or Neglect: Towards aMore Effective United Nations Approach to theProtection of Internally Displaced Persons, TheBrookings–SAIS Project on Internal Displacement andOffice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, p. 10,www.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/protection_survey.htm.

32 S. Bagshaw and D. Paul, Protect or Neglect, p. 4.33 R. Cohen, ‘UNHCR: Expanding its Role with IDPs’,

Forced Migration Review, Supplement, October 2005,p. 10.

34 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,No Refuge, pp. 65–6, and S. Bagshaw and D. Paul,Protect or Neglect, pp. 75–6.

35 Refugees International, ‘Funding shortfalls plague globalhumanitarian response’, 13 June 2005.

36 J. Egeland, ‘Towards a stronger humanitarian responsesystem’, Forced Migration Review, October 2005, p.5.

37 S. Ogata, The Turbulent Decade: Confronting theRefugee Crises of the 1990s, W.W. Norton & Co.,New York/London, 2005, pp. 50–171.

38 Major-General W. L. Nash (Ret.) at a meeting on‘Independent Humanitarian Action: A Thing of thePast?’ Brookings Institution, 16 April 2004.

39 See for example a recent study commissioned by theUN, prepared by E. B. Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kentand K. von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions:Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, May 2005.

40 See W. G. O’Neill, A New Challenge for Peacekeepers:The Internally Displaced, Brookings–SAIS Project onInternal Displacement, April 2004, pp. 6–7, 8–9,24–39.

41 M. Lacey, ‘UN Forces Using Tougher Tactics to SecurePeace’, New York Times, 23 May 2005.

42 United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome,paras. 92–3.

43 Ibid. para. 139.44 ‘UN refugee boss says world tackling past failures’,

News 1, New Brisbane, Australia, 27 September 2005.

200

EndnotesEndnotes

0

5

25

75

95

100





Internally displaced persons - UNHCR · internally displaced persons. Since the end of the Cold...

Documents

Transcript of Internally displaced persons - UNHCR · internally displaced persons. Since the end of the Cold...